Erik KALIŇÁK

Policy topics Erik KALIŇÁK is active on

What Erik KALIŇÁK has said (56)

• 2026-07-07 “(09:40:44 - 09:41:49): Well, we've been speaking now for an hour about measures to deal with the automotive industry, which has always been a flagship industry for Europe. Stellantis has closed plants in various places, including Eisenach. Audi has closed its plants in Brussels, Volkswagen for the 1st time in its history is talking about closing 4 plants and cutting a 100,000 jobs. That's the result of European manufacturing losing its competitiveness. And that's why we're paying twice as much here for energy as in The US. That's the ideological pressure that's being exerted through the green transition, and that's why our cheap energy has now been lost. Now we're talking about spending millions for observatories and subsidies for batteries and”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2026-03-25 “Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission 27.5.2026 Written question The Commission is committed to upholding children’s and women’s rights within the framework of its competences. The exploitation of surrogacy is included as a form of exploitation in the Anti-Trafficking Directive [1] . The directive targets those who coerce or deceive women into acting as surrogate mothers, without prejudice to national rules on surrogacy, including criminal and family law. Substantive family law, including rules on surrogacy, falls within the competence of the Member States. Each Member State thus decides its policy and legal position as regards surrogacy. However, the EU has competence under Article 81(3) TFEU to adopt measures of family law with cross-border implications. It is on this basis that the Commission adopted the proposal on the recognition of parenthood between Member States [2] . Given that, under international law [3] and EU law (including the Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights ) , all children without distinction have the same rights, the Commission proposal covers the recognition of parenthood established in a Member State irrespective of how the child was conceived or born and irrespective of the child’s type of family. Under the control of the Court of Justice and within the limits of the Court’s case law, Member States can invoke public policy to refuse the recognition of parenthood. The recognition of parenthood established in a third country will continue to be governed by national law. However, in applying their national law on the recognition of parenthood, Member States must respect their human rights obligations under international law, in particular the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on the recognition of the parenthood of children born abroad through surrogacy. [1] Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/36/oj/eng), amended by Directive (EU) 2024/1712 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1712/oj/eng). [2] COM(2022) 695 final. [3] I n particular, the UN Convention on the Rights of children and the European Convention of Human Rights.”
  Regulation of surrogate pregnancy · EU and national cultural identities · EU competences on human rights
• 2026-03-25 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 12.5.2026 Written question The Emissions Trading System (ETS) has reduced greenhouse gas emissions from power and industry by 50% compared to 2005 [1] , contributing to substantial health benefits from improved air quality [2] . The revision scheduled for July 2026 will determine the cost-effective emission reductions for 2031-2040, in line with the economy-wide 2040 emission reduction target. ETS2 is scheduled to become fully operational in 2028. Its trajectory is set to bring emissions down by 42% by 2030 compared to 2005, complementing other EU and national policies to decarbonise buildings and road transport. The environmental and economic impacts were assessed in the impact assessment [3] . More than three quarter of ETS auction revenue goes to national budgets and must be used for clean energy, decarbonisation and just transition activities. The Commission closely monitors this spending to ensure revenues are effectively and swiftly allocated. The remaining revenue is invested through EU-level instruments in industrial innovation, energy modernisation, energy security and — in particular from future ETS2 revenue — through the Social Climate Fund. An overview can be consulted on the Commission website [4] . The Social Climate Fund, mobilising at least EUR 86.7 billion, is available to Member States to reduce energy and transport poverty through investments to reduce households’ vulnerability to increasingly volatile imported fossil energy prices and providing direct income support to mitigate short-term impacts of ETS2. Member States must also use national ETS2 revenues to fund climate action and support households through the transition. S trong safeguards are in place to ensure a smooth start to ETS2 with stable prices and support vulnerable households. [1] 2025 Carbon Market Report: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/news-other-reads/news/2025-carbon-market-report-eu-ets-lowers-power-sector-emissions-and-expands-maritime-transport-2025-12-03_en. [2] https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2319908121. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0601. [4] https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/carbon-markets/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/how-do-member-states-use-ets-revenues_en.”
  Energy (green transition) · Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme · Air quality policy
• 2026-03-10 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 7.5.2026 Written question The Commission expects all partners, including candidate countries, to act in line with the principles of the UN Charter and to communicate responsibly. In this sense, the Commission underlines that any suggestion of the use of force against Member States or their political leaders is incompatible with the principles of the UN Charter. The EU’s partnership with Ukraine is based on shared commitments to international law and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Commission will maintain close cooperation and trust with all Member States. At the same time, the Commission recalls that the EU remains committed to supporting Ukraine, in the face of Russia’s war of aggression, which is a clear violation of international law and of the UN Charter, and European values such as peace, respect for sovereignty and the rule of law. In addition, Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of Ukraine gravely undermines European and global security.”
  EU enlargement · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-02-26 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question Ukraine has successfully repaired and reopened on 23 April 2026 the Druzhba oil pipeline which was previously damaged by Russia’s attacks. Ukraine has therefore restored the flow of crude oil to Hungary and Slovakia. The EU’s priority is to ensure energy security for all European citizens. That’s why the Commission engaged in intense discussions with Member States and Ukraine at all levels to help restore the flow of oil to Hungary and Slovakia [1] . The EU also played a role by offering Ukraine technical support and funding. The EU will also continue to work on alternative routes for the transit of non-Russian crude oil to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_26_624.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2026-02-24 “E-000757/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU remains committed to supporting Ukraine in the face of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, while also maintaining close cooperation and trust with all Member States. In this context, it is important to distinguish clearly between official positions of the Ukrainian government and statements made by individual commentators or former military personnel. The Commission underlines that any suggestion of the use of force against the territorial integrity of Member States is incompatible with the principles of the UN Charter. The EU has seen no indication that the Government of Ukraine supports such views. On the contrary, the EU’s partnership with Ukraine is based on shared commitments to international law and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU remains attentive to developments in the regional energy situation caused by Russia’s attacks on civilian infrastructure. The EU’s response has been further intensified, including efforts to enhance the resilience and recovery of Ukraine’s energy system. In addition to largescale infrastructure support, the EU is focusing on assisting the most vulnerable regions and cities. Part of the 2026 winter support package under the Ukraine Facility will be implemented through the Ukraine Energy Support Fund and will focus on the physical protection of energy infrastructure as well as urgent repairs.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2026-02-11 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The Commission recalls that the European Council has repeatedly stressed the imperative of enlargement as a strategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity. Preparing for enlargement and taking on the obligations of EU membership remains based on the own merits’ principle. The legal basis for the accession of new Member States to the EU is Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). Article 49 TEU provides that any European state which respects the values referred to in Article 2 TEU and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the EU. The conditions of admission of a new Member State to the EU and the adjustments of the EU Treaties, which such admission entails are subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant state, which is then submitted for ratification by all Member States and the acceding state in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Thus, Member States possess ample means to protect their interests in the accession process.”
  EU enlargement · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-02-09 “E-000528/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission rejects the unsubstantiated and unfounded claims made by the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in its report of 3 February 2026. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 empowers users of online platforms to appeal removals, receive explanations and seek redress where their content is removed or restricted by platforms. This protects users’ freedom of expression. For example, between April 2024 and June 2025, Meta reversed almost one third 2 of 68 million contested content moderation decisions on Facebook and Instagram. Users can also appeal platform decisions through outof-court dispute settlement. In early 2025, they overturned 52% of decisions out of the more than 1 800 complaints 3 submitted. The DSA does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined by national law or other EU laws. The Commission does not have the competence to mandate the removal of lawful content and has no role in individual moderation decisions. These decisions lie with platforms themselves, according to their own terms and conditions. However, the DSA obliges platforms to specify the reasons for restriction or removal of content and mitigate systemic risks. When online platforms fail to meet these transparency and accountability obligations, the Commission acts. In April 2024, the Commission opened an investigation into Meta for suspected demotion of political content through their recommender systems 4 . In October 2025, the Commission preliminarily found Meta failed to provide adequate reporting tools for illegal content or effective appeals mechanisms 5 . The President of the Commission and the Commission are fully focused on keeping Europe independent, secure and competitive, including in technical matters. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-impact-platforms#ecl-inpage-greater-transparency-incontent-moderation-and-more-options-to-appeal. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-contentmoderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373. 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-preliminarily-finds-tiktok-and-meta-breach-theirtransparency-obligations-under-digital.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-02-09 “E-000527/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission firmly rejects the report’s unfounded and unsubstantiated allegations, including those concerning Slovakia’s 2023 elections. Freedom of expression is a cornerstone of the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 . It helps protect this freedom by entitling users to explanations, appeals and redress when their content is removed or restricted by platforms. The DSA does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined purely by national law or other EU laws. The Commission does not have the competence to mandate the removal of specific items of lawful content; moderation decisions lie with platforms themselves. Since its application, 30% of appealed moderation decisions 2 have been reversed, proving users have real recourse mechanisms. No other law matches the DSA’s protections against arbitrary platform moderation or its demand for accountability on how platforms operate. TikTok’s alleged content removals must therefore stem from its own policies. The DSA ensures accountability and transparency through annual transparency reports, where platforms must justify restriction or removal of content (e.g., under legal provisions or terms of service). Compliance is annually checked by an external audit. The DSA also requires very large online platforms to assess systemic risks to civic discourse and elections, while considering the exercise of fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of expression and information 3 . Engaging with platforms to ask how their systems and practices operate across different jurisdictions is a normal and necessary part of regulatory oversight. Interpreting such exchanges as a wish to influence political debate or pressure platforms misrepresents the nature of regulatory dialogue. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-contentmoderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. 3 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng.”
  EU political integration · LGBTIQ+ · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-01-26 “E-000290/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The President of the US has communicated the interest in obtaining control over Greenland via social messages and other public statements. It has been made abundantly clear by the Government of Greenland and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark that the future of Greenland is to be decided by them. The EU has stated its unequivocal support to the Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland. It has called for respect of international law, territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark in various instances and notably through a Joint Statement of the President of the Council and the President of the Commission on 17 January 2026 1 . This message was clearly reiterated by the High Representative/Vice-President (HRVP) in front of the European Parliament in its plenary session on 22 January 2026 2 . The HRVP welcomed the fact that a diplomatic track had been opened between Denmark, Greenland and the US. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/01/17/joint-statement-by-president-costa-andby-president-von-der-leyen-on-greenland/. 2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/vod.html?mode=unit&vodLanguage=EN&internalEPId=2017056456 363&providerMeetingId=20260120-0900-PLENARY#.”
  EU foreign policy approach · EU-US relations
• 2026-01-26 “E-000288/2026 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission As already set out in the replies to written questions P-004175/2025 1 , E-004108/2025 2 , E004040/2025 3 and E-004172/2025 4 , the Commission is firmly committed both to protecting children and to safeguarding the fundamental rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, nonbinary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) people. These objectives are not mutually exclusive and must be pursued together, in full respect of the Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 5 (the Charter). Article 24 of the Charter provides that children have the right to express their views freely in all matters concerning them, and that those views must be taken into account in accordance with their age and maturity 6 . This provision does not affect national rules on legal capacity, nor does it predetermine specific procedural models for legal gender recognition. Rather, it requires – where the Charter is applicable pursuant to its Article 51(1), i.e. to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law - that, in any process affecting a child, the child’s best interests are a primary consideration and that their voice is duly heard and assessed appropriately, in line with the principle of evolving capacities 7 , which recognises that children’s ability to make decisions grows with age and maturity. The Commission fully respects Member States’ competences in determining the conditions and procedures for legal gender recognition, while encouraging them to ensure that such frameworks respect the child’s right to be heard and that any limitations are proportionate to the child’s best interests. The LGBTIQ+ equality strategy 2026–2030 8 aims to ensure equal treatment and protection from discrimination for all persons, including children, in line with EU law. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-004175-ASW_EN.html. 2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-004108_EN.html. 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-004040_EN.html. 4 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-004172_EN.html. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 6 In line with article 12 of the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child. 7 Article 5 of the UNCRC, to which all Members States are party. 8 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/b4952371-4308-47ad-b99502c539b75dda_en?filename=JUST_template_comingsoon_standard.pdf.”
  LGBTIQ+ · Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2026-01-26 “E-000287/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission International law and the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter must be upheld under all circumstances. Members of the UN Security Council have a particular responsibility to uphold these principles. This message was underscored in the 4 January 2026 statement 1 by the High Representative/Vice-President supported by 26 Member States, as well as by President of the European Council and President of the Commission in their public reactions to the US intervention in Venezuela. The EU has repeatedly stated 2 that Nicolás Maduro lacks the legitimacy of a democratically elected president and has advocated for a Venezuelan-led peaceful transition to democracy in the country, respectful of its sovereignty. The right of the Venezuelan people to determine their future must be respected. The Commission is in close contact with the US, as well as regional and international partners to support and facilitate dialogue with all parties involved, leading to a negotiated, democratic, inclusive and peaceful solution to the crisis, led by Venezuelans. Similarly, the EU remains ready to continue engaging constructively with the US on creating the conditions for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. The EU will continue to uphold the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders together with other fundamental tenets of international law. These principles are essential for Europe and for the international community as a whole and will continue to guide the EU action. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/venezuela-statement-high-representative-aftermath-us-interventionvenezuela_en. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/venezuela/.”
  EU foreign policy approach · EU-US relations · EU-Venezuela relations
• 2025-10-15 “E-004041/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Commission combats all forms of violence and discrimination targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) people. As announced in the Political Guidelines 1 and in the 2025 Commission Work Programme 2 , the Commission adopted a new LGBTIQ+ equality strategy 2026-2030 on 8 October 2025. The online knowledge hub mentioned in this strategy refers to a commitment set out in the Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online+ (‘Code of conduct+’) 3 . The Code of conduct+, which has been integrated into the framework of the Digital Services Act 4 , contains a set of commitments voluntarily agreed by the signatory online platform providers. These include: ‘a shared online knowledge hub facilitated by the Commission and with adequate safeguards to protect information, gathering jurisprudence and legal resources useful to assess the legality of alleged illegal hate speech, and/or past reports under the Code’. The knowledge hub as defined above is a collection of resources, unrelated to any content moderation actions or surveillance. The implementation of the Code of conduct+ by the signatory online platform providers is fully in line with the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in particular the right to freedom of expression, as especially noted in the Preamble of the Code of conduct+. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/7617998c-86e6-4a74-b33c249e8a7938cd_en?filename=COM_2025_45_1_annexes_EN.pdf. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/111777. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_300.”
  EU competences on human rights · LGBTIQ+
• 2025-10-15 “E-004040/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission Equality and non-discrimination are founding values and fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 1 and the European Pillar of Social Rights. The Commission firmly believes there is no contradiction between protecting the fundamental rights of children and those of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) people and remains fully committed to equality and non-discrimination. The new LGBTIQ+ equality strategy 2 is about ensuring that all people, including LGBTIQ+ people, are treated equally and not discriminated against in the EU. It builds on the current Strategy 3 which has been in place since 2020. The Commission fully respects the competences of Member States, and it is for Member States to determine the conditions under which legal gender recognition is granted. The protection and promotion of the rights of the child is a core EU objective. Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in line with Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which sets out the EU’s objective to protect the rights of the child, affirms that the children’s best interests must be a primary consideration in all actions relating to them, and affirms their right to express their views freely, with those views to be taken into account on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity. While substantive family law issues remain under the competence of Member States, national authorities, under the supervision of the courts, must ensure that their obligations regarding fundamental rights and children’s rights arising from national legislation, EU Treaties and international agreements, are fully respected. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/b4952371-4308-47ad-b99502c539b75dda_en?filename=JUST_template_comingsoon_standard.pdf. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5100c375-87e8-40e3-85b51adc5f556d6d_en?filename=lgbtiq_strategy_2020-2025_en.pdf.”
  LGBTIQ+ · Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2025-10-01 “E-003820/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission It is not clear to which Commission report the Honourable Member is referring in connection with the implementation of the rules on roadworthiness testing, in particular Directive 2014/45/EU 1 . Such a report was adopted by the Commission in 2020 2 , but it did not identify substantial non-compliance issues relating to the mandatory defect categories (minor, major and dangerous) already defined in Article 7 of that Directive. The Commission would also note that the reference COM(2021)137 refers to a Commission proposal for a Council recommendation on a different subject 3 . Since, in accordance with Article 4(2) of Directive 2014/45/EU, roadworthiness tests must be carried out by the Member State of registration of the vehicle, it is also unclear which situations are intended to be covered by the reference to cross-border inspections. In particular, there is currently no obligation on the Member State of registration to recognise the results of a technical inspection carried out in another Member State (on a voluntary basis). Finally, the Commission would emphasise that Directive 2014/45/EU already requires inspectors to receive adequate training, and the Commission has only proposed minor adjustments to this obligation in order to take account of technological developments. 1 Directive 2014/45/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on periodic roadworthiness tests for motor vehicles and their trailers and repealing Directive 2009/40/EC. ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/45/2023-05-20. 2 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the implementation of Directive 2014/45/EU on periodic roadworthiness tests for motor vehicles and their trailers repealing Directive 2009/40/EC, COM/2020/699 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0699. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0137.”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• 2025-10-01 “E-003817/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission Experts from Member States, as well as other stakeholders, were consulted as part of the preparatory work undertaken before the Commission adopted its proposals to revise the Roadworthiness Package. In light of this, the Commission saw no legal reasons to change the form of the legislation in question from directives to regulations. It would also note that in accordance with Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, directives are binding upon Member States as regards the results to be achieved. The proposals are currently under consideration by the co-legislators. The Commission cannot predict when the final agreed texts by the co-legislators will enter into force. In these circumstances, there are no plans to carry out any further Impact Assessment on the proposed revisions.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2025-10-01 “E-003819/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission On 24 April 2025, the Commission made a proposal to amend Directive 2014/45/EU 1 . It proposed to amend Annex I of the Directive on the minimum requirements concerning the contents and recommended methods of testing, notably to include new test items relevant for battery electric and hybrid vehicles (section 4.14 on high-voltage systems), among others. The Commission has no plans to use EU funds to equip vehicle testing stations for electric vehicle inspections, the organisation of which remains a prerogative of the Member States. The Commission does not consider that specific measures are necessary to ensure the mutual recognition of electric vehicle inspections but is of the view that the general requirements are sufficient. It is not clear what ‘reliability tests’ refer to in the question. 1 Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2014/45/EU on periodic roadworthiness tests for motor vehicles and their trailers and Directive 2014/47/EU on the technical roadside inspection of the roadworthiness of commercial vehicles circulating in the Union, COM/2025/180 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0180.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2025-10-01 “E-003816/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission If the Commission receives information that indicates the existence of an infringement of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position, it can take action to put an end to such an abuse in accordance with its standard procedures. The Commission does not possess information pointing to practices to that effect in relation to the technical inspection sector. As a general matter, the Commission sees the Single Market as critical for competitiveness and vital to deliver on the actions in the Competitiveness Compass. In this context, removing remaining barriers and expanding the Single Market enhances market access, not least for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), such as of small technical inspection companies. In this respect, on 21 May 2025, the Commission adopted the Single Market Strategy, for making the Single Market simple, seamless and strong 1 . Further, State aid rules provide many possibilities to support SMEs, in particular when they envisage cross-border expansion. On the basis of the State aid General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER), Member States can implement aid schemes without prior notification and approval by the Commission. Under the GBER, aid can be awarded to SMEs for instance to support their training actions, the use of consultancy or innovation services and their participation in fairs 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1274.”
  EU antitrust & merger enforcement: strict vs scale · EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2025-10-01 “E-003818/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member that it has no intention of making the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) compulsory in technical inspections, as further outlined in its reply to written question E-003819/2025 concerning the proposal to amend Directive 2014/45/EU 1 . The Commission has not adopted any position on the need for inspectors to comply with AI ethics and certification standards and has no plans for financing AI pilot projects for the harmonisation of inspections. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/45/oj/eng.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2025-10-01 “E-003800/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission Cross-border administrative cooperation between national authorities and the mutual exchange of information between persons and institutions are pillars of the EU social security coordination system 1 . The Commission is aware of delays in the exchange of information affecting various types of cross-border social security entitlements, including family benefits 2 . The system for electronic exchange of social security information (EESSI) between authorities and institutions is almost fully complete and the Commission is working on improving its efficiency. A new process for monitoring, mapping and lowering the response time within EESSI has been introduced. Representatives of Member States in the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Systems regularly discuss difficulties in applying the coordination rules 3 . The European Labour Authority (ELA) also organises capacity-building workshops with national authorities and institutions aimed at, among other things, improving the application of the EU social security coordination rules for citizens 4 . When the Commission assesses that the rules are not implemented or applied properly by certain Member States, it launches infringement procedures, including in the area of family benefits. As regards outreach to mobile citizens, ELA launched in late October 2025 a new information and awareness-raising campaign concerning the social security coordination rules. The Commission is focussed on obtaining final agreement of the co-legislators to its proposal to revise the EU social security coordination rules 5 . The proposal aims among other things to improve coordination processes between Member States, including in the area of family benefits. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32004R0883&qid=1760080119491, Article 76. 2 Reported for example in: https://single-market-scoreboard.ec.europa.eu/enforcement-tools/solvit_en; https://ecas.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/YEA-annual-trends-2024.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32004R0883&qid=1760080119491, Articles 71-72. 4 https://www.ela.europa.eu/en/activities/training-and-capacity-building. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52016PC0815.”
  EU regulation of cross-border and posted workers · Support for families
• 2025-09-15 “E-003536/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission In response to Russia’s energy weaponization of gas supplies, significant progress to diversify away from Russia has been achieved since 2022, thanks to the REPower EU plan 1 , in line with the Versailles Declaration and EU restrictive measures. However, remaining volumes of Russian natural gas entering the Union still represent around 13%, leading to significant risks for EU energy and economic security. Therefore, the Commission welcomes the general approach reached by the Council on 20 October 2025 2 on the legislative proposal from 17 June 2025 to gradually phase out Russian gas imports based on three pillars: a gradual and stepwise gas import ban where imports based on existing longterm contracts can continue during a transitory period, reinforced transparency, and monitoring and national diversification plans. It also welcomes the Council’s agreement on the 19 th package of sanctions against Russia which foresees, amongst other, a ban on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) as of 1 January 2027 for long-term contracts and within six months as of the entry into force of the sanctions for short-term contracts. The Commission continues to cooperate with all Member States and key partners in support of EU’s diversification efforts, including the United States, in line with the political agreement 3 by the President of the Commission and the President of the United States of 21 August 2025. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/energy/repowereu_en. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/20/council-agrees-its-position-on-rules-tophase-out-russian-gas-imports-underrepowereu/#:~:text=Today%2C%20the%20Council%20reached%20a%20general%20approach%20on,Russian% 20gas%20and%20strengthening%20the%20EU%27s%20energy%20security. 3 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreementreciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Natural gas
• 2025-09-10 “E-003512/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Energy prices in Europe are significantly lower than during the energy crisis of 2022-2023. Nonetheless, they remain considerably higher than in other major economies. Since the beginning of the mandate the Commission acted swiftly tabling the Clean Industrial Deal (CID) and the Affordable Energy Action Plan. Several Member States are already applying the proposed measures in practice and they are showing effects on the ground. While progress is underway, further efforts are needed. The Council has called for a stepping up of efforts and has welcomed the Commission’s intention to submit relevant proposals 1 . On 21 October 2025, the Commission recalled a set of seven actions to bring relief to industries and consumers 2 . In addition, the Energy Union Task Force (EUTF), launched in June 2025, plays a key role in fostering cooperation among Member States and collectively tackling high energy prices. The European Council stressed in its conclusions the role of the Task Force in supporting Member States in this respect. Since its launch, the EUTF has organised several meetings, including regarding regional readiness for South-East Europe to mitigate risks of price spikes, identifying needs for more cross-border capacity and system flexibility; on expansion and better use of the European grids; and on seven actions to lower energy prices. The recently adopted 19 th sanctions package and REPowerEU legislative proposal complement these efforts by fostering the EU’s energy independence, security of supply and market stability. The Commission stands ready to support Member States in exploring tailored solutions in line with applicable rules. 1 EUCO 18/25: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/d2nhnqso/20251023-european-council-conclusionsen.pdf. 2 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-steps-efforts-lower-energy-prices-set-actions-bring-reliefindustries-and-consumers-2025-10-21_en.”
  Energy (green transition) · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Natural gas
• 2025-09-10 “E-003513/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission categorically rejects any accusation of censorship. The Digital Services Act 1 (DSA) is content agnostic. The substantive rules determining the legality of content are not contained in the DSA, but in other pieces of national or, exceptionally, EU legislation. The DSA does not empower the Commission, nor the national competent authorities (e.g. the Digital Service Coordinators), to moderate content or to order the take down of content. Nor are they never required under the DSA to take a position on whether any specific piece of content or expression is legal 2 . Rather, the DSA seeks to ensure transparency in the content moderation policies of intermediary services providers so that service recipients can better exercise their rights online, including their right to free expression. The over-removal of lawful content by online platforms infringes the DSA. To protect freedom of expression, the DSA introduced a range of redress and transparency mechanisms, such as the obligation for online platforms to inform all affected users of content moderation decisions with a clear and specific statement of reasons and to provide them with opportunities to challenge content moderation decisions. Therefore, online platforms are prevented from shadow banning their recipients’ content under the DSA. Based on service providers’ transparency reports, the Commission is glad to note that these mechanisms have already led to the reinstatement of millions of pieces of content previously removed in error. As such, the DSA contributes to a safe, predictable and trusted online environment in which fundamental rights 6 are effectively protected. The Commission will continue to monitor compliance with the DSA to ensure that this remains the case. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 Please see the answer to parliamentary question E-3616/25.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-09-10 “E-003511/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Regulation on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure 1 sets deployment targets for public recharging points, which take into account the number of electric vehicles on the road, as well as targets for fast recharging infrastructure along the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T). The Commission acknowledges the significant impact on automotive employment in the EU of recent production and demand shifts in the global economy, economic shocks and geopolitical uncertainties. The Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector 2 has set out decisive action to help the automotive industry, its workers and Member States navigate these employment challenges and maintain a strong production base in Europe. In particular, the Commission has proposed amendments to the European Globalisation Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) and the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) regulations, which are under examination by co-legislators. The Commission is also setting up a European Fair Transition Observatory to strengthen the evidence base on employment and social aspects of the green transition. The Commission has accelerated work on the preparation of the review of the Regulation setting CO 2 emission standards for cars and vans 3 . Between 7 July and 10 October 2025, the Commission published a Call for Evidence and a Public Consultation 4 . Next, the Commission will conduct an impact assessment and prepare a proposal for adoption under the ordinary legislative procedure. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1804/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0095. 3 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/631/oj. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14765-Revision-of-the-CO2-emissionstandards-for-cars-and-vans_en.”
  Road transport environmental policy · EV charging infrastructure
• 2025-09-03 “E-003390/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission On 27 July 2025, the President of the Commission and the President of the United States (US) reached a political agreement on tariffs and trade, later confirmed by the Joint Statement 1 issued on 21 August 2025. Faced with the exceptional situation of the US imposing high tariffs on imports from the EU, the Commission’s overriding priority has been to stabilise the situation and restore predictable conditions for transatlantic trade and supply chains. The Member States and the European Parliament have all been united behind the Commission’s efforts and were regularly informed of the discussions with the US in the lead up to the leader’s meeting. While the Commission remains convinced that high tariffs are detrimental to the global economy, the negotiated outcome avoids a harmful tariff-escalation and ensures continued access to US market. The EU-US deal helps maintaining a competitive position for EU exporters on the US market. The Commission continues its strong support for Ukraine on all fronts, including in diplomatic engagements with the US. 1 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreementreciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU-US trade relations
• 2025-09-03 “E-003389/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission appreciates the Honourable Member's interest in its proposal for annual technical inspections of vehicles older than 10 years and welcomes the opportunity to address the concerns raised. The proposal is based on extensive consultations (including of experts), impact assessments, and evidence from numerous studies. Data indicates that older vehicles are more likely to have technical defects, which can contribute to road accidents and higher emissions. The impact assessment also considered the findings of 16 Member States that already require annual inspections for older vehicles, which demonstrated significant safety and environmental benefits. While human factors remain the primary cause of road accidents, addressing technical defects is a complementary measure to enhance road safety. The Commission is mindful of the potential socio-economic impact of the proposal, particularly on low-income groups. It is important to note that the cost of annual inspections is relatively modest compared to the overall cost of vehicle ownership. Member States retain the flexibility to regulate inspection fees and implement measures to support vulnerable groups. The Commission encourages them to consider these aspects when implementing the legislative changes in order to ensure fairness and accessibility. As for the affordability of new vehicles, the Commission is working with industry stakeholders to promote innovation and cost efficiency in the automotive sector. EU policies aim to support the production of affordable, sustainable vehicles. The Commission also encourages Member States to explore incentives for the adoption of cleaner and safer vehicles, which can contribute to environmental and safety objectives.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2025-09-03 “E-003391/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to upholding transparency and ensuring that all its public statements and communications are based on verified and accurate information. Regarding the specific case mentioned by the Honourable Member, the Commission can confirm that the aircraft carrying the President of the Commission to Bulgaria experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference. However, the plane landed safely. The incident was investigated and verified by the Bulgarian Air Traffic Services Authority. Additionally, the Bulgarian Prime Minister issued a statement 1 confirming the radio interference on the President’s flight. The Commission’s approach to addressing foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including disinformation, involves collaboration with Member States, EU institutions, online platforms, and civil society. Part of this approach involves addressing systemic risks on very large online platforms, while fully respecting fundamental rights, and promoting access to accurate and reliable information, including through supporting independent journalism and media. Additionally, the European External Action Service exposes FIMI actors and operations. 1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUdi4z0l6D0.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-07-15 “E-002883/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission In its 2025 Rule of Law Report country chapter for Slovakia 1 , the Commission notes that the civil society environment faces further pressure, and that the legislation to which the Honourable Member refers lays down new reporting and information disclosure obligations, which introduce additional burden for civil society organisations. It also notes that amendments seeking to establish lobbying regulation for NGOs were left out of the Law as adopted. The report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to which the Honourable Member refers recalls the importance of minimising the burden on civil society organisations. The Commission will continue monitoring the developments pertaining to the civic space in Slovakia, as it does for all Member States. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/44d5d5ba-27d1-4797-b41283ad2cc4cb57_en?filename=29_1_63964_coun_chap_slovakia_en.pdf.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2025-07-14 “E-002852/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The annual Rule of Law Report covers all Member States objectively and on an equal footing, in line with the Report’s methodology, which is publicly available 1 . The country chapters reflect the Commission’s qualitative assessment of significant developments that occurred during the reporting period. The Report is the result of close collaboration with national authorities and relies on a variety of sources, as well as on the Commission’s own data gathering. All sources are carefully assessed, with due attention paid to their factual accuracy, comprehensiveness, quality, reliability and relevance. The Rule of Law Report has become one of the instruments in the EU rule of law toolbox and a reference point at EU and national level, serving as a basis for discussions in the European Parliament, the Council and the Member States. The Commission will continue to build on the annual Rule of Law cycle and remains committed to supporting Member States in implementing this year’s recommendations and to collaborating to safeguard the EU’s core values. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/72742fd9-3ce0-4d23-9086-58f885f84cdd_en.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2025-07-14 “E-002854/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully committed to strengthening geographical balance, and work to address imbalances is ongoing. As outlined in the Mission Letter of the Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration, improving geographical balance remains a priority. In 2023, Joint Action Plans were agreed with each of the 15 underrepresented Member States (URMSs). While these Plans led to some slight positive trends, the 2024 assessment concluded that additional measures were needed. The Commission continues to implement the following measures: ensuring a more geographically balanced approach in selecting Blue Book Trainees; interviewing at least one candidate from an URMS when organising the selection of certain non-permanent posts; publishing non-permanent vacancies externally. Moreover, the Commission will extend the external publication to all temporary agent (TA) vacancies following the recently adopted TA decision C(2025)4716. With the New Recruitment Model, Commission services should interview a suitable candidate for Administrator posts from an URMS if one applies. In addition, the Commission intends to adopt General Implementing Provisions to Article 27 of Staff Regulations to enable the adoption of additional measures to strengthen geographical balance in the coming months. In 2024, the College of Heads of Administration (CCA) mandated an inter-institutional working group to identify and share the measures implemented to strengthen geographical balance, to exchange views on the results achieved, and to assess the feasibility of coordinated actions. As a result, it was decided to deepen collaboration between Institutions in the areas of outreach, data analytics and cooperation with Member States.”
  Recruitment policies in the EU
• 2025-07-14 “E-002853/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association are fundamental rights and values enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 1 , and in international treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, to which all Member States are party 2 . The Commission remains committed to safeguarding the fundamental rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) people, and has expressed its full support and solidarity to the Budapest Pride and to the LGBTIQ+ community. It is not for the Commission to comment on activities of individual Members of the European Parliament. Regarding the law passed in Hungary, the Commission is examining the provisions of the law from the perspective of the implications it may have under EU law. The Commission services have contacted the Hungarian authorities requesting clarifications on the relevant provisions. The Commission will consider all the steps necessary to safeguard EU law, as appropriate. 1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326/391, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. 2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”
  Rule of law in Hungary · LGBTIQ+
• 2025-06-24 “E-002526/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) 1 aims to cut long-term energy bills, improve living comfort, and reduce dependence on fossil fuels. Proper implementation will boost the renovation rate and enhance competitiveness of the EU’s construction industry and clean tech companies. The Commission will support Member States in the implementation, monitor the directive's effectiveness and review it in 2028 as requested by the co-legislators. The new emissions trading system for buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2) will provide a price signal to encourage decarbonisation and renovation of buildings. It is designed ensuring a smooth start of the system and is complemented by the Social Climate Fund (SCF). The SCF will mobilise EUR 86.7 billion, mainly from ETS2 revenues, to support vulnerable citizens, such as through building renovation and the roll-out of clean heating and cooling. Buildings represent the largest energy-consuming sector in Europe, responsible for 52% of gas consumption. The European building sector accounts for roughly 5% of global building energy use and about 11–12% of global building CO 2 . In addition, the EPBD and ETS2 have global relevance because they set a policy benchmark that inspires similar frameworks worldwide, drive innovation in energy-efficient construction technologies adopted beyond Europe and boost demand for sustainable building materials and systems across global supply chains. 1 Directive (EU) 2024/1275 on the energy performance of buildings (https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1275/oj/eng).”
  Climate efforts · Energy performance of buildings
• 2025-06-23 “E-002512/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Following the exchange at the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 May 2025, the High Representative/Vice-President announced a review of Israel’s compliance with Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement 1 . The review was presented at the Foreign Affairs Council on 23 June 2025 2 . The Foreign Ministers agreed that the EU’s aim is to improve the humanitarian situation. On this basis, the EU engaged in a dialogue with Israel in view of improving the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. The outcomes were presented at the Foreign Affairs Council of 15 July 2025 3 . The EU continues to closely monitor the implementation of the agreed actions. On 29 July 2025, the Commission proposed to partially suspend Israel's participation in Horizon Europe 4 . This proposal comes as a reaction to the review of Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement and is currently under discussion by Member States. While working towards improved humanitarian assistance, the EU continues to call for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and the unconditional release of all hostages, leading to a permanent end to hostilities 5 . The Commission announced in April 2025 a multiannual and comprehensive programme worth up to EUR 1.6 billion, to foster Palestinian recovery and resilience. The programme includes financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority, support to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), projects in various socioeconomic sectors as well as support to the private sector. As part of the programme, the EU has already disbursed EUR 172 million to the Palestinian Authority and EUR 82 million to UNRWA. The European Council has so far listed nine individuals, and five entities linked to violent extremism in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as the blocking of humanitarian aid into Gaza 6 . 1 https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2025/06/23/. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2025/07/15/#:~:text=The%20message%20is%20very%20clear ,is%20wholly%20committed%20to%20Ukraine.&text=The%20Council%20then%20discussed%20military,a%2 0full%20and%20unconditional%20ceasefire. 4 https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-proposes-partial-suspension-israelsassociation-horizon-europe-2025-07-29_en. 5 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/cjtb3oep/20250626-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf. 6 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/07/15/extremist-israeli-settlers-in-the-occupiedwest-bank-and-east-jerusalem-as-well-as-violent-activists-blocking-humanitarian-aid-to-gaza-five-individualsand-three-entities-sanctioned-under-the-eu-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime/.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-06-23 “E-002494/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The EU programme for the environment and climate action (LIFE) 1 provides, amongst others, financial support for the functioning of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) supporting civil society’s participation in policy making, ensuring that NGOs are an integral part of a well-functioning democratic system. The Commission observes full impartiality and does not require NGO beneficiaries to undertake advocacy activities for specific political and policy purposes. The information reported in the media the Honourable Member indicates is therefore not accurate. The Commission has repeatedly stated 2 that operating grants supporting NGOs comply with the LIFE Regulation 3 adopted by the co-legislators and their management is fully in line with the provisions of the EU Financial Regulation 4 . There is no mishandling of the EU budget. The Commission has issued guidance 5 for existing grant agreements and future calls for proposals, addressed to all Commission services and applicable to all spending programmes. The guidance prescribes that advocacy activities for specific political and policy purposes should not be mandated as a requirement or condition for EU financing. Moreover, the Commission’s model call for proposals was updated and now also requires the applicants’ proposals to comply with the guidance. This provides greater clarity to the applicants and evaluators, as well as a stronger contractual framework allowing for action in case of noncompliance. Furthermore, the selection and award of such grants is based on open calls for proposals publicly available on the Funding and Tenders portal 6 . Funding is awarded through a transparent and competitive process. 1 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life_en. 2 Reply to Written Question P-002320/2025. 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/783 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing a Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE), and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1293/2013, OJ L 172, 17.05.2021, p.53. 4 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/guidance-fundingdev-impl-monit-enforce-of-eu-law_en.pdf. 6 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-06-23 “E-002510/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission In response to Russia’s energy weaponization of gas supplies, significant progress to diversify away from Russia in a safe, affordable and sustainable manner has been achieved since 2022, thanks to the REPower EU plan 1 in line with the Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022 and EU restrictive measures 2 . However, remaining volumes of Russian natural gas entering the Union are still significant, leading to significant risks for EU energy and economic security. Therefore, the Commission adopted, on 17 June 2025, a legislative proposal 3 to gradually phase out Russian gas imports in order to end remaining gas dependencies based on three pillars: a gradual and stepwise gas import ban, reinforced transparency and monitoring and national diversification plans. The proposed Regulation is fully in line with EU law, and it has a different legal basis and a different purpose than EU restrictive measures under Common Security and Foreign Policy, that aim at incentivising changed behaviour. This proposal’s purpose is to put an end to market distortions in the EU caused by Russia, which has proved to be an unreliable energy trading partner, to the detriment of EU’s economic and energy security. The REPower EU legislative proposal is also fully in line with the principle of loyal cooperation, as it builds on more than three years of continuous cooperation with all Member States, in line with their commitment to phase out Russian fossil fuel imports. The Commission will continue to cooperate intensively with all Member States and stakeholders to ensure the gradual and coordinated phase out of Russian gas imports in the EU. 1 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-and-consumers/actions-and-measures-energy-prices/repowereu-3years_en#:~:text=This%20web-based%20report%20marks%20the%203year%20anniversary%20of,Commission%20adopted%20the%20REPowerEU%20Plan%20in%20May%202022. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/timeline-sanctions-against-russia/. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0828&qid=1750669110360.”
  Natural gas · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2025-06-23 “E-002508/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission President von der Leyen attended the meetings of the Coalition of the Willing in her capacity as President of the European Commission. Discussions at the meetings touched upon matters related to the EU’s defence industry as well as supporting collaborative research and development of defence projects among Member States. These issues fall within the scope of competences of the Commission. The Commission, as the Honourable Member knows, plays a crucial role in assisting Member States to boost their investment in defence and developing their defence industries – a prerequisite for any militarily capable Europe – as well as in providing assistance to Ukraine. Following the latest Coalition of the Willing meeting, which took place on 10 July 2025, leaders agreed, among other things, to step up action against Russia’s war economy, and to continue to support Ukraine financially and militarily. The leaders also welcomed the development of mature operational plans to deploy a reassurance force – the Multinational Force Ukraine – once hostilities have ceased, and the establishment of a United Kingdom/France-led operational headquarters to support planning activity. They also supported further peace talks between Ukraine and Russia. As was emphasised in the previous reply (E-000729/2025), the President of the Commission is responsible for ensuring the external representation of the EU when matters fall outside the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and relate to other EU policy fields (Article 17, paragraph 1, of the Treaty on European Union). The participation of the President of the Commission safeguards unity by contributing to outcomes in a way that reflects the values, interests and legal commitments of the EU and by ensuring that all Member States are kept informed about the ongoing developments.”
  EU competences on defence · EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2025-06-23 “E-002495/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU aims for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in Ukraine and supports Ukraine in its calls for a full and unconditional ceasefire. However, Russia continues to show no interest in halting aggression. Instead, it is escalating its frontline and air attacks, resulting in an increasing number of civilian casualties. Bolstering support for Ukraine and applying strong pressure on Russia remain therefore crucial to changing Russia's stance. As Ukraine's top supporter, the EU has provided EUR 164.8 billion in total support, including nearly EUR 60 billion in military aid, and pledged over EUR 24 billion in military support in 2025. The High Representative/Vice-President’s initiative to deliver to Ukraine 2 million rounds of high-calibre ammunition in 2025 has already achieved 80 percent of its target. The EU also leads in training the Ukrainian Armed Forces, with 78 500 soldiers trained since November 2022 by the EU Military Assistance Mission. The EU and its Member States remain committed to provide Ukraine and its people with all the necessary political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support, for as long as it takes and as intensely as needed.”
  Defence spending · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2025-04-09 “E-001449/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s advice that citizens be able to sustain themselves for at least 72 hours is grounded in existing emergency preparedness guidelines and international best practice, which suggest that individuals should be self-sufficient for a short period during potential disruptions in services or supply chains. This duration is recognised as critical for initial emergency response, allowing time for authorities to restore essential services and reach affected populations in a range of crisis scenarios. The Commission has identified several potential risks and threats, including in the Preparedness Union Strategy 1 and the Niinistö Report on Military Preparedness and Readiness of the European Union 2 . The specific threats identified include the consequences of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, rising geopolitical tensions, hybrid and cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, foreign information manipulation, pandemics, and the increasing frequency of natural disasters. The Commission acknowledges the need for transparency and detailed information on the risks and threats identified. The Eurobarometer surveys published in 2024 show that 65% of EU citizens feel they need more information to prepare for disasters and emergencies 3 . In response, the Strategy foresees to support to Member States to increase awareness about risks and threats, with measures such as annual EU Preparedness Day and targeted communication campaigns to ensure citizens are well informed about potential threats and the rationale behind preparedness measures. The Commission will continue to provide regular updates and practical guidance to Member States. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/preparedness_en. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b77-8739b19d047c_en. 3 https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/news/new-eu-eurobarometer-disaster-awareness-andpreparedness-eucitizens#:~:text=A%20new%20Eurobarometer%20survey%20which%20looked%20into%20the,more%20infor mation%20to%20prepare%20for%20disasters%20and%20emergencies.”
  Government stockpiling of critical medicines
• 2025-03-26 “E-001256/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The protection of central databases in key sectors, including those managed by public administration entities, are subject to the rules established by the NIS2 Directive 1 , which provide adequate horizontal safeguards against cyber-attacks, including in relation to driving licences, making it unnecessary for the Directive to contain further provisions on the matter. While mobile driving licences are to become the default format, applicants and holders retain the right to have their licence issued in both or either format. Mobile driving licences will be available via the European Digital Identity Wallets which should be rolled out in all Member States by the end of 2026. Should a citizen not possess the necessary technology for using the Wallet or does not wish to use it, they may (continue to) use a physical driving licence. Driving licences issued by Member States and by third countries are not comparable as regards the criteria for their exchange. Citizens holding licences issued by Member States may exchange or continue to use their valid driving licences when moving residence in the EU without additional obligations. Holders of driving licences issued by third countries do not have the same rights and may face administrative obligations, in particular when changing residence between Member States. Once adopted, the new driving licence Directive intends to harmonise such obligations, for selected third countries, to facilitate the free movement of their licence holders. 1 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 - OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80.”
  Driving licences
• 2025-03-26 “E-001257/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission While the application of EU trade defence instruments is not subject to impact assessments, the Commission confirms that in conducting the latest review investigation, it did analyse the overall EU interest, including the interests of EU industries using steel as an input for their production. In this regard, the Commission also considered the specific views of the European Automobile Manufacturers' Association (ACEA), which came forward as interested party and submitted comments on the request of the EU steel industry. ACEA was particularly concerned about potential tightening of the safeguard measure as concerns product category 4B, which includes corrosion resistant sheets used specifically by the automotive industry. The outcome of the review regarding category 4B is that no adjustments are applied in this category so as not to unnecessarily restrict sourcing opportunities for the EU automotive industry. Although the EU automotive industry is affected by the change of the liberalisation rate to 0.1% starting 1 July 2025, the current quotas are nevertheless increasing compared with the current quarter. In conclusion, because the measure is not tightened with regard to the product indicated as a specific concern by the ACEA, the Commission does not expect the outcome of the review to result in a sharp increase of steel prices in this category, nor to result in closures of automotive plants.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2025-03-21 “E-001212/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission As set out in the Skills and Talent Mobility package 1 , in the action plan to tackle labour and skills shortages 2 and in the Union of Skills 3 , attraction of talent to the EU is part of a comprehensive approach to tackling labour and skills shortages. This is complementary to the activation of the EU’s workforce, reskilling, upskilling, intra-EU mobility and improvement of the working conditions. The EU Talent Pool will help fill the labour shortages that cannot be filled through European workforce as it targets specific EU-wide shortage occupations, as well as those with a direct link to the green and digital transitions. Member States will be able to adjust the list of shortage occupations to their needs. Member States are free to decide whether they want to participate in the EU Talent Pool because participation is voluntary. In accordance with Article 79(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the proposal does not affect Member States’ competence to determine volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to seek work. 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions attracting skills and talent to the EU, COM(2022) 657 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52022DC0657. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1507. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/union-skills_en.”
  EU policy on brain drain · Legal migration
• 2025-03-05 “E-000933/2025 Answer given by Mr Micallef on behalf of the European Commission Commission Decision C(2023)5035 final of 19 July 2023 outlines the grounds for the enforced recovery procedure. It was established that Projekt Forum Zdruzenie (PFZ), coordinator of the project ‘Mirrors of Europe’ failed to respect its substantial obligations under the Grant Agreement signed for the above-mentioned project. As such, it was requested to return the EU funding due to this breach of obligations. Regarding the co-financing of the project, it was established that the documents provided by the project coordinator, including the financial statement was still not balanced and therefore did not comply with the requirements of the Grant Agreement, and that there was no financial contribution made by PFZ and its co-organisers to the project. The Commission is aware of the claim initiated in 2019 by the project coordinator, and of the Decision by the European Ombudsman 1 , who found no maladministration in the Education and Culture Executive Agency's decision to recover the funds. Once all means of recovering the funds unduly received by the project, as put in place by the Commission services and the Agency, had failed (including debit note, reminders, formal notices, full repayment, repayment by instalment, offsetting, etc.), the sole remaining action was the enforced recovery procedure initiated via the above-mentioned Commission Decision. Commission Decision C(2023)5035 outlines the grounds for the enforced recovery procedure. 1 European Ombudsman https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/120801.”
  Conditions to access EU budget · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-02-18 “E-000729/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission The discussions at the Summit in Paris on 17 February 2025 covered Europe’s defence and security, including the need to strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base. In addition, participants emphasised the need to step up the overall support to Ukraine, and to maintain economic pressure on Russia, including through sanctions. The President of the Commission is responsible for ensuring the external representation of the EU when matters fall outside the scope of the common foreign and security policy and relate to other EU policy fields 1 . The President of the Commission is therefore responsible for ensuring the external representation of the EU with regards to various work strands of support to Ukraine, including, among others, financial assistance and humanitarian support. Furthermore, matters related to the EU’s defence industry also fall within the scope of competences of the Commission, which plays a crucial role in assisting Member States to boost their defence industries – a prerequisite for any militarily capable and well-equipped Europe. The invitation to participate underscores the Commission’s distinct and important role in these discussions. 1 Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2012/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU competences on defence
• 2025-02-11 “E-000625/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Under the Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines 1 , an impact assessment is required for initiatives that are likely to have significant economic, environmental or social impacts or which entail significant spending, and where the Commission has a choice of policy options. Policy communications, action plans or strategies do not usually require impact assessments. Most legislative proposals under the European Green Deal 2 were subject to comprehensive impact assessments, and public consultations, in accordance with the Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines. The impact assessments were published together with the proposals they accompany and are available on Commission webpages 3 as well as on the Have Your Say portal 4 . When, due to political imperatives, the timing did not allow for the preparation of an impact assessment, the reasons and available evidence were set out in the explanatory memoranda of the proposals. This was the case for the emergency energy measures presented against the backdrop of the energy crisis 5 . 1 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/better-regulation_en 2 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en 3 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/proposals-delivering-european-green-deal_en 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say_en All impact assessments of policy proposals by the Commission are published together with the results of the associated public consultations and the policy proposals themselves on the Have Your Say portal. The European Green Deal included the review of the Effort Sharing Regulation (impact assessment SWD(2021)611), updating the Emissions Trading System Directive (SWD(2021)601), the revision of the CO2 standards for cars and vans (SWD(2021)613), review of EU rules on Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) (SWD(2021)609), the review of the Renewable Energy Directive (SWD(2021)621), review of the Energy Efficiency Directive (SWD(2021)623), the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (SWD(2021)453), revision of the Energy Taxation Directive (SWD(2021)641) or the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (SWD(2021)643). 5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5489”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Climate efforts
• 2025-01-22 “E-000276/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission For more than a decade the EU has worked side-by-side with the United States (US) to design and implement the Paris Agreement, the crucial multilateral agreement in the fight against global warming. The Commission therefore regrets the announcement of the President of the US to once again withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement. The Commission will stay the course on the Green Deal as the EU’s growth strategy. The Commission will deploy its climate diplomacy to ensure that other major polluters also show ambition in reducing greenhouse gas emissions when presenting their Nationally Determined Contributions ahead of COP 30 in Brazil. The Commission’s focus will be on supporting and creating the right conditions for reaching its common goals. This means investing and ensuring access to cheap, sustainable and secure energy supplies and raw materials, including through the Clean Industrial Deal. The Clean Industrial Deal, announced in the Political Guidelines for 2024-2029, positions decarbonisation as a powerful driver of growth and prosperity for Europeans. Building on the Green Deal Industrial Plan 1 , the Net Zero Industrial 2 and Critical Raw Materials Acts 3 , it will have a particular focus on energy-intensive industries and the net-zero sector. Some of the measures will aim at lowering energy prices, developing lead markets for EU-made decarbonised products, and leveraging circularity for the availability of raw materials. All of these measures will support the EU economy, foster the green transition and contribute to the prosperity of EU citizens by creating new jobs. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/green-dealindustrial-plan_en 2 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/green-dealindustrial-plan/net-zero-industry-act_en 3 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-rawmaterials/critical-raw-materials-act_en”
  Climate efforts · EU-US relations
• 2025-01-22 “E-000277/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. Since their adoption in 2005, the EU and its Member States have promoted the effective implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR) that aim to improve international cooperation on prevention, preparedness, surveillance, containment and response to public health emergencies. The aim of the amendments adopted in 2024 1 is to strengthen the IHR in light of the lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic, and the EU’s priorities in the field of global health 2 . As it is also explained in the explanatory memorandum to the Commission’s Proposal for a Council Decision authorising Member States to accept the amendments to the IHR, the majority of the amended provisions concern matters that have been regulated at EU level and none of the amendments are contrary to Union law. 3 Their implementation is therefore in the interest of the Union. The Commission remains committed to a successful conclusion of the ongoing negotiations for a new Pandemic Agreement 4 , provided that its content is in line with the Union’s positions and interests as reflected in the negotiating directives 5 . 2. The Commission will continue to consider all developments in the ongoing negotiations, including the implications of the announcement of the United States of America in close cooperation with the Member States, including at the Working Group on Public Health of the Council, serving as the special committee within the meaning of Article 218(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 6 . 3. Without pre-judging the outcome of the ongoing negotiations for the Pandemic Agreement, the Commission will continue to act in cooperation with Member States in accordance with Council Decision (EU) 2022/451. 1 The amendments to the IHR were adopted by the IHR States Parties at the 77 th World Health Assembly with Resolution WHA 77.17 (Strengthening preparedness for and response to public health emergencies through targeted amendments to the International Health Regulations (2005)). 2 Council conclusions of 29 January 2024 on the ‘EU Global Health Strategy: Better health for all in a changing world’, document ST 5908/24 and related Commission Communication COM(2022)675 of 30 November 2022. 3 Proposal for a Council Decision authorising Member States to accept, in the interest of the European Union, the amendments to the International Health Regulations contained in the Annex to Resolution WHA77.17 and adopted on 1 June 2024 (COM(2024) 541 final). 4 Information related to the ongoing negotiations for a new Pandemic Agreement is available at: https://inb.who.int/ 5 The Commission is negotiating the Pandemic Agreement on behalf of the European Union, for matters falling within Union competence, based on an authorisation from the Council of the European Union set out in Council Decision (EU) 2022/451 of 3 March 2022 authorising the opening of negotiations on behalf of the European Union for an international agreement on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, as well as complementary amendments to the International Health Regulations (2005) (OJ L 92, 21.3.2022, p. 1). The Commission, as the Union negotiator, is guided by the negotiating directives annexed to the Decision, laying down the main objectives and principles to be achieved. 6 As per Article 2 of Council Decision (EU) 2022/451.”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · EU-US relations
• 2025-01-22 “E-000278/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not comment about statements that former Commissioners make in their private capacity. Elections are at the core of democracy, which is a founding value of the EU. The conduct and the organisation of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional and legislative rules, as well as with their international obligations and EU law. National competent authorities and courts have the primary responsibility of ensuring compliance with these rules. The Commission supports Member States on electoral matters, notably through the framework of the European cooperation network on elections 1 , which brings together national authorities with competences in electoral matters and facilitates the exchanges of information and best practices. The Commission is also working with Member States to support the application of EU law provisions which are relevant in national electoral contexts within the EU, such as under the Digital Service Act 2 , the Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising 3 (which will become fully applicable in October 2025), the General Data Protection Regulation 4 and the Artificial Intelligence Act 5 . In 2023, the Commission also published a Recommendation on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union 6 . 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/democracy-eucitizenship-anti-corruption/democracy-and-electoral-rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065. In 2024, the Commission issued Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024XC03014&qid=1714466886277 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2829/oj/eng”
  EU political integration · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2025-01-15 “E-000133/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Democracy and the rule of law are founding values of the EU. Free and fair elections are at the core of democracy. The organisation and the conduct of national elections fall entirely within the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in line with their constitutional and legislative rules, while complying with their obligations deriving from EU law. National competent authorities and courts have the primary responsibility to ensure the respect of these rules. The Commission supports Member States, notably in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections, which brings together national authorities with responsibilities that are relevant to electoral matters. This network allows for exchanges of information and best practices and to discuss challenges to electoral processes, including in the context of recent or upcoming elections in the EU.”
  Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
• 2024-12-17 “E-002994/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is currently preparing a report on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) 1 . The report will present the first general assessment of the application of the Regulation after the recast in 2012. In the preparation of the report, the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, constitutes a key source of information on the application of the Regulation. The Commission is looking into all important judgments, including Inkreal (C-566/22) to which the honourable Member refers to. The Commission will take into account the issues the honourable Member raises in the context of the preparation of the report. 1 OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 1.”
  Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
• 2024-11-13 “E-002521/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has been following the developments in Georgia, including the adoption of the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and its entry into force, with great concern. As underlined in the June and October 2024 European Council conclusions 1 , Georgia’s democratic backsliding – marked notably by the adoption of the law ‘on transparency of foreign influence’ - has led to de facto halting Georgia’s accession process. This was also highlighted in the 2024 Enlargement report 2 , which calls on Georgia to recommit to the nine steps and to repeal problematic laws, including the one on ‘transparency of foreign influence’. The EU has reacted with concrete measures. Direct assistance to the authorities and assistance to the armed forces under the European Peace Facility assistance measure 2024 have been suspended and political contacts with the Georgian authorities have been downgraded. The Foreign Affairs Council of November 2024 3 confirmed that the measures remain in place until the Georgian authorities recommit to the EU path with concrete actions, including by repealing the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’. Developments in Georgia were discussed at the Foreign Affairs Council on 16 December 2024 4 and on 27 January 2025 5 . Several new measures were discussed and are being implemented. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/qa3lblga/euco-conclusions-27062024-en.pdf, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 2 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/7b6ed47c-ecde-41a2-99ea41683dc2d1bd_en?filename=Georgia%20Report%202024.pdf 3 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-aftermeeting-17_en 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2024/12/16/ 5 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2025/01/27/”
  EU-Georgia relations · EU enlargement
• 2024-11-04 “E-002392/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission From the perspective of competition rules, Member States have a large margin of discretion in the determination of their tax policies, provided that these policies are in line with the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). If a Member State decides to apply lower taxes to investments in tenement housing compared to investments in other types of housing, that may be selective and therefore caught by Article 107, paragraph 1 of the TFEU and would need assessment in terms of compatibility with the internal market under EU State aid rules.”
  EU housing policy · EU Competition policy
• “Madam chairperson von der Leyen, here we are once again and once again. You are proposing to do the same thing you've been proposing for the past three years. You want to send tens of billions of euros to a country where one corruption scandal follows another, where the economy is controlled by oligarchs, and where are billions disappear without any effect on the battlefield? You do the same thing expecting a different result. That is not a strategy. That is the textbook definition of insanity. And even though I don't doubt that there are a couple of madmen sitting here among us, the majority including you, Madame von der Leyen, who support this senseless prolongation of this conflict, do so not because you are mad people, but because you are not sovereign politicians. You are just obedient executors of the interests of the military industrial complex whose profits are breaking all records. At the expense of Ukrainian lives and European resources. You conceal this servility behind morals and solidarity with the victim, but you just want to prolong the war. I ask you, madam von der Leyen, if you do not want to contribute to peace, at least please do not stand in its way.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “I wanted to say, to speak for a simple reason. I have never heard anything more absurd than the title of this debate, and the debate just confirms it. If you said that the cooperation between conservatives and the far right is threatening the rights of minorities or migrants or the LGBT community, maybe okay, but the competitiveness of Europe. Do you understand this irony that you are the ones who are saying this? The centrist majority that has been destroying Europe's competitiveness over the last ten years. Your absurd ideas, your dysfunctional ideas are the real threat to our competitiveness. Green deal fighting nuclear energy, disconnecting from a cheap Russian gas and oil, sanctioning China, and so on. You are the ones that have decided that we cannot mine for ecological reasons, and we cannot import cheap materials for ideological reasons. And now you're telling us that those who disagree are a threat to competitiveness? This is insane. You feel very great about yourselves because you think that you're saving the world, but in reality, your politics cannot even save a single European factory.”
  Climate efforts
• “I think response, Mr. Kalinak, that the response is shown in what position she took before and what corruption scandals are linked to her in the past, and also how she was the Minister of Defence in Germany. So I think that is where the roots are of all this and why, despite the surveys that clearly show that Ukrainians really want peace now, they don't want to fight anymore. We can have a look at the numbers of the people who fled this country, who fled Ukraine. Despite that, some politicians moralize and they say, how, how we need to fight more.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “After the latest meeting of European leaders with the presidents Trump and Zelensky, I read in the news that Europe spends $100 billion, which it doesn't have to buy arms from the US, that it will not get to armed soldiers that Ukraine is not able to provide even now. So this approach, which is completely devoid of realism, shows how the commission sees its way to increase economic growth, and we are pushing through something that will not help our green transition. You fell in love with EVs and Electromobility as such, that you want to give subsidies to consumers, and nobody's interested in those. Not only do you ignore all experts who say that European electricity networks will not be able to handle the increased number of charging stations, which are in delay, by the way, but you are destabilizing our energy network by pushing for transition to renewables, which are extremely unstable. It doesn't matter whether you call it Green Deal, Clean Deal or Lion Deal, unless you get rid of the eco terrorists here in Brussels that want us to commit an economic suicide, you will not save our economic future.”
  EU-US relations
• “Good morning, everyone. As the co-author on the Act on Transparency of NGOs, I would like to ask, how were we supposed to fill in the recommendation of OECD, which stated that Slovakia needs to secure structural transparency in the organisation of non-governmental organisations, should be made a priority because its absence negatively influences the trustworthiness of these institutions. Organisations, namely, one of the ways is to require them to publicize and publicly offer information on their funding, on their annual activity, number of staff, etc. similar recommendation has been done by IFAD. So the Council of Europe Fatf, which said that the country should require the NGOs to publish their annual Bill of accounts, which would clearly discuss their incomes and revenues. Therefore, we have required the NGOs, which have more than €35,000 income a year, to have this transparency index where they should publicize the donors that have given them more than €5,000 a year. From this moment on, we have been bombarded by the gag, by the Venetian committee, by the Council of Europe, by this committee, by the European Commission. Of what have we dared to do? But nowhere have I find information on how we are willing to submit. However, to fulfil these requirements that were previously mentioned. Could you navigate me or guide me on how to fulfil them?”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe