Krzysztof BREJZA

Policy topics Krzysztof BREJZA is active on

What Krzysztof BREJZA has said (34)

• 2026-03-07 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 27.4.2026 Written question EU restrictive measures have played a significant role in reducing the EU’s energy dependency on Russia. The EU ‘s share of Russian energy revenues fell to less than 9% in 2025 from almost 60% in 2022. The import of Russian crude oil and petroleum products into the EU is prohibited since June 2022 [1] . To ensure energy security during a transitional phase, certain EU Member States — including Hungary — have been granted temporary exemptions for specific pipeline imports of Russian oil. The Commission welcomes the efforts taken by a number of Member States to decouple from Russian oil, which have already allowed for the lifting of such exemptions. The latest packages of sanctions imposed further restrictions on energy imports from Russia [2] [3] , and additional measures have been proposed [4] . Member States are required to fully respect the restrictive measures in force and ensure that any bilateral engagements do not contradict the EU’s common foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, following the REPowerEU roadmap proposed by the Commission [5] , in January 2026 the European Parliament and the Council adopted a permanent ban on Russian natural gas imports [6] . The Druzhba disruptions underscore the strategic importance of diversifying energy supplies. Hungary and Slovakia have the possibility to further reduce their dependence on Russian oil by making greater use of the Adria pipeline through Croatia. The Commission is strongly supporting Hungary’s and Slovakia’s diversification efforts and stands ready to facilitate necessary arrangements with relevant partners. [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/03/russia-s-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-sixth-package-of-sanctions/. [2] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures. [3] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/23/19th-package-of-sanctions-against-russia-eu-targets-russian-energy-third-country-banks-and-crypto-providers/. [4] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/statement_26_318. [5] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/repowereu-phase-out-russian-energy-imports_en. [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/261/oj/eng.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-02-24 “E-000773/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Countering Russian propaganda targeting the EU, its Member States and its partners is a priority for the High Representative /Vice-President and the Commission. The Council has taken significant measures to curb Russia’s propaganda machine. In March 2022, under the third sanctions package 1 , the Council has adopted a broadcasting ban prohibiting any content of the Russian state-sponsored media outlets Russia Today and Sputnik 2 . With the following packages, the broadcasting ban has been extended to more than 30 media outlets spreading and supporting Russian propaganda about the war against Ukraine within the EU and beyond. Additionally, the Council has listed more than 120 individuals and 30 entities involved in disseminating Kremlin-aligned disinformation, including media actors targeting European and global audiences with manipulated narratives. To address broader hybrid threats, including Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference, the EU established a dedicated sanctions regime in 2024. It targets individuals and entities undermining EU values, security, and stability, including activities affecting third countries and international organisations. The latest listings, covering four individuals, were adopted in March 2026 3 . Imposing any additional restrictive measures require a unanimous decision by the Council. Negotiations on new sanctions are confidential and neither the European External Action Service nor the Commission can comment on them. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/eu-imposes-sanctions-on-state-ownedoutlets-rtrussia-today-and-sputnik-s-broadcasting-in-the-eu/. 2 Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/351, amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP and imposing new restrictive measures against Russian media outlets engaged in propaganda actions. 3 Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/646 of 16 March 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities.”
  Foreign interference in Europe · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-Georgia relations
• 2026-02-04 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 8.6.2026 Written question While the primary responsibility for countering hybrid threats lies with the Member States, there is a strong need for a coordinated response at the EU level. In the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence [1] , the EU set out actions to prevent, detect, deter and respond to malicious hybrid activities. Through ProtectEU [2] and the Preparedness Union Strategy [3] , the Commission is strengthening the EU’s ability to anticipate, prevent and respond to hybrid threats across all sectors. This is complemented by the directives on Critical Entities Resilience [4] and on Network and Information Systems [5] , which enhance protection against sabotage and cyberattacks, and by the Digital Services Act [6] , which helps to counter online manipulation and protect the integrity of democratic discourse. The action plan on Cable Security [7] strengthens the protection of submarine data and power cables. The action plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security [8] sets out a comprehensive approach to protecting society against drone threats, including a voluntary EU counter-drone joint purchasing initiative. The Joint Communication on Defence Readiness 2030 [9] sets out clear objectives and milestones for achieving defence readiness by 2030. Two of its initiatives — the Eastern Flank Watch and the European Drone Defence — aim at integrating air defence, counter-drone systems, ground and maritime security measures and situational awareness to build a comprehensive European border defence capability combining civilian-military tools in cooperation with NATO. The Eastern Flank Watch aims to build-up the capacity of Member States on the Eastern border to face a wide range of threats, including hybrid operations, Russia’s shadow fleet and the risk of armed aggression. It aims to fortify the EU’s Eastern borders across land, air and sea, contributing to the security of the whole EU. [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0148. [3] https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/b81316ab-a513-49a1-b520-b6a6e0de6986/file.bin. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj/eng. [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022L2555. [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. [7] eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025JC0009. [8] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0081. [9] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0027.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2026-02-03 “E-000429/2026 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission While there are no plans to establish a centralised analysis of the ‘Epstein files’ at EU level, the EU has a strong legal and operational framework to support Member States in tackling complex and cross-border crime, including trafficking in human beings and child sexual exploitation. In particular, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) 1 facilitates the rapid and secure exchange of criminal intelligence across the EU and provides advanced analytical support to help national authorities identify links between suspects, financial flows and transnational criminal networks. The Commission recalls that investigation of criminal offences is the competence of national authorities. At the operational level, the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) 2 platform enables Member States to coordinate investigations affecting EU security and transform separate national child sexual exploitation cases into a shared, intelligence led EU response. The victims’ rights policy is equally high on the agenda of the Commission. The overall objective of the Victims’ Rights Directive 3 is to facilitate victims’ access to justice. The recently provisionally agreed revision of the Directive 4 further strengthens all victims’ rights, including rights to support and protection and victims’ access to justice. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/law-enforcement-cooperation/empact-fightingcrime-together_en. 3 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, pp. 57 – 73. 4 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of The Council amending Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, COM/2023/424 final.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2026-01-09 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 16.3.2026 Written question The EU has reacted firmly to Georgia’s serious democratic backsliding, including violence against protesters, opposition figures, journalists and civil society, the adoption of repressive legislation and the instrumentalisation of the justice system. These actions are fundamentally incompatible with EU values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. In response to the country’s democratic backsliding, the EU has downgraded political contacts with the Georgian authorities and suspended bilateral financial assistance directly benefitting them. The EU has also repeatedly called for the release of all journalists, activists and others unjustly detained and continues discussions among Member States on further measures, including sanctions, which require unanimity in the Council. As a consequence of Georgian authorities’ course of action, Georgia’s EU accession process has effectively come to a standstill. In its 2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy [1] , the Commission concluded that in light of Georgia’s continued backsliding on the fundamentals since then, it considers Georgia a candidate country in name only. Recently, the Commission has initiated procedures to activate the revised Visa Suspension Mechanism in reaction to non-compliance with visa liberalisation benchmarks in key areas of governance and human rights, as observed in the Seventh [2] and Eighth [3] Suspension Mechanism Report. The EU remains ready to support the Georgian people’s European aspirations, while underlining that a return to the EU accession path is fully in the hands of Georgia’s authorities and requires a genuine and irreversible commitment to EU values. [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/2025-communication-eu-enlargement-policy-extract-about-georgia_en?s=221. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2024%3A571%3AFIN. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0792&qid=1768565258267.”
  EU-Georgia relations
• 2026-01-09 “E-000055/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the dissemination of AI-generated content on TikTok advocating for Poland to leave the EU and has, in the framework of the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 , engaged in exchanges with the provider of TikTok and third parties regarding the concerned account(s). The DSA requires providers of very large online platforms (‘VLOPs’), such as TikTok, to assess the risks stemming from their services and to put in place measures to mitigate those risks, including the risks of any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse and electoral process. On 17 December 2024, the Commission initiated formal proceedings against TikTok for a suspected breach of the DSA in relation to the obligation to diligently identify, analyse, assess and mitigate systemic risks linked to election integrity, notably in the context of the Romanian Presidential elections on 24 November 2024 2 . These proceedings focus on the risks linked to the provider’s recommender systems, notably the intentional manipulation or automated exploitation of the service, as well as the provider’s policies on political advertisements and paid-for political content. The investigations in these proceedings are ongoing, and the Commission continues to gather and analyse evidence and assess any changes made by TikTok to its related systems and processes. Moreover, the Commission recalls that it has adopted guidelines for VLOPs and very large online search engines (‘VLOSEs’) on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes 3 , recommending the implementation of efficient and easily recognisable labels on AI-generated content, along with the adoption of robust content moderation processes and algorithmic systems to detect such content. 4 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:4625430. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6487. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202403014. 4 This will be further reinforced by obligation imposed by Article 50 AI Act, when it enters into application, on providers and deployers of AI systems that generate or manipulate image, audio or video content to label content constituting a deep fake: Regulation - EU - 2024/1689 - EN - EUR-Lex: https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng#cpt_IV.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• 2025-12-04 “P-004829/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has strongly condemned the violence against peaceful protesters that took place at the end of 2024 and consistently urged the Georgian authorities to respect, protect and uphold the human rights. In its 2024 1 and 2025 2 enlargement reports on Georgia, the Commission has expressed deep concerns regarding the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of crowd control measures by law enforcement bodies, as well as about persisting reports of torture and other forms of illtreatment of protest participants. That investigations launched by the Special Investigation Service, which has now been abolished, have failed to bring perpetrators of violence to justice exposes serious deficiencies in the justice system and underscores its lack of independence and credibility, fostering an environment of impunity. The latest information regarding the use of chemicals in water cannons during those protests, including Georgian official acknowledgments in this regard, as well as media reports alleging that military grade chemical substances have been used, raise serious concerns and need to be thoroughly examined by the appropriate organisations. While the EU does not have a dedicated mechanism to investigate the use of chemical weapons, it actively supports and cooperates with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which holds the mandate to carry out any potential assessments. The OPCW has consistently received support from the EU through the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget since 2004, currently amounting to a total of EUR 46.9 million 3 . 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/georgia-report-2024_en. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/georgia-report-2025_en. 3 https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2025/12/european-union-contributes-eur-445-million-support-opcwmissions.”
  EU-Georgia relations · EU competences on human rights
• 2025-11-12 “E-004480/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Addressing circumvention of sanctions, which is now a crime under EU law, is a key priority for the EU. The Commission monitors trade flows, especially goods on Common High Priority (CHP) 1 and Economically Critical Goods (ECG) 2 lists, from EU to third countries considered to be at high risk of being used as a platform for circumvention, and from these countries to Russia. The EU has several anti-circumvention tools at its disposal. These include imposing sanctions on individuals and entities facilitating circumvention of EU sanctions 3 ; strengthening export controls towards entities involved in the circumvention of sensitive items to Russia 4 ; or the prohibition on export of sensitive goods to a country whose jurisdiction is used to circumvent EU sanctions 5 . Jurisdictions monitored include Georgia. Latest data from Georgian authorities indicate that no exports of CHP items from Georgia to Russia were reported between January 2024 and October 2025. In November 2025, Georgia committed to halt re-export of ECG. Nonetheless, re-export of these items from Georgia to Russia remains a concern for EU and the Commission has called on Georgia to step up efforts to prevent that its territory or operators are used to circumvent EU sanctions. As a candidate country, Georgia is subject to heightened expectations and scrutiny regarding its alignment with EU acquis, including Common Foreign and Security Policy and EU restrictive measures. As a result of the Georgian authorities’ course of action, leading to democratic backsliding and human rights violations, Georgia’s EU accession process has come to a standstill. The Commission will continue rigorous monitoring of the situation on the ground and targeted outreach on the issue of sanctions circumvention. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/list-common-high-priority-items_en. 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/list-economically-critical-goods_en. 3 As per Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. 4 Annex IV of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. 5 Article 12f of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014.”
  EU enlargement
• 2025-09-18 “E-003627/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In 2022, 19 diplomats from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the EU were declared personae non-gratae for engaging in activities contrary to their diplomatic status, in breach of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This decision was taken in response to Russia’s disruptive actions against the interests and security of the EU and the Member States 1 . Moreover, the European External Action Service and the Commission implemented measures to permanently assess the level of the threat. The European External Action Service and the Commission are aware of several recent cases where Member States have declared diplomats from the Russian Federation and Belarus personae non-gratae for engaging in activities contrary to their diplomatic status. Within the Schengen area and when traveling to a Member State other than that of their accreditation, Council regulation (EU) 2025/2033 of 23 October 2025 2 establishes a prior notification mechanism for Russian diplomats and consular officers, as well as for members of the administrative and technical staff or of the service staff of diplomatic missions or consular posts of Russia, and for their family members. That prior notification mechanism aims at ensuring the awareness of Member States of related movements, against a backdrop of increasing hostile intelligence activities that support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The said Regulation also provides that Member States willing to do so may impose an authorisation requirement for travel to their territories of such individuals, based on visas or residence permits issued by another State. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/russia-european-union-declared-19-diplomats-personae-non-gratae_en. 2 Council regulation (EU) 2025/2033 of 23 October 2025 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202502033.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Foreign interference in Europe · EU-Belarus relations
• 2025-09-10 “E-003501/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU and Member States strongly support current efforts to achieve a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace based on the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. To this end, the EU is working in close cooperation with transatlantic partners, including the United States, and supports the efforts of the Coalition of the Willing. For peace to last, a comprehensive peace agreement will have to be accompanied by robust and credible security guarantees for Ukraine to deter future Russian aggression. This was the subject of discussions of the Leaders’ meeting in Washington, District of Columbia on 18 August 2025. The EU and Member States are contributing to security guarantees, in particular by supporting Ukraine’s ability to deter aggression and defend effectively, based on respective competences and capabilities, in line with international law. The EU is strengthening support to Ukraine (military, financial, humanitarian, energy), building on the joint security commitments signed in July 2024. Maximising the pressure on Russia with additional packages of sanctions, tackling the Russian shadow fleet and accelerating the establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression are key priorities. The European External Action Service and EU delegations continue to work on diplomatic efforts and outreach to counter Russian propaganda. A strong message is also being sent to Russia’s enablers. The EU is firmly committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, security, and European future, and to working with the United States to achieve these objectives.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-US relations
• 2025-07-17 “E-002973/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission take note of Poland’s information campaign in third countries aimed at addressing irregular migration. The Commission’s 2023 Call to Action on a Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling 1 reiterated the need to strengthen the prevention of irregular migration by providing better information in third countries and addressing misconceptions that can influence third-country nationals’ decisions on irregular migration. Raising awareness of the risks of irregular migration and migrant smuggling, of available legal pathways to the EU and alternative opportunities in origin and transit countries, is key to preventing dangerous journeys to the EU and to combating migrant smuggling. Since 2023, the Commission has funded seven projects 2 under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 3 addressed to migrants and potential migrants in third countries to raise awareness on the risk of irregular migration and migrant smuggling, and to inform migrants and potential migrants on available legal pathways to the EU and opportunities in origin and transit countries. All projects are expected to be completed in 2025. A call for proposals for new campaigns is currently under evaluation 4 . The Commission also supports InfoMigrants 5 , an online media project providing trusted information on migration in countries of origin, transit and destination. To complement and support the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum 6 , the Commission continues its work on the external dimension of migration policy, notably on comprehensive partnerships with third countries and scaling up the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling. 1 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/Call-to-action-global-alliance-to-counter-migrantsmuggling_en_1.pdf; https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/mt/ip_23_6081. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projectsresults?order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=10&sortBy=es_SortDate&programmePeriod=2021%20%202027&frameworkProgramme=43251447&topicAbbreviation=AMIF-2022-TF1-AG-INFO. 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/1147 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund; OJ L 251, 15.7.2021, pp. 1–47, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1147/oj. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/AMIF-2024TF2-AG-INFO-01?isExactMatch=true&status=31094501,31094502&programmePeriod=2021%20%202027&frameworkProgramme=43251447&order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=50&sortBy=startDate. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projectsdetails/43251447/101228857/AMIF2027?order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=10&sortBy=relevance&key words=infomigrants&programmePeriod=2021%20-%202027&frameworkProgramme=43251447. 6 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en#timeline-andmain-achievements.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-07-15 “E-002899/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Modernisation Directive 1 that entered into application in May 2022 modified the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) 2 and introduced a provision explicitly prohibiting the marketing of goods as being identical while they significantly differ with regards to their composition and characteristics (also known as ‘dual quality’). The UCPD enforcement’s responsibility is primarily for the competent authorities of the Member States. The Commission monitors and supports their work to correctly apply consumer law under the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Regulation. 3 In this context, the Commission, together with the Romanian consumer protection authority (ANPC), organised a workshop in April 2023 to exchange best practices on detecting potential ‘dual quality’ cases. The Commission also supports the development of enforcement capacities, including testing capacities, under the Single Market Programme. To date, the national authorities have not deemed it necessary to initiate a coordinated investigation 4 into potential ‘dual quality’ practices. The Commission has assessed the existing legal framework on ‘dual quality’, including whether more stringent requirements should be in place. In June 2024, it published a Report on the implementation of the Modernisation Directive. 5 The assessment showed that there has been progress over the past years, all Member States have transposed the new rule and industry practices are improving. The Report also acknowledged that concerns persist in some Member States. The Commission will continue to assist Member States’ efforts to address ‘dual quality’ cases of concern and promote effective implementation and enforcement of the relevant legislation. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32019L2161. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32005L0029. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32017R2394. 4 The CPC Regulation lays down the cooperation framework (i.e. the CPC Network) to allow national authorities from Member States to jointly address cross border breaches of consumer rules. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024DC0258R%2801%29&qid=1726811961274.”
  EU competences on consumer protection and product standards · EU restrictions on unfair commercial practices
• 2025-07-01 “E-002664/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU remains deeply concerned about the politically motivated detention of the PolishBelarus journalist and reports of his deteriorating health. The situation of political prisoners in Belarus remains a priority for the EU. The EU has consistently raised this case and those of other political prisoners both publicly, through statements by the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) and the Commission, and privately, in direct communication with the Belarusian authorities, calling for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners. The EU has also engaged in dialogue with international partners, and has addressed the issue in multilateral fora, including through EU-led resolutions at the United Nations Human Rights Council. In response to the continued systemic human rights violations in Belarus, the EU has adopted multiple packages of restrictive measures, as part of a gradual and principled approach. The EU will continue to apply pressure on the regime, press for the release of all political prisoners, and to provide financial, legal, medical and relocation assistance to victims of repression, including political prisoners, in line with its policy objectives, as outlined in the Council conclusions on Belarus 1 . 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6737-2024-INIT/en/pdf; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/46076/council-conclusions-on-belarus.pdf.”
  EU-Belarus relations
• 2025-07-01 “E-002665/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Following the Russian military aggression against Ukraine, the EU has acted firmly to cut its reliance on Russian energy. To put pressure on Russia to cease its war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has adopted 18 packages of massive and unprecedented restrictive measures 1 , including sanctions to ban coal and oil imports from Russia and to target the ‘shadow’ fleet 2 . Ensuring the full and effective implementation of sanctions as well as tackling their possible circumvention, including through third country jurisdictions, is a matter of priority. The EU continues to adjust the sanctions frameworks and has adopted numerous measures to counter circumvention. Additionally, the EU has intensified outreach to countries at risk of being used as platforms for circumvention, through diplomatic outreach of the EU Sanctions Envoy and capacity-building. In May 2025, gasoil imports from Marocco accounted for 5% of total Spanish gasoil imports, reflecting that imports from Morocco constitute only a minor share of Spain’s overall gasoil imports 3 . Member States are responsible for the implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions. National authorities are in charge of following up on possible breaches and conducting investigations. The Commission is in close contact with the competent authorities in the Member States and readily provides support in sanctions implementation. The 18 th package of sanctions introduces a prohibition to import into the EU refined petroleum products made from Russian crude. This obliges operators and national authorities to verify the non-Russia origin of the crude oil for imports of refined products. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russiasmilitary-aggression-against-ukraine_en. 2 The ‘shadow’ fleet is composed of vessels practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). 3 CORES (Corporación de Reservas Estratégicas de Productos Petrolíferos), ‘Importaciones de productos petrolíferos por países’, https://www.cores.es/es/estadisticas (accessed 23 July 2025).”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Trade relations with Morocco
• 2025-06-23 “E-002502/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is deeply concerned about the arrest of the leader of Girchi-More Freedom political party, as well as the arrests of other Georgian opposition leaders, and calls for the release of those unjustly detained 1 . In response to Georgia’s continuous democratic backsliding and human rights violations, political contacts with the authorities have been downgraded and assistance benefitting the authorities has been suspended. The EU’s support to civil society and independent media has been increased 2 . Georgia’s accession process has been effectively halted. The visa-free regime for the Georgian holders of diplomatic and service passports has been suspended 3 . On 14 July 2025, the Commission sent a letter reminding Georgia of its obligations to fulfil the conditions for visa liberalisation 4 . At the Foreign Affairs Council of 15 July 2025, Member States discussed imposing sanctions on those Georgian citizens responsible for, involved in, or associated with serious human rights violations. To date, it was not possible to reach consensus by Member States and the discussions will continue 5 . Several additional EU actions were discussed by Member States at the 15 July 2025 Foreign Affairs Council, including the activation of the Visa Suspension Mechanism and the suspension of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement 5 . All options remain on the table. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-joint-statement-recent-developments-georgia_en. 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-high-representative-kaja-kallas-pressconference_en; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2024/12/16/. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/01/27/georgia-council-suspends-visa-free-travelfor-diplomats-and-officials/. 4 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-high-representative-kaja-kallas-uponarrival-2_en. 5 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-high-representative-kaja-kallas-uponarrival-2_en; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-remarks-high-representative-kaja-kallaspress-conference-1_en.”
  EU-Georgia relations · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-06-18 “E-002464/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the Commission The EU has reacted firmly to the recent political developments in Georgia, voicing concerns over the election irregularities, the violence against peaceful protesters, and the rushed adoption of the recent legislative amendments 1 . The Commission has taken appropriate measures, including the suspension of direct financial support to the authorities, downgrading of political contacts and stepping up the support to strengthen Georgia's civil society and media landscape. On 27 June 2024, the European Council called on Georgia’s authorities to clarify their intentions by reversing the current course of action which jeopardises Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process 2 . On 17 October 2024 3 and 19 December 2024 4 , the European Council reiterated its serious concern regarding the course of action taken by the Georgian government, which runs counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded, and de facto halts the accession process. The election observation mission by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) highlighted numerous shortcomings in the parliamentary elections held on 26 October 2024 5 . The EU has repeatedly called for OSCE/ODIHR to be invited to observe the next elections and for Georgia to address the previous OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. The EU will continue following closely the developments regarding the municipal elections on 4 October 2025, calling for a free, fair and competitive electoral process. The EU continues to reiterate its call on the Georgian authorities to take credible steps to reverse democratic backsliding in order to return to the European path. The responsibility lies solely with the Georgian authorities. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/extracts-georgia-conclusions-european-council-2_en; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-joint-statement-high-representativevice-president-kallas-andcommissioner-marta-kos-latest_en. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/qa3lblga/euco-conclusions-27062024-en.pdf. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf. 5 https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/6/584029_0.pdf.”
  EU-Georgia relations
• 2025-06-16 “P-002424/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In reaction to Georgia’s democratic backsliding, the EU has adopted a number of measures. Political contacts with the authorities have been downgraded and assistance to the authorities has been suspended. The EU has stepped up its support to civil society and independent media and additional resources have been made available to counter disinformation 1 . Georgia’s accession process has been effectively halted. The visa-free regime for the Georgian holders of diplomatic and service passports has been suspended 2 . At the Foreign Affairs Council of 16 December 2024 3 , the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) proposed to impose sanctions on those Georgian citizens responsible for, involved in, or associated with serious human rights violations under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime. While unanimity on sanctions has not been reached yet by Member States in the Council, discussions with Member States continue. As announced by the HR/VP at the Foreign Affairs Council of 23 June 2025 4 , the situation in Georgia and further concrete EU measures will be discussed at an upcoming Foreign Affairs Council. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-high-representative-kaja-kallas-pressconference_en; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2024/12/16/. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/01/27/georgia-council-suspends-visa-free-travelfor-diplomats-and-officials/. 3 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-high-representative-kaja-kallas-pressconference_en. 4 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-remarks-high-representative-kaja-kallas-pressconference-0_en.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-Georgia relations
• 2025-06-06 “E-002298/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The shadow fleet used by Russia and associated security and environmental risks is an issue regularly discussed with EU Ministers that will be subject to additional measures, if needed. So far, the EU has designated 447 vessels as being linked to this fleet and will continue its efforts to disrupt its ecosystem. The EU continues engaging with flag states particularly regarding their responsibilities, ship safety and environmental risks, and takes active part in the work of the G7/NB8+ Task Force on the shadow fleet. To monitor the activities of the shadow fleet, the EU uses the maritime information and exchange system established under Directive 2002/59/EC 1 (VTMIS Directive) hosted in the European Maritime Safety Agency and Member States. Furthermore, the EU Common Information Sharing Environment and the Maritime Surveillance project of the European Defence Agency 2 allow sharing information among Member States. Finally, the EU naval operations under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy have a new task of monitoring the shadow fleet. These vessels are often substandard and underinsured. To improve safety and environmental protection, the VTMIS Directive now requires insurance reporting for all ships in EU Mandatory Reporting Systems, including ships in transit. Member States have proposed similar measures at the International Maritime Organisation. On 21 February 2025, the Commission and High Representative presented EU Action Plan on cable security to strengthen the security and resilience of submarine cables 3 . As a key action, the Commission is working with Member States towards a regional Baltic Sea hub on a real time situational picture and integrated surveillance on submarine cables, funded under the Digital Europe Programme. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/59/oj/eng. 2 https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/maritime-surveillance-(marsur). 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/joint-communication-strengthen-security-and-resiliencesubmarine-cables.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2025-05-21 “E-002039/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully aware of the current crisis of the EU chemical sector, facing high energy and feedstock prices, sluggish demand, and increased competitive pressures at international level. These major challenges are putting significant strain on EU chemicals’ producers, leading to a significant wave of closures across more than 20 major sites in the EU over the last two years. Given the strategic role of the chemical sector, often referred as the ‘industry of industries’, the Commission has presented, on 8 July 2025, a European Chemicals Industry Action Plan 1 , to respond to the current challenges facing the sector and support its global competitiveness. The Action Plan focuses on four key intervention areas: 1) strengthening resilience: maintaining critical production in EU and opening new markets and protecting the EU industry; 2) securing energy supply, supporting decarbonisation and shift towards clean and circular economy; 3) creating lead markets and promoting innovation; and 4) simplifying the regulatory framework. Specifically, to support critical productions in the EU, the Commission intends to establish a Critical Chemical Alliance together with Member States and stakeholders by the end of the year. This Alliance will define criteria for identifying critical molecules and sites. This work will then serve as the basis for targeted policy support measures, which may include enhanced trade monitoring, strengthened trade defence instruments and a possible legislative proposal on critical molecules. In addition, the Alliance will assist Member States and regions in setting up EU Critical Chemical Sites to facilitate investments and improve access to finance for the modernisation of critical production capacities. 1 COM(2025) 530 final; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=comnat:COM_2025_0530_FIN#:~:text=It%20sets%20out%20concrete%20measures%20 to%20help%20secure,promoting%20innovation%3B%20and%204%29%20simplifying%20the%20regulatory% 20framework.”
  EU restrictions on unfair commercial practices · EU industrial funding · Sourcing of critical raw materials
• 2025-05-14 “E-001930/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The ProtectEU 1 strategy aims to address online and offline man-made security threats. The causes of the Iberian blackout are under investigation by a panel under the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). In addition, Spain and Portugal will have to send a report to the Commission on the event and possible improvements by the end of July 2025. Therefore, currently, the Commission has no evidence linking the blackout to man-made threats. The EU has strengthened the legislative framework regarding the protection of critical infrastructure, both from a physical and cyber resilience perspective with the Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities 2 and the Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union 3 . ProtectEU stresses the importance of timely transposition and correct implementation of these Directives. The Commission will continue to support Member States in their implementation. Moreover, following the adoption of a Council Recommendation on critical infrastructure resilience 4 , the Commission supported the Member States in the conduct of stress tests by operators of critical infrastructure in the energy sector to identify vulnerabilities in their resilience against antagonistic threats. Additionally, the EU Preparedness Union Strategy 5 announced the review of the energy security of supply framework by 2026. One of its objectives is to increase preparedness considering the emerging threats to the energy system, including man-made threats. The Commission will consider the conclusions and recommendations of the ENTSO-E panel once their final report is available as well as the reports sent by Spain and Portugal. 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy; COM/2025/148 final. 2 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC. 3 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive). 4 Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure 2023/C 20/01 ST/15623/2022/INIT (OJ C 20, 20.1.2023, p. 1–11). 5 Joint Communication on the European Preparedness Union Strategy. Join(2025) 130 final, 26.3.2025.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure · EU energy infrastructure integration
• 2025-03-31 “E-001313/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Under Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP 1 and Regulation (EU) 833/2014 2 , the EU may designate specific vessels for their contribution to Russia’s warfare against Ukraine, including vessels that are part of Russia’s shadow fleet, which seeks to circumvent the EU and Price Cap Coalition’s caps while engaging in deceptive and high-risk shipping practices contrary to international standards. Such vessels are subject to a port access ban and a ban on provision of services. To date, the EU has designated a total of 342 vessels as part of the 14 th , 15 th ,16 th and 17 th sanctions packages 3,4,5,6 adopted in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine. In its proposal for the 18 th sanctions package 7 , the Commission proposes to designate additional 77 vessels. The Commission is continuously monitoring the developments relating to vessels belonging to Russia’s shadow fleet as part of its efforts to combat the circumvention of the EU’s Russia sanctions. It has also reached out to third countries providing flagging services to these vessels raising concerns of environmental protection and maritime safety. All decisions on EU sanctions are taken unanimously by Member States in the Council, including decisions on the sanctioning of vessels. With regards to allegations of circumvention or breaches of sanctions, the Commission welcomes any concrete information but does not comment on individual cases. Member States are responsible for the implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions. National authorities are in charge of following up on possible breaches and conducting investigations. The Commission is in close contact with the competent authorities in the Member States and readily provides support in sanctions implementation. 1 OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 13–17, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/512/oj/eng. 2 OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 1–11, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj/eng. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/russia-s-war-of-aggression-againstukraine-comprehensive-eu-s-14th-package-of-sanctions-cracks-down-on-circumvention-and-adopts-energymeasures/. 4 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-15th-sanctions-package-against-russia-itscontinued-illegal-war-against-ukraine-2024-12-16_en. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_585. 6 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/20/russia-s-war-of-aggression-againstukraine-eu-agrees-17th-package-of-sanctions/. 7 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_1471.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-02-25 “E-000837/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In reaction to Georgia’s democratic backsliding, the EU has adopted a number of measures. Political contacts with the authorities have been downgraded and assistance to the authorities has been suspended. The EU has stepped up its support to civil society and independent media and additional resources have been made available to counter disinformation 1 . Georgia’s accession process has been effectively halted. Recently, the EU took a decision to suspend the visa-free regime for Georgian holders of diplomatic and service passports 2 . At the Foreign Affairs Council of 16 December 2024 1 , High Representative/Vice-President proposed to impose sanctions on those Georgian citizens responsible for, involved in, or associated with serious human rights violations under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime. While it has not yet been possible to reach an agreement by all Member States, the discussions continue. All decisions on EU sanctions are taken unanimously by Member States in the Council. The EU is calling on the Georgian authorities to seek a way out of the current crisis by ensuring a dialogue with all political forces and representatives of civil society, while all options to restore trust should be explored. The recommendations outlined in the final Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights report 3 should be implemented as a matter of priority 4 . The EU remains ready to support all efforts towards a democratic, stable, and European future for the country. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-high-representative-kaja-kallas-pressconference_en; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2024/12/16/ 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/01/27/georgia-council-suspends-visa-free-travelfor-diplomats-and-officials/ 3 https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/584029 4 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-statement-high-representativevice-president-and-commissionerenlargement-situation-georgia_en”
  EU-Georgia relations · EU relations with Eastern Neighbourhood · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2024-12-20 “E-003079/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The European arrest warrant (EAW) is a judicial procedure between judicial authorities in the Member States based on the particular circumstances of each individual case where surrender is requested. Neither the Commission nor the Member States’ governments can interfere or influence decisions taken by the judicial authorities. The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) held that the principle of mutual recognition, which underpins the EAW framework decision, means that, in accordance with Article 1(2) thereof, the Member States are in principle obliged to act upon an EAW, arresting the persons concerned and bringing them before a national court competent to examine the warrant, including to see whether any grounds for refusal apply. In order to assess whether there is a ground for refusing the EAW, the executing court should take into account the CJEU’s case-law on the EAW, and in particular regarding the two-step procedure set out in that case-law 1 . The Commission notes that an Article 7(1) of the Treaty on EU procedure against Hungary is ongoing in Council. This procedure was initiated by the European Parliament in 2018. It is for the Council to decide on next steps in this ongoing procedure. The Commission shares the concerns expressed by the European Parliament in this procedure and always stands ready to participate in hearings and state-of-play points in the Council. 1 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 25 July 2018, LM, C-216/18 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586 and Judgment of the Court of Justice of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others, C-158/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:57.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · Rule of law in Hungary
• 2024-11-12 “E-002504/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The High Representative/Vice-President and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are aware of Russia’s use of disinformation in its hybrid campaigns against the EU and its partners. The EEAS has been instrumental for EU level efforts to counter this external security threat since 2015. It built up capability to detect, analyse and respond in collaboration with EU institutions, Member States and international partners, including via its Rapid Alert System. Building on this experience and aligned with the European Democracy Action Plan 1 , Council conclusions on democratic resilience 2 and objectives set out in the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence 3 , the Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) Toolbox 4 reinforces EU situational awareness, resilience and response, and international partnerships to tackle this threat. Exposing and responding to Russian FIMI operations and restrictive measures are part of the FIMI Toolbox. Regulation 2022/2065 (Digital Services Act) 5 along with the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation 6 provide tools to address FIMI while upholding fundamental rights including freedom of expression. The Commission and the EEAS conduct proactive information campaigns, including on EU support to Ukraine and countering Russia’s narratives on food security and energy issues. The Commission operates an internal Network Against Disinformation. The EEAS exposed Russian FIMI activities 7 and coordinates with international partners in G7, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine. The new Democracy Shield 8 will strengthen EU situational awareness and its collective ability to detect, analyse and proactively counter threats. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2250 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10119-2024-INIT/en/pdf 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-1-2022-INIT/en/pdf 4 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/tackling-disinformation-foreign-information-manipulation-interference_en 5 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1–102. 6 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation 7 See for instance https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/1st-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-andinterference-threats_en; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2nd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-andinterference-threats_en 8 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)767153”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Foreign interference in Europe · Disinformation & online freedoms
• “So who are in charge of providing access to grids to, first of all, understand better what are the planning, what is the planning at national and regional level in terms of rolling out additional electricity capacity in terms of grids? And then obviously also to see whether we can prioritise these HGV recharging points in terms of getting early permissions in terms of access to these grids, because this is obviously right now one of the main bottlenecks. So, so we we are basically trying to bring together colleagues who are in charge of energy distribution with those who are in charge of mobility and transport to, to address this, this, this problem. And last but not least on ports and airports. Here our the situation I would say is as follows that we see that for the major airports and and and ports, the situation in terms of electrification. So onshore power supply, but also the possibility to, to, to, to charge aircraft and so on looks very good. But once we go to the smaller ports along the European coastlines and shores here, the situation is, is still not satisfactory. So this will again be one of the priorities for us in terms of supporting also financially these, these places. So these ports and airports to to, to be equipped on the one hand with the electrification, but maybe also with hydrogen depending on the type of fuel which is chosen. Thank you.”
  EV charging infrastructure
• “Thank you. A number of you were referring to questions of of price transparency and whether prices are too high and whether there are price abuses going on. So I will take them all together and and answer as follows. For the time being, we do not have any clear indications that there are price abuses. It is true that what we see are, on the one hand, high deployment costs of recharging infrastructure. We also see in some places high taxation or high taxes. And we also see high electricity network costs. And if you take this all together then this probably will explain at least to quite some extent, the fact that prices vary quite significantly from one place to another. We we will look into this more closely during the review of of our fear. So this is one of the topics which we, we, we clearly have on our agenda. We would obviously want to also ensure a strong monitoring of the market. Well, on the one hand by the commission, but obviously also through the competent national authorities so that this is, is being taken care for. Care of. So no price abuses. But we obviously are not in favour of any form of price regulation. Because we believe that this would be counterproductive as this will in all likelihood have negative impacts on investments in, in, in that area.”
  EV charging infrastructure
• “Maybe just coming back to, to the beginning and, and the intervention of Mr. Gizycki. Yes. I mean, some of the targets which we have are quite ambitious, but if you put them in context and you refer to the 18,000 recharging infrastructure points which are required by 2030. I mean, when you look at the wider deployment, we are speaking about more than 100,000 recharging points each year in Europe, which are added to the existing recharging points. So if you if you put it in perspective, we still believe it is feasible. Having said that, we obviously see that I mean, for certain segments, and I mentioned the truck segment before, we are in close discussion not only with member states but also with investors. I'm thinking in particular about banks to ensure that indeed the necessary financial support can be granted. You know, that we have also a financial instrument, the alternative Fuels Infrastructure Facility, and our plan is in the years to come, to focus in particular on those segments where we still see the need for intervention, also from the EU side. Maybe just one more thing, because this has also been mentioned in this context is, is the low utilization rates. And here indeed and what what we have seen is that probably a lot of operators expected over the last years a bigger uptake of electric vehicles and, and probably in the past, this was not as, as, as significant as some of the operators had had assumed.”
  EV charging infrastructure
• “All the staff that worked on this opinion and welcome the direction of the draft prepared by Mrs. Wisniewski. We appreciate its clear focus on the core competencies, especially the importance of enforcing existing legislation such as the GDPR and the AI act, which are horizontal legislations providing widespread set of protection, including for workers. Our approach will remain pragmatic. We believe that in the opinion remit, the priority should be implementing and enforcing the legislation we already have, rather than creating additional burdens. Let's remember that the AI act was only adopted last year and it's not yet fully applicable. Our intention is to give our colleagues an ample a clear overview of existing rules, and we are confident that the. Negotiations will lead to a successful outcome and we look forward to continued constructive cooperation. Thank you.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• “Dear colleagues, I'm speaking to you as a victim of Pegasus. In 2019, when I was running for the parliament for half a year, I was under attack. I was attacked by those people. Some of them spoke today. 90,000 messages have been stolen from me. They have been modified and published on public TV with the changes, they have been distorted. There have been five trials. I have sued them and I have won. But it proves that Pegasus can be used to destroy people. What else did they do to us? The civic coalition. We were being sent by them. False documents about the elections. That's how this program was used. The spyware. It's hard to speak about it because before me, a colleague has spoken. A colleague who was imprisoned because of organizing an illegal operation against another person. Much Ivancik was in prison. He is a criminal. He was sentenced. The sentence has been issued by the court. Why is he here? Because he has been pardoned. He was pardoned by the president from the same party. Pegasus was used in Poland to destroy independent judges, journalists, to stage provocations, to intercept the opposition, to influence the election results. This cannot be allowed to repeat in any member state. The their television is now a publishing materials against Tusk. Those are materials generated by Pegasus. This is populism. We need to fight it.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• “We have launched, in fact, a Clean Transport Corridor initiative where we have signed up with nine member states along two corridors. The one is from the Mediterranean, down, up, sorry to the Scandinavian, and the other one is from the North Sea to the Baltic Sea, where we have signed together with nine member states along these corridors joint declarations and where we are working now on roadmaps to ensure that we have zero emission freight corridors by 2030 in place. And so we are currently mapping the existing and the planned recharging infrastructure projects along these 220 corridors. And and in this context, again, we are trying to address problems of access to electricity grids permitting and so on and so forth. Next slide please. And I'm almost coming to an end. This year, for the end of this year, we have foreseen a review of our alternative funding, alternative fuels infrastructure regulation. Sorry. Indeed. We have now launched the work on the accompanying impact assessment. And what we are going to look here at are, first of all, the targets, the minimum targets which we have set for cars and vans and also for HDB. So for, for for truck, we are also looking beyond the road transport also at issues of shipping and aviation. So basically the electrification and onshore power supply of ports and airports and where we are on, on that front. And then there are two issues which I guess are also important for this house.”
  EV charging infrastructure
• “How we could in particular at the subnational level, define what targets is. But one of the areas which we will certainly look at are rural areas, because we know that, I mean, in particular in cities and along highways there are little problems, but in rural areas there are. So again, against this background we will focus in the context of the revision of half year. Also on on on these questions and and then maybe my last two points. First of all, I mean, you know like leave the decision to consumers and the industry. I mean, I don't have to remind you that we had just proposed a revision of the CO2 standards for cars and vans, and there we have provided more flexibility and technologically neutral approach. So I don't think I need to dwell on this because you are perfectly aware of that. But again, I what what we will do going forward is, is, is, is is still keep the line and and and focus on the decarbonization also on, on on road transport and and this obviously also one of the issues here is the question of fair pricing. Fair pricing, as I mentioned before we will look also at in the context of the review, and I think I stop here.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “Thank you. A number of you were referring to questions of of price transparency and whether prices are too high and whether there are price abuses going on. So I will take them all together and and answer as follows. For the time being, we do not have any clear indications that there are price abuses. It is true that what we see are, on the one hand, high deployment costs of recharging infrastructure. We also see in some places high taxation or high taxes. And we also see high electricity network costs. And if you take this all together then this probably will explain at least to quite some extent, the fact that prices vary quite significantly from one place to another. We we will look into this more closely during the review of of our fear. So this is one of the topics which we, we, we clearly have on our agenda. We would obviously want to also ensure a strong monitoring of the market. Well, on the one hand by the commission, but obviously also through the competent national authorities so that this is, is being taken care for. Care of. So no price abuses. But we obviously are not in favour of any form of price regulation. Because we believe that this would be counterproductive as this will in all likelihood have negative impacts on investments in, in, in that area.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• “Thank you. President. Good afternoon, and thank you very much for inviting me. I was already here last year where I gave you an update on the implementation of our alternative fuels infrastructure regulation, where I highlighted a number of issues which are still valid today. So the situation has not significantly changed. First of all, this is my first message to you. Users of electric vehicles or cars are facing increasingly a better situation regarding recharging services. Second point, however, is that for a number of issues for example, when we look at the segment of trucks, we see also obstacles, and therefore we believe that we need to continue to support market development concerning recharging and refuelling infrastructure, maybe as a, as a quick reminder and maybe we can go to the next slide and I will not take you through all these articles just to say that the regulation sets binding targets for the deployment of recharging infrastructure for cars, for vans, for trucks. But these are minimum targets because we obviously rely first and foremost on the market to deliver the necessary recharging infrastructure. But in any case, this means that the recharging infrastructure grows in line with the vehicle uptake. So the more electric cars and vans and so on are registered in the EU, the higher will also be our recharging infrastructure targets. There's also a second target, which is important because you know that we have a Trans-European transport network also for roads. And obviously here we also have distance targets to ensure safe journeys across Europe on European highways.”
  EV charging infrastructure
• “And you see this also indicated in the degree of overachievement of 164% as an EU average. So this means that in principle we have good coverage. But it also means, unfortunately, that we have a rather low utilization rates. And this is obviously a challenge for recharging operators because some of the infrastructure can then obviously not be operated in a profitable way. The present maybe then just one word for, for our 20 distance targets, which I mentioned before. Again, the picture is quite positive, in particular in Western Europe, where most of the electric vehicles are registered, we have now a sufficient minimum coverage achieved. And and obviously we are working right now that this rollout also, accelerates across other parts of Europe. Now the last point here HGV or trucks. I mentioned already that this is a bit of a challenge as we speak. First of all, as you know, there are not many electric trucks on our highways. And, and and and and many of the recharging points which exist are not necessarily suitable for trucks and their trailers. So this is an issue which we which we are looking at because it obviously requires proper planning in terms of grid availability, electricity grid availability, in terms of space being available and obviously power output. So that we help developing this market for, for, for, for trucks. And you see that quite a number of recharging Points must still be installed to reach our 2030 targets. Next slide. And this brings me back to the issue of trucks.”
  EV charging infrastructure