Barbara BONTE

Policy topics Barbara BONTE is active on

What Barbara BONTE has said (63)

• 2026-06-17 “(15:59:15 – 16:00:24): commissioner. This commissioner seems to be, focusing increasingly on 1, route, electrification on of everything. But, this single focus is not without risks. For example, people need to be able to have a choice. And furthermore, you can't electrify everything. Sectors such as, air transport, agriculture, We would, there are still alternatives that are going to remain necessary. We have, the ETS system. These do not make energy cleaner, but they do make it more expensive. Therefore, it's important that Europe has to stick to technological neutrality. We can't rule out any solutions beforehand. E fuels, hydrogen, solar and and solar and wind, nuclear, and even fossil, fuels have to be part of the energy mix. The mix, has to remain, the choice of member states. We have to ensure that we have reliable and affordable energy. Thank you very much, mister Xenia.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2025-11-26 “E-004704/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of Stardust Solutions´ activities but lacks detailed information on the company’s commercial plans. The Commission is closely monitoring developments related to solar radiation modification (SRM). The Commission has funded projects to investigate ethical and governance aspects of SRM and related research 1 . The Commission requested the Group of the Chief Scientific Advisors to conduct a scientific risk assessment of SRM technologies. The Group delivered its Opinion 2 on 9 December 2024, reviewing studies on the effect of SRM on e.g. precipitation, temperature, stratospheric ozone, renewable energy, agriculture, hydrological cycle, etc. The Commission recognises the potential environmental, public health and geopolitical risks associated with SRM, particularly when those technologies are being advanced without a clear international governance structure. The Commission’s position on SRM is set out in the Joint Communication of the Commission and High Representative on the Climate-Security Nexus of 28 June 2023 3 which states that ‘risks, impacts and unintended consequences that these technologies pose are poorly understood, and necessary rules, procedures and institutions have not been developed’ and stresses that the EU, guided by the precautionary principle, ‘will support international efforts to assess comprehensively the risks and uncertainties of climate interventions, including solar radiation modification and promote discussions on a potential international framework for its governance, including research related aspects’. 1 See, in particular, TechEthos (https://doi.org/10.3030/101006249), GENIE (https://doi.org/10.3030/951542) and Co-CREATE (https://doi.org/10.3030/101137642). 2 https://scientificadvice.eu/advice/solar-radiation-modification/. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023JC0019.”
  Climate efforts
• 2025-11-21 “E-004655/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is not aware of concerns related to the use of Bovaer in Norway. However, the situation in Denmark is being monitored by the Commission, in close contact with the Danish authorities and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), in order to collect data to allow for a proper assessment and understanding of the situation. The current authorisation of Bovaer as a feed additive by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/565 1 is based on the EFSA opinion of 19 November 2021 2 . In accordance with Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003 3 , the Commission is considering sending shortly a new mandate to EFSA in order to re-assess the safety of the additive for the target species on the basis of new data – being and to be – collected. Should that assessment identify any possible harmful effects of the additive on animal health, the Commission will adopt without delay appropriate measures concerning the authorisation concerned. These measures may lead to the modification, suspension or revocation of the authorisation. As provided for in Article 20 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 4 and Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003, feed business operators are primarily responsible for the feed they place on the market. In the present case, the holder of the authorisation of the feed additive Bovaer is responsible in particular for ensuring that the additive still satisfies the conditions provided for in Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003, including the absence of adverse effects on animal health. 1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/565 of 7 April 2022 concerning the authorisation of a preparation of 3-nitrooxypropanol as a feed additive for dairy cows and cows for reproduction (holder of the authorisation: DSM Nutritional Products Ltd, represented in the Union by DSM Nutritional Products Sp. z o.o.). OJ L 109, 8.4.2022, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2022/565/oj. 2 EFSA Journal 2021;19(11):6905. 3 Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on additives for use in animal nutrition. OJ L 268, 18.10.2003, p. 2, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2003/1831/oj. 4 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety. OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2002/178/oj.”
  GMOs
• 2025-10-22 “E-004170/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Honourable Member will find all relevant information on the use of flights, the destinations and the purpose of the travel, since the beginning of the Commission’s mandate for both the President and the Members of the Commission on dedicated webpages which ensure transparency of missions for the public 1 . As a general rule, the air taxi may be authorised only under exceptional circumstances, either when commercial flights are not available to reach a destination or when they cannot fit with the Member of the Commission's diary, or for security reasons. A careful check of all options should be made, including agenda planning, so that the air taxi is only envisaged as a last option 2 . Following the European Green Deal, the Commission committed in its ‘Greening Communication’ 3 to reduce its overall carbon footprint by 60% from 2005 to 2030 (or 38% from 2019 to 2030). This includes an objective to reduce emissions from missions, taking into account these exceptional needs for the use of air taxis in the interest of the service. The Commission regrets to inform the Honourable Member that the Information Technology tool used for managing missions does not enable the Commission to automatically extract this data. 1 See the dedicated transparency section of the websites of the Members of the Commission via the following link: https://commission.europa.eu/about/organisation/college-commissioners_en. 2 Annex 2 to Commission Decision C(2018) 700 final of 31 January 2018 on a Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission. See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018D0221(02). 3 Communication to the Commission ‘Greening the Commission’, 5.4.2022, C(2022)2230: https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-04/c_2022_2230_2_en_act_part1_v11.pdf.”
  Budget for EU politicians · Climate efforts
• 2025-10-13 “E-004003/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) is a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation initiative concerning United States equipment. Neither the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) nor the Commission is directly involved. Regarding EU’s military support to Ukraine, the Qualitative Military Edge programme 1 (Commission’s Work Programme 2026 initiative) aims to ensure Ukraine’s fastest access to superior military equipment from the EDTIB. The Preserving Peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 2 noted past underinvestment in the EDTIB and invited Member States to aim for 55% EU defence procurement by 2030 and at least 40% jointly procured by 2027. EU instruments have boosted the EDTIB and EU strategic autonomy recently. The European Defence Fund (EDF) funded 163 Research and Development projects, engaging 1 385 European companies. The Act in Support of Ammunition Production 3 helped industry’s rampup to a two million/year shell production capacity, and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act 4 unlocked EUR 11 billion of joint procurement from the European industry. The Security Action for Europe 5 Instrument makes available EUR 150 billion in loans for the EDTIB. The co-legislators agreed on the European Defence Industry Programme key for the Defence Readiness Roadmap and its proposed flagships. The co-legislators also agreed to amend the EDF Regulation to allow Ukraine’s association to the EDF, including through the BraveTechEU initiative. The Commission’s proposal for a European Competitiveness Fund within the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028-2034, foresees up to EUR 131 billion investments for defence and space, a five-fold increase over the current MFF. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0870. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-836460afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1525/oj/eng. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  "Buy European" provisions · EU-US relations · EU competences on defence
• 2025-10-13 “E-004001/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The EU type approval framework requires that vehicles only enter the market after certification against existing standards, including high safety standards, whilst other jurisdictions rely on self-certification. The EU is working at United Nations level with other countries (such as Japan and the United Kingdom) on making that framework fit for highly automated vehicles. This work is ongoing and is scheduled for completion in 2026. Type approval of highly automated vehicles is already possible today under Regulation EU 2022/1426 1 and the Commission is working on removing the biggest remaining barrier for highly automated vehicles, namely the small-series limit (of 1,500 registrations per year per model, far exceeding current deployment levels, and its removal is thus only needed for future large-scale commercial deployment. The latter requires the technology to mature and a market for highly automated vehicles to emerge). This framework alone however is not sufficient as few Member States have national traffic rules that allow highly automated vehicles on their roads, hindering the potential of the single market for autonomous driving. Cooperation between all those that develop and build those vehicles, as well as road operators and infrastructure managers is crucial. Indeed, testing innovative automated driving technologies on public roads in Europe typically requires permits based on exemptions from national rules, which requires multiple approvals across different Member States. The Commission is working with Member States to propose crossborder testbeds with a single regulatory sandbox in early 2026 to facilitate commercial predeployment of highly automated vehicles on open roads across the EU, as announced in COM/2025/95 2 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2022/1426/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0095.”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• 2025-10-13 “E-004002/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement 1 provides for a balanced, comprehensive, and win-win outcome for both sides. Indonesia will eliminate just over 98% of tariffs on products exported by the EU, representing and close to 100% in terms of trade value. The 50% reduction in export duties ensures that the EU gains preferential treatment compared to other countries. The agreement also includes a comprehensive and satisfactory set of provisions on raw materials (including nickel and cobalt), which will enhance the integration of supply chains in this area, to the benefit of both the EU industry and Indonesian operators. 1 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/indonesia/euindonesia-agreements/text-agreements_en.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Trade relations with China
• 2025-10-03 “E-003897/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is following closely whether candidate countries, including the Republic of Moldova, respect fundamental rights as outlined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 1 . This includes monitoring the Republic of Moldova’s compliance with fundamental rights in the EU acquis, including freedom of religion, as part of the EU’s enlargement policy. The 2025 enlargement report 2 highlights that the Republic of Moldova provides adequate legal guarantees on freedom of religion or belief and there were no reported breaches of freedom of religion or belief by the Republic of Moldova in the reporting timeframe. The Commission remains committed to supporting the Republic of Moldova in its efforts to meet the standards required for EU membership. 1 OJ C326, 26.10.2012. 2 SWD(2025) 758 final.”
  EU enlargement · EU-Moldova relations
• 2025-10-03 “P-003896/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission During her meeting with Syria’s transitional President al-Sharaa in New York, together with the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission reiterated the EU’s support for a peaceful, inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition. Both presidents expressed concern over the recent violent events in Syria, condemned the widespread violence and horrific crimes against civilians and conveyed a clear message: the transitional authorities have the responsibility to ensure that the transition is genuinely inclusive, protects all Syrians from all ethnic and religious backgrounds without discrimination and ensures that all are involved in the building of the new Syria. The EU has repeatedly condemned the widespread sectarian violence in several regions over the last months 123 . The EU will also continue to support efforts to hold all perpetrators, regardless of their affiliation, accountable in line with international standards. The EU introduced new listings under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime 4 , targeting individuals and entities in Syria responsible for serious human rights abuses. The EU will continue to sanction individuals who commit human rights violations and jeopardise the peaceful transition and follow closely developments on the ground and the actions of the transitional authorities. The meeting was also a chance to reiterate the EU’s commitment to help meet the immediate humanitarian needs and to support the socio-economic recovery and reconstruction of Syria. In June 2025, EU announced a EUR 175 million package to support recovery in Syria 5 . EU support will be commensurate with developments in the country and will need to be accompanied by profound reforms. The EU will continue to be a leading humanitarian partner for the Syrian people, building on the EUR 37 billion in humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation assistance granted over the last fourteen years. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/. 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/453989_fr. 3 Syria: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the situation, 24 July 2025. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/24/syria-statement-by-the-high-representativeon-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-situation/. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/28/syria-eu-adopts-legal-acts-to-lifteconomic-sanctions-on-syria-enacting-recent-political-agreement/. 5 https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-announces-eu175-million-support-recovery-syria2025-06-04_en.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU-Syria relations
• 2025-10-03 “E-003895/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission During the Environment, Climate and Food Safety Committee meeting on 22 September 2025, the Commission representative understood that the Honourable Member’s question referred to delays or non-availability to farmers of products used to protect plants, which are plant protection products and not biocidal products, and, therefore, replied that there was no link with the discussion about data protection for active substances in biocidal products. The Commission agrees that the examples of biocidal products referred to by the Honourable Member in this question are important for farmers. The Commission has recently adopted a proposal 1 to modify Article 95(5) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 2 concerning the expiry of data protection for existing active substances which are still under examination in the review programme, with the view to find a balance between the interests of review programme participants, on the one side, and the interests of alternative suppliers of active substance, applicants for product authorisation, and users of biocidal products, on the other side. The proposal aims to maintain conditions for fair competition on the EU market, which will benefit producers and users of biocidal products, including farmers. It proposes to modify the data protection duration for existing active substances still under examination in the review programme by extending it until 31 December 2030, but does not propose to modify the data protection duration submitted for product authorisation, which is limited to 10 years after the product is authorised 3 . The proposal contributes to preserving a balance between the commercial interests of the review programme participants and the need for affordable and safe biocidal products for farmers. 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation 528/2012 as regards the extension of certain data protection periods, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=COM:2025:1020:FIN. 2 Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products; OJ L 167, 27.6.2012, pp. 1–123. ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/528/oj. 3 As set out in Article 60 of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012.”
  EU policy on pesticides
• 2025-09-17 “E-003611/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Commission adopts decisions on authorisation and monitoring of medicinal products in the EU, including COVID-19 vaccines, based on recommendations issued by the European Medicines Agency (EMA), and it cannot comment on criteria applied by other regulatory authorities. Nevertheless, the recommendations issued by the EMA and those issued by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regarding the COVID-19 vaccine Comirnaty in 2025 are not divergent, as they both indicate the preferential use of LP.8.1 for the new SARS-CoV2 variant JN.1. The EMA’s recommendations are based on the assessment of the available scientific evidence. EMA’s guidance on the antigenic composition of COVID-19 vaccines for 20252026, including Comirnaty, is based on a wide range of data. These include data on the evolution of the virus and data from animal studies on the effects of candidate vaccines targeting LP.8.1. The scientific rationale and other conditions underpinning the recommendation for the 20252026 formulation are explained in detail in the published guidance 1 . In reaching its recommendations, EMA’s Emergency Task Force (ETF) consulted with the World Health Organization, international partners, including the FDA, and marketing authorisation holders for COVID-19 vaccines. Single dose vials of Comirnaty are authorised for use in the EU 2,3 . Single dose vials are a standard presentation for vaccines. Together with multidose vials, they provide Member States with options when implementing their national vaccination campaigns. 1 https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/other/ema-recommendation-update-antigenic-compositionauthorised-covid-19-vaccines-2025-2026_en.pdf. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/health/documents/community-register/2025/20250725167118/anx_167118_en.pdf. 3 https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/all-authorised-presentations/comirnaty-epar-all-authorisedpresentations_en.pdf.”
  Vaccination · Pharmaceuticals regulation in EU
• 2025-09-09 “E-003488/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Since the beginning of 2025, trade relations with the United States (US) have been volatile. The Commission’s priority has been to restore stability and predictability and to open the door to strategic collaboration with the US. On 27 July 2025, the Commission President and US President reached a political agreement on tariffs and trade. This deal delivers confidence and predictability for European firms, and avoids the alternative of a harmful further tariff escalation. The ensuing Joint Statement 1 establishes the key parameters of the EU-US trade and investment relationship moving forward. As regards the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the EU committed in the Joint Statement to work to provide additional flexibilities in its implementation for all companies, especially for small and medium-sized companies. This is already part of the Commission’s simplification agenda to streamline and improve EU legislation. Urgent action is needed to fight climate change, which remains the Commission’s priority. All countries must step up efforts, internationally and domestically to implement commitments. This is why the EU is implementing cost-efficient policies such as carbon pricing, reducing greenhouse gas emissions while allowing the economy to grow. Measures under the European Green Deal, including CBAM, were developed through transparency, stakeholder dialogue and discussions with partner countries while complying with the EU’s international commitments. CBAM is designed to ensure that EU industries’ decarbonisation efforts are not undermined by carbon leakage and is essential to reach the EU’s climate targets. 1 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreementreciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en.”
  EU-US trade relations · Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2025-09-05 “E-003451/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The political agreement between the President of the Commission and the President of the United States (US) of 27 July 2025 foresees the promotion and facilitation of investments on both sides of the Atlantic. The USD 600 billion (roughly EUR 550 billion) represent the envisaged investments by EU companies in various sectors in the US through 2028. These investments will not be financed with public EU funds, but are envisaged to be financed by private companies and based on their own investment decisions. As regards energy purchases, the figure of USD 750 billion (roughly EUR 700 billion) corresponds to the expected offtake through 2028. The Commission can act as a facilitator to help ensure these purchases, thus supporting the energy security of the Member States. These intentions support the EU’s goal of strategic independence. With the REPowerEU Plan 1 launched in 2022, the Commission has made energy system more resilient by boosting energy efficiency, rolling out clean generation and diversifying supplies. And the legislative proposal 2 to phase out Russian gas (part of the REPowerEU Plan) put forward in June 2025 will give an additional push to completely end Russian energy imports. The energy purchases would contribute to the EU’s ability to complete the phase out of Russian energy imports. As such, it would contribute to the EU's full energy independence from Russia, EU's energy security, and lower prices for citizens and businesses. In parallel, the EU will continue accelerating its clean energy transition as a mean to achieve long-term economic prosperity and energy independence. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2022:230:FIN. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0828.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · EU-US trade relations
• 2025-09-05 “E-003443/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Member States have the competence to design their tax systems in the area of direct taxation. They set the rules and conclude Tax Conventions to eliminate double taxation with other Member States, including for investment income. However, Member States must exercise this competence in compliance with EU law, in particular with the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the EU Treaties. Based on available information, the Commission has no indications that the Belgian withholding tax refund system would be contrary to EU law. The Commission is committed to promote tax fairness, tax certainty, and to encourage simplification of tax procedures. The aim is to mitigate the risk of double taxation while ensuring an appropriate balance to fight tax abuse and tax evasion. In this context, the Commission has proposed the FASTER Directive (Framework for a Faster and Safer Relief of Excess Withholding Taxes) 1 , adopted by the Council in December 2024. This initiative seeks to make withholding tax procedures across the EU more efficient and secure for investors who invest on a cross-border basis in the internal market. The Commission is currently working closely with Member States on the implementation of the FASTER Directive which supports the savings and investments union agenda. 1 Council Directive (EU) 2025/50 of 10 December 2024 on faster and safer relief of excess withholding taxes.”
  EU rules on excess withholding taxes · EU competences on taxation
• 2025-09-05 “E-003449/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission According to the investigation and verification by the Bulgarian Air Traffic Services Authority, the aircraft carrying the President of the Commission to Bulgaria experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference. Despite this, the plane landed safely. The Bulgarian Prime Minister also issued a statement 1 confirming the radio interference during the President’s flight. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming and spoofing occurrences in Bulgaria and other eastern flank Member States have increased, impacting EU aircraft and vessels. This phenomenon is common in regions surrounding conflict zones, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. European aviation has set up operational procedures and mitigations to maintain safety in case of interferences of GNSS services. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has issued guidance with recommended mitigations to civil aviation authorities, pilots, air navigation service providers, and manufacturers. EASA is also closely monitoring the situation and is ready to mandate measures to ensure safety if it deteriorates further. To prevent future navigation disturbances and in line with Article 189 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2 , the Commission is exploring measures to strengthen resilience of EU GNSS system, including gradually deploying Galileo services 3 and reinforcing Galileo with Low Earth Orbits (LEO-PNT) component, included in the Commission proposal for a regulation for a European Competitiveness Fund 4 . This will ensure the safety and security of thousands of flights in civil aviation, while protecting the EU citizens and economy from increased GNSS interference threats. 1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUdi4z0l6D0. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016E189. 3 The Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) is a data authentication function for the Galileo Open Service worldwide users, freely accessible to all as of July 2025. The upcoming encrypted Public Regulated Service (PRS) will offer secure support to governmental users. 4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European Competitiveness Fund ('ECF’), including the specific programme for defence research and innovation activities, repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/522, (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/783, repealing provisions of Regulations (EU) 2021/696, (EU) 2023/588, and amending Regulation (EU) [EDIP]: https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0555.”
  EU competences on defence · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-07-17 “E-002994/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU is gravely alarmed by recent violent incidents in Syria and has strongly condemned the horrific crimes against civilians, including the coastal violence in March 1 , the terrorist attack against Mar Elias Church 2 and the violence in Southern Syria 3 . Therein, it has been repeatedly calling for a transparent, credible and impartial investigation, and for all perpetrators of grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law to be held accountable and brought to justice, with the support of relevant international mechanisms. The EU followed a gradual and reversible approach to sanctions relief to support Syria’s economic recovery and inclusive transition. In May 2025, the EU lifted economic sanctions on Syria, while maintaining sanctions related to the Assad regime and those based on security grounds 4 . It monitors and remains attentive to the actions of the transitional authorities. In May 5 and June 6 2025, the EU introduced sanctions against human rights violators. The EU urges a stepped-up dialogue to advance a truly inclusive and peaceful Syrian-led transition guaranteeing human rights of all Syrians from all ethnic and religious backgrounds. The EU will support Syrians’ path to stabilisation, reconstruction and an inclusive transition, with non-humanitarian aid tied to the country’s progress and the actions of the transitional government. The EU ensures effective use of funds through trusted partners, due diligence screening, and payment releases based on approved progress reports. Funds are subject to strict auditing and monitoring, with the EU Delegation and the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations Field Office in Syria ensuring thorough monitoring, oversight of operations and accountability in the allocation of resources. The EU, while cautious due to the volatile situation, is committed to creating conditions for safe, dignified, and voluntary returns to Syria, as per the European Council conclusions of 23 June 2025 7 , and will support those who voluntarily wish to return 8 . 1 Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the recent wave of violence, 11 March 2025; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/. 2 Statement by the Spokesperson on the terrorist attack in Mar Elias church in Damascus, 23 June 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesperson-terrorist-attack-mar-elias-church-damascus_en. 3 On 24 July 2025, the EU issued a statement on the violence in Sweida; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/24/syria-statement-by-the-high-representative-onbehalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-situation/. 4 Syria: EU adopts legal acts to lift economic sanctions on Syria, enacting recent political agreement, 28 May 2025; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/28/syria-eu-adopts-legal-acts-to-lift-economicsanctions-on-syria-enacting-recent-political-agreement/. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202501110. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202501255. 7 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/06/23/syria-council-approves-conclusions/. 8 Updated information is published by Frontex; https://www.frontex.europa.eu/.”
  EU-Syria relations · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2025-07-15 “E-002888/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is constantly analysing and reviewing its relations with Africa at continental, regional and national levels. The Joint Vision for 2030 1 , adopted by EU and African Heads of State and Government at the 6 th EU-African Union (AU) Summit in 2022, in Brussels, is guiding the partnership. With its Member States, the EU remains Africa’s first trading partner and investor, first partner on peace and security, first official development assistance provider and humanitarian donor. The Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package 2 , targeting at least EUR 150 billion of investments by 2027, is being implemented in a Team Europe approach to maximise impact. It grows Africa’s key infrastructure in energy, digital and transport, strengthens its health, education and research systems, and serves EU’s strategic autonomy. The 3 rd EU-AU Ministerial meeting on 21 May 2025 in Brussels witnessed strong participation and genuine interest, with 15 EU and 31 AU Foreign Ministers present. It also served as a platform for extensive bilateral exchange (more than 100 bilateral meetings, including 11 from the High Representative/Vice-President), to listen to each other, and give new impetus to the partnership. The monitoring report for the Ministerial meeting shows significant progress made on mutual priorities and joint commitments 3 . AU and Europe have a shared interest in political dialogue and long-term, mutually beneficial cooperation. The EU-AU partnership marks its 25 th anniversary in 2025 with increased engagement that will cumulate in the 7 th AU-EU Summit on 24-25 November 2025 in Angola. The EU works closely with Africa on issues of common concern, from sustainable economic development and prosperity to peace and security, from multilateral reform to climate change, demography and migration. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54412/final_declaration-en.pdf. 2 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/initiatives-sub-saharan-africa/eu-africaglobal-gateway-investment-package_en. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/pbappigp/en_preliminary_monitoring_report.pdf.”
  EU policy on African region
• 2025-07-08 “E-002770/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission On 29 October 2024, the European Commission finalised its investigation into imports of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) from China, imposing definitive countervailing duties. This decision, detailed in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2754 1 , came after an investigation into alleged unfair subsidies provided to Chinese BEV manufacturers. The Commission subsequently became aware of the practice of some importers attempting to circumvent that Implementing Regulation by (temporarily) registering new Chinese vehicles in third countries before importing them into the EU. Considering that new vehicles were defined as vehicles which have never been registered before, vehicles temporarily registered outside the EU were then declared as used when imported in the EU. To address the issue, the Commission promptly reacted by amending the Explanatory notes to the Combined Nomenclature of the European Union, (CNEN), which now provides a stricter definition of ’used vehicles’ as vehicles permanently registered for more than 6 months or driven for more than 6 000 kilometers. The CNEN were published on 13 January 2025 (C/2025/330) 2 . The Commission regularly monitors the enforcement of existing measures relating to new battery electric vehicles for passengers from China, particularly in view of potential circumvention 3 . In this regard, public import statistics published by Eurostat show that the number of used electric cars imported from China did not increase after the countervailing duty was imposed on new vehicles. In fact, the respective monthly figures have continued to stay in the area of just double-digit figures. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/330/oj/eng. 3 Specific information regarding suspicion of fraud or irregularities can be reported to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) at https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/olaf-and-you/report-fraud_en.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports · Trade relations with China
• 2025-07-08 “E-002769/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission On 3 November 2023, the Commission published a call for application for membership of a new informal expert group aimed at providing advice and expertise on certain elements of the implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in its definitive phase as of 2026. Member States’ competent authorities are part of the expert group. Applications were sought from organisations such as European business associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and think tanks with experience in CBAM and Emissions Trading System (ETS) goods, in particular in the monitoring, reporting, quantification, pricing, and verification of embedded emissions. Third countries are also part of the group as observers. The Commission did not prioritise self-funded NGOs in the composition of the CBAM expert group. NGOs represent a very small share of the participants, which are mainly industry representatives. The call was transparent and open to all interested parties. The Commission did not examine the funding of the applicant organisations during the review of the applications, as that was not a criterion for acceptance. Individual companies, including, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), are represented through European industry trade associations, which were deemed to be more representative of the sectors’ views, and more useful in terms of providing analytical inputs. All the organisations which are members of the expert group, including NGOs, academia, research institutes and think tanks were required to be registered in the Transparency Register to be appointed. There is no conflict of interest and no political influence whatsoever with regard to the composition or the operation of the CBAM expert group.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2025-06-26 “E-002581/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission In 2023, 26.9% of tertiary 1 students in the EU were enrolled in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) fields 2 . The EU average has increased by 0.6 percentage points in the past decade, though not fast enough to keep up with job market needs for some STEM fields. Compared to other large economies 3 , the EU has the second-lowest ratio of STEM graduates per thousand young people 4 (14.3), above the US (12.3) but well below Canada (18.0). Comparable data for China are not available. Findings suggest that among the key reasons behind this low ratio, are a marked decline in some STEM skills at school level in the EU, as shown by the latest PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) results, while Asian countries dominate the top of the rankings. This discourages EU learners from pursuing STEM programmes in higher education or vocational education and training. Moreover, gender bias contributes to low female enrolment. Women make up to only one third of STEM students. The STEM education strategic plan 5 adopted by the Commission in March 2025, outlines ambitious actions and targeted initiatives to help addressing the growing demand for STEM professionals, starting from early years and at all stages of education. 1 Tertiary education comprises short-cycle tertiary education, bachelor’s level, master’s level, and doctoral level. Colleges and universities are considered tertiary education institutions. 2 STEM fields: ‘natural sciences, mathematics and statistics’, ‘information and communication technologies’ and ‘engineering, manufacturing and construction’. 3 The data refers to 2022 graduates. More recent data as well as figures on enrolled students are not available. Japan, the only other non-EU G7 economy, is excluded because data on ICT (information and communication technology) graduates in are not available. 4 Between 20 and 34 years old. 5 COM/2025/89 final; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0089.”
  Research priorities within the EU
• 2025-05-28 “E-002160/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has provided assistance and redirected funds to support the socio-economic integration of Karabakh Armenians. EUR 21 million were mobilised in humanitarian support, including food and non-food items, cash assistance, winterisation support, primary health care, mental health and psychosocial support. In January 2024, the Commission adopted a EUR 15 million budget support programme under the Resilience and Growth Plan to assist the government of Armenia address the medium and long-term needs of Karabakh Armenians. In July 2024, this assistance was topped up by EUR 25 million to address housing and employment needs of the displaced population. Three projects with civil society consortia are also currently ongoing focusing on (i) livelihoods support and socio-economic integration activities (ii) access to social services and social assistance mechanisms (iii) protection of human rights of refugees. Moreover, support to Karabakh Armenians has also been streamlined across other activities, for example through the redirection of EUR 8 million to support the displaced and host communities in their business expansion needs, facilitating integration into the Armenian economy through improved access to livelihood opportunities. EU assistance is supporting the implementation of the government’s housing programme for Karabakh Armenian families, and with payments under the rent and utilities cost compensation programme. Furthermore, support was provided for the socio-economic integration activities including facilitating access to the general education, offering partial tuition subsidisation programmes, providing primary health care services and enrolling pension age refugees in the national pensions scheme.”
  Funding for EU Neighbourhood · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-05-28 “E-002161/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission refers the Honourable Member to previous replies on the topic 1 . The Commission does not fund any organisation that does not fully respect fundamental rights and values. In line with the provisions of the Financial Regulation 2 for the award of funds, the Commission carries out rigorous selection processes, including different checks on grant applicants based on objective criteria. Information about Commission funding can be obtained from the Financial Transparency System (FTS) 3 . EU funded grant projects are subsequently monitored to ensure that beneficiaries respect EU values during the implementation phase, as required in the grant agreement. A person or entity may be excluded from participating in award procedures or from implementing EU funds if they are in one of the situations provided in Article 138 of the Financial Regulation, which includes grave professional misconduct by engaging in incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence against a group of persons or a member of a group or similar activities that are contrary to the values on which the EU is founded enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. In such cases, the grant may be suspended, terminated or reduced, and the funds recovered. 1 For instance, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-002185_EN.html. 2 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R2509. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/analysis.html.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU policy on Islam
• 2025-04-30 “P-001754/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission understands that the Belgian Government is currently reflecting on the introduction of an exit tax in the context of a broader discussion on capital gains taxation. Based on publicly available information, this discussion appears to be still ongoing, and no legal act has been proposed yet by the Belgian Government or adopted by the Chamber of Representatives. Since there is no legal act or provisions in place, the Commission is not able to take a view on the compatibility of such an envisaged exit tax with EU law. In principle, restrictions to the Single Market are generally prohibited under the Treaties. Member States can adopt such exit taxes by exercising their national tax competence provided they fully comply with the free movement of capital (Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), as clarified by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · EU competences on taxation
• 2025-04-30 “E-001757/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The European Coalition of Cities Against Racism (ECCAR) is the beneficiary of an operating grant under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) 1 funding programme, under the priority ‘combat racism, xenophobia and all forms of intolerance’. The CERV aims to protect and promote the rights and values enshrined in the EU Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 2 , in particular by supporting civil society organisations active in the EU. ECCAR contributes to the CERV’s objective by supporting the implementation of the EU Anti-racism Action Plan 2020-2025 3 and of EU policy related to equality and antidiscrimination. The CERV, as all EU funding programmes, has been approved by Members States in the Council and by the European Parliament. It is implemented through multi annual programmes approved by representatives of the Member States and through calls for proposals, which are public. Any legal entity established in the EU may submit a proposal. Proposals are evaluated against pre-announced selection and award criteria by independent experts. Only the highest ranked proposals are selected for funding. The funding is provided in full transparency and in line with the Financial Regulation 4 . 1 OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1–20, Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5703/oj. 2 OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 391–407, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/beb25da4-e6b9-459e-89f7bcdbd3a8f0c8_en?filename=a_union_of_equality_eu_action_plan_against_racism_2020_-2025_en.pdf. 4 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast) available at: https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R2509.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · EU engagement with civil society
• 2025-04-30 “E-001756/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is not aware of a dedicated agreement on critical raw materials (CRM) between the United Kingdom and Ukraine. The 'One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine', signed on 16 January 2025, does not contain any specific provisions on CRM. While the accompanying 'UK–Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration', published on 17 January 2025, makes a general reference to the United Kingdom as a partner for Ukraine’s critical minerals strategy, the agreement itself does not include binding or operational commitments in this area. The Commission is monitoring the raw materials sector in candidate countries and globally with the aim to support the EU's strategic autonomy and innovation, and is exploring opportunities to diversify supply chains, and support research and development. In this regard, in 2021, the EU and Ukraine established a strategic partnership in the CRM area, aiming to enhance the security and diversification of essential CRM supply chains. This collaboration highlights the EU's commitment to ensuring a stable and sustainable supply of CRM resources, with Ukraine playing a key role in supporting the EU's objectives of sustainable growth, energy security and environmental protection.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2025-04-30 “E-001753/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has not been informed by any national or European authority about intelligence indicating that COVID-19 originated in a laboratory. The Commission cannot take a position on the cited intelligence services’ assessment, as it has not been informed about it. The Commission closely monitors scientific studies on the origin of SARS-CoV-2 and supports the research of the World Health Organization (WHO) 1 . The WHO’s Global Study on the origins of SARS-CoV-2 suggests three possible zoonotic pathways for the introduction of the virus and concludes that the introduction through a laboratory incident is extremely unlikely 2 . Furthermore, a 2023 scientific critical review concluded that the strongest evidence supports a zoonotic over a laboratory origin 3 . 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-statement-who-led-covid-19-origins-study_en. 2 https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/origins-of-the-virus, WHO-convened Global Study of Origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part Joint WHO-China Study, page 9. 3 Alwine JC, Casadevall A, Enquist LW, Goodrum FD, Imperiale MJ. A Critical Analysis of the Evidence for the SARS-CoV-2 Origin Hypotheses. mBio. 2023 Apr 25;14(2):e0058323. doi: 10.1128/mbio.00583-23. Epub 2023 Mar 28. PMID: 36897098; PMCID: PMC10127682.”
  Vaccination
• 2025-03-19 “E-001182/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission On 11 March 2025, gravely alarmed by the violence in Syria’s coastal region, the High Representative/Vice-President issued a statement 1 strongly condemning the horrific crimes committed against civilians. The EU called for a swift, transparent and impartial investigation to ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice. It welcomed the transitional authorities’ establishment of an independent investigative committee and called on them to allow the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to investigate all violations. The EU remains attentive to the actions of the new authorities in ensuring the protection of all Syrians without any kind of discrimination. The EU continues to call for an end to violence across Syria and urges involved parties to protect all Syrians. The EU supports a peaceful and inclusive Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition, upholding the universality and indivisibility of human rights and principles of equality and non-discrimination among all components of society. The EU Brussels Conference pledges ensure support to Syria and neighbouring countries, that host a considerable number of refugees. The EU’s non humanitarian assistance is subjected to extensive monitoring/evaluation mechanisms, including third party monitoring and risk assessments. The EU’s approach is gradual and commensurate with steps taken by the transitional government. The EU’s assistance follows strict implementation parameters. It aims to foster social cohesion by bringing together all Syrians without discrimination. The EU’s humanitarian aid is delivered through trusted partners in all parts of Syria. It seeks to respond to life-saving emergencies based on needs, accountability to affected populations, transparency, efficiency, effectiveness, and humanitarian principles (humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence) 2 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/. 2 EU Treaties and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, see Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, OJ C 25, 30.1.2008, p. 1–12, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A42008X0130%2801%29.”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · EU-Syria relations
• 2025-03-11 “E-001046/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The figure for the cost of violence against women in question is from a 2021 study by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE): The costs of gender-based violence in the European Union, available on the agency website. 1 EIGE, the EU agency for gender equality, is governed by the rules set out in its founding regulation 2 . EIGE’s independent research is supported by an Experts' Forum, the Institute's advisory body, composed of members from relevant responsible bodies that deal with gender equality from all EU Member States. A technical document accompanying the report, explains EIGE's rigorous methodologies in depth. Costs were calculated based on available data on economic output loss, health system utilization, criminal justice system costs, and the emotional and physical impact on victims. The methodologies ensure a comprehensive understanding and estimation of the economic costs related to gender-based and intimate partner violence. 1 https://eige.europa.eu/newsroom/news/gender-based-violence-costs-eu-eu366-billionyear?language_content_entity=en#:~:text=The%20European%20Institute%20for%20Gender,do%20not%20have %20a%20price. 2 Regulation (EC) No 1922/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing a European Institute for Gender Equality, OJ L 403, 30.12.2006, p. 9–17.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2025-03-11 “E-001047/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The EU has taken several measures to safeguard media independence and prevent undue influence from third countries. The provisions of European Media Freedom Act 1 , generally applicable from 8 August 2025, establish transparency requirements for media ownership and state advertising revenues, including those received from third-country public authorities or entities. They also mandate that public funds for state advertising in media or supply or service contracts with media be allocated through transparent, proportionate, and nondiscriminatory criteria. The Commission also co-finances the Media Pluralism Monitor and a media ownership monitoring project. However, these measures do not include monitoring of external donations or measures to prevent external donations. The Commission does not have an overview of the media outlets that have received funds from USAID. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1083”
  EU-US relations · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-02-17 “E-000718/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is concerned about the reports of attacks and persecution against Christians and committed to defending fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion and belief, and uses diplomatic and cooperation instruments for this purpose. The EU consistently condemns discrimination, intolerance, violence and persecution against or by any person based on the grounds of religion or belief. The lack of appropriate channels for political dialogue and the insufficient willingness of the Government make exchanges challenging. Nonetheless, the EU urges regularly Nicaragua to put an end to this persecution and any other human rights violation, and to ensure respect and protection of human and fundamental rights. At the same time, climate change is a critical priority for Nicaragua, given its high vulnerability to natural disasters and the significant impact on its predominantly agricultural economy, livelihoods, food security, and public health. Addressing climate-related challenges serves as an opportunity to engage with local actors in a complex and restrictive environment. Climate-related projects are an entry point to promote resilience, poverty reduction and gender equality. While no specific earmarking of funds is foreseen, EU-funded projects in Nicaragua are designed to improve the living conditions of population. A human rights-based approach is applied to ensure no one is left behind and that all fundamental freedoms are preserved. In recent years, projects in Nicaragua, funded under the civil society organisations and human rights and democracy thematic programmes, have been implemented by a wide range of civil society organisations, including faith-based organisations.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2025-02-13 “E-000675/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU reaffirms its continued and unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its repercussions for European and global security constitute an existential challenge for the EU. In 2021, the EU and Ukraine signed a strategic partnership on the critical raw materials (CRM) sector. This agreement supports the EU's commitment in diversifying and securing the supply chains for CRM resources, with a view to the EU's goal of sustainable growth and energy security. The Partnership is important in advancing the EU's green and digital transitions, enhancing competitiveness, and increasing the resilience of both EU and Ukrainian industries. The cooperation between the two partners is mutually beneficial and based on EU standards. The Partnership roadmap extending into 2025-2026 outlines a comprehensive strategy for cooperation. In the implementation of the Strategic Partnership, the Commission is engaged in a series of technical assistance projects, most notably with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Further, an EU-led technical assistance project will support the implementation of the roadmap.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2025-02-13 “E-000674/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Detailed Rules for the application of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 1 , annexed to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, refer, in their Article 2, to the definition of ‘document’ given in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Besides, it indicates non-exhaustive lists of documents which the Commission either makes public proactively (Article 3 of the Detailed Rules 2 ) or upon request under the conditions established in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 (Article 4 of the Detailed Rules). Consequently, the Commission does not narrow any definition of documents made accessible to the public. 2. In applying the rules on access to documents, the Commission makes a careful individual assessment of each document in view of its possible disclosure to the public with a view of giving the fullest possible effect to the right of public access to documents. This assessment is conducted also by considering the extensive case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and established administrative practices. 3. The Commission stands for the highest standards of transparency across the board. However, the Commission must reconcile the right of access to documents with the private and public interests that require protection, as enshrined in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, including regarding internal decision-making processes. 1 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43–48, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj). 2 Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3080 of 4 December 2024 establishing the Rules of Procedure of the Commission and amending Decision C(2000) 3614 (OJ L, 2024/3080, 5.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3080/oj).”
  Digitalization of public governance & administration
• 2025-01-27 “E-000346/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission On 17 December 2024, the President of the Commission held a meeting 1 in Ankara with President Erdoğan as part of the re-engagement agenda with Türkiye as laid down in the November 2023 Joint Communication 2 . The December 2024 Council conclusions on Enlargement 3 highlighted the EU’s strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. The discussion in Ankara also addressed the Cyprus issue, with the President of the Commission reiterating EU’s full commitment to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the United Nations agreed framework, and highlighting the importance the EU is attaching to resumption of and progress in the Cyprus settlement talks in further enhancing EU-Türkiye cooperation. In line with the relevant Council conclusions 4 , accession negotiations with Türkiye are at a standstill since 2018, and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/press-statement-president-von-der-leyen-president-turkiye-erdogan2024-12-17_en 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-politicaleconomic-and-trade-relations-0_en 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35863/st10555-en18.pdf”
  EU enlargement · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-01-21 “E-000240/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement 1 (also referred to as the 'Global Agreement') entered into force in 2000. Since its entry into force, bilateral trade between the EU and Mexico more than quadrupled and the EU trade balance with Mexico has been constantly positive reaching EUR 24.6 billion in 2023 (latest available statistics 2 ) and increasing by 16% compared to 2022. The EU's key imports from Mexico are industrial and mineral products. These include critical raw materials such as fluorspar, a substance used in the steel, iron and aluminium supply chain, as well as in the refrigeration sector. Mexico is a major supplier of fluorspar to the EU (33% 3 ) and it has also several other raw materials endowments (antimony, copper, zinc, lead). Securing access and reduced costs for these materials is essential for the EU’s green and digital transitions. Most of trade with Malaysia is in the industrial area and Malaysia is an increasingly important player notably for semiconductors. For some Member States, Malaysia is the second biggest source of semi-conductor technology after Taiwan. Malaysia also has several natural resources and commodities of interest for the EU. It is also a major hub for processing rare earths. Creating new business opportunities and strengthening supply chains in these sectors will help to boost the EU’s competitiveness and economic security, thereby supporting the digital and green transitions. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f95ad1a3-795e-4fb0-84e128351b99415c.0004.02/DOC_2&format=PDF 2 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/overview_mexico_en.pdf 3 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/study-critical-raw-materials-eu-2023-final-report_en”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2025-01-21 “E-000241/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission A key pillar of the REPowerEU plan, setting out the EU’s path to phasing out Russian energy imports, entails the EU diversifying gas imports from global partners, including the United States (US). The EU and its Member States have made great progress in recent years in terms of gas supply diversification and will continue to strive for a gas supply as diversified as possible, working with partners like Norway, the US, Mediterranean countries and other gas and liquified natural gas (LNG) suppliers worldwide, while accelerating its clean energy transition and stepping up work on affordability and sustainability. Diversifying energy supplies also entails accelerating deployment of home-grown renewable energy and increasing energy efficiency, which improves the resilience and increase EU's energy independence while advancing our climate objectives. The Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Markets Package stipulates that contracts for unabated fossil gas cannot run beyond 31 December 2049 1 . Domestic energy production reduces dependence on external suppliers and reduces the exposure of the EU to external geopolitical instability. Therefore, domestic energy reinforces the security of energy supply of the EU. Moreover, it is for Member States to decide their supply mix and the energy sources they want to develop, while complying with climate objectives. Fossil fuel extraction is not eligible for EU financial support. Natural gas infrastructure other than those under Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2022/869 are not eligible for funding under the Connecting Europe Facility. 1 Article 31(3) of Directive (EU) 2024/1788 on common rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen.”
  Natural gas · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2025-01-21 “E-000242/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission In Pakistan, the EU has been supporting education reforms in Balochistan 1 and in Sindh 2 . This support extends to the school education departments of the provincial governments, which oversee financing and operations of only the state schools. The EU support is focusing on institutional capacity strengthening, school rehabilitation, training of teachers, and learning. To ensure that the EU support is in line with EU values, the subjects and content for teachers’ training are specifically selected. For example, the teachers’ training support to Balochistan school education department covers English, mathematics and science. The EU scrutinises its projects including those on education via field visits, reporting, results oriented monitoring missions, evaluations and other monitoring mechanisms. The EU’s investment in education takes place under the framework of the EU’s Global Gateway (GG) strategy 3 towards enhancing EU’s global role and economic security. GG is aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals 4 and with Europe’s industrial capacity and interests. The quality and sustainability of GG investments will depend, however, on the availability of an educated, skilled, and competent workforce. Improving employment and educational opportunities in countries with significant migration outflows to Europe also directly addresses some root causes of migration. The EU is committed to education as a basic human right, in particular in fragile, emergency or post-conflict settings, recognising that everyone deserves access to education regardless of geographic or cultural backgrounds 5 . The EU’s investments support education pathways and studies that lead to recognised accreditation and qualifications within formal education systems. 1 Balochistan Education Support Programme II (BES II) adopted in 2019 as part of the Annual Action Programme 2019, C (2019)7736. This support will end in 2025. 2 Development through Enhanced Education Programme (DEEP) adopted in 2017, C (2017)8796. This support ended in 2024. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/globalgateway_en 4 https://sdgs.un.org/goals 5 COM(2018) 304 final - Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Education in Emergencies and Protracted Crises, https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/news/Communication_on_Education_in_Emergencies_and_Protracted_Crises.pdf”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality) · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2024-11-13 “E-2526/2024 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission In Ukraine, legislation excludes the purchase of farmland by foreigners. Some large agricultural companies working in Ukraine operate on leased land. The overall amount of leased land concerned is estimated by researchers at 3-4.3 million hectares, which corresponds to about 7% to 10.5% of the 41 million hectares of agricultural land which Ukraine had in 2020. In general, the agricultural companies operating in Ukraine sell their products on the international commodities markets thus providing food security for about 400 million people around the world. The Commission supports Ukraine in maintaining and improving its export infrastructure, including via the Black Sea ports, so that it can continue contributing to global food security. The EU accession negotiations, policy conditionalities and financial support under the Ukraine Facility 1 contribute to the reforms of the agricultural sector of Ukraine and its regulation in line with EU standards. This benefits all private investors in the sector, particularly the EU ones, which are already familiar with this Regulation. Moreover, Ukraine Facility offers incentives for European businesses to invest in Ukraine, including in the agricultural sector. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202400792”
  EU-US relations · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2024-11-13 “E-002524/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Conference of the Parties (COP) Presidency traditionally rotates between regional groups of the United Nations (UN). Regional group members hold consultations to determine which country from their region would be nominated to preside the conference. Once agreed, the country selected by the regional group sends through its regional group its nomination formally to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat. Following that process, Azerbaijan was nominated by the Eastern European Group (EEG) during the COP28 as the President of COP29. At its final plenary, the 28th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC endorsed Azerbaijan as President of COP29 1 . The EU is not a member of any UN regional group. As such, it did not have a role in the decision of the EEG to nominate Azerbaijan as the President of COP29. The primary focus of COP29 held in Baku was to address the challenges of climate change. It was recalled in the statements made in September 2023 on Azerbaijan’s military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh 2 and on the displacement of people from Nagorno-Karabakh 3 . The EU is fully committed to achieving lasting peace and stability in the region through dialogue. The EU has been actively engaged in facilitating the normalisation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, notably under the President of the European Council’s auspices. The EU stands ready to lend its continued support, including through the new EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia and through economic support for peace dividends, in order to establish long-lasting peace to the benefit of all people in the region. 1 https://unfccc.int/documents/637071 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/azerbaijan-statement-high-representative-developments-nagorno-karabakh_en 3 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/azerbaijan-statement-spokesperson-displacement-peoplenagorno-karabakh_en”
  EU-Armenia relations · EU-Azerbaijan relations
• 2024-11-13 “E-002528/2024 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Heat pump is a key technology to decarbonise the heating and cooling sector 1 . In the building sector, replacing a boiler by a heat pump in the EU allows to reduce the gas consumption by 95% or more and has thus been identified in the REPowerEU plan 2 as one of the means to reduce fossil fuel consumption, gas in particular. The Commission is working on reducing the environmental impacts of heat pumps beyond their effect on gas consumption and on their CO 2 emission reduction and will present in that direction revised ecodesign requirements for space heaters, including heat pumps, in 2025. Environmental impacts and circularity of wind turbines are extensively studied and covered in Commission’s reports 3 . A sustainability assessment is given in the Annex 2 of the Clean Energy Technology Observatory (CETO) 4 . As regards cars, a study on the life-cycle assessment of conventional and alternatively fuelled vehicles showed that battery electric vehicles score best for most of the environmental impact categories 5 . The Commission is working on the development of a methodology for the assessment and the consistent data reporting of the full life-cycle CO 2 emissions of passenger cars and light commercial vehicles under Regulation (EU) 2019/631 6 . The Commission evaluated the REPowerEU plan in 2024 7 . Over the past 2 years, it has helped the EU save energy (including 18 % natural gas savings), diversify its supplies, reduce energy prices, produce clean energy and smartly combine investments and reforms. 1 IEA, 2024, Energy technology perspectives. 2 Communication REPowerEU Plan COM(2022)230. 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html#def1 4 European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Mc Govern, L., Tapoglou, E., Georgakaki, A., Mountraki, A., Letout, S., Ince, E., Gea Bermudez, J., Schmitz, A. and Grabowska, M., Clean Energy Technology Observatory: Wind Energy in the European Union - 2024 Status Report on Technology Development, Trends, Value Chains and Markets, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/0882709, JRC139320. 5 European Commission: Directorate-General for Climate Action, Hill, N., Amaral, S., Morgan-Price, S., Nokes, T. et al., Determining the environmental impacts of conventional and alternatively fuelled vehicles through LCA – Final report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2020, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2834/91418 6 Regulation (EU) 2019/631 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 setting CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and for new light commercial vehicles. 7 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-and-consumers/actions-and-measures-energy-prices/repowereu-2years_en”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-11-13 “E-002525/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acts in the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) 1 on behalf of the EU. The Commission coordinates the EU position within the MSP by organising regular meetings with the Member States that are also MSP partners and regularly informs the Council and the Critical Raw Materials Board 2 , where the European Parliament is an observer, of its activities. Under the MSP, partner countries identify sustainable Critical Raw Materials (CRM) projects around the world to diversify the supply of CRM for the benefit of their industries. For instance, the deal between the Société du Terril de Lubumbashi, a subsidiary of Gécamines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Belgian company Umicore will supply germanium for the benefits of EU industry 3 . The MSP also supports the Chvaletice project in Czech Republic that contributes to site remediation efforts and supplies manganese for the European electric vehicles industry by re-processing mine tailings 4 . In April 2024, the EU, the United States and other MSP partners, joined by Kazakhstan, Namibia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, announced the launch of the MSP Forum (the Forum) – an additional pillar within the framework of the MSP. The Forum serves as a platform for cooperation on CRM between resource-producing and resource-consuming countries, focusing on projects identification and policy dialogue on CRM. By contributing to MSP and co-chairing the MSP Forum (along with the United States), the Commission works to ensure that the projects selected benefit the EU contributing to its resilience and diversification goals and that EU values and sustainability principles are promoted globally. The Commission hosted on 12 December 2024 in-person MSP Principals and MSP Forum events during the Raw Materials Week. 1 https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership/ 2 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-rawmaterials_en 3 https://www.umicore.com/en/media/newsroom/umicore-and-stl-sign-partnership-related-to-germaniumrecycling/ 4 https://www.mn25.ca/chvaletice-manganese-project”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · EU-US trade relations
• 2024-11-13 “E-002523/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission As stated in the impact assessment supporting the Commission’s proposal for amending the CO 2 emission standards for cars and vans 1 , one of the objectives was to stimulate innovation in zero-emission technologies to tackle the risk of the EU automotive value chain losing its technological leadership. The analysis pointed at the developments in the Chinese automotive sector and its competitive advantage in electric vehicle battery production. The trend towards zero-emission vehicles creates new business opportunities for automotive manufacturers, especially those taking an innovative approach, promoting and selling electric vehicles. Clear regulatory signals facilitate making appropriate investment decisions, to the benefit of EU industry’s competitiveness. The revised CO 2 emission targets 2 provide a long-term regulatory signal. Delaying regulatory action would increase the uncertainty for the investments and the risk of the EU automotive industry losing its technological leadership and lose market share in the EU. The countervailing duties on battery electric vehicles (BEVs) from China are the result of a thorough anti-subsidy investigation, conducted according to the EU and World Trade Organization rules. The Commission concluded that the BEV value chain in China benefits from unfair subsidisation, which is causing a threat of injury to EU BEV producers. The investigation also examined the likely impact of these measures on the EU producers, importers, users and suppliers of BEVs. Finally, with regard to the future of the car industry in Europe, the Commission released an industrial action plan for the automotive sector on 5 March 2025 3 after the President of the Commission conducted a Strategic Dialogue on this specific issue. 1 Impact assessment accompanying Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards strengthening the CO 2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in line with the Union’s increased climate ambition. 2 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/851/oj 3 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/business-and-industry/boosting-european-car-sector_en”
  Trade relations with China · State Aid
• 2024-11-13 “E-002522/2024 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s Global Gateway (GG) 1 aims to mobilise up to EUR 300 billion in public and private investments by 2027 through a mix of grants, loans and guarantees. Over 2021-2023, EUR 179 billion were mobilised – EUR 50 billion from the EU and EUR 129 billion from Member States 2 , the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The GG strategy fosters sustainable investments to support the digital and green transitions, as well as sustainable development in the climate, energy, and transport sectors, and reinforces, health, and education systems. The GG Business Advisory Group was formed to assist the Commission to strengthen cooperation with the European private sector. EU delegations have also organised over 50 business forums, facilitating discussions between businesses and policymakers and enabling EU-national Business-to-Business interactions. The European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus and the GET.invest programmes mobilising renewable energy investments 3 provide support through European development financing partners. This is done through loans, equity, and grants (and also advisory services). The EU established 14 strategic partnerships for sustainable raw material value chains, supporting local processing, refining, skills development, and environmental standards, and endorsed several GG-related flagship projects in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America. Other key initiatives include the Hi-Bar guarantee with the EBRD, a blending facility with the Inter-American Development Bank, and the critical raw materials value chains facility, which enhances collaboration between the EU and partner countries on sustainable raw material development. 1 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank The Global Gateway, JOIN(2021) 30 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0030 2 Joint Communication on building sustainable international partnerships as a Team Europe, JOIN(2024) 25 final, https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/1e8e8afb-64eb-493c-94947e2e10796bf3_en?filename=joint-communication-building-sustainable-international-partnerships-as-teameurope_en.pdf 3 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/programming/projects/getinvest-mobilising-renewableenergy-investments_enpa.eu”
  EU policy on the Indo-Pacific region
• “Thank you, Madam President. Commissioner. Colleagues. The cap must place farmers at the centre, not bureaucracy. Our farmers need less unnecessary red tape, less dogmatic rules. And they need more confidence. More trust. Let them focus on their core business, which is to provide us with the best possible products. We are calling for genuine support for innovation, new techniques like renewal and new genomic techniques. The NEETs must be fully developed and applied because that is what will make farming more sustainable and more efficient. Also, fair competition is essential. Products from outside the EU must meet the same standards as the ones our farmers produce. We have to be very careful about this in our trade policy, and we shouldn't ban plant protection products unless there are viable and affordable alternatives, because that would just be unfair. Finally, we need to get rid of the Green Deal. Green ideology is making. It's going to dismantle our farming, is going to bury our farmers. We need food security and an honest and hopeful prospect for the future.”
  Agriculture (green)
• “Colleagues. Today, once again, we see how vulnerable our energy system in the war in the Middle East is again leading to higher energy prices every time Europe becomes too dependent on imports. It's our companies and families that pay the bill, and we need oil and gas from the North Sea. We need to use those reserves in a very clever way and continue. Drilling. We also use this for cosmetics, electronics and other industries, the backbone to our welfare and the industry. And we need to invest in the future, which is nuclear energy. It's low on carbon, independent and secure. Now, for years, the commission sort of said that they needed expensive, unreliable alternatives and that nuclear energy was bad news. But we now know that that's not true. We need to use what is available and continue expanding nuclear energy, because without it, we won't have an industry. And without industry, we don't have any welfare.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Nuclear energy
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner. Do you know the definition of crazy? Craziness to do the same, but to expect a different result? That is exactly what the European Commission is doing with the clean industrial deal. It's simply trying to patch up the disastrous consequences of the Green Deal. It's exactly the same. It's a bit this is not going to save our industry. It's going to destroy it even further. Brussels says that this is going to strengthen European industry. But at the same time, companies are being forced to have further regulation. They need to reduce their CO2 emissions, which is so expensive. So the solution is to get rid of the Green Deal altogether. And that is why we need to focus on payable energy through nuclear energy. The protection of our industry against unfair competition and less involvement of the EU, and less red tape from EU, because that is the way the industry will have a future in Europe. Thank you. Thank you so much.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you very much Chair. Colleagues, in the next ten years Europe will need an increased amount of energy and electricity. Renewables will not be able to be substituted for. We would be disingenuous to say anything different. I think nuclear energy could be the most affordable and reliable. Now that means that we're going to need to have stronger grids that are more powerful and also a nuclear sector that is bolstered could give a more secure energy supply to Europe. So we must list our priorities in terms of cables and new technologies. We need great investment, no doubt. When it comes to accessibility and affordability of price, that is something that we absolutely need to focus on as well. Thank you. **Giorgio GORI @Chair (Italy, S&D): Thank you Christophe Goulart. Thank”
  Nuclear energy
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner. Colleagues. Our industry is on the edge of a disaster. The Green Deal is leading to offshoring or delocalization. We're seeing that we have speculative CRT markets, and the Cbam as it is today, is punishing rather than protecting. The EU needs to be a world player, but at the moment it's still too dependent on unaffordable energy. Production is being moved outside of the European Union. And so who are we now dependent on? That's why I want to have a stable European industry proposal review or get rid of the Green Deal. We need to see simplification and we need to see gas as an essential part of our energy mix. Because without this, simply our energy cannot manage. Energy is part of our prosperity. And please do not forget that.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Commissioner. Ladies and gentlemen, the crisis in artificial and chemical fertilizers is something that Europe has created for itself. Our farmers are being confronted today with sky high artificial fertiliser prices and an artificial fertiliser industry that is finding it more and more difficult to keep its head above the water. And that's because we've got too many climate rules. Huge energy bills and political shocks that have not gone away. Now what's the commission doing now? Well, they're putting forward an action plan. Nice words. A lot of fine promises. But unfortunately I see 0% structural specific measures. For me, this is a missed opportunity and it's too little, too late. Commissioner, we have to have real measures. Our chemical fertilisers have to be Available. We have to allow our farmers to use animal manure more, and we need to get rid of the nitrate directive that is affecting our farmers. They are really asking for you to get rid of that.”
  Use of fertilisers
• “President. Commissioner. Ladies and gentlemen, the European Commission is changing our economy into a planned economy at a rapid pace. And they're putting a ban on emission on combustion engines, which is something we've been at the forefront, and there's an attempt to artificially increase the demand for electric vehicles against the will of drivers. Why don't they want electric vehicles? Because the charging infrastructure is not ready and the cars are too expensive. We're selling these electric dreams that we can't live up to. We're shifting production outside the EU, and that is a disaster for our families and our industry. Let the free market do what it will and let's not have this ban. Planned economies has never worked. Let's give the consumer their choice back because only freedom gives us a real choice.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “(10:57:20 – 10:59:45): It's not Barbara Stembergen. She could not come. So, Emiliano Roketti, policy officer at the International Union of Tenants. The International Union of Tenants is the only organization representing tenants rights at the European level. And we are presenting more than actually all over the world in more than 75 countries, with more than 50 almost 60, actually, organizations. So on the subject of this panel, the IoT, of course, welcomes the ongoing work on the affordable housing act and to better identifying housing, housing stress zones. However, as our contribution to the questionnaire of the commission highlights, each member states define and monitors these in different ways and through different indicators reflecting different social realities and market structures. Definitions therefore rely on different combination of indicators such as the housing cost overburden, supply shortages, and demographic change. At the same time, it's important to stress that too strict and rigid rules at the EU level risk overlooking local dynamics and household level affordability challenges. So my question to all the representatives on the panel, which are from construction, urban governance, and industry, is how do you see on the new framework for identifying housing tension zones striking the right balance between ensuring comparability and legal certainty across member states, preserving flexibility needed for local authorities to reflect real housing conditions on the ground. Additionally, I would like to also stress 1 indicator that was not mentioned at least like as 1 of the possible indicators in the questionnaire of the affordable housing act, which is speculation and financialization of the housing market, which is a real indicator of housing tensions in many areas of Europe. Thank you.”
  EU policy on urban development
• “Thank you very much, chair. Thank you to the representatives of the Commission. Yes. When we're talking about restricting FAS, and rightly so, we have to look at the context as to what is decided here and what is actually happening in the member states, in Flanders, where I come from. Last year, almost 500 tons of pure FAS were burnt on top of ten thousands of tonnes of PFAS containing waste, and quite a lot of that waste is actually being imported from abroad to be destroyed in Flemish plants. We see that the Flanders authorities allowing imports, but the situation of these imports and the way in which they're burnt is not good enough. We're looking at this PFOA and PFOs, which are being found in this incineration plant. So it's not just whether it's worthwhile burning this or it's also a question of whether it's consistent with our policies at European level. Because if we're going to import PFAS material from third countries, then there's a question of what it is we're actually achieving here. And that is untenable in the longer term. So here I would ask for substitution. But we have to bear in mind what happens to waste and where it is sent. So I'd like to ask the commission as well, whether in their draft legislation, they're going to take into consideration these waste flows, not just the way that they're dealt with under controlled conditions, but also on the principle of fair balance of burden and cross-border incineration of waste. Member states can have a strict policy on PFAS, but they may just be exporting the problem somewhere else. And we are already seeing states under pressure.”
  PFAs
• “Thank you very much. And colleagues, I'm very happy that we are having this exchange of ideas, because the European steel industry is being having very difficult times over recent years. And I live in a city where ArcelorMittal has a plant, and therefore it's very concerning for us. And we all know the reasons, on the one hand, the high energy costs. Also, the green transition policy of the European Union and the competition with third countries such as China, who are selling their steel cheaply on and dumping it on our markets. And the last is Europe, where I was supposed to represent the European steel industry, but is really needs to ensure that the margins and the investment capacities of our European steel producers need to be promoted. And if we look at the European steel industry in Europe, we want to retain it, then we need to allow it to become competitive once again. And alongside anti-dumping rules, we also need to ensure that we do something about the very high energy costs. And the green transition needs to have extra legislation, not dogmatically but realistically implemented. And the European Commission needs to take this seriously. Thank you.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you. Chair I will speak in Dutch. Our farmers are facing increasingly strict rules in terms of pesticides and residue levels because of the Green Deal. A lot of substances are disappearing, and then there are even more requirements placed on farmers than there are trade agreements. And that means that farmers are really threatened because what they've been using in terms of pesticides can't be used anymore. Efsa has introduced MRLs for consumer protection, but consumer protection on paper is something different than in practice. That's why I have a question about imports. How can they be properly tested at the borders? Will member states have the right analysis capacities, and how often are you seeing those MRL levels being exceeded? Because we can't then accept products which have been treated with substances we're not allowed to use. We need to make sure that we're having effective controls and checks. Thank you.”
  Pesticides & trade
• “Yes, Director Behrendt, you're talking about trying to strike a balance between transparency and fair competition, but does this often mean for farmers higher costs, less choice, and less access to products? The long deadlines combined with the endless discussions on which compensation needs to fit—these aren't theoretical problems. We see that generic biocides often don't come on the market quickly enough or if at all. That means there's less competition, and that means there are higher costs for our farmers, and they're already under massive pressure. Over and above that, there's a tension between the sensitive industrial information held by farmers and transparency. Farmers want their products to be safe, and customers want to know what's going on, and yet we're hearing about industrial secrets and the farmers having to foot the bill for that, and big business is winning.”
  EU policy on pesticides
• “Commissioner. Honourable members Chinese export restrictions on rare earths have exposed a cruel reality. Europe is vulnerable. For years, we clung to our dogmatic climate green agenda and allowed ourselves to become wholly reliant on China. We now know that China is using this over overreliance in a power game weakening our industry. We hear a lot about plans and strategies from the commission, but it is too little, too late. Prices have risen six times. Production lines may run dry. Europe does not have any time to waste. We need swift decisions. We need to look at our own mining and refining potential. We need new partnerships with reliable countries and partners. And we need action within months, not years. Europe needs to take action now.”
  Trade relations with China
• “The Mercosur agreement will have an impact on farming. It will hit the agri sector hard. We've already got the Green Deal and we've got green NGOs who are financed by the European Commission. This is going to bring down what was built up by farmers over generation. The Green Deal means that farmers have to change their business model and some are even shutting shop. Now we have the final death blow caused by Mercosur. Why would we want milk, dairy, poultry and beef being flown in from halfway around the world from Mercosur? We've already got the highest standards here. Why would millions of our farms be jeopardised like this? The market is being upset and brought out of balance by this agreement. Farmers are affected and smaller farmers will be affected the most. Let's end this madness.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Thank you chair. I will speak in Dutch. With the commissaris you clean industrial deal for yourself as an oplossing. Dear Commissioner, the Clean industrial Deal has been proposed to try and find solutions to problems in the European industrial sector. But in reality the problems of the Green Deal itself have not really been addressed. The Green Deal set out the most restrictive climate goals for industry in the world. We have to reduce emissions by 2050, but at the same time energy prices are very high. We want to electrify everything and if this is the goal, then we have to also talk about reliable energy sources. Industry will not become greener. It will just become less competitive. In China, for example, the industrial sector is protected and European industry, on the other hand, is being overburdened with so much compliance. And that's when they end up, uh, uh, moving industry abroad. So this is not helping industry at all. The clean industrial deal is meant to simplify things, but that's not necessarily being done because we're not addressing the key issues in the industrial sector. They still need to pay high costs for energy and there are new subsidies. But in the industrial sector cannot just survive with subsidies. So industrial sectors are also being dealt with very differently. The larger companies can survive, but smaller companies don't stand a chance. So, Madam Commissioner, how exactly are you going to ensure that the industrial sector does, uh, undergo revival with these goals? And how are you going to deal with the key issues that will set up by the Green Deal? Thank you.”
  Climate efforts
• “Thank you. Chair. I will speak in Dutch. Commissioner, I really need to talk to you about the negative impact of the climate policy on our society and our economy, because in practice, we're seeing that clean growth is de-growth. The Green Deal did not lead to sustainable growth, but it led to social problems and expensive energy. The energy prices are unsustainable. Companies are leaving the EU, families are put under pressure. Who gets the bill at the end of the day? The man in the street. High price for foods and for energy and jobs lost. We're not seeing a climate transition. We're seeing something that's being imposed because of an ideology linked to climate and Out of touch with the with reality. This policy is out of date. It was before Covid and before globalization. Everything has changed in the meantime, except the European climate policy. We need to get rid of the Green Deal rather than develop it further. We need a policy based on playability and national interests. When will you finally reach that conclusion? Thank you.”
  Climate efforts
• “Thank you, chair, I will speak in Dutch. Commissioner, in recent months, we haven't heard much from you, apart from the fact that your film about your handbag that you put on social media has made you world famous to encourage Europeans to put together emergency packages. And we've also seen you on the radio and, Cash, for example, we've seen the disastrous results of the floods in Spain and Portugal. You talk about hybrid threats, and because of these, the fact that your bank cards might only be a piece of plastic, so you need to have money in cash. Now, I agree with you, cash means freedom, privacy, and can always be used and everywhere. And in this sense, I will support you. You're promoting the use of cash, however, whereas the European institutions are doing everything they can to limit the use of cash, for example, digital euro, and the fact that sometimes cash payments are no longer possible above a certain limit. And so we have to focus on this. You can't, on the one hand, focus on use of cash and at the same time support apparatus that will reduce it. Now, we saw in your handbag film, you said, when I'm walking around in Brussels, I'm always happy if I still have my handbag. There are shootings, attacks, thefts. These also affect us. And here, we also need a preparedness strategy. Here in Belgium, the use of pepper spray is still forbidden, but I think a lot of women would feel safer if they could carry pepper spray in their handbags. So a couple of questions. Are you going to give this aspect of preparedness attention as well? And will you focus on the use of cash when speaking with your colleagues in the Commission?”
  Means of payment (cash vs digital)
• “Thank you. Yes, colleagues. The conflict on energy spending on the industry is vital. Which means that people are going to have to do with less. And that is shameful. And we want to ask the commission to support the member states when it comes to implementing the new strategy, and we need to look at supporting the access to fertilisers today rather than wait. And we also want to work on making the application processes more flexible when it comes to being able to use those. Thank you very much. Thank you.”
  Use of fertilisers
• “The climate conference. The UN climate conference is more dead than alive. That's a good thing. This whole process has done nothing for Europe but cause damage. 30 years of meetings and delegations have led to a highly destructive platform, a platform where Europe is, in effect, detonating its own future while the rest of the world stand backs and laughs at our naivety. Here in the European Parliament, many members seem to defend the climate crisis as if it were sacred. We see the reality as our businesses and industry disappears, and all our businesses and citizens are suffering under this out of date Green Deal. We are responsible for a small proportion of worldwide CO2, but we seem to believe that we can change the course of the world. This causes further damage to us. This whole climate process is alien to reality. The only rational choice now would be to stop the whole process, stop the Green Deal, stop destroying our prosperity. **Nicolae ȘTEFĂNUȚĂ @Co-Chair: The Beatrice team is next.”
  Climate efforts
• “Just imagine that your flight has been delayed. You have to wait in the airport for hours. You can't make your connecting flight and all of your plans are ruined. Normally, you should be able to request compensation if your flight is delayed for more than three hours. But now there is a proposal on the table that this right to compensation will be significantly restricted by increasing the minimum time. Uh, here. Um, there is a risk that people's rights will be undermined. Passengers will get a lot less protection. Furthermore, the current procedure to request compensation is already very complicated. And actually, two out of three travellers don't get their compensation in practice. Instead of protecting citizens, it seems that the EU is now only listening to the wishes of the airlines. Passenger rights have to be protected, not hollowed out, because any passenger affected should be able to get what they have a right to.”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• “Commissioner. Fellow members. It appears that the Commission thinks that simplification of the cap will be like waving a magic wand and it will sort everything out, but I think it's just window dressing. If you look at what's actually happening, farmers are still drowning in red tape. They have so many reporting obligations. And if you compare this to the real needs on the ground, it's absurd. They need way more support, but actually they're being asked to demonstrate their own viability. That is what the commission has done. And at the same time, it opens the door wide to unfair competition, for instance, through Mercosur. Farmers don't deserve to be treated like that. They should be able to continue doing what they do best, which is produce and give us food. Less red tape means more time in the fields. They need measures that will help with innovation and ensuring food sovereignty lets farmers let farmers be farmers.”
  Agriculture (green)