Siegbert Frank DROESE

Policy topics Siegbert Frank DROESE is active on

What Siegbert Frank DROESE has said (79)

• 2026-06-16 “Thank you very much, mister. President, colleagues, digital sovereignty is an important goal in we shouldn't be dependent on The US or China in the long run, but the commission what the commission is doing is the opposite of sovereignty, centralization, rules, control instruments, new authorities. Sovereignty comes through innovative and strong companies, fair competition, and technological openness, and the ability for states to act, but not through bureaucracy and planning from Brussels. We have the digital euro. That that's supposed to be a modernization. Nobody wants it. Nobody needs it. That means that cash and financial freedom of Europeans is put at risk. The digital euro is an experiment. It's a state control measure, and it means we'll have surveillance. The freedom of people in Europe is important. The commission is, about absolute control, which is the absolute opposite of freedom. Thank you.”
  Digital euro
• 2026-06-16 “Thank you very much. Mr.. President. Colleagues. Digital sovereignty is an important goal in. We shouldn't be dependent on the US or China in the long run, but the Commission. What the Commission is doing is the opposite of sovereignty. Centralisation, rules, control instruments, new authorities. Sovereignty comes through innovative and strong companies, fair competition and technological openness, and the ability for states to act, but not through bureaucracy and planning from Brussels. We have the digital euro that is supposed to be a modernisation. Nobody wants it. Nobody needs it. It means that cash and financial freedom of Europeans is put at risk. The digital euro is an experiment. It's a state A control measure, and it means we'll have. The freedom of people in Europe is important. The Commission is about absolute control, which is the absolute opposite of freedom. Thank you. Thank you. At the end of this first round of political group speakers, I give the floor to the Vice President.”
  Digital euro
• 2026-03-04 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question The Commission acknowledges the serious threat posed by Missing Trader Intra-Community (MTIC) fraud largely driven by organised crime, with results in estimated annual value added tax (VAT) losses from EUR 12.5 billion to EUR 32.5 billion between 2010 and 2023. MTIC fraud is mentioned in the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats [1] . While Member States hold the primary responsibility for fighting VAT fraud, the Commission actively supports these efforts. The digital reporting requirements and the central VAT information exchange system as part of the ‘VAT in the Digital Age’ package [2] will provide Member States as of July 2030 with real-time information on cross-border transactions that enhance the detection of MTIC fraud. The Commission has also proposed a targeted amendment to the regulation on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of VAT [3] that strengthens collaboration between tax authorities, t he European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and t he European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). Additionally, the Commission provides technical and financial support to Eurofisc [4] . Finally, to strengthen the response against criminal networks in the context of the ongoing anti-fraud architecture (AFA) review [5] , the Commission is assessing ways to improve the protection of the EU’s financial interests, including through better prevention and combatting VAT fraud. A Commission Communication on the AFA review is planned for the end 2026. The Commission is also exploring possible amendments to the founding regulations of key anti-fraud actors, such as OLAF, EPPO, Eurojust [6] and Europol [7] , and to the directive on the fight against fraud to the EU's financial interests by means of criminal law [8] . [1] The European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/law-enforcement-cooperation/empact-fighting-crime-together_en). is a security initiative driven by EU Member States to identify, prioritise and address threats posed by organised and serious international crime. [2] https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/news/adoption-vat-digital-age-package-2025-03-11_en. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/904/oj/eng. [4] The EU network of Member State experts combating VAT fraud https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/taxation/vat/vat-and-administrative-cooperation/eurofisc_en. [5] Launched with the White Paper of 16 July 2015 — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0546. [6] European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation. [7] European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. [8] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj/eng.”
  VAT harmonisation
• 2026-03-04 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The Commission is closely monitoring the situation in the Middle East, its impact on energy prices and the EU’s security of supply in cooperation with the Member States, including Germany via the Gas Coordination Group. Currently, there is no immediate threat to the EU’s security of supply due to the war in the Middle East, with only 4% of the EU’s annual gas imports originating from the Region (Qatar, 11 bcm of liquefied natural gas (LNG)). Since 2022, the EU has equipped itself to mitigate and address potential supply crises. In answer to the 2022 crisis, among several other measures the EU adopted the Gas Storage Regulation [1] , creating a pan-European storage target in order to ensure that the EU’s gas storages would be filled for the winter. This regulation has been prolonged until 2027 and amended to grant more flexibility to the Member States in achieving their filling target in case of difficult market conditions. Since 2022 the EU has increased its import capacity in the last four years and improved supply diversification among Norway, the United States, Algeria, Nigeria, Azerbaijan, the United Kingdom, Angola, Trinidad and Tobago and other LNG exporters. The Commission presented on 22 April 2026 the AccelerateEU Communication [2] with immediate targeted actions aimed at better protecting households and industry from high energy prices. It includes structural measures to improve energy efficiency and accelerate electrification by reducing the four cost components of energy bills: energy supply itself, network charges, taxes and carbon costs. Finally, to sustain the EU’s competitiveness, the Commission is implementing the actions set out in the Clean Industrial Deal [3] to improve access to energy and reduce dependency on fossil fuels. [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-security/gas-storage_en. [2] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/accelerateeu-energy-union-affordable-and-secure-energy-through-accelerated-action_en. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0085.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · EU policy on gas storage targets · EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-03-04 “E-000899/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission In line with the political guidelines of the Commission, the proposal for the Industrial Accelerator Act 1 (IAA) is a legislative proposal designed to strengthen Europe's industrial base by boosting manufacturing, growing businesses, and creating jobs in the EU. The IAA proposal introduces targeted ‘Union origin’ requirements in specific strategic sectors when public money is involved, such as public procurement or support schemes. The objective is to support the development, competitiveness and resilience of the EU’s manufacturing sector, with a focus on selected strategic sectors. The proposed measures concern aluminium, cement, net-zero technologies as well as electric vehicles and their components. The proposal remains in line with the EU’s international commitments undertaken in bilateral trade agreements and under the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement 2 and does not discriminate against suppliers and supplies from these countries. The impact assessment accompanying the proposal sets out the detailed analysis of costs and price effects. The Commission’s assessment indicates that impacts on final prices are expected to be limited. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52026PC0100. 2 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm.”
  EU-US trade relations · "Buy European" provisions
• 2026-03-04 “E-000900/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission International law is applicable to outer space, including the UN Charter and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) and other relevant UN treaties, as well as international law of armed conflicts and consensual principles developed in the UN framework. The OST, as well as the guiding principles, constitute the cornerstone of the global governance in outer space. Outer space has witnessed a surge in security challenges over recent years. As technological advancements often outpace the development of law and policy, the international community needs to discuss on a variety of instruments and measures. The EU is an active participant in the UN Open-Ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). In the Commission’s view, dealing with contemporary challenges is best achievable by a combination of legally binding and non-binding instruments and measures. The Commission believes that developing norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours is a more realistic and practical way to deal with immediate threats. The Commission’s approach is that instead of reopening existing legal instruments or drafting new ones with a lengthy procedure, developing norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours is the most pragmatic and immediate way forward to contribute to PAROS and to tackle the most pressing threats. Many legally binding instruments drew from previous non-binding commitments and principles or resolutions in the UN framework. With no initiative on the table currently aiming to amend the OST, it is the Commission’s conviction that initially non-legally binding rules, norms and principles are the most appropriate measures to set guardrails to the behaviour in outer space in short and medium term.”
  EU competences on space policy · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2026-03-04 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 7.5.2026 Written question Russia is known to have taken steps that militarise the Arctic such as upgrading existing military bases and opening new ones, installing military equipment and facilities, conducting exercises, commissioning new nuclear submarines, testing nuclear-powered cruise missiles, as well as enlarging its fleet of icebreakers. The EU has put in place strict export controls on the relevant technologies, including dual-use technologies, to prevent the Russian military from using them.”
  Relations with NATO · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2026-03-04 “E-000897/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU shares NATO’s assessment that Russia constitutes a primary direct threat to EuroAtlantic security, particularly along the eastern borders, but also more widely as it engages in hybrid activities in other regions, and resorts to cyber threats, foreign information manipulation and interference and disinformation. The EU will continue working on its broader defence efforts to strengthen the security of its Member States, in cooperation and full complementarity with NATO. The EU remains steadfast in its commitment to protecting the security and safety of its Member States and citizens. In recent years, the EU has taken unprecedented steps to counter hybrid threats and to reinforce its resilience, preparedness and defence readiness, including on its eastern flank. For instance, the Eastern Flank Watch, one of the flagship proposals in the Defence Readiness Roadmap 1 , aims to enhance situational awareness and enable the EU to respond to emerging threats more quickly and effectively. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/readiness-roadmap-2030_en.”
  Relations with NATO · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2026-03-04 “Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question The Commission invites the Honourable Member to consult the Financial Transparency System [1] (FTS). The portal makes available to the public information on recipients of funds financed from the EU budget and implemented directly by the Commission (at headquarters or in EU delegations to non-EU countries) and other EU bodies such as executive agencies (‘direct management’) or implemented indirectly by other international organisations or non-EU countries (‘indirect management’), and beneficiaries of the European Development Fund. The annex contains an extract from the FTS website showing amounts awarded in 2024 to United Nations affiliated organisations, based on a list compiled from publicly available sources that may not be exhaustive. It indicates which organisations were awarded funding, the amounts awarded to each, and the overall total. The entities have been grouped, as far as possible, into the categories provided by the Honourable Member, in the absence of a definitive classification of these organisations. Please note that data for the year 2025 is not included, as it is currently being consolidated before the publication in June 2026 as part of the working documents of the draft budget for 2027. Data on funding to international organisations in 2026 will be made available in Working Document IX as part of the 2028 Draft Budget Procedure. See annex : Annex [1] https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html. The annual publications are based on Article 38 of the Financial Regulation (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1-222), and in accordance with the third paragraph of the article, data on recipients is not disclosed for very low value contracts below EUR 15 000 and where disclosure risks threatening the rights and freedoms of the persons or entities.”
  Size of EU budget · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2026-03-04 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 9.6.2026 Written question The Commission is aware of the outflow of individuals with links to the Islamic State from the al-Hol camp and is monitoring the situation closely. In accordance with Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union [1] , national security remains the sole responsibility of the Member States. The Commission does not possess operational information on these individuals, including on whether there are nationals of Member States among them. The EU supports Member States through measures strengthening border security, including the Schengen Information System (SIS) [2] , where competent authorities of Member States can insert alerts on wanted or sought persons, including known individuals from the camps, as well as the Entry/Exit System [3] . The new Screening Regulation [4] , applicable from June 2026, will further enhance security by requiring Member States to identify and screen all irregular migrants and asylum seekers against EU information systems. Moreover, in accordance with the mandate of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), Europol [5] supports actions of the competent authorities of Member States in preventing and combating terrorism and serious crime. The EU as co-lead of the Global Coalition to Defeat Da’esh is also working with international partners — including Syria, which has joined the Coalition in November 2025 — in countering Da’esh, while also supporting efforts to stabilise the situation in the North East Syria camps. On 26 February 2026, the Commission presented the Agenda to prevent and counter terrorism [6] , outlining actions to strengthen Europe’s response to evolving terrorist threats. These include a new SIS information alert and strengthened cooperation and information sharing on individuals potentially posing a terrorist or violent extremist threat. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32018R1860; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32018R1861&qid=1706721891286; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1862/oj/eng. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32025R1534&qid=1759832232382. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1356/oj/eng. [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/794/oj/eng. [6] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/eu-agenda-preventing-and-countering-terrorism-and-violent-extremism_en.”
  Asylum & border control · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2026-03-04 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The Commission is not aware of any formal or informal talks about a possible restarting of the Nord Stream pipeline under US control. The reliance of the EU on Russian gas and Russia’s weaponisation of its gas exports to the EU in 2022 resulted in an unprecedented energy crisis. For this reason, in 2026 the EU has adopted Regulation (EU) 2026/261 [1] , aiming at a full phase out of Russian gas imports, both pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG), by the end of 2027. Previously, Russia has repeatedly disrupted supplies of natural gas through Nord Stream in order to coerce the Union and its Member States and undermine their support for Ukraine. Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 pipelines were damaged in September 2022 and are currently non-operational. In order to prevent the resumption or the establishment of natural gas supplies through those pipelines, with the 18th package of sanctions against Russia (Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1495) [2] , the EU introduced a restrictive measures banning any transaction that is directly or indirectly connected to the natural gas pipelines Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 and that concerns the completion, operation, maintenance or use of the pipelines or parts of the pipelines. The transaction ban also covers the purchase of natural gas transported via either pipeline. Those measures were put in place to prevent generating revenues for Russia and thereby enabling the continuation of its war of aggression against Ukraine. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32026R0261. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32025D1495.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Natural gas
• 2025-09-25 “E-003730/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU reiterates its commitment to international law and to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the two-state solution in accordance with relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions where two democratic states, Israel and Palestine * , live side-by-side in peace within secure and recognised borders. The EU recalls the High-Level Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution in New York co-led by France and Saudi Arabia. The EU welcomes the agreement reached on the first phase of the Comprehensive Plan to end the Gaza Conflict put forward by the President of the United States, as well as the outcome of the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit for Peace held on 13 October 2025. The EU stands ready to contribute to the implementation of the Plan through the variety of the tools at its disposal, based on the EU’s longstanding engagement and substantial support for peace in the region. This includes humanitarian relief, assisting in security arrangements through the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy missions, supporting Palestinian Authority (PA) reforms, including in view of the PA return to Gaza, and support to the early recovery and reconstruction of Gaza. The issue remains very high on the agenda, and no effort will be spared to engage with regional and international partners who could have a positive role to play in preventing further escalation and encourage efforts to revive the political process, including through the Global Alliance. * This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-09-03 “E-003404/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with the Air Services Regulation 1 , Community air carriers have the freedom to set air fares and air rates for intra-Community air services. Furthermore, the Air Services Regulation allows for optional price supplements, if they are communicated in a transparent and unambiguous way and provided that they are set on an ‘opt-in’ basis. In 2024, the Commission and EU consumer authorities sent letters to 20 airlines identifying several types of potentially misleading green claims including in relation to ‘green fares’ and inviting them to bring their practices in line with EU consumer law 2 . This coordinated action, which was a follow-up to an alert from the European Consumer Organisation, is still ongoing. The Commission is committed to supporting measures that incentivise sustainable choices in the aviation sector in a transparent and unambiguous way. Since 1 January 2025, the ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation 3 mandates aviation fuel suppliers to ensure that aviation fuel supplied at Union airports contains minimum shares of sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), resulting in an increased availability of SAF in the EU. The Flight Emissions Label Commission Implementing Regulation 4 provides a voluntary environmental labelling scheme enabling transparency on the environmental performance of flights. The Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act 5 on sustainable activities sets out criteria for passenger and freight air transport, which include requirements on the use of SAF. 1 Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community, OJ L 293, 31.10.2008, p. 3. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2322. 3 Regulation (EU) 2023/2405 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on ensuring a level playing field for sustainable air transport (ReFuelEU Aviation), OJ L 2405 31.10.2023, p. 1. 4 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3170 of 18 December 2024 laying down detailed provisions concerning the voluntary environmental labelling scheme for the estimation of the environmental performance of flights, established pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2023/2405 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Flight Emissions Label), OJ L, 2024/3170, 31.12.2024. 5 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/2485 of 27 June 2023 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139 establishing additional technical screening criteria for determining the conditions under which certain economic activities qualify as contributing substantially to climate change mitigation or climate change adaptation and for determining whether those activities cause no significant harm to any of the other environmental objectives, OJ L, 2023/2485, 21.11.2023.”
  Decarbonisation of aviation sector
• 2025-09-03 “E-003403/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission is aware of the detours that European airlines need to undertake to fly to many Asian destinations due to the closure of Russian airspace to Union carriers. These detours result in longer and costlier operations to those destinations. Despite these challenges, EU airlines continue to register profit growth, thanks to the strong post-Covid recovery in other aviation markets, for example the trans-Atlantic market, where airlines can deploy their fleet in a profitable manner. 2. The Commission is aware of the decrease in market share for EU carriers on certain routes to Asia. Yet, air traffic from the EU to both Japan and China continues to increase year on year, while still below 2019 levels. 3. Air transport between the EU and China (as well as with Japan, the majority of the Middle East and Türkiye) is governed by bilateral agreements between individual Member States and those countries. It should be recalled that in 2016 the Commission proposed to Member States to pursue an EU-wide aviation agreement with China, but this was not taken forward by Member States. The Commission stands ready to engage with Member States in this matter.”
  Trade relations with Turkey · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Trade relations with China
• 2025-09-03 “E-003405/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Open Sales and Distribution Model (OSDM) is a rail sector initiative supported by the Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER). In 2024, the European Union Agency for railways (ERA) issued a report describing some of the in-built features of the technical coding of this data model, and possible consequences thereof 1 . In 2025 after discussions with relevant stakeholders, ERA adapted relevant parts of OSDM and integrated it in its Technical Document B.5, as one of four sectors developed, interoperable solutions for checking availability of and reserving rail products subject to dynamic pricing. The Commission intends to make reference to the ERA document when proposing to Member States a draft implementing act on technical specifications for interoperability (TSI) on telematics under the comitology procedure of the rail interoperability Directive (EU) 2016/797 2 . 2. Since OSDM has not been developed to support EU legislation 3 the Commission does not monitor how the rail sector implements OSDM. 3. Regulation (EU) 2021/782 sets out a unified framework for rail passenger rights in the EU and sector initiatives should take this legislation into account. In this respect, the Commission refers to the above-mentioned report from ERA which outlines a number of potential risks in regard to that specific Regulation. 1 https://www.era.europa.eu/content/analysis-distribution-rules-tap-osdm-and-recent-competition-cases. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/797/oj/eng. 3 Directive (EU) 2016/797, Directive 2010/40/EU (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/40/oj/eng) and Regulation (EU) 2021/782 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/782/oj/eng).”
  EU transport infrastructure integration · EU support of rail transport
• 2025-09-03 “E-003402/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission It is the duty of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the euro area national central banks to ensure that euro banknotes remain an innovative, secure and efficient means of payment. Developing new series of banknotes regularly is standard practice for all central banks. Beyond security considerations, the ECB is committed to reducing the environmental impact of euro banknotes, while also making them more relatable and inclusive for all Europeans 1 . The Commission considers the ECB's initiative to involve the public in the euro banknote design process to be a positive approach to increasing transparency and citizen engagement in the decision-making process. As a sign of its commitment to safeguarding cash, the Commission put forward a legislative proposal on the legal tender of cash in the ‘Single Currency Package’ 2 to ensure the widespread acceptance of and access to cash, alongside its proposal establishing the legal framework for the possible issuance in future of a digital euro. On the introduction of the digital euro, the Commission and the ECB are committed to ensuring the highest standards of privacy and data protection. Online payments would be subject to the highest privacy standards under current Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism rules and the Eurosystem would never be able to identify individual users. The proposal furthermore requires offline payments to be offered to users as of the first issuance of the digital euro. This version of the digital euro allows users to pay in proximity, even in absence of connectivity, with transactions to be settled directly on the device and with the transactions remaining fully anonymous. 1 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/banknotes/future_banknotes/html/index.en.html. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3501.”
  Means of payment (cash vs digital) · Digital euro
• 2025-09-03 “E-003400/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is firmly committed to promote and defend democracy, human rights and the rule of law, including in its relations with Ukraine. Ukraine has been under martial law since 24 February 2022, defending its existence against Russia’s war of aggression, among other measures, by mobilisation of its population to defence of the country. Russia continues and escalates its attacks on Ukraine despite the calls for an unconditional and immediate ceasefire to which Ukraine agreed already in March 2025. The European External Action Service and the Commission are aware of reports of harsh recruiting methods and lack of civilian alternative service for conscientious objectors. Aspects in this area are addressed in the regular annual EU-Ukraine human rights dialogue. Furthermore, the enlargement process puts Ukrainian legislation and practice under long term scrutiny including in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms and fosters ongoing close cooperation on these issues. The Commission is not aware of any Member State that has returned a Ukrainian citizen solely on the basis of their conscription status. The Commission is in regular contact with Member States authorities to ensure that protection is granted to those entitled to it. The relevant provisions under the temporary protection scheme, as well as those concerning access to international protection, are applicable.”
  EU competences on human rights · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2025-09-03 “E-003383/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Currently, in Serbia, there are no EU-funded projects specifically covering animal welfare that involve civil society organisations (CSOs). EU financial support for civil society in Serbia is channelled primarily through the Civil Society Facility 1 . The aim is to support the development of civil society in Serbia and to strengthen the contribution of CSOs to Serbia’s accession process to the EU. Funding is either managed directly by the EU Delegation or through implementing CSOs selected on a competitive basis. Serbian CSOs can apply for funding provided the eligibility criteria are met. The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance in Rural Development (IPARD III 2 ) provides support aiming at enhancing food security, sustainability of agricultural systems, and rural development. The application process is structured around specific entrusted measures, with requirements defined for each call 3 . CSOs do not usually qualify unless the specific requirements are met, such as being a cooperative. Nevertheless, one ongoing programme offers grant support for environmental CSOs 4 . The Commission has several measures at disposal to prevent, detect and correct the misuse of EU funds, such as ex-ante and ex-post controls, audits and monitoring, as well as investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office. The annual Instrument for pre-Accession Assistance monitoring committee is a key tool to track progress on the use of funds and to provide assurance regarding the sound management of the EU funds. 1 Financing Decision: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/financing-decision-civil-society-facility_en. 2 DG ENEST website overview: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/international/internationalcooperation/enlargement/pre-accession-assistance/overview_en. 3 IPARD III for Serbia: https://uap.gov.rs/ipard-iii-podrska-ruralnom-razvoju/. 4 ‘Volunteers for Nature – grown impact for citizens, actions on environmental protection’: https://mis.org.rs/en/portfolio-items/volunteers-for-nature/.”
  Funding for EU Neighbourhood
• 2025-09-03 “E-003406/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is developing the EU Digital Twin of the Ocean (DTO) 1 . It is a is a key element of the EU Mission 'Restore our Oceans and Waters' 2 and aims to provide decision support tools and transform ocean knowledge into actionable solutions for sustainability and resilience. Currently, the DTO's annual energy consumption is about 60 megawatt-hours (MWh), equivalent to the heating energy of approximately 10 houses. Of this, 20 MWh is sourced entirely from green energy, while the remaining 40 MWh draws from the French grid, which relies minimally on fossil fuels 3 . Additionally, waste heat from computing is repurposed for heating, resulting in negligible CO2 emissions from the DTO. Although energy use is expected to rise as the initiative expands, the DTO adheres to an open science principle that enhances energy efficiency by centralising resources and sharing computing results, preventing redundant data storage and calculations. The DTO holds immense potential for significant energy savings across various sectors. The World Meteorological Organization estimated that improved ocean observations and weather forecasts save the maritime industry EUR 1.5 billion annually in fuel costs, avoiding circa 8 million tons of CO2 emissions. This is achieved by optimising shipping routes according to ocean currents, wind patterns and wave heights. With the enhanced forecasting capabilities of the DTO, such savings are expected to grow. To develop the DTO's core infrastructure EDITO 4 the Commission partnered with Mercator Ocean International and the Flanders Marine Institute, who manage the Copernicus Marine Service 5 and European Marine Observation and Data Network programmes 6 . They employ a fully open and co-design approach, engaging with about 100 EU collaborative projects and interested stakeholders through Digital Ocean Fora. 1 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe/eu-missions-horizon-europe/restore-our-ocean-and-waters/european-digital-twin-oceaneuropean-dto_en. 2 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe/eu-missions-horizon-europe/restore-our-ocean-and-waters_en. 3 (6-7% in 2023). 4 EUropean DIgital Twin Ocean phase 2 https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101227771. 5 https://marine.copernicus.eu. 6 https://emodnet.ec.europa.eu.”
  Energy efficiency · EU ocean policy
• 2025-09-03 “E-003407/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The conduct and the organisation of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional and legislative rules, while respecting their international obligations and EU law. Competent authorities and courts have the primary responsibility of ensuring compliance with these rules. As stated in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. Once they joined the EU, Member States are bound to continuously respect the values of Article 2. The Commission follows the situation in all the Member States.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
• 2025-05-21 “E-002022/2025 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU Aquaculture campaign is supported by both the European Parliament 1 and the Council of the European Union 2 . It is financed through the general budget of the EU 3 , and namely the European Maritime Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund). The campaign has been developed in collaboration with Member States and the Aquaculture Advisory Council. Its material has been made available to all Member States in view of its use for national campaigns. Member States have taken co-ownership for dissemination at national level. 2. The total budget allocated for the campaign is approximately EUR 910 000, which encompasses all contracts signed for the various components of the campaign. However, it is possible that the final cost may be lower. The Commission will be able to provide an update on the campaign's total expenditure once all final reports and budgets have been submitted. 3. As it stands, the budget is broken down as follows: Strategic and creative concepts & development of promotional assets: EUR 116 383; Production of social media assets, video testimonials of aquaculture producers, adaptation of visuals of the campaign to the needs of Member States and translation: EUR 497 303; Influencers’ campaign, media dissemination (social media) and outreach strategy EUR 201 921; Campaign website, launch event of the campaign in Brussels on 25 March 2025 and monitoring of results: EUR 94 362. 1 See paragraph 28 of European Parliament resolution of 4 October 2022 on striving for a sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture: the way forward (2021/2189(INI)): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022IP0334. 2 See paragraph 18 of the Council Conclusions of 18 July 2022 on the EU's new aquaculture strategic guidelines: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11496-2022-INIT/en/pdf. 3 European Maritime Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund - Operational expenditure under direct and indirect management Budget line 08 04 02.”
  Funding for fisheries and aquaculture
• 2025-04-01 “E-001331/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU closely monitors developments in South Africa, including legislative proposals and acts adopted. This includes the Expropriation Act (Act number 13 of 2024), which was passed by the previous South African parliament and assented to by the President of the Republic of South Africa on 20 December 2024. It will enter into force on a date to be determined by the President of South Africa. The Act is currently the subject of court proceedings in South Africa. The EU follows the discussions that take place in relation to this Act. The EU will continue to monitor developments and, if deemed relevant, raise the issue with South Africa within relevant bilateral fora, such as those concerning political and human rights dialogue, which exist between the EU and South Africa as part of the strategic partnership. Under Article 8 of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe Regulation 1 , the EU is required to comply with and promote the principles of respect for the rule of law in all its interventions. Through Global Gateway, the EU aims to embed democratic principles, good governance, and transparency in all investments. In each country, the EU assesses whether the necessary preconditions for investment are in place, including those related to the rule of law. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32021R0947”
  EU policy on African region
• 2025-03-31 “E-001312/2025 Answer given by Mr Micallef on behalf of the European Commission The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union explicitly prohibits any discrimination based on membership of a national minority and promotes respect for linguistic diversity. At the same time, the legal provisions governing the use of languages fall within the exclusive competence of the Member States. The Commission also has no competence to evaluate compliance with the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.”
  EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination · EU and national cultural identities
• 2025-03-27 “E-001281/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has taken note of the Joint Declaration 1 following the 18 March 2025 meeting of Defence Ministers of Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo * , which is a non-binding document. The Commission refers the Honourable Member to the Albania, Kosovo and Croatia authorities for any further query related to their Joint Declaration. In 2023, Kosovo and Serbia reached an Agreement on the path to normalisation 2 , which rests on two key pillars of international relations: good neighbourly relations between parties and the principle that neither of the two can represent the other in the international sphere or act on its behalf. The Commission refers the Honourable Member to the relevant Member States authorities for questions on individual support of Member States to Kosovo. 1 https://www.morh.hr/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2025-03-19-deklaracija.pdf. * This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/1999 and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovoand-serbia_en.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Serbia relations · EU-Kosovo relations
• 2025-03-27 “P-001284/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 1 focuses on how the Union could best support Member States in filling their most urgent and critical conventional capability gaps. In this regard, it proposes actions and instruments to financially support Member States (in particular through the coordinated activation of the National escape clause under the Stability and Growth Pact, and the proposed new instrument Security Action for Europe – SAFE), increase the EU defence industrial readiness, including through simplification efforts, or work more closely with Ukraine and other partners. The Commission kindly notes that the questions submitted go beyond the scope of the White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030. They also fall outside the competences of the Commission. It is the prerogative of Member States to decide upon mobilisation of their armed forces, regardless of the framework in which to deploy them (North Atlantic Treaty Oganisation, EU, United Nations, coalition, national, etc.). 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025JC0120.”
  EU competences on defence · Relations with NATO
• 2025-03-27 “E-001285/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The European Council, in June 2017, strongly reaffirmed the commitment of the EU and its Member States to swiftly and fully implement the Paris Agreement, underlining that the Agreement ‘is a key element for the modernisation of the European industry and economy’ and subsequently, in March 2018, invited the Commission to present ‘a proposal for a Strategy for long-term EU greenhouse gas emissions reduction in accordance with the Paris Agreement, taking into account the national plans’ 1 . In that context, in November 2018, the Commission presented in a Communication 2 its vision for a long-term EU strategy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, calling for a climate neutral EU economy. That Communication was substantiated by a technical document 3 produced by the Commission services providing an in-depth analysis in terms of sectoral evolutions and economics of the transition towards this objective. In December 2019, the objective of achieving a climate neutral EU by 2050 was endorsed politically 4 , in line with the objectives of the Paris Agreement. This objective was set in law in the European Climate Law, which entered into force on 29 July 2021 5 . The Commission has not engaged the company McKinsey to prepare a report on the feasibility of achieving climate neutrality by 2050. 1 European Council 23 March 2018. EUCO 1/18. 2 COM/2018/773 final. 3 In-depth analysis in support of the Commission Communication COM(2018) 773. 4 European Council 12 December 2019. EUCO 29/19. 5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1119.”
  Climate efforts
• 2025-03-27 “E-001282/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Evropski pokret u Srbiji 1 (European Movement Serbia) has received limited financial support from the EU over the past decade. This funding is part of the EU's broader strategy to foster a stronger, democratic, and inclusive Serbia for all its citizens and to support their participation in the country’s EU accession process. Organisations like Evropski pokret u Srbiji play a crucial role in promoting and supporting a whole-society approach to the EU accession process. The Commission engages with a diverse range of stakeholders through open calls, thereby mitigating the risk of any single narrative dominating the political discourse in Serbia. In providing EU financial support for civil society in the Western Balkans, including Serbia, the Commission implements strict monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. These include regular audits, reporting requirements, and assessments of the impact of funded projects. This multi-faceted oversight aims to uphold the integrity of the funding process and ensure that it contributes positively to the democratic development of the country. The portrayal of civil society organisations that receive EU funding as tools of external influence undermines EU’s legitimate efforts to support civil society and democratic processes within Serbia and goes against the values that are fundamental for the future of any candidate country that wants to join the EU. 1 https://www.emins.org/en/.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Serbia relations
• 2025-03-24 “E-001224/2025 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission The closure 1 is based on the scientific advice from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) of 29 June 2023 2 . According to ICES, six of the scenarios proposed in the advice are likely to reduce incidental catches of dolphins below the potential biological removal (PBR) limit, but only for data from at-sea sampling. Also, according to ICES none of the scenarios would result in a reduction in annual dolphin mortality below the PBR for data from both at-sea sampling and strandings. It also advised that closures are likely to be the most effective short-term measure for reducing bycatches. The closure was adopted through regionalisation based on a joint recommendation submitted by the relevant Member States 3 and following consultations with the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) and the Expert Group on Fisheries and Aquaculture. According to a report on the closure implemented in winter period 2023-2024 4 , bycatches decreased from an annual average of 6100 dolphins between 2017 and 2023 to 1450 in the winter period 2023/2024. This is the lowest bycatch estimate since 2015. Ongoing research efforts on long-term mitigation measures should soon deliver results. These measures may include acoustic deterrent devices, modifications on the fishing gears, reduction of fishing effort and different types of closures. Any different approach has to be supported with scientific evidence. The fishing activity in the Bay of Biscay is regulated by other measures such as fishing opportunities. Member States have adopted strategies to gradually consume their quota throughout the year and to adjust it to market prices and needs. The Commission is not aware of changes in the fishing pattern of the type suggested. 1 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/3089 of 30 September 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 as regards measures to reduce incidental catches of common dolphin (Delphinus delphis) and other small cetaceans in the Bay of Biscay: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2024/3089/oj/eng. 2 ICES(2023). EU request on mitigation measures to reduce bycatches of common dolphin (Delphinus delphis) in the Bay of Biscay (ICES Subarea 8). ICES Advice: Special Requests: https://iceslibrary.figshare.com/articles/report/EU_request_on_mitigation_measures_to_reduce_bycatches_of_common_dol phin_Delphinus_delphis_in_the_Bay_of_Biscay_ICES_Subarea_8_/23515176/1. 3 France, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands and Belgium. 4 Bilan des mortalités par capture : hiver 2024 - https://www.observatoire-pelagis.cnrs.fr/wpcontent/uploads/2025/01/2b-Bilan-des-mortalites_hiver2024_20241115_PeltieretAl.pdf.”
  Environmental regulation of fisheries
• 2025-03-24 “E-001226/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission To date, the EU has designated a total of 342 vessels contributing to Russia's warfare against Ukraine. A number of those are part of Russia’s shadow fleet, circumventing the oil price cap and supporting Russia’s energy sector. The EU will continue to work with Member States and partners to further close related networks. In parallel, the EU will continue to engage with flag states and third countries to raise awareness of the circumvention and environmental risks linked to the shadow fleet. When it comes to monitoring ships’ activity, including those belonging to the shadow fleet, the EU uses the maritime information and exchange system established under Directive 2002/59/EC (VTMIS Directive) 1 . That information is complemented with certain commercial data though not from Vortexa. The Honourable Member refers to the export of oil from Russia to, for example, India, where it is refined into another product such as diesel. This new product can then be exported to the EU, as according to the EU’s non-preferential rules of origin this product is not of Russian origin. This is not contrary to EU sanctions. Such exports constitute only a fraction of the EU’s total demand for refined products. 1 OJ L 208, 5.8.2002, p. 10–27.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-India relations
• 2025-03-24 “E-001225/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) had published an open competitive international tender in September 2023 for a 30-year concession contract for the development and operation of port assets for Mombasa Port Berth 11–14 and Mombasa Container Terminal 1, together with Lamu Port Container Terminal Berth 1-3 and Lamu Special Economic Zone. However, this process was on hold due to a legal case. This litigation has now been resolved and KPA intends to resume the tender process. At this time, no competitive tender has been re-issued for Lamu container port. Kenya is not a Member of the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and has no commitments to accept EU bidders. Currently we have no information on the conditions of participation to this tender that has not been launched.”
  EU policy on social & environmental impact of foreign investments · "Buy European" provisions
• 2025-03-21 “E-001213/2025 Reply Article 3ae of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 introduces a ban on access to EU ports and locks for vessels registered under the flag of Russia, including replicas of historical vessels. This prohibition was initially introduced in Council Regulation (EU) 2022/576 of 8 April 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and was later amended by Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024 to clarify that replicas of historical ships are included under the definition of vessels. The prohibition aims to constrain the activity of vessels whose activity involves the generation of revenues or contributes to actions or policies which support Russia’s actions against Ukraine. If they were not covered by the ban, replicas of historical ships could be used by Russia to circumvent EU restrictive measures. The Council would point out that EU restrictive measures are carefully targeted, designed to be proportionate to the objectives they seek to achieve, and temporary in nature. The EU institutions work to develop restrictive measures in such a way as to minimise adverse consequences for those not responsible for the policies or actions leading to the adoption of restrictive measures. They are regularly reviewed, and the Council can calibrate, ease or end them, if deemed necessary and in line with the EU’s objectives.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-03-17 “E-001115/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Democracy is a founding value of the EU. Elections are at the core of democracy and should be fair and free. The conduct and the organisation of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional rules and legislation, as well as their international obligations and applicable EU law. National competent authorities and courts have the primary responsibility of ensuring compliance with these rules. The Commission has no competence to intervene in the organisation and conduct of elections. The Commission is monitoring the situation of the rule of law in all Member States, including Romania, as part of the annual Rule of Law Report exercise.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
• 2025-03-17 “E-001116/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has not been informed by any national or European authority about intelligence indicating that COVID-19 originated in a laboratory. The Commission closely monitors scientific studies on the origin of SARS-CoV-2 and supports the research of the World Health Organization (WHO) 1 . The WHO’ s Global Study on the origins of SARS-CoV-2 suggests three possible zoonotic pathways for the introduction of the virus and concludes that the introduction through a laboratory incident is extremely unlikely 2 . Furthermore, a 2023 scientific critical review concluded that the strongest evidence supports a zoonotic over a laboratory origin 3 . The Commission and the Member States implement Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 on serious cross-border health threats 4 , and related Regulations that reinforced the EU’s health security framework 5 . The Commission is currently drafting a Union Prevention, Preparedness and Response Plan (PPRP) to promote an effective and coordinated response to cross-border threats to health at Union level. Every three years, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), is to assess the implementation of the national PPRPs across all EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries. The ECDC is carrying out after-action reviews to learn from the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic 6 and has issued guidance on public health and social measures for health emergencies and pandemics in the EU/EEA 7 . In 2024, the Commission set up the Advisory Committee on public health emergencies, which, amongst others, advises the Commission on the formulation of response measures, including risk and crisis communication, in case of a public health emergency at Union level 8 . 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-statement-who-led-covid-19-origins-study_en. 2 https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/origins-of-the-virus, WHO-convened Global Study of Origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part Joint WHO-China Study, page 9. 3 Alwine JC, Casadevall A, Enquist LW, Goodrum FD, Imperiale MJ. A Critical Analysis of the Evidence for the SARS-CoV-2 Origin Hypotheses. mBio. 2023 Apr 25;14(2):e0058323. doi: 10.1128/mbio.00583-23. Epub 2023 Mar 28. PMID: 36897098; PMCID: PMC10127682. 4 Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022 on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU OJ L 314, 6.12.2022, p. 26–63. 5 Regulation (EU) 2022/2370 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022 amending Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 establishing a European centre for disease prevention and control (OJ L 314, 6.12.2022, p. 1–25), Regulation (EU) 2022/123 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 January 2022 on a reinforced role for the European Medicines Agency in crisis preparedness and management for medicinal products and medical devices (OJ L 20, 31.1.2022, p. 1–37), and Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2372 of 24 October 2022 on a framework of measures for ensuring the supply of crisis-relevant medical countermeasures in the event of a public health emergency at Union level (OJ L 314, 6.12.2022, p. 64–78). 6 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/lessons-covid-19-pandemic-may-2023. 7 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Public health and social measures for health emergencies and pandemics in the EU/EEA: recommendations for strengthening preparedness planning. Stockholm: ECDC; 2024. 8 Regulation EU 2022/2371, Article 24.”
  Covid-19 vaccines procurement
• 2025-03-17 “E-001117/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Assad regime’s fall has been a historic moment for the Syrian people. Throughout the conflict, including in the 2018 Council conclusions on Syria 1 , the EU condemned the Assad regime’s brutal violations of international law and deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, including the use of chemical weapons. What was discovered since the fall of the regime only confirmed its brutality. In this critical period, the EU supports an inclusive, peaceful, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned transition built on the respect of international law and human rights. In this context, the EU has welcomed the interim authorities’ first positive steps towards an inclusive transition, such as the National Dialogue Conference, the Constitutional Declaration, and the formation of the new government. The EU is in contact with interim authorities and local actors, including civil society, to strongly advocate for tolerance and pluralism. The EU remains attentive to the actions of the new authorities in ensuring the protection of all Syrians, regardless of their background, notably ethnic or religious, and upholding the universality and indivisibility of human rights and the principles of equality and non-discrimination. Gravely alarmed by the violence in Syria’s coastal region, on 11 March 2025, the High Representative/Vice-President issued a statement 2 on behalf of the EU strongly condemning the attacks by pro-Assad militias and the horrific crimes against civilians, including summary killings, many of which were allegedly perpetrated by armed groups supporting the transitional authorities. The EU called for a swift, transparent and impartial investigation to ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice, and welcomed the transitional authorities’ establishment of an independent investigative committee. Everything must be done to prevent any such crimes from happening again. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7956-2018-INIT/en/pdf 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/”
  EU-Syria relations
• 2025-03-05 “E-000925/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The EU programme for the environment and climate action (LIFE), under Article 11(6) of the LIFE Regulation 1 provides for ‘operating grants that support the functioning of non-profit making entities which are involved in the development, implementation and enforcement of Union legislation and policy, and which are primarily active in the area of the environment or climate action, including energy transition’. The management of these grants complies with the Financial Regulation 2 . Operating grants are awarded competitively through calls for proposals 3 , based on transparent award criteria published in the Call. Applicants submit proposals that include the description of their work programmes of activities in areas indicated in the LIFE Regulation; their proposals are assessed towards the published award criteria. All the members of the evaluation committee, including Commission or Executive Agency staff, sign declarations on absence of conflict of interest before engaging with the assessment of the submitted proposals. The grants are awarded to the proposals scoring highest towards the award criteria. The grants do not support political campaigns, as the eligibility criteria specify that the organisations supported must be independent, in particular from government, other public authorities, and from political or commercial interests 4 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/783 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing a Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE), and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1293/2013. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402509 3 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life/life-operating-grants_en and https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life/life-calls-proposals-2024_en#life-calls-for-proposals-2024 4 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life/life-operating-grants_en#application-for-operating-grants-eligibility-criteria”
  EU policy on sustainability criteria in public funding
• 2025-03-05 “E-000924/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission considers the Rail Baltica project one of the flagship projects on the transEuropean transport network (TEN-T) because it would finally allow to connect the Baltic states to the single European railway area. This is crucial for the regions’ economic growth, cohesion and now more than ever, its security and defence. For the Commission, Rail Baltica is the most urgent transport infrastructure project in the Baltic States to be implemented. 2. In the Baltic states, the Rail Baltica project is managed by RB Rail joint venture and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania authorities. The Baltic states cooperate closely, including through the RB Rail, to ensure the success of Rail Baltica. The project partners monitor the costs and expected benefits. They are also responsible for the respective railway market and ensuring that rail traffic can start as soon as the line is operational. The Commission follows the project implementation and has always encouraged the organisations involved in the implementation to use the most cost-efficient solutions. There are frequent audits, and the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency and the European Coordinator for the North Sea Baltic corridor monitor the project. 3. The co-legislators identified the infrastructure priorities of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) until 2050 in TEN-T Regulation 1 to ensure consistency and predictability. They identified Rail Baltica as a major cross-border missing link 2 . The applicable regulation also considers financial constraints and the fiscal rules of the EU to safeguard the financial stability and resilience of Member States apply. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401679. 2 Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Regulation: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1153/oj/eng.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration · EU support of rail transport · EU funding for transportation
• 2025-01-23 “E-000291/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission takes the risks posed by Russia’s shadow fleet very seriously, addressing environmental and maritime safety threats with targeted measures. EU sanctions include carveouts for vessels in need of assistance or saving life at sea. Working with the European Maritime Safety Agency and Member States, the Commission monitors these threats to protect the Baltic marine and coastal environment. Coastal and flag States must uphold the Law of the Sea Treaty 1 obligations, with coastal States enforcing environmental measures and flag States ensuring vessels meet insurance and certification standards. The Commission has also engaged with third countries providing flags to these vessels, urging them to meet their responsibilities. On 19 February 2025, the Commission proposed amending Directive 2002/59/EC 2 to mandate insurance reporting for all vessels entering EU Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems, including those in transit. This enhances maritime safety and environmental protection. 2. EU sanctions are a key tool to weaken Russia’s military aggression by imposing significant economic and political costs. These measures, including a ban on Russian oil imports (with exceptions for pipelines) and the G7+ Oil Price Cap, have reduced Russia’s oil revenues, limiting resources for its war effort. To evade sanctions, Russia is using a ‘shadow fleet’ of tankers. The EU can designate shadow fleet vessels involved in deceptive or high-risk shipping, imposing port access bans and service restrictions. So far, 153 vessels have been designated under the 14 th , 15 th , and 16 th sanctions packages, leading to a significant reduction in their operations. 1 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/59/oj/eng”
  Climate efforts · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-01-23 “E-000307/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU stands ready to support the new phase in Syria through a Syrian-led and Syrianowned peaceful and inclusive transition, grounded on human rights and international law. Coordination with all external actors and regional partners, including Türkiye, to reunite and rebuild Syria, in full respect of its sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity will be a crucial element. The recovery and reconstruction of Syria, in which the EU aims to actively engage, is a field where Türkiye plays a key role. It is therefore important that there is good cooperation and coordination between the EU and Türkiye. The EU intends to scale up its recovery efforts and support eventual reconstruction of Syria, provided that an inclusive transition continues. The EU’s approach will be gradual and proportionate to the steps taken by the interim authorities. The EU decided to suspend several restrictive measures on 24 February 2025 to facilitate engagement with Syria, its people and businesses, in energy and transport sectors, as well as to facilitate financial and banking transactions associated with such sectors and those needed for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes. The sanctions relief is gradual, conditional and reversible. The EU is regularly assessing if the conditions in Syria allow for further suspensions. Since 2011, the EU has been at the forefront of international efforts to support Syria. From 2011 until December 2024, the EU and Member States have mobilised over EUR 37 billion in support of the Syrian people and their host communities. The EU has organised the ninth edition of the Brussels Conference on 17 March 2025 to mobilise international support to help address Syria’s immediate needs, recovery and early stages of reconstruction, where the EU committed nearly EUR 2.5 billion for 2025 and 2026, while together with partners EUR 5.8 billion was pledged overall.”
  EU-Syria relations · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-01-23 “E-000292/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In the period leading up to and following the 2024 presidential elections and constitutional referendum in the Republic of Moldova, the national law enforcement authorities have been actively communicating about uncovering large-scale vote-buying schemes. Dozens of cases have been opened, and hundreds of searches have been conducted, including seizing bundles of cash. Local media have published their own investigations into vote-buying networks as well. Furthermore, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), in its preliminary findings and conclusions 1 following the first round of the presidential elections and the constitutional referendum, referred to ‘credible evidence of interference from abroad, including offering illicit monetary incentives to influence voters’. The OSCE/ODIHR, in its preliminary findings 2 and final report 3 on the 2024 Parliamentary elections in Georgia, highlighted numerous electoral irregularities which cast doubts on the integrity of the whole process. The findings raise serious concerns about the gaps and inconsistencies of the electoral legal framework, misuse of administrative resources, independence of institutions, pressure on voters, including public employees, intimidation on election day, including violation of the secrecy of people’s vote; all of which compromised the ability of voters to cast their vote without fear of retribution and eroded the public trust in the process. The final report points to post-election developments, such as the insufficient consideration of complaints, the forcible suppression of protests, which go against international standards and obligations, including Georgia’s commitments to uphold freedom of assembly. 1 https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/576117 2 https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/579346 3 https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/584029”
  EU-Georgia relations · EU-Moldova relations
• 2024-10-30 “E-002342/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In line with the 2023 third Joint Declaration on EU-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) cooperation 1 , NATO remains the foundation of collective defence for its allies and essential for Euro Atlantic security. The EU welcomes initiatives that are strengthening the collective defence of Europe. Nevertheless, the newly established Baltic Sea Command Task Force in Rostock does not fall under the remit of the EU and is not part of the EU-NATO cooperation. In this regard, the High Representative/Vice-President fully aligns with the agreed guiding principle of decision-making autonomy of both organisations. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/10/eu-nato-joint-declaration-10-january-2023”
  Relations with NATO
• 2024-09-12 “E-001695/2024 Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission 1. The investigations on the sabotage against the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines fall under the responsibility of authorities in Germany, after investigations in Denmark and Sweden have been closed. The Commission has not been asked to support the investigation. To support the prevention of further attacks, the Commission engages with Member States and the European External Action Service in a regular classified exchange on the threat to critical infrastructure and to enhance preparedness, response and international cooperation as laid out in the Council Recommendation on a coordinated approach by the EU to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure 1 . Furthermore, the Directive on the resilience of Critical Entities 2 is being transposed by Member States. Additionally, the revised EU maritime security strategy (EUMSS) 3 includes a variety of actions that will improve surveillance, protection and resilience of infrastructure, including energy pipelines from conventional, hybrid and cyber-attacks. 2. The European arrest warrant is a judicial procedure between judicial authorities in the EU Member States based on the particular circumstances of each individual case where surrender is requested. The Commission cannot interfere with, or influence the individual decisions taken by judicial authorities in this case. 1 Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure 2023/C 20/01 ST/15623/2022/INIT (OJ C 20, 20.1.2023, p. 1–11). 2 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC (Text with EEA relevance). 3 Council conclusions of 24 October 2023 on the Revised EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and its Action Plan; 14280/23.”
  Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• “Thank you very much, Madam Chair. This reminds us a little of the debate on the Baltic Sea fishery. The Iberian fishers are facing a downturn and unemployment. And the presentation, uh, I think, is an attack on the fishery on the Iberian Peninsula and on the many small companies and ultimately on jobs. And to be perfectly frank, I am a bit, uh, and I am grateful to the chairman for having summed it up so well. But, um. I might be a little bit more familiar with the politics of the Baltic Sea, but listening to the commission representative saying, we have no other choice. We're not doing politics. But you are doing politics. If, as the commission, you're involved in the legislative process and people who have invested want to guarantee their jobs in the Iberian Peninsula, find that they have no other choice. So I do think we need to strengthen the hand of those that are opposing this paper, rejecting it. It's not actually worth the paper it's written on, because it doesn't take into account the conditions faced by small and medium sized fishing communities. But I have a question now. Actually, Europe is a big family. And okay, there are national interests. That's all well and good, but what I haven't understood is how these swaps, these quota exchanges are supposed to be a problem. Countries had them. They swapped them. What's the problem? It seemed to me that you tried to come up with a sentence saying, you know, you've got to prevent more fishing in the South. I mean, that was a bit of a half explanation. I'd really like to understand why these swaps between member states are supposed to be this big problem. Thank you.”
  Environmental regulation of fisheries
• “(16:06:58 – 16:08:27): Thank you very much. Thank you for your presentation, Mr. Cipolloni. It's always nice to see you. And, delighted to see how passionately you talk to us about the digital euro. I perhaps don't entirely share your passion for it, but in any case, got a couple of questions. 1st, on acceptance. The proposal for the digital euro puts, obligatory acceptance in place for certain market players. How do you see that in relation to contractual freedom, specifically Article 133A? My 2nd question relates to something else. Now here particularly, I I'm wondering what problems we're actually resolving by introducing the new digital euro here. We've already got, quick reliable transactions. And so here, I'm just wondering what kind of problem it is we're actually trying to solve. As far as I see it, there isn't, any problem. I mean, often people talk about independence from The US, and people are very critical of Mastercard, for example. Why should the ECB though come up with a new, digital currency rather than just negotiating better conditions with what we've already got? Thank you.”
  Digital euro
• “Mr. president, colleagues, clean mobility, carbon neutrality. This are part of the failure of the Berlin conference in Brazil. We are seeing once again there's a. There is nothing being done here. Um, Brussels wants to be the, uh, the savior of the global climate. And and this is now affecting airlines and and now we should be using supposed, uh, more, more sustainable fuels. But this is obviously, um, ignoring national strategies, and, uh, there's should be no penalties for, um. There should be penalties for businesses in the. Now. The airline industry would just delocalize to Asia and you will see, um. Sustainability without competitiveness is not sustainable. The AfD from the ESM group rejects this proposal very much.”
  Decarbonisation of aviation sector
• “Thank you very much. There were two colleagues that put a question already that I wish to put. It's about the future of the fishery and the state of the data. I think the commission representative has been talking about the ecological state of the Baltic Sea, the low salinity and low oxygen levels. But what is surprising is of surprise to me is that we've got Nordstream two there. There were explosions there. What's happened as a consequence of that? What about the gas that remains in those in that pipeline? And what fallout has there been on the of the offshore wind parks, on stocks? So all of this is something that's on my mind. Somebody was talking about a sensible proposal by the commission. And after all, in Germany We've got a fairly small fishing industry, but I think this proposal is leading to a situation where the German fishery, fishing industry or the Baltic fishing industry is going to suffer a grave blow and we need to ensure that it can survive. It's not only the stocks but the people, and we need to strike the balance. And this commission proposal is, in principle the end, the death of fishing in the Baltic Sea. And I'm particularly surprised why this continued ban on leisure time fishing is being upheld. Maybe a colleague could tell us a little about that. There was also a proposal on the table. I'm sorry. The proposal that's on the table is one that we cannot support. And we must. We reject out of hand.”
  Environmental regulation of fisheries
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. Are you speaking German? So I thank the speakers for their presentations and my first question is for Capadesioras. How, what do you think about the risk that the infrastructure of large banks will mean that smaller banks will not have access to the market? So we have our small banks in Germany and I must admit their situation worries me. And then for Eric Monet, which macroeconomic consequences could tokenization of assets have with respect to capital allocation and monetary policy transmission? And what about monetary policy when we have more and more actions taking place on DLTs? How will we be able to keep an overview? Thank you.”
  ECB monetary policy
• “Israel and the US may have their reasons, but this is an attack. And there were negotiations on nuclear weapons. So are we going to apply the same standards as we do with Ukraine? If we were doing that, then we would be talking about sanctions. Of course, Iran is not a friend of the West, and Khamenei managed to reach power with our support. Now, if you look at the Middle East, it's sinking into chaos. And what are Callas and von der Leyen doing? They're fighting over powers. They should be protecting us from a wave of refugees or doing more. And Chancellor Mertz is throwing his European partners under the bus. Where is the EU Instead, we need a new start. Sovereign nations with a strong internal market where we seize opportunities in this multipolar world.”
  EU foreign policy approach
• “Thank you for the question. Well, we're talking about ECB reports. So we're talking about price stability above all. Now we've we have a lot of doubts about the policies of the ECB. Now I can't answer those questions in this debate. It's perhaps we could talk about it in a debate on Olaf or something. I'd be very happy to help you if we find ourselves in that in those circumstances.”
  ECB monetary policy
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. I will speak in German. On the 27th of February, we announced 100 billion armaments package. And we've started implementing that. There have been some interim progress made, but that's not really the point. I would like to thank you, Commissioner Kubilius, but I'd also like to ask you whether you don't think that there are potentially difficulties here in terms of what the member states are actually able to deliver. It's all very well hearing all these fine sounding words, but what is the reality on the ground? You indicated that you weren't sure what the Americans would do vis a vis Ukraine. Well, I'm left speechless thinking about the reality of this. Our closest ally, and we don't know. Since Trump came to power again, what the Americans are considering, let alone what they may do. So I think we would be well advised to recognize reality very clearly and recognize what the implications of this reality are. We need to have a proper defense industry, and we shouldn't be buying our defense equipment from America. Thank you.”
  EU-US relations
• “Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. We speak in German and so is this. So it has been said by our experts that we are already at war. And I find that quite surprising. Um, because we should have an having a public debate about such a sensitive topic. Well, Mr. Louvre, with regard to the attacks in Germany. So and the whole our nuclear power plants, we've already, um, closed those all down. So I was at a conference in Montreal, Montreal, with some colleagues from the European Parliament and Russia with regard to air transport. Well, it's simply not really very present. And we're also shortly before a, um, a truce in with Russia. And so with regard to the we have our relationships which we have to looked after. And so really to present Russia as being an enemy, it's not very clever, considering that we will soon have a peace agreement with regard to drones. We are very vulnerable in Europe. We have every 100km. We've got a an airfield. So we have close relationships with China, in fact. And it's not really a good idea to make out that they're suspects somehow for all this, uh, with regard to drone defense. Thank you.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Madam president, thank you. It's a shame that miss von der Leyen, as soon as the initial critical comments come from my comments from my colleagues, were aimed at her, she ran off. Maybe she'll hear later. €800 billion for EU defence. How many euros of that will actually end up in her pocket? And after all, she's been considered as somebody who's causing corruption. We need to counter corruption in the EU. But the EU is showing us how the US is showing us with Dodge how this can work. But in Europe we've got billions of euros that the taxpayers are paying in, but they're being stuck in people's pockets without any kind of investigation. So Mrs. von der Leyen should leave office, I believe, and I hope that the justice will make sure that she has to wear a ball and chain.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Thank you. Chair. I will speak German. Well, let me thank the commission for their report. I take the view that your assessments and reports really need an update, because the US, under Trump have declared that the Green Deal is over and that's a competitor. But when it comes to green allocations, I don't buy what you're saying. So we need an update. So our competitiveness is at stake. So my first question is. Commission what's the impact of the EU taxonomy on the competitiveness of EU companies in particular against the background of increasing geopolitical tension and global competition, and what adjustment mechanisms are available if there are measurable disadvantages from the application of it. Secondly, simplification and getting rid of administrative red tape. That's one of the targets that has been announced by our German government. Now, at the risk of sounding like a lobbyist, companies are telling us that there's a real need of implementation because of the taxonomy. What tools does the commission use to make sure whether the red tape involved is proportionate? Thank you.”
  Green Taxonomy
• “I'd like to thank the representative of the Court of Auditors for the very good report. I'm a bit surprised that the commission is simply suggesting that it will respect some of this report. I think the Commission should be aware that here in this Parliament and in its work, it is handling European taxpayers money, and it would be helpful if there were a bit more respect about this excellent report from the Court of Auditors. The European Fund for Strategic Investment was, from the outset a model of the failure of EU bureaucrats. Large announcements, pompous multipliers. And then at the end of it, the outcome has little to do with reality and it's really quite revealing. Now we can see in black and white what many people feared. The alleged mobilisation of 500 billion in investment has not happened. Nearly 131 billion. Nearly 131 billion, or 26% of the overall volume is purely fictitious, and you can read that in the report. It's very serious. And the commission hasn't even been able to evidence whether the projects were even additional, i.e., whether they would have happened, wouldn't have happened without Efsi. So it's not just about talking up what's being done. We're talking about billions of budget guarantees from member states, and ultimately we're talking about a lot of German taxpayers money, which is my interest in this room. We need to try to ensure that it's handled properly. So my question to the commission is what consequences do you draw from the structural failure on your part, and what are you going to do in the future to ensure that programmes like Investeu aren't just fairy stories, and that we ensure that people are not being sacrificed for fairy stories? And I hope that you're not going to say that you'll just respect some parts of the report. That sounds like a declaration of failure. Thank you.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• “Thank you. Madam chair, we're speaking speaking German. Now I come from a large EU member state and which in many questions is a net contributor. In other words, a lot of them in terms of the budget. And our colleague was asking about the in in equal unequal distribution of projects among various member states. So I have three questions. Firstly, how much money is flowing from invest? Eu is going into projects outside the EU and and what would be the reasoning for that? How would you explain that to the European citizens? And then I did not hear the entire, um, presentation. I was delayed, but could you guarantee to the European taxpayers that not one single euro from invest EU would end up in an inefficient, ideological, motive motivated project? And my third question, and some of the previous speakers have already mentioned this, which controls exist that would ensure that you would not have large enterprises or so-called NGOs turning out to be the main beneficiaries of these funds?”
  Conditions to access EU budget
• “Madam Chair. Thank you very much, Mr.. Cipollone. It's good to have you with us. Well, last time you came to us in July, you said that you defend cash in both real and digital form. Well, what do you actually mean by that? With my Apple Watch, I can make payments. But of course, it's a digital payment system. So it seems contradictory to me. How are you going to ensure that the digital euro doesn't, uh, step by step, replace, uh, cash and makes it traceable? I mean, that causes a lot of problems for people. Mr. Boeselager talked about small cafes. Okay, I understand that there's an issue with cash and criminals, but. Quite a lot of hotel guests quite like to pay in cash because they don't want their payments to be traceable because they're having a naughty weekend or something like that. So there are concerns about getting rid of anonymous cash payments. And to come back to what you said at the last meeting, you said that digital cash is going to be essential for the economy. Well, I see a contradiction here. If cash is so essential for the economy, then why is the ECB investing so much in digital replacement products rather than ensuring that there is genuine access to cash? We should be encouraging member states to have cash anchored in their constitutions. Well, okay, there's a third tranche that you're talking about, but nevertheless, we are very concerned that you are trying to eliminate physical cash.”
  Means of payment (cash vs digital)
• “Madam chair. Mrs. Lagarde. Colleagues, we're talking about the ECB's annual report, which shows a central bank, above all, that has actually moved right away from its initial mandate. We've seen millions in inflation's millions of people really losing purchasing power, uh, pensions and so on. Um, is and now we're talking about the digital Europe, uh, euro seen as a harmless project. It's being sold as such, but it's actually a project that is going to really restrict our monetary freedom. And it's a huge experiment. A digital euro harbors huge dangers because it will be very difficult to follow payments, and it will be very difficult to understand who, what, why and where. What is being done with people's money, taxpayers money. We have to, you know, look back in history and learn from our mistakes, Mrs. Lockhart. What you're trying to do is to reassure us today, talking about the third series of new banknotes. But the ECB needs to take note of transparency and its actual mandate, and that we need to stop this rolling out of a prop of power. We need to have supervision and controls in place. And they're all all these things are at stake right now.”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you. You were talking about the ECB's job of price stability and inflation. Stability. The president said that in the past there had been 10.8% inflation. But now inflation is back to a normal level. The question is, do you believe that the ECB head, Mr. Lagarde. That they have a realistic take on the inflation rate socially? Well, those at the head of the ECB receive over €700,000, uh, for their salary. They're not facing existential problems, but it means real losses for real families, for normal families. And this distance can be seen in these decisions. And in my opinion, the ECB leadership has no idea of the social consequences of their monetary policy. None at all.”
  ECB monetary policy
• “Yes, Madam Chair. Um, madam. Well, you used a good keyword there. Interest. Interest is increasing. You've got the generation new generation EU, and we've got to be a huge proportion of the EU budget from 2026 onwards. So there's going to be need to be quite an effort to pay that money back. Because otherwise you're going to have trouble with the financial markets. So. You've got all of these new debts coming our way. Will that have an impact on interest rates, but particularly through the impact of generation next generation EU.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. I will continue speaking in German for the colleague. Madam.Colleagues, president Lagarde, a number of EU countries, including Germany, are planning huge debt packages. Forgetting the Maastricht criteria. They're not supposed to be a recommendation. They're supposed to be a rule to prevent a currency union turning into a collapsing snowball. The idea is that you shouldn't be taking out new debt just to pay off the old debt. Rather, it should also prevent countries from getting rid of their debt through inflation. There's increasing demand for money, and in the end of the day, you'll end up with increasing interest rates. So. The EPP government in Germany is buying. Sovereign bonds with newly printed money I think so. Effectively. We've got, uh, also issues like the Russian war on Ukraine that's increasing prices as well. Then there's going to be a defence investment that's going to increase investment sorry inflation as well. So my question is is the ECB planning a new asset purchase program. That's to say buying more uh, sovereign bonds with fresh money to try and deal with the sovereign debt that's incurred by, uh, all of this.”
  ECB monetary policy
• “Can I start in—okay, some also in German. So some— On the digital euro, Mr. Cipollone is telling us the ECB perspective on this, and we had some very interesting responses and a very good dialogue. Mrs. Lagarde, when it comes to the digital euro, we're talking about something that's similar to cash, and you say, Halper, that transactions will go over payment platforms, and so the technical possibility for blocking or filtering payments is a real risk. So how can the ECB ensure that there will be infrastructure in place that makes it possible to have controls that will never be used for such controls, so that you're not going to have a situation where the digital euro fails to honor its promises?”
  Digital euro
• “Well, I don't know how old you are. I don't know how old you are, but don't you? During the Soviet period Cold War. There was that great aggressivity between both sides, but nonetheless we had very good agreements. I don't know what's happening right now. It's important to provide cheap energy to our consumers, and the United States has recognized that. And we hope that irrespective of what's going on right now, that the possibilities will exist in Europe as well. Good, cheap energy. That's what the important thing it's an issue of sovereignty. And cheap is a form of sovereignty, by the way. Thank you.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Thank you. Chair. Thank you. Chair. I will speak in German. So I'd also like to thank the experts. It was very interesting. It's interesting to listen to what you had to say. The ESN group, of course, want company tax to be mainly a matter for member states. I really don't understand the justification for having further powers transferred to the EU level when it comes to equity and debt taxation. Now, I agree that there are structural distortions when it comes to debt, and some colleagues have said, as regards Debra, that it's quite good for now that it's been laid on ice or even buried, because I believe that we want to keep our start ups in Europe and SMEs, and I think it would actually deter them. And I have a question to Mr. Ludovici, how great is the risk that special EU rules could divert capital to the US or Asia? That wouldn't be in our interest. And the second part of my question is for Miss Ryding. You talked about what might be the first billionaire in the world's history. And of course, there's a lot of innovation that lies behind that. I assume that you're talking about Mr. Musk, who's not only flying off to space, but he's also playing astronomic taxes. So it's not so straightforward. And I don't think that we want smart people to be facing too much of a tax burden. We have SMEs who are particularly concerned about and in Germany we have a industrial structure which is very much based on smaller businesses. So, for example, when you're looking at interest deductions, how does that affect family companies? Would we be looking at greater complexity or creating new loopholes? Thank you.”
  EU competences on taxation
• “Thank you chair. I will speak German. Thank you very much to the experts for what we've heard. I've got two questions. The first one to Mr. Vale. Eu analyses and studies have shown that the EU is structurally not in a position to pose any kind of threat to the dollar. So why are projects like Eurobonds or more fiscal integration should be pushed forward? This would mean that member states would ultimately be liable without any real perspective of being strategically useful. Second question is to Mr. Beck, what do you think of the goal of strengthening the euro as a global reserve currency? When. If you look at the situation with Russian assets, you can see that there is a political risk to investors in European assets.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• “We know as Germans. What dystopia here. It's sitting there and it's called Zimmermann. Quite honestly, what is being sold to us by the Democrats is quite wrong. It's not going to make people free. And we've seen an attempt here to, uh, give us a fairy tale in beautiful clothing. Yes. Uh, when we have freedom and fair competition, do you think this is going to help us? But we're looking at overregulation, and, uh, we are strengthening the very powerful companies which are powerful enough for. This is not a harmless, uh, solution. What we are seeing is a move into total control over our money, the money of Europeans. And this is what we are going to have to live under. And thanks to the past, we have our freedom. And this is something which we want to continue in the ES group. But we don't want this to happen when we are seeing people spending too much, buying too much meat or something, then the digital money is going to disappear from their accounts in the future. Digital eternity. That sounds okay. It sounds wonderful, but quite honestly, this is going to have an effect on our lives. Money consumption, everything is going to be able to be called upon by the persons involved. Quite honestly. Colleagues. This is a question of power, and we do feel that people in power have not learnt from history how not to misuse power. So we don't want a digital euro, we don't want digital ideas and we don't want any supervision from the bureaucrats or the commission. Thank you.”
  Digital euro
• “President. Members, this regulation is another example of green policy being detached from reality and the green approach. We need three things here. We need an environmental specialist, a maths professor and a linguistics specialist. If you want to understand this specific CO2 emissions. Article three. If you want to understand that you need five other regulations to understand it. For example, article one, we can see that this regulation leads to frictionless functioning of the single market. Well, the single single market does already work. We have the CMOs, and it's really silly to annoy people with these pointless new regulations like the some of the reporting in this regulation. It's over the top, it's too much red tape and it is hampering individuals and companies. Let's get rid of this regulation. It's a good thing that Friedrich Merz, who has lied in his election campaign, hasn't become chancellor because he would. He's done a favour to Germany by not getting elected.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “(15:58:22 – 16:00:41): Thank you very much for the presentations we've heard and your opinions. I'm not a lot cleverer now than I was before. And I do wonder about the basic European ideas of freedom and trust, but here we are talking about reverse charging. So I don't know if that's a good development for Europe. Over the last few years, there were quite a number of new instruments, Eurofisk, Vida, and others. But at the same time, large companies have their own tax compliance departments, but small and medium sized companies don't have those. So isn't there a danger that increasingly complex VAT rules will be a burden on those companies that have no real relationship with VAT fraud? So we're basically putting a general suspicion across a whole range of companies. Is that not contrary to the idea of Europe? And then second question, we heard about Spain from a Spanish colleague, but this could be a compliance burden for companies that definitely exists. And, of course, there needs to be proportionality in terms of the need to combat fraud and the issue of the compliance burden. We also need data collection and control monitoring mechanisms, but every extra measure seems to be accompanied with new EU competencies, new data collection, new, intervention mechanisms. Has the EU really got any kind of concept for monitoring VAT fraud that isn't just more competences for, more harmonization, more competencies for EU agencies? Because tax collection is a national competence and combating tax evasion is also a national area. I haven't really heard any good arguments from any of you that would change my mind on any of this.”
  VAT harmonisation
• “Mr. President colleagues, this budget that is being presented to us is socialist planned economy in the form of an EU budget. It's a seven year programme which aims to take €2,000 billion and and pursue socialist policy preventing free people, free sovereign people, leading them into the von der Leyen channel. We should be halving this budget. We should save and save and save this plan. This budget is undemocratic. This EU doesn't need more money. It needs a reset as a common economic area. The less money this commission gets into their pockets, the better it will be for European people. Thank you.”
  Size of EU budget
• “I will speak in German. So the translation is in progress. It's okay. Okay. Thank you for your report. I know that delivering things on time is very important. And we support the fact that you've produced this report on time. You've said that that's. What's happening. And it's going to be assessed by a council. Can I can I link to what Mr. Navarrette was saying? And I want to hear about the practice of it all. How does escape ensure that European statistics are truly independent, are methodologically clear and are free from political guidance, particularly in sensitive areas such as budget deficits, inflation or employment figures. And you know, these are issues which have political consequences. And thus this moves me to my next question. In recent times, has Escap identified any shortcomings or any cases where there was a risk to the production of European statistics? And if you did see such cases, what measures were taken to ensure that such cases do not happen again? Thank you.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• “Mr. president, ladies and gentlemen, my dear parents in the gallery. Phasing out Russian gas is the most ridiculous thing that the Commission has proposed. You can see what's going on in my hometown in Germany. We can see that companies are leaving Germany and their massive, um, sackings of experts and scientists and worsening the economic situation of Germany. The energy costs are far too high in Germany. Before the explosion in Nord Stream two, we had acceptable prices. The current price. The plans of the commission are ridiculous. More than that, they are lying to people because the Russian sanctions are not working. And you can't imagine that Russia was a fair partner before you decided to have sanctions. We saw the strength of Germany in the past. The idea was to do things right and not shoot at each other. But now Donald Trump's thinking about working with the Russians to push through Nord Stream. Oh, Nord Stream two is a good piece project for New Europe. Thank you.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Mr. President, colleagues, the only right thing in the Affordable Energy Action Plan is the observation that energy prices are too high. But the course is mentioned at wrong. And, you know, there's nonsense about the consumers and the weather. The whole of the EU policy here is wrong. It's wrong to disconnect from cheap oil and gas from Russia. The competitiveness, campus action plans and flagship projects and pilot projects should all be abandoned. We shouldn't have a green ideology here. We need a market economy, not a planned economy. Let's drop the green energy socialism. The solution on energy isn't clean energy, but cheap energy. For as long as the Commission doesn't understand that, it would be better for the Commission to do nothing. That would be better for the people. It's not the fuel that's the problem, but the fossils in the commission that are the problem, not fossil fuels. I can only recommend that they go extinct like the dinosaurs. Thank you.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “European citizens initiative. Sound good? But what's behind this? Who pays for this? Uh, we hear words like green and sustainable coming from these. This is all, you know, from the torture chamber of of ideology. And how do you get a million signatures? I mean, there are 4 million citizens in my region, but difficult to get a million together. We're talking about regions having access to EU funds. But since when does the Commission respect national differences? That is the question. Because really what they want to pose is a uniform, a European state. We've got funds that are so complex, we don't know who can apply for them and how the money can be obtained. So my suggestion would be we should have citizens initiatives, direct election of the president of the Commission by the citizens. We ought to throw von der Leyen out of office today and tomorrow, have a genuinely democratic representation of the European citizens. Thank you.”
  EU political integration
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. I apologize. I didn't hear the whole presentation, but I have two quick questions. This is, um. We have mentioned the importance of military transport. Rail Baltica. There has been problems there over the years with the various authorities. What's the state of play now? And the second point I'd like to raise is, uh, the Straits of Messina. We can see how quickly the Chinese can carry out, uh, transport projects in their country. And also, uh, I'd like to hear more about the Messina Strait. Is that going to be a tunnel? Is it going to be a bridge?”
  EU transport infrastructure integration
• “President. Honourable members, the report should be rejected because it still follows the Green Deal. Utopia. A ridiculous waste of time. Unbelievable. Invest. Eu is a monster. We have not put our house in order. We're imposing more reporting requirements. There is a call for greater transparency. This is a program with billions in funding provided by taxpayers. We should reject a greater EU guarantee with less information and vague accountability. Mrs. von der Leyen will, I'm sure, be delighted with this. Investeu will unlock huge private investment, we are told. But that will not be the case and citizens are not being asked here whether they agree. Honourable members don't blindly vote for any piece of legislation to do with Europe. This will not create greater transparency, it will lead to less transparency and accountability. Those that believe that this is progress have lost all sense of reality. The group will clearly reject this.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• “Thank you. Chair. Thank you. Chair. I will speak in German. So I'd also like to thank the experts. It was very interesting. It's interesting to listen to what you had to say. The ESN group, of course, want company tax to be mainly a matter for member states. I really don't understand the justification for having further powers transferred to the EU level when it comes to equity and debt taxation. Now, I agree that there are structural distortions when it comes to debt, and some colleagues have said, as regards Debra, that it's quite good for now that it's been laid on ice or even buried, because I believe that we want to keep our start ups in Europe and SMEs, and I think it would actually deter them. And I have a question to Mr. Ludovici, how great is the risk that special EU rules could divert capital to the US or Asia? That wouldn't be in our interest. And the second part of my question is for Miss Ryding. You talked about what might be the first billionaire in the world's history. And of course, there's a lot of innovation that lies behind that. I assume that you're talking about Mr. Musk, who's not only flying off to space, but he's also playing astronomic taxes. So it's not so straightforward. And I don't think that we want smart people to be facing too much of a tax burden. We have SMEs who are particularly concerned about and in Germany we have a industrial structure which is very much based on smaller businesses. So, for example, when you're looking at interest deductions, how does that affect family companies? Would we be looking at greater complexity or creating new loopholes? Thank you.”
  EU competences on taxation
• “Well, Commissioner. Commissioner, let me, uh, just say that, uh, I was a bit disappointed that you turned up late. I mean, I'm representative of a small parliamentary group, and I also have another committee meeting that I'm supposed to be at. And so I had to waste a lot of time. Now, I would like to renew some criticism that's been mentioned. I mean, we have a new world order here, and I don't think it's necessarily been noted everywhere. I mean, one of the largest economies in the world, the United States, has got rid of the Green Deal. I mean, you may like it or not, but I'd like your work programme in the future to reflect that. I mean, we have many relations with the United States, and what they do has an effect on our competitiveness. So when it comes to competitiveness, I would like you to reflect the new realities in your work Program. Now I have two specific questions. One on railways. So the Baltic Railways. So talking about a rapid connection from the Baltic to through Warsaw in the EU. I mean, we don't read a great deal about that. There seem to be many delays, etc.. So could you give us some information on the actual situation of that? There seem to be problems in Latvia and what are the reasons for that, and how are you planning to solve them? Mr. Gizycka said that transport must be made fit for military transport if necessary. Military mobility the NATO east flank is important, so I would like information on that. Baltic rail and then the second project. And then the second question relates to the Balkans. I mean, we constantly read that the Chinese are investing significantly which rail projects of the European In union investing in. And if there are any, are there any difficulties? And if there are, which are they? I know I'm, I've run out of speaking time, so that'll have to be it. I'll ask other questions later on. Thank you.”
  EU support of rail transport
• “Thank you very much. Two questions. First of all, proportionality and bureaucracy. Companies are suffering because of regulation red tape. And my question is, a if with regard to the sustainability rules and parameters that are there, what are you going to provide to small companies, two companies overall to achieve that proportionality, particularly once again for SMEs, so that they can make their way through this labyrinth of rules and regulations? Uh, we've seen numerous different instances. For example, in the fisheries committee we just discussed yesterday the fact that fishers are suffering terribly because they simply cannot make their way through the red tape, through the regulations, through all that's out there, uh, for, um, sustainability and so on and so forth, what is going to be provided to these people so that they can survive under these circumstances?”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Madam President and Commissioner. Dear colleagues, it is true to say that mosquito and tick borne diseases are a big problem, particularly in developing countries. And it is true to say that they are being increasingly propagated in Europe, and particularly since temperatures are due to rise by more than 3% between now and the end of the century. However, malaria and other diseases have far more to do with poverty than any rise in temperatures, and tackling poverty is the best way of preventing diseases. Certainly there has been a consensus on that from Copenhagen, from the UN Development Programme. But the Green Deal asks exactly the opposite. It is destroying our industrial basis, which is the cornerstone of our prosperity. And the rest of the world are giving up on their commitment under the Paris Agreement to keep global warming under the two degree mark. And we are simply, silently giving up on that. Mexico's president, Claudia Sheinbaum, has extended licenses for the oil and gas industry. Brazil has followed suit. And I think all of this goes to show that none of these demands, including that to end mosquito and tick borne diseases, can be dealt with by the poor sections of the population. If we become poorer, then that won't help. And that's why we've got to put an end to the Green Deal so we can have increased prosperity and by extension, better health.”
  Climate efforts
• “Thank you. Thank you. Chair. I will speak in German. I need to really talk about what we are talking about here. We're talking about the gradual centralization of fiscal competencies towards the EU. And I wasn't too unhappy about the report from the Commission because it shows there are differences between member states. And that is not a bad thing. The ESN group does not want. Ever to see the EU having more authority over tax affairs. This belongs at national level in our view. Now obviously when it comes to the future, the world will change. Perhaps we will see changes in the future. And when it comes to reforms, reforms are being implemented. But then what happens after 2026 if all funds have been spent? Is there an effective mechanism to ensure that member States have to withdraw the reforms? Second point. How does the Commission justify that future parliaments will enforce national parliaments to do things that they have never voted on? And thirdly, when it comes to discussions about new own resources, will this not lead to an EU wide income system without an explicit mandate from voters? Is that not undemocratic? Thank you.”
  EU competences on taxation
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. I will speak in German. Uh, my name is Aiden. Gentlemen, thank you for coming to speak to us. Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues. The theme of the digital euro raises a number of questions about citizens freedom. Citizens have a right to financial self-determination. And as an ESM group, we want to ensure that this is maintained. Many of us travel around the world. We know that there are good digital payment systems. And in the hearings, I haven't been entirely convinced that we really need a digital euro. First question to the Director general, Mr. Barragan. How can you ensure that a digital euro does not lead to limitations on individual Transactions. For example, in crisis situations or if there are politically motivated measures. Second question to the to Mr. Cipollone, why so far, have we got no solid legal assurance that cash will remain in place? Slovakia and Hungary are facing infringement proceedings because they have constitutional provisions on maintaining cash. That is not fake news. That is a fact. So I am very surprised to hear the words of the Commission specialist on maintaining cash, that there is no trust in that. And Mr. Dombrovskis final question goes to you. Well, the biggest economy in the world, the USA, its president, Donald Trump, has said that the digital dollar is not coming. So why are we working so hard on this when it's not a subject for debate in the largest economy in the world.”
  Digital euro