Marta WCISŁO

Policy topics Marta WCISŁO is active on

What Marta WCISŁO has said (15)

• 2025-09-12 “P-003527/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In the State of the Union speech on 10 September 2025 1 , the President of the Commission announced that, building upon Ukrainian ingenuity and experience in drone warfare, the EU will form a Drone Alliance with Ukraine. The Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 2 , presented on 16 October 2025 sets concrete timelines and milestones. The roadmap focuses on strengthening EU and Ukrainian capacities in drones and counter drone technologies to meet real operational needs. The Commission has already invested over EUR 1 billion in 52 projects through EU defence industrial programmes, while the new BraveTech EU initiative will further accelerate drone innovations 3 . The Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President also propose a set of initial European Readiness Flagships including: the European Drone Defence Initiative, building on lessons from Ukraine on innovative drone and counter-drone ecosystems, linking Research and Development with scalable production capacity, continuous technological development and the Eastern Flank Watch, to strengthen Eastern border Member States’ capacity to face hybrid threats, Russia’s shadow fleet and potential aggression. The Commission will also advance implementation of its counter-drone programme set out in the Communication of 18 October 2023 4 focusing on harmonising Member States’ frameworks and upgrading the Joint Research Centre living lab into a Counter-Drone Centre of Excellence. The Commission will expand EU-funded training, pool and share capabilities, and set common performance standards and testing methods. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025JC0027. 3 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/bravetech-eu_en. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023DC0659.”
  EU competences on defence · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · Defence spending
• 2025-09-03 “E-003378/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has no plans to reduce the scope of emissions covered by EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). Installations manufacturing fertilisers and nitrogen compounds are protected against carbon leakage: currently by free allocation under the EU ETS and in the future by the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). From 2026, CBAM will gradually place a carbon price on imports of fertilisers, equivalent to the price paid by EU producers under EU ETS. CBAM will be phased in completely (100% of embedded emissions payable) in 2034. In the meantime, for emissions that are not covered by CBAM, installations are eligible for free allowances until 2030 at 100% of the benchmark value (which is based on the emission intensity of the best-performing 10% of installations). The Commission is examining the future of carbon leakage protection beyond 2030 in the ETS review, which is due in the third quarter of 2026. The Chemicals Action Plan 1 outlines further action that the Commission is taking to modernise and strengthen the competitiveness of the chemicals sector, including a Critical Chemicals Alliance to address risks of production capacity closures, simplification options via the ‘omnibus’ packages, and action to support low-carbon fertilisers derived from hydrogen or bio-based chemicals. 1 A European Chemicals Industry Action Plan. COM(2025) 530 final.”
  Climate efforts · Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2025-08-27 “E-003311/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In the State of the Union Speech on 10 September 2025 1 , the President of the Commission announced the Eastern Flank Watch and Drone Wall initiatives. These have been included as proposals for European Readiness Flagships in the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 2 . They aim to create a strong and credible European defence posture, in particular along EU’s Eastern external borders. The Eastern Flank Watch entails surveillance capabilities, including from space, as well as the European Defence Drone Initiative. The Flagships will enhance the security of the entire EU. The Commission will support Member States to develop and procure the capabilities necessary, including capabilities to counter drones from crossing the border and entering Europe’s airspace, seas or territories through this initiative. The Commission will also support the effort through its security research and innovation programmes, the development of European drone and counter-drone technologies for civilian applications, thereby complementing defence-related initiatives and contributing to Europe’s technological and industrial autonomy. The President of the Commission also announced that Europe will frontload EUR 6 billion from the extraordinary revenue acceleration loan and establish a Drone Alliance with Ukraine, which will further strengthen security across the entire region. On 23 October 2025, the European Council asked 3 to focus in particular on concrete projects to reinforce Member States’ joint efforts to enhance their anti-drone and air defence capabilities, in a coordinated manner, by making full use of the Security Action for Europe 4 and European Defence Industry Programme 5 instruments and other relevant existing financial tools. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-836460afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/d2nhnqso/20251023-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024PC0150&qid=1762879127536.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure · EU competences on defence
• 2025-08-06 “P-003196/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the occurrence of the events referred by the Honourable Member that have affected certain agricultural sectors and producers. It has received the information provided by the Polish Minister for Agriculture on the impact of these events. The Commission is currently analysing this information and will take a decision once the assessment is completed. If justified, the Commission will adopt the necessary measures to provide emergency financial support for the affected sectors and producers. The total amount available will take into account, in particular, the weight of Poland in the Union’s agricultural sector, as well as the impact of the adverse climatic events. In order to complement the current support from the agricultural reserve, the Commission has proposed a new type of crisis payments for farmers as part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) simplification package adopted on 14 May 2025 1 . If adopted by the colegislators, it will allow the Member States to compensate severe production losses following natural disasters, adverse climatic events or other catastrophic events, funded through the CAP Strategic plans by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund and/or the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, possibly with additional national financing. The proposal is currently subject to the ordinary legislative procedure. These two instruments would provide a comprehensive framework for crisis management until the Unity Safety Net is agreed upon the legislators and becomes effective with the next Multiannual Financial Framework. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0236&qid=1755522787846.”
  Agricultural funding · Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1)
• 2025-01-31 “P-000434/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission proposed on 28 January 2025 a regulation to the Council and the European Parliament with the aim to increase gradually customs duties on nitrogen-based fertilisers imported from Russia and Belarus 1 . This proposal responds to a surge in imports, which could disrupt the EU market and harm the EU producers. In addition, this measure is vital to ensuring the EU food security and addressing growing utilization of Russian gas in its fertilizers’ production. At the same time, the proposal is carefully calibrated to minimize the risk of price increases for EU farmers. The Commission proposal does not include codes of the Combined Nomenclature 3103 (phosphorus fertilisers) or 3104 (potash). These are mineral fertilisers that are not produced from natural gas. All imports of phosphorus fertilisers from Russia are covered by the measures proposed, since they consist of monoammonium phosphate (MAP) and diammonium phosphate (DAP), not of phosphates. Furthermore, unlike for nitrogen fertilisers, whose sources of supplies are more diverse and sufficient, the pool of alternative suppliers on phosphorus and potash is more limited. Also, imports of potash from Russia and Belarus are subject to quantitative restrictions under Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 2 , as subsequently amended 3 , and the import ban under the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Council Regulation (EU) 2022/3554. The Commission continues monitoring the market of fertilisers inter alia through the Fertiliser Market Observatory and will do its utmost to facilitate the ordinary legislative process. 1 COM(2025) 34 final; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0034 2 OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 1–1; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2014:229:FULL 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj/eng 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/355/oj/eng”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Import of agri-food products in the EU · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2024-11-26 “P-002660/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has been closely monitoring the situation regarding EU’s import of nitrogen fertilisers from Russia and Belarus. For nitrogen fertilisers of heading 3102 1 , imports in the first half of 2024 reached 1.3 million tonnes, i.e., 27% more than in the first 6 months of 2023. An increase has also been observed in fertilisers mixtures containing nitrogen of heading 3105 2 , with Russia exporting in the first half of 2024close to 700 000 tonnes, almost double than one year before. It is worth mentioning that some fertiliser types, albeit not urea or nitrogen fertilisers, are also subject to restrictions under EU sanctions, i.e. a quota on imports of potash fertilisers from Russia 3 and a ban on Belarus 4 . The surge in imports clearly indicates a growing risk of further dependency on Russian supplies. The EU cannot afford to deepen its reliance on Russia in such strategic sectors linked to food security. Therefore, the Commission has proposed on 28 January 2025 a regulation 5 to the Council and the European Parliament with the aim to increase gradually duties on nitrogen-based fertilisers imported from Russia and Belarus. The measure should contribute to preserving a competitive EU fertiliser industry, reduce dependencies while also ensuring that EU farmers have access to ample and diverse sources of fertilisers. Where there is unfair competition stemming from imports, the EU uses trade defence instruments to restore fair competition. There are anti-dumping measures in place on imports of mixture of urea and ammonium nitrate from, inter alia, Russia 6 which are currently subject to an expiry review. There are also measures in place on ammonium nitrate 7 from Russia. Where measures are no longer effective, they may be reviewed. 1 Heading 3102 as defined in the EU Combined nomenclature: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2522 of 23 September 2024 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402522 2 Heading 3105 as defined in the EU Combined nomenclature, see footnote 1. 3 Article 3(i) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0833-20250225 4 Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02006R0765-20180224 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0034&qid=1742811387528 6 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1688, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019R1688 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020R2100”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU · Use of fertilisers
• 2024-10-16 “E-002090/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission provides dedicated assistance in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to support the regions at the EU`s northeastern external border to manage the consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. EUR 150 million from the European Regional Development Fund, initially allocated for Interreg programmes with Russia and Belarus, have been reallocated to internal Cross-Border Cooperation programmes to expand cooperation opportunities between the EU regions bordering Russia and Belarus and other EU regions. The eastern border regions in all concerned Member States benefit from substantial cohesion policy funding in the period 2021-2027. The Commission encourages Member States to use all available EU funding to address the new needs of the regions most affected by the war. The mid-term review of their programmes can be an opportunity to review the situation. 2. and 3. In the Political Guidelines for 2024-2029, the Commission’s President proposed a more focused, impactful and simpler budget, and a strengthened cohesion and growth policy with regions at the centre. This policy will be designed in partnership with national, regional and local authorities in order to address regional and social disparities, including in the aforementioned regions, and ensure all citizens have an effective right to stay in the place they call home.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• “Thank you very much. Madam president, Commissioner, today we are talking about changes to the Common Agricultural Policy. These changes could be beneficial for Poland and all of the member states. I am talking about the simplification of administrative burdens, greater flexibility for farmers, the omnibus. It is important for us to act in a more efficient and rapid way. We have the proposal to have a higher threshold at 2500 for smaller farmers. This is useful for Polish farmers, in particular in the Lublin area. It's important to have stability of production, food security. But the Mercosur agreement is a real danger. Commissioner, I ask you on behalf of Polish farmers to end this destructive agreement with the Mercosur countries. Polish farmers are giving away their products for free because it's so hard for them to sell them. So I invite you to come to the Polish countryside and you can get free vegetables because of the cost of transport and production. And the Mercosur agreement is simply going to end any viability for Polish farmers.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Record a sport of inspiration. Dla. Dzieci. Mojej. Normalization. Stosunku. I do. Globalni. Ogromny. Zagrozenia. Crema de la rosée. De. Propaganda. Régime I pozwala mu obras de zbrodni na. I signal zasady mozna bez. Consequential to Odessa. Fundamental. Bezpieczenstwa. Europe. Kazdy. Symbol of jest. Ambassador. Polityki I zbrodni nie ma.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Yeah. Thank you. I will be speaking Polish. So, Mr. Prime Minister, it is great pleasure to hear that the Danish presidency is going to be based on defense as a priority defense and security of European citizens. Just like the Polish presidency. I hope that this will continue to be the direction you will move in, as we did. I know that, you see. These priority are to protect Europe, defence and aid to Ukraine as real priorities. Now what about border countries like Belarus, for example? How do you what actions do you think concretely could be taken in order to support these countries and regions, which are really at the front line here? Projects like the Baltic Defence Line and the shield, the Eastern shield, will these still be supported? How can we enhance security and cooperation in the border areas, uh, to Eastern Europe, which indeed are bearing the weight of this war in Ukraine and hybrid war Being waged by Belarus and Russia. Thank you again and thank you for those priorities which are totally consistent, which resemble the Polish presidency's priorities, which are necessary and expected.”
  EU-Ukraine relations
• “Thank you very much. Um, when we're looking at audits. The European Commission information seems to be quite different to your own. We need to ensure, of course, that spending EU money is transparent and we need to avoid real cases of fraud. I think that is the situation where we need to have sanctions and we need to take proper action. However, often we are talking about small and medium sized enterprises in these situations, and the procedures are simply too complicated for them. And that's perhaps where errors are coming in. President von der Leyen herself said that simplification would be introduced in these areas. However, we have discovered that the simplification measures that have happened thus far are simply not enough. What is of particular concern is that the Court of Auditors now seems to be. Saying that measures need to be taken to ensure that their member states can. Perhaps not have access to these funds in the future. And I don't know. Whether that's the right way of doing things I think irregularities need. To be looked at in different ways. We need to look at how simple they are. Whether it's fraud or whether it's just a mistake that's been made. Particularly in relation to absorption pressure, I think it's important.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• “So we're talking about the need for greater flexibility on the production side. And the marketing of organic agricultural products. So once again, perhaps I can say that we're talking about the sort of marketing of organic agricultural products and the restricted use of protein based feeds when there is a scarcity of such supply. We also need a more balanced approach when it comes to residues. And non-authorised substances. And we're talking about changes to the MRL values. We're talking not only about norms or standards but talking about the future of agriculture. Our aim is to ensure that 25%. Of agricultural surface area is devoted to organic farming. Article 29. Now. I think we need to be clear as to. Unauthorized or prohibited substances actually means what we understand by that term. I think we need a clear and uniform definition, but I do understand that that is going to be difficult, which is why in the amendment we have tabled this term non-authorised substances or produce products, I think is something that should be further defined.”
  Maximum residue levels
• “Thank you very much. I shall speak Polish. How cynical you have to be to be criticising renewable energies in the Parliament whereas your colleague, Mr. Jackie, Mr. Chernick, is is active in this sector. How cynical you must be to be criticizing the Green Deal while your government, your government, Mr. Morawiecki as the president, he supported the Green Deal. This is a truly false attitude to be standing here, here in Parliament and telling us that it is Mrs. von der Leyen who is responsible for the prices of energy in Europe. Whereas the conflict in the Near East in the Middle East was caused by Mr. Trump. You should be ashamed.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you. I will be speaking Polish. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. A while ago we had. We could see cynism and populism on the right side of the Polish Peace Party. Politicians who blamed the European Commission for high prices of fuel and of fertilizers. And they forgot that it was their idol who caused the war in the East, and they forgot that for years they made Europe dependent on Russian fertilizers, and that in Poland they led to a huge loss of nitrogen plants. Ladies and gentlemen. Yes, indeed. Today the nitrogen sector needs support. We need the ETS revision. Farmers cannot be those upon whom we put all the costs. And those plants, the Polish Pulovski Azote plants cannot be the ones who will suffer due to regulations of ETS. Ets revision is necessary. Thank you.”
  Use of fertilisers
• “Madam president, colleagues, I think agriculture needs to be competitive. And in order to have this competitive competitiveness, we have to have a well priced fertilisers to get that. We need lower gas prices because gas is needed when you produce fertilisers on the basis of nitrates. But gas is not the only price component. Actually, ETS and cbam come into play. It would be important to, for the moment, put aside both ETS and Cbam. However, in this room I hear pro Russian narrative because it is Russia who for years was making sure that Poland was dependent on coal, gas and oil. And today in this House, people stand up and criticize the policy of the EU. Maybe it would be more honest to just give up on the pension paid out in euros and go for the Russian ruble.”
  Use of fertilisers