Yannis MANIATIS

Policy topics Yannis MANIATIS is active on

What Yannis MANIATIS has said (80)

• 2026-06-16 “(11:29:52 – 11:31:07): Madam president, high representative, the situation in The Middle East continues to be inflammatory irrespective of the agreement between Iran and The United States. The attacks of Iran didn't bring the desired results, for mister Trump, but quite the opposite created instability in the region for the world economy, and it strengthened the Iranian regime. The Israeli attacks on Lebanon create great instability in Lebanon and throughout the region, and the violence on the West Bank undermines any possibilities for peace. Irrespective of that, Europe remains absent with the council once again not being able to agree on the most simple things. This is if what we do need at this point is a strong Europe in the region that will bolster the government of Lebanon, providing hope for the region, which will have the courage to defend international law and and to condemn the violations of the far right government of Israel and provide hope for the people of Iran for a better future as well. Thank you.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-03-16 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. In this context, the EU attaches the greatest importance to safeguarding the sovereign rights of all Member States, in full respect of international law. Unequivocal commitment to international agreements and the UN Charter, as well as abstaining from unilateral actions which violate international law and the sovereign rights of Member States, remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye. The Commission is aware of reports regarding the alleged obstruction of cable-laying activities under the SEA-SPINE project co-funded by Connecting European Facility (CEF Digital) [1] , which aims to enhance digital connectivity between Greek islands and it is a strategic priority for the EU’s digital transition. Following inquiries via European Health and Digital Executive Agency , the consortium confirmed that the Ocean Link vessel completed its scheduled works between Amorgos and Astypalaia without disruption. While no formal notification of hailing was received, the Commission underscores that all EU-funded infrastructure projects operate in full compliance with international law (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [2] ). The EU rejects any unilateral actions that impede lawful activities . Given the critical role of submarine cables in securing the EU’s digital resilience, the Commission is in close cooperation with Member States to ensure the smooth completion of the project and will continue to monitor closely the situation and the project’s implementation. [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-makes-available-eu200-million-submarine-cable-and-digital-infrastructure-projects. [2] https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2026-02-12 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. The EU also remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and its acquis. [1] In its 2025 Enlargement Report, the Commission has expressed concerns about the mentioned electricity interconnection project between Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot Community. This interconnection project is not included in the 2026 Ten Year Network Development Plan of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). The Commission is not aware of any contacts between the ENTSO-E and the Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation (TEİAŞ) on the potential project mentioned, however, will continue to pay highest attention to this matter. In the context of the Observer Membership Agreement with ENTSO-E, TEİAŞ committed to ensure cooperation with all European Transmission System Operators (TSOs) at pan-European, regional and bilateral levels. The fulfilment of this requirement entails that the process of developing any type of interconnection is done with the consent of the TSO certified for the island of Cyprus under EU law. The mentioned interconnection does not have Project of Mutual Interest (PMI) status and cannot benefit from EU funding. The Commission supports the development of an electricity interconnection between Greece and the island of Cyprus with the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI). It has been awarded the status as Project of Common Interest and a EUR 657 million grant under the Connecting Europe Facility. [1] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bb4ddd1-4f20-4ee0-92db-926996ec8dd1_en?filename=t%C3%BCrkiye-report-2025.pdf, p. 62-63.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-02-05 “E-000474/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has repeatedly underlined 1 that Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations and respect the sovereignty of all Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Commission continues monitoring the situation. No flights of Turkish military jets over Greek inhabited areas have been reported since February 2023. Nevertheless, Türkiye continued to systematically issue general navigational warnings challenging Greek sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction 2 . The Council has noted the overall improvements in the relation between Greece and Türkiye, underlining its expectation for them to be sustained 3 . The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. The main aim of European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs) within the European Defence Industry Programme 4 is to enhance the EU's defence industrial sovereignty and readiness. EDPCIs are large, multi-state programs led by at least four Member States and supported by EU instruments under certain modalities. These projects focus on EU capability priorities and aim to pool demand, streamline supply chains, and reinforce the European defence technological and industrial base, while addressing urgent defence needs. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bb4ddd1-4f20-4ee0-92db926996ec8dd1_en?filename=t. 2 See footnote 1. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202502643.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2026-02-04 “E-000440/2026 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) represents an excellent achievement for the EU agri-food sector. It will remove or reduce often prohibitive tariffs on EU exports of agri-food products, creating huge new market opportunities for the EU, notably as regards table olives and olive oils. India will fully remove duties on table olives either at entry into force or after a transition period of seven years depending on the specific tariff line. Conversely, the EU will eliminate tariffs either at entry into force or over a period of up to five years depending on the specific tariff line. Olives are not a native crop in India and India’s production of olives is very limited. 2. The Commission is not aware of the actions taken by the Greek Government and invites the Honourable Member of Parliament to contact the relevant national authorities.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Export of EU agri-food products
• 2026-02-04 “E-000436/2026 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 1. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) investigation referred to by the Honourable Member is still on-going and the EPPO has not taken yet a decision about bringing the case before a competent national criminal court. As mentioned by the EPPO in its press release of 20 May 2025 related to this investigation: ‘All persons concerned are presumed innocent until proven guilty in the competent Greek courts of law’ 1 . 2. EU law requires paying agencies to respect specific accreditation criteria 2 in order to implement the Common Agricultural Policy. Among these criteria, the paying agency needs to respect specific human-resource standards and risk assessment standards, including measures to identify and manage fraud and any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the EU. The accreditation of the Greek paying agency is currently under probation and the Commission is specifically addressing the issues related to the compliance with the accreditation criteria under the on-going action plan presented by the Greek authorities. 1 https://www.eppo.europa.eu/en/media/news/greece-eppo-probes-opekepe-officials-over-alleged-organisedagricultural-subsidy-fraud. 2 Annex I of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/127: https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2022/127/oj/eng.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
• 2025-11-18 “E-004589/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Great Sea Interconnector that has been included again on the latest EU list 1 of projects of common interest under the Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E) Regulation 2 , is one of the Energy Highway initiatives identified in the European Grids Package 3 to which the Commission will continue to give strong political and technical support. Whilst the project has encountered delays, the Commission is not aware of a new timetable for the implementation having been set and is working closely with the Cypriot and Greek authorities and the project promoter to overcome the delays. At the same time, regarding the funding that the project has received under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), the conditions set out in the grant agreement apply, including regarding timelines. The inclusion of the project on the EU list and the CEF funding entail that the project fulfils the criteria of the TEN-E Regulation, including a positive cost-benefit analysis. The Cypriot and Greek authorities are looking into certain economic parameters with the objective of accelerating project implementation. The Commission supports such an acceleration. The discussions between the Commission and the Cypriot and Greek authorities comprise geopolitical risks and the Commission is fully engaged to strongly emphasize the EU dimension of the project to third countries to prevent further implementation delays. The Commission also set out its expectations in the 2025 Enlargement report for Türkiye 4 accompanying the 2025 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy 5 . 1 C(2025) 8144 final. 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure. 3 COM(2025) 1005 final. 4 SWD(2025) 756 final, p. 57. 5 COM(2025) 690 final.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration · EU funding for transportation
• 2025-11-05 “E-004373/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission As far as question 1 is concerned, the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) 1 sets out an obligation to install solar energy equipment in certain categories of residential and non-residential buildings. This obligation includes both solar thermal and solar photovoltaic (PV) or the combination of solar PV and thermal (PVT) with clear deadlines. Although the EPBD does not set an obligation to deploy a specific solar thermal capacity, the Commission’s EPBD guidance on solar energy buildings 2 recommends that buildings’ energy needs – both heat and electricity – are taken into account when deciding between PV, solar thermal, or combinations of the two. In addition, as solar thermal energy differs from PV in terms of space requirements, the guidance further recommends that the available roof area be considered in the decision-making process. The combination of solar PV and solar thermal can reduce constraints on the electricity grid and contribute to the resilience of the energy system. In what relates to question 2, Article 10, provides flexibility for Member States in implementing the obligations to deploy suitable solar installations on buildings including allowing exemptions related to technical suitability, economic feasibility and functional feasibility of solar installations. Where grid-related concerns arise, exemptions from the solar obligation should not be automatically granted. Instead, alternative solutions such as selfconsumption, energy storage or energy sharing should be considered first. Deferral may only be considered if these options remain unfeasible due to grid concerns. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1275/oj/eng. 2 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/fd6f89fe-711b-4025-bc3776b99baaa3fe_en?filename=Solar%20energy%20in%20buildings%20%28Article%2010%29%20%20annex%208.pdf.”
  EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects · Energy performance of buildings
• 2025-11-05 “E-004374/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is closely monitoring developments concerning the possible extension of United States Section 232 measures to canned food products. The Commission maintains regular communication with the United States authorities at both technical and political levels to ensure that the EU’s interests are fully taken into account. In this context, the Commission is requesting that the United States exempt EU exports from any further extension of Section 232 measures on steel and aluminium derivatives. This would preserve the spirit of the political deal agreed by the President of the Commission and the President of the United States, as reflected in the Joint Statement 1 . This would ensure that EU exports of canned goods and fruit compotes are only subject to the single, all-inclusive 15% tariff rate, and do not face any other duties or further administrative requirements. The Commission will continue to advocate for EU consumers, producers and exporters. The Commission is fully committed to protecting EU industries from unfair competition from imports. The EU has over 220 trade defence measures in place, including – since 2008 – antidumping measures on imports of prepared or preserved citrus fruits from China 2 , under expiry review since 21 October 2025. The Commission conducts investigations where it receives evidence from any affected EU industry of injury suffered from dumped and/or subsidised imports and that action is warranted. The peach compote industry is invited to contact the Commission’s trade defence services 3 to discuss the issues of concern. 1 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreementreciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en. 2 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2020/1534/2021-09-07. 3 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/contacts/trade-defence-enquiries_en.”
  EU-US trade relations · Trade relations with China
• 2025-10-31 “E-004281/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Indeed, hydropower is an important energy source being the EU’s second largest source of renewable electricity, following wind power. Hydropower produces about 29.9% of all renewable electricity in the EU, having an important role for attaining the 2030 targets and the 2050 decarbonisation objectives. Besides renewable generation, the technology also provides system services that help integrating a growing share of renewables, such as flexibility and storage. Following the submission of the final Greek National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), the Commission published its assessment 1 , taking note of the information provided by Greece on hydropower. Please note that the European Semester Country Report is a document published by the Commission, which provides a detailed analysis of each Member State’s economic and social developments and challenges. Regarding possible EU funding, according to the information available to the Commission, this project has not been supported under any programme, e.g. Recovery and Resilience Facility, 2 , InvestEU 3 , European Fund for Strategic Investments 4 , or cohesion policy funds. Furthermore, no technical assistance has been provided to the project, under the InvestEU Advisory Hub or European Investment Advisory Hub 5 . 1 SWD(2025) 140 final. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en. 3 https://investeu.europa.eu/index_en. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/economy-works-people/european-fundstrategic-investments_en. 5 https://investeu.europa.eu/investeu-programme/investeu-advisory-hub_en.”
  EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2025-10-15 “P-003991/2025 E-004053/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Following the submission of the written questions by the Honourable Member, immediate action was taken by the responsible services to correct the relevant parts of the report. The EU recognises only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law. With regard to the Türkiye-Libya Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea, the European Council has recalled, in June 2025, that it infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states 1 . EU public documents, such as the Enlargement package 2 , have repeatedly highlighted the EU positions on those issues. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/cjtb3oep/20250626-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2584.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU policy on Western Sahara
• 2025-10-06 “E-003911/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission During the last wildfire season (June-October 2025), Greece activated the Copernicus Emergency Management Service (CEMS) 1 – rapid mapping component 16 times to support response operations. To date, the CEMS – risk and recovery component has not been used to assess the impact of drought on forest ecosystems. However, the drought component of CEMS provides, without the need of any activation, near real-time data on drought impacts on vegetation. Moreover, Greece is also part of the EU Working Group on water scarcity and drought together with the responsible of CEMS Drought. Under the Rural Development Programme 2014-2022, a total of EUR 81 million is available for forestry-related measures, of which EUR 69 million has already been disbursed. Similar interventions are also planned under the Common Agricultural Policy Strategic Plan 20232027 2 . Under Horizon Europe, a European co-funded partnership on Forests and Forestry for a Sustainable Future has been proposed, but Greece has not yet expressed interest in joining. Cohesion policy allocates EUR 1.4 billion in 2021-2027 3 (including national co-financing) through national and regional programmes to support prevention, risk and disaster management measures across Greece including forest related actions. To date, projects totalling EUR 1.3 billion have been selected for co-financing. Through its Joint Research Centre, the Commission also provides software to facilitate forest die-off monitoring with Copernicus satellite data in near-real-time 4 . 1 https://emergency.copernicus.eu/. 2 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/. 3 https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/. 4 https://forest.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/activities/forest-disturbances/#div2.”
  Management of EU forests · EU policy on infrastructure for preventing climate-related disasters (floods, droughts, extreme weather etc.)
• 2025-10-06 “E-003910/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has not been made aware by the Greek authorities of the planned project in question. In the context of the 3 rd Community Support Framework 2000-2006, the Regional Operational Programme for Peloponnese funded two projects for the upgrading of the rail lines Korinthos – Andritsa and Argos – Nafplio, and of the rail lines Andritsa – Kalamata, Zevgolatio – Kalonero and Lefktro – Megalopolis with the European Regional Development Fund contribution. In the context of the 1 st Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, the Greek parliament passed the act restructuring the Hellenic Railways Organisation in March 2011. As part of the restructuring, the country implemented the closure of loss-making train routes, including those of the Peloponnese rail network. However, it should be noted that the sections Korinthos – Andritsa, Andritsa – Kalamata and Zevgolatio – Kalonero are part of the comprehensive trans-European transport network policy (TEN-T) passenger and freight rail network as defined in the Regulation 2024/1679. Therefore, measures promoting the efficient and sustainable use of all existing and planned TEN-T transport infrastructures should be implemented by the Member States, in line with the milestones foreseen by the above-mentioned Regulation, which for the comprehensive TEN-T extend to 2050. Union funding can support eligible actions that contribute to TEN-T objectives, notably through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for studies and works. Greece may also combine support from other EU instruments (e.g., cohesion policy funds), observing all programme-specific rules, state-aid provisions, and co-financing rates. Double funding remains prohibited.”
  EU support of rail transport · EU funding for transportation
• 2025-09-04 “E-003432/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Sub-investment 4 of the measure 16994 – 'Energy Efficiency and promotion of Renewable Energy Sources for auto-consumption’ within the Greek Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP), aims to provide financial support to households, specifically for the installation of new solar water heaters. This sub-investment entails the installation of 130,100 solar water heating systems and heat pumps for households, out of which, 26,020 will be for energy poor households. The Commission will assess the implementation of this measure in the context of the ninth payment request to be submitted in September 2026 at the latest. In addition, the Commission may use the European Semester process to bring further attention to the issues related to implementation. The Commission will also assess the draft National Building Renovation Plans that Member States have to submit by the end of 2025 under article 3 of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 1 . These plans must include information about financial investments, including public investments, and how these respond to national needs. In order to offer protection and support to vulnerable households, these plans must provide information about the assistance provided to vulnerable households through the Member State’s policies, measures and investments. These draft plans will be assessed by the Commission and, where relevant, will be followed by recommendations. The final plans will be submitted by end of 2026. The Commission is in close contact with all Member States on the implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) 2 , for example in the context of the Concerted Action framework 3 . In this context, the Commission assesses the timeliness of the Member States’ actions and can act if there are unjustified delays. 1 Directive (EU) 2024/1275 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the energy performance of buildings: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1275/oj/eng. 2 Directive (EU) 2023/1791 on energy efficiency: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/1791/oj/eng. 3 https://www.ca-eed.eu/.”
  Energy performance of buildings · Energy efficiency
• 2025-09-04 “E-003431/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU has supported the Turkish Coast guard in the form of financial assistance for the supply of search and rescue vessels. Assistance has been provided under the condition that the vessels will be of civilian use, while their technical specifications will allow only for search and rescue operations. As outlined in the relevant programming documents 1 , the search and rescue operations of these boats will be carried out in line with international human rights standards and in full respect of the sovereignty and relevant jurisdiction of Member States in accordance with international law. The implementation of the pre-accession assistance in Türkiye follows the EU Financial Regulation 2,3 . The Commission monitors its programmes through several means, including regular reports from implementing partners, on-the-spot verification missions, results-oriented monitoring exercises and external evaluations. If there is evidence that a beneficiary violated the applicable European legislation during the implementation of a project and did not comply with EU rules, the Commission and the national agency shall make use of all available means, including terminating the cooperation and recovering the EU funds. Any allegations will be investigated on the basis of provided evidence. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/32ff8768-90e8-49ef-8ae82fdaf429d399_en?filename=C_2024_9168_F1_ANNEX_EN_V1_P1_3857028.PDF. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkey-negotiating-framework-october-2005_en. 3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast).”
  EU-Turkey relations · Trade relations with Turkey
• 2025-08-20 “E-003265/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The projects relate to measure 16289: ‘Strategy for Excellence in Universities & Innovation’ of Greece’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) 1 . Following Greece’s request to modify its RRP, the project ‘Trust Your Stars’ was removed from the RRP as approved by the Council on 17 July 2025. The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) 2 is a performance-based instrument. The only condition for RRF payments to Member States is the satisfactory fulfilment of milestones and targets. Pursuant to Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241, Member States are primarily responsible for the protection of the financial interests of the EU under the RRF. They must put in place an effective and efficient internal control system and ensure that the use of EU funds complies with EU and national rules. For each payment request, national authorities must submit a management declaration that the funds were used for their intended purpose and that the control systems give the necessary assurances that the funds were managed in accordance with all applicable rules. In Greece’s RRP’s management and control framework, the implementing bodies (such as ministries or other public authorities) are responsible for the implementation of RRP measures, while ensuring compliance with EU and national rules. Based on Greece’s information, for measure 16289, the Commission has positively assessed the first milestone (M147), which required issuing approval decisions for certain projects. The second and final milestone (M150) that concerns the completion of the projects will be assessed by the Commission during the RRP’s ninth payment request. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resiliencefacility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en.”
  Research priorities within the EU · Governance of academic priorities within the EU
• 2025-08-18 “E-003252/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The exceptional temporary support to farmers, forest holders and small and medium-sized enterprises particularly affected by natural disasters (Measure 23) provided in accordance with Article 6a of Regulation (EU) 2020/2220 1 has to be paid by 31 December 2025, based on applications for support approved by the competent authority by 30 June 2025 (paragraph 5 of Article 6a). It is therefore not possible to change the targeting of the support or approve new applications for support now. Paragraph 4 of Article 6a requires that the Member States target the support to beneficiaries who are most affected by natural disasters, by determining eligibility conditions on the basis of available evidence. The targeting of the support in Greece and its justification has been included in the Greek Rural Development Programme and approved by the Commission. As different types of natural disasters have occurred in the Member States, and as the structure and characteristics of the agricultural sector vary between the Member States, the groups of beneficiaries who are most affected by natural disasters may vary between the Member States. 1 Regulation (EU) 2020/2220 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 laying down certain transitional provisions for support from the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and from the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) in the years 2021 and 2022 and amending Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013, (EU) No 1306/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013 as regards resources and application in the years 2021 and 2022 and Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 as regards resources and the distribution of such support in respect of the years 2021 and 2022.”
  Agricultural funding
• 2025-08-08 “E-003216/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1. In the context of the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) 1 many guidance documents that include exchanges of best practices have been developed. Those related to the management of water stress, climate change, and the reuse of wastewater for the purpose of irrigation are particularly relevant. 2. Support can be gathered from several EU funding tools, including the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 2 , as regards improving water resilience. The Greek CAP Strategic Plan 2023-2027 contains support for actions which improve water resilience, such as support for switching to drought-resilient species, efficient irrigation and nature-based solutions. Other measures activated for the river basin of the Arda are included in the third River Basin Management Plans currently being assessed. The assessment will be published end of 2025. After publication the Commission will launch a structural dialogue with Greece about its implementation of the Water Framework Directive 3 . 3. The Commission is aware that the Greek Bulgarian bilateral agreement for the Arda river was renewed on 2 May 2025 for a period of five years. Türkiye is not currently a party to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Water Convention: this limits the legal and institutional tools available. Yet, Türkiye would seemingly be willing to participate in trilateral transboundary water governance. 1 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/water/water-framework-directive_en. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agricultural-policy_en. 3 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32–35.”
  EU policy on water management
• 2025-08-08 “E-003217/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has repeatedly expressed, most recently in the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 1 , its expectation that Türkiye unequivocally commits to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes including through the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations and respect the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all Member States, in accordance with international law, including customary international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This is essential to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye, which represents an EU strategic interest. The EU remains committed to defend its interests and those of its Member States as well as to uphold regional stability. Member States are solely responsible for applying the eight criteria of the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 2 . Member States committed to strong national positions under the Common Position, including strict application of criteria four and five as a basis for denying a licence. National assessment on a case-by-case basis has resulted in some instances in a denial or suspension of exports to Türkiye, as shown in the public online database operated by the European External Action Service 3 , which reflects annual EU reports on arms export. Member States continuously work in the Common Foreign and Security Policy framework to promote convergence in arms exports. The Council’s Working Party on Conventional Arms Export remains seized of arms exports to Türkiye. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008E0944. 3 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eeasqap/sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078-f616633118bb/sheet/74299ecd7a90-4b89-a509-92c9b96b86ba/state/analysis.”
  Trade relations with Turkey · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-08-06 “E-003200/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and has called on Türkiye to fully respect international law, to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to promote good-neighbourly relations in a sustainable way 1 . In the same context, the EU remains determined to use, if need be, the instruments and options at its disposal to defend its interests and those of its Member States. The EU has noted the recent improvements in relations between Greece and Türkiye in the expectation that they will be sustainable 2 . To this respect, Greece and Türkiye have activated multiple work strands. The EU has also made clear that Türkiye must respect the sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all Member States, as well as all their sovereign rights and continues to expect Türkiye to unequivocally commit to the peaceful settlement of disputes, having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice 3 . The Commission does not have information about submission of the Türkiye’s declaration of marine parks to the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Such map is not published anywhere on the Maritime Spatial Planning Global (MSPglobal) site. MSPglobal country profile for Türkiye does not display any map and contains a disclaimer, that ‘the information in this country profile does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Links to other sites are provided for information only’. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57442/2022-06-2324-euco-conclusions-en.pdf. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16707-2023-INIT/en/pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-07-30 “E-003139/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The specific projects mentioned for the expansion of irrigation network around Anavalos have been supported under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). Funding under the EAFRD is executed under the shared management implementation mode. Consequently, the project approval process and further implementation falls under the responsibility of the Member States, and, hence, the Commission does not have information on individual submitted applications. The Commission in not aware of the specific study mentioned. Greece submitted its Third River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) pursuant to Directive 2000/60/EC (the Water Framework Directive) 1 in June 2024. The Commission is currently assessing the Greek RBMPs, together with those of seven other late Member States, and the measures included therein. The Greek Third RBMPs show that Greece is assessing the impact of artificial recharge. Artificial recharge of aquifers was implemented in all River Basin Districts between 2015 and 2021 and new artificial recharges are planned for 2022-2027. The Commission envisages to publish the results of the assessment of the Geek RBMPs by the end of 2025. As a follow up to the assessment, the Commission will engage in a structured dialogue with Greece to address the recommendations it will make to enhance the implementation of water legislation in the country. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/60/oj/eng.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-07-30 “E-003140/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Following a ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU 1 whereby Greece was declared to have failed to fulfil its obligations under the Water Framework Directive 2 , the third River Basin Management Plans were finally adopted and submitted. The Commission is assessing them and intends to publish the results end of 2025. Among the information provided, abstraction is a main reason for 6.1% of surface water bodies failing good ecological status. Lake Plastiras is identified as a highly modified waterbody with moderate ecological potential. According to the data reported by the Greek authorities, 14.1% of the groundwater bodies failed good quantitative status. The Plan reported includes measures on infrastructure, dams, and water reuse. Once its assessment will be finalised, the Commission will, in line with the EU Water Resilience Strategy 3 , engage in a structured dialogue with all relevant Greek authorities to address the country-specific recommendations it will make. Under the 2021–2027 Cohesion Policy 4 , public funding resources amounting to approximately EUR 626 million may support investments in sustainable water management in Greece. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) supports irrigation projects, with the Greek CAP Strategic Plan 2023-2027 providing up to EUR 260 million 5 . However the selection and implementation of such projects are the responsibility of the Greek managing authorities. Therefore, the Commission does not have at its disposal a detailed list of individual projects. The Commission also notes that proposed amendments to Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 6 and 2021/1056 7 highlight water resilience as a new EU priority, with flexibilities for Member States to increase support during the mid-term review of their programmes. 1 https://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-359/24. 2 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32–35. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/environment/water-resilience-strategy_en. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/available-budget_en. 5 Union contribution for interventions P3-73-1.1 and P3-73-1.4 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/category/sskap2023-2027/sskap-egkrisi-tropopoiiseis/. 6 Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund, OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, pp. 60–93. 7 Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund, OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, pp. 1–20.”
  EU policy on water management
• 2025-07-25 “E-003090/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The competent authorities of Greece have submitted all relevant information regarding sheep pox and goat pox (SGP) in accordance with EU legislation. This has been done through regular information notes and detailed presentations at the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed 1 . EU technical support has been consistently provided to Greece through various means, including the EU Reference Laboratory and the EUVET expert team 2 visit from 13 to 16 May 2025. Additionally numerous bilateral contacts and exchanges of letters with Greek authorities have occurred. Among other recommendations, vaccination, with support from the EU vaccine bank, has been strongly advised to Greece to mitigate the impact of the disease. Support for SGP surveillance is available in high-risk areas through two EU co-financed programs: TADs and THRACE. Control and eradication measures for sheep pox and goat pox may qualify for EU co-funding at a maximum rate of 30% 3 4 5 . Eligible costs include compensation for certain direct costs, such as the mandatory culling of animals or costs for essential control measures like disinfection. Moreover, exceptional EU support 6 may be granted to cover market losses incurred by farmers in areas under movement restrictions. Specific support can also be provided through the Greek Rural Development Programme 2014-2022 7 and the Common Agricultural Policy Strategic Plan 2023-2027 (CSP) 8 for investments aiming at restoring agricultural potential following catastrophic events. 1 https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal-topics/committees/paff-committees/animal-health-and-welfare_en. 2 https://food.ec.europa.eu/animals/animal-diseases/veterinary-emergency-team_en. 3 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/690/oj. 4 C(2023) 8926 final, Commission Implementing Decision of 21.12.2023 on the financing of the Programme for the internal market, competitiveness of enterprises, including small and medium-sized enterprises, the area of plants, animals, food and feed, and European Statistics and the adoption of the work programme for 2024-2027 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6150e32-3fa5-4276-923ba36faf4fec1e_en?filename=C_2023_8926_F1_COMMISSION_IMPLEMENTING_DECISION_EN_V3_P1_31 19489.PDF. 5 Annex 3 to C(2023) 8926 final, Commission Implementing Decision of 21.12.2023 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/c69d5f53-6966-420f-86287ff84bf91646_en?filename=C_2023_8926_F1_ANNEX_EN_V2_P1_3132789.PDF. 6 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1308/2024-11-08). 7 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/metra-paa-pages/ependytika-epicheirimatika/. 8 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/category/sskap-2023-2027/sskap-egkrisi-tropopoiiseis/.”
  Agricultural funding · Animal diseases prevention and management in the EU
• 2025-07-25 “E-003093/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has been gravely alarmed by violent incidents that have occurred in Syria since March 2025, and have claimed a high number of victims, including civilians. The EU strongly condemned the terrorist attack perpetrated against Mar Elias church 1 , and more recently, the violence in Southern Syria 2 . The EU called for a transparent, credible and impartial investigation, and for all perpetrators to be held accountable and brought to justice. In May 3 and June 4 2025, the EU introduced sanctions against human rights violators. The EU believes that it is the time for dialogue and for advancing a truly inclusive and peaceful, Syrian-led transition that guarantees human rights and fulfils the aspirations of all Syrians. Syria’s transitional authorities bear the responsibility to protect all Syrians without distinction, and to take necessary steps towards disarmament, demobilisation and the restructuring of national security forces in line with international norms and standards. Furthermore, all parties must stop all acts of violence, ensure the safety of all civilians, and prevent any further incitement and sectarian discourse. The EU welcomed the transitional authorities’ commitment to build a new Syria based on national reconciliation, rule of law, and human rights for all Syrians: the National Dialogue Conference, the adoption of a Constitutional Declaration, and the appointment of two transitional justice authorities were first steps in this long process. The EU will continue to call for the implementation of these commitments and for the full, equal and meaningful participation of all Syrians in all spheres of political life and society and will continue to follow closely developments on the ground. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesperson-terrorist-attack-mar-elias-church-damascus_en. 2 .https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202501110. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202501255.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU relations with Kurdish people · EU-Syria relations
• 2025-07-25 “E-003092/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation form an essential part of Albania’s European integration process as stated in the 2024 enlargement report 1 , as well as in previous ones. In the context of the accession negotiations, Albania has stated its commitment to good neighbourly relations. The Commission took note that the map in question was swiftly removed following its initial publication. As regards the rights of persons belonging to minorities, Albania adopted three bylaws in December 2024, which were necessary to ensure implementation of the relevant framework legislation. These bylaws addressed the crucial issues of free self-identification and the use of languages for persons belonging to minorities, guaranteeing alignment with European standards and the principle of free self-identification. Albania needs to ensure effective implementation of its legislative framework, notably by allocating adequate resources to central agencies and local government, staffing and training of local authorities based on annual projections, including, among others, capacities for data collection. The Commission is now closely monitoring Albania’s progress on empowering the State Committee on National Minorities, which needs to be fully functional and have adequate resources and recruitment procedures in line with the recommendations of the Commission and of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’ Advisory Committee. 1 SWD(2024) 690 final.”
  EU-Albania relations · EU relations with Western Balkans
• 2025-07-22 “E-003035/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to maintaining in place the existing trade defence measures and preventing unfair trade practices that could undermine their effectiveness. Maintaining a robust automotive manufacturing base in the EU and ensuring technological sovereignty in emerging automotive technologies is a priority for the Commission. Achieving this goal requires a holistic and strategic approach, involving all stakeholders across the automotive value chain. To this end, the Commission put forward an Action Plan on the future of the automotive sector alongside complementary actions envisaged in the Clean Industrial Deal, notably the affordable energy action plan 12 . According to the referenced news article, investments in electric vehicle production are underway in Türkiye. The Commission will monitor developments closely to ensure alignment with EU trade defence measures and safeguard the interests of the EU automotive industry. However, as production and exports to the EU have not yet commenced, circumvention cannot be considered at this stage. As a possible remedy, the Commission may initiate an anti-circumvention investigation if there are sufficient indications of circumvention. This formal procedure is triggered when evidence suggests that existing measures, such as countervailing duties, are being circumvented. Governed by strict legal criteria, the investigation determines whether specific actions constitute circumvention. If confirmed, the Commission may extend duties to the circumvented imports to preserve the effectiveness of the original measures. The Commission will continue to act decisively to safeguard the EU automotive industry while promoting innovation and competitiveness. 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 5 March 2025: Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector, COM(2025) 95, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0095. 2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 26 February 2025: Action Plan for Affordable Energy Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans, COM(2025) 79, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0079.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · Trade relations with Turkey
• 2025-07-14 “P-002866/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and continues to expect all countries to respect the sovereignty and the sovereign rights of all Member States, in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Abstaining from unilateral actions which run counter to EU interests, violate international law and the sovereign rights of Member States remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. As recalled by the European Council in June 2025 1 , the Türkiye-Libya Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the customary law based on the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states. The EU firmly believes that maritime delimitation disputes need to be settled by peaceful means, notably through good faith negotiations, and in full respect of international law, including UNCLOS. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/cjtb3oep/20250626-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2025-07-06 “E-002750/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU strongly condemned the terrorist attack perpetrated against Mar Elias church in Damascus, which claimed a large number of victims 1 . This is a grave reminder of the need to intensify efforts against the terrorist threat and to ensure the enduring defeat of Daesh and other terrorist groups, which continue to pose a threat to Syria, the region and Europe. The terrorist attack against Mar Elias church is an attack against all Syrians. The EU stands in solidarity with the Syrian people and supports all efforts by the transitional authorities aimed at ensuring the security of all Syrians with no discrimination. The EU continues to call for an immediate end to violence across Syria and for all those responsible for serious crimes to be held accountable and brought to justice. In May 2 and June 3 2025, the EU also introduced sanctions against human rights violators and those fuelling instability in Syria. Such violent episodes underline the importance of an inclusive transition and the need for state institutions to fulfil their responsibility in maintaining order and protecting the population throughout Syria. The EU welcomed the transitional authorities’ commitment to build a new Syria based on national reconciliation, rule of law, separation of powers, as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms for all Syrians. The holding of a National Dialogue Conference, the adoption of a Constitutional Declaration, and the appointment of a transitional government were first steps in this long process, but the EU will continue to call for the full, equal and meaningful participation of all Syrians in all spheres of political life and society, and will continue to monitor closely developments on the ground. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesperson-terrorist-attack-mar-elias-church-damascus_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202501110. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202501255.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU-Syria relations
• 2025-07-03 “E-002735/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and expects all countries to respect sovereign rights of all Member States, in accordance with international law, including customary international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Abstaining from unilateral actions running counter to EU interests, violating international law and Member States’ sovereign rights remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. On 27 May 2025, the EU lifted all economic sanctions on Syria to support Syria’s inclusive political transition and economic recovery 1 , while maintaining sanctions related to the Assad regime and introducing additional sanctions against human rights violators and those fuelling instability in Syria. While lifting sanctions, the EU confirmed it will continue to closely monitor the developments on the ground and to engage with the transitional government on the steps it pursues to fulfil the aspirations and safeguard the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Syrians from all ethnic and religious backgrounds, without discrimination 2 . The EU commends the transitional government’s statements vowing to develop peaceful relations with all countries in full respect of international law, including customary international law and UNCLOS 3 , while such critical issues for EU interests are raised regularly at political level by the High Representative/Vice-President with her counterparts. The EU firmly believes that maritime delimitation disputes need to be settled by peaceful means, notably through good faith negotiations, and in full respect of international law, including UNCLOS. As recalled by the European Council in June 2025 4 , the Türkiye-Libya Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the customary law based on the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/28/syria-eu-adopts-legal-acts-to-lifteconomic-sanctions-on-syria-enacting-recent-political-agreement/. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/20/syria-council-statement-on-the-lifting-ofeu-economic-sanctions/. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10688-2025-INIT/en/pdf. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/cjtb3oep/20250626-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf.”
  EU-Syria relations · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-06-20 “E-002485/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 1. In the period 2022 to 2024, the main State aid Guidelines allowing for support to energyintensive industry were (i) Section 2.4 of the Temporary Crisis Framework (TCF) and Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF), 1 (ii) Section 4.11 Climate Environmental Protection and Energy Guidelines (CEEAG) 2 , (iii) Emission Trading System State aid Guidelines (ETS) 3 . In that period, the Commission approved 21 schemes under Section 2.4 TCF, 10 schemes under Section 2.4 TCTF, four schemes under Section 4.11 CEEAG and 17 schemes under the ETS Guidelines 4 . 2. The notion of aid is an objective notion explained in the Notice on the notion of State aid 5 . Member States are only required to notify measures if these constitute State aid or if these do not meet the requirements under the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) 6 or the de minimis Regulation 7 . 3. Wholesale energy prices differ across Member States and even within in different bidding zones due to market fundamentals, including, but not limited to, interconnection and grid capacity and regional balance of energy supply and demand 8 . Divergence of wholesale energy prices across Europe does not per se constitute a distortion of competition in the Single Market. Furthermore, the Commission has approved Greek schemes to support energy intensive industries for the ETS allowance prices embedded in electricity prices (SA.103180), for compensation under Section 2.4 TCTF (SA.107915), and reduction on levies raised for renewable sources and high-efficiency cogeneration (SA.52413, adopted on 18 December 2018). Finally, the new Clean Industrial State aid Framework (CISAF) 9 , in its Section 4.5, provides for additional avenues to support certain categories of energy intensive industries. 1 OJ C 101 17.3.2023, p. 3. Initially already included in the Temporary Crisis Framework for State Aid measures to support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia, OJ C 131I, 24.3.2022, p. 1. 2 Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy 2022, OJ C 80, 18.2.2022. 3 Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post-2021, OJ C 317, 25.9.2020. 4 These statistics count new or reintroduced schemes (schemes that expired and were renotified). Amendments and prolongations were not counted. The most recent State aid scoreboard contains further analysis of aid measures, available at: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/scoreboard_en. 5 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 262, 19.7.2016. 6 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 187, 26.6.2014. 7 Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/2831 of 13 December 2023 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, OJ L, 2023/2831, 15.12.2023. 8 The Affordable Energy Action Plan (COM/2025/79) of 26 February 2025 presents several actions to foster the integration of the EU energy markets.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices · Energy transition (state support)
• 2025-06-01 “E-002183/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. Within the EU framework for fiscal policies, it is Member States’ competence to establish, modify taxes and decide upon allocation of collected funds among national, regional or municipal authorities. Tourist taxes tend to be collected on municipal or regional level, though practices vary among Member States. Tourist taxes may support the economy in transitioning towards more sustainable solutions (improving and updating of infrastructure across travel sectors). 2. The Recovery and Resilience Facility is a temporary instrument to aid the EU emerge stronger and more resilient from the COVID-19. Together with the Cohesion Funds, on the basis of national plans prepared by the Greek government and agreed with the Commission, they have supported measures to prepare local communities for future climate impacts, preventing part of the damage caused by weather-related extreme events 1 . The EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) was set up to respond to major natural disasters within Europe. Since its inception in 2002, it has become one of the main EU instruments for post-disaster recovery and expression of EU solidarity. However, the EUSF is intended to support and not replace national measures to mitigate natural disasters. In 2021-2027, Cohesion Policy supports Greece with EUR 1.4 billion for the prevention and management of climate-related risks, through the Civil protection 2 , Environment and Climate Change 3 , and regional programmes 4 . In case of disasters, and if assistance is needed, national authorities can also activate the Union Civil Protection Mechanism 5 . 1 For example, the database of projects financed by the Cohesion Fund currently provides 184 examples of climate adaptation projects in Greece, addressing all these hazards, for a total budget of 450 million euros in the period 2014-21: https://kohesio.ec.europa.eu/en/projects?theme=Climate-change-adaptation-and-riskprevention&policyObjective=Greener,-carbon-free-Europe&country=Greece. 2 https://civilprotection-program.gr/. 3 https://peka-program.gr/. 4 https://www.espa.gr/el/Pages/staticRegionalProgrammes.aspx. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02013D1313-20231218.”
  EU strategy for tourism development
• 2025-06-01 “E-002184/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU and the EU Delegation in Cairo are aware of and closely monitoring the developments following the Ismailia Court of Appeals’ ruling linked to the legal status of Saint Catherine’s Monastery in Sinai. In a meeting called by the Arab Republic of Egypt’s Foreign Ministry, the Egyptian authorities assured Member States’ Ambassadors and the EU Head of Delegation in Cairo that the Egyptian government remains fully committed to preserving the monastery’s religious, historical, and spiritual status. The Egyptian authorities reaffirmed that the monks' access to the site will not be affected by the court ruling. This matter is also subject to ongoing direct negotiations between the Greek and Egyptian governments. The EU, and its Member States, will continue to follow this matter and the commitments made by the government of Egypt.”
  EU-Egypt relations · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2025-04-28 “E-001698/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Fertilisers are highly tradeable internationally and the EU is dependent on imports for most of the inputs they require. Exogeneous developments, such as spikes of natural gas prices or tightening of global supply for phosphatic fertilisers, have a strong impact on production costs. The Commission is currently undertaking several initiatives to support the European industry, among which the Action Plan for Affordable Energy 1 that will benefit energyintensive industries. In addition, the President of the Commission announced a dedicated action plan for the EU chemical industry 2 . The Common Agricultural Policy 3 supports the improvement of nutrient management, that includes the substitution of mineral with bio-based fertilisers, closing nutrient loops and therefore reducing dependencies. Such actions are planned for 15.5% of EU farming area by 2027 4 . A Fertiliser Market Observatory 5 was also established to improve market transparency and monitoring. Fertilisers availability and affordability in the EU improved in 2024, driven by increased nitrogen fertilisers production and lower prices. The Commission is currently exploring the simplification potential for rules on EU fertilising products 6 , including possible disproportionate burden on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Furthermore, SMEs can seek financial support from different EU programmes, like the EU Innovation Fund 7 and the European Hydrogen Bank 8 . 1 eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0079. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/el/read_25_1198. 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013, OJ L435, 6.12.2021. 4 https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DashboardCapPlan/result_indicators.html#. 5 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/markets/overviews/market-observatories/fertilisers_en. 6 Regulation (EU) 2019/ of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 laying down rules on the making available on the market of EU fertilising products and amending Regulations (EC) No 1069/2009 and (EC) No 1107/2009 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2003/2003, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019R1009. 7 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-funding-climate-action/innovation-fund/what-innovation-fund_en. 8 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023DC0156.”
  Use of fertilisers
• 2025-04-14 “E-001530/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU recently adopted countermeasures against the United States (U.S.) tariffs on steel and aluminium 1 but suspended those for 90 days 2 to allow sufficient space and time for negotiations towards a mutually satisfactory solution. Should these negotiations not be successful, the adopted countermeasures can automatically enter into force. The EU also continues preparatory work for possible further proportionate countermeasures in response to other additional U.S. import tariffs. The EU also has at its disposal internal measures to address impacts on EU agricultural producers from situations of market disturbance, including for Greek fruit producers and processing industry. More broadly, the Commission will continue to work on diversifying trade with other partners than the U.S. Regarding possible trade diversion from China caused by the U.S. tariffs, the Commission is monitoring imports closely to ensure that it detects in good time any potential increase in imports due to trade diversion. An Import Surveillance Task Force is set up for this purpose. Should there be any noticeable increase in Chinese imports, the EU will be ready to respond appropriately. Under the EU-Türkiye trade regime for agricultural products, Türkiye’s liberalisation of agricultural trade towards the EU remains indeed more limited than the EU’s liberalisation towards Türkiye. A key objective of modernising the Customs Union with Türkiye would be to achieve mutually enhanced market access for trade in agricultural products. However, progress on this modernisation has been stalled when the Council ceased work on it in 2018. 1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/778 of 14 April 2025 on commercial rebalancing measures concerning certain products originating in the United States of America and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/886, OJ L, 2025/778, 14.4.2025, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/778/oj. 2 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/786 of 14 April 2025 suspending commercial rebalancing measures concerning certain products originating in the United States imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/778 and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2882, OJ L, 2025/786, 14.4.2025, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/786/oj.”
  Export of EU agri-food products · Trade relations with Turkey · EU-US trade relations
• 2025-04-10 “E-001483/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission On 2 April 2025 the United States (US) announced a 10% across-the-board additional tariff on most EU exports to the US as of 5 April, including on table olives from Greece, to be increased to 20% as of 9 April. On 9 April 2025, the US, however, suspended the 20% additional tariff for a 90-day period, while keeping an additional 10% tariff in place. These additional 10% US tariffs also apply to US imports from Egypt, Türkiye, Morocco and other countries. The EU adopted countermeasures against the US tariffs on steel and aluminium 1 but suspended those for 90 days 2 to allow sufficient space and time for negotiations towards a mutually satisfactory solution. Should these negotiations not be successful, the adopted countermeasures can automatically enter into force again. Also, the EU continues preparatory work for possible further proportionate countermeasures in response to other additional US import tariffs. The EU has at its disposal several instruments to address impacts on EU agricultural producers from situations of market disturbance. The EU has successfully challenged at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) the countervailing duties imposed by the US on imports of ripe olives from Spain. This is in the context of trade defence procedures. The US has not imposed any anti-dumping or countervailing duties on table olives from Greece and no specific challenge at the WTO against US tariffs on table olives from Greece is therefore envisaged at this stage. 1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/778 of 14 April 2025 on commercial rebalancing measures concerning certain products originating in the United States of America and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/886, OJ L, 2025/778, 14.4.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/778/oj. 2 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/786 of 14 April 2025 suspending commercial rebalancing measures concerning certain products originating in the United States imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/778 and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2882, OJ L, 2025/786, 14.4.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/786/oj.”
  EU-US trade relations
• 2025-03-27 “E-001299/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Product Environmental Footprint Category Rules for Apparel and Footwear (PEFCR A&F) 1 were developed by the textile industry based on Recommendation 2021/2279 2 . The aim is to facilitate reliable measurement of environmental impacts across a product's life cycle, from raw material extraction to its end-of-life. The PEFCR identifies environmental hotspots to support companies in improving their products but does not allow the communication of an overall single score and therefore cannot underpin the comparison among products made of different fibres in business-to-consumer communication. Circularity aspects, such as renewability and biodegradability, are integrated into the Environmental Footprint (EF) method's 16 impact categories. Separated indicators could lead to double-counting and therefore they are deemed as not needed. Regarding microplastics, while their release is not yet a specific impact category due to the lack of a robust scientific model, the PEFCR A&F already requires an assessment of fibre fragmentation during laundry. The Commission will make an effort to include the latest scientific evidence related to microplastic release in the upcoming revision of the EF methods. The use of natural fibres as a biodegradable and microplastic free alternative to fossil-based synthetic fibres will also be looked at in the context of the review of the EU Bioeconomy Strategy 3 . 1 https://pefapparelandfootwear.eu/. 2 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/2279 of 15 December 2021 on the use of the Environmental Footprint methods to measure and communicate the life cycle environmental performance of products and organisations, C/2021/9332, OJ L 471, 30.12.2021, p. 1–396. 3 expected by the end of 2025: https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-launches-consultation-eubioeconomy-strategy-2025-03-31_en.”
  Green claims · Circular economy · Sustainable fashion
• 2025-03-27 “E-001301/2025 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission 1. Greece has taken steps towards ensuring compliance, i.e. towards finalising, adopting and communicating to the Commission its maritime spatial plan, but these are still to be finalised. The Commission is currently in a dialogue with Greece to support and ensure compliance with the judgment. 2. Pursuant to Article 260(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Greece is required to take the necessary measures to comply with the above-mentioned Court judgment. Concretely, Greece is required to establish its maritime spatial plan and to send copies of that plan to the Commission and any other Member States concerned. The Commission will continue to closely monitor the situation.”
  Decarbonisation of maritime transport · EU ocean policy
• 2025-03-14 “E-001111/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is well informed of the latest developments concerning the Great Sea Interconnector project and the associated risks regarding the project implementation schedule. The Commission is in regular contact with the Greek and Cypriot authorities, at both Ministerial and technical level, as well as with the energy regulatory authorities of the two countries and the project promoter. As a project of common interest under the Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure (‘TEN-E Regulation’) 1 , the Great Sea Interconnector continues to have the full support of the European Commission, as it is intended to end the energy isolation of Cyprus, allow for a higher share of renewables in its energy mix, bring the potential to lower energy prices for consumers and increase the security of energy supply of two EU Member States and the EU system altogether. Projects of common interest are closely monitored by the Commission and there are regular contacts with both governments concerned. So far, the designation of a European coordinator under Article 6 of the TEN-E Regulation has not been considered for the project in question. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/869/oj”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · EU energy infrastructure integration
• 2025-02-14 “E-000748/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission On 26 February 2025, the Commission adopted the Action Plan for Affordable Energy 1 , explicitly pointing to the adoption of two strategies that will shape EU policy in the heating and cooling sector, namely the Electrification Action Plan and the Heating and Cooling Strategy. These strategies aim to reduce our reliance on fossil fuels and lower our greenhouse gas emissions by tighter integration of various parts of our energy system and capturing the potential of clean energy sources, including solar energy. The Commission plans to adopt these strategies in the first quarter of 2026. The Communication on the Clean Industrial Deal 2 , adopted by the Commission on 26 February 2025, lists several business drivers relevant for EU-made clean energy technologies, such as promoting the market, expanding financing possibilities for consumers and improving the availability of skilled workforce. Specifically for the manufacturing of solar energy systems, some of the relevant initiatives arising from Clean Industrial Deal for 2025 are new Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (planned for the second quarter of 2025) and guidance on social leasing for clean products (planned for 2025). The Communication also underlined that the Commission would also continue to make fast and efficient use of Trade Defence Instruments, such as anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties where necessary. 1 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/affordable-energy_en 2 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Energy (green transition)
• 2025-02-07 “E-000579/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Between August 2022 to December 2024, the EU has reduced its natural gas demand by 18% compared to the average of the years 2017-2021, resulting in 175 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas saved. As substantiated in the Impact Assessment of the Climate Target Plan 2040 1 , the projections show 90 bcm of gaseous fuels (including biogas and biomethane) will still be used by 2050. Gaseous fuels will be part of our energy mix in the future but at a reduced level and in cleaner form, including biogas and biomethane. The Central and South-Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity (CESEC) High-Level Group is working on maximising the use of the Trans-Balkan Pipeline, which can significantly contribute to the regional diversification of supply. CESEC has been addressing barriers to its full use, notably gas quality, regulatory barriers (including tariffs) and market barriers. Through CESEC, the Commission follows the evolution of the Vertical Corridor while maintaining that maximized use of existing natural gas infrastructure should be a precondition to capacity developments. The EU-Türkiye High-Level Energy Dialogue was suspended in 2019 following Turkish unauthorised drilling activities in the East-Med region. The Commission and the High Representative presented a Joint Communication on EU-Türkiye relations 2 in November 2023 recommending that the High-Level Energy Dialogue be reopened, under strict conditions. In April 2024, EU Leaders underlined that the EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye and tasked the Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to the European Union (Coreper) to advance work on the recommendations of the Joint Communication in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner. 1 SWD/2024/63 final (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024SC0063). 2 JOIN(2023) 50 final (https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-euturkiye-political-economic-and-trade-relations-0_en).”
  Natural gas · EU energy infrastructure integration · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2025-02-07 “E-000580/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission In Greece there is a momentum for the EU Climate Neutral and Smart Cities Mission 1 ; of the six Greek cities selected for the Cities Mission, five have already received the Mission Label. These cities established the ‘Climanet’ network, and the Greek government announced EUR 20 million to be allocated to these cities for the preparation of studies and the financing of projects 2 . At European level, 53 Cities have so far been awarded with a Mission Label. A further 33 Climate City Contracts are now under review. 80 more cities have joined the Twinning Learning Programme 3 to replicate good practices: nine are Greek cities 4 . The Climate City Capital Hub 5 , launched in June 2024, helps labelled cities 6 to get projects ready for investment. It offers advice on financing solutions, in cooperation with existing advisory services, such as those offered by the European Investment Bank (EIB), and puts cities in touch with investors. Through the ‘Enabling City Transformation Programme’ under Horizon Europe, EUR 21 million were secured in 2024 to deploy advisory services of the EIB 7 . In addition, the EIB ringfenced a lending envelope of EUR 2 billion for the labelled cities to support the implementation of their decarbonisation strategies. Greek Mission cities will also receive support from EU Cohesion Policy and, in line with the European Regional Development Fund/Cohesion Fund Regulation 8 , they are implementing their sustainable urban development strategies, to support energy efficiency, climate adaptation, smart cities and green transport projects. Finally, EU actions, such as the Covenant of Mayors 9 , the Green City Accord 10 , the European Urban Initiative 11 , the URBACT IV programme 12 and others, support cities in capacity-building and knowledge exchange. 1 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe/eu-missions-horizon-europe/climate-neutral-and-smart-cities_en 2 https://2030.ioannina.gr/?page_id=1121 3 https://netzerocities.eu/twinning-learning-programme/ 4 These are Penteli, Palaio Faliro, Mytilene and Vari-Voula-Vouliagmeni (selected for Cohort 1); Chalkida and Chios (in Cohort 2); Fyli, Heraklion and Larisa (in Cohort 3). 5 https://netzerocities.eu/capital-hub/ 6 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/document/942e747e-3ccf-4121-a973-9cc8032fc421_en 7 Including European Local ENergy Assistance (https://www.eib.org/en/products/advisory-services/elena/index) and the InvestEU Advisory Hub (https://investeu.europa.eu/investeu-programme/investeu-advisory-hub_en). 8 OJ L231, 30/06/2021, Article 11. 9 https://eu-mayors.ec.europa.eu/en/home 10 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/urban-environment/green-city-accord_en 11 https://www.urban-initiative.eu/ 12 https://urbact.eu/”
  Climate efforts · EU policy on urban development
• 2025-02-05 “E-000517/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. As regards pillar II of the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) the project ‘Kozani 230 megawatt photovoltaic’, which is receiving EUR 40 million, aims to set up three solar photovoltaic powerplants, of which the first is already operational. The European Investment Bank (EIB) also finances another investment worth EUR 195 million in the same domain, to be partially implemented in the region. Concerning pillar III of the JTM, one project is being implemented in the region – ‘Socioeconomic Transition of Western Macedonia 1 ’. The project comprises 15 sub-projects in five different areas of investments, including energy efficiency, renewable energy sources integration, measures upgrading buildings or urban renewal. The project is implemented by the region, acting as coordinator for six municipalities. The EU grant and the EIB loan for the project amount to EUR 14 million and EUR 58 million, respectively. The project started on 1 November 2023 and is due to end on 31 October 2026. 15 permanent jobs are expected to be created. 2. The last cut-off date of the first call under Public Sector Loan Facility (PSLF) was on 11 September 2025. Western Macedonia submitted a multi-sectoral grant application underlying a project designed with the assistance of the EIB Advisory Hub. The grant application totals to EUR 19.8 million. The proposal is under evaluation until the beginning of December 2025. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projectsdetails/44773066/101137296/JTM?order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=10&sortBy=es_SortDate&framew orkProgramme=44773066.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-01-17 “E-000199/2025 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges the importance of oceanographic research vessels, as key marine science research infrastructure contributing to a better understanding of the ocean and its ecosystems, particularly in the context of climate change, food and water security, and fisheries science 1 , where surveys at sea, particularly in the Mediterranean, play a crucial role in supporting the scientific process. Research vessels play multiple roles for biodiversity and ecosystem studies, climate change research, marine geology and seafloor mapping and are essential for surveys, including acoustic surveys. The competent Greek authorities may explore funding under the EU’s European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) Programme, and Horizon Europe. The EMFAF may support the collection, management, use and processing of data in the fisheries sector, and research and innovation programmes. The ERDF may support part of the investments needed and research and innovation programmes, while Horizon Europe does not fund the construction of research infrastructure but may fund some development phases in line with the European Strategy Forum on Research Infrastructures. Under shared management principles governing Cohesion Policy funds, the selection of such a project would fall under the responsibility of the relevant national and regional authorities. Any activation of EMFAF or ERDF funding must therefore align with the objectives of the respective Greek programmes as agreed between the Commission and Greece. 1 Regulation (EU) 2017/1004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 on the establishment of a Union framework for the collection, management and use of data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific advice regarding the common fisheries policy, L 157/1, 20.06.2017.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2024-12-28 “E-003087/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The fall of Assad’s criminal regime marks a historic moment for the Syrian people. The High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) confirms the EU commitment to a Syrianled, Syrian-owned peaceful and inclusive political transition, where all groups participate at the negotiating table. The European Council conclusions of 19 December 2024 1 underlined ‘the need to ensure respect for human rights, including women’s rights, non-sectarian governance and the protection of members of religious and ethnic minorities, and to safeguard Syria’s cultural heritage’. It called on ‘all parties to preserve national unity and ensure the protection of all civilians, the provision of public services as well as the creation of conditions for an inclusive and peaceful political transition’. The EU stands ready to support the new phase in Syria in coordination with regional partners (Türkiye, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, others). The HR/VP expressed the EU’s position in international meetings, including in Aqaba 2 , Riyadh as well as during her recent visit to Ankara. Türkiye has a legitimate right and responsibility to fight against terrorism, ensuring that this is done in accordance with the rule of law, respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, in full respect of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighbouring states. In October 2019, Member States committed to strong national positions regarding their arms export policy to Türkiye on the basis of the provisions of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on arms export controls. There is no arms embargo to Türkiye in place. This would require unanimity. The responsible Council Working Group remains seized on this important matter. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/press-statement-eu-high-representative-foreign-affairs-and-security-policyfollowing-international_en”
  EU-Syria relations · EU-Turkey relations · EU relations with Kurdish people
• 2024-12-25 “P-003085/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. In this context, the EU continues to expect Türkiye to respect the sovereignty and the sovereign rights of all member States, in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1 , and to unequivocally commit to and promote good neighbourly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. The European Council Conclusions of 12 December 2019 2 clearly stated that the Türkiye-Libya Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states. 1 https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/41768/12-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf”
  EU-Syria relations · EU-Turkey relations
• 2024-11-27 “E-002685/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. Cohesion Policy Funds provide over EUR 1.4 billion 1 to Greece for the 2021-2027 period for risk prevention and disaster management through the ‘Environment and Climate Change’ and ‘Civil Protection’ programmes, as well as regional programmes. Integrated Territorial development actions in urban areas based on Sustainable Urban Development strategies are supported within the 13 regional programmes. Special attention is given to measures tackling environmental and climate challenges in these areas. The National Recovery and Resilience Plan ‘Greece 2.0’ 2 supports crisis management, ecosystem resilience, early warning systems, Smart Cities, and Science & Technology. Ongoing and planned initiatives could support the ELDAP’s 3 action plan. The Horizon Europe 4 EU Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change 5 and the EU Mission on Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities 6 , both launched in 2021, offer opportunities for enhancing resilience to climate change in urban and rural areas. Partners from Greece are being supported. 2. ELDAP could also benefit from the capacity building activities of the European Urban Initiative 7 , supported by Cohesion Policy funding, notably from the city-to-city exchanges and national events aimed at improving the quality of cohesion funds’ investments on the ground and knowledge activities 8 . 3. The European Union Civil Protection Mechanism 9 co-finances projects for disaster prevention and preparedness. The Knowledge for Action in Prevention and Preparedness 10 1 Website of Partnership Agreement of Regional Development for Greece (ESPA): https://www.espa.gr/el/pages/default.aspx 2 Greece National Recovery and Resilience website: https://greece20.gov.gr/en/ 3 Greek Network of Resilient Cities. 4 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en 5 The Horizon Europe EU Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change offers opportunities for addressing resilience to climate change in urban and rural areas: https://climateadapt.eea.europa.eu/en/mission/funding/opportunities?size=n_10_n&filters%5B0%5D%5Bfield%5D=objectPro vides&filters%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=any&filters%5B0%5D%5Bvalues%5D%5B0%5D=Funding%20oportun ity&filters%5B1%5D%5Bfield%5D=readingTime&filters%5B1%5D%5Btype%5D=any&filters%5B1%5D%5 Bvalues%5D%5B0%5D%5Bname%5D=All&filters%5B1%5D%5Bvalues%5D%5B0%5D%5BrangeType%5D =fixed&filters%5B2%5D%5Bfield%5D=issued.date&filters%5B2%5D%5Btype%5D=any&filters%5B2%5D% 5Bvalues%5D%5B0%5D=Last%205%20years&filters%5B3%5D%5Bfield%5D=language&filters%5B3%5D% 5Btype%5D=any&filters%5B3%5D%5Bvalues%5D%5B0%5D=en&sort-field=title.index&sort-direction=asc 6 The EU Mission on Climate-neutral and smart cities addresses climate change mitigation objectives (climate neutrality) while accounting for the climate resilience dimension of the ecological transition in cities: https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe/eu-missions-horizon-europe/climate-neutral-and-smart-cities_en#what-are-eu-missions 7 European Urban Initiative: https://www.urban-initiative.eu/ Under Cohesion policy, the European Urban Initiative supports innovation experimentation in cities and builds capacity and knowledge of cities of all sizes including in the topics of sustainable and resilient urban centres. The initiative has a budget of EUR 395 million from the European Regional Development Fund for the 20212027 programming period. 8 E.g. the knowledge platform Portico and its functionalities such as the community of members, knowledge resources, good practices, and the Urban Panorama tool, which aims at guiding users through EU urban initiatives, programmes and organisations.”
  Climate efforts
• 2024-11-21 “E-002612/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission On 10 July 2024, the Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1923 1 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of titanium dioxide from China. On 15 November 2024, the Commission submitted for a vote the draft implementing act concluding the investigation to the Trade Defence Instruments Committee. At the same time, the draft implementing act was sent to the European Parliament. Under the ‘Union interest’ section of the draft implementing act, the Commission assessed the impact on companies across value chains, on the basis of all the information collected during the investigation. The Commission acknowledged the impact the duties might have on companies in different value chains. The definitive draft implementing act thus sets the duties as a fixed amount per kilogram instead of a percentage of the value of the imported product to soften that impact. The prices of titanium dioxide are expected to increase, which will result in lower share of the duty in the final price of titanium dioxide. The Commission also allowed for titanium dioxide used in production of white inks for printing to be exempted from duties. The draft implementing act 2 was published on 9 January 2025 and will be applicable for five years. The downstream industry also has the possibility to request the initiation of an antidumping investigation. In fact, the Commission has initiated an anti-dumping investigation into imports of decor paper from China following a complaint from EU producers which also use titanium-dioxide as a raw material. 1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1923 of 10 July 2024 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of titanium dioxide originating in the People’s Republic of China, https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/1923 2 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/4 of 17 December 2024 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of titanium dioxide originating in the People’s Republic of China, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202500004”
  Trade relations with China · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2024-11-07 “E-002465/2024 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is carefully following the energy-prices situation, particularly in SouthEastern Europe. The Commission has already put forward several initiatives to mitigate the impact of the volatile price of fossil fuels on consumers. The revised Electricity Market Regulation 1 and Renewable Energy Directive 2 contain provisions to promote the use of Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), by the industrial sector and limited to non-fossil generation. Pooling demand for PPAs is one of the instruments envisaged in legislation 3 . According to State aid rules, Member States can adopt measures like partial compensation of energy-intensive companies in sectors facing strong international competition for higher electricity prices resulting from indirect emission costs, 4 to prevent carbon leakage. The reduction of levies financing energy policy objectives or by tax reductions allowed under the Energy Taxation Directive 5 are other possible measures. Greece has in place two approved schemes: a EUR 1.36 billion partial compensation scheme 6 and a levy reduction scheme 7 . The Commission will put forward the initiatives of question 3 in a timely manner, with some of them already in its first 100 days. Their aim will be, amongst others, to bring down energy prices for companies and households, and supporting investment in clean energy infrastructure and technologies. Cooperation between EU institutions, Member States and stakeholders is needed to streamline implementation and ensure affordability measures directly benefitting industries and citizens. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02019R0943-20240716 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02018L2001-20240716 3 Article 19a paragraph 2 of the revised Electricity Market Regulation 2024/1747. 4 Under the EU Emission Trading System. 5 Without approval by the Commission (in line with the General Block Exemption Regulation). 6 SA.103180, published in OJEU C/2023/186. 7 SA.52413, published in OJEU C/2019/078.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-25 “E-002263/2024 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) offers possibilities for interventions for land development projects, similar to the Achyra dam project, through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). The Greek CAP Strategic Plan 1 does foresee relevant investment interventions, including projects in irrigation. It finances land projects aiming primarily at increasing the efficiency of water use in agriculture, through interventions, such as reservoirs, dams, ponds etc., and the modernisation of irrigation networks. Based on the principles of shared management applicable to the CAP, the project approval process falls under the responsibility of the Member States, and, hence, the Commission does not have information on individual submitted applications. In accordance with the Greek CAP Strategic Plan, the eligible beneficiaries may be the Ministry of Rural Development & Food, and other Ministries or the local government (A' or B' level). Energy storage technologies, including pumped hydropower storage, are key for the clean energy transition, to better integrate variable renewables in the electricity system and reduce overall energy system costs. The Commission incentivises the use of energy storage through its recommendations on energy storage 2 . Member States are required to establish indicative national objectives for non-fossil flexibility, including demand response and storage, under the revised Electricity Regulation 3 . Although the Commission follows a technology neutral approach regarding storage solutions, leaving investment decisions to the market, it recognises the potential of hydropower storage in contributing to the flexibility of the energy system. 1 http://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/el/keimeno-synimmena-paa/egkrisi-tropopoiiseis 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32023H0320(01) 3 Article 19f of Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401747”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-01 “E-001908/2024 Answer given by Ms Ferreira on behalf of the European Commission In November 2023, Greece requested EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) assistance for the storm ‘Daniel’ to cover part of the costs for emergency and recovery operations incurred by public authorities 12 . The Commission approved the application, paying an advance of EUR 25.4 million in February 2024, with a balance of EUR 76.1 million due by year-end. Private damage is not eligible under the EUSF. Greece has not applied for EUSF assistance for the ecological catastrophe resulting in masses of dead fish appearing in the Pagasetic Gulf. Through the Recovery and Resilience Facility, EUR 600 million 3 are planned for the restoration and resilience of the road and railway networks in the areas affected by the storm. Under the 2014-2020 Cohesion Policy Funds, some EUR 150 million have been allocated to support the disaster management system addressing the results of the floodings in some Greek regions 4 . Additionally, around EUR 13 million from the ‘Competitiveness, Entrepreneurship and Innovation’ programme aimed to support enterprises’ adaptability and workers affected by the floods in these areas. Under 2021-2027 programming period, almost EUR 2.7 billion from the European Regional Development Fund is available to support small and medium-sized enterprises in Greece, including in tourism (out of which EUR 37 million in the ‘Thessaly Programme’). In addition, some EUR 160 million have been allocated for support of sustainable tourism assets (out of which EUR 4 million in the ‘Thessaly Programme’). The tourism ecosystem can also receive indirect support 5 . However, under the shared management and subsidiarity principles governing Cohesion Policy funds, the selection and implementation of specific projects fall under the responsibility of the Member State. 1 For example, the recovery of essential infrastructure, provision of temporary accommodation to the population, cleaning-up operations, and protection of the cultural heritage. 2 All amounts of this reply refer to public expenditure. 3 Under the Greek Recovery and Resilience Plan, EUR 500 million in grants have been allocated planned for the restoration and resilience of the road and railway networks in the areas affected by storm ‘Daniel’. 4 From the ‘Transport Infrastructure, Environment and Sustainable Development’ programme. 5 For example, under social inclusion, integrated territorial development in urban and non-urban areas and general business support (including for digitalisation, energy efficiency, greening, extroversion).”
  EU strategy for tourism development · Cohesion and rural funding
• 2024-09-06 “E-001651/2024 Answer given by Ms Simson on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is set to continue its work focusing on measures to bring down prices and costs for households and business by developing an Action Plan for Affordable Energy Prices 1 . It will inter alia aim to support industries and companies through the transition, while unlocking decarbonisation pathways for industry and companies. Furthermore, the Commission will continue to prioritise investments in clean energy infrastructure, in particular with a planned clean energy investment strategy for Europe, including clean infrastructure and storage. This Action Plan for Affordable Energy Prices will build on the implementation of the adopted Electricity Market Design reform 2 and will include additional initiatives to enable lower energy costs for end-users while accelerating decarbonisation, to develop an overall cost-efficient system and ensure adequate investments in infrastructure. The Commission will also continue to actively monitor the energy markets in Europe with a view to preserving competition on those markets and ensuring the supply of secure and clean energy at affordable prices to businesses and consumers. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1511 2 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-and-consumers/electricity-marketdesign_en#:~:text=Reform%20of%20the%20electricity%20market%20design.%20To%20boost%20renewables, %20better”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-08-29 “E-001572/2024 Answer given by Ms Simson on behalf of the European Commission There are multiple EU funding instruments in place which Member States may use to fund energy renovations. The main ones are Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and Cohesion Policy. In Greece, the amounts allocated to building renovation are, approximately: EUR 2.6 billion for the RRF, involving 116,500 renovations (with an average 30% primary energy savings), 80 hospitals, 150 public buildings as well as the construction of new buildings; EUR 2.5 billion for Cohesion Policy 1 , covering the renovation of buildings, both public and private, across multiple regions and under the 2014-2020 and the 2021-2027 programming periods 2 . The number of dwellings renovated during the 2014-2020 programming period will be available when the closure documents of that period are submitted, while it is estimated that some 85,900 dwellings will be renovated in the 2021-2027 programming period. Due to the overlap between the different funding instruments and the ongoing closure of the 2014-2020 programme, data on the specific expenditure or the specific number of building renovations for the period 2021 to 2023 is not yet available. The Commission monitors expenditure and impact criteria across multiple categories and may address issues if necessary. As of October 2024, no significant delays on expenditure have been identified. The Commission cannot comment on amendments that have not been officially submitted. The Commission can only assess completed documents officially submitted as part of the reporting obligations. Once the National Energy and Climate Plan is submitted, the Commission will publish an assessment and follow up as needed 3 . 1 In Greece, addresses buildings energy renovation is addressed under the Cohesion Fund and the European Regional Development Fund. 2 Note that due to the ‘n+’ rule, funding for projects in the period 2020-2023 can come from either the 20142020 or the 2021-2027 operational programmes. The ‘n+x’ rule allows for the allocation and reporting of expenditure for a period of ‘x’ years after the nominal end of the programming period. 3 For example: through the Country Specific Recommendations in the European Semester or in bilateral meetings with Member States.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-08-20 “E-001530/2024 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Freedom of religion, tolerance and respect for fundamental rights are core values of the EU and, as such, a crucial element of the EU accession process. Türkiye as a candidate country needs to adhere to those values as well. The freedom of thought, conscience and religion is monitored under Chapter 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights) of the annual country report on Türkiye 1 . While the last report from 2024 notes that freedom of worship is generally respected in Türkiye, it also underlines that the situation of freedom of thought, conscience and religion needs to be improved. In particular, the Venice Commission’s recommendations 2 on the legal status of non-Muslim religions and the right of the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate to use the title ‘Ecumenical’ have yet to be implemented. The EU is committed to the preservation of cultural heritage in Türkiye. The Sümela Monastery is inscribed in the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation’s tentative World Heritage list 3 . Once inscribed as a World Heritage site, Türkiye has the obligation to ensure that the outstanding universal value of the inscribed site on its territory is not impacted. The Commission will continue reporting on the rights of non-Muslim religious communities. It takes note of the mutual agreement between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Turkish authorities on the celebration of the Feast of the Dormition on 23 August 2024. 1 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/8010c4db-6ef8-4c85-aa06814408921c89_en?filename=T%C3%BCrkiye%20Report%202024.pdf, p. 31. 2 https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD%282010%29005-e 3 https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/?action=listtentative&state=tr&order=states”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2024-08-05 “E-001478/2024 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Commission took note that the repeat municipal election took place in Himara on 4 August 2024. Holding transparent, inclusive and credible elections in line with international standards is a key requirement for any country aspiring to join the EU. A number of complaints by representatives of political parties were dealt with by the Albanian complaint mechanisms. The Commission also took note that the Electoral College decided to uphold the decision of the Central Election Commission’s Sanctions and Complaints Committee which had dismissed the opposition coalition’s request to invalidate the results of the Himara byelections and repeat the mayoral by-elections in the municipality. The EU will continue to encourage the Albanian authorities to address all outstanding recommendations from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Venice Commission on the electoral law process. The Commission attaches the highest importance to the respect of the rule of law and fundamental rights, including the protection of property rights in Albania. It will continue to closely monitor electoral developments in Albania. In its 2024 Rule of law Report, in the Albanian Country Chapter, the Commission stated that overall corruption is prevalent in many areas, including during electoral campaigns, and found that preventive measures suffer from an overly complex legal framework and continue to have a limited impact, particularly in vulnerable sectors 1 . Through the Stabilisation and Association process and the Enlargement process, the Commission also follows closely the protection of national minorities and the consolidation of property rights in Albania and assesses progress through its annual report 2 . As part of the European integration process of Albania, the EU closely monitors and supports the consolidation of democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights in the country. 1 SWD(2024) 828 final, 2024 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Albania, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/0154dce1-5026-45de-8b37e3d56eff7925_en?filename=59_1_58088_coun_chap_albania_al.pdf 2 SWD(2023) 690 final, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/202311/SWD_2023_690%20Albania%20report.pdf”
  EU-Albania relations
• 2024-07-31 “E-001463/2024 Answer given by Mr Gentiloni on behalf of the European Commission In 2020, the General Secretariat for Civil Protection of the Ministry of Citizen Protection of Greece requested financial assistance under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) and received EUR 750,000 to develop a National Disaster Risk Management Plan for Greece, which was successfully completed in 2021. This has helped Greece accessing funds for risk prevention and resilience under the European Cohesion Policy Funds (2021-2027). Following the 2023 wildfires, the General Secretariat for Civil Protection of Greece requested a UCPM Peer Review focused on the Greek wildfire risk management system, which was released on 20 June 2024 1 . The Commission is monitoring the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Fund (RRF) investment which co-funds the construction of the Regional Civil Protection Operations Centres, and is in regular contact with the Greek authorities to ensure that the investment is fully implemented within the RRF timeline. This process is ongoing. 1 https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/news/ucpm-wildfire-peer-review-report-handed-overgreek-authorities”
  Climate efforts
• “56:57 – 14:59:06): Thank you, Mister Chair, dear Commissioner. Thank you for joining us today at our committee meeting. I represent the Socialists and Democrats as to you, and I think you can probably admit that choosing to participate in Donald Trump's Board of Peace was a monumental mistake. Somehow your presence gave some legitimacy to the few countries that chose to participate, which is an affront to international law. I also would like to know what mandate you had to travel to the US and why you participated. Moreover, the European Commission referred to the need for the EU as one of the main donors to be present. Is that why you had to go? That's what the Commission said. We do, however, need a very specific strategy and roadmap. We can't participate in meetings of structures that fall outside international law. You mentioned the activities at the start of your term, and you said that at the start of April we will have a new text. I do hope that it won't be too general and lacking in specific priorities. I do hope that that text will assist us in solving remaining problems. Now for the Eastern Mediterranean, who will be responsible, you or someone else? Thank you.”
  EU-US relations
• “My dear colleagues, the critical raw materials are necessary. Their ingredients to maintain our economical and environmental are digital ambitions of the Union and for our own security. More than 80% of the big European enterprises are exposed to Chinese rare earth. The reaction of the Union has to be immediate and dynamic in all the practices that are used to manipulate trade. We have to implement the regulation on raw materials in member states on behalf of the European Union. We have to activate our local mining capabilities and the recycling possibilities to define the minimum level of strategic reserves of rare earth, and to move ahead to bilateral cooperation with countries that fulfil standards of sustainability and human rights. Only in this way, we can strengthen the strategic autonomy of the Union, protecting our industrial base. Thank you very.”
  Trade relations with China
• “Dear colleagues. The work programme of the Commission unfortunately does not rise to the occasion. It seems that the president has not grasped this new geopolitical environment. All of the environment has been thrown off balance. Everything we knew until today. So we see that in the letters, both of the high representative as well as the commissioner that is responsible for the Mediterranean, they were supposed to draw up a cohesive policy for the Middle East, but this has now gone away. All we see are generalities, Whereas at the same time, the Middle East remains a top priority for the EU, the Gaza is hanging by a thread. We have new people at the helm in Lebanon, and we do not know what the next day will be. So we expect to see what the strategy for the Mediterranean will be at the third quarter of the year. But as we have seen in these first few weeks of the Trump administration, we are in a new world. The EU should be ready to support this multilateral governance system that is based in the United Nations organization, the respect of international law and the integrity of borders. So, of course, we do have a very good first step, which is the Bible for the European defence. But we need to start funding immediately. We cannot wait for defense investments at the expense of the welfare state. Strategic autonomy should finally become a reality. Thank you very much.”
  Defence spending
• “Dear chairman, dear Commissioner, dear colleagues, This packet of the European Commission on Networks is a decisive step towards an interconnected European grid. We have five times more investments and in coordination with the Connecting Europe facility on which I am the rapporteur, can bring down energy prices in areas like the southeastern Europe that have a lot of grid problems, especially in Greece, where we have double the European average of energy poor people. Connection with Cyprus and the fact that the Great Sea Interconnector has been put into the priority projects, demonstrates how important this, uh, piece of legislation is. And then we have the trans-balkan Vertical corridor. So I would like to call upon the European governments to rise to the occasion and help us make all of these projects a reality. Thank you.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration
• “Thank you very much, chairman. Minister. I'd like to welcome you to our committee. I wish you all the best for the Danish presidency as well. But of course, in order to have success, we need to have respect for international law by all partners at international level. As a result. There was a Foreign Affairs Minister meeting yesterday, and there was a discussion about what's happening in the Middle East. And there's also discussion about the Mediterranean. And our colleague very rightly focused on the situation in Gaza. We really need to do something to try to resolve that situation. Furthermore, you didn't mention the countries of the South when it comes to the neighbourhood relationship and we have a problem with Turkey. I have two questions. First of all, on Turkey. As part of a provisional agreement with Syria, the Syrian Foreign Affairs minister was present yesterday in the ministers meeting. So there's an agreement to create an exclusive economic area. Which violates the rights of the Cypriot republic. Turkey signed an illegal agreement with Libya as well. So we have that exclusive economic area which completely flouts marine law. And it also ignores the rights of the Cypriot republic as a result. I would like to know to what extent the Danish presidency plans to take measures to resolve all of those problems. And I once again would like to wish you all the best for the presidency. Thank you.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• “Dear sir, the challenges in Poland, Romania, the Baltic countries and also drone incidents in Denmark, Belgium and Germany have proven that we need to act immediately at the European level. The roadmap of the Commission for defence is a useful tool, but it is not enough on its own. The European Council should also give the political direction so that this will not just remain a wish list. Obviously, all of those defense initiatives should not be confined to a particular area of the EU. You had mentioned an area from the Baltic to the Black Sea. You forgot that the European border goes all the way down to the Mediterranean, where member states face a series of challenges. President Costa was very right in Copenhagen when he said that we need a global approach. We need a Europe that will protect all of their citizens from all of the dangers. Thank you very much.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Thank you. Colleagues. India is one of the most important countries in Asia with a constantly growing economy. It will be the third biggest in the world by 2030. Last January, the communication about our new strategic agenda has been a new positive step. I hope we will have a mutually profitable agreement on a geopolitical level as well, including issues concerning the environment, sustainability and human rights. India remains one of the most important trade partners of Russia, and after the recent tariffs by the US, we have seen a new rapprochement between India and China that has surprised many of us. So we need a comprehensive EU strategy for a new partnership that will upgrade the relations with India. Thank you.”
  EU-India relations
• “Dear colleagues. Trump's decision to impose 20% tariffs on European products and the trade war of 1 trillion of euro will negatively impact both Europe and the US. We will have this pause until June. However, tariffs of 10% have already been applied and there are also tariffs of 25% on aluminium, steel and cars. The EU must use this period until June so as to To negotiate an agreement that will address all trade barriers on both sides of the Atlantic. At the same time, we must get ready for a possibility of not having an agreement. In that case, we will have to decide on a series of countermeasures. At the same time, we need to take measures in order to relieve our producers who are damaged by the tariffs, especially in the agri agri food sector. Especially olive producers and producers in Greece are hit by these tariffs. They must not bear the brunt of this war. Trade war. Thank you.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “My dear colleagues, if we have seen shown from the recent crisis in the Middle East, is the weakness of the European Union to have a substantial role in the development in a region of the highest geopolitical importance. This weakness was particularly obvious during the attacks in Iran. While the world around us changes the strategy, our strategy for the Middle East from the commission has been postponed for the far future. Let's say for the very far future, the the Europe shouldn't be absent. We should assure that the transitional government in Syria will respect international law, human rights, and that all the religious and ethnic minorities will participate, participate equally and securely in this new course. We should support the new government in Lebanon in the difficult task it has ahead. We should demand the immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the stop, stop of the blockage, free access for humanitarian aid and the liberation of all hostages. It's unacceptable that the foreign ministers did not decide to suspend the Association Agreement between the European Union and Israel. In spite of the clear violations of human rights by Israel. Europe should act and should prove that Europe supports international law and human rights everywhere, not only in some cases. The peace talks that are taking place these days, we hope that will be a good first step in order to start the talks in the framework of the two state solution, to have a viable solution of peace in the area. Thank you very much.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Thank you very much, chairman. First of all, I'd like to thank the director of Acer for his presentation. I would like to mention some things in the Acer reports. Unifying the EU market is still problematic. If you compare regions and member states in some member states, but in entire regions such as Eastern Europe, the problem of price variability is more acute. Thirdly, the flexibility of energy systems and cross-border capacity is restricted. Fourthly, important And cross border works and reforms are delayed. Um, future markets are not developed enough. In your report on um completing the wholesale wholesale price markets, you also, uh, used Greece as a case study. You looked at different scenarios, including the extreme scenario of the 4th of September 2024 at 8 p.m., where the prices in the market were actually €942 per megawatt hour. And you said, and here I quote, the way that energy offers change, um, vary change depending on the state of the market and that leads to more profitability. So, director, I have two questions. First of all, why is it that in southeastern Europe, especially in countries such as Greece, because you have a case study, why are there huge wholesale energy price fluctuations? Because as you can imagine, these fluctuations have an impact on businesses and households. So what lies behind this, and what are the most important changes that the European Commission is going to have to put through through its proposals in 2026, in order to deal with the problems that you talked about earlier. And I'm talking about the grid package and the white paper in particular.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• “Dear president von der Leyen, yesterday you presented your proposal for a new foreign policy doctrine for the EU. Let me say from the outset that it is unacceptable even to imply that the EU, that the EU could move away from the international law and international legality as its basis. Of course. That does not mean that we cannot name things as they are. We need to condemn the violations of international law. Uh, like, uh, it happens in Iran. We need to protect our member states, like in Cyprus where Greece, Italy, Spain, France are showing Solidarity in action. We need to forward the European values and not just the.”
  EU foreign policy approach
• “16:31 – 16:17:49): Grice Gruyten. Thank you very much, Chair, and thank you very much to Anna Neumann for her great work in the draft report. I look forward to the report. I look forward to what the rapporteur and the shadows are going to produce. And I think it's only right that we are taking on this topic not only in defense of all those European citizens in our streets, in our cities that suffer from surveillance, from the threat of even being killed in our streets. We must give the signal to all countries that use this transnational repression that we are not going to accept that. And that in itself has also an effect on these countries and on what we as a European Union are prepared to accept and also the signal that we give thereby to autocrats, to autocratic regimes.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Madam president, ladies and gentlemen, the EU China Summit is going to take place at a significant time geopolitically. Particularly our relationship with China is important. Yet complex. Bilateral trade is worth €57 billion per year. We have to defend our values, which are non-negotiable. We have to be realistic in terms of China's position in the world. China dominates the world in technology, for example. We have to stick with the One China policy. But our relationship with Taiwan is important from the point of view of technological Theological resilience. Market distortion caused by state subsidies is not something that we can just sit by and watch. The European Commission needs to use all the tools and tools at its disposal to ensure that we protect European manufacturing. And the restrictions on rare earth exports have affected our industries badly.”
  EU-China relations · Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market
• “Thank you. Electricity grids and energy storage are the are at the heart of our future energy security. We need these infrastructures so as to ensure that we have affordable energy for our businesses and consumers for the time being. We haven't achieved that. A regulation on energy grids together with the MFF should enable us to kick start investment. We have to lay great emphasis on energy security. Finding a fair balance between prices and Member States, so as to avoid undergoing phenomena such as what has recently happened in Greece and Spain. We need greater autonomy and protection for electricity grids, protecting them from extreme weather events and external aggression.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration
• “Ministers, we are talking about a Europe that wishes to be energy independent and at the same time enjoy lower energy prices for households and enterprises. In order to achieve this. We need cheap renewable energies, new interconnections, new storage facilities, internal grids and energy infrastructure. Something that neither the Commission nor the governments of EU member states recently have made any progress on. So things are now difficult. And what I'm describing is even more applicable to remote areas such as islands and markets such as the Mediterranean or southern Europe, where we need more infrastructure. My question is as follows. In the context of the negotiation for the new MFF. Mhm. Do you support increasing the budget to increase and enhance the Connecting Europe facility in order to use even more renewable energies in order, at the end of the day, to reduce the charges imposed by certain Member States on enterprises and households. Thank you.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration
• “Dear Commissioner. And one of the most important messages was the solidarity of European states to Cyprus, which is faced with the results of the attack from the United States and Israel against Iran. Today we are submitting a roadmap for the defense market. The integration of this market is a prerequisite for the development of a defense industry in all Member States. Finally, as the defense industry is becoming an important pillar of European defence autonomy. We should make sure that European made arms should. Weapons should not be again be found to to threaten a member state. Thank you.”
  Arms export from the EU
• “Thank you chair. The Competitiveness Compass has a number of interesting points, but there are five problematic points here. Firstly, there's a lack of proposals that could be directly implemented. So there's a point about legislation. But that doesn't mean that we're going to lower the bar when it comes to environmental and and labour conditions and requirements. So we also need to think about protecting citizens who are suffering due to the digital transition, the energy Position. In fourth place, we need to have a policy that provides support through public funds. And in fifth place, what we mustn't do is seeing a fund, a reactivation fund, moving away from our environmental goals. What we do need to do is create funding instruments which support businesses, support citizens and allow them to prosper within this new European framework. Thank you.”
  EU policy on sustainability criteria in public funding
• “Dear colleagues, I think that it is now commonplace that we can not only base ourselves on NATO and the new American administration for our security. That means that if we need to invest more in defense, we have to do it together. The proposal for rearming EU allows us to spend more on defense, but with more loans, loans that will be at the expense of national budgets. Unfortunately, we have not seen any motive for common actions. So we have here something that creates a. Something negative. And what is being done is that the cohesion funds are being diverted for other ends. We cannot have cohesion without security, but we cannot have security without social cohesion as well. We need to invest in both of those things so that we will have a robust defence defense and a robust society. Otherwise, we will be vulnerable from the outside. Thank you very much.”
  Defence spending
• “Dear Commissioner. One of the most important messages was the solidarity of European states to Cyprus, which is faced with the results of the attack from the United States and Israel against Iran. Today we are submitting a roadmap for the defense market. The integration of this market is a prerequisite for the development of a defense industry in all member States. Finally, as the defense industry is becoming an important pillar of European defence autonomy. We should make sure that European made arms should. Weapons should not be again be found to to threaten a member state. Thank you.”
  Arms export from the EU
• “Thank you very much, madam chair. I will speak in in Greek, so please use your earphones. I want first of all, I want to thank all of the core rapporteur for the excellent work. And now in Greek, My position concerning the orientation of CEF is clear. It should admit it should be a targeted European tool financing projects with real transborder added value, increasing security of energy competitiveness, the cohesion territorial cohesion and the strategic independence of the European Union. Immediate priority is supporting the electrical interconnections, supporting and strengthening the networks and also having a way to have warehousing energy, the European Union. We cannot have an energy union if we have serious problems of congestion at an international level and areas that are isolated from the European networks. These investments can contribute to reducing the price of energy, the security of supply, and a better incorporation of renewable forms of energy. Furthermore, priority is the support of regional island areas and less interconnected regions of Europe. The territorial cohesion is not a theoretical notion, but is a precondition for a just and powerful Europe. For this reason, I feel that we should have special cares we should take for projects that permanently go against territorial disadvantages, and all areas can participate in the single market. Of course, I couldn't not express my reservations. I have reservations concerning the proposals for enlarging the field, the coverage of the regulation in financing nuclear energy projects or other new forms of energy when these proposals do not increase the total budget of CEF energy and do not include a clear, institutional framework and selection criteria eligibility criteria. The restated funds of CEF should go apply into interconnections, supporting the networks, storing the energy, and using renewable, energy resources that give added European value. CEF should be a tool uniting Europe, reducing inequalities, and supporting this joint, independence in energy.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration
• “Dear colleagues, during the first three weeks of the new US Trump administration, we see a coordinated attack against the multilateral context that we created after World War Two. 25% tariffs on steel and aluminum do not protect the U.S. consumers and businesses, as President Trump believes. On the contrary, it makes everyone poorer, and the only one who will come victorious and benefit from this will be China that is heavily relying on state aid. The EU must take any action to protect the industrial Infrastructure and bases in Europe and the jobs that it creates. We do have tools at our disposal, but we need to be united and have the political will to take countermeasures. Of course, we must keep any channel of communication open, but we will not succumb and bend the knee in front of Mr. Trump. So the EU, it is high time to prove that we can do what we must.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Madam president, the European Union can not be a spectator when faced with the crisis in the Middle East. We need a holistic strategy for the region, for an energy diplomacy based on international law and multilateral cooperation. We need a strategy that will make Europe sovereign. We can't pay the bill for others decisions. We have to take action in order to protect our interests and our allies. One example is Lebanon, where constant attacks are undermining the work of the government there and stability throughout the region. As Europe, we are face to face with our second energy crisis of recent years, the Strait of Hormuz have proven that Iran has a trump card that nobody realize. We need to be resilient to crises. We need to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels And a dependence on fertilizers.”
  EU-Lebanon relations
• “16:31 – 16:17:49): Grice Gruyten. Thank you very much, Chair, and thank you very much to Anna Neumann for her great work in the draft report. I look forward to the report. I look forward to what the rapporteur and the shadows are going to produce. And I think it's only right that we are taking on this topic not only in defense of all those European citizens in our streets, in our cities that suffer from surveillance, from the threat of even being killed in our streets. We must give the signal to all countries that use this transnational repression that we are not going to accept that. And that in itself has also an effect on these countries and on what we as a European Union are prepared to accept and also the signal that we give thereby to autocrats, to autocratic regimes.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Dear sir, dear Commissioner, if we want the EU to have a say in the geopolitical developments and be in a position to protect all of its citizens from Greenland, Finland and Estonia down to Greece and Cyprus. We need to have an autonomous, united and sovereign European defence. We see geopolitical balance changing daily. We can no longer be dependent upon others. The issues of national security and the national security strategy of the US are there. The messages are clear. We can no longer ignore them. So we need to move forward with the necessary steps so that if and when the need arises, we will be able to act on our own. And of course, that means that the European defence clause has to be defined. Solidarity between member states will not just be wishful thinking, but it needs to be something real. Actual help. We recently heard the Secretary general of NATO say that it is a utopia to think that the Europe can protect herself. On the contrary, dear Secretary. Gentlemen, what is Utopia is just keep raising defense spending without having more cooperation. And we cannot rely on someone who often sees us not as an ally. So we need to have a new that will be able to see the other world powers eye to eye. Thank you very much, very much.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. I would like to welcome my two friends and the two commissioners. I thank them for their presence in this joint meeting of the committees in recent years. The energy transition, the not to depend not to depend on unreliable suppliers and to promote alternative fuels, hydrogen and synthetic fuels. All those things show the importance to have networks and to be able to store energy. The two elephants in the room at the same time, it's clear that we have some administrative problems that have to be faced in order to be able to achieve our results. The CEF has has to make promote connectivity, and can support all these procedures by reducing the energy cost, a cost that in some regions of Europe, such as southern Eastern Europe, where Greece also belongs. This cost is very high of the energy higher than in other regions. Question. To what degree does CEF allow the financing of internal connections and storage that will have a positive consequence and contribution in connection at an internal national level?”
  EU energy infrastructure integration