Andrius Kubilius

Policy topics Andrius Kubilius is active on

What Andrius Kubilius has said (80)

• 2026-07-21 “Dear Minister Kierwiński, Dear Secretary of State Szymański, Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen, My dear Polish friends, I have come to Poland to celebrate a success story. Today we signed an important agreement. This is a big day for Poland, the Eastern Flank and the entire European Union. Poland is showing real leadership; By investing in space, Poland is investing in its security, its economy, and its future. Today's signature will make Poland a pillar of Europe's secure connectivity strategy and a driving force for the Eastern Flank. Today, Poland is helping Europe to stand stronger, act more independently, and remain competitive in a rapidly changing world. As you know Poland received 60 billion euro from the EU recovery and resilience facility to build a strong and resilient Poland after COVID. Today, Poland is investing 656 million euro from this fund into its own secure satellite connectivity system. To bring security from space. And more than investing, Poland is also pioneering a truly new European approach. Adding a Polish module to a European satellite constellation. So Poland will have better capacities, and the whole of Europe will have better capacities. Last year the Commission announced: Remaining Recovery and Resilience Fund money could also be spent on security,defence and space. For space, it could be integrated in the EU IRIS² programme. The Polish government has decided to follow this scheme. To build a Polish constellation as part of IRIS², the European Union Secure Connectivity Programme. I applaud this decision. This massive investment shows great Polish leadership. I hope other Member States will follow. It shows Poland truly understands the decisive importance of space for our economy and security. By choosing to build its own constellation as part of IRIS², Poland partners with Europe into one system. This modular implementation, as part of IRIS², brings reinforced sovereign communications and tailor-made solutions when and where needed. And this 656 million euro will directly benefit Polish people, Polish and European citizens. IRIS² is a new constellation of hundreds of satellites built by the EU. That will bring superfast secure internet from space to every corner of Polandevery corner of Europe – and every corner of the world. Secure connectivity, anywhere and anytime. For civil security, law enforcement and defence. It will bring trusted secure communications for armed forces. And also for police, border guards and coast guards, Polish and European. So they can better protect our borders,fight crime, and save lives at sea. And IRIS² will bring secure satellite connectivity to protect the messages of Polish and European governments and embassies from foreign espionage. By integrating the Polish system with IRIS², Poland chooses to go European instead of going alone. Bringing EU added value. This offers Poland a comprehensive satellite system – for a good price. More satellites will pass over Poland, providing better services. Creating jobs – and good quality jobs – in Poland. A sovereign solution with capacities that Poland can manage autonomously thanks to an additional ground station in its territory – a “gateway”. A big benefit to the country and local community. And what is important: Poland's investment today will make the entire Eastern Flank stronger. Will make Poland a connectivity hub for the entire Eastern Flank. Bring more capacity for secure connectivity to the Eastern Flank. Secure connectivity from space is our lifeline in times of crisis and war. Almost impossible for enemies to break into or take down. So today you make Poland, the Eastern Flank and the entire European Union stronger in our security and defence. I thank you for that! Your decision to spend this money through IRIS² is very welcome. It builds on the incredible space journey Poland is making. On the remarkable ramp-up of Poland's space ecosystem and investments. To mention only a few: • The Polish “CAMILA” Earth observation constellation. Also funded through the EU Recovery Fund. • The new Centre for Civil Security and Resilience announced together with ESA just one week ago here in Warsaw. • The many successful Polish space companies, who are already fully integrated in European space projects across different domains. This impressive ramp-up of Poland's space ecosystem demonstrates Polish leadership in Europe. This is especially important for the Eastern Flank. Poland has the scale, the talent, and the ambition of a space faring nation. A European leader in space. Helping to shape a stronger, more secure, and more innovative space ecosystem across our part of Europe. In a time of geopolitical instability, this leadership is essential. So what are the next steps for the EU in secure satellite connectivity? This year we started the initial operations of GOVSATCOM, pooling secure satellite communications and sharing them among all requesting Member States. Next year we will add commercial services to GOVSATCOM, bringing additional services. And we are moving ahead with IRIS². IRIS² will be accelerated to start initial operations by 2029. So let me conclude. Poland's ambitions in space will bring great results right here on the ground. This is about security, sovereignty, economic resilience, and technological leadership right here on Earth. Europe's strength in space lies in our ability to act together. When we invest in common European space infrastructure, all Member States benefit. We create economies of scale, reduce fragmentation, strengthen resilience. We ensure that no country is left behind in accessing critical capabilities. But the key point is this: It is better to develop one European system that can grow over time than to multiply separate national systems that are more costly, less interoperable, and less efficient. Separate national systems cost more and can achieve less. By joining forces in Europe, we can have more, cheaper and better space systems and services. This is precisely the logic behind IRIS² and our broader Secure Connectivity strategy. Today's technologies allow us to work in a modular and flexible way. That means we can build systems that are expandable, adaptable, and future-proof for the benefit of all Member States. And that is exactly what Poland is doing today: A true European solution, using EU funds, bringing true security in connectivity. For Poland and for Europe. Poland can be proud today. I look forward to working with you on the next steps.”
  EU competences on space policy
• 2026-07-13 “(15:50:41 - 15:51:15): it was said by professor Marino. And the workforce shortage is chronic diseases, healthy aging, preparedness for the future emergencies, and ensuring that innovation remains accessible for patients. So, even where our health care systems differ, there is much we can learn from each other. And and also in these challenging days and geopolitical situation, it is very important to to to continue and and strengthening our cooperation. Thank you very much.”
  EU policy on aging workforce and pensions
• 2026-07-13 “(17:29:18 - 17:30:37): Thank you so much. Dear minister, thank you for your presentation. Before I give the floor to my colleagues, I would like to pose a question to you and the health funding in the context of annual budget for 2027. And then more broadly in the context of upcoming MFF. As regards the annual budget, we have concerns on the health funding in particular EU for health program and its allocation. Could you please elaborate the position of the Irish presidency on the 2027 budget for health? And the second question on the upcoming MFF and the proposed new structure of health funding. How do you plan to ensure sufficient funding for health in general and more specifically, health in crisis preparedness and response? I'm concerned that the proposed MFF architecture where health no longer has a dedicated budget line might not meet the citizens' expectations in terms of lessons learned from the crisis 19 pandemic and in light of the recent health crises. Next speaker is Andres Cuglia, please.”
  EU funding and budget allocation for health programmes
• 2026-07-13 “(15:46:55 - 15:50:41): Thank you very much, chair. Dear colleagues, I would like 1st to express my sincere thanks to everyone who made this, mission possible. In particular, I would like to thank our secretariat, our staff and political advisers whose hard work and careful preparation ensured an excellent program, for us. And also, I want to thank all colleagues who participated and especially to our chair, professor Ignacio Marino, for his leadership through the mission. During the mission, we engaged with a broad, range of stakeholders from American policymakers, think tanks to public health leaders, researchers, and some of the world's leading experts in in Pittsburgh. The timing of this mission was particularly important. United States has withdrawn from the from the World Health Organization and Global Health Security, but, face a significant challenge now, including emerging infectious diseases, threats and, like the recent Ebola outbreak. So maintaining a strong transatlantic dialogue is more, important than ever because public public health challenges do not stop at national borders and neither, should our cooperation. And and also, we see other challenges, in the health policy, in Europe, which, is related to to new, policies in The US. But, but, I would like to highlight maybe 1 part of the mission our our visit to Pittsburgh, because it's very interesting that Pittsburgh is has a remarkable transformation and economic and and also social transformation because it was once known as the center of the American steel industry, and the city faced a severe decline following the collapse of the sector and and and, losing more than half of its population. But rather accepting decline, it reinvented itself through investment in education, research, health care, and innovation. So it, was converted from industrial city to a science and medical hub. And the the city has 300,000 citizens and 100,000 people working for the for the Pittsburgh Medical Center, which is amazing, and and it's 1 of the world's leading academic centers in child transplantation. And it was very, very valuable to see how well recognized and appreciated our our, is our chair, professor Ignacio there who used to work there as a professor. So as just to to 1 comment that as a doctor, myself, and politician, I was particularly inspired to see how decades of sustained investment in science and especially in medicine have transformed not only, health care outcomes, but the entire region, and the economy and the development of the region. So our discussions in Washington also, reminded us that despite differences between the Europe and and US health care systems, we face many common challenges, as”
  Public and private sectors role in healthcare services
• 2026-07-13 “(16:21:18 - 16:23:16): Thank you very much for this presentation and excellent research. And I think it is, and, it is clear that it is 1 of the biggest challenges nowadays, and and we don't have the right tools, to solve this issue in 1 days or 2 days. And we we have to have, long term solutions. But to to have a long term, solution, we need, clear, data and evidences. And and that's why, what you just, showed us and provided. And and, because we see these issues all around the member states, in every member state, and despite the the the health is a member state, the health care topic is member state competence. These these evidences show us that we we must have EU level plans and coordination to to help, for example, to those, young people who who suffer. And And maybe 1 question, if I may, that to what, to extend the study and the specific impact of digital environment on young people living with chronic conditions who face a double burden of increased mental health vulnerability, what are the numbers? Or what is the difference among the population between those who have chronic conditions and those who don't have and not mental ones? Thank you very much.”
  EU policy on mental health
• 2026-07-02 “Well, good morning to everybody. I'm Commissioner, who is going to spend all the money which you will offer. So that's my point. And I will try to explain why. You know, it's so good to spend money on European level, but I will try also well to share some thoughts about. Why we need to have big enough European budget. And I will start from very rhetorical question and will try to elaborate on that. Are we serious about the war? I will start from reminding what ancient Rome people were saying. If you want peace, prepare for war. Preparation for war. Investment into defense costs a lot of money, but non investment into defense would cost us much more of war consequences. So investment into defense saves our money, our future expenditures. That is why I would like to thank Commissioner Peter Serafini and all his team for all their efforts to propose in the next MFF, five times bigger spending for defence and space. This is impressive and absolutely needed. But still, I want to raise that question, which I started at the very beginning. Are we serious about the war? And I would and I would want to say a few words, not just about defence spending, but also about the size of the whole EU budget. The MFF proposal is only about 1.26% of nine. As we know, Flügels always want to cut it down to 1%, and those positions are not changing for the last several decades. It is time to ask is it right? We need to remember that the war is not only a big defense expenditure, it is much more.”
  Defence spending
• 2026-07-02 “That is how each serious person would do with his family money. He or she would spend more now in order to avoid much larger spending later. It's time to come back to simple, prudent logic when we are talking about MFF. And now a few sentences. Why increase the EU defence and space spending is beneficial for member states and especially for taxpayers, because defence spending on EU level means real added value and saving of money. First point. Very soon we shall have a big question how to replace heavy equipment and strategic enablers which our transatlantic partners will start to withdraw from Europe. German experts from so-called Sparta to Zero group economists Calculated that it will cost us €500 billion to replace those without equipment. It cannot be such an amount of money, it cannot be covered from next MFF. Where for defence and space we can have around €130 billion if member states will agree. Which means for defence around 6070 billion. But on a national defence spending level, during next ten years there will be a round of €7 trillion. If member states will increase their defence, spending up to three up to 3.5% of GDP. What they promise to NATO enough to finance replacement. If the member states will be convinced to spend part of their defence money in a collective way. Usually, member states need to be incentivised by EU subsidies to go for such a collective action. This is how EU defence spending creates added value. It creates possibilities for member states to spend their defence money in a more prudent way.”
  Defence spending
• 2026-07-02 “And second point, we know from experience of previous European Union defense programs that if we are able to incentivize member states to go for joint procurement, in that case, the price for military equipment goes down by 30%. This is the effect of the scale of contract. We can calculate how much can be saved if all the defense procurement during the next ten years will be realized in a way of joint procurement. Since during the next ten years, member states are going to spend around €7 trillion, as I said before, for they will spend those money for defense. We can expect that around 4,050% of those money will go for investment into new defense equipment, which means that defense procurement during those ten years can reach three €3.5 trillion. If all of that procurement will be successfully incentivized to be realized as joint procurement contracts and can save 30% from €3.5 trillion, which means it can save around €1 trillion of national defense spending, which is more than half of the whole MFF spending. In order to achieve such a huge saving, we need to have financial power on EU defence spending level in order to incentivise member states to go for joint procurement. If member states really want to avoid the war and to save money from their defence spending, they should increase both the whole EU budget and also defence and space spending on EU level. But first of all, we need to answer the question are we serious about the possibility of war? I hope that we are becoming serious.”
  Defence spending
• 2026-07-02 “Well, uh, definitely we have very clear priorities. And first of all, of course, support Ukraine is one of the strategic priorities. It does not go from MFF. It goes through Ukraine support loan, uh, 60 billion for defence for next two years. And this is really some kind of breakthrough. And definitely when we see that Ukraine is able to start to prevail, we need to support that prevail even more. Now. Second, definitely we need to develop our own defense capabilities according to NATO capability targets. We are not military people. Nato is making all the military defense plans, all the capability targets. But we are coming. We are able to come with very important EU assistance, EU instruments like raising additional funds or implementing the defence industrial policy instruments. So that is our our priority, as I said, and it can help member states very much both to develop pan-European projects with our finances, we can help, which is quite problematic because in EU we have quite a fragmented defence picture because of historical legacy, because of the treaties. Mario Draghi was very precise about speaking about all that fragmentation. So our efforts to bring member states together Uh, brings a lot of added value. And of course, one member states are able to agree to go together. I was trying to explain that in a very simple numbers that saves money. Uh, joint procurement is very clear. If member states are going for joint procurement, savings can reach up to 30%. The issue and problem is that, uh, what experts were saying before one member states have more money for defense in their pockets. That's why I have to say, based on human psychology, usually they want to go alone. So so we need to really to, to have instruments on EU level in order to incentivize, to convince them to go together and to develop what is needed to be developed in order for us to be ready to defend ourselves in such a way to deter any kind of aggression.”
  Defence spending
• 2026-07-02 “Well, of course, now we have well, we have a lot of new instruments developed during recent period of time. We had we tested some of them earlier. The previous commission started the job. For us now, the biggest issue is that in this summer we have very limited amount of money. It's €1.5 billion left. And that's why really, until next time, if. Definitely. The problem is that we cannot. Use our our instruments full scale. Now what we what we did during this period of time. Besides really bringing new defence industrial programme, so-called Egypt, with new instruments and tested instruments to support joint procurement to support expansion of production. Uh. Now we are starting new programmes of so-called European defence projects of common interest again, pushing member states or incentivising member states to go together to develop big pan-European projects like Defence Shield or Drone Defence Initiative or Eastern Flank Watch. Those are the instruments which were important from another side also. It allows us to have new instruments to support Ukrainian defence, industrial integration with our defence industry and that's very, very, very helpful for Ukraine itself. But also we see a lot of benefit which such an integration brings to our defence industries, which can learn a lot, which can really test their own products very, very effectively. On the directly on the front line and things like that. On another side, I was talking more about defense, but very important is also another part of my portfolio space where again, using EU funds and also using using national money, which are coming through European Space Agency, we are able to develop very important new space systems. And really, we can be proud that we are technologically, we are very good. Of course, Elon Musk sometimes overshadows our achievements, but we need to remember that Galileo navigation system developed by Europe is the best in the world. Copernicus. For us, observation is also the best in the world. Now we are moving with so-called secure satellite communication system, which is which will be better than Starlink, at least experts are saying. So I don't, you know, argue with them. Of course it costs. A really very important space systems.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on space policy
• 2026-07-02 “Are we serious about war? I will start with reminding of what people said in ancient Rome: if you want peace - prepare for war. Preparation for war, investment into defence costs a lot of money. But non-investment into defence would cost us much more inconsequences of war. So investment intodefence saves our money, our future expenditures. I would like to thank Piotr Serafin for all his efforts to propose in the next MFF five times bigger spending for defence and space. This is impressive and absolutely needed. But still I want to raise the question - are we serious about war? And I want to say few words not just about defence spending, but also about the size of the whole EU budget. The whole MFF - is only about 1.28% GNI. Frugals want to cut it down to 1%. And those positions have not changed for the last several decades. It is time to ask - is it right? We need to remember, that a war is not only big defence expenditure. It is much more. During a war there is a much bigger expenditure on civil protection, on military mobility, on stabilization of finances and economy, etc., etc. It's very useful to compare ourselves with the history of the USA budget. For 70 years after Independence Day in 1789 till the civil war in 1861, the USA federal budget was around 1.5% of national GDP. During the civil war in the USA the federal budget increased up to 12-15% of GDP, after the war it went down to 2.5% and stayed at thislevel till the First World War, when it increased again up to 20% of GDP and later during the Second World War it increased up to 40%. Next year we shall celebrate the 70 yearanniversary of the Rome treaty. We are still at the early stage of USA history. And our budget is like the USA budget during theirfirst 70 years - around 1.2% of GDP. And we have real threats, that Russia will start a war against EU Member States quite soon. In that case – following an analogy with USA history, our EU budget perhaps will increase up to 12-15% of our GDP. Here comes the question - are we serious about possibility of war? If we are serious - then now is the time to discuss not how to cut EU budget, but how to increase it at least up to 2%. In order to avoid the war. And in order toavoid in the case of war the need to increase EU budget up to 12-15%. It means that an increase of the MFF now would save us from much bigger spending later on, in the case of war. That is what each serious person would do with his family money - he or she would spend more now in order to avoid much larger spending later. It's time to come back to simple prudent logic, when we are talking about the MFF. And now, few sentences - why increased EU defence and space spending is beneficial for Member States and especially for taxpayers. Because defence spending on EU level means real added value and saving of money. First point, very soon we shall have a big question how to replace heavy equipment and strategic enablers, which our transatlantic partners will start to withdraw from Europe. German experts from theSparta 2.0 group calculated that it will cost us 500 bln euro. It cannot be covered by the next MFF, where for defence and space we can have around 130 bln euro, which means for defence around 60-70 bln. But on the national defence spending level during next 10 years here will be around 7 trln euros, if Member States will increase their defence spending up to 3.5% of GDP. Enough to finance replacement, if the member States will be convinced to spend part of their defence money in a collective way. UsuallyMember States need to be incentivized by EU subsidies to go for such a collective action. That is how EU defence spending creates added value - it creates possibilities for Member States to spend their defence money in a more prudent way. And second point, - we know from experience of previous EU defence programs, that if we are able to incentivize Member States to go for joint procurement, in that case the price for military equipment goes down by 30%. This is the effect of the scale of contract. We can calculate how much can be saved, if all defence procurement during the next 10 years will be realized in the way of joint procurement. Since during the next 10 years Member States are going to spend around 7 trlneuros for defence, we can expect that 40-50% of that money will go for investment into new defence equipment, which means that defence procurement during those 10 years can reach 3-3.5 trln euros. If all ofthat procurement will be successfully incentivized to be realized as joint procurement contracts, in can save 30% from 3.5 trln euros, which means it can save around 1 trln euros of national defence spending, which is more than half of the whole MFF spending. In order to achieve such a huge saving we need to have financial power on EU defence spending level in order to incentivize Member States to go for joint procurement. If Member States really want to avoid war and to save money from their defence spending, they should increase both the whole EU budget and also defence and space spending on EU level. But first of all we need to answer the question - are we serious about the possibility of war. I hope, that we are becoming serious.”
  Defence spending
• 2026-07-02 “Well, I said, you know, that definitely member states are have the responsibility for development of defense according to European treaties. Uh, defense is national prerogative, national sovereign right and responsibility. Uh, so, uh, and as I said, you know, member states are going to spend The up to €7 trillion, which will be 100 times more than we shall be able to spend on EU level. So this is not very clear proportion, but what is important for us to understand and why is we are not overlapping, but we are coming with assistance to member states really to help them to do the job together, because we have this historical legacy that we have 27 national armies, 27 national defence budgets, 27 national defence policies, and how to say, you know, and 27 veto rights. And that is not. To say, we cannot consider that this is the best way how we can become the strongest in the defence of European continent. I am always asking my everybody if the United States would decide to abandon federal, army, and federal defense budgets and would go into 50, you know, armies and 50 defense budgets on the state level. What the United States becomes stronger in military and defense or not. So perhaps our answer is very clear. So that is why when we have all that, our mosaic of 27, we need to look how to become more united. And here comes exactly. European Union with our financial instruments, with our possibilities to incentivize member states to spend their money 100 times more of their money in a prudent way.”
  EU competences on defence
• 2026-07-02 “During the war there is much bigger expenditure on civil protection, on military mobility, on stabilization of finances and economy, etc. etc. it is very useful to compare ourselves with a history of United States of America. Budget for 70 years, I would remind for 70 years after the Independence Day in 1789, till civil War in 1861, United States federal budget was around 1.5% of national GDP. During civil war, United States federal budget increased up to 1,215% of GDP. After the war, it went down To 2.5% and stayed at such a level until the First World War, when it increased again up to 20% of GDP. And later during the Second World War, it increased up to 40%. Next year we shall celebrate 70 years anniversary of Rome Treaty. We are still at an early stage of United States history, and our budget is like the United States. Around 1.2% of GDP. And we have real threats that Russia will start the war against EU member states quite soon. In that case, following analogy with US history, our European Union budget perhaps will be forced to increase up to 1,215% of our GDP. Here comes the question are we serious about possibility of the war? If we are serious, then now it's time to discuss not how to cut EU budget, but how to increase it at least up to 2% in order to avoid the war And in order to avoid, in the case of war, the need to increase your budget up to 12 or 15%, it means that increase of MFF now would serve us, would save us from much bigger spending later on in the case of war.”
  Size of EU budget
• 2026-07-01 “Dear Christophe, Paulius, and Hélder, I thank you for inviting me here today. I will start from an obvious truth: space is a big part of our economy and of our defence. Kill space capabilities - and our daily life will stop, and our defence will stop. For defence - space is our eyes in the sky, our communication arteries in the sky, and through positioning – our satellites are guiding stars for navigation. The point is: attacks against our satellites by adversaries can blind us, and mute us and disorient us in our defence on the ground. We need to understand the very simple logic of modern warfare. In the case of war there will be no big difference in space, if we compare with the ground. Like in the war on the ground - the main infrastructural assets for economy (energy infrastructure, transport infrastructure) are becoming the main targets for attack by adversaries. The same with defence infrastructure on the ground, weapon systems for defence - they are also the main targets in the case of aggression. There will be no difference with space. We can say - the main infrastructure is changing, that is why the targets are changing. Past wars started with attacks on enemy radar. Today's wars start with attacks on satellites. The Russians started their invasion of Ukraine with a malware attack on the KA SAT satellite system. Which also disrupted satellite services in the European Union. And in the EU we are already under attack. Jamming attacks, interfering with our satellite signals. What does it mean for us? 50,000 flights affected in one year - 2025! In the Baltic: in 2025, a five-fold increase year of radio frequency interference. Russian Luch 1 and Luch 2 satellites have in the past three years performed suspicious proximity operations, near European satellites, where they could steal unencrypted data. Russia has also positioned satellites close to American intelligence satellites. And a few years ago, China used a satellite with a robotic arm to drag a defunct satellite into a graveyard orbit. The potential for harm is obvious. We need to understand: the attacks on space assets will be unavoidable and there will be many more of them, and we need to be ready for that - our structures in space need to be more resilient, and we need to have everything what is needed to defend them: both in space and for space infrastructure on the ground. It will be too late to start to prepare for the attacks, when the attacks happen. There are three groups of threats to space services, that we need to focus on. First: electromagnetic interference. Like jamming and spoofing. These happen most often and are also hardest to attribute to any attacker. They affect all space systems. They can also have natural causes. Like space weather phenomena in the high north. Second: Cyber attacks. These are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Thanks to Artificial Intelligence that learns and adapts. In the close future, AI will enable cyber attacks that are so fast, that they will be impossible for humans to counter. Third: Physical threats and proximity threats. Hostile satellites approaching our satellites, to eavesdrop, damage or destroy satellites. Laser beams to blind satellites, or kinetic attacks to damage or destroy satellites. The core strategic problem: it' s often impossible to tell in advance the difference between legitimate in-orbit use, or aggressive intent. The same instruments needed to build an in-orbit economy, can be used for aggressive goals. Rendezvous, docking, proximity navigation. That means there are no simple legal or technical solutions. We need creativity, new and disruptive technologies and methods, to be able to deal with these threats. I will repeat myself - we need to realise: Space is a critical infrastructure – like water works, energy plants, hospitals, harbours and airports. On Earth there is protection in place: police, armies, airforce, air defence and drone defence. We need to answer - how do we defend our critical space infrastructure? First of all, we need to understand - that defence of space assets is based on the same principles as defence of ground assets. In defence the first need is - detection through surveillance or intelligence of what your adversary is planning to do or is doing aggressively against you. Second, you need to strengthen resilience of your infrastructure, that it would be able to withstand possible attacks or quickly to repair the damage of the attack. And you need to have weapons to deter attack or to destroy the attacker. And, third, you need to have mobility infrastructure and transport means to bring your weapons to the frontline. How are and should those principles be implemented in space? Few words on the first topic - on detection capabilities: in the next MFF, we have proposed to reinforce the protection of space assets, through reinforced space situational awareness capacities and through radio frequency interference monitoring. also, to share information on physical threats to satellites we have set up the EU Space Information Sharing and Analysis Centre, where EU space actors can share information on threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents in near real-time. Making sure that no operator stands alone. On second - on resilience of our infrastructure and defence of infrastructure in space: to begin with, we are protecting our communication signals. Govsatcom is a major step forward. Sovereign, encrypted satellite communication for all Member States. That will make it impossible for hostile states to eavesdrop on our signals. Critical for military and civilian use. Govsatcom started operations in January. By 2027 we will expand Govsatcom services with commercial satcom services. Which will provide additional coverage and security. And in the future, IRIS2 will bring secure European connectivity for the entire continent. The European Space Act presents minimum requirements for space operators address vulnerabilities of space missions. We need an ambitious agreement between Parliament and Council. This year we will present an action plan for a European Space Shield. Which will also cover the defence of our satellites. We are now closely discussing this plan with the Member States. We are looking at threat detection, asset protection, rules of engagement. And the potential role of a dedicated protective fleet. Finally it is equally important that we have operational procedures for business continuity in times of crises. In times of war. Our space systems need to be defence ready. And the third topic – the importance of mobility and transportation for defence of space. As you know, we now are discussing the very important regulation on Military Mobility on the ground. Thanks for the ambitious Parliament position. All of us, we understand how important is military mobility for the defence. As John Pershing said, “battles are won by infantry, but wars are won by logistics”. I don't know who will play the infantry role in the defence of space, but it's absolutely clear that victory in the “future space wars” will depend on logistics, which means on mobility, on transportation in space. Which means - on launching, on dynamic micro launching, on ability of ambitious in-space operations. And you know very well what problems in Europe we are facing with our independent launching capabilities. We need to resolve them urgently. This is the must in our preparedness for most extreme contingencies. And final remark - defence cost money. We know that. Defence of space - also cost a lot of money. But non-investment into defence of space - will cost much more. I wish you fruitful negotiations with the Council on ambitious defence and space spending in next MFF.”
  EU competences on space policy
• 2026-06-30 “Good afternoon, I am honoured that you asked me to deliver the closing keynote at this important conference. Important for Britain and important for the European Union. I understand that because of this conference, the UK government today announced an increase of the defence budget. This whole day you have been discussing the future of our EU – UK relationship. And what everyone wants after a long day of conferencing: a nice long speech by a European Commissioner. You must really miss us a lot! And I have to admit: I miss you too. I have always admired Great Britain. Your history, culture, democracy. So it is a great pleasure to discuss how we can work closer together on our defence. We meet on a nice sunny day in June – and the timing is not coincidental. Ten years after the Brexit referendum. But I get my inspiration from history. I think today of a different event, also in June. Of an event that was maybe the very first step towards European integration. European integration in embryo. And this was the proposal made in June 1940 – at a moment of extreme danger – Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands already defeated, conquered, occupied. Just after Dunkirk: 300,000 soldiers withdrawn to Britain, leaving behind all tanks, vehicles and heavy equipment. A colossal military disaster. Paris already taken, the fall of France – imminent. At this moment of great danger the British government made an extraordinary proposal, supported by Winston Churchill and Charles De Gaulle: to form a political union between Britain and France. The statement said: "France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations but one Franco-British Union. The constitution of the Union will provide for joint organs of defence, foreign, financial and economic policies. Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain. Every British subject will become a citizen of France.” This proposal was the most far reaching proposal for political and military unity before or since. One of the fathers of this idea was by the way someone I have been known to quote at times: Jean Monnet, god-father of European unity. This proves it was a good idea. We know this British-French unity never happened. It came too late. But the idea that in Europe unity brings strength kept its value. And why do I mention this story today? To make clear: Let's not wait for disaster to strike. To work together for our defence. Britain and the European Union must work together for the defence of Europe. Right now. Right now, when we are still able to prevent disaster. When we can deter Russian aggression. Can prevent Putin from testing us. It is true – Ukraine is starting to stabilise the frontline and even push back. Ukrainian drones have stopped the Russian advance. They are disrupting Russian logistics and striking deep behind enemy lines. Crimea - without gasoline. Long lines for gasoline in Moscow. But that Ukraine is prevailing does not mean the war is over. It does not mean Russia is weak. Russia is still outproducing us. And is able to use millions of drones. Russia's international ‘friends' ensure supply chains of components. Russia is responding with desperate attacks, like the recent attack on the 1000 year old Kyiv Pechersk Lavra monastery. Or provocations against the Baltics and Eastern Flank. The more Ukraine prevails, the more desperate Putin gets. We should be prepared for more and worse provocations to come. Putin is still a danger, to European security. Putin is still willing and able to test Article 5. And at the same time, our American allies are increasingly calling on us Europeans to take more responsibilities for our defence. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently even went further: He called on Europe and not just to take primary responsibility, but to take the lead on European defence. And he announced a review of American forces. Which means America may move some capabilities, especially “material” capabilities to other parts of the world. And we have to be prepared. Not in the distant future. But soon. So that means that we, Europeans will have to take a greater role in providing defence capabilities. Especially strategic capabilities we lack – strategic enablers like air to air refuelling and space data intelligence. And when the Americans talk about Europeans, they don't talk about the European Union or its members. They talk about all of us, Europeans. Also about you – our British friends from the United Kingdom. So we are at a decisive moment, and need to take decisive action. We have a good foundation for action. This last year we have achieved things no-one could imagine ten years ago. In the European Union we have created a financial big bang for our defence. With 150 billion euro in SAFE loans. 60 billion euro loans for Ukraine's Defence. Member States have pledged 6.8 trillion for defence by 2035. The next step: the coming production big bang. Ramping up production capacity and defence production on a continental scale. We are mobilising our instruments such as the European Defence Industrial Programme to support defence industrial ramp up and address bottlenecks in our defence supply chains. We are cutting red tape for defence industry, supporting massive pan-European defence projects, are improving military mobility and we are looking at how we can create a more efficient defence market in Europe. In short: we're supporting Member States and NATO for our defence. With EU added value: EU laws. EU money. EU scale. EU coordination. EU collaboration. Last year we did a lot to strengthen our defence capabilities. But still Russia with its war economy is able to outproduce us, all together - EU and United Kingdom together. Such a difference in the numbers creates temptation for Putin to test us. We are still learning how to mass produce “good enough” defence products, not only “haute couture”. Our industrial cooperation is vital in order to change those numbers. Last year we signed the Security and Defence Partnership with Great Britain. To give form to our joint responsibility for security on the European Continent. Because there can be no security or peace in Europe without Great Britain. To start with: Britain has a powerful and innovative defence industry. Our Member States can buy British – because our Member States decide by themselves where to spend their own national defence money. And Member States' money is the lion's share of European defence spending. Probably a hundred times more than we are going to spend on the EU level. When we are spending European money: up to 35% of components in products procured with the help of EU funds can come from outside the EU. This can be significantly increased if both of us decide to sign an agreement with the EU to participate in the SAFE instrument. Like we did with Canada. As a military power, Great Britain is a cornerstone of NATO. Defence and deterrence on the European Continent depend on Britain with its strong army, navy, air force and nuclear deterrent. Britain is responding strongly to Russian provocations; Recently intercepting a Russian shadow fleet tanker. As you know I am from Lithuania – what makes me personally happy is Britain's strong commitment to NATOs Eastern Flank – with troops in Estonia. And although the European Union is now the strongest supporter of Ukraine worldwide, Britain has been a leading supporter of Ukraine. From Day one. Politically. financially. Last week you announced 750 million pounds for drones for Ukraine. And the United Kingdom is also one of the first to learn the lessons of the war in Ukraine. In last year's Strategic Defence Review you changed your warfare doctrine to the 20:40:40 doctrine. 20 percent of targets to be hit by heavy conventional weapons, 40% by light kamikaze drones, another 40% by heavy drones and missiles. So, that is the same as in Ukraine -where 80% of frontline targets are hit by drones. And I have often said: the Strategic Defence Review should be an example to us in the European Union, to also learn from Ukraine. As the American Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently said: "The Ukrainian military forces are the strongest and most powerful in Europe." And President of Finland Alexander Stubb said: “there is no army in Europe or the United States, by the way, capable of conducting a modern war the way Ukraine is doing” I don't know if British generals would agree with this statement, that the Ukrainian army is the best in Europe and maybe in the world. But it would be difficult to understand if we in Europe would not take it as our vital interest to integrate the best European, or even global, military force of Ukraine, into our European defence architecture. And it would also be difficult to understand if the the European Union and its Member States did not join forces for our defence with the United Kingdom, one of the strongest military powers in Europe, and the strongest economic power on the European continent. The goal: to create a strong European pillar of NATO, able to take primary responsibility for the defence of the whole European continent. The UK is not part of the EU. Ukraine is not part of NATO, EU membership for Ukraine will take a while still. We have already the Security and Defence Partnership with the UK. But how can we work more closely together? And how can we at the same time make the European pillar of NATO stronger? In my view, the answer can be a European Defence Union. A union set up by those countries who want to work together more closely on the defence of Europe. Ukraine, but also the United Kingdom, and other countries, would be able to join forces with European Union Member States in establishing this European Defence Union. The most effective way to set it up would be: a new intergovernmental treaty. With a newly created leadership body, a European Security Council. And if Britain would join the Defence Union, it should certainly be part of this leadership body. The Security Council could be based on the current E5 leaders informal meetings on defence. They met again last week, in Berlin. France, Germany, Italy, Poland and United Kingdom. Where they agreed to strengthen collective security, defence industrial cooperation and support for Ukraine. In the same way, the European Security Council would be a platform to find big answers to big issues. Like for example: how to replace American capabilities if they are removed. How to set up 100,000 strong European rapid reaction force, if American soldiers would leave. How to develop pan-European defence projects, like the Eastern Flank Watch. It's possible to envisage a roadmap for the European Defence Union. It could start with an informal European Security Council. Then a new intergovernmental treaty on European Defence Union. First with pioneering countries who want to take part. Others can follow later. Then Ukraine can join. Then after that the formal set up European Security Council. Whatever form it takes, we must urgently step up our cooperation on defence. A lot has changed in the last ten years. We discovered last week that Brussels is no longer the city of eternal rain. And also today it is sunny. And we discovered in the last years, that the European Union is not only an economic giant, and a political giant, but also a giant in our defence. But a sleeping giant. And we are waking up, the sleeping giant. Defence has become the European Union's number one priority. And no-one predicted that ten years ago, or even five years ago. The European continent cannot be defended without Great Britain. And the European continent, is Great Britain's first line of defence. And if we join forces, we can succeed in the greatest challenge of our time. And deter Russian aggression, prevent war and preserve peace.”
  EU competences on defence
• 2026-06-25 “1. Summit reminds - Eastern Flank Watch is for defence of the Eastern Flank region and for defence of the whole Union. 2. The Member States from Eastern Flank region are taking the biggest responsibility and heaviest burden of investment into defence in the whole Union. 3. Eastern Flank countries invest the biggest percentage of their national GDP into defence of the whole Europe and are taking the biggest responsibility to use SAFE loans for defence of the region, but also of the whole Union . Total amount - 76 bln euro out from 150 bln. 4. Eastern Flank countries, which defend the whole Union, deserve solidarity of the whole EU. It is very important that recent EUCO stressed this solidarity principle in its Conclusions, while speaking about importance of Eastern Flank Watch project for the whole Europe. 5. I would like to remind, that Commission from the very beginning was considering Eastern Flank Watch as one of the most important flagship defence projects of Europe and stressed it in European Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, which was published by Commission last October. 6. Today I would like to inform, that Eastern Flank Watch is one of the leading European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI's) projects, which together with other 4 projects, very soon will be evaluated by Commission and presented to the Council for final approval. That will give to Eastern Flank Watch project high European political status and will create possibilities for the EFW project to get access to EDIPprogramme grants. 7. It's very important that Ukraine is participating as a participating member state of EDPCI in the development of EFW project. Their experience in drone defence and ground defence is very much needed for EFW to become a success. 8. The region needs assistance not only in the development of its defence capabilities, but also in the development of all other infrastructure, needed for preparedness: military mobility, energy supply security, health care readiness. 9. Also, I would like to remind recent Commission Communication on Eastern Border Region, which was on 18th February presented by my colleague, Vice President of Commision Rafaele Fitto and which put very clear goal to support economical and social resilience of the region, which is suffering because of the increasing threats. 10. Eastern Flank Summit is very important, because it shows political unity of the region. Such unity can bring new ideas from this region to materialize in the form of more intensive cooperation in the areas of common defence policies, joint proposals for development of European security architecture, regional integrated defence market development, attraction of investment into development of modern defence industries in the region. Region has huge potential, together with Ukraine, to become a new powerhouse of European defence industry. 11. I would like to thank leadership of Poland for organizing this very important Summit for the defence of the whole Europe.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2026-06-23 “Good morning. We met last year at this same conference. Since then Ukraine is prevailing. Prevailing on the battlefield, in the air and at sea. Ukrainian drones have brought the Russian advance to a standstill on land. Ukrainian drones command the air, disrupting Russian logistics behind the front lines. Drone Commander Robert Brovdi says, that up to 300 kilometres behind the front lines, it's “unlikely” Russian military vehicles will reach their destinations. And new, long range Ukrainian drones are striking deep behind enemy lines. Just yesterday a satellite ground control centre north of Moscow. Crimea - without gasoline. Long lines for gasoline in Moscow. Ukraine is no longer a receiver of support but also a giver of support. Supporting Gulf countries to defend against the drone danger from Iran. Included into development of pan-European EDPCI projects: for drone and air defence, long range missiles production, etc. Putin is responding to Ukrainian successes with increasingly desperate attacks, like the attack on the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra monastery last week, founded 1000 years ago. In Kyiv, the birthplace of Orthodoxy. A UNESCO World Heritage site. An attack on culture, on religion and civilisation. A brutal attack but not a surprising attack. Putin has no respect for history or humanity or Christianity. Provocations are increasing also against the Baltics and Eastern Flank. Last week – in Poland the murder of Semyon Skrepetsky, a Russian dissident. Murdered, it appears because of his paintings about Putin. Unfortunately, there can be more such attacks. Worse such attacks. Not only in Ukraine, but also in Europe. That Ukraine is prevailing does not mean the war is over. It does not mean Russia is weak. Russia is still outproducing us. And is able to use millions of drones. Putin is still a danger, to European security. Putin is still willing and able to test Article 5. The questions is: are we willing and able to defend ourselves and deter aggression? Our American allies are asking the same question. They are calling on us, Europeans to take more responsibilities for our defence. This is not new. But now things are getting real. Getting urgent. In his speech last week, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth called for a NATO 3.0, built on the NATO 1.0 type obligations of Member States, that won the Cold War, followed by the Post Cold War NATO 2.0, when Europeans decided that we can enjoy “peace dividend”, since the Americans alone will defend Europe. It's obvious - we need NATO 3.0. Secretary Hegseth asked for Europeans to be “in the lead” on conventional defence of the continent. This is NATO 3.0. In his speech, Secretary Hegseth announced a “six-month Department of War review” to “examine America's force posture and basing in Europe.” And the goal of this review: “to ensure that NATO is moving fast and irreversibly toward Europe leading, stepping up to take primary responsibility for the defense of Europe”. But also to make sure that America's forces “are postured for America's global needs”. And what this means is that America will move capabilities, especially “material” capabilities to other parts of the world. And we have to be prepared. This could not be at some distant time in the future. It could be soon. We are now faced with an urgent challenge to replace American strategic enablers and heavy weaponry. We need to remember, that Europe very heavily depends now on the Americans for strategic enablers like air to air refuelling, space based intelligence. Without such capabilities we will be weaker in our defence, weaker in our deterrence. If we don't fill these capabilities, that could be an open invitation for Putin to test us. We need to pay the price for peace, to avoid the cost of war. Filling strategic gaps will cost hundreds of billions. The Kiel Institute in their Sparta 2.0 paper estimates 500 billion euro. Much more than the 131 billion euro, the Commission proposes for Defence and Space in the next multi-annual EU budget. This kind of money can only be found on a national level, where Member States will spend around 7 trillion euro during next 10 years, according to their pledges given to NATO. But for to be successful, it needs to be spent together, and European. We have done a lot in the last year. SAFE loans – 150 billion euros, Ukraine Support Loan – 60 billion euros. Member States pledges – 6.8 trillion for our defence. And many proposals and initiatives on defence. To cut red tape for industry, improve military mobility and proposals to build pan-European projects – European defence projects of Common Interest. If we hadn't done all that, we would now be in a catastrophic situation. We have a strong foundation for action. But foundations alone are not enough for defence and deterrence. We now need to double down. The next couple of years can be especially challenging, dangerous and unpredictable. We learned how to raise additional funds. We still need to learn how to spend them in an effective way in order to outproduce, out innovate, outgun Russia. So you ask, what is our strategy? There are three things we now need to do and are doing: a) support Ukraine and integrate with Ukraine; b) from slow and low “haute couture” production to massive “good enough” production; c) integrated, effective European defence market; To start with, the first goal - we must continue to support Ukraine, so Ukraine can continue to prevail. And we must integrate European and Ukrainian military and industrial capabilities. This we are doing with the Ukraine support loan. By giving Ukraine access to the European Defence Fund. With the Drone Alliance we are setting up with Ukraine. And BraveTech EU: Ukrainian and European companies finding solutions to battlefield challenges. But we need to do much more, go much further. American Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently said: "The Ukrainian military forces are the strongest and most powerful in Europe." And President of Finland Alexander Stubb said: “there is no army in Europe or the United States, by the way, capable of conducting a modern war the way Ukraine is doing”. But why do they consider the Ukrainian army the best? My answer: not only because they have brave soldiers and smart commanders, but also because their defence industry is the best and most innovative. And why is the Ukrainian defence industry the most innovative? I got the answer last year, when I had informal discussions with prominent Ukrainian leaders of politics and industry, who created the “drone army” in 2023. They made a clear comment: “If we would have listened to the Ukrainian generals from the very beginning of the full scale invasion, we would not have been able to create the drone army”. At the very beginning of the war, there was no military demand for drones and for innovative defence. Only after some time, in Ukraine, innovative defence supply managed to transform military demand. Thanks to innovative supply – Ukraine changed its war doctrine. Thanks to transformation of its war doctrine, Ukraine is prevailing. It would be difficult to understand if we in Europe would not take it as our vital interest to integrate the best European, or even global, military force of Ukraine into our European defence architecture. It would be difficult to understand if we did not integrate the most innovative defence industry in the world into our European defence technology industrial base. We must integrate Ukraine – into our European Defence Industry, into our European Defence Market, and into a future European Defence Union. Second part of our strategy: we must ramp up production. The money is there. Member States must now start placing big orders, big joint orders, big European orders. Including contracts for “ever warm” facilities. That will bring long term visibility for industry. To reduce risk for industry. And industry needs to ramp up production capacity. To keep prices down and meet production deadlines. We can learn from Ukraine's massive defence production big bang: from 1 billion in 2022 to 50 billion in 2026. And we must learn from Ukraine how to make “good enough” defence products. European defence industry produces “haute couture” defence products. Products that are technologically advanced, but difficult to make, expensive and hard to scale up. Products that are made in peacetime for peacetime conditions. Ukrainian industry produces weapons for wartime conditions, to perform on the battlefield. ‘Good enough' weapons that get the job done. Weapons that shoot down drones, stop the enemy advance. Weapons that need rapid production, rapid innovation, rapid repairs. Third part of our strategy: we cannot transform our Defence production without transforming our EU Defence Market. Member States are responsible for defence. That's a historical, political and legal reality. Member States need to protect their security interest. But as a result, in the European Union we have 27 defence markets, 27 sets of rules. And so defence industry still has many obstacles. Obstacles that we have removed for other sectors of the economy, in many years of European integration, and which have brought massive prosperity. For example: for defence Member States have different national standards and certifications. 27 different rules. So: more national assessments, more testing, more audits, more paperwork, more expenses. Especially a burden for start-ups and SMEs. Another example: transfer licenses for products and components, which create obstacles to production, when components are produced in different Member States, and need to be moved between Member States for final assembly. So: products stuck at borders – losing time, losing money, disrupting supply chains. The fact that we have no properly integrated defence market is also an obstacle to defence innovation. Fragmentation limits possibilities for innovative newcomers to enter the market. Up to 80% of what Primes produce is procured by their national governments and national militaries. It means - just a few companies are almost monopolizing the whole market. Up to 80% in defence is procured using the TFEU Article 346 exemption, through direct awards. Without a public competitive tender. Direct awards can be necessary for security. But they have become the default. And this is out of balance. Our primes are important for our defence. But so are our start ups and SMEs. They need space and opportunities too! And without an integrated market they have no space and opportunities. Because the established status quo on the supply and demand side in the fragmented European markets dominates everything. And that is why transformation of demand and transformation of defence doctrines in Europe is so slow. No market - no transformation! We need a more integrated European defence market for three reasons. First: for our European strategic autonomy. As the Letta and Draghi reports show: for European competitiveness we need a defence market on a European scale. More global competitiveness of our defence industry also means our governments and militaries will buy more European production, instead of production from other countries. Second, we need a more integrated European defence market, to mobilise the talent of Europe's start ups and SMEs. So they can easily enter the market, grow and innovate, and in the end can transform the war doctrines of our countries. Like it happened in Ukraine. Third, we need a more integrated European defence market for our power to defend and deter. For strong supply lines between Member States. So we can mobilise the massive power of the European economy and the power of an integrated defence market for our defence. We must ask ourselves: Has America got one single defence market, or 50? Would America be stronger or weaker if it had 50 separate defence markets on the states level, instead of one? So what are we waiting for? Defence is a national prerogative. But it's clear that more integrated European defence market will make national industry and national defence stronger. While doing nothing will leave us fragmented and divided and weaker – European and national. At a time when we need to be strong as Europe. A time when Russia is escalating its production and its provocations. A time when America is asking us to step up, because in some areas, they might step aside. Now is the time to create a more integrated European Defence market. Last week, the European Council stressed the importance of the European Defence Market. Its functioning and integration. Next week, the Commission will present a communication on a more integrated European defence market, with detailed analysis and follow up steps. Later this year we will present a proposal to change defence procurement rules. And other market rules. We can do it. We have found the money for our defence. We have made the laws for our defence. Now we must create a market for our defence. It's urgent and important we do this. And do this soon.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2026-06-23 “Russia: tragedy as an opportunity. 10 points Thanks to organizers of Second edition of Brussels Dialogue. I Remember very well how we were organizing the first one, back in 2023. After two years of the war tragedy. And with the hopes. Even about different future of Russia. Now we have the fifth year of the war. More hopes about the strength of Ukraine. Less hopes about the different future of Russia. Nevertheless, I want to talk about the hope. That is why I call my short intervention “Russia: tragedy as an opportunity. 10 points” • The criminal war against Ukraine is the big tragedy for Ukraine. The war is tragedy also for Russia. Not only because Moscow is burning or there is no gasoline in Crimea or even in Moscow, and not only that Russia is losing hundreds of thousands or millions of young people, but because continuation of the war and of the aggressive policies makes trajectory of the long term development of Russia totally deeply negative. • It's for Russian people and Russian elite to decide - do they want to continue such trajectory of degradation. • I still believe, that Russia can use this domestic crisis, of its own design, to transform itself back to normality. The crisis is good momentum for such transformation. Read Jared Diamond “Upheaval: How Nations Cope with Crisis and Change” (2019) on the national tragedies and transformation in Japan, Finland, Germany, etc. • We can predict, that such transformation back to normality will never happen in Russia while Putin is in power. • The West should keep very clear position: normalisation of relations with Russia can happen only if Russia transforms itself back to normality. What does it mean “back to normality” - it is for us to decide: the just peace in Ukraine; no more neo-imperial wars against neighborhood; no “total war” against it's own people; etc. • The biggest danger is that after peace in Ukraine will established (hopefully the just peace, with the increasing EU support in order for Ukraine to prevail), that after that all the West, starting from USA, but also some European leaders will compete, who will be the first to reestablish good relations with Putin without any conditions on Russia transformation back to normality. Such a “Reset 2.0”, with much worse future outcomes both for Europe, but also for Russia itself. • Europe has vital strategic and long term interest in Russia's ability to transform itself back to normality, because this is the only way towards sustainable and long-term peace in Europe. • How Europe can help Russia in such a transformation back to normality? Europe should develop now the strategy of it's future normalised relations with Russia after it's transformation back to normality, in order to show to Russian people, and to Russian elite, that there is an alternative way for them, not only Putin's way of tragedy and degradation. • EU support to success of Ukraine, through the military assistance and euro-integration support to Ukraine is the most important instrument to trigger and to inspire Russian people and Russian elite to seek transformation of Russia back to normality. • Today Europe and Russian Democrats need to come to one joint conclusion: Tragedy of Russia has one name - Putin. Transformation of Russia back to normality is more important for Europe's security, than new “reset of relations with Putin”, which will only continue the tragedy of Russia and which can easily become the tragedy of the whole European continent. Za naše “beznadežnoje delo”! Za vashu i nashu svobodu! Slava Ukrainy!”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2026-06-17 “Good morning, I'm glad to be at Eurosatory, the biggest meet-up of defence industry in the world. Truly massive. It's no wonder France is the host of such an event. France is leading in European defence, with its powerful military force, defence industry and independent nuclear deterrent. And France will only become more important. As Russia continues its war of aggression and American allies are calling on Europe to take more responsibilities for European defence, people in Europe are looking for leadership on defence. And people in Europe are looking to France. Europe and NATO can only be strong in defence, if Member States are strong in defence. And Member States can only be strong if we are together strong as a European Union. The division of labour is clear: Member States are in charge of defence. And the European Union supports: with EU added value, EU laws, EU coordination, EU scale, and EU money: For example the SAFE loans for France I will be signing in a few hours. 15 billion euro to support defence ramp up in France and Europe. Eurosatory is the best place for industry and military to meet. Two key partners for deterrence. Peace in Europe depends on you. As American general John Pershing said: “battles are won by infantry, wars are won by logistics”. That also means: timely supply of what industry is producing. Eurosatory is a colossal defence market place. Thousands of defence companies, big and small, come here from all around the Europe: primes and startups; big names and new kids on the block. They come to showcase their products: from drones to direct energy weapons; from helmets to helicopters; from satellites to submarines. Here we find the latest in defence innovation: from robotics to electronics to artificial intelligence. Here ministries of defence, armies come to find the products they need for their defence. And I hope they will also buy things, that are not yet on their shopping list. What is so great about this marketplace: it brings supply and demand together. Here you can find products, you didn't even realise, you need. Great innovators understand this, that with innovative supply they create a new demand. Henry Ford, the industrialist said: “If I had asked people what they wanted, they would have said: faster horses.” So he built cars, and people started to demand cars. I want to spend a few sentences in order to explain, what we need to learn about supply and demand from Ukraine. In today's world of defence, the Ukrainians are the masters of defence innovation. And the masters of innovative supply. American Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently said: "The Ukrainian military forces are the strongest and most powerful in Europe." And President of Finland Alexander Stubb said: “there is no army in Europe or the United States, by the way, capable of conducting a modern war the way Ukraine is doing”. But why do they consider the Ukrainian army the best? My answer: not only because they have brave soldiers and smart commanders, but also because their defence industry is the best and most innovative. And why is the Ukrainian defence industry the most innovative? I got the answer last year, when I had informal discussions with prominent Ukrainian leaders of politics and industry, who created the “drone army” in 2023. They made a clear comment: “If we would have listened to the Ukrainian generals from the very beginning of the full scale invasion, we would not have been able to create the drone army”. At the very beginning of the war, there was no military demand for drones and for innovative defence. Only after some time, in Ukraine, innovative defence supply managed to transform military demand. Like Henry Ford with the innovative supply of cars managed to transform the public demand. Now the demand for innovations from the military and political defence leadership of Ukraine leads the transformations in supply. The biggest achievement of President Zelenskyy, minister Fedorov, generals Zaluzhnyi and Syrskyi, was that they understood that innovative supply changes the whole modern warfare doctrine. That's why they changed military demand, focusing on drones and drone warfare. So, in conclusion: thanks to innovative supply – Ukraine changed its war doctrine. Thanks to transformation of its war doctrine, Ukraine is prevailing, pushing back on the frontline and striking deep into Russia. We see the result of Ukraine's defence transformation also here today, in Paris at this conference. Two years ago, there were only 10 Ukrainian companies at this conference. Now there are 80. Very innovative companies. I am very glad they are here. They illustrate the massive Ukrainian defence production big bang: from 1 billion in 2022 to 50 billion in 2026. And they illustrate the massive shift from state monopoly to private companies. In Ukraine, the battlefield decides what weapons are needed for defence. Weapons not decided by peacetime planners, but weapons to meet the real wartime needs of a country under siege. Weapons that need rapid production, rapid innovation, rapid repairs. Not “haute couture”, but “good enough” production: cheaper, easily scalable, and good in destroying enemies. Weapons to shoot down incoming drones and missiles. To stop the enemy advance. To disrupt logistics and strike strategic targets deep behind enemy lines. My geopolitical conclusion: we need Ukraine. It would be difficult to understand if we in Europe would not take it as our vital interest to integrate the best European, or even global, military force of Ukraine into our European defence architecture. And it would be difficult to understand if we did not integrate the most innovative defence industry in the world into our European defence technology industrial base. We need Ukraine in order to learn how to transform supply and how to transform demand in defence. Supply and demand go hand in hand. And in defence of Europe both need disruption. As happened in Ukraine. In Europe we are learning from Ukraine, but still our prevailing industry is a peacetime defence industry. Transformation of supply and of demand in Europe goes very slowly if we compare with Ukraine. I want to give a few arguments to explain that the main reason for such slowness is the lack of an integrated defence market in Europe. Here at Eurosatory today we have a great defence marketplace. Maybe the greatest defence marketplace in the world. But in the European Union itself we are not tapping into the full potential of the European market for defence. Because we do not have such an integrated market. As we know, Member States are responsible for defence. That's a historical, political and legal reality. It's part of the EU Treaty. Member States need to protect their security interest. But as a result, in the European Union we have 27 defence markets, underpinned by 27 sets of rules. Not an integrated market. Fragmentation costs money. Fragmentation hinders start ups and SMEs. In the United States, only 40 per cent of procurement goes to the top ten defence companies. Here in Europe, it's between 67 and 90 per cent for Germany, Poland and the UK – as a study by Bruegel shows. Up to 80% of what Primes produce is procured by their national governments and national militaries. It means - just a few companies are almost monopolizing the whole market. Up to 80% in defence is procured using TFEU Article 346 exemption, through direct awards. Without a public competitive tender. Direct awards can be necessary for security. But they have become the default. And this is out of balance. And this means - that there is no integrated defence market in Europe. And limited possibilities for newcomers to enter the market. We are proud of our primes – but our start ups and SMEs need space and opportunities too! Opportunities to enter the market, to grow, opportunities to scale. And without an integrated market there is no space and opportunities for them. Because everything is dominated by the established status quo on supply and on demand side. The existence of 27 defence markets creates barriers to business, especially to smaller ones. For example, national transfer licenses between EU Member States. To move not only finished products, but parts of products. Even to move in an established industrial process, when components are produced in different countries, and for the final product assembly they need to be transferred between EU Member States. And those components are stopped on the borders: losing time, losing money. Also an obstacle for cross border supply chains, and very difficult to overcome by SMEs. Or another example - different standards and certifications between Member States. Which means more assessments, more testing, more audits, more paperwork, more expenses. Again, especially a problem for start ups and medium sized companies. Those are the obstacles for ramp up of defence production, for innovation, for the transformation of demand. We have to find a better way! And that way is – an effective and integrated defence market. Since I started as Commissioner, we have brought EU added value to support Member States and Ukraine in their defence. And to strengthen not only Europe, but also the whole of NATO, with additional finances and industrial policy instruments; cutting red tape and obstacles for defence industry. We just agreed on major reform: maximum 102 days to wait for a permit, instead of up to four years as it was up till now in some cases. To construct a production line or a factory. But the biggest red-tape that against transformation of our defence, against transformation of supply and demand in defence is the non-existence of an integrated defence market. I want to stress, there are four major reasons, why we need more integrated European defence market. The first, - despite the fact that defence is a national prerogative, national security will benefit from a more integrated European defence market. A more integrated European defence market will help national defence industries grow, produce and prosper. This will make it much easier for French defence industry to sell products to other Member States. And will bring jobs, high quality jobs and economic growth to all parts of Europe, including France. Second, from the Letta and Draghi reports it's clear that for European defence industrial competitiveness we also need a defence market on a European scale. Increased global competitiveness of our defence industry will mean that our governments and militaries will buy more European production, instead of production from other countries. So, our strategic autonomy depends on our industrial competitiveness. That makes a more integrated European defence market essential for our strategic autonomy. And, the third reason, - a more integrated European defence market is also essential for our European defence readiness. To be strong in a world of giants – we ourselves must also be giants. Giants in market size. That is how we can increase our ability to defend and deter as Europe. We need the power of a more integrated European defence market in order to outproduce Putin. Russia is still outproducing us. And that is a real threat. We can ramp up our production by long term visibility of demand, by speeding up production and its innovation, by moving from “haut couture” to "good enough” production, by improving security of supply. Everything that comes with an effective and integrated defence market. And the fourth reason, - a more integrated European defence market will help the many defence start-ups and SMEs in Europe. Including start-ups that have their stands here today and are maybe in this room here today. By boosting defence innovation and best leveraging deep tech in the integrated European defence market, by removing national silos and obstacles of fragmentation to help those who are small, but smart and innovative. The integrated defence market is the best help for SMEs to grow, and innovate, to easily enter the market and in the end to transform the war doctrines of our countries. Like it happened in Ukraine. In short: we need to mobilise the massive power of the European economy and power of an integrated defence market for our defence. So we can outproduce, outinnovate and outperform Russia. So we can defend ourselves, deter aggression and preserve peace. Ladies and gentlemen, We meet today on a great market place of defence. A great market place of ideas. Defence is no ordinary market. And Defence industry is no ordinary industry. But a resource for our defence. We must use our EU added value to level up our national defence. A more integrated European defence market will only make us stronger in our national security and national sovereignty, because we shall have a stronger European defence industry. I wish you a lot of success. Today and in your important future work.”
  Defence spending
• 2026-06-16 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 16.6.2026 Written question In accordance with the Treaties, EU procurement directives would require a contracting authority, like the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands, to conduct a procurement procedure under the applicable directives when purchasing goods, such as train cars, of a value equal or higher than the applicable thresholds [1] [2] . These rules would ensure, inter alia , the respect of EU primary law principles applicable to procurement, in particular those of equality of treatment, transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality. Such a procurement procedure would provide an opportunity to interested undertakings in any Member State to compete for that contract by submitting a bid for the supply of the goods in question, in conformity with the contracting authority’s technical specifications. The Commission does not see any tension that would result from the possible application of those directives to the situation described in the question. Those directives precisely apply to the purchases of, inter alia , goods by contracting authorities in Member States, including the ministries of defence. The Commission does not see any tension between the application of EU competition law and the potential purchase of decommissioned rolling stock directly from the Dutch Railways by the Ministry of Defence for the transport of wounded military personnel . In particular, the exercise of public power prerogatives such as the provision of military capabilities falls outside of the scope of EU antitrust rules. In addition, purchases by public authorities that do not provide an unfair advantage to the seller would not raise state aid issues. Finally, the Military Mobility Regulation proposal [3] does not provide for the prioritised acquisition of military mobility capabilities. [1] Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj. [2] Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/81/oj. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0847.”
  EU competences on defence
• 2026-06-09 “Good morning, Thank you very much. And dear Aliona, you did a great job, really very interesting to read (https://www.martenscentre.eu/publication/europes-new-security-architecture-ukraine-as-a-strategic-pillar-of-the-continents-defence-future/) and to listen to. And I will try to share some comments on a very important topic: European security architecture and Ukraine, why these two are so closely connected and why we need to talk about European security architecture. Something new. So I will start from very simple facts of truths. First of all, in Europe we are definitely living through very different times than it was several years ago. We have a really clear understanding of threats: Russian threats, the continuation of the war in Ukraine, and the possibility of Russian aggression against EU and NATO member states, which our intelligence services are predicting. Then the war in Iran, and the issues related with the supply of weapons to Europe and to Ukraine; these issues can come very soon. And the last point are the very loudly and quite clearly announced American plans to start withdrawing resources from Europe, shifting them to other regions like Indo-Pacific or the Western Hemisphere. So in general, there is nothing new about where we are. Second, we can just agree with some recent big statements. For example, Marco Rubio, who said that Ukraine has the strongest army in Europe. That was repeated by Alex Stubb. He even said that the Ukrainian army may be the best in the world. I don't know if the Americans will agree, but that was a good statement. And it should speak to us: if we have on the European continent the strongest army right in our neighbourhood, that should make it very clear that integration of Ukrainian defence capabilities with European defence should be in the strongest vital interest of Europe. That is one thing. Now, Ukraine has the strongest army, not only because they have the bravest soldiers and the smartest generals, but also because Ukraine has the strongest innovative defence industry. And so Europe should have also the strongest vital interest to integrate that innovative defence industry with the European defence industry. From another side, we need to look into our own situation. We have a fragmented European defence policy and defence industries. That is our historical legacy. We have 27 defence policies, 27 defence budgets, 27 national armies, and 27 national vetoes. And we can only ask ourselves: would the Americans become stronger if they would have instead of 1 federal army they had 50 armies at the state level, 50 defence budgets and 50 defence policies and 50 vetoes? Perhaps not. So that's why we need to understand that if we really want to become stronger – that is our wish looking into all those challenges – we need to become more united, not more fragmented. That is in my view, one of the key prerogatives. And it is the most difficult to overcome because politically and psychologically, this is a historical legacy. According to the treaties, defence for member states is a national prerogative, and the EU, until now, is playing a very limited role. I would remind also that recently Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in the Ambassadors Conference and the German Foreign Affairs Minister Wadephul in the Adenauer Conference, raised a very important question, which has in itself the answer, The question was: are our doctrines, institutions, and decision-making in foreign policy, but also in security policy, in defence policy, are they fit for today's challenges or not? While they gave no proper answer, the question was raised in such a way that it was giving the answer. That really, we need to understand that we have a problem: our institutions and our defence architecture as they are at the moment, they do not fit all the challenges which we are facing. Looking at what is directly my responsibility, defence industry, we have big defence-industrial challenges at the moment in the European Union. Despite all the financial resources which we are bringing into the defense industry of Europe, Russia still quite heavily outproduces the European Union in all the different areas of defence production. American withdrawal demands effective replacement of their strategic enablers on European continent. German experts just recently calculated that it will cost around 500 billion euro for Europeans to build those strategic enablers and to replace American ones now located on the European continent. And in addition to that, a last point: we do not have a single defence market on the European continent. Here you can remember the Draghi report on the fragmentation of defence industry, which does not allow defence production to scale up as we would like to see. This is what allows me to say that we need big change of our policies and practices in defence. I have spoken lately about broader issues we are facing in Europe. But in my view, mainly Ukraine is the issue why we urgently need to talk about the new European security architecture, because we cannot integrate Ukrainian defence capabilities, the best in Europe, into the old structures. That's my very simple conclusion. NATO membership for Ukraine is not agreed at the moment, and we do not see when it can be agreed. Membership in the EU can take a longer time. I would be very happy to see Ukraine tomorrow as member of European Union, but we need to see a reality. It can take a longer time. And Europe needs to become much stronger, not at some time in the future, but now. We need to understand: if Putin will now start aggression against an EU or NATO country, we will face a battle-tested Russian army with the capability to use millions of drones. We have no such experience among EU or NATO member states, at least those who are on the front line or here in the European continent. Only Ukraine has such an experience. This is the very clear condition why we need a European defence architecture with possibility for Ukraine to integrate institutionally now, not tomorrow. That is why we need what we call European Defence Union. It's not very different what you have said about Security Council, but institutionally it is a little bit different. We can discuss: “what does it mean – the European Security Council” and “what does it mean – the European Defence Union”, but I understand that when you speak about European Security Council we speak about European Defence Union, but their essence is very similar. In my view, Ukraine, but also the United Kingdom, Norway, maybe Turkey, maybe even Canada, would be able to join European Union Member States in this established European Defence Union. The European Defence Union should be established voluntarily amongst the member states, amongst the countries, which want much stronger cooperation in defence, much more unity in defence, which now is not available. European Defence Union from the legal or constitutional point of view can be created in different ways, perhaps. For the time being I am trying to avoid technicalities of legal thought how it can be created; I am much more focused on the content, what that union should bring. But in my view, the most effective way would be to look into the possibility of a new intergovernmental treaty. Because all other attempts to find in EU treaties some kind of enhanced cooperation articles and so on, first of all, would leave some countries which are not members of the EU in some kind of unknown territory. So what should we do with Ukraine, United Kingdom, Norway? How should we include them into the European Defence Union? And second important point, in my view, looking again into from the historical point of view, European Union Treaty articles on defence, security and foreign policy are devoted mostly to the activities of the European Union outside of European Union territory; for external activities, operations and so on, but not to the territorial defence of European countries. So that is, in short, how I see the next stages. I can repeat very briefly why we need a European Defence Union, not only for Ukraine, despite the fact that I said mainly for Ukraine, but we can see a lot of benefits also for internal developments of the European continent in defence. So in my view, First of all, a European Defence Union could be a very strong platform for more unity, for more effective decision making and for collective leadership. That is why, in my view, a European Defence Union can be effective instrumentally to create a leadership body, a European Security Council. That's our difference, because in my view, a Security Council could be a smaller arrangement among big member states, that have power militarily, but also several rotational member states and then institutions in order to have an effective platform, as Macron and Merkel were saying 10 years ago. An effective platform to discuss big issues and to find big answers to big issues. And then we can have the whole coalition of willing countries, which we should now call members of European Defence Union. Why do we need such kind of leadership like a European Security Council? In my view, first of all, for a balanced top-down approach in developing the most important pan-European defence projects. What we call now EDPCIs (European Defence Projects of Common Interest) or the same strategic enablers. As I mentioned, the strategic enablers, according to the evaluation of German experts, will cost us 500 billion euros. So it's quite a big amount of money. It's absolutely clear that we will not be able to finance it from the next MFF, but we can finance from attempt to have partly – and maybe it is the wrong word – ‘collectivization' – It sounds a little bit Soviet, but at least to agree among the member states that they will spend part of their national defence money. We need to remember that by 2035, member states will increase their defence spending up to 3.5% of GDP. It will be around 7 trillion euro which Member States will spend. So really, that covers the 500 billion, but we need to find a way how to partly use that money in a collective way. Also we need some kind of this leadership in the form of European Security Council to agree among ourselves how we shall replace not only strategic enablers of American origin, but also how we replace what we can call American Rapid Reaction Force in Europe, the role which is now played by American troops, around of 100,000. So in order again to agree on European Rapid Reaction Force, how to create it, we need some kind of this leadership. A European Defence Union, in my view, should be built around the principle of article 42(7) of Treaty on European Union, on mutual assistance. Here I would turn your attention to Chancellor Merz, who back in Munich spoke about Article 42(7) as the basis for a European pillar of NATO, which is, according to him, separable but not separate. And he also spoke about Article 42(7) in his proposal how Ukraine should be going through integration towards the EU. So this is really where I see a very good connection of what we are trying to speak about and what the Chancellor was speaking about in some way in the same direction. The European Defence Union will be inside of NATO in the same way as the European Union is. With some members, maybe not being members of NATO, but as an organisation it should be in a very strong cooperation, with NATO. And of course, with the EU I think there could be a possibility to find a way how European Union institutions would be effectively used for the benefit of the European Defence Union. Ukrainian membership in a European Defence Union, in my view, would be the major stepping stone towards full membership in the European Union. Through this integration into a European Defence Union, we really can create among Europeans, a clear understanding of the vital interest of Europe in having Ukraine inside Europe. I'm afraid that for the time being, there is a shortage of that understanding. Usually when Europeans are talking about Ukrainian membership, we say, “we are good people in Europe, maybe we shall give Ukraine this nice gift of membership in the EU”, which is the wrong approach. Ukraine's membership in the EU is in our vital interest. It's the interest of Ukraine, but it's our vital interest as well. What is needed to progress into this direction? Well, first of all, definitely peace in Ukraine. And in my view, we need to have a plan for how Ukraine will prevail, which Ukraine is now doing. But maybe an even more defined plan for the prevailing of Ukraine would be needed in order to push Putin towards peace. This is the only way Putin can be pushed for a just peace. And then we need to be ready to finance such a plan. We need to shift from our assistance logic when we are talking always that we shall stand with Ukraine as long as it takes, into a little bit different logic. We shall support Ukraine in order for Ukraine to prevail. That is the way how peace will be achieved. Then at the very beginning we would need much more intensive work by an informal European Security Council; at least in the format we now see as E5, E5+, which is doing not a bad job, but it would be very good if such an informal gathering started to look more precisely at how this European security architecture in the form of European Defence Union should be developed, so to discuss some kind of roadmap towards European Defence Union and Ukraine in the European Defence Union and to coordinate the process. And then the whole roadmap, in my view, could be very simple. First of all an informal European Security Council. Then the creation through an intergovernmental treaty of a European Defence Union; first among those who want that European Defence Union, we can have some kind of threshold for how many countries need to sign the treaty. Maybe15 member states would be enough for the establishment of the European Defence Union, then others would maybe follow later on. Then Ukrainian membership in the European Defence Union, and the creation of a formal European Security Council inside of the established European Defence Union. And then all the other things which we need to develop very soon, like the key enablers, the 500 billion euros for that, the rapid reaction force and so on and so on. My question is how Ukraine would look at this possibility. That is a very important point. It would be really very positive if Ukraine would take that as an important step forward and in some way would take a big part of the leadership in developing of this new European security architecture. And just finalising, this is another topic. But in my view, we Europeans still need to understand the vital interest of us, of Europeans to have Ukraine in our security architecture in order, first of all, to use Ukrainian defence capabilities to strengthen our own defence capabilities. Of course, on the way to help Ukraine to achieve peace and then also to strengthen Ukrainian defence. But we are still not looking at the broader picture, which in my view is still missing for us to understand the whole importance, of a new European security architecture together with Ukraine. Because we need to see the long-term impact of this development on the eastern part of the European continent, including Russia. In my view, sustainable peace in Europe can come through the success of Ukraine and the inspirational power of that success on possible developments in Russia. With Russia coming back to normality, and there are of course two questions: When –after Putin? And what does it mean normality? But this is how we can go into the next stage of our discussion.”
  EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-05-26 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) [1] is based on Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2] which provides a legal basis for the EU to act swiftly in emergency situations. The SAFE Regulation and in particular Article 10, explicitly empowers the Commission to enter into loan agreements and operational arrangements with Member States, following the adoption of a Council implementing decision. This regulation does not condition disbursement on the prior adoption of a specific national implementing legislation by the Member State since the instrument is directly applicable. Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2026/412 on making the financial assistance under Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 available to Poland [3] fulfils the procedural requirement under Article 10(1) of the regulation [4] , and the Commission’s role is to ensure compliance with the eligibility criteria set out in Article 16 of the regulation [5] . To date, Polish authorities have not raised any objections regarding the availability or disbursement of SAFE funds. The Commission will act in accordance with the Treaty and the SAFE Regulation, ensuring that all procedural safeguards are respected. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2016/art_122/oj/eng. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2026/412/oj/eng. [4] Please see footnote 1. [5] Please see footnote 1 .”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
• 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The Commission notes that the Military Mobility Package [1] adopted in November 2025 stands as a comprehensive set of measures to ensure the swift, coordinated and secure movement of military personnel and equipment across the EU. The Package includes a regulation proposal [2] aiming to strengthen Europe's defence readiness by addressing barriers to military mobility across transport regulatory, infrastructure, and capability dimensions-critical areas that currently hinder military transport across borders. The Commission takes note of the issues raised concerning airport screening procedures for military personnel travelling via civil infrastructure. However, these issues do not fall within the scope of the current legal provisions under the regulation proposal, since these do not include measures relating to security screening practices at airports. Provisions on civil aviation security such as those in Regulation (EC) 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 [3] stand as common rules to protect civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference that jeopardise the security of civil aviation. Consequently, the Commission does not foresee, in the context of the measures laid down in the broader Military Mobility Package, the development of additional common guidance in this area. Any such considerations would fall outside the scope of the current envisaged measures and legislative proposal. [1] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/military-mobility_en. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0847. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/300/oj/eng.”
  Asylum & border control · EU competences on defence
• 2026-05-20 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 20.5.2026 Written question Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [1] provides a legal basis for the EU to act swiftly in emergency situations. Under this provision, the Council may adopt necessary measures based on a Commission proposal, ensuring continuity in critical policy areas. On 30 November 2025, the Commission received the European defence industry investment plans from Member States and assessed them in accordance with the criteria set out in the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation [2] . The subsequent steps in the regulation’s implementation are underway and progressing as planned. The Commission considers that Article 122 TFEU is the only and appropriate legal basis for the SAFE Regulation. However, should the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ultimately annul the SAFE Regulation, this would not automatically suspend its implementation. The European Parliament has requested that the CJEU maintain the regulation’s effects until it is replaced by a new act adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E122:EN:HTML. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2026-05-11 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question Advanced storage technologies from batteries to supercapacitors have important dual civilian and military use. Establishing a strong and resilient battery supply chain while reducing external dependencies is therefore of strategic importance for the EU, as reflected in the Battery Booster Strategy [1] . The EU also supports technological innovation and innovators ecosystems in the Strategic Energy Technology Plan [2] and in the Startup and Scaleup Strategy [3] . In terms of defence policy, the European Defence Fund [4] supports defence sector interoperability in energy-efficient solutions and green technologies that meet NATO and EU standards, notably energy storage systems like customised batteries, fuel cells and multi-source energy systems. The BraveTech EU initiative [5] established between EU and Ukraine will also contribute to this objective by considering the lessons learnt in the battlefield. The European Defence Industry Programme [6] supports resilient European defence supply chains through cross-border industrial cooperation, procurement actions, strategic reserves and industrial reinforcement actions. It includes measures to anticipate and mitigate serious disruptions in the supply of defence and non-defence products, which the Commission is currently implementing in consultation with Member States through the Defence Security of Supply Board. In addition, the Commission is working with Member States, industry and civilian standardisation stakeholders to prepare a landscape and gap analysis for defence and dual-use standardisation, to further reinforce the efficiency and interoperability of the EU defence market. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/682/oj/eng. [2] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/research-and-technology/strategic-energy-technology-plan_en. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0270. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/european-defence-fund-2021-2027.html. [5] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/bravetech-eu_en. [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2643/oj/eng.”
  Defence spending · "Buy European" provisions
• 2026-05-11 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 8.6.2026 Written question While the primary responsibility for countering hybrid threats lies with the Member States, there is a strong need for a coordinated response at the EU level. In the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence [1] , the EU set out actions to prevent, detect, deter and respond to malicious hybrid activities. Through ProtectEU [2] and the Preparedness Union Strategy [3] , the Commission is strengthening the EU’s ability to anticipate, prevent and respond to hybrid threats across all sectors. This is complemented by the directives on Critical Entities Resilience [4] and on Network and Information Systems [5] , which enhance protection against sabotage and cyberattacks, and by the Digital Services Act [6] , which helps to counter online manipulation and protect the integrity of democratic discourse. The action plan on Cable Security [7] strengthens the protection of submarine data and power cables. The action plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security [8] sets out a comprehensive approach to protecting society against drone threats, including a voluntary EU counter-drone joint purchasing initiative. The Joint Communication on Defence Readiness 2030 [9] sets out clear objectives and milestones for achieving defence readiness by 2030. Two of its initiatives — the Eastern Flank Watch and the European Drone Defence — aim at integrating air defence, counter-drone systems, ground and maritime security measures and situational awareness to build a comprehensive European border defence capability combining civilian-military tools in cooperation with NATO. The Eastern Flank Watch aims to build-up the capacity of Member States on the Eastern border to face a wide range of threats, including hybrid operations, Russia’s shadow fleet and the risk of armed aggression. It aims to fortify the EU’s Eastern borders across land, air and sea, contributing to the security of the whole EU. [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0148. [3] https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/b81316ab-a513-49a1-b520-b6a6e0de6986/file.bin. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj/eng. [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022L2555. [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. [7] eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025JC0009. [8] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0081. [9] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0027.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2026-04-28 “E-000862/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) 1 instrument provides for an open architecture that allows concluding bilateral agreements with third countries – specifically acceding, candidate and potential candidate countries or those with whom the EU has entered into a security and defence partnership. Regarding the expressions of interest submitted by Japan, South Korea, and Türkiye, the Commission is currently assessing these requests and finalising loan agreements that each Member States will sign with the EU. Once these loans agreements are established, the Commission will have a clearer picture on any possible budgetary leftover under SAFE. That also includes the possibility of certain amounts under the agreed national plans that could be re-attributed to other procurements. This would be also the right moment to discuss with Member States on the possibility to negotiate additional SAFE bilateral agreements. Any potential opening of negotiations of a bilateral agreement in the context of SAFE, needs to follow the procedure set out in Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 2 , where the Council may authorise the Commission to negotiate the said agreements on behalf of the EU. Furthermore, Article 17 of the SAFE Regulation spells out conditions for the participation of third countries’ entities and products in SAFE, including the conditions and modalities of participation of contractors and subcontractors established in the third country in the common procurement under the SAFE instrument; the rules related to the cost of components originating in the third country; conditions of any financial contribution to be provided by the third country to the EU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2008/art_218/oj/eng.”
  "Buy European" provisions · EU competences on defence
• 2026-04-28 “P-000886/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The most recent analysis of EU collaborative procurement (2024-2025) 1 performed by the European Defence Agency, stated that ‘only 12 out of 27 Member States reported their EU collaborative equipment procurement data, making it impossible at present to provide a comprehensive analysis of EU collaborative defence equipment procurement and to adequately assess the state of the EU defence landscape in this area’. Currently, around 40% of defence expenditure by Member States is directed at the US Foreign Military Sales Mechanism, while less than 50% of defence procurement is sourced in the EU 2 . Several EU initiatives support collaborative procurement. The European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act 3 allocated EUR 300 million to offset the costs of cooperation, leveraging more than EUR 11 billion of collaborative purchases. The Security Action for Europe 4 instrument is designed to foster collaborative procurement, while the European Defence Industry Programme 5 supports actions on common procurement. Both instruments are in early days of their implementation and do not allow measuring their impact on the collaborative procurement. The Defence Readiness Omnibus proposal 6 aims at, inter alia, facilitating common procurement by simplifying procedures. Member States’ report on their exports of military equipment which includes data on intra-EU transfers. The Commission will present in 2026 a report evaluating the impact of Directive 2009/43/EC 7 . 1 https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/2025-eda_defencedata_web.pdf. 2 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/2026-european-macroeconomic-report_en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 5 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2643/oj. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0823. 7 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/43/oj.”
  Defence spending
• 2026-04-27 “E-000481/2026 E-000524/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Pursuant to Articles 34(2) of the Space Programme Regulation 1 and 30(3) of the Secure Connectivity Regulation 2 , the Commission determines General Security Requirements (GSR) for all its space systems to address current and future threats upon them, such as replay and jamming/spoofing attacks. The GSR are EU classified information and are based on a security risk assessment which systematically analyses relevant risks considering the geopolitical context and the capabilities of state actors. The Commission relies on the Security Accreditation Board (SAB), an independent body composed of EU Member State representatives, established by Article 36 of the Space Programme Regulation, to provide security accreditation of EU space infrastructures before their deployment and operations by auditing all components and procedures to ensure full respect of the security requirements contained in the respective GSR. Moreover, risks linked to the supply chain of EU space systems are limited through eligibility and participation conditions defined in Article 24 of the Space Programme Regulation and Article 22 of the Secure Connectivity Regulation. Consequently, thanks to their security design, even if some of the targeted satellites host payloads for the EU space programme no effect is identified. European commercial sector satellites may be more exposed to interference or malicious activities. Therefore, the Commission proposal for an EU Space Act 3 in June 2025 aims to enhance the resilience of commercial and governmental satellites. Furthermore, the Council Decision on the security of systems and services deployed, operated and used under the Space Programme 4 lays down operational provisions to respond to threats upon need. 1 OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, pp. 69–148, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj. 2 OJ L 79, 17.3.2023, pp. 1–39, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/588/oj. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0335. 4 OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, pp. 178–182, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2021/698/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on space policy
• 2026-04-24 “P-000873/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The security and territorial integrity of all Member States is a core interest of the EU, which is actively supporting and coordinating Member States’ efforts to strengthen their defence industrial base and the EU’s overall defence readiness in a 360-degree approach. Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union 1 is an important and powerful instrument in this regard. In case of an attack on its territory, its activation is the responsibility of the attacked Member State. The Commission stands ready to support Member States in its implementation as necessary. The Commission actively supports enhancing defence capabilities through technological cooperation and advanced surveillance systems, including counter-drone technologies. The European Defence Fund 2 stands as a key programme facilitating the development of counterdrone systems, such as through European Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems 3 and Tactical Advanced Laser Optical Systems 4 projects. Additionally, the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) 5 will further empower Member States to address their defence requirements. Member States and industry will be able to seize funding opportunities for joint acquisition or industrial reinforcement projects in relation to drones and counter-drone capabilities. EDIP also enables Member States to establish and receive funding for European Defence Project of Common Interest that could, for instance, organise the development, production and acquisition of drone and anti-drone systems. Under the Secure Action for Europe 6 instrument, Cyprus has requested a total of EUR 1 181 503 924 in loans through this instrument. These defence investments will strengthen the defence posture of Cyprus against any threats. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092: https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 3 European Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems: https://defence-industryspace.ec.europa.eu/document/download/d2719294-4288-43b4-9093-a2bc6134ace4_en?filename=EDF-2023DA-AIRDEF-CUAS%20E-CUAS.pdf. 4 Tactical Advanced Laser Optical Systems: https://defence-industryspace.ec.europa.eu/document/download/de830426-7142-4a72-961b-f7abcaa739b6_en?filename=EDF-2023-LSRA-DIS-LDEW%20TALOS-TWO.pdf. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2643/oj/eng. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2026-04-23 “E-000393/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund (EDF) 1 , including through its European Defence Innovation Scheme 2 , boosts cross-border cooperation across the EU by supporting collaborative research and development of defence products and technologies, including disruptive technologies, in line with commonly agreed capability priorities. In addition, the European Innovation Council accelerator – under the defence mini-omnibus 3 – can support dual-use and defence technologies, including through equity investments. Moreover, the Defence Readiness Omnibus 4 aims to enable quicker innovation cycles under the EDF. To support Member States – as only buyers and users of defence products and technologies – in their endeavour to invest more and together in defence, the EU is backing joint procurement through the European Defence Industry Programme 5 . It also supports production ramp-up activities, enabling the required technologies to be made available at the necessary speed and scale. The recent Commission proposal for a new Programme for agile and rapid defence innovation (AGILE) 6 aims to support the rapid development of emerging and disruptive defence products and technologies, with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises, including innovative start-ups and scale-ups, to respond to the most pressing needs of Member States. This holistic approach is expected to continue and expand, as set out in the Commission's proposal for the European Competitiveness Fund 7 , in complementarity with the proposed Horizon Europe programme 8 . Overall, the EU aims to reduce fragmentation within the technological, capability and industrial landscapes, while ensuring a smooth transition from research to deployment and continuity across the full innovation cycles, as well as fostering synergies between civilian and defence research. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/european-defence-fund-2021-2027.html. 2 https://eudis.europa.eu/index_en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2653/oj. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0822(01)&qid=1774518478081. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2643/oj/eng. 6 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_687. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0555. 8 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0543.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2026-04-16 “E-000669/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund 1 (EDF)’s aims to enhance the competitiveness of the European defence technological and industrial base, and to promote cooperation in defence research and development between entities of all sizes across the EU and EDF associated countries. All applicants can compete for EDF funding under fair, transparent and non-discriminatory call conditions, in line with the EDF and the Financial Regulations. Applications are assessed using uniform eligibility and selection criteria. National defence ecosystems are very diverse: some Member States have well-established, internationally active defence industries, while others have ecosystems dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The EDF implements several measures to foster broader inclusion and cross-border collaboration, particularly with and among SMEs. The European Defence Innovation Scheme, funded at around 20% of the annual EDF budget, aims to drive technological progress and boost SME involvement 2 . As a result, the EDF Interim Evaluation Report 3 highlighted that SMEs accounted for 43% of distinct beneficiaries, particularly from Eastern Europe. The Commission’s proposal for the European Competitiveness Fund includes several additional cross-sectoral measures designed to encourage participation across the EU, such as project advisory services, the ‘EU for Business’ Network, value chain builder actions and EU Tech frontrunners actions. 1 OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, pp. 149–177. 2 https://eudis.europa.eu/index_en. 3 COM(2025) 299 final of 17 June 2025 - https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defenceindustry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpage-european-commission/edf-interim-evaluation-report_en.”
  Defence spending
• 2026-04-16 “E-000484/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The EU position on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) at the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) is developed by the EU in close consultation with Member States. The EU presents its position at the GGE on LAWS. The GGE on LAWS, which began in 2014, is expected to present a recommendation on LAWS to the 2026 November CCW Review Conference. The EU position at the GGE on LAWS is developed in cooperation between EU institutions and Member States, in line with the EU Treaty and its provisions on the Common foreign and security policy, which is agreed by unanimity by Member States. The EU is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. These principles align with EU’s commitment to the promotion and respect of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The respect of IHL obligations and the ratification of related international conventions remains the competence of Member States. The European defence industrial programmes do not fund actions related to defence products that are prohibited by applicable international law. The programmes, moreover, lay down specific provisions regarding lethal autonomous weapons. The European Defence Fund 1 specifically bans the EU funding of lethal autonomous weapons without the possibility of human control over the selection and engagement decisions when carrying out strikes against humans. In addition, the European Defence Industry Programme 2 cannot fund defence products which are prohibited by applicable international law, nor lethal autonomous systems that operate outside a responsible chain of human command and control or cannot comply with the principles of IHL. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2643/oj/eng.”
  Artificial Intelligence for military purposes · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2026-04-15 “E-000701/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission According to the eligibility criteria under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation 1 , contractors and certain subcontractors must be established and have their executive management structures in a Member State, a European Economic Area (EEA) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) State, or Ukraine. These entities must not be subject to control by a third country other than EEA EFTA States or Ukraine or by one of their entity or, where they are subject to such a control, they must present security guarantees verified by Member States. All infrastructure, facilities, assets, and resources used for the purposes of the common procurement must in principle be located within the territory of a Member State, an EEA EFTA State, or Ukraine. Accordingly, the eligibility criteria under Article 16 of the SAFE Regulation are defined from an EU (including EEA EFTA States and Ukraine) wide perspective, rather than from the standpoint of any individual Member State. The Commission is responsible for assessing European defence industry investment plans to ensure compliance with the Regulation's conditions in particular those of Article 4, 7(2) and 16. During the implementation, Member States will provide information and evidence of progress in fulfilling the plan. The Commission will assess that conditions under the Regulation are fulfilled before disbursement of the loan instalments. The Regulation on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the EU budget 2 applies to all EU funds, including SAFE funds. Furthermore, the SAFE Regulation requires that the loan agreement will contain provisions on the protection of the financial interests of the EU, and on audit and control. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on defence
• 2026-04-07 “E-000289/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges that national security is the sole responsibility of Member States. It also notes that Article 42(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 1 foresees that the progressive framing of a common EU defence policy will lead to a common defence, when the European Council so decides unanimously and when all Member States adopt such a decision in accordance with their constitutional requirements. The Commission also acknowledges that under Article 42(2) TEU the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy is not to prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. The Article 23j B-VG of the Austrian Constitution governs its interaction with the provisions on the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy in the TEU. Finally, on democratic legitimacy, the Commission emphasises that the Treaties provide for decision-making processes that ensure the participation of Member States and their democratic institutions, including unanimity in the European Council for decisions related to common defence. The Commission remains committed to upholding the above-mentioned principles and ensuring that any future initiatives reflect the collective will of Member States and their citizens. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2008/art_42/oj/eng/.”
  Relations with NATO · EU competences on defence
• 2026-03-24 “E-000530/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund’s (EDF 1 ) general objective is to foster the competitiveness of the entire European defence technological and industrial base. All eligible entities established in Member States and EDF associated countries can apply for funding through annual calls for proposals on equal and fair competitive terms and conditions, which are prepared with full transparency and in close coordination with the Member States. Proposals are selected for funding based on the same set of award criteria, as set out in the EDF Regulation 2 . The geographical distribution of EDF beneficiaries remains, to date, uneven across Europe. The EDF, like the other EU defence industrial programmes, pursues an objective of inclusiveness by fostering transnational cooperation and also incentivising the entry of new players in the defence sector. It remains that the levels of participation in the programmes depends significantly on the respective size, structure and maturity level of each national defence technological and industrial base. Each Member State is characterised by a different history and legacy in terms of its defence-relevant industry, with specific features and strengths. Nevertheless, the particular attention paid by defence programmes on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) plays in support of the broadest possible access to EU funding. In addition, the European defence innovation scheme 3 , which is funded with around 20% of the EDF annual budget, provides a range of measures designed to support innovation and SMEs. As a result, as highlighted in the EDF interim evaluation report 4 , 43% of unique participants in the EDF are SMEs, a significant proportion of which are established in Central and Eastern Europe. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj. 2 OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, pp. 149–177. 3 https://eudis.europa.eu/index_en. 4 COM(2025) 299 final of 17.6.2025 - https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defenceindustry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpage-european-commission/edf-interim-evaluation-report_en.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2026-03-19 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 19.3.2026 Written question By the regulatory deadline of 30 November 2025, 19 Member States submitted their national defence investment plans under the Security Action for Europe Regulation (SAFE) [1] . These plans collectively account for nearly two years of defence equipment procurement for the EU-27 [2] , demonstrating a commitment to scaling up European defence readiness. Regarding the product categories, the submitted plans are comprehensive and cover all capability categories set out in Article 1 of the SAFE Regulation, which reflect the priority areas identified by the European Council. While the detailed breakdown of each activity remains sensitive due to the nature of the national defence data involved, the Commission can confirm that the requested funding involves both Category C and Category C products. In line with the EU's commitment to Ukraine's security, support to Ukraine is a core feature of SAFE. The vast majority of the submitted national plans include procurement activities involving in different manners Ukraine. On procurement structures, SAFE incentivizes cooperation. To date, there is a pre-dominance of cooperative procurement, which represents more than 65% of the total planned activities, amounting to approximately EUR 98 billion. It is worth mentioning that current single procurement projects include provisions to extend the benefit of the contract to additional SAFE eligible partners. The Commission is currently finalising its assessment of the remaining plans. A comprehensive report, which will provide additional detailed information on the implementation of SAFE and the specific breakdown of activities, is scheduled to be presented to the European Parliament in May 2026. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. [2] https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/2025-eda_defencedata_web.pdf.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2026-03-05 “P-000439/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The EU GOVSATCOM 1 provides satellite communication services for crisis management, natural and man-made disasters, humanitarian crises and maritime emergencies. Operations started in January 2026. Member States have now access to a wide catalogue of services from existing governmental systems that have already been used by civil protection agencies in events of crisis. The service catalogue will be further extended with additional existing services coming from commercial systems. GOVSATCOM does not include services for direct connections with personal devices and between citizens. The Commission is exploring the ways for providing direct to device services under the Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite (IRIS²) system 2 , including considerations on radio spectrum requirements. At the same time, the Galileo Early Warning Satellite Service to be available by end-2026, will transmit alerts directly to smartphones, or to any other navigation devices of citizens located in areas threatened by a looming natural or manmade disaster. GOVSATCOM resources are already available for all Member States since January 2026 irrespective of the Digital Networks Act (DNA) 3 . In this regard, the DNA proposal aims at establishing an EU authorisation regime for satellite networks and services, including for civil protection and disaster relief and foresees as a task of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications to adopt a ‘Union Preparedness Plan for Digital Infrastructures’ that should include crisis management practices and for which the role of GOVSATCOM and IRIS 2 could be assessed. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/govsatcom-satellite-communications_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/588/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52026PC0016.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2026-03-05 “E-000194/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission can clarify that the total funding available under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation 1 is set at EUR 150 billion, as outlined in Article 6 of the Regulation. The Regulation does not foresee an ex ante distribution key among Member States for the financial assistance being provided to them. The Commission launched a call for expression of interest, requesting Member States to provide for an indicative loan amount based on their own assessment of risks, needs and other pertinent criteria. 2. The tentative allocation of financial assistance was based on the requests from the Member States and respecting the caveat of the Regulation in Article 13. The Member States submitted their requests for financial assistance before 30 November 2025. When submitting the proposals for Council Implementing Decisions on financial assistance to Member States, the Commission considers existing and expected financing needs of the requesting Member State as expressed in the requests for financial assistance, applying, in accordance with Article 8(5), the principles of equal treatment, solidarity, proportionality and transparency. 3. The Commission establishes guidance and procedures for all stages of the implementation of the instrument (assessment of the plans, assessments of requests for payments, amendments) that guarantee the proportionality of the controls and equal treatment of the Member States. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2026-03-04 “E-004397/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes the safety of citizens and the prevention of accidents very seriously. Responsibility for authorising, supervising and enforcing safety requirements at defenceindustrial sites lies primarily with the competent national authorities, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. When it comes to legislation like the Seveso III Directive (2012/18/EU) 1 , EU law harmonises objectives, not operational supervision. The Military Mobility Package 2 puts forward proposals for a comprehensive set of measures to ensure the swift, coordinated and secure movement of military personnel and equipment across the EU. The proposal for a Military Mobility Regulation does not include any financing for industrial activities as such. Safety measures, including for industrial sites, are outside the scope of the Military Mobility proposal. However, safety measures foreseen at the EU level for different modes of transport will continue to apply. In fact, initiatives like the proposed European Competitiveness Fund 3 (Article 47) feature the ‘enhancement of the protection and resilience of infrastructures that are strategic for military mobility’ 4 . The Commission stands ready to engage with all national Greek authorities should substantiated concerns regarding the application of this specific piece of EU legislation be brought to its attention. 1 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/industrial-emissions-and-safety/industrial-accidents_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0846. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0555. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0555R(01).”
  EU competences on defence · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2026-03-04 “E-000178/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The grant agreement signed with the consortium requires beneficiaries to notify the Commission in advance of any transfer of ownership or licensing of results to a nonassociated third country or entity. Compliance with this contractual obligation may be verified ex post by the Commission, in particular through audits. The assessment involves checking whether the third country is subject to any restrictive measures adopted by the Council in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (e.g. arms embargos, restriction on admissions, asset freezes and other economic measures such as restrictions on imports and exports). The assessment would also check whether the transfer could contravene the objectives in Article 3 of the European Defence Fund (EDF) Regulation 1 . Notifications made under Article 23(4) of the EDF Regulation are not intended to be made public. The assessment as to whether access is possible may take place following the submission of a request for access to documents, which is assessed in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 2 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj/eng.”
  Arms export from the EU · EU competences on defence
• 2026-02-26 “E-000177/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 1. The parliamentary question E-003832/2025 1 requested information on a concrete project. The Commission considered that the question fell within the remit of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 2 . Had the Commission received such a notification under Article 23(4) of the European Defence Fund (EDF) Regulation 3 , it would have previously consulted the recipient in line with Article 4(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 on its disclosure and assessed the potential impact on protected interests under Articles 4(1) and 4(2). 2. To date, the Commission has received no notification under Article 23(4) of the EDF Regulation. 3. To date, the Commission has issued no reply. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-003832_EN.html. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng.”
  Arms export from the EU
• 2026-02-18 “E-003762/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 1 , the Commission recalled that even though Member States’ defence spending has grown by over 31% on aggregate since 2021, it remains far below US levels. Rebuilding European defence needs sustained public and private investment. Even with the additional budgetary leeway introduced by the ReArm Europe Plan 2 , the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) must considerably increase EU support to strategic European defence investments. The Commission considers that defence-related funding under the next MFF, notably in support to research and development (R&D), shall primarily be driven by these objectives, while considering, where relevant, potential dual-use applications, such as supporting related firefighting activities. The Commission’s report ‘Safer Together’ 3 highlights firefighters' role in emergencies, including in Ukraine and their need for modern technologies for situational awareness and safe evacuations. The future European Competitiveness Fund (ECF) 4 will provide significant support to investment in defence, security and space. As such, the Commission proposed a dedicated ‘Resilience, Security, Defence and Space’ policy window, under the ECF, with a EUR 131 billion budget. This window will address civil security industry needs. Defence industrial instruments and its budget cannot replace civil protection instruments. In addition, the Commission proposal for the next MFF foresees that dual-use R&D activities may be supported under the programme Horizon Europe 2028-2034 5 . Finally, in line with the Preparedness Union Strategy 6 , the Commission aims to boost the support to the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, notably for aerial-fire-fighting means. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readines s%202030.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2653/oj/eng. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b778739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0555&qid=1753802586340. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0543. 6 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/b81316ab-a513-49a1-b520b6a6e0de6986/download.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2026-01-29 “P-004394/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Recent airspace violations over several Member States are being monitored in close cooperation with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and within the Council Horizontal Working Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats. Primary legal responsibility for countering hybrid threats rests with individual Member States. The Commission and the EEAS support Member States in their efforts. The EU legal framework for critical energy infrastructure consists of the Critical Entities Resilience Directive 1 and the Network and Information Systems Directive 2 (NIS 2) 2 , with the Commission developing guidelines for their implementation. Regarding drone incursions into the airspace, the Commission proposed a European Drone Defence Initiative, as well as the European Air Shield, European Space Shield and Eastern Flank Watch initiatives 3 . Member States’ endorsement will enable the Commission to proceed with their implementation. The European Defence Drone Initiative, in conjunction with Member States' capability coalition on drones and counter-drones, could significantly enhance Europe’s collective response. The Commission also plans to present soon an Action Plan on drone and counter-drone security covering areas such as security, aviation, research, critical infrastructure protection and civil-defence synergies. Furthermore, the ProtectEU Strategy tackles internal security threats, including hybrid threats. The EU supports Lithuanian efforts to develop and test, jointly with other European authorities and innovators, systems to detect, identify and mitigate unauthorised aerial threats used for smuggling, and/or hybrid threats 4 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022L2557&qid=1767776918378. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022L2555&qid=1767777141903. 3 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-836460afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf.. 4 See projects FOLDOUT: Through-foliage detection, including in the outermost regions of the EU, https://foldout.eu/; NESTOR: aN Enhanced pre-frontier intelligence picture to Safeguard The EurOpean boRders, https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101021851; BorderForce: Flexible system extending automated border surveillance by increased situational awareness adaptable to uncertain times with unforseen events, https://borderforce-horizon.eu/; and CROSSMARE: Advanced Cross-Border And Multi Domain Interoperability Framework For Improved Collaborative Operational Efficiency For Secure Maritime Borders, https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101225981; EU-HYBNET (Empowering a Pan-European Network to Counter Hybrid Threats, https://euhybnet.eu/).”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2026-01-26 “E-004522/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation 1 is meant to provide financial assistance to Member States, enabling them to carry out urgent and major public investments in support of the European defence industry in response to the current crisis situation. The Regulation does not foresee an ex-ante allocation of resources. It requires Member States to express an interest in receiving financial support. Once it received expressions of interest from Member States during the summer 2025, the Commission allocated tentatively the loan amounts to the Member States by applying the principles of equal treatment, solidarity, proportionality and transparency. The Commission agreed on the tentative allocation of loan amounts on 9 September 2025 2 . Member States were requested to present a formal request for financial assistance, accompanied by a European defence industry investment plan by 30 November 2025, describing the plans to use the funds and ensure compliance with the provisions of the SAFE Regulation. The Commission is assessing Member States’ requests and how the conditions laid down in the Regulation would be fulfilled, in particular when it comes to the conditions to use the SAFE instrument and its eligibility rules. Member States remain responsible for their defence planning and defence procurement decisions, as well as for respecting international commitment taken in fora other than the EU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng/pdf. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/704924ae-3aa2-4bd3-9675e9cf1e5dfb96_en?filename=communication-to-the-college.pdf.”
  Defence spending · Relations with NATO
• 2026-01-19 “E-004401/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Delegated Regulation 1 adopted by the Commission on 28 August 2025 concerning the InvestEU fund provides that in the area of defence final beneficiaries receiving more than EUR 10 million of EU funding shall be established in the EU or an associated country and shall not be controlled by non-associated third country entities unless they provide a guarantee approved by the country in which they are established. Such guarantee shall provide assurances that the involvement of the entity will not contravene the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States. Currently, only Norway and Iceland are associated to InvestEU. These countries have contributed to the InvestEU Fund on the basis of Article 81 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area 2 . In line with that Agreement, the amendments proposed in the Delegated Regulation of 28 August 2025 ensure that entities established in these associated countries benefit from similar conditions as entities established in Member States. As a candidate country to the EU, Türkiye participates in EU programmes and could in principle be associated to InvestEU. The specific conditions for its association would need to be agreed between Türkiye and the Commission based on the association agreement as ratified by the European Parliament. However, at this advanced stage of implementation of the programme, the Commission does not envisage the association of Türkiye or any other non-EU associated countries to InvestEU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2025/1774/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1994/1/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on defence · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2026-01-14 “E-003661/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The control of export of military equipment and technology is exercised by the Member States and subject to national legislations, the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 1 , and international instruments such as the Arms Trade Treaty 2 and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The export outside the EU of equipment and technology listed on the EU Common Military List 3 requires an export license by the relevant Member State. Licence applications for such equipment must comply with the criteria of the Council Common Position and international obligations and commitments of the licensing Member State. The national authorities of the exporting Member State are responsible for such assessment. As announced in the State of the Union address by the President of the Commission 4 , the Commission presented a proposal to the Council to suspend certain trade-related provisions of the Association Agreement between the EU and Israel 5 that fall within the EU’s common commercial policy. If adopted, this would mean that imports from Israel would lose their preferential access to the EU market and exports from the EU would lose their preferential access to the Israelian market. The Council, through its relevant working groups, works towards increased convergence between Member States’ arms export policies. Specifically, the impact of the conflict in Gaza on national arms exports policies of Member States is continuously on the agenda of meetings. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02008E0944-20250415. 2 https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-text.html?templateId=209884. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1499/oj/eng. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:22000A0621(01).”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Arms export from the EU
• 2026-01-13 “E-004320/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Critical raw materials (CRMs) dependencies undermine the EU’s long-term competitiveness and transition objectives. They also risk hampering its defence readiness targets and support to Ukraine, thereby posing a direct security risk and undermining European security. EU institutions and Member States, in coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, should mobilise every possible lever at their disposal to expediently decrease CRMs dependencies from defence industrial value chains. The Commission takes seriously the risk stemming from dependency on China on the different stages of the raw materials process. The Commission adopted the RESourceEU Action Plan on 3 December 2025 1 . The aim of RESourceEU is to secure access to alternative sources of CRMs in the short, medium and long term for the European industry. The RESourceEU Action Plan includes a proposal for a new financing hub that will de-risk investment and coordinate different aims of funding, as well as proposals of adjustments to the EU-regulatory framework on permitting. Work on CRMs partnerships with resource-rich countries will continue, as well as coordination with like-minded countries in relevant multilateral fora. The above-mentioned avenues to address the CRMs dependencies’ risks are instrumental to strengthen defence capabilities, as well as defence readiness and industrial resilience by 2030. 1 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/01c448d6-dc93-40d7-9afe-4c2af448d00c_en.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · EU-US relations
• 2026-01-13 “E-003787/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument 1 aims at providing financial assistance to Member States to carry out urgent and major public investments in support of the European defence industry in response to the current crisis situation. Only Member States can request such financial assistance in forms of loans, guaranteed by the EU’s budget. The SAFE instrument has an open architecture. It foresees the possibility for third countries to participate in common procurement, but also to conclude bilateral agreements with acceding, potential candidate and candidate countries and other third countries with which the EU has entered into a Security and Defence Partnership in order to open the eligibility conditions of the instrument. Thanks to those bilateral agreements, defence industrial entities established in a third country would become eligible as contractors for procurements supported by SAFE, beyond the current rules foreseeing that the cost of the components originating outside the EU, European Economic Area, European Free Trade Association States and Ukraine shall not be higher than 35 % of the estimated cost of the components of the end-product. The Regulation also foresees that no component shall be sourced from a third country that contravenes the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States. When procuring with SAFE support, the contracting authorities supported by SAFE must perform this assessment. On 23 June 2025, Türkiye expressed its interest to discuss such a bilateral agreement with the EU. The Commission is currently assessing this request. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  Defence spending
• 2026-01-08 “E-004130/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully engaged in maintaining and fostering the EU's autonomous, reliable and cost-effective access to space, as indicated in the EU Space Programme Regulation 1 and in the Mission Letter of the Commissioner for Defence and Space 2 . Access to space is a key enabler and indispensable element in the overall space value chain: without autonomous access to space, there is no credible and strategically autonomous EU space policy. The EU has regained its autonomous access to space thanks to the entry into service of the Ariane 6 and Vega C launchers which have already brought into orbit EU satellites for both Copernicus and Galileo EU systems. Additional launches of EU satellites with European launchers are planned throughout 2026. The EU ambition is to facilitate the aggregation of demand for European launchers, to foster research and innovation in technology, and to support European critical and strategic test and launch infrastructure, without prejudice to the European Space Agency (ESA)’s activities. The Commission is regularly engaging with ESA to ensure alignment of ESA’s activities with the strategic goals of the EU Space Programme. The EU and ESA are separate entities with different governance systems and decision-making procedures: ESA selects the launch service providers for the launch of ESA satellites while the EU selects the launch service providers for the launch of its own EU satellites. For the support of United States operators launching from EU territory, the Commission is not involved in any decision. The Commission is committed to ensuring an autonomous, secure and cost-efficient capability to access space, considering the essential security interests of the EU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj/eng. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/630c289c-7ff1-4fdd-944f0f596e7e7914_en?filename=mission-letter-kubilius.pdf.”
  EU-US relations · "Buy European" provisions · EU competences on space policy
• 2026-01-06 “E-003409/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is fully driven by participating Member States. Decisions on project proposals, participation, and implementation are taken by national governments within the Council framework, supported by the PESCO Secretariat (European External Action Service, including the EU Military Staff, and the European Defence Agency). The EU institutions cannot steer Greece’s participation in PESCO, which is voluntary, and decision-making remains intergovernmental. The Commission supports the broader efforts on defence through simplifying the regulatory environment for defence industry, and through instruments like the European Defence Fund (EDF). Other initiatives reinforcing the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, such as the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) 1 and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) 2 , or the newly adopted European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) 3 , offer financial support for Member States’ collaborative defence efforts in view of strengthening defence readiness. The EDF promotes participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and nontraditional defence actors, allocating around 20% of its work programme 4 to the EU Defence Innovation Scheme. A network of EDF National Focal Points 5 provides additional support. Around 100 Greek entities are participating in 137 of the 287 projects supported by the EDF and its predecessor programmes between 2017 and 2024, half of which are SMEs. While EDIRPA applications are closed, joint procurement will be supported under EDIP, in line with the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 6 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1525/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024PC0150&qid=1765184118540. 4 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpageeuropean-commission_en. 5 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/network-european-defence-fund-nationalfocal-points-nfp_en. 6 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-836460afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2025-12-19 “E-004003/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) is a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation initiative concerning United States equipment. Neither the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) nor the Commission is directly involved. Regarding EU’s military support to Ukraine, the Qualitative Military Edge programme 1 (Commission’s Work Programme 2026 initiative) aims to ensure Ukraine’s fastest access to superior military equipment from the EDTIB. The Preserving Peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 2 noted past underinvestment in the EDTIB and invited Member States to aim for 55% EU defence procurement by 2030 and at least 40% jointly procured by 2027. EU instruments have boosted the EDTIB and EU strategic autonomy recently. The European Defence Fund (EDF) funded 163 Research and Development projects, engaging 1 385 European companies. The Act in Support of Ammunition Production 3 helped industry’s rampup to a two million/year shell production capacity, and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act 4 unlocked EUR 11 billion of joint procurement from the European industry. The Security Action for Europe 5 Instrument makes available EUR 150 billion in loans for the EDTIB. The co-legislators agreed on the European Defence Industry Programme key for the Defence Readiness Roadmap and its proposed flagships. The co-legislators also agreed to amend the EDF Regulation to allow Ukraine’s association to the EDF, including through the BraveTechEU initiative. The Commission’s proposal for a European Competitiveness Fund within the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028-2034, foresees up to EUR 131 billion investments for defence and space, a five-fold increase over the current MFF. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0870. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-836460afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1525/oj/eng. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  "Buy European" provisions · EU competences on defence · EU-US relations
• 2025-12-17 “E-004372/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Rockets and launchers are the same thing, and the terms can be used interchangeably. In addition, no United States (US) rockets are operated directly by the EU or a European public institution. Any US company intending to launch its rocket from the territory of a Member State would need to address itself to the Member State in question in order to obtain a licence to launch. Neither the Commission nor the European Space Agency (ESA) are the competent authorities to allow US or any other company to perform launch services from European territory. The Commission is fully engaged in maintaining and fostering the EU's autonomous, reliable and cost-effective access to space, as indicated in the EU Space Programme Regulation 1 . Access to space is a key enabler and indispensable element in the overall space value chain: without access, there is no autonomous EU space policy. The EU ambition is to facilitate the aggregation of launch service demand for the needs of the European programme, to foster research and innovation in technology, and to support European critical and strategic test and launch infrastructure, without prejudice to ESA’s activities. The Commission is regularly engaging with ESA to ensure alignment of ESA’s activities with the strategic goals of the EU Space Programme. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj/eng.”
  EU-US relations · EU competences on space policy
• 2025-12-17 “E-004118/2025 Answer given by Mr. Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Critical raw materials (CRMs) dependencies undermine the EU’s long-term competitiveness and transition objectives. They also risk hampering its defence readiness targets and support to Ukraine, thereby posing a direct security risk and undermining European security. EU institutions and Member States, in coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, should mobilise every possible lever at their disposal to expediently decrease CRMs dependencies from defence industrial value chains. The risks stemming from China’s export licensing requirements on the rare earth elements (REE) export rules (those implemented on 4 April 2025, as well as those announced on 9 October 2025) to the European defence industry are serious. While the latter measures have been suspended for one year, they are not subject to an outright repeal. In addition, measures introduced in April 2025 and before on REE and permanent magnets continue to be in force. The EU and Member States should remain vigilant to further Chinese actions. The Commission adopted the RESourceEU Action Plan 1 on 3 December 2025. The aim of RESourceEU is to secure access to alternative sources of CRMs in the short, medium and long term for the European industry. The Action plan provides for measures to accelerate the deployment of CRMs projects, with EUR 3 billion of EU funds for next year. It also announces measures to support circularity of CRMs, notably by increasing access to rare earth scrap. From 2026, the EU CRM Centre will be set up and will be responsible for financing, joint purchasing, stockpiling and monitoring activities. Work on CRMs partnerships with resource-rich countries will continue, as well as coordination with like-minded countries in relevant multilateral fora. 1 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/01c448d6-dc93-40d7-9afe-4c2af448d00c_en.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Defence spending
• 2025-12-15 “E-003822/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The guarantees that have been submitted to the Commission substantiated that: (i) control over the entity is not exercised in a manner that restricts its ability to implement the action or deliver results; (ii) access by the non-EU parent company to sensitive information is prevented with security measures applied where relevant; and (iii) ownership of intellectual property and results remain within the EU entity and is not subject to non-EU control or export without prior authorisation. In line with the European Defence Fund (EDF) Regulation 1 , the guarantees were approved by the Member State of establishment of the nonEU controlled entity and the Commission has assessed them and concluded compliance with the EDF Regulation. The measures to ensure compliance with the EDF Regulation have been recorded in the provided documents and are part of the grant file managed by the Commission. The Commission holds the right to audit projects (until five years after the final payment), informs the European Anti-Fraud Office or the European Public Prosecutor's Office when it becomes aware of any suspected illegal activity, terminates grants or recovers funds in case of non-compliance. At this stage, the implementation of the Advanced Capabilities and Certification of Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (ACTUS) project proceeds in compliance with applicable rules. Once cost claims will have been submitted, ex ante controls performed, and payments will be processed, it will be included in the population to be sampled, in the framework of the annual audit programme. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2025-12-12 “E-003850/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The ‘Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ 1 clearly underlines that the proposed European readiness flagships require massive and coordinated investments into panEuropean projects that will shield Europe as a whole and thus benefit all Member States. The European Drone Defence Initiative, for example, will be designed with a 360 degrees approach. It will address threats that can reach any Member State. Investments into European readiness flagships do not come from a single, central funding source, on the contrary, funding will come from diverse sources, public and private. At EU level, possible defence industry related options for investments are the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Instrument 2 , the European Defence Industry Programme 3 (once in force), or the European Defence Fund (EDF) 4 . These programmes have clear governance rules that will be observed. Start-ups, scale-ups, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps play an important role in the overall European Defence Readiness agenda. EU defence initiatives encourage participation of smaller players and new defence actors. For example, nearly 40% of EDF beneficiaries are SMEs. On 19 November 2025 5 , the Commission put forward a Defence Industry Transformation Roadmap, that will focus on the role of innovation and the opportunities of such companies. This will include the issue of access to finance and contracts. Such an approach will be particularly inclusive and aims to promote and accelerate the thriving of national innovation ecosystems existing across Europe. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/readiness-roadmap-2030_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024PC0150. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 5 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/513de692-d08c-40cc-80c3cb6611ace178_en?filename=EU-Defence-Industry-Transformation-Roadmap.pdf.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-12-12 “E-003851/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission On 23 October 2025 1 , the European Council invited the Commission to present options for financial support based on an assessment of Ukraine’s financing needs and invited the Commission and the Council to take work forward to revert to this issue at its next meeting in December 2025. In its deliberations, the Commission’s considerations include several key parameters, namely that funding must address Ukraine’s critical defence requirements, funding must be rapidly available, any new financial package must safeguard Ukraine's debt sustainability, funding must also be flexible enough to cater for the evolving defence needs and the significant uncertainties regarding Ukraine’s financing needs in the years ahead, as well as the need for a fair burden sharing with international partners. The Commission’s proposals will not discriminate against or favour the defence industry of any particular Member State. The final decision on the conditions upon which the EU will provide financial support to Ukraine will be taken by the co-legislators. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2025/10/23/.”
  Arms export from the EU
• 2025-12-12 “E-003832/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with Article 23(4) of the European Defence Fund (EDF) Regulation 1 , the Commission shall assess whether a transfer of ownership to a non-associated third country or non-associated third country entity contravenes the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States, or the objectives set out in Article 3 of the EDF Regulation. Where such a transfer of ownership contravenes the security and defence interests, the support provided from the Fund shall be reimbursed. The Commission has in place a mechanism to assess whether a transfer of ownership to a non-associated third country or non-associated third country entity contravenes the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States, or the objectives set out in Article 3 of the EDF Regulation. Notifications made under Article 23(4) of the EDF Regulation are not meant to be public. Neither is the reply of the Commission to the entity notifying the transfer of ownership. A request for information from a third party on the existence of notifications cannot result in such notifications made public without the consent of the recipient of the EU funding. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2025-12-12 “E-003449/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission According to the investigation and verification by the Bulgarian Air Traffic Services Authority, the aircraft carrying the President of the Commission to Bulgaria experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference. Despite this, the plane landed safely. The Bulgarian Prime Minister also issued a statement 1 confirming the radio interference during the President’s flight. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming and spoofing occurrences in Bulgaria and other eastern flank Member States have increased, impacting EU aircraft and vessels. This phenomenon is common in regions surrounding conflict zones, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. European aviation has set up operational procedures and mitigations to maintain safety in case of interferences of GNSS services. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has issued guidance with recommended mitigations to civil aviation authorities, pilots, air navigation service providers, and manufacturers. EASA is also closely monitoring the situation and is ready to mandate measures to ensure safety if it deteriorates further. To prevent future navigation disturbances and in line with Article 189 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2 , the Commission is exploring measures to strengthen resilience of EU GNSS system, including gradually deploying Galileo services 3 and reinforcing Galileo with Low Earth Orbits (LEO-PNT) component, included in the Commission proposal for a regulation for a European Competitiveness Fund 4 . This will ensure the safety and security of thousands of flights in civil aviation, while protecting the EU citizens and economy from increased GNSS interference threats. 1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUdi4z0l6D0. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016E189. 3 The Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) is a data authentication function for the Galileo Open Service worldwide users, freely accessible to all as of July 2025. The upcoming encrypted Public Regulated Service (PRS) will offer secure support to governmental users. 4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European Competitiveness Fund ('ECF’), including the specific programme for defence research and innovation activities, repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/522, (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/783, repealing provisions of Regulations (EU) 2021/696, (EU) 2023/588, and amending Regulation (EU) [EDIP]: https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0555.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU competences on defence
• 2025-12-12 “E-004046/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The satellites of Copernicus, the EU’s earth observation system feed the Copernicus Emergency Management Service, and the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) provide a continuous, multi‑sensor stream for detecting, mapping, and assessing wildfires and their impacts. As Copernicus’ programme manager, the Commission aims to continue its satellite-based monitoring, e.g. by integrating Sentinel-3 data in EFFIS to mitigate satellite decommissioning impacts, or by accelerating the low latency near-real time broadcast of Sentinel 3 data for wildfire detection. To ensure continuity, Sentinel 3 satellites will be replaced by Sentinel 3 Next Generation, featuring state-of-the-art technologies and improved data accuracy and coverage, complemented by expansion missions. These actions will strengthen the capacity of EFFIS. Copernicus ensures access to additional satellite data sources via the Copernicus Contributing Missions, that include commercial missions, to satisfy the whole range of observational requirements. Moreover, the Commission is evaluating the potential of the Meteosat 1 Third Generation – Flexible Combined Imager data to monitor wildfires in Europe and collaborates with the Canadian Space Agency, anticipating the integration of data from the future WildFireSat constellation. Horizon Europe supports the evolution of Copernicus services, space technology innovation and partnerships, advancing wildfire monitoring and management technologies, exemplified by CHAMELEON 2 or ForestFireAI 3 . Copernicus is included in the European Competitiveness Fund proposal 4 that is tightly linked to research and innovation to ensure a seamless investment journey. 1 MeteoSat means meteorological satellites, here geostationary Satellites of the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT). https://www.eumetsat.int/. 2 https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101060529. 3 https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101206950. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0555.”
  EU policy on infrastructure for preventing climate-related disasters (floods, droughts, extreme weather etc.)
• 2025-12-04 “P-003855/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission shares the Honourable Members’ deep concern. Russia’s violation of Estonian airspace is not an isolated incident but part of a deliberate pattern to test and undermine European security. The EU’s security is under threat and defending it is a top priority for the EU and the Member States. The Commission is mobilising EU funding for air defence. The Communication on ‘Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap’ 1 designated air and missile defence a top capability priority. The Commission proposed the ‘European Air Shield’ as a European Readiness Flagship which builds upon the proposed European Drone Defence Initiative and Eastern Flank Watch. To fund this, the Commission will ensure that the European Defence Fund and European Defence Industry Programme dedicate significant budgets to air defence systems. The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument 2 will help Member States procure these assets jointly, leveraging up to EUR 150 billion in financing. Security and climate objectives are mutually dependent, not mutually exclusive. Without security, long-term climate goals are unachievable. Without tackling climate change, extreme events and devastations are inevitable. This is not an 'either/or' choice. Mobilising adequate resources for defence and using them efficiently is crucial. The Commission’s proposal for a new European Competitiveness Fund for the next EU budget is informed by this recognition: support to defence industry is at the centre of one of the four policy windows – ‘Resilience and security, defence industry and space’ 3 with an indicative envelope of EUR 131 billion for these priorities – ensuring effective funding to equip the EU for these pressing challenges and the new geopolitical reality. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-836460afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0555.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Defence spending
• 2025-11-24 “E-003311/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In the State of the Union Speech on 10 September 2025 1 , the President of the Commission announced the Eastern Flank Watch and Drone Wall initiatives. These have been included as proposals for European Readiness Flagships in the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 2 . They aim to create a strong and credible European defence posture, in particular along EU’s Eastern external borders. The Eastern Flank Watch entails surveillance capabilities, including from space, as well as the European Defence Drone Initiative. The Flagships will enhance the security of the entire EU. The Commission will support Member States to develop and procure the capabilities necessary, including capabilities to counter drones from crossing the border and entering Europe’s airspace, seas or territories through this initiative. The Commission will also support the effort through its security research and innovation programmes, the development of European drone and counter-drone technologies for civilian applications, thereby complementing defence-related initiatives and contributing to Europe’s technological and industrial autonomy. The President of the Commission also announced that Europe will frontload EUR 6 billion from the extraordinary revenue acceleration loan and establish a Drone Alliance with Ukraine, which will further strengthen security across the entire region. On 23 October 2025, the European Council asked 3 to focus in particular on concrete projects to reinforce Member States’ joint efforts to enhance their anti-drone and air defence capabilities, in a coordinated manner, by making full use of the Security Action for Europe 4 and European Defence Industry Programme 5 instruments and other relevant existing financial tools. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-836460afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/d2nhnqso/20251023-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024PC0150&qid=1762879127536.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU competences on defence
• 2025-11-21 “E-003689/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In a debate in the European Parliament on 9 September 2025 1 , the High Representative/VicePresident reiterated EU’s commitment to security guarantees and a comprehensive, just and lasting peace for Ukraine. Despite diplomatic efforts, Russia’s illegal war of aggression continues and there are no signs that Russia’s objectives to subjugate Ukraine has changed. The EU stands unwavering in its support of Ukraine, its sovereignty, and its right to chart its own future. Only by putting more pressure on Russia and supporting Ukraine, can Ukraine protect its interests—which align with those of the EU. The EU remains steadfast in the support of Ukraine and its people: So far, the EU and its Member States have provided EUR 177.5 billion of assistance, including almost EUR 63.2 billion of military support. Moreover, the EU provides training to Ukrainian soldiers through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine. According to the current mandate, all mission activities are located on EU soil. Member States contribute to the mission by offering training modules and personnel, with the equipment being funded through the European Peace Facility. The Commission supports Member States effort in supporting Ukraine, a vital European security interest. It also fosters closer defence industrial cooperation between the EU and Ukraine, as well as common procurement of defence products to aid Ukrainian defence against Russia’s illegal war of aggression. Through such gradual defence industrial integration, Ukraine, with its defence innovation, helps protect Europe as a whole. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2025-09-09-ITM-002_EN.html.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2025-11-21 “E-003919/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Member States are and will remain sovereign for their national security and defence. They are responsible for defining the capability objectives required to ensure the readiness of their national armed forces so that they can fulfil their strategic-military missions, including those undertaken within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Commission aims, with its regulatory and budgetary capacity, to support them in enhancing defence readiness by 2030. On this basis, the Commission has put forward the Readiness 2030 plan 1 , whose main pillars are the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) 2 instrument and the National Escape Clause (NEC) within the Stability and Growth Pact 3 . The SAFE instrument aims to support financially Member States to procure defence products and other products for defence purpose. In doing so, Member States should also aim to address critical capability gaps and strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Conditionality is attached to ensure a balance between immediate readiness and long-term industrial strength using EU budget to derisk loans. When it comes to the NEC, it can be activated by Member States to increase defence expenditures, with a maximum of 1.5% of their gross domestic product. The Commission supports Member States in ensuring a robust defence industrial base while gaining immediate operational readiness. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readines s%202030.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 3 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a57304ce-1a98-4a2c-aed536485884f1a0_en?filename=Communication-on-the-national-escape-clause.pdf.”
  "Buy European" provisions · EU-US relations
• 2025-11-19 “P-003527/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In the State of the Union speech on 10 September 2025 1 , the President of the Commission announced that, building upon Ukrainian ingenuity and experience in drone warfare, the EU will form a Drone Alliance with Ukraine. The Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 2 , presented on 16 October 2025 sets concrete timelines and milestones. The roadmap focuses on strengthening EU and Ukrainian capacities in drones and counter drone technologies to meet real operational needs. The Commission has already invested over EUR 1 billion in 52 projects through EU defence industrial programmes, while the new BraveTech EU initiative will further accelerate drone innovations 3 . The Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President also propose a set of initial European Readiness Flagships including: the European Drone Defence Initiative, building on lessons from Ukraine on innovative drone and counter-drone ecosystems, linking Research and Development with scalable production capacity, continuous technological development and the Eastern Flank Watch, to strengthen Eastern border Member States’ capacity to face hybrid threats, Russia’s shadow fleet and potential aggression. The Commission will also advance implementation of its counter-drone programme set out in the Communication of 18 October 2023 4 focusing on harmonising Member States’ frameworks and upgrading the Joint Research Centre living lab into a Counter-Drone Centre of Excellence. The Commission will expand EU-funded training, pool and share capabilities, and set common performance standards and testing methods. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025JC0027. 3 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/bravetech-eu_en. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023DC0659.”
  EU competences on defence · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · Defence spending
• 2025-11-03 “E-003361/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The support to space new entrants, startup and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is a key objective of the EU Space Programme 1 . To this end, the Commission created the CASSINI initiative 2 , with an investment capacity of up to EUR 1 billion for 2021-2027 complemented by an equivalent amount by private venture capital funds. Since 2021, the CASSINI initiative has channeled investment capital guarantees to 16 venture capital funds and made four co-investments directly into space companies. These funds have made more than 60 investments into space companies until the second quarter of 2024. The European Innovation Council has provided over EUR 300 million in support for space technologies. Within Horizon Europe, SMEs benefit from EUR 15.3 billion in Cluster 4 ‘Digital, Industry and Space’ with a lump-sum cost model, where there is no need to declare non-recurring costs separately. The European Investment Bank also provides venture debt to SMEs and mid-caps developing highly innovative technologies, solutions or platforms 3 . These financing solutions have proven to be successful in helping space SMEs accessing finance and thus also in funding their non-recurring costs. Looking ahead, the Commission, in close coordination with the European Space Agency, the EU Agency for the Space Programme and Member States, will: (i) set-up a CASSINI Growth Investment Facility and a Debt / non-dilutive Financing Facility, also addressing the scaleup phase; (ii) set up a Manufacturing Accelerator, offering advisory services for optimising manufacturing processes, logistics and sourcing strategies; and (iii) facilitate the expansion and modernisation of manufacturing and test facilities across the EU, in line with state aid rules. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj/eng. 2 with the European Investment Fund as implementing partner; https://www.cassini.eu/cassini-initiative. 3 https://www.eib.org/en/products/equity/venture-debt/index.”
  EU industrial funding · EU competences on space policy
• 2025-10-20 “E-002209/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Türkiye cannot benefit from the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) 1 loans as only Member States can do so. However, in accordance with Article 2(3), as a candidate country, Türkiye can join Member States in procuring jointly defence products. In addition, the Turkish industry can provide, as any other third country entity, up to 35% of the estimated cost of the components of the end-product. Legal entities established in the EU and controlled by another third country or by another third-country entity may participate in the common procurement if subjected to a foreign direct investment screening or if the country of establishment provides guarantees. Article 17 provides for the possibility for the Turkish defence industry to further participate in procurement actions, subject to the conclusion of a bilaterial international agreement. On 23 June 2025, Türkiye expressed its interest to discuss such an agreement with the EU. Under Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Council may authorise the opening of negotiations and, following the negotiations led by the Commission in the name of the EU, if successful, conclude the agreement. The European Parliament needs to be informed at all stages of the procedure and has to give its consent to the agreement. At any rate, no component shall be sourced from a third country that contravenes the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States. This provision will have to be applied by contracting authorities of Member States. When it comes to the use of Article 122 of the TFEU as legal basis for SAFE, the Commission and the Council considered it as the appropriate legal basis for exceptional financial assistance to Member States, responding to crises or exceptional events. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on defence · EU enlargement
• 2025-10-16 “P-003367/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) interference, including jamming and spoofing, occurs daily in the EU's Eastern territories, notably in areas close to conflict zones, affecting both Global Positioning System (GPS) and Galileo 1 or EGNOS 2 . This threat is not new, and the European Union Safety Agency (EASA) has issued guidance to aviation stakeholders to ensure safety during GNSS service disruptions. EASA is closely monitoring the situation and stands ready to implement safety measures whenever needed. The pilot flying the plane carrying the Commission President to Plovdiv, Bulgaria, reported a GPS issue to air traffic control and used an ILS (Instrument Landing System) during a safe landing. The Commission is committed to tackling this issue and works alongside its Member States to bolster the resilience of the EU Galileo system. Already world-class, Galileo declared in July 2025, the Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) to provide assurance that the received Galileo navigation message is coming from the system itself and has not been modified. In the near future, key measures will include deploying more satellites in low earth orbit to improve resilience, developing interference monitoring services, and supporting complementary position, navigation and timing services. The Commission will also increase cooperation with Ukraine on relevant anti-jamming and anti-spoofing technologies to mitigate a wide spectrum of signal interference. These steps will prevent future navigation disturbances and ensure the safety and security of thousands of flights in civil aviation, while also protecting the EU's citizens and economy from the increasing threat of GNSS interference. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/galileo-satellite-navigation_en. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/egnos-satellite-navigation_en.”
  EU competences on space policy
• 2025-10-15 “E-003114/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission When taking action, the EU is particularly vigilant in ensuring the respect of the allocation of competences, as enshrined in the Treaties and fully respects the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. The recent initiatives put forward to address EU defence readiness do not depart from this position. In particular, proposals in support of EU defence industry are based on Article 173 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1 . Articles 42 to 46 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 2 deal with the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). More specifically, Article 42(2) of the TEU foresees the progressive framing of a common EU defence policy. Any decision leading to a common defence shall be taken unanimously by the European Council. The solidarity between Member States is reflected in Article 42(7) of the TEU, which sets out the obligation for Member States to provide aid and assistance in case one of them is the victim of an armed aggression on its territory. In accordance with Article 29 of the TEU, Member States’ national prerogative in terms of arms exports to non-EU countries are exercised consistently with Council’s Common Position 2008/944 3 , last updated in April 2025. It is for Member States to ensure that national decisions in this regard conform to that common position. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2016/art_173/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/compos/2008/944/oj/eng.”
  EU-Turkey relations · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2025-10-14 “E-003243/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The general objective of the European Defence Fund (EDF) 1 is to foster the competitiveness, efficiency and innovation capacity of the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB). This contributes to strategic autonomy by supporting collaborative actions and cross-border cooperation, particularly involving small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps. The EDF also aims to strengthen the agility of defence supply and value chains, and better exploit industrial potential in innovation, research and development. It encourages the participation of SMEs and non-traditional defence actors, including technologies with dual-use potential, such as unmanned vehicles, for which collaborative research and development (R&D) actions are underway. The defence sector is demand driven, since Member States and associated countries remain the only buyers and end users of the defence technologies and products. Consequently, the EDF annual work programmes aligns with the priorities set by the EDF programme committee, reflecting the needs of the armed forces of Member States and associated countries. The programme committee has not identified firefighting as an area to be addressed. Nonetheless, several ongoing EDF R&D actions may have dual use potential, such as unmanned vehicles, and the resulting product could be used by Member States military to support in national calamities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-09-25 “E-002960/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) 1 instrument aims to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base and improve defence readiness of Member States by providing loans to Member States to invest in defence. SAFE encourages common procurement by Member States even with Member States that did not request any SAFE loans. By facilitating common procurement of defence equipment through coordinated planning and harmonised requirements, SAFE promotes better interoperability, cost-efficiency, and industrial coordination. German defence companies can benefit from increased demand and investment, that will contribute to job creation and innovation. The instrument further supports the standardisation and modernisation of capabilities across Member States, aligning with Germany’s defence policy priorities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-09-24 “P-001514/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The recurrent hybrid threats, in particular at the EU Eastern border, pose new challenges. To guarantee security and territorial integrity, Member States must be able to act decisively. A strong EU response is also needed, in full respect of EU and international law. The Commission supports Member States in several ways. First, the EU supports Member States to build-up their defence capabilities and increase their defence readiness, through its whole toolbox, that includes defence industry-related instruments. Regarding the monitoring and reinforcement of the external border from a defence perspective, Member States could request financial support under the new Security Action for Europe instrument 1 or as part of the implementation of the future European Defence Industry Programme 2 , particularly since ‘The Eastern Border Shield’ has been identified by the White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 3 among priorities. The Commission has also engaged with Member States to explore additional options to support national efforts consented to strengthen EU external borders and the possible scope of magnitude of such support. Second, more broadly, the EU could also support Member States’ borders through funding instruments, such as the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 4 . It ensures funding for effective integrated border management at the external borders, to facilitate legitimate border crossings, prevent and detect illegal immigration and cross-border crime and to effectively manage migratory flows, in accordance with Articles 77(2) and 79(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. For instance, activities related to the automated border surveillance systems are part of Poland’s 2021-2027 BMVI programme. The BMVI does not provide support to Member States’ defence activities. In addition, the Interreg 5 Poland-Ukraine 2021-2027 programme supports the improvement of border mobility and is investing EUR 50 million to reconstruct regional roads and rails along the Polish – Ukrainian border with view of their dual use application. 1 OJ L, 2025/1106, 28.5.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024PC0150. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0120. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1148/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32021R1059.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-09-10 “E-002267/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not intend to do so: Member States gather knowledge or documentation about unidentified anomalous phenomena according to the national security needs. The Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy remain dedicated to the safety and security of the space environment. In particular, the Commission is committed to enhancing the EU space situational awareness capabilities, within the remit of the EU Space Regulation 1 and in line with its recent proposals for the European Competitiveness Fund, without prejudice to national competences. Additionally, the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and national civil aviation authorities may receive safety reports on unidentified airborne objects that may endanger civil aviation safety. The collected safety occurrence reports are stored in a central repository and analysed for safety purposes only. Reporting, storing and analysis of civil aviation occurrences are governed by Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation 2 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32021R0696. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/376/oj/eng.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU competences on space policy
• 2025-09-10 “E-002723/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The EU budget supports the competitiveness of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base via different programmes, supporting Member States or entities which are based and controlled in the EU. Neither Türkiye nor its defence industries are allowed to receive any funding from that source. In the current multiannual financial framework, EU defence programmes do not allow for the participation of third countries except where the legislation explicitly provides this. To this date, this has only been the case for countries being part of the European Free Trade Association that are also members of the European Economic Area (EFTA EEA), and for Ukraine. The Security Action for Europe 1 instrument provides financial assistance to Member States only. Based on the Regulation, some third countries (acceding countries, candidate countries and potential candidates, and other third countries with whom the EU has entered a security and defence partnership) can participate in common procurement with Member States as any other third country which means that they are allowed to buy defence products originating from the EU or from Ukraine and EFTA EEA countries in common procurement with Member States. This allows to increase the level of aggregation of the demand necessary to scale up the EU industrial capacity and at the same time ensures that Member States participating to the procurement obtain better prices. However, Türkiye’s industrial entities are not eligible for these acquisitions, unless an international agreement is concluded on this matter with the EU. So far, no such agreement has been concluded by the Council. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2025-09-09 “E-003011/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund (EDF) 1 supports the EU’s strategic autonomy by funding only entities established in the EU and Norway. Israel-based entities are not eligible 2 . EU-based entities controlled by non-EU entities, such as INTRACOM DEFENSE, may participate only if robust safeguards are in place 3 . EDF rules require submitting guarantees, approved by the Member State of establishment, ensuring that the non-EU parent company cannot access sensitive information, and that results and intellectual property rights remain with the EU entity. The Commission assessed the submitted guarantees and concluded to compliance with the EDF Regulation. Moreover, any transfer of ownership of results of EDF actions outside the EU or Norway requires prior notification to the Commission and may trigger recovery of funds if it conflicts with the security and defence interests of the EU, its Member States or the objectives of EDF 4 . Furthermore, ethical screening is conducted for all projects under the EDF Regulation 5 . This process assesses ethical risks at project-level, focusing on its content, activities, and methodologies, not on participants’ corporate structure. Compliance with international law is also evaluated at project-level. The advanced capabilities and certification for tactical unmanned aerial vehicle systems (ACTUS) project underwent such screenings before grant agreement was signed. The Commission also holds the right to audit projects, launch European Anti-Fraud Office investigations, terminate grants, and recover funds in case of non-compliance with applicable rules. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 2 Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/697. 3 Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/697. 4 Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2021/697. 5 Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2021/697.”
  Arms export from the EU · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2025-09-09 “E-002865/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund (EDF) 1 supports the EU’s strategic autonomy by funding entities established in the EU and Norway. Israel-based entities are therefore not eligible 2 . EU-based entities controlled by non-EU entities, such as Intracom Defence, may participate if robust safeguards are in place 3 . EDF rules require submitting guarantees, approved by the Member State of establishment, ensuring that the non-EU parent company cannot access sensitive information and that results and intellectual property rights remain with the EU entity. The Commission assessed the submitted guarantees and concluded to compliance with the EDF Regulation 4 . Any transfer of ownership of results of EDF actions outside the EU or Norway requires prior notification to the Commission and may trigger recovery of funds if it conflicts with the security and defence interests of the EU, its Member States or the EDF objectives 5 . Ethical screening is systematically conducted at project-level, focusing on project-specific activities, not on participants corporate structure. Compliance with international law is also evaluated at project-level. The ACTUS project also underwent this screening. The Commission holds the right to audit projects, launch investigations of the European Anti-Fraud Office, terminate grants and recover funds in case of non-compliance with applicable rules. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 2 Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/697. 3 Article 9(4) of the EDF Regulation. 4 Ibidem. 5 Article 23 of the EDF Regulation.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Arms export from the EU
• 2025-09-08 “E-003012/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund (EDF) 1 supports the EU strategic autonomy by funding only entities established in the EU and Norway. Israel-based entities are not eligible 2 . EU-based entities controlled by non-EU companies, such as INTRACOM DEFENSE may participate only if robust safeguards are in place 3 . EDF rules require submitting guarantees, approved by the Member State of establishment, ensuring that the non-EU parent cannot access sensitive information, and that results and intellectual property rights remain with the EU entity. It is for the competent authorities in the Member State to approve the guarantee and for applicants to submit it to the Commission. The Commission assessed the submitted guarantees and concluded compliance with the EDF Regulation. Moreover, any transfer of ownership of results of EDF actions outside the EU or Norway requires prior notification to the Commission and may trigger recovery of funds if it conflicts with the security and defence interests of the EU, its Member States, or the objectives of the EDF 4 . The Commission holds the right to audit projects, launch European Anti-Fraud Office investigations, terminate grants, and recover funds in case of non-compliance. Under EDF, the results of an action are owned by the beneficiary that generated them. Regarding the Advanced capabilities & certification for tactical unmanned aerial vehicle systems (ACTUS) project, the intellectual property rights will remain with INTRACOM DEFENSE as the EU-based beneficiary. The applicable safeguards ensure that the non-EU parent entity cannot access or exploit the technologies or results developed under the EDFfunded action. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 2 Article 9(1) of the EDF Regulation. 3 Article 9(4) of the EDF Regulation. 4 Article 23 of the EDF Regulation.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Defence spending
• 2025-09-08 “E-002181/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with the Treaty on EU, the EU pursues in its actions the objectives of preserving the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States, including those of the Republic of Cyprus. Whilst Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 on Security Action for Europe (SAFE)1 does not include references to specific foreign policy situations or occupations, it aims at supporting the financial efforts of the Member States to increase their defence readiness in accordance with these objectives. SAFE also establishes eligibility conditions for the participation of defence entities in common procurement under that instrument, which ensures the preservation of the security and defence objectives of the EU and of its Member States. In SAFE, entities established in third countries or under the control of third countries (to the exception of Ukraine and countries of the European Free Trade Association also members of the European Economic Area) are, in principle, not allowed to participate in common procurement under the instrument. SAFE foresees the possibility for entities from third countries to participate in common procurements under SAFE only on condition that the third country in question is firstly an acceding, potential candidate or candidate country or has concluded with the EU a security and defence partnership agreement, and, secondly, an international agreement in accordance with Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. These agreements must ensure that there is no conflict with common foreign security policy’s interests. The EU has not concluded any agreement with Türkiye on these matters. It follows that Turkish companies are not authorised to participate in SAFE common procurements. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on defence
• 2025-08-26 “E-002579/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The exceptional situation stemming from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its consequences on the security environment, justifies that the EU takes urgent measures to establish a temporary instrument aimed at providing financial assistance to Member States. The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) purpose is to support Member States that want to invest in defence industrial production to increase their defence readiness. The Commission does not oppose or choose between security and welfare; and social policies remain high on its agenda. The Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument 1 provides substantial financial means, e.g. via the Recovery and Resilience Facility 2 , rescEU 3 and EU4Health 4 . At any rate, decision prioritising their policy agendas remain ultimately the responsibility of the Member States. Participation of third countries to procurement supported by SAFE as buyers allows to increase the level of aggregation of the demand necessary to scale up the EU industrial capacity and at the same time, ensures that Member States participating to the procurement obtain better prices. Conditions for Ukraine and Türkiye industrial participation in SAFE are different. Ukrainian industry gets a standing that is as similar as possible to that of the EU industry. By contrast, the Turkish industry can only be made eligible though a bilateral agreement needs to be signed between Türkiye and the EU. The adoption of such an agreement rests with the Council, in accordance with the applicable legal basis and the decision with a vote to take place in line with the applicable legal basis and decision-making process. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32020R2094. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02021R0241-20240301. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EL/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022D0288#:~:text=Decision%20No%201313%2F2013%2FEU%20set s%20out%20the%20legal%20framework,an%20effective%20response%20to%20natural%20and%20manmade%20disasters. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/522/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-08-19 “E-002202/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 on Security Action for Europe (SAFE) 1 aims at financially supporting Member States to increase their defence readiness. Loans can only be accessed by Member States. SAFE establishes eligibility conditions for participation of companies as contractors to common procurement under the Instrument. Entities established in third countries or under the control of third countries (except for Ukraine and countries of the European Free Trade Association that are also members of the European Economic Area) are, in principle, not allowed to participate to common procurement under the SAFE instrument. Entities established in the EU and controlled by third countries could only be eligible to participate in the common procurement as contractors if they fulfil security based conditions or if they have been subject to screening within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/452, and, where necessary, to appropriate mitigation measures. In addition, the Regulation states that for the purpose of procurements supported by SAFE, no component shall be sourced from a third country that contravenes the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States. The SAFE Regulation furthermore foresees the possibility for entities from acceding, potential candidate and candidate countries (other than Ukraine) and other third countries with which the EU has entered into a Security and Defence Partnership to participate as contractors to common procurements under SAFE only on the condition that the third country in question has concluded an international agreement with the EU as spelled out in Article 17 of the SAFE Regulation. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on defence · EU-Turkey relations