Claudiu-Richard TÂRZIU

Policy topics Claudiu-Richard TÂRZIU is active on

What Claudiu-Richard TÂRZIU has said (34)

• 2026-06-17 “(15:18:37 – 15:20:06): Commissioner, we want electrification, but how? We wanted to switch from gas and oil to electrical power. Okay. But that's not okay at all. But your plan doesn't say anything about nuclear power. All you want is solar panels and word and wind turbines, most of which are brought in from China. When Romania have safe, clean power, hydropower, and nuclear power from Cernavodo. We could produce more of both. But sometimes the European Commission doesn't agree with that, doesn't want that. You want 1 rule for the whole of the union, 1 3rd electrical power until 2030. But Romania, for instance, has villages that do not have a 3 phase electrical power supply at all. You cannot ask us to go at the same pace as more advanced countries. You want the Romanian citizen's electrical vehicle to be used by the grid without his permission when the state needs power, his battery, other people's decision. That's rather weird. We want electrification, no doubt about that, but with funding especially allocated to villages with the use of nuclear power and only in the conditions in which man is in charge and not the system. Thank you very much. And now miss madam Fris.”
  Nuclear energy
• 2026-02-06 “P-000486/2026 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission 1. In its Commission Implementing Decision of 28 May 2025, the Commission concluded that milestone 215 was not satisfactorily fulfilled and, as a result, EUR 231 million was suspended in relation to that milestone 1 . 2. The Commission concluded that milestone 215 could not be considered satisfactorily fulfilled because, following the Romanian Constitutional Court’s Decision 724/2024 of 19 December 2024 2 , the new legislation on special pensions does not strengthen the contributory principle of the system and does not correct the inequities between beneficiaries of special pension categories and beneficiaries of the public pension system from the point of view of the contributory aspect. 3. Following the Commission Implementing Decision of 28 May 2025, Romania had six months to address the shortcomings identified by the Commission. On 28 November 2025, the Romanian authorities submitted documentation on four suspended milestones, including milestone 215, which the Commission is currently assessing. Pursuant to Article 24(8) of the Recovery and Resilience Facility Regulation 3 , once the Commission has completed its assessment, it will communicate its findings to the Romanian authorities. Romania will then have two months to submit its observations before the Commission proceeds with any final decision. No decision to reduce the financial contribution has been taken at this stage. 1 See the Commission Implementing Decision of 28.5.2025 on the authorisation of the disbursement of the third instalment of the non-repayable support and the third instalment of the loan support for Romania https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/647a956c-b008-4a82-96519f87286a2ad1_en?filename=C_2025_3487_1_EN_ACT_part1_v3.pdf. The relevant assessment and conclusions related to milestone 215 are in recitals 9, 121-129, and 155-158. 2 See the Romanian Constitutional Court’s Decision 724/2024 of 19 December 2024 https://www.ccr.ro/wpcontent/uploads/2025/02/Decizie_724_2024.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj/eng.”
  Conditions to access EU budget · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2025-11-28 “E-004717/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The European Democracy Shield is designed in full respect of the allocation of competences between the EU and its Member States. It stresses that Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) and disinformation campaigns are often enabled by manipulation techniques, like AI-generated content or AI-driven amplification. The EU has a strong regulatory framework to address these challenges, including the AI Act 1 and the Digital Services Act 2 . In addition, the Regulation on political advertising 3 provides that political advertising must be clearly labelled and include information on who paid for it and whether targeting or ad-delivery techniques have been used. Building on this framework, the European Democracy Shield sets out further measures, including work with signatories of the Code of Conduct on Disinformation 4 to improve the detection and labelling of AI-generated and manipulated content on social media. Furthermore, the Commission announced guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes. The European Centre for Democratic Resilience will provide a framework for cooperation and coordination among participating Member States and EU institutions and bodies, in full respect of the allocation of competences. Under the European Democracy Shield, support to free and independent media and media pluralism is a priority, building on the EU regulatory and policy framework. To further support the viability of the media sector, the Commission will assess ways to strengthen the prominence of media services of general interest and modernise advertising rules as part of the evaluation and upcoming review of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 5 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence, OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024. 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services, OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, pp. 1–102. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj). 4 https://disinfocode.eu/the-code. 5 Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities, OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, pp. 69–92.”
  EU political integration · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-11-19 “E-004627/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission carried out an audit on Integrated Territorial Investment (ITI) Danube Delta operations in 2023. The audit conclusions were sent to the Romanian authorities and have led to a number of actions that need to be implemented by the Romanian authorities in order to address the deficiencies identified in the audit. The findings of the audit were complex and require an extensive follow-up from the authorities to implement all recommendations, including financial corrections. Commission audit reports are sent to the concerned national authorities but are not published. 2. A number of projects were affected by irregularities and there are ongoing follow-up actions by the Romanian authorities to correct those irregularities, as identified by the Commission audit report. The Commission is monitoring the implementation of those corrective actions. 3. According to the Commission’s practice, audit reports are not published, even once finalised. They are being sent to the Member State concerned as part of the Commission’s usual practice, first for a contradictory procedure and second as a final audit report for implementation of the audit recommendations. The same applies to reports resulting from the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigations. It is not for the Commission to publish any findings of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) investigations, as the EPPO is fully independent from the Commission.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-10-15 “E-004031/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission highlights its commitment to ensure that EU legislative, policy and administrative measures adhere to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 1 which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. The Commission stresses that in individual cases, it is primarily for Member States, including their judicial authorities, to ensure that fundamental rights are effectively respected and fulfilled 2 . Under the Victims’ Rights Directive 3 all victims of crime, including victims of torture, are entitled to a set of rights. To strengthen those rights, the Commission adopted a proposal for the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive 45 . In addition, the 2004 Compensation Directive 6 obliges Member States to establish national compensation schemes to victims of violent intentional crimes and to guarantee access to fair and appropriate compensation. The modalities of those schemes, however, remain the responsibility of Member States. The Commission supports and protects victims of crime through funding instruments, such as the Justice programme 7 and the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme 8 . The EU is committed to eradicating torture globally as part of its internal and external policies, highlighted in the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2027 9 . The EU promotes global initiatives like the Global Alliance for Torture-Free Trade and supports the United Against Torture Consortium 10 , aiming for comprehensive measures against torture. 1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 391 – 407. 2 The views of regional and UN human rights mechanisms, such as those of the UN Committee on Torture, offer important guidance on the gaps in national compliance with international standards and ways to strengthen the human rights enjoyment in practice. 3 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57. 4 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, COM/2023/424 final. 5 Some of the proposed amendments specifically refer to victims of core international crime. The proposal includes amendments related to victims’ right to compensation from the offender and right to legal remedies. It is currently under negotiations by the co-legislators. 6 Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 relating to compensation to crime victims, OJ L 261, 6.8.2004, p. 15. 7 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/justice-programme_en; Regulation (EU) 2021/693 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Justice Programme, OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 21. 8 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/citizens-equality-rightsand-values-programme/citizens-equality-rights-and-values-programme-overview_en. 9 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-action-plan-human-rights-and-democracy-0_en. 10 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/united-against-torture_en.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · EU policy on victims' compensation rights
• 2025-09-30 “E-003797/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Commission shares the assessment that urgent action is needed to address the challenges presented in ’Europe’s Environment 2025’ 1 . At the same time, the report confirms that strong policies deliver real impact. Greenhouse gas emissions have gone down by 37% since 1990, while the EU economy has grown by 70%. Premature deaths from air pollution have nearly halved. These successes are the outcome of environmental policy measures and their effective implementation. The 2025 Environmental Implementation Review 2 shows that the latter is significantly less costly than consequences of inaction such as higher healthcare costs. Slow progress in biodiversity protection, circular economy and transport emissions is a reminder that staying the course on environmental policy goals is essential, including to reap the co-benefits for strategic autonomy and economic security. In addition to agreed measures such as the Nature Restoration Regulation 3 or the Emissions Trading System 4 for road transport and buildings, the Commission has presented a Water Resilience Strategy 5 and will present a Circular Economy Act in 2026. The proposed next Multiannual Financial Framework 6 includes a 35% climate and environment spending target, providing strong public funding to reach environmental goals, and tools to crowd in private investment to reinforce Europe’s leadership in clean tech innovation. In its recent environment omnibus, the Commission proposed simplifying rules relating to industrial emissions, circular economy, environmental assessments for permitting, and geospatial data. The changes will reduce the administrative burden for businesses 7 while keeping the EU's ambitious objectives to protect the environment and human health. 1 https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/europe-environment-2025. 2 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/2025-environmental-implementation-review_en. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869, OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024. 4 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/carbon-markets/ets2-buildings-road-transport-and-additional-sectors_en. 5 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/environment/water-resilience-strategy_en. 6 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/eu-budget-2028-2034_en. 7 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/attachment/882049/Factsheet-EnvironmentalOmnibus.pdf.”
  Climate efforts · Circular economy · Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2025-09-30 “E-003790/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1 The unique situation of the Danube Delta and the importance of its ecosystem demands particular attention within the meaning of Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 1 . Via EU cohesion policy, Member States conduct their economic policies and coordinate them in such a way to attain the objectives set out in Article 174. The place-based approach of cohesion policy provides Member States with flexibility to allocate funding to regions based on identified needs to address socio-economic and territorial disparities. 2 The TFEU establishes the legal framework for the outermost regions and the adoption of specific measures applicable to them. Any change to this list of regions and the description of their specific characteristics would require an amendment of the Treaty. 3 Cohesion policy investments have been supporting the sustainable development of the Danube Delta through a specific ‘integrated territorial investment’ instrument. With more than EUR 400 million in the 2021-27 period earmarked across different programmes, these investments contribute directly to the achievement of the objectives of the Integrated Sustainable Development Strategy of the Danube Delta. The Danube Delta also benefits from international cooperation projects from several territorial cooperation programmes (Interreg), including the Danube Region, Romania-Bulgaria, and Black Sea Basin. Interreg priorities focus on promoting climate change adaptation, enhancing inclusive and qualitative social services, developing research and innovation. The region is also a major focus of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region. This macroregional strategy addresses shared challenges including environment, transport, and economy. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/LSU/?uri=CELEX:12016E174.”
  Funding for OCTs and outermost regions · Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-09-11 “E-003517/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The European Climate Law sets a legally binding target of net zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050. The law also sets the intermediate target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990. The EU institutions and the Member States are bound to take the necessary measures at EU and national level to meet the target, considering the importance of promoting fairness and solidarity among Member States. Member States are responsible for defining commitments and trajectories leading to this target in the National Energy and Climate Plans and in the Territorial Just Transition Plans. To achieve them, they take active measures, based on their national and regional context. The Just Transition Mechanism, supporting regions in addressing negative impacts of the transition to climate neutrality, is expected to mobilise ca. EUR 55 billion. Romania receives support from the Mechanism, including through a dedicated allocation of over EUR 2.1 billion from the Just Transition Fund (making it the third largest beneficiary). Under EU cohesion policy, Romania has access to an envelope of almost EUR 31 billion to tackle development challenges, including in relation to the energy transition. Furthermore, there are other funding opportunities and initiatives to help regions and countries phasing out of coal, such as the Modernisation Fund, only available to the 13 lower-income Member States (including Romania). The Coal Regions in Transition Initiative 1 , whose next round starts in December 2025, aims at improving the regions’ technical and administrative capacity for clean energy transition and better competition, supporting Member States in their transition away from coal and other fossil fuels. 1 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/clean-energy-transition/eu-coal-regions-transition_en.”
  Climate efforts · Energy transition (state support)
• 2025-08-27 “E-003317/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission Current research 1 indicates that Artificial Intelligence (AI) is unlikely to replace whole professions. Rather, it is expected to affect job quality and the organisation of work, automating certain tasks while complementing others. The Commission’s approach is to ensure that AI is developed and deployed in a safe and trustworthy manner, fully respecting fundamental rights while supporting workers in adapting to technological change and promoting fair workplaces. This is supported by a broad labour law acquis as well as specific legislation. The Platform Work Directive 2 promotes transparency and fairness in algorithmic management, ensuring both workers and self-employed are informed about task allocation, pricing, and can contest automated decisions or request human review. The AI Act 3 classifies AI systems used in employment and worker management as high-risk, imposing strict requirements for transparency, safety and human oversight to support ethical AI deployment. In parallel, the Commission is investing in skills development, lifelong learning and social dialogue to ensure that workers can seize the opportunities offered by AI while limiting risks. The Union of Skills, 4 launched in March 2025, will play a central role in equipping workers with the skills needed to thrive in AI-driven economies and in making the green and digital transitions socially fair and inclusive. Building on this foundation, the Commission will present still in 2025 a Quality Jobs Roadmap, which will address, among others, the impact of digitalisation on the workplace. 1 https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/what-skills-and-abilities-can-automation-technologies-replicate-andwhat-does-it-mean-for-workers_646aad77-en.html. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/2831/oj/eng. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828(Artificial Intelligence Act) - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/union-skills_en.”
  Artificial Intelligence · EU support for cultural and creative sector
• 2025-05-22 “E-002054/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. In line with the principles of better regulation, the upcoming legislative proposal on animal welfare on farm will be accompanied by a comprehensive impact assessment, just as the legislative proposal from 2023 on the welfare of animals during transport was 1 . These assessments consider the structural differences across Member States, including the diversity of farm sizes and production methods. In addition, the Commission performs extensive stakeholder consultations to take into account the realities on the ground. The objective is to ensure proportionate rules while still achieving the intended welfare outcomes. 2. Based on the outcome of the impact assessment and stakeholder consultations, the Commission will aim to propose proportionate rules for on-farm animal welfare with a gradual approach, species-specific transition period, and to provide farmers with sufficient financial support and time to adapt. The harmonised and modernised rules will also provide farmers with the assurance of a long-term stability for their investments. The transport proposal adopted in 2023 is now in the hands of the co-legislators. 3. Modernising EU animal welfare rules presents a strategic opportunity to enhance the competitiveness of the entire EU livestock sector while fostering innovation. Many of the current EU animal welfare rules are outdated, many Member States have adopted national rules going beyond minimum EU requirements, and private initiatives have flourished, leading to a fragmentation of the internal market and causing distortions in competitiveness. Harmonisation of the standards across Member States will promote fairer competition and a smooth functioning of the single market. 1 https://food.ec.europa.eu/animals/animal-welfare/eu-animal-welfare-legislation/animal-welfare-duringtransport_en.”
  EU requirements on animal welfare for farmers · Agricultural funding
• 2025-05-22 “E-002055/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission A number of climate policy instruments contribute to the goal of economic, social and territorial cohesion of the EU, notably for eastern European countries. From the volume of allowances to be auctioned under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), 10% of the auctioning revenue is distributed among 16 specific Member States for the purpose of solidarity 1 . The Modernisation Fund also contributes to modernising the energy systems of lower-income Member States 2 . The Just Transition Fund 3 supports the economic diversification and reconversion of territories expected to be impacted by the transition. The Effort Sharing Regulation 4 recognises the different capacities of Member States by setting national targets depending on their level of income. Romania has a target of -12.7% in 2030 compared to 2005, while the EU target is -40% and national targets range from -10% to -50 5 . The Social Climate Fund (SCF) will alleviate the social and economic impacts of the new Emissions Trading System for buildings, road transport and additional sectors, in particular in Member States with energy and transport poverty above the EU average. Romania benefits from 9.25% of the total maximum financial allocation under the SCF 6 . The decarbonisation of the EU economy implies a steep reduction of fossil fuel imports 7 and associated costs, which will allow to invest in the deployment of decarbonised energy supply and energy efficiency, reinforcing our energy security and creating new economic opportunities and jobs. More recently, the Commission adopted the Affordable Energy Action Plan 8 to lower the energy bills for industries, businesses and households, and the Clean Industrial Deal 9 which will mobilise over EUR 100 billion to support EU-made clean manufacturing. 1 Commission Decision (EU) 2020/2166. 2 Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 3 The Just Transition Fund has a budget of EUR 20 billion over 2021-2027: https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/just-transition-fund_en. 4 Regulation (EU) 2018/842. 5 Regulation (EU) 2023/857 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/842 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement. 6 Annex II of the Regulation (EU) 2023/955 on establishing a Social Climate Fund. 7 See for instance section 2.6 of Annex 8 in Part 3/5 of the impact assessment (SWD/2024/63 final) Securing our future, Europe’s 2040 climate target and path to climate neutrality by 2050 building a sustainable, just and prosperous society. 8 COM(2025) 79 final. 9 COM(2025) 85 final.”
  EU industrial funding · Climate efforts
• 2025-04-28 “E-001692/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 1 already provides a wide range of tools to support farmers as regards improving water resilience, namely through sustainable farming practices, preventive productive and non-productive investments and risk management tools, along with support for precision/digital farming, advisory services and knowledge transfers, cooperation and innovation under the CAP Network. The Romanian CAP plan 2023-2027 contains support for the modernisation of existing irrigation infrastructure 2 contributing to an efficient use of water, for new irrigation infrastructure 3 , and for investments and actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change. In its Communication ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework (MFF)’ 4 , the Commission explains key policy and budgetary challenges that will shape the design of the next MFF. The Commission intends to present its proposal for a reformed and reinforced EU budget post-2027 in July 2025. As outlined in the Water Resilience Strategy 5 , the next MFF is an opportunity to further support water resilience through investment and reforms. In the recent Mid-Term review of the Cohesion Policy 6 , the Commission proposed an exceptional package of measures to encourage Members States and regions to invest in water resilience. It includes up to 100% of EU financing and 30% of prefinancing in water resilience projects, as well as various flexibilities. The Water Framework Directive 7 allows Member State authorities who set the cost recovery arrangements including water pricing, to have regard to the social, environmental and economic effects of the recovery as well as the geographic and climatic conditions of the region(s) affected, as long as the environmental objectives are met. 1 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/financing-cap/cap-funds_en. 2 EUR 400 million public expenditure. 3 More than EUR 102 million public expenditure. 4 COM(2025) 46 final: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/6d47acb4-9206-4d0f-8f9b3b10cad7b1ed_en?filename=Communication%20on%20the%20road%20to%20the%20next%20MFF_en.pdf. 5 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/environment/water-resilience-strategy_en. 6 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘A modernised Cohesion policy: The mid-term review,’ COM(2025) 163, 1 April 2025: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/communication/mid-term-review-2025/communication-mid-termreview-2025_en.pdf. 7 Article 9 of the Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32–35.”
  EU policy on water management · Agricultural funding
• 2024-11-19 “E-002588/2024 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The rights of persons belonging to minorities are fundamental values of the EU and are part of the Copenhagen criteria for accession to the EU. In June 2024, the Commission confirmed that Ukraine had fulfilled the requirement to enact a law addressing the remaining Venice Commission recommendations from June and October 2023 linked by amending in December 2023 the law on national minorities as well as the laws on state language, media and education 1 . Subsequently, the EU invited Ukraine, in the Negotiating Framework, to prepare an Action Plan on national minorities 2 . As part of the accession process, the Commission conducts a screening of Ukraine’s alignment with the EU acquis in the field of fundamental rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. The Commission consistently conveys the message, in bilateral contacts with Ukrainian counterparts, that it is expected that Ukraine will continue to implement the adopted legislation adequately and effectively, in line with European standards and as part of a constructive mutual dialogue with the representatives of the national minorities. The Commission will continue to follow closely the Ukraine government’s ongoing dialogues with representatives of persons belonging to national minorities, including the representatives of Ukraine’s Romanian national minority. The Commission is also assisting Ukraine in its reform efforts, by supporting the project ‘Support for implementing European standards relating to anti-discrimination and rights of national minorities in Ukraine’ implemented by the Council of Europe 3 . 1 Venice Commission Opinion (June 2023) (https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2023)021-e) and Venice Commission Follow-up Opinion (October 2023) (https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDLAD(2023)028-e). 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/25/eu-opens-accession-negotiations-withukraine/ 3 https://www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/support-for-implementing-european-standards-relating-to-anti-discriminationand-rights-of-national-minorities-in-ukraine”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU competences on human rights
• 2024-11-16 “E-002559/2024 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. As explained in the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe 1 , companies are currently not under a legal obligation in the EU to market a medicine in all Member States. Access disparities, with smaller and less affluent countries especially affected, can be due to various factors. This includes national pricing and reimbursement policies, market size and the organisation of health systems. It can also be due to marketing decisions of individual companies. 2. The Commission is committed to addressing the issue of access to affordable medicines for all EU citizens while respecting national competences on pricing and reimbursement of medicines, in line with Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The proposed reform of the general pharmaceutical legislation 2 includes stronger incentives to launch innovative medicines in all Member States; measures for earlier entry of generics and biosimilars and for faster and simpler authorisation procedures. The Commission also supports and encourages cooperation between Member States on pricing, reimbursement and procurement policies in the group of National Competent Authorities on Pricing and Reimbursement and Public Healthcare Payers (NCAPR), based on mutual learning and bestpractice exchange, to improve the affordability and cost-effectiveness of medicines and health system’s sustainability. 1 COM(2020) 761 final. 2 Commission proposals, COM(2023) 192 final and COM(2023) 193 final.”
  Pharmaceuticals regulation in EU · EU policy against medicines shortages
• 2024-10-30 “E-002315/2024 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The prevalence of healthcare-associated infections (HAI) reported by Romanian hospitals in the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control’s (ECDC) point prevalence surveys (PPS) 1 is indeed low: 2.8% (second lowest) in 2011-2012 2 , 3.6% (fourth lowest) in 2016-2017 3 , and 3.1% (second lowest) in 2022-2023 4 . Some degree of under-reporting may be possible, as shown by the data on patient case-mix (severity of the clinical condition of hospitalised patients) in the PPS sample from Romania and the results of the validation of this and previous PPS, but the extent of under-reporting cannot be quantified. The low reported prevalence of HAI can also be partly explained by the very low diagnostic testing in Romanian hospitals (third lowest in 2016-2017 and second lowest in 2022-2023), indicating that some HAI may remain undiagnosed because diagnostic tests are not performed. In accordance with Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 5 , Member States must provide a report on their prevention, preparedness and response planning for serious cross-border health threats, which includes their national capacities related to HAI surveillance. ECDC periodically assesses the Member States’ prevention, preparedness and response planning at national level under Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371. Such an assessment 6 is scheduled to take place in Romania in 2026. In any case, the Commission remains in contact with the relevant Romanian authorities. Based on the information provided by the Member States and the results of the assessments carried out by ECDC, the Commission shall produce a report on the state of play and progress and may support the action of the Member States through general recommendations on prevention, preparedness and response planning. 1 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/search?s=Point+prevalence+survey 2 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/point-prevalence-survey-healthcare-associated-infectionsand-antimicrobial-use-0 3 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/point-prevalence-survey-healthcare-associated-infectionsand-antimicrobial-use-5 4 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/PPS-HAI-AMR-acute-care-europe-2022-2023 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2371/oj 6 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/about-ecdc/what-we-do/public-health-emergency-preparedness-assessments”
  Antimicrobial resistance
• 2024-09-30 “E-001885/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The European Climate Law 1 establishes the EU’s commitment to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990, and to reach climate neutrality by 2050. Delivering on those objectives requires ambitious policies to ensure a swift and sufficient decrease in emissions from all sectors. The Regulation on CO 2 emission standards for light-duty vehicles 2 plays a key role in this by setting a 100% emissions reduction target from 2035 onwards for new cars and vans put on the EU market. In the past years, this Regulation has already started to deliver. Average CO 2 emissions of new cars registered in Europe have gone down each year since 2020. In 2023 they were 28% below 2019 levels as battery electric cars reached a market share of 15.5%, up from 2% in 2019. The CO 2 emission standards, together with the measures put in place for recharging infrastructure, batteries and the sustainable supply of critical raw materials provide the market with long-term predictability, so that investments can be channelled in clean technologies, development of new value chains, and reskilling of workers. This will make sustainable zeroemission mobility increasingly affordable and accessible for consumers, reduce energy consumption and dependency on fossil fuel imports and improve air quality. As other major economies are advancing towards zero-emission mobility, it is essential for the EU industrial competitiveness to create the conditions for the EU industry to provide zeroemission vehicles. This will create new business opportunities and jobs in the EU and will allow our automotive industry to maintain its leadership in global markets. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj 2 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/631/2024-01-01”
  2035 CO2 Emission Target for Cars
• 2024-09-09 “E-001659/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 1. Under the Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine on the Carriage of Freight by Road signed on 29 June 2022 1 , Ukrainian hauliers are granted only limited rights for access to the EU market compared to the rights of the hauliers established in EU. The Ukrainian operators are only allowed to perform bilateral transport operations from or to Ukraine and transit the EU territory in case of operations with third countries. They do not have the right to perform cross border trade between Member States or cabotage within a Member State, unlike European hauliers. Ukrainian hauliers are required to comply with all the obligations resulting from the Agreement. Member States have the responsibility to enforce these obligations including by laying down effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties. The amending Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine signed on 20 June 2024 2 has clarified and reinforced control measures to enhance its implementation 3 , including a system for monitoring compliance of road haulage operators. 2. The Agreement does not affect the competence and responsibility of Member States to control road transport activities, including to ensure that they do not involve any criminal or illegal activities such as human trafficking or drug smuggling. 3. Under the Agreement Ukrainian haulage undertakings are not granted the right to compete with EU hauliers for intra EU trade. Ukraine is a member of both the European Agreement Concerning the Work of Crews of Vehicles Engaged in International Road Transport 4 and the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) Multilateral Quota System 5 , Ukrainian haulage companies and drivers are therefore subject to the safety, social and competition standards contained in these agreements. 1 OJ L 179, 6.7.2022, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2022/1158/oj 2 OJ L, 2024/1878, 2.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2024/1878/oj 3 EU and Ukraine update and extend Road Transport Agreement: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3382 4 https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XI-B-21&chapter=11&clang=_en 5 https://www.itf-oecd.org/ecmt-road-transport-platform”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• “Thank you president. Dear colleagues, it is hard to find in the Commission's archives a project that is less connected to reality and more utopic than this energy package. We are in the eye of an economic storm and this will, um, make tremble with fear. The, uh, the best of our political players. Look what is happening in the Persian Gulf. We have proof. The best proof there is of the fact that humanity is dependent on the classical sources of energy. Non-polluting energies cannot ensure constant, uh, levels of energy to maintain the world's economies moving. We pay a very high price for the irresponsible policy that led member states to close down. Stable economic energy capabilities before preparing viable alternatives. Romania is the clear example. Shutting down of mines were a result of administrative choices that has turned us. Have turned us into clients. From producers, into clients of external producers. Energy is not an ideological experiment. Before anything else, the EU needs safe, secure and accessible energy. Development and Competitivity are utopias. As.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Dear colleagues, the left claims to fight poverty. The right truly wants prosperity for all, since there were colleagues who who wanted to go the ideological way in this debate. But my perspective is, yes, the perspective of of a right wing politician. Poverty is indeed a most dreadful reality in today's society. The lack of basic living conditions leads to disease, illiteracy, Marginalization and crime. Combating poverty doesn't require budgetary resources. It is actually an investment, the most profitable one that we can make because each euro invested today in infrastructure, medical services, education, training tomorrow will reduce the budget that we need for healthcare, public order or social assistance, basically. We're talking about a smart and productive reallocation of public funds. The Parliament needs to have the courage and the decency to fight poverty just as determinedly as they did it, when they decided to reduce pollution levels in the EU. It is a matter of will to trigger the largest investment programme in history in order to revitalise the disadvantaged regions of the EU, and the chairman interrupts the speaker.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• “Mr. Commissioner, in Romania and in other member states and in Eastern Europe, livestock breeding is not only an economic activity that is essential, but it's also an integral part of our culture and the identity of our rural areas. Nevertheless, new European initiatives on animal welfare, for example doing away with cages and restrictions during transport mean huge costs for the small farms, which don't have the resources to respect that legislation. Now, I would imagine that this kind of standard is based on the reality of large farms in Western Europe. And then we want there to be homogenized application without taking in mind, without bearing in mind the structural differences between member states. As you can imagine, there are huge differences between Western Europe and Eastern Europe in that regard. And this means that there will that there will be distortions on the market if we continue down this path. How can you ensure that all these policies take into account the realities in Eastern Europe, and that these farmers will receive support and flexibility. A room for manoeuvre so that they can adapt without having to give up completely on their. Their farming. How are you going to assure equitable implementation that's equitable? Of these standards in all Member states?”
  EU requirements on animal welfare for farmers
• “06:18 – 16:09:10): Thank you, Chair. I'm from Romania. The communist regime had its secret espionage service which would attack, threaten, and assassinate dissidents who were anti-communist both in Romania and in other countries. So I'm very familiar with what transnational repression can look like and I'm very interested in this topic, so I was very happy to be a shadow rapporteur for the file. I have read through the rapporteur's proposals and I wanted to highlight a couple of things. There are a few aspects that need further clarification to give us an efficient text. First of all, the terminology is not very clear. We have expressions such as dedicated channels and mechanisms or clear communication channels. They haven't been defined and they should be because we can't be certain what we're talking about here. Are they structures or are they platforms? If we don't make the text more specific, it will be declarative only but not particularly applicable. Second, the pros are for national contact points and European contact points. This needs to be simple. We have cooperation networks; they should be working. The problem isn't a lack of structures but a lack of efficacy or efficiency of these structures. We also need a legal basis. On the other hand, cross-border nature of transnational repression—that's a redundant use of language. We need to be very clear in our terminology. It's clear that if something is happening beyond borders, it's transnational. I do not think it's beneficial to bring in ideological concepts in a report such as this one. We need to extend protection to all persecuted people regardless of gender. We shouldn't be introducing gender ideology here. The text needs to be based on legal realities and the competencies of the Union. The Union needs to be a secure space for those who are persecuted. We need to do away with needless bureaucracy and strengthen national competencies. As shadow rapporteur, I will be tabling amendments for greater clarity both institutionally and in the text. Thank you.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “President, colleagues, it appears that there's going to be more red tape, more checks and less freedom for farmers by 2028. There will be a reform which the commission is preparing. The budget will be frozen and there'll be just one heading for direct payments, and solidarity between member states will be significantly constrained. Budget. And for countries like Romania, this will mean that farmers will just not have enough income. At the same time, they'll have all of this red tape and and then as a kind of triple whammy. All these products will be coming in from outside the EU that are not produced to the same standards. There's rhetoric about young people, but actually retired farmers will be excluded from per hectare surface payments. But in Romania, there are many retired people who help out, work alongside the rest of the family and family farms depend on this for their operations. So listen to farmers. Don't keep punishing them. Give them.”
  Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1)
• “Thank you, dear colleagues. The telecommunication sector in the EU is at a point where it is very fragile. The US and China have consolidated their market around 3 or 4 big tech companies. The European market is still fragmented. We have over 100 operators and they suffer under the fragmentation. This fragmentation is a major obstacle in making large investments. The DNA strategy is a late recognition of the fact that overregulation prioritized low prices in the short run and sacrifice the independence, and even develop industrial development in the long run. Romania has one of the fastest types of internet service in the world, and this is a happy coincidence, not a result of Brussels. If you do not reduce the bureaucratic burden, Europe will become a simple market for foreign technologies without real digital sovereignty. We condemn ourselves to depending on our global competitors.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• “Thank you president. Dear colleagues, it is hard to find in the Commission's archives a project that is less connected to reality and more utopic than this energy package. We are in the eye of an economic storm and this will, um, make tremble with fear. The, uh, the best of our political players. Look what is happening in the Persian Gulf. We have proof. The best proof there is of the fact that humanity is dependent on the classical sources of energy. Non-polluting energies cannot ensure constant, uh, levels of energy to maintain the world's economies moving. We pay a very high price for the irresponsible policy that led member states to close down. Stable economic energy capabilities before preparing viable alternatives. Romania is the clear example. Shutting down of mines were a result of administrative choices that has turned us. Have turned us into clients. From producers, into clients of external producers. Energy is not an ideological experiment. Before anything else, the EU needs safe, secure and accessible energy. Development and Competitivity are utopias. As.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Dear colleagues, let's dot the T here. Let's cross the t of the. I, uh, it's been decided that unity is no longer necessary when decisions are taken behind closed doors. Technically speaking, the EU has approved the allocation of funds to the total amount of 90 billion in support of Ukraine for the next two years. But in actual fact, a small number of countries, through a judicial artifice, has decided to suspend the member the right of other member states to decide on this highly sensitive file. It's no point in getting into details about accounting or policy, but one question needs to be answered are we a union of states? Or have we already become a federation led by a political ideological aristocracy? Unfortunately for the European taxpayers, what you've done was to substitute their right to be represented in decision making. You have assumed responsibilities on their behalf, and those responsibilities will be divided up democratically. Does that make Europe stronger? No. Thank you.”
  EU political integration
• “20% of the country is declared protected area, so one quarter of Romania's territory has been declared a protected area. Well, Romania is a very beautiful country, and it has, of course, I'm sure there are many areas that are worth protecting because they are unique. However, we should not forget that preserving the environment, saving the environment, keeping our water and our air clean should not negatively affect the economy. So how do we reach this balance? This? I know that it's it's not one of the prerogatives of the agency to answer this question, but when we dictate all sorts of policies for the protection of the environment, do we also take into consideration the need to protect the economy? And I will, I will, I will close immediately. I don't want to monopolize the discussion, but I still have one question. Given the fact that. Biodiversity is being lost, water is is polluted and the circular economy is stagnating in spite of all the directives, in spite of all the billions of euros spent, the citizens, the European citizens, see the costs rather than the benefits of these policies. Additionally, the European Court of Accounts confirms a 12% increase in uh in expenditure over evaluating by 12% the expenditures of the resilience mechanism. How do you intend to correct all these problems? Thank you very much.”
  Nature protection and restoration in the EU
• “You, President, I have several questions for Commissioner McGrath and might be forever thankful if you could have a precise answer. First of all, why does the Commission use the EU budget in order to intervene in fields such as elections, mass media, and the civil society? This should be the exclusive responsibility of the member states. Isn't this another proof of centralizing certain competencies that do not belong to Brussels based on the treaties? How can you make sure that financing for the European Shield for Democracy won't be channeled only for NGOs that support the, let's say, normal agenda and exclude the conservative voices? My third question, when it comes to rule of law and excluding this topic, don't you run the risk of punishing the governments that do not agree with the ideology of Brussels? Aren't you turning the MFF into a political weapon? How can the Commission make sure that the potential European Center for Coordination against this information won't turn into a censorship tool and it stays a tool for respecting the freedom of speech? My fifth question, supporting media via the Media Plus program, how can the Commission make sure that you won't interfere with the market where certain publications can receive direct advantages from Brussels whereas others do not have support? And we do have examples. Therefore, my concern is two. One, thank you.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “Thank you chair. I will speak in Romanian. The ECR supports this objective to speed up granting permits, because it is an important element in our energy infrastructure and in our energy autonomy. However, the legal framework is not the only bottleneck. Administrative capacity, institutional coordination, and an efficient implementation in the member states are also part of the bottleneck, which is why I believe we should be balanced in our approach. First of all, spatial planning and land use must be flexible and adapted to national realities, including when it comes to protecting agricultural land, local communities and their strategic priorities. Secondly, tools such as tacit approval may contribute to reducing administrative delays, but we need clear legal safeguards which are compliant with national administrative systems. Next, this acceleration of permitting must not sacrifice public trust, dialogue with institutions, legal clarity or coherence, because these are the guarantees needed for project success. We are ready to work together to build a framework that will cut down bureaucracy, accelerate investments and respect subsidiarity, Competitiveness and the legitimate interests of member states. Thank you.”
  EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner. Dear colleagues. This democracy shield type strategy and the fact checkers mechanism do not represent a defensive weapon, but an ideological control instrument, an instrument of political censorship. The so-called protection against misinformation is a mere pretext, is a mere excuse to be able to build a network of publicly financed people hired to cancel any critical discourse against the official line. So organizations and institutions are thus turned into prosecutors, uh, to, uh, with, with the role to eliminate, uh, unpleasant content online. This violates the right to freedom of speech, the freedom of speech. We need debate and not imposed silence for the naive. I will say the following thing. Look into the history of communism, and there you will see the real face of ideological fanaticism over utopia that promised a perfect society, but the turned half a continent into a concentration camp for millions of people.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Thank you very much, Chair, Commissioner. Indeed, the proposal regarding the Democracy Shield sounds great, quite generous apparently, ambitious, and filled with good intentions, just like so many documents that start from the European Commission but end up harming the member states. I have reasons to believe that this Democracy Shield can be used against the interests of the member states and their peoples. I'm worried when I read 'fact checkers.' There's a phrase that worries me. We know how they are financed and funded. We know what institutions exist in Romania and what dirty political games they're playing. So I'm worried by this desire to develop a network specializing on elections, so there's no longer any confidence in a member state organizing its own elections. Once again, I look at my country, Romania. Your caution, yes, might be somewhat justified because the presidential elections of 2024 were canceled without any plausible explanation. But you see, that was precisely because there was an alleged foreign intervention, there's some foreign power marring our elections, unproven until today, but would lead to the cancellation of the whole electoral process. This Democracy Shield should not create a mechanism whereby all other member states could go through what Romania experienced in 2024. This is an attack against democracy, and eventually the voters will have zero confidence if that's the way we're going. Of course, there would be some other questions, but I've exceeded my time. I would like you to focus on what I've said so far. Thank you.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Colleagues, I am from Romania, a country that earned its freedom with many sacrifices. So I'm very concerned with the direction that the EU is pushing us. Sped up digitalisation, digital euro, digital identities. In theory, it's progress. But in fact, it's a risk. Who is controlling us and who. I'm not against technology, but I'm against decisions taken from above. Without guarantees for citizens, freedom can be deleted with one single click. And trust is not built with an algorithm. People know what control is and prefer to keep their money at home. We cannot build a digital society without trust. We call for a digital future which is human centred and not the processor at the centre. We need a guarantee that the digital euro will not be centralized control. We need to be convinced that an E d is our own identity, not the identity of a system. Sovereignty is not only a pleasure. The future is in our hands.”
  Electronic identity · Digital euro
• “Thank you very much. I will speak in Romanian. In the present report. It's an interesting report for the following reason. All efforts seem bound to fail. Unlike the previous speakers, I see no progress here. On the contrary. Or anyway, the progress that has been made is not significant since And we have a reduction of 37% of greenhouse gases since 1990, and an ever increasing use of regenerative regenerable energy. Uh, how come that the health of ecosystems continues to to deteriorate? Why is that? After so many efforts, uh, after so much effort, we have reached such a tiny result. Then what doesn't work? What? What is wrong? Second. Efforts were made especially by, uh, newly, uh, new EU member countries such as Romania, the country that I represent here. Efforts for decarbonization. Huge, uh, with huge economic impact, with huge social impact, with, uh, very serious consequences on the local economies, on the way of life of people in those Eastern European countries. And this was done taking huge risks such as losing energy independence in some cases. And yet we see that this report says that decarbonisation and clean technologies improve competitiveness. How did they improve competitiveness? How how did this happen? Because what we see is a decrease of economic activity, a higher risk of losing our energy independence and so on. So excuse me, but some things are so obvious. And we hear here such a triumphant speech that does not fit, uh, the actual content of the report, uh, as far as Romania is concerned, I noted something else.”
  Climate efforts
• “For Romania. Creating a stronger European Europe is not an abstract concept. We are in the eastern flank and we are in the first line of defence for the European Union. If there is aggression from Russia. This is why we need to be clear on the direction that we choose. Yes to cooperation, yes to strengthening capacities and yes to strengthening the European, the eastern flank, but no to centralising military decisions in Brussels and no to transfers of sovereignty. Um, the defence remains the core of competences for the national states and national um defence that is strengthened has to be complementary to NATO. It does not have to replace it and create create strategic confusion. Furthermore, we need to be fair when we are developing this. We need to develop industrial capacity, including in the places where the risks are at their highest. Thank you.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner. Dear colleagues, as we see an accelerated trend towards digitalization, it is our duty to reaffirm to restate an essential principle, EU citizens must be able to use cash in the future. This is not a gift given to them. It is a fundamental right. This is not just a legal tender cash. It is the guarantee for economic life, private life and social inclusion. For millions of Europeans, cash payment is not a secondary option, but the main way in which they participate in the economy and in a world more and more vulnerable to cyber attacks and technology, the cash remains the only legal tender that works at any moment for anybody. That is why it is high time that the union should give firm assurances that cash will be legal tender, accepted everywhere and protected by law. We must guarantee to the citizens of the European Union not just the possibility to pay cash, but the actual right to use cash as their main legal tender, their main means of payment as tradition and dignity and the dignity of each and every one of us demands any limits imposed on cash payments is an unacceptable abuse against European citizens. The idea that electronic payments help us fighting corruption is a false start because, uh, truly, the big heists are done via banks, not by using, uh, huge bags of cash. For example, in Romania. Local authorities acquired 1300 school buses of a price of €260,000 each. Although the price, the maximum price should have been about €90,000. So the the money that was misspent was €130 million. And this was not done by cash. Again, all these suspicious transactions with vaccines during the pandemic were not made by cash. Uh, if you want to find huge fraud, go to the government buildings and into other official institutions of the member states. Not in the, uh, with the workers.”
  Cash as means of payment