Hannah NEUMANN

Policy topics Hannah NEUMANN is active on

What Hannah NEUMANN has said (37)

• 2026-07-13 “(15:45:27 - 15:48:40): Thank you, chair, and, thank you, minister, for being here. I would like to raise the issues, but that they are closely interconnected. 1st of all, this parliament, 8 weeks ago passed a very strong, report to stop and prevent transnational repression inside the European Union with cross party support. We see that a lot of regimes, Russia, Iran, China, but many more also Turkey, Egypt, Vietnam, extend the repression against opposition from inside their countries also to the European Union in a very brutal way. This is a growing threat. These regimes are cooperating. But within the European Union, the member states are not yet cooperating very well to find a good response to this threat to European citizens and people living in Europe. This report lines out a few things that need to be done very soon. So best, under your council presidency, 1st of all, finding a joint definition for transnational repression. We're suggesting 1 in the report, starting data gathering on cases of transnational repression, but also exchange best practices amongst member states, especially those that are in the lead. I think Ireland is best placed to deal with this issue because you have a strong and a long history of supporting human rights defenders and people seeking refuge here in the European Union And because a close cooperation with The UK would be needed to work on this issue, they are really leading and far ahead of the European Union. And it will be crucial, and this is a very small step, but with a big impact to address the issue also by name in the European security strategy that is at the moment being drafted, and that will be, I guess, published in the course of your presidency. To give you 1 concrete example also for problem where our system has loopholes that enable transnational repression. The commission last month had talks with the Taliban on sending, people back to to Afghanistan. What we have seen in Germany is that the Taliban ask in return for access to consulates. These consulates are the places where the addresses are of all the Afghans that fled the Taliban to Europe. So, basically, the Germans have been handing over the addresses of all the Taliban enemies to the Taliban. And, I mean, we can just do a easy math on what the Taliban will do with that. So this is how we enable and support transnational oppression at the moment in the European Union and account on your presidency, 1st of all, to find all these loopholes and close them, but also to stop this nightmare of talks with the Taliban when return they will ask for access to consulates. And the last point is the issue of spyware. We had a very good debate in the plenary on spyware abuse because 1 of our fellow colleagues, Stelios Kologlu, was spied upon while working on spyware abuse in this house. 1 colleague of you, I think, made very strong remarks on how to fix this. This parliament 3 years ago wrote down how we can deal with the issue of spyware abuse. Member states came back to us saying, but this is national security, so the EU shouldn't do it. Member states should do it. Well, then maybe it's on the council now to implement these things. Thank you.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• 2026-06-23 “(09:36:37 – 09:39:25): Sorry, I didn't hear that. Yes. Good morning. Welcome, Commissioner. Thanks for being here today. I I have a question on attacks on democracy through terrorist attacks, in particular, election periods. I'm from Germany. And during the past federal election campaign, we saw a number of smaller but horrific terrorist attacks, 1 almost every 2 weeks in Germany, which ended miraculously and, after the elections. And there there is a term among experts that's called stochastic terrorism. It basically means, that we see increasingly individual perpetrators who are not structurally affiliated with a terrorist organization, but who get targeted online. So the very vulnerable people, few social tides, maybe some mental derangement already that that, you know, the algorithms, and the social networks are able to pick up. And then these individuals are targeted with very radicalizing content and at a certain point even with instructions on how to commit these attacks. Are you investigating this phenomenon? Is that something that's that's on your mind? You're discussing an expert groups that Europol is working on that member states are discussing because this is what we are increasingly seeing, not this traditional affiliation with a terrorist organization, but really very isolated individuals, but who are very easy to target. Are you discussing this with DG Connect? Because in the Digital Services Act, we have a very specific ban on having health data, like people who are particularly anxious or depressed political affiliation religious data in the data profiles of the social network, the social media companies, but I don't think they comply with this ban. Is this something you discussed with DG Connect on how to enforce? Are you discussing how algorithms radicalize potential terrorists? It's my main question. And 2nd 1 on Russian intervention, especially sabotage, physical interference. This is also something we are perceiving increasingly in Germany, but also in other countries. And I have a feeling that the security forces keep this very secret. You read some article with a lot of, you know, might be, could, should, on online, and then that's basically it. And when you talk to investigators, they say, yes, we do have the data, but it never comes out. Is that something you also discuss? Because in that case, the purpose of the Russian interference is achieved because there is this feeling in the public that there's something wrong. It might be attributed to parties who have nothing to do with it. So would it help to discuss this more to bring this more out in the open? Thank you.”
  Privacy & law enforcement
• 2026-06-23 “(09:50:45 – 09:53:15): Yeah. But but it it is it is something where where, as I said, where the lines are are blurring and where we need you mentioned the platforms, where we need the platforms, of course, to cooperate. And the EU Internet Forum is exactly that, that we are putting pressure on the platforms, on the social media companies to to comply on the 1 hand, but also to to cooperate on on the the other hands. And also when it comes to state actors, because you were mentioning that as well, state actors more and more use organized crime to infiltrate, the society. And that that's what what it is actually about, and it's what what we also focus on our Europol, reform and the new the new mandate there. And then you were mentioning also the sabotage from the Russian side. In the end, whether we discuss it with the Member States, the clear answer is yes, of course. And you are right. We are not always very clear because it is not clear. And you have to be, in a way, in that respect, I think you have to be 100% clear that the reason behind this attack is actually Russian interference. And it's not always 100% clear. Sometimes, it's 80% clear and the intelligence services from the member states mainly think it is. And that's why you can't say precisely, yes, it's 100% Russian interference. Sometimes you can. We know that from the shadow fleet. We know that from the cable the cables in the Baltic Seas, we know that, that was Russian interference if you can prove it. Sometimes you can prove it to 80%, but not to 100%. And that's why some member states and also on the European level, are a bit reluctant to say it's 100% Russian interference. But do we discuss it with the member states? Of course. Every day, these hybrid threats, especially on the there's just, last week, I think that, there was a ministerial meeting on that topic on the the hybrid, the hybrid attacks in the North Of Germany that was in the Baltic, it's called the Baltic 6, where Germany also takes part in a way because it's on that border. Yes, the Muslim Brotherhood, the last question.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2026-06-16 “(10:40:49 – 10:42:07): Sometimes honesty is the only way out, dear colleagues, so let's be honest. With Iran, there is a deal that they will start negotiating a deal. The Strait Of Hormuz, which was opened before the war, might reopen. In return, the Iranian regime gets sanctions relief and access to frozen assets while they continue to kill their own people. In Gaza, we have a ceasefire that is no ceasefire. In the West Bank, violent settlers are burning down what remains of the possibility of a 2 state solution. Beirut is being bombed. This is the madness you get when no 1 cares about international law anymore, and civilians pay the price in Gaza, Israel, Lebanon, and beyond. And Europe remains painfully divided. Defending international law as we always have, that was Germany's bid during its campaign for the Security Council. No surprise it failed. But why not prove it now, at least in the European Council Chancellor Merits, by applying international law consistently, sanction Ben Gurion smudderage, stop violent settlers from profiting from privileged access to the European market, and keep the sanctions on Iran for as long as this brutal regime remains in power. International law was not written for times of harmony. It was written precisely for moments like this.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-03-11 “E-001020/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In January 2026, while brutally repressing peaceful protests, the Iranian authorities had implemented a large‑scale internet shutdown following a well-known pattern observed during the periods of unrest, that became even tighter, without precedents in terms of breadth and duration, since the beginning of the conflict with US and Israel. In parallel, the so-called ‘antiespionage law’ expanded Iranian authorities’ control over social media and online activity with harsh penalties for censorship circumvention. The EU’s response has been strong, both in statements denouncing the situation and in concrete acts. In her statement on behalf of the EU condemning the crackdown, the High Representative/Vice-President also called ‘for ensuring the right of access to information, including by restoring access to the internet for all’. In March 2026, the Council adopted restrictive measures targeting among others the head of Tehran’s cyber police, which plays a key role in filtering the internet, censorship, controlling the social media content and unjustly prosecuting citizens. The EU’s commitment extends to multilateral fora: At the Human Rights Council session on 16 March 2026, the EU reiterated its call for Iranian authorities to restore all communications, including full access to the internet, and to ensure the right of free access to information for all. The EU recognizes the internet access needs of Iranian citizens and the sensitivities involved, especially in light of the ‘anti-espionage law’, which increased Iranian authorities' control over social media and online activity and imposed severe penalties for censorship circumvention. The EU will therefore consider options that prioritize the safety of beneficiaries and partners.”
  EU-Iran relations · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-03-04 “P-000886/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The most recent analysis of EU collaborative procurement (2024-2025) 1 performed by the European Defence Agency, stated that ‘only 12 out of 27 Member States reported their EU collaborative equipment procurement data, making it impossible at present to provide a comprehensive analysis of EU collaborative defence equipment procurement and to adequately assess the state of the EU defence landscape in this area’. Currently, around 40% of defence expenditure by Member States is directed at the US Foreign Military Sales Mechanism, while less than 50% of defence procurement is sourced in the EU 2 . Several EU initiatives support collaborative procurement. The European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act 3 allocated EUR 300 million to offset the costs of cooperation, leveraging more than EUR 11 billion of collaborative purchases. The Security Action for Europe 4 instrument is designed to foster collaborative procurement, while the European Defence Industry Programme 5 supports actions on common procurement. Both instruments are in early days of their implementation and do not allow measuring their impact on the collaborative procurement. The Defence Readiness Omnibus proposal 6 aims at, inter alia, facilitating common procurement by simplifying procedures. Member States’ report on their exports of military equipment which includes data on intra-EU transfers. The Commission will present in 2026 a report evaluating the impact of Directive 2009/43/EC 7 . 1 https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/2025-eda_defencedata_web.pdf. 2 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/2026-european-macroeconomic-report_en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 5 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2643/oj. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0823. 7 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/43/oj.”
  Defence spending
• 2026-01-21 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 19.3.2026 Written question By the regulatory deadline of 30 November 2025, 19 Member States submitted their national defence investment plans under the Security Action for Europe Regulation (SAFE) [1] . These plans collectively account for nearly two years of defence equipment procurement for the EU-27 [2] , demonstrating a commitment to scaling up European defence readiness. Regarding the product categories, the submitted plans are comprehensive and cover all capability categories set out in Article 1 of the SAFE Regulation, which reflect the priority areas identified by the European Council. While the detailed breakdown of each activity remains sensitive due to the nature of the national defence data involved, the Commission can confirm that the requested funding involves both Category C and Category C products. In line with the EU's commitment to Ukraine's security, support to Ukraine is a core feature of SAFE. The vast majority of the submitted national plans include procurement activities involving in different manners Ukraine. On procurement structures, SAFE incentivizes cooperation. To date, there is a pre-dominance of cooperative procurement, which represents more than 65% of the total planned activities, amounting to approximately EUR 98 billion. It is worth mentioning that current single procurement projects include provisions to extend the benefit of the contract to additional SAFE eligible partners. The Commission is currently finalising its assessment of the remaining plans. A comprehensive report, which will provide additional detailed information on the implementation of SAFE and the specific breakdown of activities, is scheduled to be presented to the European Parliament in May 2026. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. [2] https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/2025-eda_defencedata_web.pdf.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2025-05-23 “E-002087/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 1. Industry inputs and Commission responses: the Strategic Dialogue with the European Defence Industry 1 aimed to address key objectives such as ensuring long-term visibility on defence procurement plans, simplifying regulatory frameworks, securing access to critical raw materials and components, enhancing financing options for defence enterprises, and tackling talent shortages. Industry representatives expressed the need for increased defence spending, a more integrated European defence market, regulatory simplification, and improved access to finance. There were also calls for supporting innovation and easing export controls. Inputs provided by the industry and by the trade unions have been taken into consideration for relevant initiatives, such as the Defence Readiness Omnibus 2 . 2. Selection of participants: The dialogue included 15 companies, two trade unions, and one defence industry association. Participants were selected based on geographical representation, company size, and their involvement in priority capability domains as outlined in the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 3 . This ensured a comprehensive inclusion of both large contractors and small and medium-sized enterprises in strategic discussions. 3. Future dialogues and transparency: although future Strategic Dialogues with the defence industry are not planned at this stage, the Commission is committed to continue ensuring diverse representation from across Europe in any future engagements, maintaining the relevance and focus of discussions. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/read_25_1181. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/defence-readiness-omnibus_en#relevant-links. 3 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/introducing-white-paper-european-defenceand-rearm-europe-plan-readiness-2030_en.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2025-04-08 “E-001431/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Fundamental Rights Agency regularly monitors the state of civic space in the EU, noting that negative media reports and campaigns, online threats and harassment are the most prevalent threats experienced by civil society organisations and human rights defenders 1 . The EU has built a comprehensive legal framework protecting fundamental rights when digital technologies are used. Recently, the Directive (UE) 2024/1385 on violence against women 2 has defined digital offences, such as cyber harassment and cyber incitement to hatred or violence. It provides for specific aggravating circumstances when such crimes are committed against a person because that person is a journalist or a human rights defender. On 8 August 2025, Article 4(3-9) of the European Media Freedom Act 3 will become applicable, protecting journalistic sources and confidential communications, to ensure free and independent media across the EU and to protect them against interference. Under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme 4 , the Commission also supports the protection of civil society organisations (CSOs) and human rights defenders, including in the digital sphere. The 2024 Call for proposals for CSOs protecting and promoting EU values 5 had a specific focus on supporting CSOs monitor and react to threats and attacks, including through capacity-building activities to develop resilience, with a total budget call of EUR 74.5 million. The Commission intends to step up its engagement with and protection of CSOs and human rights defenders and plans to present an EU Civil Society Strategy in 2025 6 . 1 https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2023/civic-space-2023-update?page=4&pid=45d38e5f-4198-4eee-be43ca1dd0d1e8e8#read-online. 2 Directive (EU) 2024/1385 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on combating violence against women and domestic violence, OJ L, 2024/1385, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1385/oj. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act), OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj. 4 More information about the Programme can be found on the Commission’s Funding & Tenders Portal: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/programmes/cerv. 5 https://www.eacea.ec.europa.eu/system/files/202312/CERV%20INFO%20DAY%20VALUES%20CALL%202024.pdf. 6 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategy-documents/commission-workprogramme/commission-work-programme-2025_en.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-04-02 “E-001364/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is in the process of reviewing the Cybersecurity Act (Regulation (EU) 2019/881 1 ). To support this review and gather views of interested stakeholders, on 11 April 2025, the Commission opened a call for evidence and a public consultation, available on the Have Your Say portal 2, , both open until 20 June 2025. The Commission aims to publish an evaluation of the Cybersecurity Act, as well as an impact assessment and a proposal for a revised Cybersecurity Act, in 2025, as announced in the ProtectEU Strategy 3 . In the review process, the Commission is taking into account the current cybersecurity threats landscape. The Commission is assessing the need to amend the mandate of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and its role in the cybersecurity ecosystem, to ensure it is fit for purpose. The Commission is also assessing the European cybersecurity certification framework (ECCF) and considering the options that would contribute to a better integration of the EU cybersecurity market and improve efficiency of the ECCF, including addressing information and communications technology (ICT) supply chain security challenges. The Commission is also looking at simplification possibilities, in particular as regards reporting obligations. Setting out and implementing a robust cybersecurity framework is imperative to ensure economic stability, cyber resilience and security of critical infrastructures. The Commission refers the Honourable Member to the 2024 State of the Digital Decade package 4 and the Seventh Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Security Union Strategy 5 , which outline the progress in implementing cybersecurity policies in the internal market. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/881/oj/eng. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14578-The-EU-Cybersecurity-Act_en. 3 COM(2025) 148. 4 2024 State of the Digital Decade package https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/2024-state-digitaldecade-package. 5 COM(2024) 198.”
  Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
• 2025-03-31 “E-001318/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is following very closely the investigations that are ongoing at national level in a number of Member States in relation to increased hybrid activities of Iranian state bodies on European soil. Investigations on hybrid threats remain a national prerogative of Member States. The EU bases its positions and actions on the outcomes of investigations and legal proceedings conducted by the competent national authorities, which establish facts, responsibilities and the level of threat in line with the legal and law enforcement order at national level. The EU has a comprehensive policy approach towards Iran and will continue to use all tools at its disposal to address all issues of concern with Iran, including in relation to hybrid threats.”
  EU-Iran relations · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-03-19 “E-001170/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission actively monitors the implementation of the Visa Code 1 by Member States. The main tool for this purpose is the Schengen evaluation mechanism, which is complementary to national monitoring mechanisms set out by Member States. No specific Schengen evaluation has taken place in the consulates of Member States in Iran since international travel restarted post-COVID. The Visa Code requires Member States to conduct thorough security checks before issuing visas. The Commission encourages Member States to conduct particularly thorough assessments of visa applications that involve individuals linked to regimes under EU sanctions. The operational responsibility for visa issuance lies with Member States. Member States and their national competent authorities are responsible for the implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions. The Commission, as guardian of the treaties, monitors and supports the Member States to ensure a uniform implementation of EU sanctions, however, it is not competent to handle individual cases. The EU has a comprehensive policy approach towards Iran and will continue to use all tools at its disposal to address all issues of concern with Iran. 1 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p. 1–58, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/810/oj.”
  Foreign interference in Europe · EU-Iran relations
• 2025-02-19 “P-000765/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The implementation of the EU environmental legislation is primarily the responsibility of the national authorities, which should ensure that permits for projects are fully compliant with EU law. According to the available information, on 31 January 2025 the General-Director of Environmental Protection (GDEP) issued a decision 1 amending the decision 2 of the Regional Director of Environmental Protection (RDEP) in Szczecin setting the environmental conditions for development of the container terminal in the port of Świnoujście. The decision of the GDEP sets, among others, further environmental obligations for the project. According to the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report 3 and additional clarifications provided to the Commission by the Polish authorities before the Commission issued its opinion pursuant to Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive 4 , possible impacts of the project were analysed also in relation to the marine Natura 2000 sites 5 . It was concluded, however, that the project would have significant negative effects only on the terrestrial habitat types within the site PLH320019 Wolin i Uznam. Based on provided evidence the Commission had no reasons to question the findings of the authorities. According to information provided by the authorities the construction of the waterway is a separate project as it will serve not only the new container terminal but all ports in the Świnoujście area. According to the authorities 6 , the project will be subject to an EIA including on the Natura 2000 sites. The Commission has published guidance documents 7 , which may be used by the national authorities to ensure application of the Habitats 8 and EIA Directives 9 in conformity with the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU. 1 D00Ś-WDŚIII.420.2.2023.AL.34. 2 W0NS-0Ś.420.29.2020.KK.46. 3 Developed pursuant to Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1–21. 4 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7. 5 PLH990002 and PLB990003. 6 https://www.gov.pl/web/infrastruktura/jest-umowa-na-studium-wykonalnosci-nowego-toru-podejsciowego-doportu-w-swinoujsciu 7 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/nature-and-biodiversity/natura-2000/permitting-procedure_en https://environment.ec.europa.eu/law-and-governance/environmental-assessments/environmental-impactassessment_en#law 8 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50. 9 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1–21, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014, OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1–18.”
  EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects · Nature protection and restoration in the EU
• 2025-01-20 “E-000208/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has always been very clear on Iran’s unacceptable military support to Russia and has repeatedly called on Iran to immediately cease any direct or indirect assistance to Russia, which constitutes a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter 1 . The Russia-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership signals that the two countries intend to work even closer together in many areas. The EU will monitor very closely the implications of this agreement, as well as its potential impact on EU security and the rules-based international system and will react resolutely if needed. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf”
  EU-Iran relations · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “Minister. Commissioner. Dear colleagues. The Iranian regime fuels terror at home and abroad, through executions, through proxies, through a nuclear program built for impunity. Hamas, one of its proxies, committed the horrific October 7th attacks. Netanyahu's government responded with brutal force in Gaza, blocking humanitarian aid, expanding illegal settlements in the West Bank. But what did Netanyahu's and Trump's bombs achieve? The centrifuges will spin again. The hate has deepened. This is not good versus evil. It is a tragedy of leaders abusing power and of people caught in between. Because Israel is also the protesters in the streets. Palestine is also the civilians trapped between occupation and Hamas. Iran is also the women who burn their jobs and whisper azadi. These people are not collateral to geopolitics. They are the path to peace. And if we center our foreign policy on them, on human dignity and international law, we can support their call for a lasting peace rooted in freedom for everyone. And because I was somehow just awarded 30s. Allow me to raise my frustration with the fact that Kaya is not here today to discuss this crucial topic for us here in the European Union and for the future of the region. And I would hope that she could be here with us a bit more often. Thank you.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Dear colleagues, everyone says Europe needs to become more independent in defense, and I agree. For years now, we have been putting forward concrete ideas at the European level on how to get there. Like these reports that show, for example, how flagship projects can strengthen European security by building a European drone defence, by reinforcing the eastern border, by developing European air defence capabilities. All these are good proposals. And at a time when Trump is firing more missiles in the Middle East than he has delivered to Ukraine, flirting once again with Russian oil and threatening to throw Ukraine under the bus. Europe must move forward together many times in this House. We have set the direction only to be faced with hesitation from member states or ignorance, as their absence today shows. So if capitals continue to say that Europe does not deliver, let me be clear we do. You only need to walk your talk. And please hurry up.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Dear colleagues, spyware abuse is a massive threat to our fundamental rights. It corrodes democracy from within. We all know it. Yet member States again and again say they need it for national security. Well, fine. Then let's talk national security, because spyware companies claim they make us safer, while evidence proves the opposite. The exploits they use are later on picked up by Russia and others used against us. The highest number of targets are lawmakers, military officials, even governments. The odds are high that people in this very room are infected right now. This is absurd. Dear colleagues, given the security threats Europe is already facing and AI is just turbocharging this danger, combining, analyzing, exploiting data at a scale we've never seen. If we don't act now, the problem will be 100 times worse in a year's time. And we know how to stop this. We spelled it out in the Pegasus report two years ago to the council. Get your act together and fix this before it's too late. Too late? You're in Poland before all should know this.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• “I mean, how credible are we when we decry the Taliban's gender apartheid, on the one hand, and then quietly pursue deportations or technical contacts on the other, only for our short sighted political priorities? I would say if the world could outlaw racial apartheid in the 1970s, it can and must outlaw gender apartheid today. It's about accountability, the backbone of international law. One expert mentioned it the Crimes Against Humanity treaty, now under negotiations at the UN, is our once in a generation chance to close this gap in international law. And either we seize it now or we abandon Afghan and Iranian women and countless more women to silence UN experts. Leading human rights organizations, such as the ones who were speaking here today, have warned that without such recognition, international will remain blind to the most systematic form of gender persecution of our time. And I really think, and here I join the call of my colleague, that Europe, and especially this Parliament, should not just support that call, we should lead it. And let's use also this session to think about how we can maybe have a resolution encouraging all European Union institutions and the member states to really lead the work that is currently going on at UN level, to make sure that gender apartheid becomes part of these conventions. Thank you.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• “Have you guys done with the shouting? Thank you. Dear colleagues, the people in Iran did not choose this war. The regime did. Yet they are the ones paying the highest price. Trapped between missiles from above and repression from within. Trump and Netanyahu are gambling with the lives of 90 million Iranians and with the future of an entire region. How are we supposed to endorse a war when the goal is unclear and the strategy changes by the hour? A war in which desalination plants and historical sites are considered legitimate targets. A war in which the death of 150 schoolchildren is not even worth an apology. The Islamic regime chose this war, and the regime should be its sole target. This regime will fall. It is politically, economically and morally morally bankrupt. The only question is when and how many will it drag into the abyss before it does in Iran and across the region? So to those still supporting this machinery of repression and death, choose Iran over ideology, defect and end this madness. Dear colleagues, this is not our war, but its consequences are already ours to deal with. So Europe must engage in close coordination with partners in the Gulf, in support of Iranian civil society and the diaspora to stop escalation and prepare for a day after our union was built on the ashes of the most brutal war in human history. It is proof that freedom and peace are possible. The people in the region deserve nothing less. For freedom. Azadi.”
  EU-Iran relations
• “35:16 – 15:37:36): Thank you Chair. And I will actually speak on the work program first, the Middle East strategy. In the shadows of the current escalation in the Middle East, we see that the situation, especially regarding Palestine, is not improving since the ceasefire from October 2023. Six hundred sixty-three civilians have been killed in Gaza. We see the expansion of settlements and also the killing of civilians including children just last weekend. But we also see that Hamas is actually not being disarmed. So I'm wondering what is the EU strategy? How will it be reflected in the Middle East strategy, also given that the approaches of Trump and his likes in his board of peace are clearly not moving ahead?”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Dear colleagues. Europe needs to spend more on defence. And we commission. Council and this House need to make sure that more spending actually leads to more security. Security for European citizens and for Ukrainians, and not to higher profits for the defence industry. Let me be clear. We Greens are ready to support the defence industry where it matters access to finance and raw materials, securing supply chains, less bureaucratic hurdles, more skilled workers. But this isn't a one way street, and I expect you and the Commission and the Council to make this very clear in the strategic Dialogue that you are going to have with the defence industry. All this extra money must result in extra security and not in extra shareholder returns. And if there will be no serious answer, no fair contribution from industry, then yes, expect our calls for an excess profit tax to grow only louder in this House across party lines, as it does in the UK already.”
  Defence spending
• “Dear colleagues, everyone says Europe needs to become more independent in defense, and I agree. For years now, we have been putting forward concrete ideas at the European level on how to get there. Like these reports that show, for example, how flagship projects can strengthen European security by building a European drone defence, by reinforcing the eastern border, by developing European air defence capabilities. All these are good proposals. And at a time when Trump is firing more missiles in the Middle East than he has delivered to Ukraine, flirting once again with Russian oil and threatening to throw Ukraine under the bus. Europe must move forward together many times in this House. We have set the direction only to be faced with hesitation for member states or ignorance, as their absence today shows. So if capitals continue to say that Europe does not deliver, let me be clear we do. You only need to walk your talk. And please hurry up.”
  EU competences on defence
• “We have always had victims in this committee for reasons that I don't understand. They can't be present on the stage. We have to accept that apparently these are the new majorities in this House. But that's why I decided that, at least in terms of pictures, they can be with us today.”
  EU engagement with civil society
• “Thank you, Chair, and thank you, dear colleagues. I'm especially grateful that so many are here discussing the outlook of this report even beyond shadows and I'm looking forward to very constructive negotiations and also to amendments from your end on what you already hinted to: concrete proposals on how we can improve things through coordination but also other ways and means. And I encourage you to look into your different national context as well because responses are very different between member states. Some are starting to work on the prod, on the issues, others so far haven't worked on it at all. Some have very good experiences, some such as the case of Austria we also see loopholes in the system. I mean, you know, I have issues with the Iranians when I'm in Vienna. The Iranians can spy on me legally, so that's the situation that we have at the moment and I think these are exactly these loopholes that we need to find ways and means to close. And I'm also looking forward to all of us having a joint understanding of what transnational repression is at the end of this process. Thank you very much. ***Recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on promoting transnational governance on water in the interests of conflict prevention and peace”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Thank you. Chair. Um, and first of all, thank you to the speakers that we had today that looked at the issue from very different perspectives, from the legal one, as well as having experienced these forms of discrimination. I think in this House, we are all painfully aware of what it means to be a woman in Iran or Afghanistan jailed for how you dress. Expelled from school. The moment you turn 12. Banned from working to feed your family. Denied custody of your own children. Your testimony in front of the court was only half to that of men. If it's taken into account at all and all of this simply because of your gender. Because you are a woman. This is not a series of isolated abuses. Let's be very clear. This is a deliberate system of domination. Racial apartheid once denied the humanity of people in South Africa with laws that segregated, humiliated, and erased people only because of their race. And today, in Iran or Afghanistan, women and girls are denied their humanity only because of their gender. They are being segregated, humiliated and erased. And if the international community fails to hold these regimes accountable. Others will follow. Others will feel emboldened to do exactly the same thing. And it is at the same time important that we also confront our own contradictions here in Europe. You mentioned one example.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• “Dear colleagues, we all have a right to hope. But we also have the duty to face reality and to act accordingly. There is a ceasefire in Gaza on paper, but for Palestinians, little has changed. Airstrikes continue. The Israeli government severely limits humanitarian aid. Children sleep in rain soaked blankets. Cold, fragile. Hungry. And while the world focuses on Gaza, violence by the Israeli military and settlers is escalating in the West Bank with complete impunity. People are shot while harvesting olives. Just last month, the Israeli military shut down the last Palestinian seed bank after they had destroyed its seed production facility in Hebron. This summer, seeds are not terrorists. This is not about Israel's security. This is an attack on Palestinian food sovereignty and its systemic good roads for Israelis only, broken roads and endless checkpoints for Palestinians on their own land. One set of laws for Palestinians, another one for Israelis. An Israeli child throwing a stone might get an angry look at worst, while a Palestinian child can be shot dead or held for years in administrative detention without due process. All of this is meant to send a chilling message you have no future here. Yes, we may have grown used to this reality. Dear colleagues, but we should never accept it. And that is why I urge the Commission and Member States to finally implement the measures announced in the state of the Union. Suspend the Association agreement. At least its trade provisions. Impose targeted sanctions on ministers, on settler organisations and their donors, and finally, protect those who uphold international law by activating the blocking statute to defend the International Criminal Court. I was in Palestine with six colleagues last week. I encourage all of you to go and see for yourselves, because if we allow one terror to justify another terror, only terror will.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Thank you, Chair, and thank you, dear colleagues. I'm especially grateful that so many are here discussing the outlook of this report even beyond shadows and I'm looking forward to very constructive negotiations and also to amendments from your end on what you already hinted to: concrete proposals on how we can improve things through coordination but also other ways and means. And I encourage you to look into your different national context as well because responses are very different between member states. Some are starting to work on the prod, on the issues, others so far haven't worked on it at all. Some have very good experiences, some such as the case of Austria we also see loopholes in the system. I mean, you know, I have issues with the Iranians when I'm in Vienna. The Iranians can spy on me legally, so that's the situation that we have at the moment and I think these are exactly these loopholes that we need to find ways and means to close. And I'm also looking forward to all of us having a joint understanding of what transnational repression is at the end of this process. Thank you very much. ***Recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on promoting transnational governance on water in the interests of conflict prevention and peace”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Obey or we make your life miserable. Resist and we break. You flee and we find you even in Europe. Speak up and we come after your family. This is how the Iranian regime has ruled for decades, and now they are expanding this model from holding their own people hostage to holding the world hostage in the Strait of Hormuz. You sanction us, we close the strait. You want negotiations, we make you wait, you resist. We create an economic crisis. Pure blackmail. And if they get away with this, dear colleagues, others will follow. This is not only about Iran. It is about freedom of navigation and weather. Blackmail wins. And this is why Europe needs to get engaged. For a reliable solution for freedom of navigation against blackmail on the international stage. Trump is not going to get this done, but also against blackmail in Iran. Because while we debate geopolitics here. Millions of Iranians live a different reality. More brutality, more executions. More censorship. And yet some in Europe speak of sanctions relief in return for opening the Strait of Hormuz, which would give the very wrong signal that blackmail works and that Europe turns a blind eye on repression. Dear colleagues, these sanctions were imposed for massive human rights violations, and they must remain until these violations stop. So no handshake, no deal, no lifting of sanctions. As long as people are silenced, executions continue and political prisoners remain behind bars. This is what Europe must bring to the negotiation table. Boroya Azadi.”
  EU-Iran relations
• “Thank you. And first of all, I would like to thank actually WhatsApp for their work to secure communication and pick up some fights with the big ones and as always and others towards this end. And I would like to applaud the chair for the sequencing of this meeting, because it kind of brutally exposes the gap between the abuse of spyware and the security threat resulting from it, as well as the, well, still blatant inaction of the commission to do something about it. Um, in this regard, my questions go to the commission first. One, you mentioned the Media Freedom Act, which will go into place in in August. This only covers journalists. So what is with the rest of the people that are illegally spied upon? Priests, politicians, lawyers? Um, second question, you mentioned data protection, but where is the use if it's not being enforced against member states? I'm wondering why did the commission so far not send a letter to the Italian authorities to inquire about the spyware abuse? Or did you? And then lastly, I mean, because of the work that we did in the committee, we all know for at least two years now how dangerous spyware abuse is. We know what to do about it. It has all been written down in our recommendations, but so far on the commission side, nothing happened. You had two years to think about it. So I'm wondering for the four years to come, which of the recommendations of the Spyware Committee do you intend to implement and when?”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• “Dear colleagues. We are no longer at peace and Putin moves us closer to war. Week after week, drones shut down our airports, Russian fighter jets cross our skies, disinformation divides our societies and the US a shaky ally at best. This challenge is far too big for any member state to face alone. And whenever national governments feel overwhelmed, they call on the EU to fix the problem. Strategic autonomy. European sovereignty a true defence union. The speeches of heads of states are grand. The actions not so much. Transfer the necessary powers to the EU or provide the budget we need. Sure. No. But when Europe then can't perform miracles with this non support, the same capitals are the first ones to point the fingers. Dear colleagues in the council, we don't have time for these games anymore. Together we are 500 million people with one of the world's strongest economies. Either we defend every inch of the European project together or there will be no more European project. And when that happens, by the way, your handy European scapegoat will be gone as well.”
  EU competences on defence
• “53:38 – 15:59:10): Dear colleagues, dear Chair, transnational repression sounds like quite a technocratic term, but it is oppression. As the Chair said, it is when repressive regimes such as China, Russia, Iran, Rwanda, Eritrea, Egypt, Turkey, Venezuela—we are right now counting about forty of those repressive regimes—when these regimes do not stop at harassing, imprisoning, killing opposition in their own countries but they start doing the very same thing here in Europe to silence dissent. They target dissidents, journalists, activists, human rights defenders, academics, diaspora communities, and also everyone else who supports them. They use a broader and ever-growing range of tactics from physical intimidation and attacks to abuse of legal, financial, administrative tools to digital attacks, cyber attacks, and coercion by proxies, especially going after family members in the home countries. They use loopholes in our systems and they work with organized crime. Transnational repression has become one of the most serious and under-addressed threats to our democracies and the people living in Europe, to human rights but also to European sovereignty and security. In recent years, and for those who oppose these brutal regimes, the message is sadly very clear: at the moment, they are nowhere safe. Let me be very clear, dear colleagues, when foreign regimes silence voices inside Europe, they are targeting individuals but they are also targeting our democracy, our freedom, and our security. At the moment, they are mocking us, they are mocking our security services, and far too often they get away with it because right now our response frameworks are not fit for purpose. And that is what we intend to change with this report. First, we in Europe have at the moment no clue how big the problem really is. Transnational repression is significantly underreported. That's why we underestimate the scale and the scope of it. Two, the little response we have is scattered. National approaches alone are doomed to fail because perpetrators of transnational oppression do not care about borders and they cooperate with each other. So should we, to stop them from exporting loopholes in our laws and gaps between member states and also on the EU level. Same as on national levels, the responsibility for transnational oppression is not clear. It sits somewhere between DG HOME, DG JUST, EAS, the digital, and no one really feels in charge. Number three, we do not yet dare to stand up to the perpetrators and work with communities to protect victims well enough. With this report, I—and I assume we—try to respond to these challenges with recommendations for a coherent victim-centered EU strategy to address transnational oppression based also on previous international efforts of the G7, the OHCHR, the Council of Europe, and others by doing the following: One, establishing a common EU definition for transnational oppression because we cannot address what we do not clearly define. By demanding reliable data gathering on the scale and scope of transnational repression in Europe and worldwide. By strengthening protection and support for victims including legal assistance, prevention, and psychosocial care. Victims must be at the center of our response. By preventing and responding to specific tactics including physical attacks, digital abuse, and proxy-based threats. By addressing the structures that enable transnational oppression in Europe including vulnerabilities in our own systems. By cutting financial flows and dismantling the environments that allow organized crime to operate because perpetrators often use proxies such as criminal networks, agents, and intermediaries. By strengthening deterrence and accountability, ensuring that perpetrators finally face consequences. By positioning the European Union as a global leader in countering transnational oppression. And by encouraging subsequent Council presidencies to pick up from us and ensure consistent implementation of these concepts across DGs but also in the member states. This report, dear colleagues, builds on a DROI report but it is the first in the European Parliament to address this complex issue in all its forms and implications. The draft you currently see is only the beginning. It outlines the structure for the report but I will also table many additions to this draft report myself. This report is an opportunity for the European Parliament to adopt a blueprint for Commission, EAS, member states, others to finally find effective solutions to the growing threat of transnational oppression. Dear colleagues, let us together make sure that people who at the moment feel nowhere safe will finally be safe here in Europe. Now, in this spirit, I'm looking forward to your amendments, to constructive cooperation in the negotiations on this important and timely file. And I would also like to sincerely thank the AFET secretariat, namely Kirsten and Mark, for all the excellent support so far, as well as the many stakeholders from member states, from different DGs, but also from the many communities affected by transnational repression whose knowledge, expertise, and lived experiences are already an important, essential part of this draft. Thank you.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Commissioner, that is quite a poor start. Ten minutes for the whole work programme. No president here? No. Again, my colleagues were polite, but let's spell it out. This is disrespectful. Disrespectful to European citizens and to us, their elected representatives in this House. Now, on foreign and defence policy, you announced plenty of good strategies. We stand with Ukraine. We push for enlargement, the European Defence Union, cybersecurity, Middle East strategy and hidden in the fine print. Finally, a review of our Iran policy. But the main strategy is missing. Commissioner, how do we make member states understand that they are weak, if alone in a world of bullies, that these are joint European strategies and not papers that they can bluntly ignore, like they are ignoring us today, by the way. And one last thing we cannot fix every Trump mess, but one we must and we can. Supporting and protecting human rights defenders and free journalists wherever they are under threat, be it in Russia, Venezuela, Iran or in exile in the European Union. Usa has long led the way. Now we need to step in. These people aren't just activists. They are our biggest allies in the fight against bullies, autocrats and warmongers.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Um. Thank you. Chair. Um. I am the person responsible for handing out these flyers. These flyers show victims of the Paragon spyware scandal in Italy. We have in previous sessions of this committee. No, let me just finish as well as the committee when we had hearings.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• “55:06 – 16:58:34): Thank you very much, Chair, and first of all, I would like to thank the rapporteur for the work done so far. I would, before going into some details, say that I'm quite frustrated to see that a large part of the ECF is actually for defense, but still we are only in the role of opinion-giving committee, and I find that a bit frustrating. So let's make it a very strong opinion, but also let's clearly say that it cannot stay like this given that the ECF, as part of the MFF, is going to give priorities for the next seven years. I think we should carefully look at the proposal incoming. What you can expect, let's say, to be underlined from the Green side is first of all EU money for EU capabilities. So everything that will be supported by the ECF should clearly go into strengthening EU capabilities and especially in line with strategic decisions that have been made in the last year when it comes to readiness 2030 or the white books. So let's make sure that the money really goes there. Where the proposal really needs to be strengthened is with regards to parliamentary oversight and the governance structure because at the moment they are leaving out the board that we have created under EDIP, but they are also leaving out the European Parliament in any substantial oversight role, which has been promised to us in the EDIP negotiations. I don't know whom of your colleagues was there, but it was quite clear EDIP has to be fast, ECF will be the proper program there, we will have parliamentary involvement, they apparently have forgotten that. So dear colleagues, let's fight for that to come back. Then I would also say we should make sure that a lot of funding should go to small and medium enterprises, mid-caps, but also innovative startups because they are the ones that need the money a lot. We have a lot of big players; they are making a lot of money at the moment, so I think our main focus when it comes to support should go to small and medium enterprises and also to projects that contribute to common procurement, interoperability, interchangeability, consolidation of the—so everything that we have basic, so in terms of safeguards and benchmarking in EDIP should translate into ECF, if not even improved. Also, when it comes to European preference, I would like to see the sixty-five percent being increased to eighty percent at least by the end of the ECF, which is in six years or seven years. And also sustainability should be in one way or another taken into account. I think that would be the large part of our amendments. And one point also, dear colleagues, when it comes to earmarking, and I think that's a discussion that we need to have with some of the other committees. I understand that if you have a program for seven years, there needs to be some flexibility, but if you don't start with ring-fencing and earmarking, we will never ever get a say again. So I think we should be very clear in terms of what we want this money to be spent on and ring-fence it, but also show to the Commission and the Council that whenever they think we need to reconsider because strategic priorities change, because the world changes, they can always come back and re-discuss with us. But we shouldn't give them the free pass from the very beginning. Thank you.”
  EU competences on defence
• “(09:34:32 – 09:36:27): So what do I say after Thijs now trying to be the unemotional German General? It's good to have you here. You know the drill already. European defense industry strategy is now two years old and it has some benchmarks and as every year I ask you where are we when it comes to these benchmarks which I'm gonna point it out again. By 2030 at least fifty percent of member states defense procurement should be devoted to procurement from European defense industrial base and the second one by 2030 member states should procure at least forty percent of defense equipment in a collaborative manner. So I understand all the technical discussions and reforms and everything that's happening in EDA but does it actually help us to reach these goals because it's already one third of the time until 2030 that we have worked on these goals so are we moving closer? How has it changed in the last two years? That's the first question. Second question, you said it so nicely we just provide the platform for cooperation but it's on member states to then cooperate. Which ones are actually cooperating? Which ones are not? Can you at least speak in terms of clusters or something maybe big ones small ones I don't know what is the decisive criterion but I think it's also time that we are being a bit more transparent also in our frustrations when it doesn't happen. And the last question and I'm asking you that one not as a representative of the member states but as the boss of EDA with a lot of experience in what works and what doesn't. We are at the moment discussing the setup of the ECF also here in this committee. How do you think it should be shaped from your perspective the European Competitiveness Fund in the next MFF so that we actually reach also some of the strategic goals of the white paper and the readiness 2030? Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “53:18 – 11:56:16): Thank you first of all it's quite telling that ECR and the Patriots are not here but first of all thank you for for your remarks and I think there is nevertheless a very broad support in this house for the work of the ICC and we are all quite frustrated with what happened to a number of judges of the ICC after they have been put on the US sanctions list. And first of all it's unacceptable that they are put on the US sanctions list and second it's unacceptable that we as the European Union cannot protect them from the damage that results from these sanctions. I have a few questions in this regards actually I mean you said the EU unlike ICC state parties is not a member of the Rome Statute but there is a cooperation agreement between the EU and the ICC so I'm still trying to understand what legal obligation the European Union has under this EU ICC cooperation agreement to assist the courts and its judges. And I know I mean we have asked for the blocking statute to be activated that of course the ICC has also asked for the blocking statute to be activated you have had discussions with the commission on this one so do you know why the commission has not after your outreach to them activated the blocking statute did they give you any reasons I mean this discussion started in summer that's what like seven months ago so that's the first question I would have. And the second one is that I understand the ICC is trying to shift at the moment when it comes to digital technologies to financial aspects and everything away from a US focus of applications programs and everything what measures do you think that you should focus on in order to build more digital and financial autonomy based on your experiences what what is it that is lacking for example what is it that you cannot replace where where where we would need to step up on the EU level also for our own institution by the way I mean this whole European Parliament is run on Microsoft it kinda scares me and we all have this wonderful Apple phones your colleague yesterday in the drug committee said and colleagues I mean just imagine that her Apple account was blocked overnight imagine they are blocking your Apple account overnight we are all doomed I mean let's be very clear and we really need to make sure that we have a different approach to that. And then the last question is what other measure measures beyond the blocking statute because that's the most prominent one are on the table when it came to Greenland we discussed also the anti coercion instrument is that something that you think we should also discuss with regards to the situation of the ICC and there is the article seventy of the Rome Statute that provides that the ICC has retaliatory power in the event of illegal offenses against its officials is that something you have ever considered and what could that look like? Thank you.”
  Support for International Criminal Court
• “53:38 – 15:59:10): Dear colleagues, dear Chair, transnational repression sounds like quite a technocratic term, but it is oppression. As the Chair said, it is when repressive regimes such as China, Russia, Iran, Rwanda, Eritrea, Egypt, Turkey, Venezuela—we are right now counting about forty of those repressive regimes—when these regimes do not stop at harassing, imprisoning, killing opposition in their own countries but they start doing the very same thing here in Europe to silence dissent. They target dissidents, journalists, activists, human rights defenders, academics, diaspora communities, and also everyone else who supports them. They use a broader and ever-growing range of tactics from physical intimidation and attacks to abuse of legal, financial, administrative tools to digital attacks, cyber attacks, and coercion by proxies, especially going after family members in the home countries. They use loopholes in our systems and they work with organized crime. Transnational repression has become one of the most serious and under-addressed threats to our democracies and the people living in Europe, to human rights but also to European sovereignty and security. In recent years, and for those who oppose these brutal regimes, the message is sadly very clear: at the moment, they are nowhere safe. Let me be very clear, dear colleagues, when foreign regimes silence voices inside Europe, they are targeting individuals but they are also targeting our democracy, our freedom, and our security. At the moment, they are mocking us, they are mocking our security services, and far too often they get away with it because right now our response frameworks are not fit for purpose. And that is what we intend to change with this report. First, we in Europe have at the moment no clue how big the problem really is. Transnational repression is significantly underreported. That's why we underestimate the scale and the scope of it. Two, the little response we have is scattered. National approaches alone are doomed to fail because perpetrators of transnational oppression do not care about borders and they cooperate with each other. So should we, to stop them from exporting loopholes in our laws and gaps between member states and also on the EU level. Same as on national levels, the responsibility for transnational oppression is not clear. It sits somewhere between DG HOME, DG JUST, EAS, the digital, and no one really feels in charge. Number three, we do not yet dare to stand up to the perpetrators and work with communities to protect victims well enough. With this report, I—and I assume we—try to respond to these challenges with recommendations for a coherent victim-centered EU strategy to address transnational oppression based also on previous international efforts of the G7, the OHCHR, the Council of Europe, and others by doing the following: One, establishing a common EU definition for transnational oppression because we cannot address what we do not clearly define. By demanding reliable data gathering on the scale and scope of transnational repression in Europe and worldwide. By strengthening protection and support for victims including legal assistance, prevention, and psychosocial care. Victims must be at the center of our response. By preventing and responding to specific tactics including physical attacks, digital abuse, and proxy-based threats. By addressing the structures that enable transnational oppression in Europe including vulnerabilities in our own systems. By cutting financial flows and dismantling the environments that allow organized crime to operate because perpetrators often use proxies such as criminal networks, agents, and intermediaries. By strengthening deterrence and accountability, ensuring that perpetrators finally face consequences. By positioning the European Union as a global leader in countering transnational oppression. And by encouraging subsequent Council presidencies to pick up from us and ensure consistent implementation of these concepts across DGs but also in the member states. This report, dear colleagues, builds on a DROI report but it is the first in the European Parliament to address this complex issue in all its forms and implications. The draft you currently see is only the beginning. It outlines the structure for the report but I will also table many additions to this draft report myself. This report is an opportunity for the European Parliament to adopt a blueprint for Commission, EAS, member states, others to finally find effective solutions to the growing threat of transnational oppression. Dear colleagues, let us together make sure that people who at the moment feel nowhere safe will finally be safe here in Europe. Now, in this spirit, I'm looking forward to your amendments, to constructive cooperation in the negotiations on this important and timely file. And I would also like to sincerely thank the AFET secretariat, namely Kirsten and Mark, for all the excellent support so far, as well as the many stakeholders from member states, from different DGs, but also from the many communities affected by transnational repression whose knowledge, expertise, and lived experiences are already an important, essential part of this draft. Thank you.”
  Foreign interference in Europe