Jaume ASENS LLODRÀ

Policy topics Jaume ASENS LLODRÀ is active on

What Jaume ASENS LLODRÀ has said (33)

• 2026-06-16 “(11:46:07 – 11:47:22): International politics, it's not the issue of who bombs more, but who achieves something, their objectives. And the agreement between The United States and Iran, there are 2 factors, Israel and Europe. They are the losers. Israel, The United States didn't achieve its particular growth goals. It's gotten less from what it had before. And and at the same time, Israel, it feels threatened, so they're trying to undermine this particular agreement. Also, the the consequences of the war, instability, inflation, and it and the global south all have have come out really losers in all of this. And the 02/2025, so the speaker writes, 2015, that particular agreement has been undermined as well. And now Spain, which has called for working together in order to achieve democracy and peace in the region and not some sort of new world where the right is dominating, That is the path to go.”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2026-03-04 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 8.6.2026 Written question Developments in Iran and the wider region threaten regional and global security. The EU welcomes the ceasefire agreed upon by the US and Iran and will contribute to all diplomatic efforts to pursue a comprehensive strategy for lasting peace across the region. The EU remains committed to safeguarding freedom of navigation, in line with international law, as reflected in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), and the security of global maritime trade routes, including through Operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES [1] . Responding to the rising and volatile energy prices and energy security concerns, the Commission published a communication AccelerateEU [2] that lays out a series of measures in support of governments and EU consumers. The EU is also implementing policies to boost the domestic production of critical raw materials (such as the Critical Raw Materials Act [3] and the RESourceEU Action Plan [4] ), and to diversify its supply with trusted partners, notably via the 16 partnerships it has signed on critical raw materials. The EU has not observed any increase in migratory movements towards the EU as a result of the Middle East crisis. However, the EU is closely monitoring the situation, including of migrant workers and of Afghan migrants and refugees in the region, and it is in continuous contact with Member States, partner countries and all relevant stakeholders. The Commission is encouraging Member States to prioritise preparedness and contingency planning, in line with the Pact on Migration and Asylum [5] . The EU Foreign Affairs Ministers have agreed that the Iran sanctions framework will be broadened to also be able to target those responsible for a possible prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz [6] . [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eunavfor-aspides_en?s=410381. [2] COM(2026) 370 final: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/7fac9eea-5717-4182-a368-bd68c427ff4c_en?filename=Communication.pdf. [3] Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj. [4] COM(2025) 945 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0945. [5] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en. [6] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2026/05/11/.”
  Asylum & border control · EU-Iran relations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-02-24 “E-000758/2026 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has been using the non-legally binding working definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition 1 since 2017 as a tool in recognising contemporary forms of antisemitism. The 2018 survey by the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) among Jewish Europeans shows that the examples in the definition reflect what the vast majority perceives as antisemitic 2 . The Commission therefore considers the IHRA definition as the benchmark for promoting a rights-based and victim-centred approach to combating antisemitism 3 . Member States endorsed the use of the IHRA definition in Council Conclusions on combating racism and antisemitism, adopted on 4 March 2022. The use of the IHRA definition is consistent with the EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) and was reaffirmed by the Council in 2024 4 . The IHRA definition does not limit freedom of expression as the examples of the definition clearly state that ‘criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic’. Antisemitic acts are criminal when they are so defined by law. 1 https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism. 2 https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/experiences-and-perceptions-antisemitism-second-surveydiscrimination-and-hate. 3 The drafting of the original working definition took place under the umbrella of the European Union Monitoring Centre and in an OSCE context and included a variety of experts who continue to support the definition. 4 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14245-2024-INIT/en/pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.”
  EU competences on human rights · Jewish culture and antisemitism
• 2026-02-24 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The EU Delegation in Colombia has participated in the sessions of the National Roundtable on Guarantees since its creation, including at Ambassador level, and will continue to do so. During the participation, and through regular political dialogue with national authorities (both spontaneously and within established formats such as the annual EU-Colombia Human Rights Dialogue) it has systematically been highlighted the importance of maintaining this space between civil society and authorities as a permanent forum to strengthen guarantees for human rights defenders. It is also called for high level participation and for follow up on commitments to translate into effective protection actions in the territories. The EU Delegation in Colombia stands ready to take part in regional round tables upon invitation. For example, the Delegation participated in the establishment of the Caquetá Territorial Roundtable on Guarantees in 2024. In addition, the Delegation maintains regular contact with the Human Rights Directorate of the Colombian Ministry of the Interior, the Ombudsman’s Office and civil society organisations participating in the Roundtable at the national and regional levels to follow up on the commitments made. The EU human rights cooperation portfolio in Colombia includes actions to strengthen and facilitate civil society participation in both the national and regional roundtables, by helping civil society to prepare their participation.”
  EU relations with left-wing Latin America · EU competences on human rights
• 2026-01-14 “E-000136/2026 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s publications and geographical visualisations focus on the EU and the continent ‘Europe’. To produce maps and cartographic visualisations, the Commission uses internationally agreed standards and good practices, complemented with authoritative geospatial data from Member States 1 . Any mapping choice depends on the context (e.g. geographical scope and purpose of the map) and no single, perfect solution exists as any projection deforms some parts of the world. While acknowledging the importance of equitable projections, in its publications and websites, the Commission uses the most appropriate cartographic projections. At the same time, the Commission follows the ongoing global geopolitical discussions and assesses the different practices and methodologies of cartographic projections including the ones like Equal Earth. Beyond the Commission’s mapping and visualisation practices, the EU’s role under Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is limited to supporting, coordinating and supplementing the actions of the Member States. Responsibility for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems lies exclusively with the Member States. Accordingly, decisions concerning the choice of pedagogical materials, including the use of specific cartographic projections in educational resources, fall within the competence of national and, where applicable, regional authorities. 1 The current mapping practice of the Commission is based on the European Lambert azimuthal equal-area projection (ETRS89-extended / LAEA Europe - EPSG:3035 – https://epsg.io/3035), because it preserves areas and minimizes distortion for European territories. This mapping projection was implemented also in the INSPIRE Directive 2007/2/EC (as Data Specification on Coordinate Reference Systems – Technical Guidelines: https://knowledge-base.inspire.ec.europa.eu/publications/inspire-data-specification-coordinate-referencesystems-technical-guidelines_en), which is enriched with some other projection recommendations for various specific use cases.”
  EU and national cultural identities
• 2025-11-26 “E-004700/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict put forward by the President of United States and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2803 (2025) offer a way out of the devastating conflict. The EU is ready to contribute through its unique toolbox, including by supporting the Palestinian Authority (PA) in its reforms, in view of the PA’s return to Gaza. The PA is a key partner in the region, and the EU has consistently supported it politically and financially. The EU Comprehensive Support Programme for Palestinian Recovery and Resilience 20252027 1 , worth up to EUR 1.6 billion, is anchored in the PA’s implementation of the key reforms identified in the Reform Matrix agreed upon between the EU and the PA in November 2024. The first meeting of the dedicated Palestine Donor Group took place on 20 November 2025. The EU aims to foster stability by supporting the security arrangements foreseen in the UNSC resolution 2803, notably through the two EU’s civilian Common Security and Defence Policy missions on the ground. The Board of Peace will oversee the transitional governance administration including the Palestinian technocratic committee that will be responsible for the day-to-day operations of the civil services in Gaza. These are very important tasks that the EU will support and contribute to, in line with its position that recovery and future reconstruction efforts in Gaza need to be Palestinian-led and owned. The EU is committed to the two-state solution, viewing it as the only path to lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. 1 https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/factsheet-comprehensive-programme-palestinian-recoveryand-resilience-and-palestine-donor-group-2025_en.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-09-19 “E-003641/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU respects the intention of those on board the flotilla ships to draw attention to the humanitarian plight of the population of Gaza. In the EU everyone has the right to exercise such activism and freedom of assembly. This is a core pillar of EU’s values. The freedom of navigation under international law must also be upheld. Attacks against such flotillas are not acceptable. The authorities responsible for ensuring consular protection are the states to which the citizens belong. The EU discourages flotillas as a means of aid delivery, as it risks the safety of the participants, and the action is in itself inefficient. The EU’s focus will always be on delivering aid through proven and effective structures, with EU’s partner organisations on the ground. The EU urges the parties and the international community to make all efforts to finally bring this terrible conflict to an end now, through an immediate and permanent ceasefire that enables the provision of immediate and unimpeded humanitarian assistance at scale to address the needs of the population. Israel must fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law. The EU will continue to insist on this with its Israeli counterparts.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · EU humanitarian missions
• 2025-07-22 “E-003031/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The EU supports Colombia’s peace process combining development, foreign policy, and humanitarian aid. Efforts focused on sustainability, gender equality, institutional strengthening, land reform, ex-combatant reintegration, youth, protection of human rights defenders and social leaders 1 . In 2024, EUR 3.5 million were directed towards implementing the peace agreement and sustaining the dialogue processes through trust fund payments. The EU also enhanced access to justice through the Special Jurisdiction for Peace and backed government peace initiatives with a EUR 2.5 million Foreign Policy Instruments project. Of the EUR 31 million allocated under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe 2025–2027 2 , at least 30% intends to support Global Gateway initiatives aimed at reducing social and territorial inequalities to foster peace. The EU and its Member States back Colombia’s peace process by supporting the 2016 Peace Agreement and the government’s Total Peace agenda, including urban peace initiatives and dialogue with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-dissident Estado Mayor. The EU fosters conflict resolution by promoting reform dialogues, coordinating humanitarian action, and supporting inclusive civil society initiatives while providing expertise on humanitarian law and transitional justice, in line with democratic principles. 1 Detailed reports of the results of the EU Trust Fund for Peace are available at: https://www.fondoeuropeoparalapaz.eu/en/. 2 Decision: https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2e2834f5-5ab9-4f07-a5f7e7b32d6b6480_en?filename=ad-mip-2024-c2024-7502-americas-caribbean-annex_en.pdf.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2025-06-23 “E-002496/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 1 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) defines three priority layers of the network, each with specific requirements and target completion dates: the core network by 2030, the extended core network by 2040, and the comprehensive network by 2050. While the Eje Transversal Ferroviario (ETF – ‘Crosslink Railway Corridor’) high-speed rail project, which aims to connect Lleida with Girona by bypassing Barcelona, may support modal shift and sustainable mobility goals, it is currently not included in the TEN-T network as defined by the Regulation. The ETF project is therefore not eligible for funding under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). Nevertheless, the Commission continues to encourage investments that align with the objectives of the European Green Deal and the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy 2 , including initiatives that enhance rail freight and reduce road congestion, provided they are consistent with the TEN-T framework. The ETF infrastructure could receive support of the European Regional Development Fund under the actions dedicated to transport and sustainable mobility, but the concrete conditions for financing needs to be checked by the beneficiary with the authorities responsible for the management of the funds in Spain 3 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1679/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0789. 3 Directorate for EU Funds in the Ministry of Finance, https://fondoseuropeos.gob.es/es-ES/Paginas/Inicio.aspx.”
  EU funding for transportation · EU support of rail transport
• 2025-05-27 “E-002123/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Water Framework Directive 1 (WFD) requires Member States adopting and implementing a programme of measures in each River Basin District (RBD), including measures to reduce or phase out emissions to meet the standards set in the Environmental Quality Standards Directive 2 (EQSD). As required by Article 5 to EQSD, all emissions, discharges and losses of priority substances, including heavy metals listed in Annex I to EQSD, should be listed in an inventory for each RBD including their concentrations in sediment and biota, as appropriate. Heavy metals are in the indicative list of the main pollutants in Annex VIII to WFD, which Member States have to consider including in their monitoring programs. The Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) 3 regulates the environmental impacts of large industrial installations. Its scope now also covers the mining of metals. The process to develop minimum environmental EU-level requirements (Best Available Techniques (BAT) Conclusions 4 ) for these mining activities, which will address emissions to water, has started in 2024 and shall not exceed four years. Within four years of publication of the BAT Conclusions, Member States need to update the permits to comply with the IED, and installations need to comply with the permit conditions. Without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, it is the primary responsibility of the relevant national authorities to ensure the correct implementation and enforcement of the applicable EU legislation. 1 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73. 2 Directive 2008/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directives 82/176/EEC, 83/513/EEC, 84/156/EEC, 84/491/EEC, 86/280/EEC and amending Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 84–97. 3 Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 amending Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste, OJ L, 2024/1785, 15.7.2024. 4 Commission Implementing Decisions establishing the best available techniques (BAT) conclusions, under Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on industrial emissions.”
  Water pollution · Industrial emissions directive (IED)
• 2025-05-05 “E-001803/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The European Affordable Housing Plan (EAHP) will support EU countries, regions & cities in increasing the supply of affordable and sustainable housing, and improve access to housing for people in need, for example by addressing structural challenges and unlocking public and private investment. The Commission will also make proposals to tackle the inefficient use of the current housing stock. The Commission will carefully assess whether the EAHP should consider binding measures such as the ones the Honourable Member refers to. At the same time, the Commission notes that housing affordability are largely a competence of Member States, regions and local authorities, and therefore any avenue on housing will have to respect the principle of subsidiarity. The Commission notes that expenditures on housing and defence are not mutually exclusive and both finance important European objectives. The Commission also notes that it proposed in the mid-term review of the cohesion policy 1 that Member States can double the planned cohesion policy investments in affordable housing. In addition, the Commission works with the European Investment Bank and national promotional banks to establish a pan-European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing and aims to revise the relevant State aid rules. 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council A modernised Cohesion policy: The mid-term review, COM/2025/163 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0163.”
  EU housing policy · EU competences on social policies
• 2025-04-30 “E-001764/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The European Medicines Agency is a decentralised agency of the EU, which is responsible for the scientific evaluation, supervision and safety monitoring of medicines. Scientific criteria are used to evaluate submitted marketing authorisation applications. Cooperation on biotechnology is prioritised under both the EU-Cuba Multiannual Indicative Programme 1 and the EU-Cuba Global Gateway Investment Agenda 2 . Most recent EU-funded initiatives on biotechnology: (i) programme executed by the Pan American Health Organization and the United Nations Development Programme to support the Cuban regulatory agency for Medicines and BioCubaFarma towards meeting international standards, foster innovation and exchanges with European entities, and increase production capacity (EUR 8.5 million grant); (ii) blending operation (EUR 8 million grant linked to a EUR 25 million loan) implemented by Agence française de développement to support the Finlay Institute of Vaccines to increase its production of meningococcal vaccines. Health is one of the 5 pillars of the Global Gateway, and the Commission is committed to supporting the Global South achieve strategic autonomy with a strong focus on supporting sustainable and resilient health systems. 1 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/31833263-a4e0-4027-b98783ac795275d9_en?filename=mip-2021-c2021-9130-cuba-annex_en.pdf. 2 Infographic with priorities/ country project examples under the GGIA EU-Cuba: https://internationalpartnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/8a38960b-b3a8-44db-9013-8030bfe53d56_en?filename=EUCuba-partnership_en.pdf.”
  Joint EU procurement of medicines · Pharmaceuticals regulation in EU
• 2025-03-25 “E-001245/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The European Union welcomes the Arab Recovery and Reconstruction Plan endorsed at the Cairo Summit on 4 March 2025 and is ready to engage with Arab partners, as well as with other international partners, on that basis 1 . Any plan for the future of Gaza must provide credible solutions for reconstruction, governance and security. Recovery and reconstruction efforts must be based upon a solid political and security framework acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians, which provides peace and security to both sides. The EU is determined that there must be no future role for Hamas in Gaza’s governance. In that context, the EU continues to support the Palestinian Authority and its reform agenda, also to help it prepare for its return to govern Gaza. On 14 April 2025, the Commission announced a multiannual Comprehensive Support Programme worth up to EUR 1.6 billion, to foster Palestinian recovery and resilience 2 . While no specific EU budget exists to support reconstruction yet, the Commission is committed to exploring available instruments to establish a contribution once conditions permit. The EU deplores the breakdown of the ceasefire in Gaza and calls for an immediate return to the full implementation of the ceasefire-hostage release agreement 3 . The EU has continuously supported the efforts by the mediators and urges the parties to swiftly find a solution to prevent further loss of life. The EU has repeatedly called for humanitarian aid access and distribution, as well as the supply of electricity to Gaza, to be resumed immediately 4 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/viyhc2m4/20250320-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1055 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/viyhc2m4/20250320-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/viyhc2m4/20250320-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_1052”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-03-06 “E-000966/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU has been consistently clear in its position that settlements are illegal under international law and has repeatedly condemned Israel’s settlement policy and related activities, and the occupation of the Palestinian territory that began in 1967. This was also confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion issued on 19 July 2024 1 . EU positions and policies, including the ones described above, are fully aligned to United Nations resolutions regarding the status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and are consistent with the conclusions of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 19 July 2024. 1 https://www.icj-cij.org/index.php/node/204160”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-02-12 “E-000665/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission stresses that efficient border management must uphold fundamental rights, including human dignity and the principle of non-refoulement. In light of the tragic death of three minors at the Bulgarian border, the Commission notes that it is the responsibility of the Bulgarian authorities to investigate allegations of wrongdoings and ensure accountability. While national authorities are tasked with these investigations, the Commission is in regular contact with Bulgaria to discuss border and migration management issues, including full respect of fundamental rights 1 . 2. The 2021-27 Border Management and Visa Instrument 2 , governed by the Common Provisions Regulation 3 , requires Member States to meet horizontal enabling conditions (HECs), one of which relates to the mechanisms for ensuring compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter). Bulgaria, as all Member States, must demonstrate HEC compliance at the programme’s adoption and implementation 4 . If the Charter HEC is no longer fulfilled at the level of relevant specific objective, the Commission will not reimburse affected expenditure. 3 The 2023 Facilitation Directive proposal 5 explicitly sets out that the elements of the offences included therein are usually not fulfilled when it comes to the provision of humanitarian assistance or the support of basic human needs. The Directive does not aim to criminalise humanitarian aid provided to third-country nationals in line with legal obligations. 1 This engagement includes closely working with the Bulgarian authorities to reinforce the national independent mechanism to monitor fundamental rights compliance at the external borders. The issue was covered within the framework of the Pilot Project for fast asylum and return procedures (https://homeaffairs.ec.europa.eu/reporting-results-pilot-project-fast-asylum-and-return-procedures-bulgaria_en) and has been reinforced under the Cooperation Framework with Bulgaria on border ad migration management (https://homeaffairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/07649e14-1d49-48f1-a08a9f8d8b9d4e9e_en?filename=Cooperation%20framework%20between%20the%20European%20Commission%2 C%20the%20EU%20agencies%20and%20the%20Republic%20of%20Bulgaria_en.pdf&prefLang=it). 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy. 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy. 4 Bulgaria, like all Member States, had to justify that it fulfils all HECs at the adoption of the programme and during the implementation of the programme has put in place measures to ensure the respect of fundamental rights for all projects funded. The Commission has frequent exchanges with the Bulgarian Managing Authority in charge of BMVI. HECs are discussed in Monitoring Committee meetings, during technical level exchanges, and are reported on in the Annual Performance Report. 5 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum rules to prevent and counter the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the Union, and replacing Council Directive 2002/90/EC and Council Framework Decision 2002/946 JHA, 28.11.2023, COM(2023) 755 final, Recital 7.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-02-03 “E-000445/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission is aware of the challenges that unbalanced tourism may create for the infrastructure, the environment, the economy and/or the social fabric of certain local destinations, as well as affecting the quality of the experience for visitors. This was acknowledged by the 2022 report on Unbalanced tourism growth at destination level 1 . The Commission supports through several projects the exchange of good practices among the Destination Management Organisations, including on tourist flows management. The link between tourism and the housing crisis lacks more detailed studies, which will be needed in order to better understand their potential mutual influence. The Commission has already established a Housing Task Force to steer and coordinate the preparation of the European Affordable Housing Plan 2 , with a view to addressing structural drivers of the housing crisis. 2. As announced in the Commissioner for Sustainable Transport and Tourism confirmation hearing 3 , the Commission will present in early 2026 its Sustainable Tourism Strategy, following consultations in the next few months with the European Parliament, Member States, Local and Regional Authorities, other stakeholders of the sector, and tourism destinations. 3. In terms of financing, a guide for EU funding is available for tourism stakeholders 4 , as no single specific instrument is dedicated to promote or manage tourism. For example, EUR 1,79 billion are allocated to Spain for the development of Tourism Sustainability Plans under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF) 5 . Moreover, EUR 4.2 billion between 2021 and 2027 are allocated to sustainable tourism under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), out of which EUR 700 million have been earmarked to Spain. 1 Root causes, impacts, existing solutions and good practices, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/816f1561-3a32-11ed-9c68-01aa75ed71a1/language-en 2 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/proximity-and-social-economy/social-economyeu/affordable-housing-initiative_en 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/nl/press-room/20241029IPR25032/hearing-of-commissioner-designateapostolos-tzitzikostas 4 https://transport.ec.europa.eu/tourism/eu-funding-and-businesses/guide-eu-funding-tourism_en 5 https://www.igae.pap.hacienda.gob.es/sitios/igae/esES/Control/Documents/Anexo%20Decisi%C3%B3n%20ST-9303-2024-ADD-1_es.pdf”
  EU strategy for tourism development
• 2024-11-27 “E-002679/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The unconditional respect and the relentless promotion of international law, including criminal law, are at the heart of both the EU identity and foreign policy. The EU has taken note of the arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and reiterates its support to the ICC and its activities based on the principles set out in the Rome statute. All Member States as state parties to the Rome Statute are obliged to cooperate fully with the ICC, including regarding the implementation of arrest warrants. The High Representative/Vice-President had an exchange with Foreign Ministers at the December 2024 Foreign Affairs Council 1 on the importance of EU support to the ICC. The EU keeps its diplomatic and trade relations with third countries under constant review. The EU has been consistently clear that political engagement and frank and open dialogue are the most effective way to convey the EU’s concerns, including to Israeli partners. The High Representative/Vice-President convened the EU-Israel Association Council on 24 February 2025 2 , which provided an opportunity for the EU and its Member States to discuss the situation in the Middle East and convey the EU’s concerns. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2024/12/16/ 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2025/02/24/”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Support for International Criminal Court
• 2024-11-06 “E-002433/2024 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with the procedure of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility 1 , the Commission disburses payments to Spain following a payment request upon completion of the milestones and targets specified in the Council Implementing Decision on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Spain 2 . The Spanish authorities are responsible for the completion of milestones and targets and the Commission assesses the implementation of the relevant measures exclusively against the specific requirements set out in the Council Implementing Decision. In this specific case, target 218 (‘Budget award of plans promoting the sustainability of Tourism at their destination’) was part of the fourth payment request. The target required the publication in the Official Journal of the award to different local authorities with 35 % of the funds to account for measures addressing green transition, sustainability and energy efficiency/electromobility at destinations and compliance of the selection criteria with the ‘Do no significant harm’ Technical Guidance 3 , but the Council Implementing Decision did not specify the concrete actions to be funded. When assessing the fulfilment of that target, the Commission verified whether those requirements were met and concluded that this target was satisfactorily fulfilled 4 . Member States remain under the obligation to implement their recovery and resilience plans in line with national and EU law. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R0241 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13695-2023-ADD-1-REV-1/en/pdf 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021XC0218%2801%29 4 The Commission’s preliminary assessment of Spain’s fourth payment request of 12 June 2024, page 204 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e8b93743-5a80-4c10-9caa4dabedc95728_en?filename=C_2024_4171_1_EN_annexe_acte_autonome_nlw_part1_v2_1.pdf”
  Agricultural funding
• 2024-11-06 “E-002431/2024 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Drinking Water Directive 1 provides that water intended for human consumption must be wholesome and clean and requires that Member States ‘improve or maintain’ access of people to water intended for human consumption. The competent authorities in the Member States are responsible for the correct implementation of EU law. In line with the Commission’s strategic approach on enforcement action 2 , the most effective way to address individual cases of possible non-compliance, such as the situation described by the Honourable Member, would be the use of the means of redress available at national level. On the other hand, given the systemic nature of the infringements of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive 3 , the Commission pursues an infringement procedure 4 against Spain that covers several agglomerations including Vejer de la Frontera 5 . The Commission has not identified any funding from the European Regional Development Fund 6 to projects in the area of drinking water or sanitation in El Palmar in 2014-2020. Component 5 of the Spanish Recovery and Resilience Plan 7 , funded under Next Generation EU 8 , focuses inter alia on improving the management of water resources. Investment 1 aims at implementing actions on water treatment, sanitation, efficiency, savings, re-use and infrastructure. More specifically, this measure finances the entry into service of water and wastewater treatment infrastructures providing services to at least 425 000 population equivalents in Spain. 1 Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption (recast), OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1–62. 2 As set out in the Communication of 19 January 2017 (EU law: Better results through better application C/2016/8600, OJ C 18, 19.1.2017, p. 10–20) and in the Communication of 13 October 2022 COM (2022) 518 final - Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers. 3 Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste-water treatment - OJ L 135, 30.5.1991, p. 40–52. 4 Reference INFR(2017)2100. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_19_6304 6 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/european-regionaldevelopment-fund-erdf_en 7 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resiliencefacility/country-pages/spains-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en 8 https://next-generation-eu.europa.eu/index_en”
  EU competences on social policies · EU housing policy
• 2024-11-06 “E-002432/2024 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan proposed an ambitious and realistic EU target to reduce the number of people at risk of poverty or exclusion by at least 15 million by 2030. All Member States have defined national targets relating to this EU headline target. A number of EU initiatives 1 have been adopted that directly relate to poverty reduction and their implementation at national level will be key for to achieve the EU target. Looking forward, the political guidelines 2024-2029 2 announced a new action plan for implementing the European pillar of social rights. The first-ever EU anti-poverty strategy will aim to help people to get access to the essential protections and services they need, along with addressing the root causes of poverty. The political guidelines also stress the importance of affordable housing. The Commissioner for energy and housing has been tasked to develop the first-ever European Affordable Housing Plan and – with effect from 1 February 2025 – a Housing Task Force is to be created within the Commission to coordinate all housing-related matters, including those that the Honourable Member mentioned. The Commission will ensure that it has a robust social component catering to the needs of the most vulnerable, including those experiencing or risking homelessness. The European Social Fund+ in Spain has been key in supporting vulnerable groups, particularly single mothers, through targeted investments. The work-life balance directive 3 and the Council Recommendation on early childhood education and care 4 aim at increasing female labour-market participation, including for single mothers. 1 European Child Guarantee, Council Recommendation (EU) 2021/1004 of 14 June 2021 - https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021H1004; Directive on adequate minimum wages, Directive (EU) 2022/2041 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32022L2041; Council Recommendation on adequate minimum income ensuring active inclusion, Council Recommendation (EU) 2023/C 41/01 of 30 January 2023 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023H0203%2801%29; European Platform on Combating Homelessness, Lisbon Declaration on the European Platform on Combatting Homelessness of 21 June 2021; Council Recommendation on Access to social protection, Council Recommendation (2019/C 387/01) of 8 November 2019 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019H1115%2801%29; Commission Communication on better assessing the distributional impact of Member States' policies, COM(2022) 494 final https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52022DC0494 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf 3 Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019L1158 4 Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on early childhood education and care: the Barcelona targets for 2030 2022/C 484/01 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022H1220(01)”
  Support for families · EU competences on social policies · EU housing policy
• 2024-10-24 “E-002255/2024 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The EU aim to ensure the competitiveness of its industry and a well-functioning internal market attractive to investments. As an example, Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 1 (Net-Zero Industry Act (‘NZIA’)) provides instruments to support manufacturing capacities for clean technologies and their key components within the European Union, including wind, and limit dependencies from a single country. Articles 25 and 26 of NZIA compel Member States to introduce non-price criteria in public procurement and auctions and help levelling the playing field. In addition, the Commission introduced instruments to stimulate investments in sectors strategic for the transition towards a net-zero economy. The Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (‘TCTF’) 2 includes provisions related to State aid to promote accelerated investments in these sectors. The TCTF also allows to provide higher individual support where there is a risk of investments being diverted away from Europe. In addition, EU funds such those as those channelled through the Innovation Fund and the funds provided through the Recovery and Resilience Facility also support investments in clean technologies. Last, the Commission enforces trade agreements and where necessary uses trade defence instruments. These instruments could protect the European workforce from delocalisation. Specifically in relation to public auctions, they are the most efficient price discovery mechanism and minimise the need for public support 3 while ensuring a sufficient return for the auction winner. These efforts will continue, including in the context of the Clean Industrial Deal, aimed to ensure competitive industries and quality jobs while decarbonising our economies. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724. 2 Communication from the Commission Temporary Crisis Framework for State Aid measures to support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia (OJ C 101/3, 17.3.2023). 3 COM(2022) 638 final.”
  EU industrial funding · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-16 “E-002116/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has repeatedly called 1 on Israel to fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, in all circumstances. It has recalled the need to fully implement the provisional measures orders rendered by the International Court of Justice on 26 January, 28 March, and 24 May 2024 2 . As such, any actions by Israel must ensure the protection of civilians and their access to humanitarian aid 3 . In its conclusions of 17 October 2024 4 , the European Council reaffirmed its call for an immediate ceasefire, the unconditional release of all hostages, the urgent improvement of access and sustained distribution of humanitarian assistance at scale throughout Gaza, and an enduring end to hostilities, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2735 5 . Control on the export of arms by Member States is subject to national legislation, the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 6 and the Arms Trade Treaty 7 and any applicable restrictive measures. The Commission is not in a position to assess specific export cases against the criteria of the Common Position. The EU strongly condemns the ongoing extremist settler violence in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. It has adopted two sets of sanctions under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against extremist settlers. The adoption of restrictive measures against individuals or entities is a matter for the Council to decide, further to a proposal from either the High Representative/Vice-President or a Member State. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-un-general-assembly-1stcommittee-regional-disarmament-and-security-1_en?s=63; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/09/26/statement-by-the-high-representative-onbehalf-of-the-eu-on-the-military-escalation-between-israel-and-hezbollah/ 2 https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240524-ord-01-00-en.pdf; https://www.icjcij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240328-ord-01-00-en.pdf; https://www.icjcij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf 3 Geneva Convention (IV), Geneva, 12 August 1949. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/17/european-council-conclusions-17-october2024/ 5 https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-res-2735.php 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008E0944 7 https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-text.html?templateId=209884”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Support for International Criminal Court · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• “President within a couple of years. The new generations are going to ask those of the future. What have you done? What was done when and when the genocide was taking place in Gaza? And I know what I'd say. Madame von der Leyen, Madame Kallas. You. You were kind of on the periphery. You. Although the International Court of Justice issued decisions concerning this, you remained on the side, leaving no mark whatsoever. And the 70,000 people, more than that, that have died in Gaza. They can't get up and point at you, but. You, you and other governments continue to provide arms for this machine of annihilation, of genocide and destruction, that of Netanyahu as well. And we saw what happened with the flotilla, the Freedom flotilla. We are not going to stop. We're not going to stop until those who are responsible are held accountable, held accountable at this terrible moment. Thank you.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner. European decadence can be summed up in two images one. Von der Leyen humiliated on Trump's private golf course and the other image is a picture of leaders in her offices taking notes like detained students in detention. Trump has since he came into power and bombed several countries and he's threatened to attack others. Greenland. And we've seen interference in electoral processes such as in Argentina, support for Malay and support for neo-Nazis elsewhere, Trump wants to break up the European Union, but also NATO and the UN. What else does he need to do in order for us to understand this as a threat to our security? How many borders did Hitler have to cross before the world understood that they needed to put a stop to him? Trump has said he doesn't believe in the UN. But. One of the threats comes from within.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Good morning. Thank you for coming to the Parliament today. I don't know whether you saw what happened in Jerusalem yesterday. Israel went into a UN building. They stole material, equipment, and they took down the UN flag and they put up their flag. Are we supposed to do the same at the European Union institutions? Should we take down the EU flag and put up the American flag and the Israeli flag? Because it seems that we're just being the puppets in this new, new, new imperial order of Trump and Netanyahu. You say that we need to defend the rule based order, but in fact you're doing the opposite. The International Court of Justice says that we're dealing with a genocide, but Europe continues to collaborate with the genocide, with its weapons and its money. On top of that, we aren't accepting what the International Court of Justice resolution say. We're actually accepting sanctions from Trump on the UN. So we're not doing enough to protect our institutions. This is inconsistent. If you believe in this international order, you would do something to protect it, and you wouldn't go along with Trump and Netanyahu's whims. Thank you.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Thank you. Chairman. What's happening is very serious. Trump. Doesn't act in line with what his judges say, but he also persecutes judges with sanctions. The most serious thing is that we are playing his game. I'm in a criminal lawyer, and here I can clearly see the crime of intimidation, obstruction of justice, which goes against the statute of Rome. There is a blocking statute, and we've used it in the past to protect economic interests in the European Union. So why don't we use it now to protect our judges? This is of great concern because we have contributed to genocide in Gaza, but now we're contributing to the persecution of judges who are trying to investigate what's going on. And we're doing that by being passive because we have tools to protect them, but we're not using them. The line that separates civilization from barbarity is this. Having independent officials and judges like the judge who we heard from today, who can apply the appropriate measures without fear of reprisals. It's not enough what we've heard from Mr. Tesla. And when he says that the commission regrets what's happened, that's not enough. We shouldn't regret anything. We should act and protect our judges. Not defending our judges makes us accomplices to the crime.”
  Support for International Criminal Court
• “Thank you. Since the so-called ceasefire, 240 people in Gaza have been killed by Israel in the West Bank. We're seeing an increase in illegal settlements and settler violence. In one, uh, month. We've seen over a thousand attacks which have are not being dealt with. There was a mosque set on fire last night. Today in. Ursula von der Leyen said nothing about this because she wants us to forget what's going on there. She wants us to forget European complicity in this, that we continue to not implement resolutions from international courts. We continue to maintain a completely illegal criminal trade agreement with Israel. We continue selling arms to them. We continue being responsible for this apartheid policy and the ethnic cleansing of Netanyahu. But we will still be here. We will still be saying that it's you who is responsible for this, not morally responsible, but politically responsible as well.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Commissioner, are you defending Israel being bombarded because you defend Iran being bombed? Because writes, I don't know, maybe you're defending Israel being bombed as well. Israel is carrying out the worst of all crimes, ie genocide in Gaza and other crimes in other places. They're assassinating thousands of civilians. For example, the children that the school. You defend that. Well, in order to defend Israel's rights. Are you defending them? And do you also defend the fact that judges and prosecutors are being sanctioned for investigating these crimes? There is a blocking statute to neutralize Trump's sanctions. But you you are not implementing this statute. This is not a violation of our sovereignty. It's a crime of article 70 of the Rome Statute. Obstruction of justice. So not only you, are you complicit in genocide? Uh, but you're also complicit in other crimes as well.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Commissioner, the democracy Shield in Spain are falling apart this Friday on the 50th anniversary of the death of Franco. Some Francoists took charge of a state institution. They wanted to filter truth. And they. This was a criminal in Spain. In Germany, we haven't had a true democratic rupture. The dictator died in bed and Francoists accepted elections and they formed a party that now Partido Popular. But they kept the structures of the Francoist State and impunity for those who committed crimes under the dictatorship. People have tried to investigate them, have been threatened. Now they're using structures to persecute judges and prosecutors and others because they don't think that Europe is watching. And for many years during the dictatorship in Spain, Europe turned the other way and looked away. We need to pay attention to what is happening in Spain, because we must not allow the right to kidnap, just judicial powers.”
  Rule of law in Spain
• “Thank you very much. President. Today, Ursula von der Leyen talked about European independence. But Europe has been converted into a colony under Trump's new imperial order. When it comes to military interests, technological technology, energy. Unveil talked about the symbol of anti-fascism a Europe of never again that symbol, this compromise never again that is now buried in the ruins of Gaza. It's been with our weapons. It was done with our money. So we should remember Simone Veil. Um, Europe, uh, should not will not be, uh, independent unless it moves past its colonial gaze. We need more moral coherence. Thank you.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Well, I've listened to the right now and I think what the real problem is in the blackout. It is the ideological cave in which you live. Come out of your cave, Mr. Bouchard. The blackout. It wasn't the sun or the wind. It was an energy system that has been privatised by, you know, public control of that. Your friends as Mr. Aznar's. As friends. When you hide behind the free market, that's a monopoly. And that just looks for economic profit but doesn't invest to avoid this. Experts had seen this coming, but you are a part of that because ex-ministers, previous prime ministers, those who are CEOs, they're sitting there sitting on those tables. So you should look amongst your friends. You defend the interests of companies. You defend your interests. The problem is, is that you think that energy is a privilege and it is a right.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• “Commissioner. Trump doesn't need to kidnap anyone in Europe, as he did in Venezuela, to govern. Because we are obedient subjects, we give up our military bases except for the Spanish one, so that they can be used to bomb a school with more than 100 children there in Iran. When NATO is defending interests, well, we know that the secretary general of NATO made statements the very week that von der Leyen was declaring the end of a rule based order. So finally, the masks are being beginning to fall. So thank you for being honest. But what's the point of being part of a club when being a member, a paying member? You're being told that if a country like Greenland is being attacked, you're not going to get backed up. And if it's Russia, then you're being identified as an opponent all of a sudden. So we must free ourselves from the, um, uh, control a narcissist in charge. Interruption.”
  Relations with NATO
• “Trump's trade war is a symptom, a symptom of a structural crisis of the liberalised trade from the 80s on, and each crisis is an opportunity not to go back to prior positions or to help Trump with his self-destructive war, but to think about fairer policies. That means a great many things, but amongst other things, strengthening the democratic sovereignty of our economy and ensuring that imports respect the labor environmental standards that we do. It also means ensuring that we have a digital area of our own in Europe. It means promoting more balanced multilateralism, and it also means ensuring and encouraging public oversight of strategic sectors. Trump is putting up walls. We need to promote rights. We shouldn't, in fact, come up with more neoliberalism on our side. No. Another world, another form of trade is both necessary and urgent.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)