Mary KHAN

Policy topics Mary KHAN is active on

What Mary KHAN has said (28)

• 2026-03-23 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The Commission proposal for a Return Regulation [1] provides the legal framework setting out the minimum conditions for the establishment of return hubs. Among these minimum conditions, an agreement or arrangement for return hubs may only be concluded with a third country where international human rights standards and principles in accordance with international law, including the principle of non-refoulement, are respected. The proposal is now subject to negotiations between the co-legislators, which will define the legal conditions for return hubs. The Commission takes note of the discussions among Member States on return hubs. The Commission is not involved in bilateral talks between Member States and third countries on exploring possible future agreements or arrangements on the establishment of return hubs. [1] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC, COM/2025/101 final.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2026-02-09 “E-000522/2026 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission In January 2026, the Commission presented the first five-year European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy 1 setting out three main objectives: preventing illegal migration and breaking the business model of smugglers; protecting people fleeing war and persecution, while preventing abuse of the asylum system; and attracting talent to boost the competitiveness of the EU’s economy. In addition, thanks to the reforms brought by the Pact on Migration and Asylum 2 , an assertive migration diplomacy, and effective operational cooperation within and outside the EU has led to a reduction in illegal arrivals since 2023. Notwithstanding the distribution of competences defined by the EU legal order in relation to policies and individual decisions to regularise the status of illegally staying third-country nationals, in an area without internal borders the actions of one Member State may have consequences for other Member States and on the EU as a whole. A national residence permit does not give authorisation to settle freely around the EU, but only to live and work in the Member State that issued it 3 . If a person holding a national residence permit is found to be illegally staying in another part of the EU, that person must go back to the Member State that issued it 4 . National authorities must act in a spirit of sincere cooperation for this to happen swiftly. The Commission understands that the conditions being considered for regularisation process in Spain include whether the applicant has a criminal record or poses a threat to public order or security. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0045. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52020DC0609. 3 Article 21, Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (OJ L 239, 22.09.2000, pp 19-62: EUR-Lex 42000A0922(02) - EN - EUR-Lex). 4 Article 23, Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (OJ L 239, 22.09.2000, pp. 19-62: EUR-Lex 42000A0922(02) - EN - EUR-Lex).”
  Asylum & border control · Legal migration
• 2025-10-28 “E-004227/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The European Drug Report 2025 1 points to high availability of cocaine in the EU. As announced in ProtectEU 2 , the Commission adopted an EU action plan against drug trafficking 3 and a new EU drugs strategy 4 in 2025. The strategy seeks to address the drug situation in a balanced, comprehensive approach; the action plan will promote targeted activities addressing drug trafficking routes, enhancing crime prevention and international cooperation. In 2026, the Commission will propose new rules on organised crime to dismantle criminal networks more effectively. The Commission encourages Member States to transpose as a matter of priority the 2024 asset recovery and confiscation rules should be transposed to strengthen the follow the money approach 5 . Moreover, through the European Ports Alliance and upcoming Ports Strategy, the Commission is reinforcing public-private security cooperation across all ports. Half of the EU’s most dangerous criminal networks are involved in drug trafficking 6 , which is and will remain a key threat to internal security 7 . The new action plan against drug trafficking aims to strengthen law enforcement and judicial cooperation efforts. The Commission has started negotiations to increase Eurojust operational cooperation with key third countries through cooperation agreements, notably with Latin America. There is no evidence highlighting a specific link between migration and cocaine trafficking in Europe. 1 https://www.euda.europa.eu/publications/european-drug-report/2025_en. 2 COM(2025) 148 final. 3 COM(2025) 744 final. 4 COM(2025) 743 final. 5 Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on asset recovery and confiscation, OJ L, 2024/1260, 2 May 2024. 6 Europol (2024), Decoding the EU’s most threatening criminal networks. 7 Europol (2025), EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment, https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · Regulation of drug precursors in the EU
• 2025-10-24 “E-004198/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme (CERV) 1 aims at protecting and promoting rights and values as enshrined in the Treaties, the Charter, in particular by supporting civil society organisations 2 . Under its Equality, Rights, and Gender Equality strand, CERV focuses on, inter alia, combating discrimination, racism, xenophobia and all forms of intolerance, both online and offline 3 , as well as intolerance of persons belonging to minorities, taking into account multiple discrimination 4 . CERV is implemented through multi annual programmes approved by the Programme Committee constituted by representatives of the Member States and through calls for proposals, which are public 5 . The International Network Against Cyber Hate (INACH) has been awarded a grant under the call for proposals for operating grants to framework partners active in the areas of EU values. Proposals are evaluated against pre-announced selection and award criteria by independent experts. The funding is provided in line with the Financial Regulation 6 and the principles of equal treatment and transparency. During implementation, grants are closely monitored to ensure that they are implemented according to the grant agreement. In the event of incorrect implementation or in cases of fraud, irregularities, substantial errors or serious breach of contractual obligations, including the violation of EU values as enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, the grant may be suspended, terminated or reduced and funds may be recovered. The monitoring of the implementation of the grants in which INACH is involved has not revealed any such breach. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5703/oj. 2 Ibid. Article 2(1). 3 Ibid. Article 4. 4 Ibid. Recital 14. 5 Calls are published on the Funding and Tenders portal of the Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home. 6 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast) ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.”
  EU engagement with civil society · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-10-11 “E-003993/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has taken note of the views expressed by Signal regarding the proposal for a Regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse 1 . The proposal focuses on prevention and includes provisions on detection orders as measures of last resort when prevention measures are insufficient; they are targeted only to services at risk, and to specific users or group of users, where possible, and are issued by a judicial or independent administrative authority balancing all the rights at stake and assessing their necessity and proportionality. When executing a detection order, providers are required to put in place the requisite safeguards to ensure the security and confidentiality of the communications of users. The proposal does not set requirements for specific service providers to withdraw from the EU. The proposal relies on a thorough and publicly available impact assessment 2 and strives to achieve a fair balance in the protection of all fundamental rights impacted, including the right to privacy and the rights of the child enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 3 . As is outlined in the Roadmap for lawful and effective access to data for law enforcement 4 , the Commission recognises that encryption and other cybersecurity measures play an important role in protecting information systems from espionage and disruption and securing communications, privacy and personal data. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022PC0209. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52022SC0209. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0349.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse · Privacy & law enforcement
• 2025-10-08 “E-003963/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the growing concerns regarding knife incidents in schools across various Member States. However, the collection and analysis of data regarding specific crime types, including knife attacks, fall primarily under the jurisdiction of Member States. The Commission does not maintain a centralised record of knife attacks in schools. Instead, it relies on national authorities to provide relevant statistics, which can then be collected for broader analyses. The statistical office of the European Union (Eurostat) does not have access to data on knife attacks in schools, therefore it is not possible to evaluate any trends of this crime. Eurostat collects statistics on crime and criminal justice in the Member States annually, on voluntary bases, focusing on criminal offences as set-out in the international classification of crime for statistical purposes (ICCS) 1 . Data on police-recorded offences are disseminated in the Eurostat database 2 . Knife attacks could be included under intentional homicide (ICCS code 0101) and serious assault (ICCS code 020111) 3 . Preventing violence and radicalisation among young people is a priority for the Commission. Through the EU Knowledge Hub on Prevention of Radicalisation 4 and the EU Internet Forum 5 , Member States and practitioners exchange experiences and develop guidance on preventing youth violence and addressing harmful online and offline influences that can lead to radicalisation, including in schools. These actions strengthen the capacity of teachers and youth workers to identify early signs of violence and foster inclusion, critical thinking and resilience. They complement Member States’ primary responsibility for school safety and crime prevention. 1 ICCS is available at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/iccs.html. 2 Eurostat online database: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/crim_off_cat/default/table?lang=en&category=crim.crim_off. 3 More information on crime statistics is available on Eurostat webpage: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/crime/overview. However, separate data on the number of criminal offences or number of victims of knife attacks in schools are not available. 4 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/eu-knowledge-hub-prevention-radicalisation_en. 5 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-union-internet-forum_en.”
  EU policy on criminal justice · Asylum & border control
• 2025-09-30 “E-003785/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Following discussions in the Eurogroup, where Member States expressed their wish to reach an agreement on the proposed Regulation on the digital euro 1 in a timely manner, the Danish Presidency has stated its intention to seek a general approach in the Council. The Commission is supportive of this goal. The proposed Regulation is technology-neutral and hence does not prescribe any specific technical solutions for the digital euro infrastructure. Within the framework of the Regulation, which defines the essential elements of the digital euro, the European Central Bank (ECB) is responsible for decisions on technological aspects and implementation. The ECB has recently published the outcome of its public procurement procedures for subcontractors, whose input will inform its decision-making process. Safeguarding the privacy of digital euro users remains of paramount importance. The Commission and the ECB have repeatedly underlined that the digital euro aims to provide stronger privacy protection than existing private payment instruments. In particular, the offline payments will ensure cash-like privacy, meaning that only the two parties involved in a transaction will have knowledge of it and its details, and for the online payments, when the ECB settles these payments, it will not know the identity of the users involved. The proposed Regulation sets out strict rules governing the use of personal data by payment service providers and the ECB. It explicitly stipulates that the ECB will have no access to data that can identify the individual, while payment service providers will be permitted to access personal information necessary for customer due diligence, anti-money-laundering measures, and fraud prevention. 1 COM/2023/369 final, herein referred to as the proposed Regulation.”
  Digital euro · Means of payment (cash vs digital)
• 2025-09-02 “E-003359/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1 , the Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of Union law and the validity of the Union acts. The Court of Justice’s rulings resulting from requests for preliminary rulings are binding. As guardian of the Treaties, the Commission monitors the compliance of national law and practices with the requirements laid down in Union law and the rulings of the Court of Justice. The judgment mentioned by the Honourable Members concerns the rules of the currently applicable acquis, the Asylum Procedure Directive 2 . It is important to note that under Article 61(2) of the Asylum Procedure Regulation 3 , which will replace the Asylum Procedure Directive, a third country can be designated as a safe country of origin at EU and national level with exceptions for specific parts of its territory or clearly identifiable categories of persons. Although these provisions will start applying on 12 June 2026, the Commission proposed in April 2025 to advance its application 4 . Negotiations on this proposal are currently ongoing in the European Parliament and in the Council. 1 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 47– 390. 2 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) OJ L 180, , pp. 60–95. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU; OJ L, 2024/1348, 22.5.2024. 4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the establishment of a list of safe countries of origin at Union level; COM(2025) 186 final.”
  Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts · Asylum & border control
• 2025-08-27 “E-003303/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) does not define which content is illegal – that is governed by national and, in exceptional cases, other pieces of EU law. All law in the EU and the implementation of any law in the EU must comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 1 , which guarantees the right to freedom of expression and information. The DSA does not regulate content, nor can it be used as a legal basis to censor any specific viewpoint online. Rather, it sets out clear and transparent rules for platforms to establish procedures for tackling the spread of illegal content and other societal risks, such as risks to the well-being of minors, while protecting users’ freedom of expression. The DSA mandates transparency, clear explanations for content removals, and robust appeal mechanisms. Thanks to the transparency resulting from the DSA, it can be noted that the DSA appeal mechanisms already lead to millions of pieces of content to be reinstated. It remains the sovereign right of the EU and its Member States to regulate economic activities on their territory consistent with the EU’s democratic values. The Commission has clarified the DSA and these points to the United States administration. The DSA was adopted through the EU's legislative process, with large majorities in the Council and the European Parliament. It is the Commission’s duty to fully enforce the law, which it does with full transparency, following due process subject to independent judicial scrutiny. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2016/oj/eng.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-08-22 “E-003276/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission and EU Agencies active in Greece 1 provide substantive support to Greece to manage migration. The total EU Home Affairs Funds support to Greece since 2015 is over EUR 5 billion 2 . Following the mid-term review of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) 3 and the revision of the multi-annual financial framework, Greece is benefitting from an additional EUR 103 million under AMIF to support the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum 4 , including on reception 5 . The support that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) provides to Greece is not determined by the Commission, but is agreed between Frontex and each Member State, following a request for assistance by that Member State. The Commission is aware of the rules introduced by Greece in relation to third-country nationals arriving in Greece from North Africa and is assessing the situation. The Commission holds regular exchanges with the Greek authorities and monitors all measures taken, to ensure they comply with EU and international law, including the right to seek asylum and the principle of non-refoulement. The EU has strengthened its use of diplomacy and its collective weight to leverage EU policies to support returns and readmission. Visa policy has been effective to promote cooperation in this area. The revision of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Regulation is currently under negotiation. In its proposal for the new regulation establishing Global Europe for the period 2028-2034, the Commission proposes to establish a stronger link between development and migration cooperation. 1 European Agency for Asylum (EUAA), European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and European Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). 2 This refers to financial support under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and Internal Security Fund for the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework as well as support under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Border Management and Visa Instrument and the Internal Security Fund for the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework. 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/1147 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, OJ L 251, 15.7.2021, p. 1–47. 4 Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM(2020) 609 final. 5 This support comes on top of the basic allocation of EUR 434 million for Greece under the AMIF for the 20212027 period.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-08-04 “E-003171/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not have specific statistics on the proportion of third-country nationals classified as mentally ill or not criminally responsible in cases of serious violent crime in the Member States, or information on the use of medical and psychiatric diagnoses in the context of national criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the rules on the assessment of criminal responsibility and, more specifically, on the possible interference of a mental condition, lie within the exclusive competence of the Member States.”
  Legal migration · EU policy on criminal justice
• 2025-07-29 “E-003123/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC 1 applies to legally resident third-country nationals and refugees 2 . It does not apply to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, since the harmonisation of rules relating to this category was introduced at EU level in 2004 by the Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC 3 , which has since been repealed and replaced by the Recast Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU 4 . Although the Recast Qualification Directive contains provisions on accompanying family members, it does not cover family reunification of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. Therefore, EU law does not establish harmonised rules for the family reunification of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, which remains a competence of Member States. The Commission is currently not planning to revise the Family Reunification Directive. The Commission is focused on monitoring the implementation of the Directive, including through a comprehensive study being done within the framework of the European Migration Network. The Commission cannot predict what may happen to third-country nationals who are applying for family reunification in Germany and invoke Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The EU is not party to the Convention and it is for Member States to manage those requests in light of the applicable national, European and international obligations. 1 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251, 3.10.2003, p. 12, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/86/oj. 2 ‘Refugee’ as defined in Article 2(b) of ‘the Family Reunification Directive’. 3 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on the minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection. 4 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast) (OJ L 337, 20.12.2011, pp. 9), which will be replaced, as of 12 June 2026, by Regulation (EU) 2024/1347 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted, amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC and repealing Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L, 2024/1347, 22.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1347/oj).”
  Legal migration · Asylum & border control
• 2025-07-11 “E-002845/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The right to gather peacefully is a fundamental right enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and must be protected and upheld at all times. The Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, monitors the application of the Charter and related EU laws, strengthens its dialogue with Member States and launches infringements as appropriate where there is a breach of EU law. In July 2022, the Commission referred Hungary to the Court of Justice of the EU over national rules that discriminate against people based on sexual orientation and gender identity 1 . The Commission considered that those rules violate single market rules and the fundamental rights of individuals, in particular of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) people, as well as the common values at the core of the EU 2 . The case is still pending before the Court of Justice. A hearing in this case took place on 19 November 2024 and the Advocate General issued her opinion on 5 June 2025. The Commission is committed to achieving a Union of Equality, including for LGBTIQ people as outlined in the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 3 . As announced in the 2025 Commission Work Programme 4 , the Commission will present a renewed LGBTIQ Equality Strategy in 2025. The Commission firmly believes that children’s rights and LGBTIQ rights are not mutually exclusive. The preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights reaffirms that the EU is founded on indivisible and universal values, which means that no fundamental right can be more important than the others, and that the fundamental rights contained therein are rooted in international obligations shared by all Member States. Any limitation on these rights must meet the conditions set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter, including respect for the principle of proportionality. 1 C-769/22, Commission v Hungary, Valeurs de l’Union. 2 Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. 3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025, 12 November 2020, COM(2020) 698 final. 4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Commission work programme 2025, 11 February 2025, COM(2025) 45 final.”
  Rule of law in Hungary · LGBTIQ+ · EU competences on human rights
• 2025-06-24 “E-002528/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is taking a range of measures to strengthen the protection of the EU's external borders. These include supporting Member States through the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), which is equipped to provide operational assistance, deploy rapid border interventions, and enhance surveillance capabilities. The Commission also continues to work on implementing the Pact on Migration and Asylum 1 , which aims to improve the management of migration flows and ensure effective external border control, in full compliance with fundamental rights. The Commission acknowledges the importance of distinguishing between legal and irregular migration to uphold the integrity of the Schengen system and security in Europe. EU migration and asylum law, as well as the Schengen acquis provide a comprehensive framework for this distinction, corroborated by the Pact on Migration and Asylum. Regarding internal border controls, the Commission recognises the challenges posed by security threats and unauthorised secondary movements. The Schengen Borders Code 2 allows for temporary internal border controls in exceptional circumstances, and the Commission is assessing the proportionality and necessity of such measures on a case-by-case basis. The principle of free movement within the Schengen area remains a cornerstone of the EU, and the Commission is committed to addressing security threats and irregular migration flows to reduce the need for internal border controls. 1 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en. 2 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, 23.3.2016.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-06-11 “E-002343/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Family Reunification Directive 1 , under Article 4, allows reunification with the sponsor’s spouse and minor children, including minor or adopted children of the sponsor or their spouse for who they have custody. Recital 11 of the Family Reunification Directive emphasises that the right to family reunification should be exercised in proper compliance with the values and principles recognised by Members States, including by taking restrictive measures against applications for family reunification of polygamous households. The Directive respects national legislations preventing polygamy. In that regard, the Family Reunification Directive explicitly states in Article 4(4) that Member States shall not authorise family reunification in the event of a polygamous marriage, where the sponsor already has a spouse living with him in the territory. According to the information available to the Commission, Austria and Germany transposed this provision correctly. Moreover, the Directive also provides that Member State may limit the family reunification of minor children of a further spouse. As clarified by Recital 10, it is up to the Member State to decide whether to authorise the family reunification with the minor children of the sponsor and a further spouse. 1 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251, 3.10.2003, p. 12–18.”
  Legal migration · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2025-06-04 “E-002246/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Member States may restrict the free movement rights of EU citizens, including the right of their own nationals to travel to another Member State, on grounds of public policy or public security. When adopting a restriction, Member States must comply with the requirements and procedural safeguards set out in Directive 2004/38/EC. In particular, restrictive measures may be taken only on a case-by-case basis where the personal conduct of an individual represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of the society of the Member State. Decisions must be proportionate and based on an individual assessment. The person concerned must have access to judicial and, where appropriate, administrative redress procedures in the Member State to appeal against or seek review of the decision. This means that an EU citizen wishing to challenge such a restriction can do so by making use of the means of redress available at national level. The Commission cannot engage in investigations into establishing the factual situation on the ground, as it lacks the legal powers – and means – to do so. Nor does it have powers of review of individual implementing measures taken by national authorities. Finally, while the Commission ensures and monitors the compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights 1 of measures falling under EU competence, it remains the competence of national authorities to investigate, prosecute, and try, in accordance with applicable national legislation, individual cases of alleged violations of the rights under the Charter in national implementing measures. 1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391–407.”
  Asylum & border control · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-05-27 “E-002121/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission On 16 April 2025, the Commission proposed 1 a first EU list of safe countries of origin. The proposal will support a more uniform application of the concept of safe countries of origin, while helping Member States to process asylum applications faster and more efficiently for applicants whose claims are likely to be unfounded. Under Article 61(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 2 , the assessment of whether a third country is a safe country of origin must be based on a range of relevant and available sources of information, including information from Member States, the EU Asylum Agency, the European External Action Service, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and other relevant international organisations, and must take into account where available the common analysis of the country of origin information referred to in Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2303 3 . In accordance with these rules, the Commission consulted the entities mentioned above when preparing its proposal. 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the establishment of a list of safe countries of origin at Union level; COM(2025) 186 final. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU; OJ L, 2024/1348, 22.5.2024. 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/2303 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2021 on the European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010, OJ L 468, 30.12.2021, p. 1– 54.”
  Asylum & border control · Regulation of NGOs in Europe
• 2025-05-27 “E-002110/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully committed to upholding democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Member States and is monitoring developments at national level, including through the annual Rule of Law Reports 1 . The Commission, however, does not have a general power to examine how an individual case relating to the functioning of a national political party is addressed by a Member State. It is for national competent authorities and courts to ensure compliance with relevant national and EU law. Under the EU Treaties, Member States also remain responsible for safeguarding their national security. Their intelligence services collect and analyse information on threats related to national security in accordance with national law. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rulelaw/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle_en.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-03-25 “P-001246/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Member States have not applied for EU funding for physical barriers for the purpose of securing the EU external borders under the Instrument for Border Management and Visa Policy (BMVI) in the 2021-2027 programming period 1 . The BMVI contributes, among others, to the specific objective of supporting effective European integrated border management at the external borders by facilitating legitimate border crossings, preventing and detecting illegal immigration and cross-border crime and effectively managing migratory flows. The BMVI funds actions to improve border controls and border surveillance capabilities, including border surveillance systems and equipment, information technology systems, mobile and stationary units as well as the maintenance of equipment 2 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy, OJ L 251, 15.7.2021, p. 48–93, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1148/oj. 2 Information on funding to the Member States for border management at the EU’s external borders is available in the Commission webpage: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/funding_en.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-02-05 “E-000536/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission provides statistics through Eurostat, including on migration 1 and crime 2 , in accordance with the applicable Regulations and does not collect data as referred to in the Honourable Member’s question. Eurostat focuses on criminal offences as set out in the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes. 2. Research 3 has revealed different aspects that do not allow for the assumption of a causal link between migration and crime 4 . Taking only a single factor into account creates a biased image 5 and would be misleading. 3. The Pact on Migration and Asylum was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in May 2024 6 . It provides for new tools to monitor the implementation of the Common European Asylum System, including a dedicated monitoring by the European Union Asylum Agency. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/migration-asylum 2 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/crime 3 Research for example from the public research institute ‘Institut Convergences Migrations (IC Migrations)’ https://www.icmigrations.cnrs.fr/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/4_Fiche-insecurite_V3.pdf and http://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=982. Several media shared that research in the past years, for instance: https://www.tf1info.fr/politique/presidentielle-2022-peut-on-dresser-un-lien-direct-entreimmigration-et-delinquance-comme-le-fait-valerie-pecresse-2201402.html; https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2023/04/21/immigration-les-etrangers-pas-plus-delinquants-que-lesautres-selon-une-etude_6170487_3224.html; https://factuel.afp.com/doc.afp.com.34QB9EL 4 For example, many condemnations are for misdemeanours and some misdemeanours are specific to foreigners when it is about the policing of regular stay in the EU and cannot therefore be representative of a comparison between nationals and foreigners. 5 Recent analysis by the ifo Institute has shown that ‘More foreigners do not increase Germany’s crime rate’ (press release of 18 February 2025 at https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2025-02-18/more-foreigners-do-notincrease-germanys-crime-rate). Media coverage includes the article ‘Study: Immigration has not raised German crime rate’ published by DW on 20 February 2025 at https://www.dw.com/en/study-finds-immigration-has-notraised-german-crime-rate/a-71691228 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1351/oj/eng”
  Asylum & border control · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2024-12-12 “E-002901/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission As indicated by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Report quoted by the Honourable Member, in 2024 irregular border crossings into the EU have significantly decreased, with a 38% reduction compared to 2023. In the framework of the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling 1 , the Commission is working to fight organised criminal groups responsible for migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings to the EU. The implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum 2 and enhanced international cooperation on migration will also contribute managing irregular migration and reducing the incentive for migrants to embark in dangerous journeys. There is no recent assessment on the fiscal impact of irregular migration on the EU. No such study is currently planned to be carried out. Available studies assessing the fiscal balance in relation to asylum seekers and refugees are specific to the context and the country and show mixed results. 1 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/irregular-migration-and-return/internationalconference-global-alliance-counter-migrant-smuggling_en- European Commission 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en”
  Asylum & border control
• “In a strong Europe. In a changing world. That's the motto of the Danish EU presidency. A strong Europe for me, that's a Europe of fatherland based on security and tradition. Not open borders or a foreign ideology. But it's no chance that Denmark has taken its special path on migration. It's not part of the Common European Asylum system. And so Denmark has wiggle room that we in Germany can only dream of. Copenhagen can defend its borders, can carry out returns and negotiate asylum centers in third countries. Germany has lost control of its borders. It has rising crime and frustration among the indigenous population. That's the result of open borders. Migration is not a question of destiny. It's a matter of political will. Germany should leave the Common European asylum system, and perhaps in your time, you could tell Friedrich Mertz.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you very much Mister Brunner. The original proposal had this had an had trust in the European institutions which has been upset completely because before there was going to be monitoring of four hundred and forty million people in all the way through to their private communications which really was a slap in the face to all fundamental rights and we're not talking about targeted investigations into presumed suspects we're talking about mass scanning of of messages and pictures and videos using messenger for controlling the the content before we've actually put proper provisions in place. It's a reversal of the burden of proof and this is a failure also because there's pressure there's public pressure as well and we need to have a lot of technical experts involved and today we're also hearing about this about child protection. I'm a mother as well so this is very close to my heart but what we're doing we're creating infrastructure that can then be extended even further and that's the point because anything that we create now can be used for other purposes in the future perhaps we're talking about fake news or we're talking about monitoring sub infrastructure. No one is disputing the fact that child sexual abuse is one of the worst possible crimes but monitoring the private communications of millions of people does not solve that problem. That problem gets solved either at member state level or by investing more resources in prosecution rather than placing all citizens under general surveillance. An article thirty five allows this to be used up to six percent of the global turnover and this is we're talking about encrypted messages that can be can be seen with this scanning. I hope that you understand what I mean on this on this point how is the Commission going to prevent these being misused or AI technology being used by these technological operators? So that's my first question and then I want to agree with my colleague Ms Zippel a person's reputation can be left in tatters when we have this these AI systems producing fake news about individuals and that can lead to the locking of of of the innocence accounts as well. Who's responsible for all of that ultimately who someone who gets a reputation like this or has had a a house search they they're no longer able to operate in society so who is responsible in instances like that?”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• “Thank you very much chair commissioner Brunner. Uncontrolled mass migration has been the biggest challenge that we faced in our time and clearly a long term effective strategy on bringing it to an end is long overdue. We have to say this again and again and what we see with the asylum and migration pact that when it comes to having centers outside of Europe we're not even talking about that anymore but we know that every that this is still a problem. Also returns are only in the draft phase in the regulation and it's only mentioned as an option. So this is where my first question comes in. Why have you rejected this idea of having processing centers outside of the EU and especially on the deadly Mediterranean route? Why has that not found its rightful place in your strategy? And instead of talking about this what we're calling the solidarity mechanism which is going to be distributed by force across the EU, the commission seems to be only acting against the member states and to also deny and and what are we doing about countries that refuse to take their citizens back? It's development assistance that is being paid more and more to these countries which are not prepared to find a compromise or to cooperate when it comes to taking seriously their responsibilities. Here we're talking about trade sanctions because that could have a major role to play. You did mention that and we will take a very we'll keep a very close eye on that until you make statements about how that is being put into practice. But this is my second question and once again this is a question about the solidarity mechanism. Why are we looking at countries like Germany which are only temporarily taken out of the solidarity mechanism despite the fact that the burden has been excessively disproportionate for a long time? Thank you.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Anti-discrimination here and there. We don't have proper arguments don't carry. That word is used not to solve problems, but to have to deflect criticism and to drive through political projects. And that is how this so-called anti-discrimination directive works with the protection of people with disabilities. That's what we're talking about. But actually it intervenes into things which actually fall to the member states, um, social, uh, matters, uh, housing, etc. and the, um, to give you an example of this, an honorable, uh, sports club has a separate, uh, changing rooms because of the private sphere and protection. And this rule can be legally challengeable if somebody has access to the women's changing rooms because they think they're a woman and they feel themselves, uh, affected by discrimination. And they can appeal not because of improper conduct, because of political legal terms. This directive goes beyond the protection of people with disabilities. Far beyond it is being used to drive social ideas when it comes to sexual identity and ways of life, which will be binding throughout the EU. Past democratic majorities. At the same time, real problems are driven out. Attacks to schools are allowed because they're German. If some experiences don't have any place in the term of anti-discrimination, we're not talking about equality. And speaker is cut off.”
  EU policy on disability inclusion & accessibility
• “Thank you very much Missus Gregory. Well first of all thank you for the report on asylum because unfortunately it's showing that there it's still a huge amount of migratory pressure with no brakes being put on. I mean since twenty fifteen millions of people have arrived last year another million and I think that this really shows the powerlessness of the Union. More than half of these people are not entitled to protect protection around eighty percent of the people who are not entitled remain in the EU. So I think the problem is clear to everyone anyone who sets foot on European soil remains there and the asylum and migration pact will change nothing there. I'd like to focus on the massive breach of the Dublin regulation and I can clarify that with a specific case from Germany to show exactly how much of a failure the policy is. Mohammed A from Iraq made a number of asylum requests in Lithuania in twenty twenty one which were all rejected. In twenty twenty two he moved further to Germany. According to the Dublin regulation he should have been sent back to Lithuania instead he stayed. He launched appeals there were the bureaucratic failings and as a result he stayed in Germany for years until in summer twenty twenty five he killed a sixteen year old girl Liliana Kaye. So my question is how can you ensure that the Dublin regulation will actually be implemented in future and rejected asylum seekers should not hang around in Germany for years even though other EU member states should have competence over their cases. Second question how can you explain well this is from the report seventy nine thousand accepted Dublin relocation requests well only seventeen percent of those were ever actually carried out.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Unfortunately, Mr. von der Leyen has left the room. But we should never forget that in the midst of the corona crisis, she came up with her first proposal for EU chat controls, which is a massive interference in the private lives of European citizens. At the time, the social media gave people the chance to express their views, um, that were kind of outside the imposed orthodoxy of of the public media. But of course, this freedom of expression is a thorn in the eye of the EU Digital Services Act, the Digital Euros. They are all part of the agenda to stifle freedom in Europe And now, as well as the green transition, they're talking about the digital transition on the pretext of protecting citizens. They are actually monitoring and surveilling all of our activities online and censoring, uh, social media platforms. Nearly half of people in Germany no longer dare to freely express their views. And this is the result of your policy. We don't want surveillance of the internet. We don't want to be nannied online. We want freedom. And you'll only get that with the AfD.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Thank you very much. Rapporteur for my group supported this report as well. But first, personally, this is a much deeper problem, especially in Germany, in our society because there there are doctors games in kindergartens play in Berlin where strange men are invited to come and cuddle with children, young people who are encouraged to believe they are living in the wrong body, subject to medical interventions under the name of tolerance and diversity and progress. Let me be clear. This is not progress. This is an attack on the innocence of our children and the values that keep our societies together. Many countries in Europe, in Germany, especially children, are faced with sexualized content even before they reach sexual maturity. They can't understand these these, uh, brochures, these left wing NGO attempts to educate people. They pervert the natural development of our children and shift and blur the borders of normality. These are all things that the CDU in Germany are supporting as well. But abuse starts a long time before a pornography and internet. It starts where your party, friends and support organizations incite children. We cannot allow that our children become victims of sick ideologies in a world without God, without family, without values in this world. Everything is possible. Everything is allowed, and we reject this out of hand. Children need support, love and borders and don't need to be sexualized too early on.”
  Role of education (social change vs. tradition)