Georg MAYER

Policy topics Georg MAYER is active on

What Georg MAYER has said (25)

• 2026-06-17 “(15:30:05 – 15:31:20): You very much, president. The commission is calling it an action plan on electrification. Well, I think it's more of a doctrine which will make electricity compulsory everywhere, factories, heating, transport. But 1 of the questions they're not answering, and where that is, where's the electricity coming from? Yes. It comes out of the plug in the wall, but where is it being produced? We need to have so I mean, we've had speak about sovereignty. Well, the batteries come from China. The solar panels come from China. All the raw materials come from China. The EU has created a logo for independence. Well, actually, we're going to end up with things that cost 3 times as much as they need to because they're coming from the other side of the world. We're going to end up with no plan whatsoever. It is the citizens that are going to end up paying at the end of the day. What you come up with, mister commissioner, you have to deliver on. We need to ensure that we can have affordable prices for consumers. This plan isn't progress. It is a risk for consumers. Mister Van Dyke, go ahead. Thank president.”
  Battery supply chain: EU gigafactory sovereignty vs. reliance on Asian suppliers
• 2025-07-21 “E-003018/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Member States already play a central role in the implementation of the main EU horizontal acts related to the security and protection of critical infrastructure 1 , including energy, for example via a national strategy for enhancing the resilience of critical entities and a national cybersecurity strategy 2 . The Commission presented on 26 February 2025 an Affordable Energy Action Plan 3 with eight concrete actions. This includes measures to make bills more affordable, reduce price spikes and, in particular, a revision of the energy security framework in early 2026, where the Commission will look, among others, at the lesson from the investigation of the blackout in Spain and Portugal of 28 April 2025. As indicated in the Affordable Energy Action Plan, a decarbonised energy system will deliver quality jobs, growth and energy security. Europe’s reliance on imported fossil fuels causes energy price volatility and higher supply costs, while making the EU more vulnerable to external pressure and global market uncertainty. In 2024, the EU’s fossil-fuel energy import bill reached EUR 362 billion. The energy transition and energy security are two sides of the same coin. A shift from traditional dependency on imported fossil fuels to the deployment of domestic and homegrown clean energy shiels consumers from market volatility, strengthens our strategic autonomy in the field of energy, and ultimately contributes to deliver secure and affordable energy to European citizens and industries. 1 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC (CER Directive), OJ L333, 27.12.2022, p. 164; Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive), OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80. 2 Article 14 of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 and article 7 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 respectively. 3 COM/2025/79.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices · EU energy infrastructure integration · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2025-07-21 “E-003019/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The 2021-2027 multi-annual financial framework (MFF) budget for the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) programmes is 17% lower, in current prices, compared to the previous MFF. Over 2021-2025, it has been reinforced with EUR 10 million from the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor programme 1 in 2023. There were few minor transfers (about EUR 1 million a year) from the Euratom programme to Horizon Europe. There were thus no significant changes. The Commission acknowledges that Member States might have different views on the role of nuclear energy. However, a sound scientific and technical basis for the safe operation of reactors and management of radioactive waste is crucial for those Member States that include nuclear energy as part of their energy mix, and for those that need reassurance that nuclear power plants in neighbouring countries respect the highest safety standards. In addition, the Euratom programme supports research and innovation in other related fields, including health and medicine. Therefore, the European public at large benefits from Euratom-funded research. Article 7 of the Euratom Treaty 2 provides that Community research and training programmes have to be adopted by unanimity in the Council. This ensures that any research activity foreseen is in the interest of and approved by all Member States. Moreover, during implementation, in the preparation of work programmes, the Commission is assisted by a programme committee of Member States to achieve the largest possible agreement. The procedure used requires approval from said committee before the Commission can adopt the work programmes. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/iter_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:11957A007.”
  Nuclear energy
• 2025-07-21 “E-003021/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission In the context of the extension of the Gas storage regulation, unfavourable market conditions include, for example, indications of possible market manipulation or of trading activities that hinder cost-effective storage-filling thereby significantly limiting the ability to ensure that gas storages are filled according to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 1 . If those conditions persist, the Commission can consider a potential increase of the level of allowed deviation taking into account, in particular, storage filling levels, global gas supply, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) supply outlook, and signs of market manipulation. To meet the Union's gas needs while reducing supply risks, the overall framework must balance energy security considerations with market-based principles. The framework therefore sets filling targets while allowing flexibility to adapt to constant changes in the gas market and to take advantage of the best purchasing conditions. When such flexibilities are used, the Commission and Member States should assess their potential consequences and inform the Gas Coordination Group (GCG) immediately. Each Member State defines its own filling trajectory and may decide to make use of the flexibilities provided in the regulation, as long as they do not negatively impact the ability of directly connected Member States to supply their protected customers or negatively impact the functioning of the internal market. Specific national circumstances are considered via provisions applicable to specific situations, such as storage capacity, the level of exports or domestic production. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/gas-supply-security-in-theeu.html#:~:text=Regulation%20(EU)%202017%2F1938%20aims%20to%20strengthen%20European%20Union, vulnerable%20consumers%20are%20always%20supplied.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · EU policy on gas storage targets
• 2025-06-26 “P-002578/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Cooperation with third countries is a key priority for the EU and a legal obligation under the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) 1 . This serves a double purpose: explain the EUDR, its rationale and its requirements; and discuss concrete needs and concerns and explore cooperation possibilities to support the transition towards Deforestation-free supply chains. The Commission has scaled up its engagement with partner countries, Member States and global stakeholders since 2024 to support preparations and provide an update on EUDR latest developments. On 2 October 2024, the Commission published a Strategic Framework for International Cooperation to promote Deforestation-free supply chains globally 2 . The Commission, together with Member States has increased dedicated funding, in particular with the launch of a EUR 86 million Team Europe Initiative (TEI) on Deforestation-free Value Chains 3 and created targeted value-chain initiatives such as the Sustainable Cocoa Initiative, forming part of the broader ecosystem of deforestation-related programmes under the TEI framework 4 . The EU Multi-Stakeholder Platform on Protecting and Restoring the World’s Forests 5 continues to dedicate specific sessions to support Member States. In addition, the Commission holds a high number of informal meetings with Member States to ensure a well-coordinated approach on EUDR implementation among competent authorities. Generally speaking, the Commission has held a very high number of meetings with partner countries, Member States and stakeholders, and continues to engage with all parties to ensure a smooth implementation of the EUDR. 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010, OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 206–247. 2 https://green-forum.ec.europa.eu/document/download/98053bb7-bb73-4157-bf35a9ffa35e2ee2_en?filename=Annex%20to%20Communication%20Strategic%20Framework%20for%20Internati onal%20Cooperation%20EUDR.pdf. 3 https://zerodeforestationhub.eu/. 4 which currently provides support in more than 20 partner countries: Argentina, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Laos, Liberia, Paraguay, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia. Other countries might still be added in the future, depending on the funding situation of the TEI. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expertgroups/consult?lang=en&groupId=3282&fromMeetings=true&meetingId=23741.”
  Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights) · Trade impact on forests
• 2025-04-24 “E-001649/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not have specific data on the number of civil society organisations supported by EU funding involved in the Commission's policymaking processes as advisors, project partners or stakeholders since 2018. The Commission's approach follows the principles of better regulation 1 and ensures that policymaking is transparent, inclusive and based on sound analysis, minimising the risk of undue influence from any group or interest. The Commission seeks to engage with a wide range of stakeholders, including civil society organisations to gather diverse perspectives and expertise to improve its policymaking. The Commission is not aware of EU-funded organisations with ‘targeted narratives against populist, migration-critical or conservative positions’. The recipients of EU grants remain fully and solely responsible for their own views. The Commission closely monitors the implementation of projects. In case of misconduct such as a serious breach of obligations and grave professional misconduct, including lack of respect of EU values, the Commission may suspend or terminate the grant agreement, in line with the contractual provisions 2 and the Financial Regulation 3 . The Commission issued guidance 4 , clarifying which activities should not be mandated as a condition for EU financing. Support for activities related to policy development and implementation, including enhancing the involvement of civil society organisations, remains an important and legitimate funding objective, as designed by the co-legislators in the relevant legislation. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/better-regulation/better-regulation-guidelines-andtoolbox_en. 2 See for example the Justice Programme Model Grant Agreement: https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/just/agr-contr/general-mga_just_en.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/guidance-fundingdev-impl-monit-enforce-of-eu-law_en.pdf.”
  EU engagement with civil society · Transparency requirements for interest groups
• 2025-04-24 “E-001650/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission There are rules ensuring the visibility of EU financial support. In line with point (h) of Article 204(2) of the Financial Regulation 1 , grant agreements typically include provisions governing the visibility of the Union financial support, except in duly justified cases where public display is not possible or appropriate. Article 17 of the Commission´s Model Grant Agreement 2 (MGA) refers to an obligation to acknowledge EU support through the display of the European flag and a funding statement (‘(Co-)Funded by the European Union’). These rules do not require organisations funded by the EU to ‘publicly label their financial dependence on EU funds’. There is no legal requirement for the Commission to collect information on ‘voluntary’ publication of annual reports on funding sources and project funding by civil society organisations. However, Article 38 of the Financial Regulation 3 requires the Commission to publish information about EU fund recipients, including the amounts of EU support committed, in the Financial Transparency System 4 . Interest representatives that register in the Transparency Register 5 as not representing commercial interests, which would typically include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), are required to report their lobbying activities and disclose their main funding sources as well as the amount of each contribution above EUR 10,000 exceeding 10% of their total budget and the name of the contributor in their registrations in the Transparency Register 6 . The Commission proactively shares the objectives and outcomes of funded projects on the Funding & Tenders Portal 7 . The Commission refers to its previous answers regarding advocacy activities implemented by NGOs 8 . The Commission has issued guidance 9 , clarifying which activities should not be mandated as a condition for EU financing. Support for activities related to policy 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509. 2 See, for example, the Justice programme MGA: https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/just/agr-contr/general-mga_just_en.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html. 5 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en. 6 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/searchregister-or-update/search-register_en. 7 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home. 8 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000280-ASW_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000351-ASW_EN.pdf; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/291733/Replies%20to%20questionnaire%20addressed%20to%20Cssr %20responsible%20for%20Budget%20and%20Administration_final.pdf. 9 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/guidance-fundingdev-impl-monit-enforce-of-eu-law_en.pdf.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-04-24 “E-001652/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission´s accounting system groups the legal entities funded by the Commission according to certain categories 1 . ‘Civil society organisations’ are not a category on their own but part of one or another category, with no specific split per entity within that category. For this reason, the Commission is not in a position to provide an exhaustive overview of the support from the EU budget provided to ‘civil society organisations. The Commission´s Financial Transparency system 2 publicly shows the EU funding received by a given beneficiary and beneficiary type, also below EUR 500 000. Where an organisation is listed in the Transparency Register 3 , it must publish EU funding received, which can thus be verified as well. Moreover, the projects awarded under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme 4 , the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 5 , Horizon Europe 6 , and Erasmus+ 7 during the years from 2018 to 2024, including their beneficiary(ies) and the EU contribution awarded per entity are publicly available on the EU Funding & Tenders Portal in the section Projects & Results 8 . Under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) 2021-2027 9 , several calls have been launched, with details available at the following links: AMIF-2025-TF2-AG-INTE (Transnational Actions on Asylum, Migration and Integration) 10 ; AMIF-2024-TF2-AG-INFO (Information and awareness raising campaigns on the risks of irregular migration in third 1 The categories include: private companies, non-governmental organisations, not-for-profit organisations, private persons, Ex staff member and other Numéro Unique de Personnel - NUP holders, Member States, Regions-Provinces Member States, European Free Trade Association - EFTA Countries, Third States, RegionsProvinces Third States, International Organisations, European Investment Bank - EIB, Other public bodies, European Union - EU Institution & Bodies, EU executive agencies, EU decentralised agencies, EU Joint Undertakings and Public-Private Partnerships - PPP, European Investment Fund - EIF, European Commission EC entities not consolidated, EU trust funds, staff, Member of Parliament. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html. The annual publications are based on Article 38 of the Financial Regulation (OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1–239), and in accordance with the third paragraph of the article, information on recipients is not disclosed in specific cases outlined therein. 3 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/citizens-equality-rightsand-values-programme/citizens-equality-rights-and-values-programme-overview_en. 5 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/funding/asylum-migration-and-integration-funds/asylum-migration-andintegration-fund-2021-2027_en. 6 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/horizon-europe_en. 7 https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu. 8 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projectsresults?order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=10&sortBy=es_SortDate. 9 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/funding/asylum-migration-and-integration-funds/asylum-migration-andintegration-fund-2021-2027_en. 10 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/calls-forproposals?callIdentifier=AMIF-2025-TF2-AGINTE&isExactMatch=true&status=31094501,31094502,31094503&order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=5 0&sortBy=startDate.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Accounting and auditing of EU budget · EU engagement with civil society
• 2025-04-24 “E-001651/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission invites the Honourable Member to consult the Transparency Register 1 . On 01 September 2025, it identified 249 non-governmental organisations (NGOs), platforms, networks and assimilated which have their head office in Belgium and which declare to have received EU grants in the current and last financial year. Registrants are required to ensure that the information provided upon registration is subsequently kept up to date, including the amount and source of any EU grants contributing to their operating costs. Datasets of historical information since January 2015 can be consulted on the official portal for European data 2 . Moreover, since 2008, the Financial Transparency System (FTS) 3 releases detailed information on recipients of funds financed from the budget implemented under direct management. Former EU staff (officials, temporary or contract agents, accredited parliamentary assistants) have a right to work after the end of their service, including for civil society organisations, subject to the obligations and conditions set out in Article 16 of the EU Staff Regulations 4 . The Commission does not have comprehensive information about the current employment of former EU staff. The Commission does not have any preferential policy towards any civil society organisation. In line with the better regulation principles, stakeholder consultations are transparent, inclusive, and accessible, allowing all interested parties, regardless of their affiliation or physical location, to provide input. This ensures that diverse perspectives are considered in the EU policymaking process. 1 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en. 2 https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/transparency-register?locale=en. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html; the annual publications are based on Article 38 of the Financial Regulation (Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509), and in accordance with the third paragraph of the article, information on recipients is not disclosed in specific cases outlined therein. The NGO classification used on the FTS is based on self-declarations by entities receiving funding from EU funds through grant agreements or contracts directly managed by the Commission. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1962/31(1)/2014-05-01/eng.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2024-10-28 “E-002275/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 1. With the exception of the determination of the volume of admission of third-country nationals, which remains the exclusive competence of the Member States, the common immigration policy is a shared competence between the EU and the Member States. As regards the admission of non-EU workers, Member States retain the right to apply national rules if those have not been harmonised at EU level. These national rules cannot, however, jeopardise the security and the well-functioning of an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, as holders of residence permits (like holders of the Hungarian ‘National Cards’) can move in the Schengen area for up to 90 days in any 180-day period. 2. The Commission continues to condemn in the strongest possible terms the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression of Ukraine by Russia. In this context, all actions taken at EU and Member States’ levels need to consider the security of the Schengen area as a whole. The Commission adopted specific guidance 1 in 2022 to ensure additional scrutiny as this is a matter of European internal security. Against this background, the Commission maintains its deep concern regarding national schemes covering Russian and Belarusian nationals. 3. The fact that Hungary has put in place a facilitated scheme to admit Russian and Belarusian nationals for the purpose of work, without considering the security concerns of the other Schengen States raises concerns. This increases the common risks and undermines mutual trust. 1 C (2022) 7111 final.”
  Enlargement of Schengen area · Legal migration
• 2024-10-28 “E-002268/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission 1. As the case referred in the parliamentary question is still pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 1 , the Commission cannot comment on it. The Commission has not made any announcement in this context and does not intend to introduce changes with a retroactive effect that would introduce a burden on car manufacturers or disadvantage citizens that purchased their cars in good faith. Irrespective of the outcome of the CJEU Judgement, the Commission will ensure a proper follow-up with Member States. 2. The pending case that has given rise to preliminary ruling proceedings before the CJEU concerns a specific vehicle purchased by a citizen and compensation to that individual citizen. There is no indication from the CJEU that the case would have implications for the validity of the original emission type-approval for the vehicle type concerned and would require a recall of vehicles. Liability and damage compensation rules are applied on a case-by-case basis for individual vehicles concerned by a legal dispute. 1 Joined cases C-251/23 and C-308/23, Mercedes-Benz Group e.a.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2024-10-28 “E-002271/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Since the start of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) transitional period in October 2023, the Commission has been providing detailed guidance to help importers adapt to the new reporting requirements, including detailed manuals, webinars, and e-learnings. As of 31 October 2024, over 71.000 reports were submitted from over 33.000 importers covering more than 150 countries. During this learning phase, the Commission has been gathering data and information on implementation, including through direct exchanges with industry. During the November 2024 meeting of the CBAM Expert Group gathering representatives from Member States, EU associations and third countries, ideas for the simplification of the CBAM were discussed. The Commission is committed to addressing potential issues identified during the transitional period ahead of the start of the definitive period, after sufficient data from CBAM reports has been collected, and to ensure a smooth roll-out of the mechanism during the post-2025 period. Among others, the Commission is currently looking into the question of the application of the de minimis CBAM rule in the definitive period. The CBAM applies evenly across the EU, and only to imports. In relation to exports, as mentioned in its 2024 Carbon Market Report 1 , the Commission will further look in 2025 into the carbon leakage risk of goods produced in the Union for export in a report on the application of the CBAM to the European Parliament and to the Council. 1 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/92ec0ab3-24cf-4814-ad5981c15e310bea_en?filename=2024_carbon_market_report_en.pdf”
  Climate efforts
• 2024-10-28 “E-002274/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has just finalised the negotiation, on behalf of the EU, of a status agreement, as provided for in Article 73(3) of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation 1 , with Bosnia and Herzegovina. This agreement would allow for the deployment of border management teams of the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps, by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), to Bosnia and Herzegovina upon the request of the relevant authorities. Status agreements are already in place with Albania 2 , Moldova 3 , Montenegro 4 , North Macedonia 5 and Serbia 6 . On 27 January 2025, the Council adopted a decision on the signing of the status agreement and transmitted the agreement to the European Parliament for its consent, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 218(6)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 1 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624. OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1. 2 Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Albania on operational activities carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in the Republic of Albania. OJ L, 2023/2107, 5.10.2023. 3 Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova on operational activities carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in the Republic of Moldova. OJ L 91, 18.3.2022, p. 4. 4 Agreement between the European Union and Montenegro on operational activities carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in Montenegro. OJ L 140, 30.5.2023, p. 4. 5 Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of North Macedonia on operational activities carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in the Republic of North Macedonia. OJ L 61, 27/02/2023, p. 3. 6 Status Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on actions carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in the Republic of Serbia. OJ L 202, 25.6.2020, p. 3.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-10-28 “E-002267/2024 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s reply to the Court’s observations and recommendations was published alongside the audit 1 . The REPowerEU Plan 2 suggested an aspirational target of 10 million tonnes of EU renewable hydrogen production and 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen imports by 2030 to lower the imports of Russian fossil fuels, proposing to increase the mandatory targets for renewable hydrogen consumption in industry and the transport sector 3 .The co-legislators however decided on a lower level of binding targets under the Renewable Energy Directive 4 . In addition, the co-legislators also agreed on mandatory targets for renewable hydrogen consumption in industry in 2035 and laid out pathways in the aviation 5 and maritime 6 sector to promote the uptake of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen up to 2050. The Commission is currently working with Member States, including through an assessment of their National Energy and Climate Plans, to ensure the timely transposition of the mandatory demand volumes decided by the co-legislators in industry and transport. 1 Available at: https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECAReplies/COM-Replies-SR-2024-11/COM-Replies-SR2024-11_EN.pdf 2 COM(2022) 230 final. 3 The annex to the REPowerEU Plan (SWD(2022)230 final assesses that 8 m tons of this higher renewable hydrogen production and import could replace EU natural gas demand of 27 billion cubic meters. 4 Directive (EU) 2023/2413. 5 Regulation (EU) 2023/2405. 6 Regulation (EU) 2023/1805.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-28 “E-002266/2024 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The requirement of tethered caps and lids is one of the measures of the Single-Use Plastics (SUP) Directive 1 , which aims to reduce the impact of the unsustainable use of plastic on the environment and human health and was part of the final agreement by the co-legislators. In compliance with the Better Regulation 2 rules, stakeholders were consulted and the expected impacts of the SUP Directive were assessed in detail before its adoption in an impact assessment accompanying the proposal 3 , based on a supporting study 4 . Caps and lids from SUP beverage containers were found more than twice as often on EU beaches than the containers themselves. The impact assessment estimated that the measure will lead to almost no littering of caps and lids separately. The design requirement would increase by 2% the unit weight of plastic bottles, but the entire cap or lid would now be recycled. However, depending on a company's design choices and innovation practices, the design requirement of tethered caps does not have to lead to the use of more plastic. This is already demonstrated by several existing company practices. In combination with binding targets for the separate collection of SUP beverage bottles 5 , the tethering requirement will help to significantly reduce their littering. Tasked by the Commission, the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) developed a harmonised standard on test methods and requirements to demonstrate that plastic caps and lids remain attached to beverage containers 6 . The Commission is set to carry out an evaluation of the SUP Directive by 3 July 2027. Part of this procedure will be an open public consultation to which all stakeholders, including the expert mentioned by the Honourable Members, can submit their feedback. 1 Directive (EU) 2019/904 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the reduction of the impact of certain plastic products on the environment, OJ L 155, 12.6.2019, p. 1–19. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-regulation_en 3 Summary of SUPD Impact Assessment: https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/6e9b7f79-da96-4a53-956fe8f62c9d7fed/library/466e246b-cfa3-4b3e-a3c7-fe78bb53ee0a/details?download=true 4 Supporting study - Assessment of measures to reduce marine litter from single use plastics: https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/6e9b7f79-da96-4a53-956f-e8f62c9d7fed/library/10fe4f5e-45cb-4604-8e8a247d8d76f1f5/details?download=true 5 Article 9(1) of the SUP Directive sets the following targets for the separate collection for recycling for SUP beverage bottles: 77% by 2025 and 90% by 2029. 6 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/1060 of 30 May 2023 on a harmonised standard for test methods and requirements to demonstrate that plastic caps and lids remain attached to beverage containers drafted in support of Directive (EU) 2019/904 of the European Parliament and of the Council. This standard takes into account the reliability and safety of beverage container closures, as well as the necessity of not undermining the bottles’ recyclability.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2024-10-28 “E-002273/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Contrary to what is claimed by the Honourable Members, the annual amount of penalties imposed by the Commission on car manufacturers is not in the billions of euros. Since the EU CO 2 targets for cars started applying in 2012, only one German vehicle manufacturer had to pay a penalty for exceeding its target in one single calendar year. The provisions on the excess emissions premiums for cars and vans manufacturers exceeding their CO 2 emission reduction targets are set out in Article 8 of Regulation (EU)2019/631 1 . The Regulation requires the Commission, for each calendar year, to impose an excess emissions premium on a manufacturer where its average specific emissions of CO 2 exceed its specific emissions target. The Commission calculates the excess emissions premiums for those manufacturers that exceeded their targets by applying the rules set out in Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/631. According to Article 8(4) of the Regulation, the amounts of the excess emissions premiums shall be considered as revenue for the general budget of the EU. These provisions have been in place since 2009 for cars and 2011 for vans and have not been changed by the co-legislators in any of the amendments to the Regulation adopted since. The President of the Commission will convene a Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the Car Industry in Europe to design solutions as this industry goes through a deep and disruptive transition and to make sure that the future of cars will continue to be made in Europe. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/631/oj”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “Thank you. President. Cyber security is indispensable across all sectors. This proposed act, however, does not offer more security, just red tape, a certification procedure that comes with many obligations. Market access in exchange for fees. Smes in particular, will struggle with high costs and excessive administrative burden, but they won't enjoy greater security. We will see a bureaucratic monster for our companies. Yet again. Paper will not offer security. We can all only do so through technology. That is the only thing that will protect our companies against criminals. Thank you.”
  Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
• “Thank you very much, president. Distinguished colleagues, the forest fires recently show one thing, and that is that disaster management protection is a national purview and must remain so. Countries know the situations better than anyone else. Subsidiarity, of course, needs to be our watchword and Brussels tries to exploit crises cease to try and grab more power and to waste billions of euros, which disappears. And we have people in situ who are left waiting. We have various models, and national prevention requires different approaches, and that is why more resources should flow to the member states rather than to Brussels. That should be our guiding principle.”
  EU political integration
• “Thank you, Madam President. The strategy that you're proposing here has been not very successful. It's going to remain so. And this is no real contribution to energy security in Europe. You can take that at face value. In fact, it's going to achieve the opposite. It's short sighted and is destroying ourselves. Epp has been lobbying together with the commission, and that means that we're damaging ourselves here in Europe. And that's something that's not going to be able to be undone. It also is short circuiting the member states. Well, at least there's an American president who can see further and who's providing for peace, much more far sighted than the European nomenclature, who've just been saber rattling over the past years. Trump now has prepared a piece which will help everybody, and the whole European and global press in recent months have been making fun of Trump, but he is still pressing on. So this is scandalous for everybody. Those who are proposing that we continue with war.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Thank you, Madam President. There's an old saying in Berlin about I can hear you singing Nightingale. I wonder what the implications of your proposals will be for industry. Once again, this gives us a further example of the ideological underpinnings of the European Green Deal, which is causing such widespread suffering under European businesses. This is getting worse and worse in many are leaving small and medium sized enterprises which are the backbone of our economy, have been. Are being forced to bear ever more tax burdens and this is driving them abroad. The supply chain provides a good example of the impact of these exaggerated demands on our companies. We need chemicals in practically every sector of industry and farming, and we are endangering the security of own supplies if we continue down this road, while at the same time forcing our businesses to expatriate. Environmental protection involves protecting our home. It's important to remember that, however, we have to remain keep our feet on the ground. We shouldn't have utopian objectives. These can only damage our businesses and push us into the arms and dependency of the USA and China. Ladies and gentlemen, we call for less red tape. We demand a greater Disability. We call as well for fair competition for our businesses and a level playing field. We have to ensure that we can bring jobs back to Europe by doing away with excessive bureaucracy, creating secure jobs and anything else in the Green Deal is rubbish.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you, Madam President. Well, what we're experiencing here in front of our doors again, is the nth time that European farmers are demonstrating in front of the European Parliament. And they're absolutely right. When you look at the situation. Absolutely right. They're demonstrating for their own rights and they're suffering when we're talking about plant protection measures. We're not just talking about agriculture here. We're talking about energy prices. We're talking about security of supply. And we're also talking about whether the EU is helping its own farmers, if they're taking them seriously, or if they're taking the Michael. We know that producing fertilizers costs a lot of energy. But if you're going to close them down, it means we're going to close our farms down as well. The farmers have already paid through the nose and the commission has promised an action plan. We've heard that on a number of occasions before. I think it's going to be too little. Just providing these green headlines, we need to have stable gas provision, low electricity prices, no red tape and no ideological expensiveness.”
  Use of fertilisers
• “Thank you. Madam. Colleagues. Industry. This industry is is absolutely indispensable for our industry and for Europe. Now we seem to pretend that external factors are responsible for the situation we're in at the moment. But that is not the truth, because the problems are home made in China. In the United States, everything seems to work. So we seem to have the wrong policies that have been implemented by the European government. And this from the very start, Mrs. von der Leyen made all the mistakes that she could possibly make. So it's not the external factors which you use an excuse as an excuse that's not decisive. It's the internal factors and alternative renewable energies. And I think that Commission realizes this is not an alternative because they're not pretty used, not very useful industry suffering from this and they're moving away. You can see the automotive industry, which is suffering where millions of jobs are being lost.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you. The Chinese and the Americans are representing their own interests. And, of course, they're fighting very hard to do so. But that's not something that we seem to be doing in this house. We seem to be representing American, the American trade, and then the Americans and the Chinese come here and say how lovely it is in Europe, but they destroy our economy. At the moment, we have an ideologically guided Commission policy. And then we just hear a lot of buzzwords. We are experiencing deindustrialization in Europe, and our industry is deliberately being driven away. We could still use plastic and plastic bottles, but we would have to have the right conditions in place to do so. Now, the end of the combustion engine is something that's making it difficult for our industry to keep up with its competitors. Something that we also need to avoid is getting into a conflict with China that will just damage us.”
• “Thank you very much, president. This is really beyond a joke. What is going on? And I think that the anybody, blind as they may be ideologically and the Greens are that things just don't and cannot work the way they think and the way they've been trying to make them work. We need to get rid of all this bureaucracy and all this crazy policy making, because what's been happening over the years in energy policy is more and more bureaucracy. And now we can see what is happening because we don't even have secure networks. It's absolutely imperative to identify the causes. But the commission doesn't seem to be changing its course. It's still obsessed with the green. The green transition. Wind and sun, which is not efficient. And I think this has been proven. I don't want to be giving you an apology for the apocalypse, but frankly, we don't want to see such a blackout again, although I'm certain that we're going to, because of the absolute blind faith of commission and governments.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Well, Mr. Sieper, it's nothing to do with me defending Putin or Russia. I'm defending Europe and the member states, and I think that's what's the difference between me and you. It's not about Putin. It's about European interests that are not being represented.”
  EU foreign policy approach