Michał WAWRYKIEWICZ

Policy topics Michał WAWRYKIEWICZ is active on

What Michał WAWRYKIEWICZ has said (34)

• 2025-06-20 “E-002483/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The EU has strengthened the legislation on critical infrastructure, both from a physical and cyber resilience perspective with the Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities 1 and the Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (the NIS 2 Directive) 2 . ProtectEU, the new European Internal Security Strategy 3 , streamlines EU action in this area. The Council Recommendation on critical infrastructure resilience 4 led to the conduct of stress tests in the energy sector. The review of the energy security of supply framework by 2026 will assess and update the existing EU energy security framework to make it suitable for decarbonisation, as well as to better address emerging risks, including natural hazards or man-made threats. As regards cybersecurity, the EU has a comprehensive framework in force with the NIS 2 Directive and the Cyber Resilience Act 5 , which focuses on cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements. The EU also has specific technical binding rules for cybersecurity in the cross-border electricity flows in the EU and neighbouring countries. Cybersecurity risk assessments are underway in critical sectors, including energy, under Directive (EU) 2022/2555 6 . A risk assessment for wind under the wind package is being carried out, and a similar assessment will be carried out for solar energy infrastructure. The Commission also adapted the first-ever EU network code on cybersecurity for the electricity sector in March 2024 and adopted, with the High Representative/Vice-President, the EU Action Plan on Cable Security in February 2025 7 . In addition, the European Preparedness Union Strategy 8 enhances the EU’s preparedness and readiness for future crises. 1 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC, OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, pp. 164–198. 2 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive), OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, pp. 80–152. 3 COM(2025) 148 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0148. 4 Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure 2023/C 20/01, OJ C 20, 20.1.2023, pp. 1–11. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R2847. 6 See footnote 2. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0009. 8 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Preparedness Union Strategy, JOIN(2025)130 final.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration · Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2025-02-05 “P-000532/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The EU takes note of the announcement made by the President of the United States (US) on 20 January 2025 to temporarily suspend all US foreign assistance programmes for 90 days pending a review by the administration. It also observes that on 28 January 2025, the US State Secretary extended the waivers of the pause to lifesaving humanitarian programmes. The impact of the temporary freeze on US foreign assistance, notwithstanding the waivers in force, cannot be fully ascertained yet, but impacts can already be felt globally. The EU is in close contact with its Member States, donors and aid organisations to assess the impact on EU-funded projects and affected populations. Mitigation measures, including early use of financial reserves, will be put in place, if necessary, to safeguard EU humanitarian response. Measures will be taken on a case-by-case basis in coordination with relevant stakeholders. However, despite all mitigating measures and efforts, the EU cannot be expected to fully compensate for the US foreign aid freeze. As a major development and humanitarian donor, the EU remains at the forefront of global efforts to promote sustainable development and tackle crises. The EU continues its efforts in addressing poverty and accelerating progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals 1 . The EU also remains engaged in fragile countries or in complex settings with specific policy focused on lifesaving actions, supporting the populations’ most immediate needs in terms of food, health, shelter, protection and education. The EU will not step back from its humanitarian commitments and will continue working to save lives and alleviate suffering, in line with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. 1 https://www.undp.org/sustainable-development-goals”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · EU-US relations
• 2024-12-06 “E-002809/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act 1 , the Code of Practice on Disinformation 2 and the Regulation on political advertising 3 provide a robust framework to mitigate the spread of disinformation on online services. The Regulation will ensure transparency of messages designed to influence elections and regulatory processes and will strengthen the rules for targeting political advertising. The Code plays a key role in mobilising online platforms, civil society and factchecking organisations to combat disinformation, including through the Rapid Response System. The EU also supports independent fact-checkers and researchers through the European Digital Media Observatory. The Democracy Shield will aim to combat foreign information manipulation, interference and disinformation. It will strengthen the EU’s ability to detect, analyse and counter threats, increase situational awareness and support societal resilience and preparedness, through digital and media literacy. Mechanisms are being put in place to protect the EU entities 4 via the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2023/2841 5 . Actions are also being taken by the Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board 6 , in cooperation with the Cybersecurity Service for the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies (CERT-EU). Responses can include, on the basis of proposals by CERT-EU, the adoption of mechanisms for incident response coordination and cooperation for significant incidents and for the management of major incidents, including the establishment of cyber crisis management plans at EU entities’ and at EU levels. The Recommendation on inclusive and resilient elections also contains measures on electionrelated cyber threats 7 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising. 4 EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. 5 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, which entered into force on 7 January 2024 – https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj 6 of which the Commission is a member. 7 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 of 12 December 2023.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-12-06 “E-002813/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s rule of law report 1 , published annually since 2020 and covering all EU Member States, contains a specific chapter dedicated to media freedom and media pluralism. The report’s monitoring permits the Commission to identify issues as they arise, thus acting as a preventative mechanism. Where appropriate, the report has contained specific recommendations addressed to the relevant Member States. Article 26 of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) 2 , applicable from 8 August 2025, requests the Commission to ensure that the internal market for media services, including risks to and progress in its functioning, is independently and continuously monitored. This monitoring exercise will be conducted independently by a specialised academic entity in collaboration with researchers from the Member States based on a set of key performance indicators defined by the Commission in consultation with the European Board for Media Services. Article 22 of the EMFA obliges Member States to lay down rules which allow for an assessment of media market concentrations that could have a significant impact on media pluralism and editorial independence. Article 6 requires media service providers to make accessible to the recipients of their services up-to-date information on the total annual amount of public funds for state advertising allocated to them and the total annual amount of advertising revenues received from third-country public authorities or entities. Those provisions shall apply from 8 August 2025. The Commission is not considering additional measures at this stage. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rulelaw/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle_en#rule-of-law-report 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401083”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
• 2024-12-06 “E-002812/2024 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EU has acted firmly to cut its reliance on Russian energy. REPowerEU 1 , adopted in May 2022, sets out a plan to fast forward the clean transition, diversify supplies, and enhance EU energy resilience. The EU phased out Russian coal imports. Oil is down from almost a third to 3% of total EU imports. In terms of gas, the EU reduced its Russian gas imports from over 45% in 2021, to 19% in 2024, replacing it with alternatives from trusted international partners. However, Russian energy, particularly gas, remains in the EU energy mix. To address this, the Commission plans to swiftly adopt a Roadmap to end Russian energy imports by fully implementing REPowerEU. Regarding infrastructure, gas will remain important for the EU’s energy mix in the coming years. The Commission is monitoring ongoing projects, especially Projects of Common Interest and selected REPowerEU projects funded by the Recovery and Resilience Facility, which are vital for EU’s energy security. Completion of these projects will enable the EU to eliminate Russian gas dependency. However, the EU must focus on rapid electrification, renewable energy integration and investing in electricity interconnections as outlined in the Grids Action Plan 2 , to meet climate goals and enhance energy resilience. Given the EU’s climate policy direction and interconnected gas markets, further EU budget support for new gas infrastructure cannot be justified anymore, once ongoing projects are completed. The Energy and Housing Commissioner will present a Clean Energy Investment Strategy in 2025. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/key-documents-repowereu_en 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A757%3AFIN&qid=1701167355682”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-12-06 “E-002810/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission supports the key role that independent civil society organisations (CSOs) play for the well-functioning of democracies, by upholding the common values on which the EU is founded, including the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights 1 . The Commission is working to ensure that CSOs can carry out their activities without undue interference, in an environment where they are protected, supported and empowered. The Commission has a dedicated policy work strand on a thriving civic space 2 , which includes the 2023 Recommendation to Member States on civic engagement 3 . Under the Citizen Equality Rights and Values programme 4 , it has supported almost 1 500 civil society organisations in all 27 Member States with a budget of EUR 1.55 billion for the 2021–2027 financial programming period – the biggest amount ever allocated for this purpose. The Commission will strengthen the engagement and protection of CSOs with all the necessary tools, including with a dedicated Civil Society Strategy, as announced in the 2025 Commission Work Programme. In this context, the Commission will come forward with a dedicated Civil Society Platform to support more systematic civil dialogue and with actions to enhance the protection of CSOs and human rights defenders under attacks. The Commission has adopted a Directive 5 and a Recommendation 6 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’). The Directive entered into force on 6 May 2024 and Member States shall transpose it into national law by 7 May 2026. The Commission is closely following their implementation in the Member States. 1 See the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM/2022/716 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022DC0716 2 https://commission.europa.eu/aid-development-cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-fundamental-rights-eu/eucharter-fundamental-rights/application-charter/thriving-civic-space-protect-fundamental-rights_en?prefLang=es 3 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2836 of 12 December 2023 on promoting the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making processes, C/2023/8627. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/programmes/cerv 5 Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj/eng 6 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2022/758/oj/eng”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · EU engagement with civil society
• 2024-12-06 “E-002815/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU relies on the findings of the International Election Observation Mission led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) with participation of the European Parliament. Its report highlights serious concerns about the impact of recently adopted electoral legislation, the independence of institutions involved in the election process, and pressure and intimidation on voters, including public employees. These factors compromised the ability of voters to cast their vote freely, without fear of retribution. The report also raises concerns regarding post-election developments, including insufficient consideration of complaints and the forcible suppression of protests which go against international obligations and standards, including commitments to uphold freedom of assembly. The EU has urged the Georgian authorities to address the reported concerns swiftly, transparently and independently. This responsibility lies with the Georgian authorities. The EU will continue calling on the Georgian authorities to address the recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR report promptly, in particular in view of the municipal elections of October 2025. This is crucial to rebuild public trust in the electoral process. Since June 2024, the EU has responded to Georgia's democratic backsliding with concrete measures and continues to closely monitor the situation. The EU stands with the Georgian people and their choice for a European future.”
  EU-Georgia relations
• 2024-12-06 “E-002814/2024 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission and the High Representative/Vice President presented the first ever European Defence Industrial Strategy in March 2024. The Strategy was outlining that ‘it is necessary to launch a discussion on quantifying the EU’s financing needs for defence industrial readiness which would be commensurate with this change of the security paradigm, and on how to ensure such adequate financing’ 1 . In June 2024, the European Council invited the Commission and the High Representative to present developed options, to be discussed by the Council, for public and private funding to strengthen the defence technological and industrial base and address critical capability gaps. In this context, the Commission President sent a letter to the European Council on 4 March 2025 presenting the ReArm Europe Plan, including the proposal for a new financial instrument to support Member States in boosting their defence capabilities. This instrument will deliver loans to Member States, borrowing funds based on a guarantee provided by the EU budget. When it comes to the energy transition and green energy it is important to note that Member States still benefit from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Next Generation EU, providing grants and loans to help EU economies emerge stronger and more resilient from the Coronavirus crisis, notably by investing in the green transition. Both the ReArm Europe Plan and the Next Generation EU have been tailored to support Member States in facing exceptional circumstances outside their control while not endangering the financial stability of the EU. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en%5E/ip_24_1321”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2024-12-06 “E-002811/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Promoting a culture of the rule of law is a priority for the Commission. The best guarantee for the respect of EU common values is a robust political and legal culture supporting the rule of law in every Member State. While respecting the competence of Member States to organise their education systems, the Commission supports the implementation of the 2018 Council Recommendation on promoting common values 1 . This collaboration involves policymakers, civil society and social partners in the working group on Equality and Values in Education and Training 2 . Building on the 2023 Council conclusions on citizenship education 3 , the Commission is exploring guidelines for democratic citizenship education and a competence framework tailored for the EU context. The Erasmus+ programme 4 promotes common values through initiatives like the Jean Monnet actions, Erasmus+ Teacher Academies and the European School Education Platform. The Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme 5 supports civil society organisations at all levels in the EU empowering them to enhance democratic processes and protect and promote fundamental values, such as the rule of law. In September 2024, the Commission launched a communication campaign for the general public explaining in accessible terms why the rule of law matters in everyday life 6 . The campaign will also be hosted on the EU Learning Corner 7 , which offers a range of educational materials related to fundamental values. The Commission will explore how to further develop such activities. The annual Rule of Law Report also refers to good practices for promoting a rule of law culture at national and EU level such as the discussion on promoting a rule of law culture through education held in the Education Council in May 2024 8 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2018_195_R_0001 2 https://education.ec.europa.eu/about-eea/working-groups 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202301339 4 https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/ 5 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/citizens-equality-rightsand-values-programme/citizens-equality-rights-and-values-programme-overview_en 6 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rulelaw/rule-law/what-rule-law_en 7 https://learning-corner.learning.europa.eu/index_en 8 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/27db4143-58b4-4b61-a021a215940e19d0_en?filename=1_1_58120_communication_rol_en.pdf”
  EU engagement with civil society · EU engagement with youth
• 2024-10-30 “P-002355/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Regarding an extension of the current General Regime of Conditionality, the Commission is not in a position to make specific commitments in relation to possible legislative proposals. In the exercise of its right of initiative, the Commission follows the better regulation principles when preparing a legislative proposal. The outcome of this process can therefore not be prejudged. Since 2020, the Commission examines rule of law developments in all Member States on a continuous basis through the Rule of Law Report. Five years on, the preparedness of Member States, and of the EU as a whole, to detect, prevent and address emerging challenges has greatly improved. The Rule of Law Report is prepared based on a well-established, transparent methodology that considers different sources. External expertise and input from a variety of international organisations and EU agencies, as well as the Council of Europe and the Fundamental Rights Agency, constitute valuable sources for the Commission’s assessment. The Commission takes full responsibility for the assessment and recommendations presented in the Report. Respect for the rule of law is key for the functioning of the single market and for a business environment that fosters investment and innovation. All aspects of the rule of law currently covered by the annual Rule of Law Report are also relevant for the business environment. The Commission has different instruments at its disposal to ensure compliance with EU law and the functioning of the single market, including monitoring tools such as the Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard, as well as the possibility to initiate infringement proceedings.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “(17:50:01 – 17:51:27): Thank you very much. Thank you very much Commissioner for all of your efforts in the area of justice, rule of law, and human rights. But as we are facing today the fourth anniversary of the beginning of the war in Ukraine, I would like to ask you about the Convention to establish the International Claims Commission for Ukraine. Thank you very much for signing this convention in the name and on behalf of the Commission. I believe this is a milestone in our Europe's collective effort to ensure accountability and justice in Ukraine. So I have a general question about this convention. What is your assessment when it comes to the process of ratification across all the member states? And when it comes to detailed specific issues related to this convention and the operating of this claims commission, do you have any idea about the assessment of the claims, the collection of evidences, legal confirmation of the value of the claims, what will be the method of determining the amount of losses and as a consequence of damages? Could you tell us more about that? Thank you.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “Thank you very much. Um, first of all, I would like to thank the rapporteurs from the Committee on Budget and Budgetary Control, uh, Mr. Germain and, uh, Madam Hohlmeier, uh, for your work. And I find your, um, report already very, very, um, focused and detailed. Uh, so now I would like to, to make some general comments, uh, from my side as, as rapporteur. I generally agree with the position that this regulation should be the subject of, of revision. And, uh, there are some issues related to one wording of the of this legislation of the particular provisions. And second, this legislation also, uh, needs some practical guidelines when it comes to application of this regulation, especially by by the Commission. Uh, one general remark from, from my side is having in mind that we have already five years of application of this legislation is is the general question, uh, what is the protection of the budget of the European Union? Uh, is it only the protection of direct violations of the, of the spending of the European money, or maybe broader? It is also the protection of the of the rule of law as such, because if we do not have, uh, if we do not have proper institutional protection of the rule of law, then, uh, the budget cannot be spent properly, and there are no measures of control of that kind of budget. So this is one one general question, uh, when it comes to detailed comments, uh, the first issue concerns the effectiveness of the conditionality mechanism. Um, and as rightly noted in the report, the Commission has failed to apply, um, the rule of law conditionality regulation in a timely and effective manner, repeatedly delaying the initiation of proceedings against some member states. The Commission's role as guardian Guardian of the treaties requires it to take the necessary steps to trigger the mechanism.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “Thank you. Chair. Mrs.. D'arrigo, having led the council's horizontal drug group and served as a chair of the Emcdda Management Board, how will you ensure that the new agency, EU Drug Agency, maintains a balanced approach that reflects both public health and integral security dimensions, especially when facing Her diverging member States priorities and pressure from third countries. And following up this question also, what practical steps would you take to enhance civil society involvement and integrate innovative priorities like the environmental impact of drugs into EU DA's operational work streams? Thank you.”
  Regulation of drug precursors in the EU
• “Thank you chair. First of all, I would like to to express my admiration and appreciation for Canadian attitude to regarding countering FEMA and and protecting democracy. And as, as we can see, you provided the highest possible standards for democratic resilience. So I am looking forward for the for the cooperation. And I would like to ask you about the potential ways of cooperation and synergy between Europe, European Union and, and Canada, especially when we are planning to operate the, the European Centre for Democratic Resilience. Where do you see the ways and paths for, for our cooperation. Thank you very much.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Thank you. Chair. Dear Minister, first I would like to express my sincere gratitude for. For your commitment. Unwavering commitment to protection of the rule of law, serving today as a minister of justice and being a part of Polish presidency, but also serving back in 2015, between 2015 and 2020 as as Polish Ombudsman. I will try to stick to I will try to stick to, to uh, to request one chair to be to be uh, in the topic of today's debate. I mean, the goals of Polish presidency. My question is about your assessment when it comes to potential improvement of the toolbox of the European Union. That is the, in my opinion, not effective enough. Uh, having in mind the experiences Insists from the last 15 years from Hungary and Poland. And what can we do to debate, to start the debate on it? For this toolbox to be able to improve it. Thank you.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “Madam chair, madam Vice President, dear colleagues, we are discussing today the issue of sovereignty. Digital sovereignty. What does that mean? Actually, it means two things. First, reducing dependence on non EU technologies such as iCloud data, AI and chips. And second, it means safeguarding the EU's right to apply its own digital rules freely. We Europe must build our own tech capacity through open standards, through interaction between separate systems and investment in European solutions. When it comes to sovereign enforcement, please bear in mind that DSA, DMA and AI act are objective laws. They are not political. We don't want to hurt anyone with these laws. They protect consumers. They protect competition and citizens rights no matter where companies are coming from. We, the union, must not give in to political pressure. A consistent enforcement of our laws is the essence of the true sovereignty. Thank you.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• “Thank you chair. First of all, I would like to to express my admiration and appreciation for Canadian attitude to regarding countering FMI and and protecting democracy. And, uh, as, as we can see, you provided the highest possible standards, uh, for democratic resilience. So I am looking forward for the for the cooperation. And I would like to ask you about the potential ways of cooperation and synergy between, uh, Europe, European Union and Canada, especially when, uh, we are planning to operate the the European Centre for Democratic Resilience. Where do you see the ways and paths for for our cooperation? Thank you very much.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Chair. Um, I would like to ask especially both of you, about the engagement of the civil society in the control of the elections. Uh, is this process somehow, uh, organized? Are they prepared to control the elections? And because when we are talking about coordination of our activities here in the European institutions, uh, and, uh, uh, all of the activities inside Armenia and thinking what can be done from our side? How can we be helpful in the process of preparation to, to, to the elections? Thank you.”
  EU engagement with civil society
• “Thank you chair. First of all, I would like to to express my admiration and appreciation for Canadian attitude to regarding countering FEMA and and protecting democracy. And as, as we can see, you provided the highest possible standards for democratic resilience. So I am looking forward for the for the cooperation. And I would like to ask you about the potential ways of cooperation and synergy between Europe, European Union and, and Canada, especially when we are planning to operate the, the European Centre for Democratic Resilience. Where do you see the ways and paths for, for our cooperation. Thank you very much.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “It is it is very clear that after five years, the that the full potential of this conditionality mechanism has not been, uh, properly used, and if the commission were willing, it could make this instrument. A far more powerful. On many occasions, despite Olaf and Eppo pointing to a significant budgetary risk in several member states, the commission failed to act, ultimately deciding on measures in only a single case. The second comment, second issue is that I wish to emphasize is the transparency transparency of the conditionality mechanism. At present, the commission decision making regarding the application of the mechanism lacks clarity. While numerous recommendations have been made by various bodies to to apply it, the Commission decided decisions not to do so have not been adequately explained or justified. And thirdly, but maybe most importantly, the report should address the crucial element of smart conditionality. This is not a marginal, uh, technically, but decisive factor for the credibility and fairness of the entire mechanism, and maybe for the credibility of of the European Union as, as such. Although the regulation explicitly obliges member states whose EU funds are suspended to continue respecting their obligations towards final recipients and beneficiaries, in practice those actors are often deprived of of support, and this leads to a situation in which local authorities, NGOs, entrepreneurs, students and other stakeholders pay the price for Misconduct of central governments. So smart conditionality must therefore guarantee that the ultimate recipients of EU funds are shielded from the political misuse of the mechanism, and that support reaches those who depend on it most. My objective will be to further elaborate on the above mentioned issues, in the opinion that will be prepared by the Libe Committee. Thank you.”
  Conditions to access EU budget
• “Thank you. Chair. Uh, thank you for your presentation. Um, madam Deputy Director, I would like to begin by welcoming the Commission's initiative, which is widely regarded as a very important step forward. The strategy provides a strong starting point. However, the key challenge now lies in ensuring that this implementation implementation of this strategy is effective and that is carried out in close cooperation with those it is intended to serve, namely the civil society itself. The document very heavily relies on the Member States playing a crucial role in enabling and protecting civil space at national, local and grassroots level. It emphasises that member states are often the first to provide concrete support to to civil society. The civil society which is at risk actually. Therefore, the document underlines that working with member States to promote a safe, supportive and enabling environment for civil society organisations throughout the EU is therefore an important priority for the Commission. My question concerns a situation when Member States are unwilling to cooperate in this respect, and do not recognise the protection of the civil society as a priority. Um, which is the fact in in some of the member states. So could you please elaborate us a little bit more? What will be in the situation? What is the assessment of the Commission? What is the programme and the plan of the Commission in the situation when the Member state is not cooperating? Thank you.”
  EU engagement with civil society
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner, colleagues, we are talking today about independence of judiciary, independence of justice. The cornerstone of the European Union and the International Criminal Court stands as one of the central pillars of the international legal order. Its mandate to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression ensures that the gravest violations of international law do not remain unpunished for this system to function. Judges, prosecutors and officials of the court must be able to act independently. Immunity for ICC officials is therefore not a personal privilege. It's a structural safeguard protecting the integrity of the international justice. This principle is particularly relevant today. The prosecutor of the court is investigating allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed on the territory of Ukraine since November 2013, including crimes linked to the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing aggression by Russia. Those who investigate such crimes must not face any pressure. Judicial independence can be undermined not only through political attacks but also through financial leverage. European judges must be free from any pressure. Also economic one. They must always be safe and fully independent. This is in our best interest because only then we can speak about justice. We must strive to strengthen our economy. Our European autonomy and sovereignty to avoid being subject to any external oppression. Europe therefore, needs stronger economic security, greater payment sovereignty, and greater independence from foreign, financial and payment infrastructure. Only a Europe that is economically resilient can ensure that international judges and prosecutors act freely, without any fear and guided solely by the law. Thank you.”
  Support for International Criminal Court
• “Thank you. Chair. Um, Commissioner, thank you for being with us and presenting the the idea of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience, which is, as our rapporteur, Tomas Tobar, presented in the draft report, that this is the operational heart of the European Democracy Shield. My first question is a formal one. Do you support. I understand that you support, but I need the confirmation from the Commission that you support the the idea to to give the legal personality to, to this institution as a separate institution. And second question is about, uh, civil society, uh, that you mentioned during your presentation. Um, how do you want to engage the civil society, non-governmental organizations in the, uh, activity of the of the European Center for Democratic Resilience? Uh, because in my opinion, it pays exceptional role in the protection of democracy. Thank you.”
  EU engagement with civil society
• “Thank you chair. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your presentation. I think we are on the same track, uh, when it comes to observation that that there is an alarming increase of synthetic drugs and and criminal trafficking networks. Um, so so the agency is expected to play a stronger operational role, including better cooperation with Europol and judicial actors. So how would you ensure that this agency you call the modern agency enhances its early warning and threat assessment functions and contributes concretely to security and enforcement efforts, while preserving its core scientific and policy advisory integrity? And the second question is because you have a strong background in Eurojust, is deeply rooted in cross-border judicial cooperation and the agency administration at Eurojust. So so how how do you intend to shift your focus from, from judicial cooperation to the public health and regulatory domain of drugs policy. Thank you.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• “Yeah. Thank you, Madam President. Mr. Commissioner, what I expect from the European Commission when it comes to strategic initiatives for this term is to be decisive, firm guardian of the rule of law and the democracy, using all possible available tools that you have at your at your disposal. But not only. I also expect legislative initiatives to be taken to strengthen the existing toolbox. This is what we learned from in recent years from the countries which were clearly violating our principles, values and rules. This is what we learned from Poland between 2015 and 2023. And this is what we learned from Hungary until now. That even the most appropriate, correct and rapid use of the infringement proceedings, article seven, and also conditionality mechanisms is not effective enough to protect the rule of law. Therefore, I strongly encourage you to work on it, to work on increasing your tools. And what I want to assure you is that this House is ready for cooperation.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “(09:31:45 – 09:33:13): Thank you, chair. I will share, my gratitude for you that you are here with us, Vera and Yoruba. And, my personal remark is that, that's how how progressive participation in the public life can be. The first time when we met back in 2017 here in Brussels, you were the representative of the institution. I was the representative of the NGO, and now on the reverse, you are the representative of the NGO. I am very glad for that. My question is about the the cycle for the rule of law. I don't know if you have heard about the initiative that we presented here in the parliament a couple of months ago with Sofie Wilmes and Alessandro Zahn. This is the the, initiative, the the idea to coordinate all of the toolbox that is in the in the hand of the European institutions to prevent the violations of the rule of law. I would like to know what is your what what is your assessment about this idea, having in mind that we are and your new initiative is is going to face new threats like the digital threats, disinformation, manipulation, AI threats, and all of these threats. And that might be, as a consequence, the violation of the rule of law as well. Thank you.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “Madam president, Commissioner, colleagues, we are discussing today the most important topic of all, and I would like to thank Mr. Leonard for and all the others that work on that file for, for the great job. Protecting children from sexual abuse, especially online, is our core duty. And I believe no one in this House has any doubts about that. With over 32 million reports in 2022. Stronger EU wide protection is urgently needed. The DSA sets a framework but enforcement is still too weak. We need real accountability from platforms and better coordination across all of the 27 member states. This legislation brings essential updates, clear definitions, longer limitation periods, and stronger victim support. This is a great advantage of this document. Parliament must also address online anonymity and poor age controls by promoting effective age verification and identification to protect children. And finally, a huge topic of using artificial intelligence that was raised by the rapporteur at the beginning of this debate. This is probably our biggest challenge in protecting children against sexual abuse. Thank you.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• “Thank you. Chair. Commissioner, thank you for being with us and presenting the the idea of the European Centre for Democratic resilience, which is, as our rapporteur Tomas Tobar, presented in the draft report, that this is the operational heart of the European Democracy Shield. My first question is a formal one. Do you support. I understand that you support, but I need the confirmation from the Commission that you support the the idea to to give the legal personality to, to this institution as a separate institution. And second question is about civil society that you mentioned during your presentation. How do you want to engage the civil society, non-governmental organizations in the activity of the of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience? Because in my opinion, it pays exceptional role in the protection of democracy. Thank you.”
  EU engagement with civil society
• “Thank you. Chair. Commissioner, thank you for being with us and presenting the the idea of the European Centre for Democratic resilience, which is, as our rapporteur Tomas Tobar, presented in the draft report, that this is the operational heart of the European Democracy Shield. My first question is a formal one. Do you support. I understand that you support, but I need the confirmation from the Commission that you support the the idea to to give the legal personality to, to this institution as a separate institution. And second question is about civil society that you mentioned during your presentation. How do you want to engage the civil society, non-governmental organizations in the activity of the of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience? Because in my opinion, it pays exceptional role in the protection of democracy. Thank you.”
  EU engagement with civil society
• “Chair. Um, I would like to ask especially both of you, about the engagement of the civil society in the control of the elections. Uh, is this process somehow, uh, organized? Are they prepared to control the elections? And because when we are talking about coordination of our activities here in the European institutions, uh, and, uh, uh, all of the activities inside Armenia and thinking what can be done from our side? How can we be helpful in the process of preparation to, to, to the elections? Thank you.”
  EU engagement with civil society
• “Thank you. Chair. Um, first of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude for all of the defenders of the rule of law here in this room. And, Madam President, Mr. Commissioner, thank you for all of your efforts to protect the rule of law. We all understand that the rule of law is a cornerstone of our union, and we we are repeating it every day constantly. But we need to assure this, I would say practical aspect of, of of this topic. And having that in mind, I would like to raise two issues. First of all, the toolbox. We definitely have an open debate about the necessity, potential, necessity to improve the European toolbox for the protection of the rule of law. I am personally having the opinion that we need to expand the the the the existing toolbox, what we have right now in our hands, what is our in our disposal? It's not enough to effectively protect the rule of law. And the second aspect is our protection of our internal aspect. We do not have any direct link legal link between the internal market, which works on the basis of the principle of trust and devastation of the rule of law. If any member States devastate the rule of law, we do not have the open and direct mechanism to protect our direct our internal market. Thank you.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “Mr. Commissioner, colleagues, the European Union is undoubtedly under attack. European democracy is challenged by the architecture on online platforms. They play a crucial role in determining what citizens see, share and ultimately what they believe in. The platforms promote content that is polarizing, misleading, and emotionally charged, while fact based journalism and constructive political discourse are structurally disadvantaged. And who benefits most from that? Of course. Russia, whose main goal is to destroy our European unity, values and democratic system, destabilized, weak and manipulated Europe is Russia's strategy. The platforms have learned how to exploit algorithms to spread its propaganda, using coordinated networks, bots and targeted narratives to manipulate visibility and shape political debate. However, the European Union is not powerless against this threat. The European Democracy Shield must not only be a shield, but also a sword that allows us to protect ourselves from those from these acts of hybrid warfare. Now, the Commission needs to use the available tools to ensure that Europe's digital public space is resistant against Russian propaganda. Thank you.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Thank you. Chair. Um, Commissioner, thank you for being with us and presenting the the idea of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience, which is, as our rapporteur, Tomas Tobar, presented in the draft report, that this is the operational heart of the European Democracy Shield. My first question is a formal one. Do you support. I understand that you support, but I need the confirmation from the Commission that you support the the idea to to give the legal personality to, to this institution as a separate institution. And second question is about, uh, civil society, uh, that you mentioned during your presentation. Um, how do you want to engage the civil society, non-governmental organizations in the, uh, activity of the of the European Center for Democratic Resilience? Uh, because in my opinion, it pays exceptional role in the protection of democracy. Thank you.”
  EU engagement with civil society
• “Thank you chair. First of all, I would like to to express my admiration and appreciation for Canadian attitude to regarding countering FMI and and protecting democracy. And, uh, as, as we can see, you provided the highest possible standards, uh, for democratic resilience. So I am looking forward for the for the cooperation. And I would like to ask you about the potential ways of cooperation and synergy between, uh, Europe, European Union and Canada, especially when, uh, we are planning to operate the the European Centre for Democratic Resilience. Where do you see the ways and paths for for our cooperation? Thank you very much.”
  Foreign interference in Europe