Fernand KARTHEISER

Policy topics Fernand KARTHEISER is active on

What Fernand KARTHEISER has said (43)

• 2026-03-17 “Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 29.4.2026 Written question The EU remains committed to its restrictive measures against Russia, including those aimed at hampering Russian revenue generated from oil exports. The Commission is dedicated to monitoring global developments to ensure the robustness of the EU’s policy framework and upholding the effectiveness of sanctions. Currently, there is no review planned for the EU sanctions policy in relation to the recent US measures. The Commission remains convinced that the Oil Price Cap and existing sanctions are well-targeted and continue to be effective, even amid current market volatility. These measures have successfully reduced Russian oil export revenues while maintaining the stability of oil markets, with export volumes from Russia remaining broadly stable. The Commission continuously engages in constructive dialogues with several partners, including the US, to ensure energy security and support diversification. In this respect, the EU has made substantial progress since 2021, with Norway (31%), the US (26%) and North Africa (13%) being the EU’s top suppliers of gas, while oil imports are well diversified with over 10 main suppliers, none of them providing more than 18% of total supply. The Commission has also launched a series of reforms meant to accelerate clean energy deployment to reduce energy prices, home-grown clean energy being the best solution to lower prices and protect the EU from the volatility of global fossil fuel markets.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-US relations
• 2025-11-05 “E-004382/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union is an autonomous decentralised agency of the European Union. It operates in the context of the Multiannual Financial Framework, with fixed and constant resources, to support EU agencies and institutions in delivering on their commitment to multilingualism over a growing range of tasks. The Translation Centre reports to its Management Board, where the Commission has two representatives out of 72 members representing all Member States, EU institutions, bodies and agencies. Information presented to the Management Board by the Centre and available to the Commission does not point to a particularly high staff turnover nor to general staff discontent. Accordingly, the Commission is not able to confirm the accuracy of the article’s statements. 2. The Commission encourages the Centre to carry out regular staff well-being surveys and to act and report on the results to the Management Board. Moreover, the Commission stands ready to support the agency. For example, the Commission can provide psychological support for Centre’s staff via a service level agreement, in case of need. Also, ongoing discussions between the Commission and decentralised agencies aim to provide staff of the latter with the same level of protection against harassment as for Commission staff, based on Commission Decision C(2023)8630 on the prevention of and fight against psychological and sexual harassment.”
  Multilingualism in EU institutions
• 2025-10-29 “E-004248/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission fully supports the objective of providing stability for businesses in the context of the implementation of the Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). To this end, the Commission will adopt by the end of 2025 several implementing and delegated acts to implement CBAM’s definitive phase from 1 January 2026. These will include the default values, benchmarks and the methodology to calculate the prices of CBAM certificates from 2026 onwards. For each quarter in 2026, the Commission will calculate and publish the prices of CBAM certificates which will apply to imports of CBAM goods into the Union. Therefore, importers will know the default values, benchmarks and applicable price of CBAM certificates as soon as possible during the year of imports, thus helping them manage their financial liability ahead of the sales of CBAM certificates which will only start on 1 February 2027. Finally, as a climate measure, the CBAM has been designed from the outset in full compatibility with the Union’s legal obligations, including World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The CBAM implementing rules will continue ensuring CBAM fully aligns with core principles such as non-discrimination, transparency, and proportionality by mirroring the EU Emissions Trading System.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2025-10-08 “E-003954/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 places the utmost importance on accessibility, assistive technologies and the provision of reasonable accommodation as enablers of rights and a prerequisite for the full participation of persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others. During the last decade, a number of EU rules have been adopted in different areas to make the EU more accessible for persons with disabilities and to support their cross-border mobility. The European Disability Card will give persons with disabilities legal certainty that their disability status will be recognised when accessing special conditions or preferential treatment offered by a wide variety of services, activities or facilities 1 . To support the implementation of the Strategy, the EU promotes the use of EU funding by the Member States, which can support schemes as the one referred to in the question. For instance, the Cohesion Fund or the European Regional Development Fund can support projects aimed at adapting built environments for better accessibility for persons with disabilities, or in transport, making mobility accessible for all passengers. The Commission and the Member States are required to take accessibility for persons with disabilities into account throughout the preparation and implementation of programmes 2 . In addition, Member States can exchange good practices in the context of the Disability Platform. The Commission also adopted the Notice Guidance on independent living and inclusion in the community of persons with disabilities in the context of EU funding, to support Member States and stakeholders in promoting the rights to independent living. 1 Directive 2024/2841, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202402841. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R1060, Article 9(3).”
  EU policy on disability inclusion & accessibility
• 2025-10-03 “E-003894/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The legal architecture consisting of two parallel legal instruments (the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement 1 and the Interim Trade Agreement 2 ) is in line with the Treaties. The negotiating directives adopted by the Council in 1999 envisaged the possibility of a separate EU only interim agreement on trade. This architecture is not new as it was adopted by the Council and the European Parliament for the Advanced Framework Agreement between Chile and the EU 3 . In line with the Treaties, the Council and the European Parliament will endorse the agreement and ensure legitimacy and inclusiveness of the adoption process. Trade agreements are concluded by the EU with the consent of the European Parliament, directly elected by EU citizens. These agreements are subject to a vote by the Council, which democratically represents EU governments. Member States represented in the Council may consult with their national parliaments and other stakeholders ahead of the conclusion of the agreement. The Commission supports Member States’ efforts to inform and consult their national and regional parliaments about the agreement. The Commission also regularly replies to questions from national parliaments. The Court of Justice 4 has clarified the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence in trade policy and confirmed that for matters falling within the EU’s exclusive competence, the power to conclude these agreements belongs to the EU institutions - the Council and the European Parliament. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0356&qid=1762168726070. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0338&qid=1762168726070. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2024/1759/oj. 4 https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=190727&doclang=en.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• 2025-09-29 “E-003772/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is closely monitoring the trials of Karabakh Armenians in Baku and calls on Azerbaijan to respect due process and the rights of detainees, including to adequate medical care, and to ensure that the allegations made against them are investigated in a transparent manner. The EU has also advocated to address these issues as part of confidence-building measures between the parties. The EU continues to stress the importance of guaranteeing fair trial standards and adequate detention conditions, in line with Azerbaijan’s international commitments. In this context, the EU welcomes the latest visit of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) to Azerbaijan from 22 September to 3 October 2025 1 . The trials at the Baku Military Court touch on the much larger question of achieving lasting and sustainable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is crucial that both countries continue to make progress on their path towards full normalisation of relations. In this context, the EU strongly commends both sides for the initialling of their bilateral peace treaty on 8 August 2025 in Washington, District of Columbia. The EU stands ready to help implementing the Washington agreements 2 . 1 https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/council-of-europe-anti-torture-committee-cpt-carries-out-a-visit-toazerbaijan-1. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/statement_25_1948, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/08/armeniaazerbaijan-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-initialling-of-the-armenia-azerbaijan-peace-treaty/.”
  EU-Azerbaijan relations · EU-Armenia relations
• 2025-09-23 “E-003692/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission As the Commission pointed out in its reply to written question E-003458/2025 1 , the EU honours and commemorates all victims and sacrifices made to end the Second World War, a profoundly tragic chapter in the history of Europe and the world. Regrettably, the Second World War brought painful divisions in Europe and for many Europeans the end of the war brought not freedom, but further subjugation. On the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Asia, the EU paid tribute also to the courage of the people of China, who endured immense suffering in defending their homeland and contributing to the end of the war. Russia continues to deliberately manipulate historical narratives surrounding the Second World War and its aftermath to distract and divert attention from the uncomfortable truth. It remains essential to uphold historical accuracy and reject any attempts to rewrite history for political gains, ensuring that the sacrifices and lessons of the past give guidance toward a peaceful and just future. Unfortunately, Europe is confronted with another painful reality: Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine violates international law, including the United Nations Charter and international humanitarian law. The EU stands with Ukraine in its efforts to restore its full independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Remembrance of communism/Soviet Union
• 2025-09-09 “E-003486/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 is an EU law that applies solely within the EU and does not have extraterritorial effects. The Commission enforces EU laws effectively, fairly and without discrimination towards all companies operating in the EU. Any measures taken by the Commission are subject to independent judicial scrutiny. The DSA promotes and protects freedom of expression. Nothing in the DSA obliges online intermediaries to remove lawful content nor stipulate if content is or not lawful. The DSA makes online platforms accountable to citizens, including by mandating transparency around content moderation, and by granting appeal rights. The EU and Canada exchange information about their respective sovereign approaches to a range of digital matters under the EU-Canada Digital Partnership, including regulation of platforms. The DSA is not part of trade negotiations. The Commission has requested approval from the Council to launch negotiations for a digital trade agreement with Canada, but the digital trade disciplines that are envisaged will not include any commitments regarding the DSA. To the contrary, the EU will seek to reconfirm in the agreement– in line with its other digital trade agreements – the parties’ right to regulate within their territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives. With his letter of 28 August 2025, published on X 2 , the former Commissioner for Internal Market informed the Chairman of the Committee on the judiciary that he would not be able to participate at a hearing on 3 September 2025, being not available on that date given the very short notice. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://x.com/ThierryBreton/status/1961143710306927053.”
  US-EU tech coordination · Disinformation & online freedoms · EU-US relations
• 2025-07-25 “E-003095/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully committed to respecting the linguistic diversity of the EU and cooperates closely with the different linguistic services of the EU institutions to that effect. 1. The Commission recognises the importance of supporting interpreters in adapting to technological advancements, including Artificial Intelligence. This involves engaging in dialogues with interpreters and industry experts, establishing adequate upskilling strategies, and ensuring that technological tools support and complement, rather than replace, human expertise. 2. The Commission is aware of concerns about the future of the interpreting profession and acknowledges the need to attract talented individuals. The Commission actively supports awareness campaigns and a wide array of initiatives to highlight the value of multilingualism and the opportunities available in the interpreting field. The interpretation services of the EU institutions recruit interpreters in line with their specific needs. 3. Specialised academic curricula are vital to ensure that institutions have access to qualified interpreters to meet their multilingual needs. The Commission values the well-established cooperation between EU institutions and universities to train interpreters in language combinations required by the institutions. It provides support through networks, consortia, training assistance, bursaries and grants.”
  Multilingualism in EU institutions
• 2025-07-11 “E-002850/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The overall objective of the Commission’s support to the International Criminal Court (ICC) is to contribute to the fight against impunity for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole 1 . The specific objectives are to broaden the understanding of the ICC and the Rome Statute, achieve greater support and cooperation of states with the ICC, and to reinforce national capacities in dealing with crimes under the Rome Statute. The Commission fully supports the independence and impartiality of the work of the ICC. To ensure that financing by the Commission does not negatively affect the independence of the ICC, the financial contribution is not earmarked. The Commission has been supporting the ICC since 2003, and the current financial contribution is for EUR 3 million which will cover the period until 31 December 2025. The Commission is also planning additional financing in the amount of EUR 3 million for the years 2026-2028. The terms of cooperation and assistance between the EU and the ICC are defined in the 2006 Agreement between the two 2 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/03fdbrg2/action-plan-en_2020-2027.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/agreement-between-the-eu-and-the-international-criminalcourt-icc.html.”
  Support for International Criminal Court
• 2025-07-02 “E-002680/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is already using state-of-the-art language tools, technology and linguistic data assets in its translation workflows to enhance the efficiency and quality of the translation work in the context of a high and sustained overall demand for translation and a pressure on Commission’s resources under the administrative heading. The role of translators will remain essential in the Commission’s translation workflows, in particular for legislative texts. The Commission will continue to deliver high-quality translation and other language services that meet the needs of the Commission departments and end users, using a flexible resources mix combining in-house staff, a reliable and qualified pool of external contractors, and language technology as an enabler. The Commission ensures that the use of technologies based on artificial intelligence (AI) remains fully compliant with the AI Act 1 , including the aspect of human oversight. Through the Digital Europe programme 2 , the Commission supports the development of multilingual AI services and AI tools for all EU official languages, including low-resource languages 3 , so that none of the languages is left behind. These services and tools are provided for free to the EU institutions and to public administrations, small and medium-sized enterprises, non-governmental organisations and academia in the Member States. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (AI Act), OJ L, 2024/1689. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/activities/digital-programme. 3 https://language-tools.ec.europa.eu/.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2025-06-12 “P-002380/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine is a blatant violation of international law including the United Nations (UN) Charter, goes against the EU’s objective to strengthen the multilateral rules-based order and is a threat to all countries, not just to Europe. The EU condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia must remain isolated internationally and, with its political leadership, held fully accountable for the violations of international law and international humanitarian law it has committed. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked a fundamental turning point in EU-Russia relations. The EU’s wartime approach towards Russia consists of isolating Russia internationally; imposing restrictive measures; ensuring accountability; supporting EU’s neighbours and helping partners worldwide to address the global consequences of the war; working closely together with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and partners; enhancing the EU’s resilience; supporting civil society, human rights defenders and independent media 1 . As long as Russia continues to violate international law including the UN Charter and wages a war of aggression against Ukraine, there can be no return to normal relations. Since Russia started its war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU’s diplomatic engagement with Russia is being kept to minimum. The priority of any contact with Russia is to deliver the call to stop its illegal aggression and the violation of the UN Charter, and respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/foreign-affairs-council-defence-press-remarks-highrepresentative-josep-borrell_en.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-06-11 “E-002330/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission In 2018, the Commission approved the acquisition of Ilva by ArcelorMittal. This approval was conditional on the sale of several steel plants in Europe to preserve effective competition. ArcelorMittal suggested Liberty House Group as a suitable purchaser of the said steel plants. The Commission thoroughly assessed the suitability of Liberty House Group as a purchaser in 2019. As a general matter, the Commission thoroughly assesses all foreseeable effects of all reportable acquisitions, including in the steel sector, in its merger control approvals. At the time of the Commission’s merger control approval, it was not possible to foresee the issues that would arise in the following years. Most notably, in 2021, Greensill Capital, a financial backer of Liberty House Group, filed for insolvency. As a result, Liberty House Group started to face material financial difficulties. Beyond the merger control aspects, the Commission has carefully assessed the EU interest in several reviews of measures related to steel imports, most recently the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/612 of 24 March 2025 1 , and is confident that a fair balance of interests has been achieved. During the latest review of this measure, the Commission carried out a detailed analysis of all submissions to bring short-term relief to the EU industry in categories facing significant import pressure, while not unnecessarily restricting sourcing opportunities for EU user industries and other stakeholders in categories where import pressure is not present. More generally, building on the Clean Industrial Deal, the Commission adopted the Steel and Metals Action Plan 2 that aims to strengthen the sector’s competitiveness and safeguard the industry’s future. 1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/612 of 24 March 2025 amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing a definitive safeguard measure on imports of certain steel products, OJ L, 2025/612, 25.3.2025. 2 COM(2025) 125 final.”
  EU Competition policy · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2025-05-07 “E-001834/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission notes the concerns regarding the alleged incident involving Archbishop Marchel of the Moldovan Orthodox Church. The 2024 enlargement report 1 highlights that Moldova largely upholds the freedom of religion and belief, with no documented violations reported. The country has implemented a national strategy aimed at cultivating tolerance to address issues such as racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance, in accordance with the Commission’s guidance. A new enlargement report for 2025 is anticipated to be released in the fall of 2025. The Commission remains committed to upholding the principles of rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of religion or belief, as core EU values. These principles are central to Moldova’s EU accession process. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/858717b3-f8ef-4514-89fe54a6aa15ef69_en?filename=Moldova%20Report%202024.pdf.”
  EU-Moldova relations · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2025-04-24 “P-001672/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Pursuant to Article 91(1) of the Digital Services Act (DSA), by 17 November 2025, the Commission shall evaluate and report to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the application of Article 33 of the DSA and the way that the DSA interacts with other legal acts, in particular those listed in Article 2(2) and (3) of the DSA. The Commission services, in close cooperation, have started the preparatory work towards the adoption of the report. The preparation of this report is closely aligned with the on-going work of the Simplification Package 1 . The report will also be informed by surveys addressed to a variety of stakeholders (including civil society organisations, companies and regulatory authorities) and other relevant analysis. Pursuant to Article 91(3) the DSA, the report may be accompanied by a legislative proposal to amend the DSA, if necessary. At this stage, however, there is no such indication. The protection of freedom of expression was at the core of the design of the DSA. The DSA has inter alia increased the transparency and accountability over the content moderation decisions taken by providers of intermediary services and reinforced redress mechanisms for users. In addition, the DSA requires providers of services designated as very large online platforms and very large online search engines to identify, assess and analyse, and effectively mitigate systemic risks stemming from the functioning, design and use made of their services and related systems, including in relation to any actual or foreseeable negative effects for the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of expression. The Commission is committed to protecting freedom of expression in monitoring and enforcing the DSA rules. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/news/commission-proposes-cut-red-tape-and-simplify-business-environment2025-02-26_en.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2025-02-14 “P-000703/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has been actively engaged in diplomatic efforts aiming at the cessation of hostilities, provision of humanitarian aid and the resumption of peace talks under the Luanda/Nairobi peace process. It has been doing so in close contact with likeminded and its regional partners across the Great Lakes region. A joint ministerial meeting between the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community will follow-up on the conclusions of the Joint Summit of the two organisations held on 8 February 2025 1 to address the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which set a path for, inter alia, a ceasefire and the restart of peaceful negotiations. The Foreign Affairs Council of 24 February 2025 2 examined ways to put pressure on Rwanda to stop its support to the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) armed group and withdraw its troops from the DRC. It decided to suspend security and defence consultations with Rwanda and adopted a political decision to include new listings to its existing autonomous sanctions regime in view of the situation in the DRC, depending on developments on the ground. The Foreign Affairs Council of 24 February 2025 also discussed the need to review the Memorandum of Understanding with Rwanda 3 on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw material value chains. This review is currently ongoing. 1 Communiqué: https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Communique%20of%20the%20Joint%20EACSADC%20Summit.pdf 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2025/02/24/ 3 https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/58035”
  EU-Congo (DRC) relations · EU-Rwanda relations
• 2025-01-24 “E-000315/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The draft Commission Delegated Regulation on regulatory technical standards specifying adjustment of own funds requirement and minimum features of stress testing programmes of issuers of asset-referenced tokens or of e-money tokens (‘draft RTS’) 1 is based on the empowerment laid down in Article 35(6) of Regulation on Markets in Crypto-assets 2 (MiCA). It further specifies Article 35(3) and (5) of MiCA and does not include any new obligations or imposes any unnecessary additional burden on market participants. The European Banking Authority (EBA) held an open public consultation on the draft RTS, which was open to anyone who wished to respond on the EBA’s website 3 between 8 November 2023 and 8 February 2024. The consultation was part of a package of several draft RTS on prudential matters under MiCA, for which the EBA held a hybrid public hearing on 30 January 2024 for all registered interested stakeholders. The provision stipulating that the draft RTS is to enter into force and apply 20 days after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union 4 (OJ) is standard for such regulatory acts. The draft RTS as adopted by the Commission is publicly available and can be consulted by market operators since 13 December 2024. 5 Its publication in the OJ is preceded by a three-month scrutiny period, as laid down in Article 13 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 6 . The maximum timeframe for issuers to adjust to higher own fund requirements 7 was extended from three months to six months following the public consultations based on comments received from the stakeholders. This timeframe strikes the right balance between allowing an issuer sufficient time to adjust while addressing the higher risks posed by the issuer. 1 C(2024) 6908 final. 2 Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets, and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 and Directives 2013/36/EU and (EU) 2019/1937 (OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 40, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1114/oj). 3 https://www.eba.europa.eu/publications-and-media/events/consultation-adjustment-own-funds-requirementsand-design-stress EBA received 8 responses. 4 Article 11 of the draft RTS. 5 Register of delegated and implementing acts, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/regdel/#/delegatedActs/2443?lang=en 6 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/1093/oj). 7 A laid down in Article 3 of the draft RTS.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU · Regulation of crypto
• 2025-01-15 “E-000147/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Democracy is a founding value of the EU. The essence of democracy is that citizens can freely express their views and participate in democratic life, choose their political representatives, and have a say in their future. Freedom of expression and freedom of information are both enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 1 and respected across EU legislation. EU law and policies do not aim to regulate the content of messages. On the contrary, they promote transparent access to an open democratic space. As long as legal boundaries are respected (such as respect for hate speech prohibitions and national defamation rules), citizens and political actors should be able to express themselves freely. Citizens have a right to seek and receive information and should be able to form their own opinions in a public space where a plurality of views can be expressed, where they have a right to disagree and where they can take part in elections which are free from interference, whether foreign or domestic. Foreign interference in the context of elections and democratic debate happens when a foreign state or foreign actor undertakes or triggers a covert operation, directly or through proxies, which aims to harm the integrity of the democratic debate, institutions or processes. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12016P%2FTXT.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-01-07 “E-000018/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The EU taxonomy aims to help identify investments into activities that make a substantial contribution to EU environmental objectives. The taxonomy already covers several technologies that are important for Europe’s strategic autonomy and resilience, such as manufacturing of renewable energy, generation of electricity and/or heat from renewable sources, hydrogen, storage and batteries, grids technologies, also recognised under the NetZero-Industry-Act 1 , as well as transitional energy activities including gas and nuclear. Although defence activities are not covered as such in the taxonomy, undertakings in the defence sector can report investments into greening of their buildings or transport like any other sector 2 . The EU taxonomy is a living document. More activities could be added to its scope over time. This could include more strategic activities. The Platform on Sustainable Finance 3 , an independent advisory group, is currently developing recommendations for potential inclusion of mining and refining of critical raw materials in the taxonomy. In line with the EU Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) 4 , improving access to finance for the defence industry is a priority for the EU, and the EU sustainable finance framework does not impose any limitations in this regard. EDIS stresses that, ‘with the exception of weapons subject to prohibitions by international conventions signed by Member States - which are therefore deemed by the EU to be incompatible with social sustainability - the defence industry enhances sustainability, given its contribution to resilience, security and peace’. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724, OJ L, 2024/1735, 28.6.2024. 2 Commission Notice on the interpretation and implementation of certain legal provisions of the EU Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act establishing technical screening criteria for economic activities that contribute substantially to climate change mitigation or climate change adaptation and do no significant harm to other environmental objective, OJ C, C/2023/267, 20.10.2023 , https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/267/oj 3 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/overview-sustainable-finance/platform-sustainable-finance_en 4 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrialstrategy_en”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-12-16 “E-002970/2024 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. The negotiations of the amendments to the International Health Regulations (2005) (hereafter ‘IHR’) were successfully concluded on 1 June 2024 and such amendments were adopted by the IHR States Parties at the 77 th World Health Assembly with Resolution WHA 77.17 1 . None of these amendments and none of the original provisions of the IHR affect the capacity of the Member States to define their health policy and the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care as enshrined in Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. In addition, Article 3(4) of the IHR has not been modified as a result of the amendment process. 2. Digitalisation of documents contributes to digitalisation of healthcare systems and health certificates can be a valuable tool to facilitate travel and trade in case of health emergencies. While it is up to each IHR State Party to decide whether to use digital health certificates, the Commission supports their use. This is also consistent with the support provided by the EU to the World Health Organization (WHO) global digital health certification (GDHC) network. The GDHC network, in which Member States can voluntarily join, is based on the standards and specifications developed for the EU Digital COVID Certificate, including with the purpose to validate digital signatures against fraud. 3. The recommendations issued by the WHO on the basis of the amended IHR remain, by definition, not legally binding. Their objective is to guide IHR States Parties in preventing, preparing for and responding to public health threats. In line with Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 2 , the Commission shall take WHO recommendations into account when adopting recommendations on common temporary public health measures. 1 WHA77.17 - Strengthening preparedness for and response to public health emergencies through targeted amendments to the International Health Regulations (2005). 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022 on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU, OJ L 314, 6.12.2022, p. 26-63.”
  Vaccination · EU competences on health
• 2024-10-02 “E-001919/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission The EU has responded strongly to the human rights violations and repressions by the Iranian authorities and has set out its policy towards Iran in Council conclusions of December 2022 1 . The EU will continue to consistently use all diplomatic opportunities to voice and express consistently the EU position on the human rights situation in the country. The EU has implemented several sanctions packages 2 targeting individuals and entities for their involvement in serious human rights violations. Moreover, the EU consistently supports the Iranian people’s fundamental desire for a future where their universal rights and freedoms are respected and upheld. The EU continues to engage directly with Iranian authorities in order to prevent executions from being carried out, including for Behrouz Ehsani and Mehdi Hassani, as well as other cases. The EU has a clear, strong and long-standing opposition to the death penalty. It violates the inalienable right to life as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and represents the ultimate denial of human dignity. It also fails to act as a deterrent to crime and makes any miscarriage of justice irreversible. The EU consistently calls on Iran to respect due process rights for the accused and ensure that those in detention or imprisonment are not subjected to mistreatment. The EU will continue to voice its firm opposition to the death penalty with Iranian authorities, in all contexts and under all circumstances. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/12/iran-council-approves-conclusions/ 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-iran/”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2024-10-02 “P-001925/2024 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully committed to addressing the challenges faced by EU Institutions in Luxembourg, particularly in attracting and recruiting specialised profiles. To tackle these concerns, the Commission, in collaboration with other EU institutions based in Luxembourg, including the European Parliament, has established a high-level interinstitutional working group to develop targeted solutions. The Commission regrets that it currently lacks sufficient data to provide a detailed response to the Honourable Member’s question on the percentage of people leaving their jobs early due to financial reasons. Regarding a correction coefficient for Luxembourg, the Commission refers the Honourable Member to its report on Annex XI to the Staff Regulations 1 . The report concludes that a correction coefficient might not adequately reflect Luxembourg’s distinct characteristics and recommends targeted social measures instead. The Commission informs the Honourable Member that an agreement has been reached by the budgetary authority on the 2025 budget, securing funding for a measure supporting low and entry grade level staff of all Luxembourg-based institutions exposed to high housing costs. It is now for the institutions concerned to adopt their respective legal basis for the payment of this measure. Furthermore, in May 2024, the Luxembourg government adopted a range of housing support measures, including rent subsidies, that EU staff residing in Luxembourg may have access to in parallel. These measures should help EU staff facing the high housing costs in Luxembourg. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0180&qid=1658936823063&from=EN”
  Budget for EU politicians
• 2024-09-02 “E-001588/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has repeatedly called on Azerbaijan to release those who have been detained for exercising their fundamental rights, including journalists, human rights defenders, and political activists. The EU continues to engage and raise these issues with Azerbaijan as part of the human rights dialogue and bilaterally, including at the highest level. Any decision relating to sanctions is for the Council to make by unanimity. In parallel, the EU continues to call upon Azerbaijan to ensure the rights of Karabakh Armenians, including their right to return to their homes without intimidation and discrimination. The EU remains fully committed to facilitating dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan to achieve lasting and sustainable peace, including through political and financial support. EU engagement with Azerbaijan remains instrumental in order to promote peace, stability and prosperity in the South Caucasus through regional cooperation, including in the context of the normalisation process between Azerbaijan and Armenia.”
  EU-Azerbaijan relations · EU foreign policy approach
• 2024-09-02 “E-001593/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission In December 2023, the Commission opened an investigation into X’s compliance with the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 . In July 2024, the Commission informed X of its preliminary view that the platform is in breach of the DSA in areas linked to dark patterns, advertising transparency and researcher access to data. X now has the possibility to exercise its rights of defence by examining the documents in the investigation file and by replying to these preliminary findings. In parallel, the Commission continues its investigation in areas linked to the dissemination of illegal content and the effectiveness of the measures taken to combat information manipulation, which were also covered in the opening decision of December 2023. All acts and decisions adopted by the Commission are taken within the limits of the Commission’s powers followed due process and are subject to judicial review by the EU courts. The letter sent to X on 12 August 2024 did not interfere in any election campaign. It merely aimed to ensure that freedom of expression and of information are effectively protected and focused on the impact in the EU of the consequences of certain findings relating to the functioning of the online service X, following up on previous exchanges with its provider. The EU and the United States (US) are combined home to nearly 800 million people, who have a strong stake in a peaceful and prosperous world. The EU and US work together to promote common values, which include peace, freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Actions taken by the Commission with relation to X in enforcing the DSA have no bearing on this relationship. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU-US relations
• 2024-09-02 “E-001591/2024 Answer given by Mr Reynders on behalf of the European Commission Under EU law 1 , EU citizens have the right to reside in the territory of other Member States for up to three months with the only requirement of holding a valid identity card or passport. Checks on compliance with that provision cannot be carried out systematically. The person concerned may only be asked to provide evidence in case of substantiated doubts (which may be the case where the person comes into contact with the national authorities over a period of more than three consecutive months). Assessing the duration of a stay requires an individual examination, based on objective factors and taking into account the person’s intention and relevant evidence. During the first three months of residence, in accordance with Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC, EU citizens who are not engaged in economic activity may be refused social assistance benefits by the host Member State. After three months, pursuant to Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38/EC, economically nonactive EU citizens must have sufficient resources not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State. EU citizens who do not comply with those residence conditions can be expelled and can only claim a new right of residence there under Article 6 after having genuinely and effectively terminated their residence under Article 7. In December 2023, the Commission issued guidance on the Directive 2 , including on the above matters. It is within the competence of the Member States to develop policies to tackle begging, which is a phenomenon that can also concern own nationals. 1 Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 6. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C_202301392”
  Asylum & border control · Legal migration
• 2024-09-02 “E-001590/2024 Answer given by Ms Ivanova on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recognises the autonomy of sport organisations and supports a European Sport Model 1 based on the values of integrity, inclusion, and fairness. Independent sport’s governing bodies are responsible for setting the rules and regulations establishing eligibility requirements for competitions. The Commission notes that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has its own rules on participation of transgender or intersex athletes and confirmed that the athlete referred to in the written question respected the IOC´s eligibility requirements to participate in the Olympic women’s boxing competition, welterweight category. The Commission will continue to promote sport for all, gender equality and inclusivity in sport in line with the priorities set out in the EU Work Plan for Sport 2024-2027 2 . 1 For more information on the concept of European Sport Model: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/d10b4b5b-e159-11ec-a534-01aa75ed71a1/language-en 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9771-2024-INIT/en/pdf”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2024-09-02 “P-001589/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission The Commission conducted consultations with Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia and Ukraine to verify facts and develop a common understanding of the situation. The Ukrainian authorities confirmed that the sanctions imposed on Lukoil do not hamper the overall transit of oil via the Druzhba pipeline as long as Lukoil is not the owner of the oil. In practice, missing volumes from Lukoil were replaced with different suppliers/traders through the same Druzhba pipeline in July and August 2024. There was therefore no interruption of energy supplies. On 9 September 2024, Hungary’s MOL Group announced it had concluded a new arrangement providing a sustainable solution for crude oil transportation via the Druzhba pipeline 1 . The Commission services have concluded that urgent arbitration under the EUUkraine Association Agreement 2 does not appear to be warranted. The Commission maintains continuous contacts with Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia and Ukraine, and stands ready to act whenever necessary to ensure security of supply. Finally, as part of the EU’s response to Russia’s unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, the Commission has put in place the necessary regulatory framework for all 27 Member States to diversify their energy sources away from Russian fossil fuels. The objective of diversification away from Russian fossil fuels should be actively pursued. 1 https://www.bse.hu/newkibdata/129120781/MOL_crude%20agreement__20240909_eng.pdf 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0295”
  EU-Ukraine relations · Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• 2024-09-02 “E-001592/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission Freedom of expression is essential to the EU democratic system and is protected under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 1 , which is binding on the EU institutions and Member States when they are implementing EU law. In relation to political views expressed and shared on-line, the Digital Services Act 2 (DSA) does not regulate whether specific content is illegal. The DSA’s objective is to ensure that everyone in the EU can enjoy online platform services safely, in full respect of fundamental rights, including the freedom of expression. It does so by defining platforms’ responsibilities, so that very large online platforms and very large search engines take reasonable, proportionate and effective measures to mitigate the risks stemming from the design or functioning of their service. It also protects users in the EU against over-removal of lawful content. In December 2023, the Commission opened an investigation into X’s compliance with the DSA. In July 2024, the Commission informed the provider of X of its preliminary view that it may be in breach of the DSA in areas linked to dark patterns, advertising transparency and researcher access to data. The provider of X now has the possibility to exercise its rights of defence by examining the documents in the investigation file and by replying to these preliminary findings. In parallel, the Commission continues its investigation in relation to practices linked to the dissemination of illegal content and the effectiveness of the measures taken to combat information manipulation. All acts and decisions adopted by the Commission are taken within the limits of the Commission’s powers and are subject to judicial review. Mr Breton stepped down as Commissioner for Internal Market on 16 September 2024. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2024-07-17 “– Madame la Présidente, la réalité sur le terrain démontre que l’Ukraine ne pourra pas gagner la guerre contre la Russie. Pourquoi alors faire une politique visant à prolonger les souffrances et mener une guerre jusqu’au dernier Ukrainien? Je soutiens les efforts de médiation du Premier ministre hongrois Viktor Orban. Je note que, d’après une dépêche de l’agence AFP d’hier, même le président Zelenski estime que la Russie doit être représentée au prochain sommet de la paix. Non seulement avons-nous besoin d’une solution négociée avec la Russie pour le conflit actuel, mais encore d’une architecture européenne de sécurité qui inclue la Russie. Je ne veux ni d’une nouvelle guerre froide, ni d’une course aux armements. Aussi devrons-nous nous interroger de façon honnête sur nos propres responsabilités en tant qu’Union européenne dans la genèse du conflit ukrainien: quel était notre rôle dans la non-mise en œuvre des accords de Minsk? Est-ce que nous avons exacerbé les tensions internes en Ukraine par l’accord d’association?”
• “Thank you very much. Yes. Um, I would like simply to add a few comments, because I'm, of course not a shadow rapporteur, but simply an independent member. Um, I would I have I have been listening very carefully to your introduction, and I must say that I'm deeply impressed by many of the aspects that you have raised, because I think that there are a number of really important issues there. However, I think that men often are touched in the very same way than women by these problems. For instance, if you are a man with disabilities, you might have also a lot of problems to find a job. If you are a man victim of domestic violence, you have very similar problems. And in Luxembourg, just to cite our statistics, we know that about 40% of the victims of domestic violence are male, and we know that men usually do not report easily such incidents for a number of reasons that I think everybody knows. So I'm not sure whether this strategy should be targeted so much on women. I think that there are a number of issues that are also concerning men, and that the approach could be broader about competence. I would like also to say a few words. Of course, combating poverty has a lot to do with having a good economic situation and a good economic situation of the EU and its member states is fully in the realm of competence of the European Union. Social policies usually are not. So we have to be very careful here to draw a line between what is EU competence and what is national competence. I would plead, in order to have a credibility of the European institutions, to respect strictly this division of labour between the Union and the Member States, so not to tell member States what they have to do, but to make a clear Difference.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• “Mr. president. Thank you Commissioner. On the 28th of April, that blackout of electricity in Spain and in France showed us how dangerous the Green Deal was. Being addicted to unstable energy sources because the NGOs were calling for it and the EU was funding it, risks leaving all our citizens in darkness. Our energy policy should be based on science, not on ideological chimera. Electricity grids need to be more stable rather than spreading chaos. Meteorological conditions synchronized across Europe mean that there is no reliable green source of energy. Nuclear is the only sustainable and safe way with environmental protection, but it's inexplicably neglected by EU policy. The Spanish blackout should serve as an alarm call for US citizens, and companies need reliable energy based grids, which can be truly interconnected.”
  Nuclear energy
• “Madam president. Prime Minister. The Trump administration. General Kellogg. Um. Rubio have said that the war in Ukraine is a proxy war, a coalition wage war, uh, by NATO against Russia. Thanks to the New York Times, we know that it's commanded from Wiesbaden. As the President Trump says, that this is Biden's war and that if he had been president, it would never have started. Today, Americans are contradicting our propaganda, which is this, a unilateral Russian war? And they no longer include this terminology in their official declarations. We need to be aware of what this means. We have to be aware that America wants to end this war. We have to change our policy towards Russia and put and help Ukrainians to rebuild, both politically and economically. We hope that the Danish presidency will act in this direction.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “We should also be respectful of the independence of non-governmental organizations. We had a number of discussions in the last weeks and months on that subject, and we should not finance NGOs because if we finance them, well, they are not independent anymore. There are a number of other issues that we very seldom discuss, but where there could be a clear discrimination of men. And I would say that, for instance, the job to be a soldier is usually not very well paid. However, we see that in a number of member States, men are subject to compulsory military service. Women not in Germany. Now we have seen first steps to introduce a compulsory military service for men and a voluntary military service for women, which means that men would have to spend a certain time in the army being badly paid, whereas women during the same time could proceed with their normal careers. So also there I would have expected, actually, the Farm Committee to protest violently, violently against those member states that force men to go to the army, but not women because it might be a source of discrimination. Quite obvious one, I would say. So there are a number of things that we should discuss during the weeks and months to come, and I'm very much looking forward to it, because I think that we can have vivid and interesting discussions. Thank you again for your proposal.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• “It's very kind of you, Mr. President, that you give me the floor, but I'm not speaking on behalf of my group and therefore I wanted to wait until the end in order maybe to ask a question. So I want to be very clear. I'm not speaking on behalf of ECR, but I'm very glad that the Minister is here today with us and has informed us about the progress in her country, which is something that we of course value all. But I have a question, and it is maybe a less enjoyable one because I would like to go back to the events in 2014, in Odessa. There has been a, well, a number of incidents in those days. And one of the incidents led finally to the death of, I think, 42 people who have been burned alive in the house of the trade unions in Odessa. There has been an inquiry and the Council of Europe has one year and a half later has said that there was no progress and that the inquiry has not been impartial. And until now we don't know who has been responsible for that attack and who will be brought to trial for the murder of these 42 people. So I would like to ask you, as the Minister of Justice of Ukraine, and congratulations for that nomination, madam. Again, what are you going to do to bring the those responsible for that murder to trial? Thank you very much.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “Chair, I understand the reasons why the European Commission imposed a fine on Google. No one should abuse their power to limit the freedom of expression. But why does the European Commission does not apply the same principle to itself? It is both judge and party in the on the regulation, on digital services. It is limiting the freedom of expression whilst claiming the contrary and promoting its own views in the media. That is why this regulation Should be completely overhauled. The future Democracy Shield, which is supposed to strengthen and protect our democracy, will quickly turn against citizens and voters. The annulling of democratic elections in Romania was a clear warning. This shield will limit political pluralism and will restrict freedom of expression like for Google. One must monitor the actions of the European Commission. Thank you.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Yes. Thank you very much, madam. I am really deeply impressed by your explanations. I'm new here, so I'm listening very carefully and I try to understand what you are telling us. But I have the feeling that we are perhaps not living in exactly the same world. I will listen to the banks, and I hear a lot of complaints. Too much. Too many regulations, too much compliance, a lot of complaints also that the bank's efficiency has decreased. I think the European Central Bank has said the same, and also the latter report should be taken very seriously. I think because the confirm that regulation can be a risk. So I wonder, do we really need even more layers of additional regulation? Do we really need to increase and to put additional costs and more bureaucracy on the shoulders of our banking system. I doubt it, and I wonder, and that would be my question if we came to this quite perfect system that you are outlining, and you are perfectly in your right to, to to try to achieve this, but I wonder what would be the practical results if we did that? What would be left, for instance, to national supervisors? And I wonder whether we really need more European supervision because we don't have that. For instance, in judicial system, there are, of course, National Courts Act also as European courts in the application of European law. So do we need more European structures? And what would be then the advantage of additional layers of European supervision when we would have efficient national supervision functioning according to a common regulatory framework? Thank you very much.”
  Financial regulation
• “Thank you very much, chairman. I appreciate this discussion. I think it's an extremely interesting and important one, Actually, I understand from all the previous speakers that the intention is to create legal certainty, legal clarity, but I think that this tax is exactly creating the contrary. It is creating uncertainty and absolute confusion because with the definition that we have now here, actually it's possible for any man engaging in a sexual relation for women to be brought to justice and the presumption of innocence is non-existing. A possibility of claiming that the woman has actually been in an agreement is almost impossible. So this hurts women, because men will not be easily ready to engage in a relationship or in a sexual act with a woman, because the legal risk is enormous. It hurts society. It hurts the state of law because the presumption of innocence is, is, is actually not existing anymore. So we have also been hearing about the Istanbul Convention. I wanted to say that many member states have not ratified the Istanbul Convention, and it will not be possible to impose on such countries to respect a legal framework that they have not adhered to. Also, let me say that since there are several references to war situations, including a reference to the Rome Statute that also men can be victims of rape, and since this is referring in several places, this document is referring in several places to the equality between women and men, so it should be taken into account that men also can be victims of rape.”
  Sexuality and reproduction
• “Um, it's a matter that our states have to agree to, and I would be very doubtful, as far as my country is concerned, that we should ever agree to such a position that that you are wanting now to to promote. But let me say there is a health issue in this, and it is the financial health of the European Commission. And we have not yet talked about that aspect, because if I read the Multiannual Financial framework that is suggested, I read in the proposals of the Commission the introduction of a new own resource, a tobacco excise duty, own resource. And the Commission has told us that they expect these measures, that they are now proposing to generate a revenue of 15 billion in the European Union, of which 11.2 billion are expected to go into the pockets of the European Commission. So what we are really discussing here today is an overreach of commission competence at the expense of the competences of the member states in health policy. It is a further attack on subsidiarity and the competences of the Member States in taxation policy. And all this in order to increase the financial health of the European Commission. So I would ask the European Commission to give this discussion more credibility, and perhaps in order to give it more credibility, is the Commission prepared to drop the idea to increase own resources with this proposed measure? Thank you very much.”
  Own EU resources
• “President, the EU keeps asking for more money to prosecute a war in Ukraine instead of looking for peace and to act in areas where it has no competence. In clear violation of the treaties. It wants to borrow more and more money to make integration irreversible. The Commission hasn't earned our trust, and we have to put a stop to its thirst for more money. The vaccine scandal hasn't yet been cleared up for Covid. We don't want the commission to use taxpayers money to corrupt NGOs. We don't know where the debt for the next generation project is going, how it's going to be reimbursed. Instead of new own resources, the commission should make do with the financing it has and prove that in the future it will move the money well and in a transparent, efficient and honest fashion. Thank you.”
  Size of EU budget
• “Thank you very much, chair. And thank you, Mrs. Lagarde, for being with us here today, and also for assuring that you are going to respect the treaties. That is a very, very good news. And I hope that others also will follow your example. Now, I would like to come back to the issue of the banking, which is of concern to many of us. We have seen it already today here in this room also, and I mention it because the European Central Bank has an agreement, a cooperation agreement with Amla, which is the anti-money laundering authority. Now, when people are being debagged and not only physical persons, but also NGOs, press organs, and it happens quite a lot actually, often they are not being told even that they are being debunked. And when they finally notice that, they have been debunked often. Any information is refused with the argument that this has been done under the rules governing money laundering. So it is a very, very difficult situation, and I would be grateful if you could mention this also with Amla. In order to to clarify the situation. Thank you very much.”
  Anti-money laundering regulation
• “Um. Thank you. I'm speaking German. Thank you chair. I'll be speaking German as well because I wanted to raise an issue. Um, that happened in Germany recently. There is a rule that German men between 18 and 45 have to ask permission from the German Defense Ministry to leave the country for more than three months. Now, this is a restriction of the freedom of movement, and I would have hoped that the European Commission would be able to say whether this leads to an unequal treatment of men and women, and at the same time a restriction of freedom of movement for European citizens. However, they have not said anything. You may well say that military service is a national competence, but this does have repercussions on EU level. Frau von der Leyen and Madame Kallas seem to stress their competences and and the Commission's competences on any occasion. I find it very unusual that they have not taken a stance on this particular issue. I would appreciate to hearing your views on it.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• “Thank you. Chairman. Commissioner, you have the strategic canvas and the Clean Industry Act. But in spite of that, the Commission is not capable to face up to the challenges that our industry is meeting. And the Commission has its responsibility to bear here and acts to the detriment of the EU's economic interest. Natural gas and the conversion of that into electricity. What good is it if the price is 70%, 75% higher than world market prices, and gas only costs 50% more in inverted commas. Another example then the ETS. Emission trading system. That means that our industries have to close DeCamp. And then there's the carbon leakage that the commission is trying to combat. Apparently the third example is the supply chain. That too will be a crushing failure. A lot of non-EU suppliers refuse to go along with that legislation and the bureaucracy it brings with it. It's high time that the Commission renounces its ideology so that common sense can prevail. Thank you.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Mr. president the EU's energy policy is strangling our economy. It's time for pragmatic solutions. The ideological experiments must end. The situation is dire. And yet representatives from industry knocking on our doors tell us that the commission isn't listening. The emissions trading system must be abolished. It's a burden driving up costs with no positive results. We must also rethink how electricity prices are calculated, making them fair and affordable and not tied to volatile market whims. Eu sanctions against Russia are crippling our economies without reaching their targets. We must lift them without delay. Subsidies for renewables must also end. They distort markets and burden taxpayers. Instead, we must invest in nuclear power, a reliable, clean and future proof solution. And finally, our gas grids and supply must remain intact to ensure an energy mix and a security of supply. Thank you very much.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices