Gaetano PEDULLA'

Policy topics Gaetano PEDULLA' is active on

What Gaetano PEDULLA' has said (42)

• 2026-02-25 “E-000787/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is closely monitoring the development of the procedure for the award of the A22 motorway concession referred to by the Honourable Member and has already contacted the Italian authorities to gather information on how they intend to proceed with said award procedure. The purpose of this dialogue is to assess the compatibility of the planned path forward with EU law also in light of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU of 5 February 2026 in case C-810/24 1 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62024CJ0810.”
  EU Competition policy · EU transport infrastructure integration
• 2026-02-18 “E-000698/2026 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Projects not directly connected to the management of a Natura 2000 site, but likely to have a significant effect on it 1 , must be subject to an appropriate assessment to evaluate its impact in view of the site’s conservation objectives 2 . Projects may only be authorised if no significant impact is detected. This concerns any project likely to have an impact, even if located outside a Natura 2000 site, as is the case for the planned incineration plant. According to publicly available documents 3 , the project will not have significant impacts on nearby Natura 2000 sites 4 . Competent authorities must consider all the polluting substances, scientifically recognised as harmful, that an installation emits before granting a permit 5 including per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) emissions, even if these were not included in the relevant best available techniques (BAT) 6 conclusions for the activity concerned. The Commission is working to determine current and future techniques to avoid or reduce PFAS emissions that could be applied in installations covered by the Industrial Emissions Directive 7 . The Innovation Centre for Industrial Transformation and Emissions 8 helps gathering knowledge on PFAS 9 . The Commission agrees that disposal operations undermine the circular economy by hampering the supply of valuable secondary raw materials. Disposal shall only be a last resort option according to the waste hierarchy 10 . With the forthcoming Circular Economy Act 11 , the Commission is assessing ways to maintain and improve incentives to move waste away from incineration. The Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive 12 also encourages the recovery of sludge in accordance with the waste hierarchy. 1 Alone or in combination with other plans or projects. 2 According to Article 6(3) of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora; OJ L 206, 22.7.1992. 3 On the Regione Veneto portal: https://sharing.regione.veneto.it/index.php/s/WRezFgeiEFHwLf4. 4 Namely, sites ‘Delta del Po (IT3270023)’ and ‘Delta del Po: tratto terminale e delta Veneto (IT3270017)’. 5 Case 626/22 of the Court of Justice of the EU, https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/document?source=document&docid=287503&doclang=EN. 6 Best available techniques (BAT) means the most effective and advanced techniques, developed on a scale allowing implementation in the relevant industrial sector, under economically and technically viable conditions. 7 Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 OJ L, 15.7.2024. 8 https://innovation-centre-for-industrial-transformation.ec.europa.eu/. 9 necessary before launching a revision of the relevant BAT conclusions. 10 Set out in Article 4 of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3–30, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/851 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 109–140 and Directive (EU) 2025/1892 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 September 2025 amending Directive 2008/98/EC on waste, OJ L, 2025/1892, 26.9.2025. 11 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy_en. 12 Directive (EU) 2024/3019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 concerning urban wastewater treatment (recast), OJ L, 2024/3019, 12.12.2024, Article 20.”
  Nature protection and restoration in the EU · Industrial emissions directive (IED)
• 2026-01-28 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question The Digital Services Act (DSA [1] ) entitles recipients of hosting services to a statement of reasons, and recipients of online platforms to an internal complaint-handling system, if their content is restricted by providers of those services. It also entitles recipients to access out-of-court dispute settlement bodies [2] . On this basis, millions of moderation decisions have been reversed since 2024 [3] . The DSA further mandates providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs [4] ) to identify, analyse and assess systemic risks in the EU stemming from their services, and to mitigate those risks. The Commission Guidelines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes pursuant to Article 35(3) of the DSA [5] point out that collaborating with independent fact-checkers who work on the basis of high ethical and professional standards can be one way for VLOPs to mitigate risks to civic discourse. All content moderation decisions based on fact-checking are subject to the transparency and redress measures mentioned above. The Commission initiated proceedings in relation to Meta for the suspected demotion of political content through Facebook and Instagram’s recommender systems [6] . The Commission is continuously monitoring compliance with the obligations of the DSA. The Commission published the European Democracy Shield [7] , which aims at reinforcing the integrity of the information space in the EU, and where the EU’s commitment to academic freedom is reaffirmed. Pursuant to Article 91(2) of the DSA, the Commission shall evaluate the DSA by 17 November 2027, addressing, among others, its impact on the respect for the right of freedom of expression and information. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. [2] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-out-court-dispute-settlement. [3] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-content-moderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops. [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3014/oj/eng. [6] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373. [7] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2660.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-10-01 “E-003803/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU fully respects and supports the role of international courts and UN mechanisms, including the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The EU cannot comment on proceedings that are ongoing. The EU does not itself make legal determinations on the commission of international crimes; such qualifications require judicial findings following due process. The EU remains dedicated to upholding its international obligations and takes note of the provisional orders of the International Court of Justice in the South Africa versus Israel case. The EU has repeatedly called on Israel to fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, in all circumstances. The EU considers ICC of key importance in upholding international criminal justice and the fight against impunity. The EU supports the ICC and the principles set out in the Rome Statute and respects the Court’s independence and impartiality. The European Council has called upon all Member States to ensure full cooperation with the Court, including by the prompt execution of outstanding arrest warrants.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Support for International Criminal Court
• 2025-09-11 “E-003522/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1715 1 on the Lyon–Turin cross-border project sets out the necessary steps and timetable for planning and constructing the new high-speed railway line between Lyon and Turin, covering the base tunnel, the French access lines, and the Italian access lines. However, it does not commit to specific financial amounts nor guarantee the future allocation of EU funding to Tunnel Euralpin Lyon Turin (TELT), Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI) or Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer français (SNCF) Réseau under the Commission proposal for the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Transport programme 20282034. As set out in the CEF proposal 2 , funding allocation will continue to be based on competitive calls between eligible projects. The Commission proposal for CEF provides an overall budget envelope of EUR 51.515 billion for transport objectives. CEF grants will be awarded through competitive calls for proposals. The Commission, however, remains committed to continuing support for works on the Lyon–Turin tunnel, one of the TEN-T (trans-European transport network) flagship projects. The Commission proposal for CEF maintains the possibility for EU co-financing of up to 50% of eligible costs. The programme’s objective is to support the implementation of the TEN-T, with a particular focus on cross-border projects of common interest. Lyon-Turin is listed in the indicative annex of such projects. However, the budget, co-funding rates, and scope of CEF 2028-2034 are currently under negotiation by the co-legislators. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/1715/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0547.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration · EU funding for transportation
• 2025-08-09 “E-003220/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission While research related to dual-use products or technologies is not prohibited, any research and innovation activities carried out under Horizon Europe (HE) must have an exclusive focus on civil applications. When implementing the projects, all beneficiaries must ensure that all activities under the project comply with this rule as well as with ethical principles and relevant national, EU and international legislation. HE projects’ results 1 may be developed into technologies with a dual-use potential, even if they were originally intended and funded for purely civil applications. This transition could happen beyond the lifetime of the project itself. At project level, several safeguards have been established under HE to ensure that EU funds are not used for activities that violate international law. In line with Article 19 of the HE Regulation, pertaining to ethics, the proposals to be funded are evaluated by external independent experts and are subject to a self-assessment and a systematic ethics screening, which may result in rejection or in specific additional ethics-related obligations in the HE grant agreement. During the lifetime of a selected project, the continued compliance with the grant agreement is monitored by the Commission and its Agencies in charge of implementing HE. Ethicsrelated checks or reviews may be initiated at any time, if ethical concerns arise. Noncompliance may lead to any of the measures provided for in the grant agreement, including termination of the project. The Commission and its Agencies would review all reported cases which allegedly breach HE rules. So far it has not been established that any activities under current projects involving Israeli entities breached the principle of exclusive focus on civil applications. Article 2(2) of the Agreement on the association of Israel to Horizon Europe 2 sets out the principle that Israeli entities participate in the Horizon Europe programme under terms and conditions equivalent to those applicable to legal entities established in the EU. While any actions of the State of Israel cannot be considered automatically attributable to Israeli entities participating in HE, Israel needs to comply with Article 2 of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement 3 . In the context of Israel’s intervention in the Gaza Strip and the ensuing humanitarian catastrophe, the Commission has come to the conclusion that Israel is violating human rights and humanitarian law thus breaching Article 2 of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement. Therefore, it has proposed to the Council to partially suspend the HE Association Agreement with Israel so that legal entities established in Israel would not be eligible to participate in calls for grant and investment support under the HE European Innovation 1 Once the project is over. 2 Agreement between the EU, of the one part, and Israel, of the other part, on the participation of Israel in the Union programme Horizon Europe — the framework Programme for Research and Innovation, OJ L 95, 23/03/2022. 3 ‘Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement’.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-07-16 “E-002942/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission In line with Article 55 of the TEN-T Regulation 1 , the Commission may adopt implementing acts for the implementation of cross border sections of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T). The Lyon-Turin railway line is situated on the TEN-T core network. It is a complex crossborder long-term investment involving France, Italy and their respective neighbouring regions of Auvergne Rhône Alpes and Piedmont. The implementing decision for this cross-border section was discussed with France and Italy in the context of Inter-Governmental Committee Lyon-Turin. The decision was approved by the Commission on 30 July 2025 and was published in the EU Official Journal 2 . It lists several planned milestones necessary to move forward with the investment, including its timetable. There is no direct link between the implementing decision Lyon-Turin and a possible resumption of the Alpine Rail Motorway services. The latter is based on a set of bilateral agreements between France and Italy. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401679. 2 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1715 of 30 July 2025 laying down detailed rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the implementation of the Lyon-Turin cross-border project on the Mediterranean European Transport Corridor (notified under document C(2025) 5111): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202501715&qid=1754460384368.”
  EU support of rail transport · EU funding for transportation · EU transport infrastructure integration
• 2025-06-05 “E-002276/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The exercise of property rights by public owners is not, as such, restricted under EU law provided that all applicable rules are respected, including the rules on State aid and competition rules, and the integrity of the internal market is maintained. To ensure the integrity and stability of the single market in banking services, the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) 1 includes robust safeguards to ensure that the prospective shareholders do not endanger the sound and prudent management of EU credit institutions. In particular, any acquisition of a qualifying holding in a EU credit institution is subject to prior supervisory approval based – inter alia – on the assessment of the acquirer’s suitability and the proposed governance structure (Articles 22 and 23 CRD). In the countries participating in the Banking Union, this supervisory approval falls under the competence of the European Central Bank. The Commission remains committed to ensure compliance with the EU acquis in cooperation with national and EU authorities. 1 OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338–436.”
  European Banking Union · Financial regulation
• 2025-05-23 “E-002085/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The North Sea–Rhine–Mediterranean Corridor is the busiest corridor in the trans-European transport network (TEN-T), carrying substantial amounts of both freight and passenger traffic. Thus, any disruptions along this corridor can have wide-reaching consequences for the entire EU transport system. Ensuring the robustness and seamless functioning of this corridor is therefore essential. Although the TEN-T Regulation 1 focuses on achieving an EU-wide, coherent and integrated transport infrastructure of high technical standards by given deadlines, it also underlines the importance of its maintenance in a way that it provides, during its lifetime, a high level of service and service adapted to the traffic flows. While the strategic coordination of the TEN-T development (construction or upgrade) is guided at the European level, the responsibility for infrastructure maintenance and operational readiness lies with the individual Member States. The Commission, including its TEN-T Coordinators, have no role to play in this context. This means that national authorities are in charge of ensuring the upkeep, resilience, and capacity of the transport infrastructure located on their territory, including application of the road infrastructure safety management procedures. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1153 and (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013.”
  EU support of rail transport · EU transport infrastructure integration
• 2025-04-24 “E-001673/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not comment on individual cases or specific transactions. The Commission notes that in the European banking union significant banks are supervised by the Single supervisory mechanism, which has the task of vetting prospective acquirers of banks’ shares under EU rules (qualifying holdings). In addition, national competition authorities and/or the Commission have also the power to veto it under relevant EU and national competition rules. In principle, EU law prohibits restrictions to the fundamental market freedoms. As an exception, Member States may impose restrictions through their national laws only if such restrictions are proportionate and based on legitimate public interests. In the banking sector, such interests have to be other than prudential ones, to avoid interference with the European Central Bank’s competence. However, reliance on those exceptions must be interpreted strictly, to reflect genuine and sufficiently serious threats to a fundamental interest of society. Moreover, those derogations must not be applied to serve purely economic ends.”
  European Banking Union · Financial regulation
• 2025-02-11 “E-000615/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recalls that according to the principle of free administration by public authorities enshrined in Article 2 of Directive 2014/23/EU 1 , Member States authorities may choose to perform their public interest tasks with their own resources, or in cooperation with other authorities or to confer them upon economic operators. As illustrated in the answer given to written question E-005180/2021, a concession within the meaning of Directive 2014/23/EU, such as the A22 motorway concession referred to by the Honourable Members, may be awarded without a call for tenders if the in-house requirements under Article 17 of that Directive are fulfilled. However, if the in-house requirements, including the absence of private capital in the concessionaire company, were not all fulfilled, the concession would have to be awarded via a call for tenders ensuring fair competition under the rules set out in that Directive. According to the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment as enshrined in the EU public procurement rules, it is of utmost importance that any eventual participation of the incumbent concessionaire in the tendering procedure should be accompanied by the adoption of the appropriate mitigation measures to ensure that competition is not distorted. 2 In the case at hand, the project financing award procedure providing for a pre-emption right for the incumbent concessionaire raises serious concerns with regard to its compatibility with EU law. The Commission is in touch with the Italian authorities and closely monitors the file. 1 Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (OJ L 094 28.3.2014, p. 1). 2 Ibid., articles 3, 35; Directive 2014/24/EU, articles 18, 41.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration · EU Competition policy
• 2025-02-05 “E-000533/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission In the context of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP), the Commission (Eurostat) regularly assesses the quality both of actual data reported by Member States and of the underlying government sector accounts compiled according to the European system of accounts (ESA 2010) 1 and the Manual on Government Deficit and Debt 2 . In the event of a doubt regarding the correct implementation of the ESA 2010 accounting rules, the Member State concerned can request clarification from the Commission (Eurostat). In this context, the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) asked Eurostat to provide advice on the statistical recording of specific tax credits, taking into account the legislation established in 2020 and the main changes taking place in 2023 and 2024. Following ISTAT’s requests, Eurostat published three letters 3 concerning the statistical recording of the specific tax credits in the government accounts. With regard to the compliance of the data provided by ISTAT with the ESA 2010 methodology, the Commission acknowledges that ISTAT implemented Eurostat’s methodological advice published on 4 July 2024 for the 2020-2023 data. The Commission has no competence for assessing the compatibility of national legislation lying outside the scope of EU law, such as the Italian Law No 67/2024, with fundamental rights or general principles of law 4 . In principle, such issues fall within the competence of national courts, subject to supervision by the European Court of Human Rights. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5925693/KS-02-13-269-EN.PDF.pdf/44cd9d01-bc64-40e5bd40-d17df0c69334?t=1414781932000 2 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/16029761/KS-GQ-23-002-EN-N.pdf/77a75b07-61c3-7d345243-70d09bc00e44?version=3.0&t=1677163672121 3 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/methodology/advice-eu-countries 4 See, in particular, Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland, paragraph 31; Case C299/95, Friedrich Kremzow, paragraph 15.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets · EU competences on taxation
• 2025-02-04 “E-000477/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has no specific information about the project referred to by the Honourable Member and about its alleged environmental impacts. According to the information available, this project is not financed by European funds. Under Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive 1 , Member States must take appropriate steps to avoid the deterioration of natural habitats and habitats of species in Natura 2000 sites. As regards projects that are likely to have a significant impact on a Natura 2000 site, in accordance with Article 6(3) of the Directive, Member States have to carry out an assessment of the impacts in view of the site's conservation objectives. In the case of a negative assessment, national authorities may authorise the project only for imperative reasons of overriding public interest and provided that there are no alternative solutions. In such cases, Member States shall take compensatory measures to ensure that the overall coherence of Natura 2000 is protected. The Commission published several guidance documents to help Member States implement the above-mentioned provisions 2 . Italy has transposed these provisions in its national legislation 3 and, in 2019, adopted tailored national guidelines to facilitate and ensure their consistent implementation across its regions 4 . The Region of Piedmont has also adopted relevant and upto-date rules transposing the above provisions and guidelines 5 . Member States are primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with EU law, including verifying individual cases of potential breach of the relevant rules, and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will continue monitoring the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. 1 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/guidance_en.htm 3 https://www.mase.gov.it/pagina/la-valutazione-di-incidenzavinca#:~:text=Si%20tratta%20del%20processo%20d,di%20significativit%C3%A0%20di%20tali%20incidenze. 4 https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2019/12/28/19A07968/SG 5 Delibera Giunta Regionale n. 55-7222/2023/XI: https://www.regione.piemonte.it/web/temi/ambiente-territorio/biodiversita-aree-naturali/rete-natura2000/valutazione-incidenza”
  Water pollution
• 2025-01-27 “E-000350/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Since the start of the conflict in Sudan in April 2023, the European External Action Service has been discussing the situation in this country during its political dialogues and exchanges with the Emirati authorities at various levels. The EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, has also been engaging with the Emirati and other regional stakeholders. In this context, the EU representatives have raised concerns about reported United Arab Emirates (UAE) support to the rapid support forces, while emphasising the importance of the UAE’s constructive engagement for reaching a sustainable cease-fire in Sudan. The negotiated outcome documents of two high-level meetings on Sudan co-organised by the EU, Germany and France in New York 1 and Paris 2 – attended by UAE – urge foreign actors to cease support to the warring sides. Situation in Sudan has also been discussed in the meetings with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including the first EU-GCC Summit in Brussels on 16 October 2024, where the EU and GCC leaders (UAE represented at the level of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance) underscored the importance of stopping the war and eventually returning to a political process leading to civilian rule in Sudan, and urged the Sudanese armed forces and the rapid support forces to engage seriously and effectively with crisis resolution initiatives, including the Jeddah platform. The Commission will continue to follow closely the conflict in Sudan and engage with the key regional stakeholders, including the UAE, in the regional efforts aimed at achieving a lasting peace and justice in Sudan. In the meantime, the EU has already adopted three listings of restrictive measures 3 , including against entities that are based in the UAE, and stand ready to consider additional sanctions against those who are fuelling the war. 1 https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/2677588-2677588 2 https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/sudan/news/article/ministerial-meeting-for-advancing-thesudan-peace-initiatives-paris-le-15-04-24 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202403154”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · EU relations with United Arab Emirates · EU policy on Sahel and Sudan
• 2025-01-27 “P-000356/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission When granting State aid to Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) in 2017, the Italian authorities undertook a series of commitments to ensure the compatibility of the aid with the applicable EU law, including State aid rules as derived from Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The commitments were amended by the Commission decision no 5536 final of 2 August 2022. One of the applicable commitments was an acquisition ban (commitment 1), which applied to MPS until a predefined date or until Italy had implemented the so-called ‘Disposal of the State participation’ (commitment 12), whichever was the earliest. The Commission can confirm that, at the date of the announcement by MPS of its voluntary public exchange offer on the shares of Mediobanca, on 24 January 2025, Italy had already complied with commitment 12 and MPS was no longer subjected to the acquisition ban or any other State aid-related constraints that would prevent its offer. Article 127(1) TFEU sets the primary objective of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which includes the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB is an autonomous EU institution and it would be the ECB’s task to assess the impact of this transaction on the financial stability according to applicable legal framework. As to the third question, the Commission cannot comment on any hypothetical scenarios. The Commission recalls, however, that Article 345 TFEU enshrines the principle of neutrality of the Treaties as regards the system of property ownership. Accordingly, an intervention by a Member State toward a bank, if in line with the terms acceptable by a private market economy operator, would not amount to State aid and not be subject to the related rules.”
  European Banking Union · EU policy on banks profits
• 2024-12-12 “E-002906/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Directive (EU) 2016/343 sets out rules on public references by public authorities to the guilt of a suspect or accused person prior to a conviction. It does not require specific limitations as to the publication by the press of procedural documents relating to the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Without prejudice to national law protecting the freedom of press and other media, the Directive only establishes minimum rules, requiring that the dissemination of any information by public authorities to the media must respect the presumption of innocence and not create the impression that the person is guilty before his or her guilt has been proven according to law. The 2024 Rule of Law report for Italy 1 noted that the legislative initiatives regulating access to and publication of certain judicial information were a source of concern for media stakeholders. The report also notes that the Italian Government considers these initiatives to be justified to guarantee the right to privacy and the presumption of innocence. The Commission will continue monitoring the developments in this respect in the framework of the Rule of Law Report. 1 European Commission, 2024 Rule of Law Report, ‘Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Italy’ (SWD(2024) 812 final); https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/60d79a4f-49cd-4061-a18fd3a4495d6485_en?filename=29_1_58066_coun_chap_italy_en.pdf.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-12-11 “E-002855/2024 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1. Article 2 of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive 1 requires Member States to take all the necessary measures to ensure that, before consent is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment 2 are subject to a requirement for development consent and an assessment with regard to their effects. Article 6(4) provides that the public concerned shall be given early and effective opportunities to participate in the environmental decision-making procedure and shall be entitled to express comments and opinions when all options are open to the competent authority before the decision is taken 3 . The project in question falls under the scope of the EIA Directive 4 . According to publicly available information, an EIA was carried out in 2013 and the authorisation has since been extended twice. The Commission does not have sufficient information to assess whether the project has undergone a change or extension likely to have significant adverse effects on the environment justifying a new EIA procedure 5 . 2. Article 6(1) requires Member States to ensure that the authorities likely to be concerned by the project, by reason of their specific environmental responsibilities or local and regional competences, are given an opportunity to express their opinion on the information supplied by the developer and on the request for development consent 6 . The Commission does not have sufficient information to assess the situation in this respect. 3. Without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, Member States are primarily responsible to ensure compliance with EU law, including verifying individual cases of potential breach in the relevant development consent procedures 7 . 1 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (codification), OJ L 026 28.1.2012, p. 1. 2 By virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location. 3 Article 2(4) of the EIA Directive provides that Member States may, in exceptional cases, exempt a specific project from the provisions laid down in the Directive. In this event, they shall make available to the public concerned the information obtained when determining if other forms of assessment would be appropriate, the information relating to the decision granting exemption and the reasons for granting it. They shall also inform the Commission of the reasons justifying the exemption granted. 4 This project could be covered by Annex I, points 12 or 15, or Annex II, point 10 (f), (g) or (m). 5 Which would include a new public consultation. 6 Article 5(2) states that, where requested by the developer, the competent authority, taking into account the information provided by the developer in particular on the specific characteristics of the project, including its location and technical capacity, and its likely impact on the environment, shall issue an opinion on the scope and level of detail of the information to be included by the developer in the environmental impact assessment report. The competent authority shall consult the authorities referred to in Article 6(1) before it gives its opinion. 7 National authorities, including national courts, are thus the first line of enforcement of EU law and, in line with its strategic approach on enforcement procedures, the Commission focuses on systemic non-compliance (Communication of 19 January 2017: EU law: Better results through better application - C/2016/8600, OJ C 18, 19.1.2017, p. 10–20 and in the Communication of 13 October 2022: COM(2022) 518 final - Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers).”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-31 “E-002383/2024 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Italy’s Recovery and Resilience Plan provides for the financing for a total of EUR 1.5 billion of the so-called ‘IPCEI Fund’, which is also financed through national resources. The objective of the measure is to provide support through the Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) Fund to projects belonging to four IPCEIs, namely, (i) the ‘Microelectronics and Communication Technologies’ IPCEI, (ii) the ‘Hydrogen Technology value chain’ IPCEI, (iii) the ‘Hydrogen related infrastructure and applications in the industrial sector’ IPCEI and (iv) the ‘Next Generation Cloud Infrastructure and Services’ IPCEI. The Commission notes that innovative projects are generally expected to result in the creation of highly skilled jobs by the enterprises that undertake them. The Commission is committed to strengthening the global competitiveness of the EU industry and net-zero technologies supply chains. Such initiatives aim to provide predictability, certainty and long-term signals to incentivise demand and create conditions that facilitate investments in net-zero technology manufacturing, while supporting the workforce needed in this sector. This work will draw on the report by Mario Draghi with the goal to enable sustainable prosperity and competitiveness. As its first major initiative, the Commission has presented a Competitiveness Compass that will frame the work for the rest of the term. The Commission has also launched a Clean Industrial Deal and proposes a Circular Economy Act, a European Competitiveness Fund, as well as risk-absorbing measures to promote private investments in innovation and the twin transition. The Commission will aim to ensure that these efforts benefit all, including by supporting quality jobs.”
  State Aid · EU industrial funding
• 2024-10-31 “E-002381/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The regional programme Lombardia 2021/27, co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund, supports the Urban Development Strategy of the Gallarate Municipality, which includes the construction of a new school complex in an area which is occupied by woodland. That woodland is not located in areas protected at EU level and/or areas of high naturalistic value, it does not fall within Natura 2000 Network sites and there are no interferences with ecological networks. The woodland is situated in an area under the responsibility of the Ticino Valley Regional Park. The Ticino Park Authority already issued the authorizations for the transformation of the woodland. On 17 July 2024, the Gallarate Municipality proceeded with monetary compensation in favour of the Ticino Park Authority, so that the same authority can implement mitigation and compensation works in other areas with high environmental value, also within the municipality of Gallarate. The objective to achieve no net land take in the EU by 2050 is enshrined in the EU Soil Strategy for 2030 1 . In view of that, the Commission aims to support Member States with guidance on how to reduce soil sealing and land take by revising the EU soil sealing guidelines. The proposed Soil Monitoring Law 2 , currently undergoing inter-institutional negotiations between the co-legislators, puts forward mitigation principles that Member States should observe in case of land take. 1 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/eu-soil-strategy-2030_en 2 Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on Soil Monitoring and Resilience (Soil Monitoring Law), COM/2023/416 final.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-09-19 “E-001769/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Non-Italian EU citizens residing in Italy in accordance with the conditions of the Free Movement Directive 1 enjoy equal treatment with Italian nationals within the scope of the EU treaties. This also applies to mobile EU workers, who in addition benefit from the specific rules provided by Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 2 . A benefit like sustainable mobility grants for natural persons may be qualified as a social advantage for mobile EU workers covered by equal treatment under that Regulation 3 . The EU legal migration acquis also establishes that third-country nationals covered by the relevant directives enjoy equal treatment vis-à-vis nationals of the Member State 4 , including as regards goods and services under the terms of those directives, such as the benefit at hand. The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality prohibits not only direct discrimination but also measures that are indirectly discriminatory because they are intrinsically liable to affect EU citizens or third-country nationals more than nationals of the host State and there is a consequent risk that they will place the former at a particular disadvantage. However, indirect discrimination can be justified if it is based on objective considerations independent of nationality and is proportionate to the legitimate objective of the national provisions. As held by the EU Court of Justice, ‘it is legitimate for a host Member State to wish to ensure that there is a genuine link between a claimant to a benefit and the competent Member State’ 5 . For EU workers, a genuine link is in principle established by the very fact that they have taken up work in a host Member State. Finally, Italian citizens residing in Italy do not normally fall within the scope of EU free 1 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 2 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union. 3 Article 7(2). 4 Notably: the Long-Term Residence Directive (Article 11(1)(f) Council Directive 2003/109/EC on the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, OJ L 16, 23.01.2004, p. 44-53); the Single Permit Directive (Article 12(1)(g) Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State, Official Journal L 343 of 23.12.2011, p. 1-9); the EU Blue Card Directive (Article 16(1)(f) Directive (EU) 2021/1883 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2021 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment, and repealing Council Directive 2009/50/EC, OJ L 382, 28.10.2021, P. 1-38); the Students and Researchers Directive (Article 22(1) Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing (recast), OJ L 132, 21/05/2016, p. 21-57) and and the intra-corporate transferees Directive (Article 18(2)(e) Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer, OJ L 157, 27.05.2024, p.1-22). 5 C‑75/11, Commission v. Austria, ECLI:EU:C:2012:605, paragraph 59.”
  EU political integration (free access) · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• “Thank you. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you to Fernando for his report. And thank you for for the detail. Actually, we have spoken along during all this seminar. Still, our difference in point of view remains. The first read of the report substantially weakens the benefit that the digital Euro can bring to the European Union. It will reinforce the current dominance of international card scheme. This is basically a fact. There cannot be a offline digital euro without the online version. The offline component is simply an additional functionality built up on top of the offline on the online infrastructure, not a separate system. It's an option if you want. Limiting it to the offline use would fail to the extent disadvantage to areas like e-commerce, which are becoming increasingly integral to daily life of European and where Europe lacks to widespread solution. The report promotes a divisive narrative as well on the private versus the public solution. And this is actually, according to me, not exactly the the true. We believe that a pan-European public payment infrastructure should not be seen as a substitute for private system. The two can and should coexist. Excluding small merchandise, which represent 95% in Europe from mandatory acceptance along with cash, would leave payment made at the point of sale, mainly to international card scheme. Maintaining the dependence on the scheme that we have today, the cross-border provision of digital euro services reinforced the idea of pan-European public payment infrastructure independent from a non-European private networks.”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you very much for the left group, Mr. Pedulla, one minute 30. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President. Commissioner, the right to use cash. It's a right to financial inclusion in citizens day to day lives. Our communities are concerned about this, about ATMs shutting down greater pressure to do online banking, digital payments. It makes people more vulnerable, especially older people. People who don't have bank accounts, refugees, people sleeping rough for their dignity and participation in day to day life. This is the most inclusive form of payment cash. This legislative proposal for cash payments and digital euros made clear that cash should be accepted everywhere in the EU, and that cash should be accessible to all citizens and businesses. That's a step in the right direction. But some people on the right have been trying to manipulate people's fears and say, oh, this is all about mass surveillance of citizens, and they're spreading panic. That doesn't help anyone, that doesn't help our vulnerable citizens. What we need to do is bolster, boost these proposals to protect fundamental rights so that there are different forms of payment. And there's there's always an inclusive option. We're not saying it's either or. It has to be all cash or all digital. We have to give people the option because it's a right to use cash today and tomorrow.”
  Means of payment (cash vs digital)
• “Thank you. Chair. I'll speak in Italian. President Lagarde, I have a great deal of respect for your work and the work of the ECB, and that is why I believe it goes beyond financial stability. Tier one and containment of inflation. Let's look rather at some concrete data 2025 was it was reminded here was exceptional for the banks and the banking system in Italy. We were expecting a profit rise for last year between 10 and 13%. Now given that situation a banking posts were 0.8%. That is assets 10 to 13% and 0.8% for the. So my question is, will you actually carry out some moral persuasion, moral suasion on the banking sector so that they can do what they should do and give credit to companies, because at the moment we have a huge difficulty because we've got the burden of investment, but if we don't give them the wherewithal, that will be impossible. Thank you.”
  ECB monetary policy
• “Thank you. Chair. I'd like to speak Italian. Growth in Europe at the moment is very low and unequal. This is in part the impact of the r f r. The Commissioner has given us the figure, or we're asking the businesses. We need a vote in the European Parliament and to, postpone the deadline for the program, and I would ask what you would involve procedural complexity. But the first indication of the RR is to get the member states to simplify their procedures. If you're not in A, you need to be able to simplify the Commission's procedures. The impact of the RR on the economies is low, and the closing, this drastic closing of the program will have a very major impact on employment and social well-being. Looking at this situation in Italy, which has the biggest grant, I'd like an update from the commissioner on the spending and on the unspent resources. And I'd also like to ask Commissioner Dombrovskis, how can you reconcile the cutting of the budget announced by the Commission as the end of the RR and the economic recovery that isn't there, even against the background of the looming trade war with the US? Thank you. Thank you. The first question concerns a question which is very much debatable. It's not the will of the commission. It's about modifying a range of legislative acts. It's not what it involves. The Council, the Parliament, the commission and a qualified majority and national parliaments as well. It's. And so to imagine that we can talk about those who want to and those who don't want to doesn't represent the actual state of affairs. When you look at all of the laws that are involved, it's very complex. And the commission are as I said, we want to get community to draft a communication which, along with Valdis, that we've in which we speak about how to go about this, the possible transferring of instruments that could be moved into other programs.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• “We on the left believe that the public should always enjoy the greatest Advantage here, but causing industries to collapse is not advantageous. So I've got a couple of questions. One for Mrs. and one for Mrs. Scorpio. Mrs. Pelzer has told us about the competitiveness for Europe and this difficulty that manufacturers, uh, will not face. But what about this breach of the rule of law, potentially namely. Businesses were led to invest based on the starting situation in a number of countries. Do you not think, as Professor Mosconi has said, that this is. An issue? Uh, we have magistrates working with Europol and EPPO, and they talk about a non marginal impact from counterfeit products, which is in fact increasing exponentially. And then from Mrs. Scorpio, the internal market, you think the situation will be improved rather than jeopardised. But don't you think it's the opposite, don't you think? Subject to proof to the contrary, that in light of this harmonisation. Which we never see in any other sector of fiscal policy, will in fact lead to an explosion in the opposite direction? Thank you.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• “This has strengthened the EU strategic autonomy, enhances economic sovereignty and consolidate the international role of the euro. We should help European banks to integrate digital euro acceptance network and standard payment solution. Giants like Visa and Mastercard will invest billions to hamper any attempt by European companies to erode their monopoly power, as they have done in the past. In the current situation geopolitical situation, we must come together rather than divide against international finance and conglomerate. The draft report will instead benefit dominant non-European solution, will continue to exploit their position of advantage and delay our ability to achieve strategic autonomy. Finally, there is the issue of seigniorage, which will recover using digital payment through the euro digital currency. In fact, the ECB states that with the recovery of digital, with the recovery of senior debt, we will get from the digital euro. We pay the infrastructure that we should pay. In conclusion, we are skeptical about the draft report improve the commission proposal, which is well funded and strong balanced. We will work to amend the text to make the digital Euro an effective, accessible, truly public form of digital money. Thank you.”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you. Chair Lalucq, I prefer speaking Italian. Thank you very much. Thank you Minister. Now, you stated very clearly what your position is on the digital Euro is a position that we in the left group appreciate. But, um, our chairwoman, Mrs. Luluc, mentioned some of the previous stages that this file has gone through in the Parliament. There's a lot of resistance. There's resistance from the banking system and from this very committee when it comes to moving forward on the digital euro. You said you are hoping that this would move forward, but in your semester in the presidency, will you be taking any initiatives to move this file forwards? Second question what's your view on the 28th regime? It will have an impact on the Savings and Investment Union, of course. Third question also on savings and investment union. We're waiting to see how this file progresses. But are there real distortions when it comes to, uh, the position of companies? I can give you an example. In 2025, in Italy, Italian banks had profits of 10 to 13%. That's €28 billion. More or less. But loaning loans only went up 0.8%. So 13% extra profits. But jobs went up by 0.8%. You talked about small and micro enterprises. The lending to these companies went down. So over the course of your semester, would you put at least a sticking plaster on this distortion.”
  EU policy on banks profits · Digital euro
• “Yeah. Thank you chair Lalucq. I continue in Italian. Well, first of all I'd like to thank the rapporteur. Thank you for all the work you've done on this important file. We recognize the potential of AI to improve research and innovation, including when it comes to compliance and combating fraud. These are sectors where I can make for concrete improvements if it's used responsibly. Nonetheless, we must be clear eyed about the risks associated with AI, and we feel many of these risks are not taken seriously enough in the draft report. This is not just about the type of models used. The use of AI in the financial sector brings about bigger questions about protecting consumers, about responsibility. For instance, when it comes to the insurance sector, we've seen cases where AI guided cases may increase the exclusion of some more vulnerable groups with a lack of the necessary care. These are specific cases that showcase the issues with AI. There is also a risk when it comes to the excessive dependency on AI, which is still opaque. Financial markets depend on trust and a clear assignment of responsibility. We must ensure that the use of AI does not weaken these fundamental principles. Lastly, the we do share the need to avoid overregulation that must not become a pretext to give up on stronger protections where they are needed. The regulation on AI must be compatible with regulations on the financial sector. We want to make sure that all of this happens in a constructive way, so that the final text better reflects these concerns, while at the same time, we wish to support innovation that will be of use to the public interest. Thank you.”
  Financial regulation
• “President. Commissioner Hoekstra, the far western fiscal fragmentation that we're seeing in Europe is the initial factor of unfairness, unfair competition and the loss of competitiveness for countries in the European Union. We're seeing that there's another war that von der Leyen is fighting and spending billions of euros on this, but this is a far West that's a gift to undermining our rules, to not helping companies. Then you have the way we just gave up against Trump in negotiations there and the massive tax burden for our workers, our artisans and our companies. It's becoming shameful in Italy, where Mr. Meloni has. Increased tax burden by 42.5%, which is a historical increase in tax for the Five Star Movement. We refuse to accept this. We don't want this sort of regime for for tax in Europe. We need to reduce taxes there. There seem to be money you found for bombs. Can you find some for citizens?”
  Defence spending · Priorities of taxation policy in the EU
• “President. The course chartered by the council is such that we are favouring the interests of some member States. Europe is being very obedient, but is betraying its independence as well as citizens values. Now, this course will not give us more security. Rather, we are going down the road of rearmament, which will lead us nowhere. And we have ordinary people, small and mid-sized enterprises, who are bearing the brunt of cuts to social services and welfare. Now with the leaders of the Five Star Movement, Giuseppe Conte. We had the NATO summit and we went to The Hague to put in place the foundations for a different Europe, a Europe of peace and social justice, the Europe of the citizens and not of the lobbies. And in closing, allow me to add the fact that we failed to suspend the Association Agreement between the EU and Israel as a result of the veto of certain leaders, including Giorgia meloni, means that we are seeing children queuing up for bread and being mowed down by the Israeli Defence Force. We are seeing a genocide in Gaza. It is shameful.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “He said you'll be focused on new needs regarding our needs in defense. Are you thinking of a new governance? Are you going to try to ride roughshod over national governments decisions to direct the funding where you think it's appropriate? Thank you.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Thank you. Chair. I'll speak in Italian. President Lagarde, I have a great deal of respect for your work and the work of the ECB, and that is why I believe it goes beyond financial stability. Tier one and containment of inflation. Let's look rather at some concrete data 2025 was it was reminded here was exceptional for the banks and the banking system in Italy. We were expecting a profit rise for last year between 10 and 13%. Now given that situation a banking posts were 0.8%. That is assets 10 to 13% and 0.8% for the. So my question is, will you actually carry out some moral persuasion, moral suasion on the banking sector so that they can do what they should do and give credit to companies, because at the moment we have a huge difficulty because we've got the burden of investment, but if we don't give them the wherewithal, that will be impossible. Thank you.”
  EU policy on banks profits
• “Thank you. Chair. I will speak in Italian. Chairman. And Mr. Bailey, thank you very much for this exchange of views. Now, you have mentioned various issues and concerned in the private credit sector and also in the, uh, Bond the repo market, I think. Um, so it's an unstable situation at the moment. Things are difficult, but I would like to know what your proposals are. You said we need new tools or instruments. So I would like to know what you propose, what you expect from this, uh, committee and from the European Parliament. More austerity, more recommendations to the financial system, an increase in stress testing. I mean, I'm sure you've got ideas as to how we should deal with these difficult situations. And then two further questions, if I may. One, which was recalled by Mrs. Laluk on, uh, the issue of ships that are being allowed through the Straits of Hormuz. On the payment of crypto or stablecoins. Now, the very nature of these, uh, of these cryptocurrencies is that they can't, uh, be supervised. Now, Would you say they're more of a problem for the euro or for the dollar? Is this something that we should be more concerned about, or is it someone else who should be worrying? And then a final question, if I may. Seeing as I have a little bit of time left in the FSB report, there's a great deal of emphasis placed on the advantages of the energy transition. So my question, this pressure to delay things. This idea of reforming or abolishing the ETS. For example, the emissions trading scheme. I mean, is this something that you're concerned about? Is this something that worries you or is this something that could have an impact on stability also financial in Europe. Thank you very much.”
  Use of stablecoins
• “The scientific community has clearly shown that emissions arising from air transport have doubled in the past few years. Yet the air sector has unfair tax advantages. We need to make sure that there is a transition that cannot be postponed when it comes to how we handle this. As for the fisheries sector, the tax is applied here ought not to weigh on small producers. Member states should think carefully about how they tax products that will facilitate the transition of small scale fisheries transitioning to renewable sources. We want, furthermore, to avoid distortions that will compromise the aims of the directive. We must make bold and timely choices to speed up the green transition. And it's very important to underscore that access to energy must be considered a human and social right. Member states should be adopting specific measures to ensure fair access to energy. All must have access to clean energy which is necessary for life with dignity. Thank you.”
  Decarbonisation of aviation sector
• “Thank you. Chair I'll take the floor for substitute Pasquale Tridico. Okay. I prefer to talk in Italian. Well, let me begin by thanking the rapporteur. Energy taxation, as far as we are concerned, must have as its primary aim the green transition. That must be the absolute priority. Pouring investment into clean energy alternatives. Energy taxation has a key role to play in EU legislation on the climate. At the same time, we need to take account of the impact on redistribution that energy taxation may cause, in particular the impact on vulnerable families, and the Commission should be taking this into account and be vigilant when it comes to increasing inequality. We must furthermore guarantee an energy supply to all families, in particular low income households. We need to reflect, too, on the impact of fossil fuels on the climate. We must incorporate the polluter pays principle into the EU tax system for energy. There ought to be specific measures for certain types of energy products, and we have transition periods for those. But that transition must be swift to ensure that we're not slowing down our action against climate change. The taxation system ought not to disproportionately burden vulnerable groups, and that is why the member states ought to have the possibility of implementing different rates on the same products When these products are used to guarantee fair access to energy for all households, and we should furthermore be incentivizing public transport.”
  Priorities of taxation policy in the EU
• “Thank you very much. Good afternoon, everybody. Good afternoon, particularly to you, Commissioner. You said to us that there were many obstacles in the market and that the tariffs were a particular issue. I'd like to ask you a few questions. Some of these issues I've raised with you before. Could you give us an estimate of what you think are the biggest obstacles in the market? Golden power, for example, that's been used in Italy by the government in order to try to shape the new banking market structure has been problematic because the market has been thrown into disarray. A number of particular banking groups have been affected. Some major prospective takeovers have been prevented. Other banking groups have also sought to get involved in mergers and takeovers. The dirigiste approach by the government is unprecedented and has caused, as I say, extreme disarray in the banking sector in Italy. So could you comment on that? And could you say whether you think that this is really going to be the end of the Savings and Investment Union because the. Cat's out the bag now. We can't put the genie back in the bottle. So we didn't want to see this, but we've now got to face this problem. How do you think we can tackle it?”
  European Banking Union
• “Thank you. Chair Lalucq, I prefer speaking Italian. Thank you very much. Thank you Minister. Now, you stated very clearly what your position is on the digital Euro is a position that we in the left group appreciate. But, um, our chairwoman, Mrs. Luluc, mentioned some of the previous stages that this file has gone through in the Parliament. There's a lot of resistance. There's resistance from the banking system and from this very committee when it comes to moving forward on the digital euro. You said you are hoping that this would move forward, but in your semester in the presidency, will you be taking any initiatives to move this file forwards? Second question what's your view on the 28th regime? It will have an impact on the Savings and Investment Union, of course. Third question also on savings and investment union. We're waiting to see how this file progresses. But are there real distortions when it comes to, uh, the position of companies? I can give you an example. In 2025, in Italy, Italian banks had profits of 10 to 13%. That's €28 billion. More or less. But loaning loans only went up 0.8%. So 13% extra profits. But jobs went up by 0.8%. You talked about small and micro enterprises. The lending to these companies went down. So over the course of your semester, would you put at least a sticking plaster on this distortion.”
  EU policy on banks profits
• “Mr. president, colleagues. Commissioner. Well, the finding a house, a home is the first obstacle to be full citizens. The House Special Committee report recognises the problem, but offers an answer which does not really refers to the logic of the market. Private investment, deregulate and accelerate To procedures is not going to guarantee cheaper housing accessible to all. For us, we feel that housing is a fundamental right. We need to have a strong role of the public sector without any profits involved. We want to take measures against speculation and also all those empty houses that are on the market. And we need, Commissioner, what we need to do. Your project is not ambitious enough. Sir, you know you're not listening to me. I see that you're looking at your phone. So, uh, we're spending billions on other investments, but we're not spending very little in the housing sector. And everything else is just a waste of words. Thank you.”
  EU housing policy
• “Good morning. President, I have a suggestion we should change the title of this debate, because Ursula von der Leyen has turned it into the comatose state of the Union. President of the commission. It's a real shame. There's a long list. The farmers are being sacrificed on the altar of trade deals with Mercosur. It's a scourge on small and medium sized enterprises that are exporting their work to the world. The trade deal with Trump is a humiliation for Europe. You've defended it here, but it's a humiliation. Our goods will be more expensive in the US, while the US will not pay taxes in Europe. What a disaster. You are a threat to the security and safety of Europe. With the EU program we are getting into the Ukrainian war whereas we just need peace. The policies of this commission are a death sentence for Palestinian children. What do you expect? Do you think you're going to stop arms sales to Israel? Go home.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll also speak Italian. We are accustomed to seeing different facts and figures when we meet experts in a variety of sectors. But we have heard more than before different views and figures and numbers. In terms of evaluating the impact of the commission proposal. There is a first number which didn't seem credible. And from that I begin to have doubts about the approach as a whole. Eurostat figures. Say that there are 66,000 tobacco sales points in Europe, and that seems inconsistent because in Italy alone there are more than 50,000. Maybe there's an underlying lying fact which doesn't stack up. And also, when Professor Hannah Ross told us that from her point of view, there is no risk of a strong market shock. We met the agriculture and manufacturing industry sector. They talked us to us not about a shock, but a tragic situation because they had made investments and in particular in Italy, we have a country where major investment has been made by industry. They tell us that this will have a negative impact on jobs and investment affecting farms in particular.”
  Smoking regulation
• “Thank you very much, chair. We have our wonderful interpreters with us today, so I'll be speaking in Italian. Thank you very much. Chair. Thank you very much, Vice President. Mr.. I very much appreciate the work of the task force. That's something you have presented very recently. I have some questions for you. I very much welcome the introduction of the spirit of simplification. First of all, the, um, national measures such as, um, tax that can be levied on the banking system. That is what happened in Italy in the most recent budget. Are they compatible? It's very precise. Question are they compatible with simplification and the simplification model that you have presented. My second question is more general in nature this simplification. Will it lead to an increase on the tax on on credit? And another question. The objective of simplification here is to try and regulate supervision and supervision make up in Italy. We've seen something quite extraordinary over the last few months. We have seen the government that has used in an improper way, a certain powers stopping an Italian bank from purchasing another bank and essentially choosing a foreign buyer. I'm talking about UniCredit here. Now, I know that you're not going to go into the specific case, but UniCredit was able to buy a VPN, which then became a French bank. So I come to a conclusion now, is this acceptable? Is this simplification, is it going to protect us or do we need to step it up a gear? Thank you.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you. Chair. I'll speak in Italian. President Lagarde, I have a great deal of respect for your work and the work of the ECB, and that is why I believe it goes beyond financial stability. Tier one and containment of inflation. Let's look rather at some concrete data 2025 was it was reminded here was exceptional for the banks and the banking system in Italy. We were expecting a profit rise for last year between 10 and 13%. Now given that situation a banking posts were 0.8%. That is assets 10 to 13% and 0.8% for the. So my question is, will you actually carry out some moral persuasion, moral suasion on the banking sector so that they can do what they should do and give credit to companies, because at the moment we have a huge difficulty because we've got the burden of investment, but if we don't give them the wherewithal, that will be impossible. Thank you.”
  EU policy on banks profits