European Commissioner for Security, defense industry and space · DEFIS · Lithuania
- 2026-06-17 “Good morning,
I'm glad to be at Eurosatory, the biggest meet-up of defence industry in the world. Truly massive.
It's no wonder France is the host of such an event.
France is leading in European defence, with its powerful military force, defence industry and independent nuclear deterrent.
And France will only become more important. As Russia continues its war of aggression and American allies are calling on Europe to take more responsibilities for European defence, people in Europe are looking for leadership on defence. And people in Europe are looking to France.
Europe and NATO can only be strong in defence, if Member States are strong in defence. And Member States can only be strong if we are together strong as a European Union. The division of labour is clear: Member States are in charge of defence. And the European Union supports: with EU added value, EU laws, EU coordination, EU scale, and EU money: For example the SAFE loans for France I will be signing in a few hours. 15 billion euro to support defence ramp up in France and Europe.
Eurosatory is the best place for industry and military to meet. Two key partners for deterrence.
Peace in Europe depends on you. As American general John Pershing said: “battles are won by infantry, wars are won by logistics”. That also means: timely supply of what industry is producing.
Eurosatory is a colossal defence market place. Thousands of defence companies, big and small, come here from all around the Europe: primes and startups; big names and new kids on the block.
They come to showcase their products: from drones to direct energy weapons; from helmets to helicopters; from satellites to submarines. Here we find the latest in defence innovation: from robotics to electronics to artificial intelligence. Here ministries of defence, armies come to find the products they need for their defence.
And I hope they will also buy things, that are not yet on their shopping list.
What is so great about this marketplace: it brings supply and demand together. Here you can find products, you didn't even realise, you need.
Great innovators understand this, that with innovative supply they create a new demand. Henry Ford, the industrialist said: “If I had asked people what they wanted, they would have said: faster horses.” So he built cars, and people started to demand cars.
I want to spend a few sentences in order to explain, what we need to learn about supply and demand from Ukraine. In today's world of defence, the Ukrainians are the masters of defence innovation. And the masters of innovative supply.
American Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently said: "The Ukrainian military forces are the strongest and most powerful in Europe."
And President of Finland Alexander Stubb said: “there is no army in Europe or the United States, by the way, capable of conducting a modern war the way Ukraine is doing”.
But why do they consider the Ukrainian army the best? My answer: not only because they have brave soldiers and smart commanders, but also because their defence industry is the best and most innovative.
And why is the Ukrainian defence industry the most innovative? I got the answer last year, when I had informal discussions with prominent Ukrainian leaders of politics and industry, who created the “drone army” in 2023.
They made a clear comment: “If we would have listened to the Ukrainian generals from the very beginning of the full scale invasion, we would not have been able to create the drone army”.
At the very beginning of the war, there was no military demand for drones and for innovative defence. Only after some time, in Ukraine, innovative defence supply managed to transform military demand.
Like Henry Ford with the innovative supply of cars managed to transform the public demand.
Now the demand for innovations from the military and political defence leadership of Ukraine leads the transformations in supply.
The biggest achievement of President Zelenskyy, minister Fedorov, generals Zaluzhnyi and Syrskyi, was that they understood that innovative supply changes the whole modern warfare doctrine. That's why they changed military demand, focusing on drones and drone warfare.
So, in conclusion: thanks to innovative supply – Ukraine changed its war doctrine.
Thanks to transformation of its war doctrine, Ukraine is prevailing, pushing back on the frontline and striking deep into Russia.
We see the result of Ukraine's defence transformation also here today, in Paris at this conference. Two years ago, there were only 10 Ukrainian companies at this conference. Now there are 80. Very innovative companies.
I am very glad they are here. They illustrate the massive Ukrainian defence production big bang: from 1 billion in 2022 to 50 billion in 2026.
And they illustrate the massive shift from state monopoly to private companies. In Ukraine, the battlefield decides what weapons are needed for defence. Weapons not decided by peacetime planners, but weapons to meet the real wartime needs of a country under siege. Weapons that need rapid production, rapid innovation, rapid repairs.
Not “haute couture”, but “good enough” production: cheaper, easily scalable, and good in destroying enemies. Weapons to shoot down incoming drones and missiles. To stop the enemy advance. To disrupt logistics and strike strategic targets deep behind enemy lines.
My geopolitical conclusion: we need Ukraine.
It would be difficult to understand if we in Europe would not take it as our vital interest to integrate the best European, or even global, military force of Ukraine into our European defence architecture.
And it would be difficult to understand if we did not integrate the most innovative defence industry in the world into our European defence technology industrial base.
We need Ukraine in order to learn how to transform supply and how to transform demand in defence. Supply and demand go hand in hand. And in defence of Europe both need disruption. As happened in Ukraine.
In Europe we are learning from Ukraine, but still our prevailing industry is a peacetime defence industry. Transformation of supply and of demand in Europe goes very slowly if we compare with Ukraine.
I want to give a few arguments to explain that the main reason for such slowness is the lack of an integrated defence market in Europe.
Here at Eurosatory today we have a great defence marketplace. Maybe the greatest defence marketplace in the world.
But in the European Union itself we are not tapping into the full potential of the European market for defence. Because we do not have such an integrated market.
As we know, Member States are responsible for defence. That's a historical, political and legal reality. It's part of the EU Treaty. Member States need to protect their security interest.
But as a result, in the European Union we have 27 defence markets, underpinned by 27 sets of rules. Not an integrated market.
Fragmentation costs money. Fragmentation hinders start ups and SMEs.
In the United States, only 40 per cent of procurement goes to the top ten defence companies. Here in Europe, it's between 67 and 90 per cent for Germany, Poland and the UK – as a study by Bruegel shows.
Up to 80% of what Primes produce is procured by their national governments and national militaries. It means - just a few companies are almost monopolizing the whole market.
Up to 80% in defence is procured using TFEU Article 346 exemption, through direct awards. Without a public competitive tender.
Direct awards can be necessary for security. But they have become the default.
And this is out of balance. And this means - that there is no integrated defence market in Europe. And limited possibilities for newcomers to enter the market.
We are proud of our primes – but our start ups and SMEs need space and opportunities too! Opportunities to enter the market, to grow, opportunities to scale.
And without an integrated market there is no space and opportunities for them. Because everything is dominated by the established status quo on supply and on demand side.
The existence of 27 defence markets creates barriers to business, especially to smaller ones.
For example, national transfer licenses between EU Member States. To move not only finished products, but parts of products. Even to move in an established industrial process, when components are produced in different countries, and for the final product assembly they need to be transferred between EU Member States.
And those components are stopped on the borders: losing time, losing money. Also an obstacle for cross border supply chains, and very difficult to overcome by SMEs.
Or another example - different standards and certifications between Member States. Which means more assessments, more testing, more audits, more paperwork, more expenses. Again, especially a problem for start ups and medium sized companies.
Those are the obstacles for ramp up of defence production, for innovation, for the transformation of demand.
We have to find a better way!
And that way is – an effective and integrated defence market.
Since I started as Commissioner, we have brought EU added value to support Member States and Ukraine in their defence. And to strengthen not only Europe, but also the whole of NATO, with additional finances and industrial policy instruments; cutting red tape and obstacles for defence industry.
We just agreed on major reform: maximum 102 days to wait for a permit, instead of up to four years as it was up till now in some cases. To construct a production line or a factory.
But the biggest red-tape that against transformation of our defence, against transformation of supply and demand in defence is the non-existence of an integrated defence market.
I want to stress, there are four major reasons, why we need more integrated European defence market.
The first, - despite the fact that defence is a national prerogative, national security will benefit from a more integrated European defence market. A more integrated European defence market will help national defence industries grow, produce and prosper. This will make it much easier for French defence industry to sell products to other Member States. And will bring jobs, high quality jobs and economic growth to all parts of Europe, including France.
Second, from the Letta and Draghi reports it's clear that for European defence industrial competitiveness we also need a defence market on a European scale. Increased global competitiveness of our defence industry will mean that our governments and militaries will buy more European production, instead of production from other countries.
So, our strategic autonomy depends on our industrial competitiveness. That makes a more integrated European defence market essential for our strategic autonomy.
And, the third reason, - a more integrated European defence market is also essential for our European defence readiness. To be strong in a world of giants – we ourselves must also be giants. Giants in market size.
That is how we can increase our ability to defend and deter as Europe. We need the power of a more integrated European defence market in order to outproduce Putin. Russia is still outproducing us. And that is a real threat.
We can ramp up our production by long term visibility of demand, by speeding up production and its innovation, by moving from “haut couture” to "good enough” production, by improving security of supply.
Everything that comes with an effective and integrated defence market.
And the fourth reason, - a more integrated European defence market will help the many defence start-ups and SMEs in Europe. Including start-ups that have their stands here today and are maybe in this room here today. By boosting defence innovation and best leveraging deep tech in the integrated European defence market, by removing national silos and obstacles of fragmentation to help those who are small, but smart and innovative.
The integrated defence market is the best help for SMEs to grow, and innovate, to easily enter the market and in the end to transform the war doctrines of our countries. Like it happened in Ukraine.
In short: we need to mobilise the massive power of the European economy and power of an integrated defence market for our defence.
So we can outproduce, outinnovate and outperform Russia. So we can defend ourselves, deter aggression and preserve peace.
Ladies and gentlemen,
We meet today on a great market place of defence. A great market place of ideas.
Defence is no ordinary market. And Defence industry is no ordinary industry. But a resource for our defence.
We must use our EU added value to level up our national defence.
A more integrated European defence market will only make us stronger in our national security and national sovereignty, because we shall have a stronger European defence industry.
I wish you a lot of success.
Today and in your important future work.”
Defence spending
- 2026-06-16 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 16.6.2026 Written question In accordance with the Treaties, EU procurement directives would require a contracting authority, like the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands, to conduct a procurement procedure under the applicable directives when purchasing goods, such as train cars, of a value equal or higher than the applicable thresholds [1] [2] . These rules would ensure, inter alia , the respect of EU primary law principles applicable to procurement, in particular those of equality of treatment, transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality. Such a procurement procedure would provide an opportunity to interested undertakings in any Member State to compete for that contract by submitting a bid for the supply of the goods in question, in conformity with the contracting authority’s technical specifications. The Commission does not see any tension that would result from the possible application of those directives to the situation described in the question. Those directives precisely apply to the purchases of, inter alia , goods by contracting authorities in Member States, including the ministries of defence. The Commission does not see any tension between the application of EU competition law and the potential purchase of decommissioned rolling stock directly from the Dutch Railways by the Ministry of Defence for the transport of wounded military personnel . In particular, the exercise of public power prerogatives such as the provision of military capabilities falls outside of the scope of EU antitrust rules. In addition, purchases by public authorities that do not provide an unfair advantage to the seller would not raise state aid issues. Finally, the Military Mobility Regulation proposal [3] does not provide for the prioritised acquisition of military mobility capabilities. [1] Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj. [2] Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/81/oj. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0847.”
EU competences on defence · "Buy European" provisions
- 2026-06-09 “Good morning,
Thank you very much. And dear Aliona, you did a great job, really very interesting to read (https://www.martenscentre.eu/publication/europes-new-security-architecture-ukraine-as-a-strategic-pillar-of-the-continents-defence-future/) and to listen to. And I will try to share some comments on a very important topic: European security architecture and Ukraine, why these two are so closely connected and why we need to talk about European security architecture. Something new. So I will start from very simple facts of truths.
First of all, in Europe we are definitely living through very different times than it was several years ago. We have a really clear understanding of threats: Russian threats, the continuation of the war in Ukraine, and the possibility of Russian aggression against EU and NATO member states, which our intelligence services are predicting.
Then the war in Iran, and the issues related with the supply of weapons to Europe and to Ukraine; these issues can come very soon. And the last point are the very loudly and quite clearly announced American plans to start withdrawing resources from Europe, shifting them to other regions like Indo-Pacific or the Western Hemisphere. So in general, there is nothing new about where we are.
Second, we can just agree with some recent big statements. For example, Marco Rubio, who said that Ukraine has the strongest army in Europe. That was repeated by Alex Stubb. He even said that the Ukrainian army may be the best in the world. I don't know if the Americans will agree, but that was a good statement.
And it should speak to us: if we have on the European continent the strongest army right in our neighbourhood, that should make it very clear that integration of Ukrainian defence capabilities with European defence should be in the strongest vital interest of Europe. That is one thing.
Now, Ukraine has the strongest army, not only because they have the bravest soldiers and the smartest generals, but also because Ukraine has the strongest innovative defence industry. And so Europe should have also the strongest vital interest to integrate that innovative defence industry with the European defence industry.
From another side, we need to look into our own situation. We have a fragmented European defence policy and defence industries. That is our historical legacy. We have 27 defence policies, 27 defence budgets, 27 national armies, and 27 national vetoes. And we can only ask ourselves: would the Americans become stronger if they would have instead of 1 federal army they had 50 armies at the state level, 50 defence budgets and 50 defence policies and 50 vetoes?
Perhaps not.
So that's why we need to understand that if we really want to become stronger – that is our wish looking into all those challenges – we need to become more united, not more fragmented. That is in my view, one of the key prerogatives. And it is the most difficult to overcome because politically and psychologically, this is a historical legacy. According to the treaties, defence for member states is a national prerogative, and the EU, until now, is playing a very limited role.
I would remind also that recently Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in the Ambassadors Conference and the German Foreign Affairs Minister Wadephul in the Adenauer Conference, raised a very important question, which has in itself the answer, The question was: are our doctrines, institutions, and decision-making in foreign policy, but also in security policy, in defence policy, are they fit for today's challenges or not?
While they gave no proper answer, the question was raised in such a way that it was giving the answer. That really, we need to understand that we have a problem: our institutions and our defence architecture as they are at the moment, they do not fit all the challenges which we are facing.
Looking at what is directly my responsibility, defence industry, we have big defence-industrial challenges at the moment in the European Union. Despite all the financial resources which we are bringing into the defense industry of Europe, Russia still quite heavily outproduces the European Union in all the different areas of defence production.
American withdrawal demands effective replacement of their strategic enablers on European continent. German experts just recently calculated that it will cost around 500 billion euro for Europeans to build those strategic enablers and to replace American ones now located on the European continent.
And in addition to that, a last point: we do not have a single defence market on the European continent. Here you can remember the Draghi report on the fragmentation of defence industry, which does not allow defence production to scale up as we would like to see.
This is what allows me to say that we need big change of our policies and practices in defence.
I have spoken lately about broader issues we are facing in Europe. But in my view, mainly Ukraine is the issue why we urgently need to talk about the new European security architecture, because we cannot integrate Ukrainian defence capabilities, the best in Europe, into the old structures. That's my very simple conclusion.
NATO membership for Ukraine is not agreed at the moment, and we do not see when it can be agreed. Membership in the EU can take a longer time. I would be very happy to see Ukraine tomorrow as member of European Union, but we need to see a reality. It can take a longer time. And Europe needs to become much stronger, not at some time in the future, but now.
We need to understand: if Putin will now start aggression against an EU or NATO country, we will face a battle-tested Russian army with the capability to use millions of drones. We have no such experience among EU or NATO member states, at least those who are on the front line or here in the European continent. Only Ukraine has such an experience. This is the very clear condition why we need a European defence architecture with possibility for Ukraine to integrate institutionally now, not tomorrow.
That is why we need what we call European Defence Union. It's not very different what you have said about Security Council, but institutionally it is a little bit different. We can discuss: “what does it mean – the European Security Council” and “what does it mean – the European Defence Union”, but I understand that when you speak about European Security Council we speak about European Defence Union, but their essence is very similar.
In my view, Ukraine, but also the United Kingdom, Norway, maybe Turkey, maybe even Canada, would be able to join European Union Member States in this established European Defence Union. The European Defence Union should be established voluntarily amongst the member states, amongst the countries, which want much stronger cooperation in defence, much more unity in defence, which now is not available.
European Defence Union from the legal or constitutional point of view can be created in different ways, perhaps. For the time being I am trying to avoid technicalities of legal thought how it can be created; I am much more focused on the content, what that union should bring. But in my view, the most effective way would be to look into the possibility of a new intergovernmental treaty. Because all other attempts to find in EU treaties some kind of enhanced cooperation articles and so on, first of all, would leave some countries which are not members of the EU in some kind of unknown territory.
So what should we do with Ukraine, United Kingdom, Norway? How should we include them into the European Defence Union? And second important point, in my view, looking again into from the historical point of view, European Union Treaty articles on defence, security and foreign policy are devoted mostly to the activities of the European Union outside of European Union territory; for external activities, operations and so on, but not to the territorial defence of European countries.
So that is, in short, how I see the next stages.
I can repeat very briefly why we need a European Defence Union, not only for Ukraine, despite the fact that I said mainly for Ukraine, but we can see a lot of benefits also for internal developments of the European continent in defence.
So in my view, First of all, a European Defence Union could be a very strong platform for more unity, for more effective decision making and for collective leadership. That is why, in my view, a European Defence Union can be effective instrumentally to create a leadership body, a European Security Council. That's our difference, because in my view, a Security Council could be a smaller arrangement among big member states, that have power militarily, but also several rotational member states and then institutions in order to have an effective platform, as Macron and Merkel were saying 10 years ago. An effective platform to discuss big issues and to find big answers to big issues. And then we can have the whole coalition of willing countries, which we should now call members of European Defence Union.
Why do we need such kind of leadership like a European Security Council?
In my view, first of all, for a balanced top-down approach in developing the most important pan-European defence projects. What we call now EDPCIs (European Defence Projects of Common Interest) or the same strategic enablers. As I mentioned, the strategic enablers, according to the evaluation of German experts, will cost us 500 billion euros. So it's quite a big amount of money.
It's absolutely clear that we will not be able to finance it from the next MFF, but we can finance from attempt to have partly – and maybe it is the wrong word – ‘collectivization' – It sounds a little bit Soviet, but at least to agree among the member states that they will spend part of their national defence money. We need to remember that by 2035, member states will increase their defence spending up to 3.5% of GDP. It will be around 7 trillion euro which Member States will spend. So really, that covers the 500 billion, but we need to find a way how to partly use that money in a collective way.
Also we need some kind of this leadership in the form of European Security Council to agree among ourselves how we shall replace not only strategic enablers of American origin, but also how we replace what we can call American Rapid Reaction Force in Europe, the role which is now played by American troops, around of 100,000. So in order again to agree on European Rapid Reaction Force, how to create it, we need some kind of this leadership.
A European Defence Union, in my view, should be built around the principle of article 42(7) of Treaty on European Union, on mutual assistance. Here I would turn your attention to Chancellor Merz, who back in Munich spoke about Article 42(7) as the basis for a European pillar of NATO, which is, according to him, separable but not separate. And he also spoke about Article 42(7) in his proposal how Ukraine should be going through integration towards the EU.
So this is really where I see a very good connection of what we are trying to speak about and what the Chancellor was speaking about in some way in the same direction. The European Defence Union will be inside of NATO in the same way as the European Union is. With some members, maybe not being members of NATO, but as an organisation it should be in a very strong cooperation, with NATO. And of course, with the EU I think there could be a possibility to find a way how European Union institutions would be effectively used for the benefit of the European Defence Union.
Ukrainian membership in a European Defence Union, in my view, would be the major stepping stone towards full membership in the European Union. Through this integration into a European Defence Union, we really can create among Europeans, a clear understanding of the vital interest of Europe in having Ukraine inside Europe. I'm afraid that for the time being, there is a shortage of that understanding.
Usually when Europeans are talking about Ukrainian membership, we say, “we are good people in Europe, maybe we shall give Ukraine this nice gift of membership in the EU”, which is the wrong approach. Ukraine's membership in the EU is in our vital interest. It's the interest of Ukraine, but it's our vital interest as well.
What is needed to progress into this direction? Well, first of all, definitely peace in Ukraine. And in my view, we need to have a plan for how Ukraine will prevail, which Ukraine is now doing. But maybe an even more defined plan for the prevailing of Ukraine would be needed in order to push Putin towards peace.
This is the only way Putin can be pushed for a just peace. And then we need to be ready to finance such a plan. We need to shift from our assistance logic when we are talking always that we shall stand with Ukraine as long as it takes, into a little bit different logic. We shall support Ukraine in order for Ukraine to prevail. That is the way how peace will be achieved.
Then at the very beginning we would need much more intensive work by an informal European Security Council; at least in the format we now see as E5, E5+, which is doing not a bad job, but it would be very good if such an informal gathering started to look more precisely at how this European security architecture in the form of European Defence Union should be developed, so to discuss some kind of roadmap towards European Defence Union and Ukraine in the European Defence Union and to coordinate the process.
And then the whole roadmap, in my view, could be very simple. First of all an informal European Security Council. Then the creation through an intergovernmental treaty of a European Defence Union; first among those who want that European Defence Union, we can have some kind of threshold for how many countries need to sign the treaty. Maybe15 member states would be enough for the establishment of the European Defence Union, then others would maybe follow later on. Then Ukrainian membership in the European Defence Union, and the creation of a formal European Security Council inside of the established European Defence Union. And then all the other things which we need to develop very soon, like the key enablers, the 500 billion euros for that, the rapid reaction force and so on and so on.
My question is how Ukraine would look at this possibility. That is a very important point. It would be really very positive if Ukraine would take that as an important step forward and in some way would take a big part of the leadership in developing of this new European security architecture.
And just finalising, this is another topic. But in my view, we Europeans still need to understand the vital interest of us, of Europeans to have Ukraine in our security architecture in order, first of all, to use Ukrainian defence capabilities to strengthen our own defence capabilities. Of course, on the way to help Ukraine to achieve peace and then also to strengthen Ukrainian defence.
But we are still not looking at the broader picture, which in my view is still missing for us to understand the whole importance, of a new European security architecture together with Ukraine. Because we need to see the long-term impact of this development on the eastern part of the European continent, including Russia. In my view, sustainable peace in Europe can come through the success of Ukraine and the inspirational power of that success on possible developments in Russia.
With Russia coming back to normality, and there are of course two questions: When –after Putin? And what does it mean normality?
But this is how we can go into the next stage of our discussion.”
EU-Ukraine relations
- 2026-05-26 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) [1] is based on Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2] which provides a legal basis for the EU to act swiftly in emergency situations. The SAFE Regulation and in particular Article 10, explicitly empowers the Commission to enter into loan agreements and operational arrangements with Member States, following the adoption of a Council implementing decision. This regulation does not condition disbursement on the prior adoption of a specific national implementing legislation by the Member State since the instrument is directly applicable. Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2026/412 on making the financial assistance under Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 available to Poland [3] fulfils the procedural requirement under Article 10(1) of the regulation [4] , and the Commission’s role is to ensure compliance with the eligibility criteria set out in Article 16 of the regulation [5] . To date, Polish authorities have not raised any objections regarding the availability or disbursement of SAFE funds. The Commission will act in accordance with the Treaty and the SAFE Regulation, ensuring that all procedural safeguards are respected. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2016/art_122/oj/eng. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2026/412/oj/eng. [4] Please see footnote 1. [5] Please see footnote 1 .”
EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
- 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The Commission notes that the Military Mobility Package [1] adopted in November 2025 stands as a comprehensive set of measures to ensure the swift, coordinated and secure movement of military personnel and equipment across the EU. The Package includes a regulation proposal [2] aiming to strengthen Europe's defence readiness by addressing barriers to military mobility across transport regulatory, infrastructure, and capability dimensions-critical areas that currently hinder military transport across borders. The Commission takes note of the issues raised concerning airport screening procedures for military personnel travelling via civil infrastructure. However, these issues do not fall within the scope of the current legal provisions under the regulation proposal, since these do not include measures relating to security screening practices at airports. Provisions on civil aviation security such as those in Regulation (EC) 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 [3] stand as common rules to protect civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference that jeopardise the security of civil aviation. Consequently, the Commission does not foresee, in the context of the measures laid down in the broader Military Mobility Package, the development of additional common guidance in this area. Any such considerations would fall outside the scope of the current envisaged measures and legislative proposal. [1] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/military-mobility_en. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0847. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/300/oj/eng.”
Asylum & border control · EU competences on defence
- 2026-05-20 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 20.5.2026 Written question Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [1] provides a legal basis for the EU to act swiftly in emergency situations. Under this provision, the Council may adopt necessary measures based on a Commission proposal, ensuring continuity in critical policy areas. On 30 November 2025, the Commission received the European defence industry investment plans from Member States and assessed them in accordance with the criteria set out in the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation [2] . The subsequent steps in the regulation’s implementation are underway and progressing as planned. The Commission considers that Article 122 TFEU is the only and appropriate legal basis for the SAFE Regulation. However, should the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ultimately annul the SAFE Regulation, this would not automatically suspend its implementation. The European Parliament has requested that the CJEU maintain the regulation’s effects until it is replaced by a new act adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E122:EN:HTML. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
Defence spending · EU competences on defence
- 2026-05-11 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question Advanced storage technologies from batteries to supercapacitors have important dual civilian and military use. Establishing a strong and resilient battery supply chain while reducing external dependencies is therefore of strategic importance for the EU, as reflected in the Battery Booster Strategy [1] . The EU also supports technological innovation and innovators ecosystems in the Strategic Energy Technology Plan [2] and in the Startup and Scaleup Strategy [3] . In terms of defence policy, the European Defence Fund [4] supports defence sector interoperability in energy-efficient solutions and green technologies that meet NATO and EU standards, notably energy storage systems like customised batteries, fuel cells and multi-source energy systems. The BraveTech EU initiative [5] established between EU and Ukraine will also contribute to this objective by considering the lessons learnt in the battlefield. The European Defence Industry Programme [6] supports resilient European defence supply chains through cross-border industrial cooperation, procurement actions, strategic reserves and industrial reinforcement actions. It includes measures to anticipate and mitigate serious disruptions in the supply of defence and non-defence products, which the Commission is currently implementing in consultation with Member States through the Defence Security of Supply Board. In addition, the Commission is working with Member States, industry and civilian standardisation stakeholders to prepare a landscape and gap analysis for defence and dual-use standardisation, to further reinforce the efficiency and interoperability of the EU defence market. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/682/oj/eng. [2] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/research-and-technology/strategic-energy-technology-plan_en. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0270. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/european-defence-fund-2021-2027.html. [5] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/bravetech-eu_en. [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2643/oj/eng.”
Defence spending · "Buy European" provisions
- 2026-05-11 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 8.6.2026 Written question While the primary responsibility for countering hybrid threats lies with the Member States, there is a strong need for a coordinated response at the EU level. In the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence [1] , the EU set out actions to prevent, detect, deter and respond to malicious hybrid activities. Through ProtectEU [2] and the Preparedness Union Strategy [3] , the Commission is strengthening the EU’s ability to anticipate, prevent and respond to hybrid threats across all sectors. This is complemented by the directives on Critical Entities Resilience [4] and on Network and Information Systems [5] , which enhance protection against sabotage and cyberattacks, and by the Digital Services Act [6] , which helps to counter online manipulation and protect the integrity of democratic discourse. The action plan on Cable Security [7] strengthens the protection of submarine data and power cables. The action plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security [8] sets out a comprehensive approach to protecting society against drone threats, including a voluntary EU counter-drone joint purchasing initiative. The Joint Communication on Defence Readiness 2030 [9] sets out clear objectives and milestones for achieving defence readiness by 2030. Two of its initiatives — the Eastern Flank Watch and the European Drone Defence — aim at integrating air defence, counter-drone systems, ground and maritime security measures and situational awareness to build a comprehensive European border defence capability combining civilian-military tools in cooperation with NATO. The Eastern Flank Watch aims to build-up the capacity of Member States on the Eastern border to face a wide range of threats, including hybrid operations, Russia’s shadow fleet and the risk of armed aggression. It aims to fortify the EU’s Eastern borders across land, air and sea, contributing to the security of the whole EU. [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0148. [3] https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/b81316ab-a513-49a1-b520-b6a6e0de6986/file.bin. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj/eng. [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022L2555. [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. [7] eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025JC0009. [8] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0081. [9] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0027.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
- 2026-04-28 “E-000862/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) 1 instrument provides for an open architecture that allows concluding bilateral agreements with third countries – specifically acceding, candidate and potential candidate countries or those with whom the EU has entered into a security and defence partnership. Regarding the expressions of interest submitted by Japan, South Korea, and Türkiye, the Commission is currently assessing these requests and finalising loan agreements that each Member States will sign with the EU. Once these loans agreements are established, the Commission will have a clearer picture on any possible budgetary leftover under SAFE. That also includes the possibility of certain amounts under the agreed national plans that could be re-attributed to other procurements. This would be also the right moment to discuss with Member States on the possibility to negotiate additional SAFE bilateral agreements. Any potential opening of negotiations of a bilateral agreement in the context of SAFE, needs to follow the procedure set out in Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 2 , where the Council may authorise the Commission to negotiate the said agreements on behalf of the EU. Furthermore, Article 17 of the SAFE Regulation spells out conditions for the participation of third countries’ entities and products in SAFE, including the conditions and modalities of participation of contractors and subcontractors established in the third country in the common procurement under the SAFE instrument; the rules related to the cost of components originating in the third country; conditions of any financial contribution to be provided by the third country to the EU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2008/art_218/oj/eng.”
"Buy European" provisions · EU competences on defence
- 2026-04-28 “P-000886/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The most recent analysis of EU collaborative procurement (2024-2025) 1 performed by the European Defence Agency, stated that ‘only 12 out of 27 Member States reported their EU collaborative equipment procurement data, making it impossible at present to provide a comprehensive analysis of EU collaborative defence equipment procurement and to adequately assess the state of the EU defence landscape in this area’. Currently, around 40% of defence expenditure by Member States is directed at the US Foreign Military Sales Mechanism, while less than 50% of defence procurement is sourced in the EU 2 . Several EU initiatives support collaborative procurement. The European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act 3 allocated EUR 300 million to offset the costs of cooperation, leveraging more than EUR 11 billion of collaborative purchases. The Security Action for Europe 4 instrument is designed to foster collaborative procurement, while the European Defence Industry Programme 5 supports actions on common procurement. Both instruments are in early days of their implementation and do not allow measuring their impact on the collaborative procurement. The Defence Readiness Omnibus proposal 6 aims at, inter alia, facilitating common procurement by simplifying procedures. Member States’ report on their exports of military equipment which includes data on intra-EU transfers. The Commission will present in 2026 a report evaluating the impact of Directive 2009/43/EC 7 . 1 https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/2025-eda_defencedata_web.pdf. 2 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/2026-european-macroeconomic-report_en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 5 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2643/oj. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0823. 7 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/43/oj.”
Defence spending · "Buy European" provisions
- 2026-04-27 “E-000481/2026 E-000524/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Pursuant to Articles 34(2) of the Space Programme Regulation 1 and 30(3) of the Secure Connectivity Regulation 2 , the Commission determines General Security Requirements (GSR) for all its space systems to address current and future threats upon them, such as replay and jamming/spoofing attacks. The GSR are EU classified information and are based on a security risk assessment which systematically analyses relevant risks considering the geopolitical context and the capabilities of state actors. The Commission relies on the Security Accreditation Board (SAB), an independent body composed of EU Member State representatives, established by Article 36 of the Space Programme Regulation, to provide security accreditation of EU space infrastructures before their deployment and operations by auditing all components and procedures to ensure full respect of the security requirements contained in the respective GSR. Moreover, risks linked to the supply chain of EU space systems are limited through eligibility and participation conditions defined in Article 24 of the Space Programme Regulation and Article 22 of the Secure Connectivity Regulation. Consequently, thanks to their security design, even if some of the targeted satellites host payloads for the EU space programme no effect is identified. European commercial sector satellites may be more exposed to interference or malicious activities. Therefore, the Commission proposal for an EU Space Act 3 in June 2025 aims to enhance the resilience of commercial and governmental satellites. Furthermore, the Council Decision on the security of systems and services deployed, operated and used under the Space Programme 4 lays down operational provisions to respond to threats upon need. 1 OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, pp. 69–148, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj. 2 OJ L 79, 17.3.2023, pp. 1–39, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/588/oj. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0335. 4 OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, pp. 178–182, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2021/698/oj/eng.”
EU competences on space policy
- 2026-04-24 “P-000873/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The security and territorial integrity of all Member States is a core interest of the EU, which is actively supporting and coordinating Member States’ efforts to strengthen their defence industrial base and the EU’s overall defence readiness in a 360-degree approach. Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union 1 is an important and powerful instrument in this regard. In case of an attack on its territory, its activation is the responsibility of the attacked Member State. The Commission stands ready to support Member States in its implementation as necessary. The Commission actively supports enhancing defence capabilities through technological cooperation and advanced surveillance systems, including counter-drone technologies. The European Defence Fund 2 stands as a key programme facilitating the development of counterdrone systems, such as through European Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems 3 and Tactical Advanced Laser Optical Systems 4 projects. Additionally, the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) 5 will further empower Member States to address their defence requirements. Member States and industry will be able to seize funding opportunities for joint acquisition or industrial reinforcement projects in relation to drones and counter-drone capabilities. EDIP also enables Member States to establish and receive funding for European Defence Project of Common Interest that could, for instance, organise the development, production and acquisition of drone and anti-drone systems. Under the Secure Action for Europe 6 instrument, Cyprus has requested a total of EUR 1 181 503 924 in loans through this instrument. These defence investments will strengthen the defence posture of Cyprus against any threats. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092: https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 3 European Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems: https://defence-industryspace.ec.europa.eu/document/download/d2719294-4288-43b4-9093-a2bc6134ace4_en?filename=EDF-2023DA-AIRDEF-CUAS%20E-CUAS.pdf. 4 Tactical Advanced Laser Optical Systems: https://defence-industryspace.ec.europa.eu/document/download/de830426-7142-4a72-961b-f7abcaa739b6_en?filename=EDF-2023-LSRA-DIS-LDEW%20TALOS-TWO.pdf. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2643/oj/eng. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
- 2026-04-23 “E-000393/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund (EDF) 1 , including through its European Defence Innovation Scheme 2 , boosts cross-border cooperation across the EU by supporting collaborative research and development of defence products and technologies, including disruptive technologies, in line with commonly agreed capability priorities. In addition, the European Innovation Council accelerator – under the defence mini-omnibus 3 – can support dual-use and defence technologies, including through equity investments. Moreover, the Defence Readiness Omnibus 4 aims to enable quicker innovation cycles under the EDF. To support Member States – as only buyers and users of defence products and technologies – in their endeavour to invest more and together in defence, the EU is backing joint procurement through the European Defence Industry Programme 5 . It also supports production ramp-up activities, enabling the required technologies to be made available at the necessary speed and scale. The recent Commission proposal for a new Programme for agile and rapid defence innovation (AGILE) 6 aims to support the rapid development of emerging and disruptive defence products and technologies, with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises, including innovative start-ups and scale-ups, to respond to the most pressing needs of Member States. This holistic approach is expected to continue and expand, as set out in the Commission's proposal for the European Competitiveness Fund 7 , in complementarity with the proposed Horizon Europe programme 8 . Overall, the EU aims to reduce fragmentation within the technological, capability and industrial landscapes, while ensuring a smooth transition from research to deployment and continuity across the full innovation cycles, as well as fostering synergies between civilian and defence research. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/european-defence-fund-2021-2027.html. 2 https://eudis.europa.eu/index_en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2653/oj. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0822(01)&qid=1774518478081. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2643/oj/eng. 6 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_687. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0555. 8 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0543.”
Defence spending · EU competences on defence
- 2026-04-16 “E-000484/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The EU position on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) at the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) is developed by the EU in close consultation with Member States. The EU presents its position at the GGE on LAWS. The GGE on LAWS, which began in 2014, is expected to present a recommendation on LAWS to the 2026 November CCW Review Conference. The EU position at the GGE on LAWS is developed in cooperation between EU institutions and Member States, in line with the EU Treaty and its provisions on the Common foreign and security policy, which is agreed by unanimity by Member States. The EU is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. These principles align with EU’s commitment to the promotion and respect of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The respect of IHL obligations and the ratification of related international conventions remains the competence of Member States. The European defence industrial programmes do not fund actions related to defence products that are prohibited by applicable international law. The programmes, moreover, lay down specific provisions regarding lethal autonomous weapons. The European Defence Fund 1 specifically bans the EU funding of lethal autonomous weapons without the possibility of human control over the selection and engagement decisions when carrying out strikes against humans. In addition, the European Defence Industry Programme 2 cannot fund defence products which are prohibited by applicable international law, nor lethal autonomous systems that operate outside a responsible chain of human command and control or cannot comply with the principles of IHL. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2643/oj/eng.”
Artificial Intelligence for military purposes · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
- 2026-04-16 “E-000669/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund 1 (EDF)’s aims to enhance the competitiveness of the European defence technological and industrial base, and to promote cooperation in defence research and development between entities of all sizes across the EU and EDF associated countries. All applicants can compete for EDF funding under fair, transparent and non-discriminatory call conditions, in line with the EDF and the Financial Regulations. Applications are assessed using uniform eligibility and selection criteria. National defence ecosystems are very diverse: some Member States have well-established, internationally active defence industries, while others have ecosystems dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The EDF implements several measures to foster broader inclusion and cross-border collaboration, particularly with and among SMEs. The European Defence Innovation Scheme, funded at around 20% of the annual EDF budget, aims to drive technological progress and boost SME involvement 2 . As a result, the EDF Interim Evaluation Report 3 highlighted that SMEs accounted for 43% of distinct beneficiaries, particularly from Eastern Europe. The Commission’s proposal for the European Competitiveness Fund includes several additional cross-sectoral measures designed to encourage participation across the EU, such as project advisory services, the ‘EU for Business’ Network, value chain builder actions and EU Tech frontrunners actions. 1 OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, pp. 149–177. 2 https://eudis.europa.eu/index_en. 3 COM(2025) 299 final of 17 June 2025 - https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defenceindustry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpage-european-commission/edf-interim-evaluation-report_en.”
"Buy European" provisions · Defence spending
- 2026-04-15 “E-000701/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission According to the eligibility criteria under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation 1 , contractors and certain subcontractors must be established and have their executive management structures in a Member State, a European Economic Area (EEA) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) State, or Ukraine. These entities must not be subject to control by a third country other than EEA EFTA States or Ukraine or by one of their entity or, where they are subject to such a control, they must present security guarantees verified by Member States. All infrastructure, facilities, assets, and resources used for the purposes of the common procurement must in principle be located within the territory of a Member State, an EEA EFTA State, or Ukraine. Accordingly, the eligibility criteria under Article 16 of the SAFE Regulation are defined from an EU (including EEA EFTA States and Ukraine) wide perspective, rather than from the standpoint of any individual Member State. The Commission is responsible for assessing European defence industry investment plans to ensure compliance with the Regulation's conditions in particular those of Article 4, 7(2) and 16. During the implementation, Member States will provide information and evidence of progress in fulfilling the plan. The Commission will assess that conditions under the Regulation are fulfilled before disbursement of the loan instalments. The Regulation on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the EU budget 2 applies to all EU funds, including SAFE funds. Furthermore, the SAFE Regulation requires that the loan agreement will contain provisions on the protection of the financial interests of the EU, and on audit and control. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj/eng.”
EU competences on defence · "Buy European" provisions
- 2026-04-07 “E-000289/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges that national security is the sole responsibility of Member States. It also notes that Article 42(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 1 foresees that the progressive framing of a common EU defence policy will lead to a common defence, when the European Council so decides unanimously and when all Member States adopt such a decision in accordance with their constitutional requirements. The Commission also acknowledges that under Article 42(2) TEU the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy is not to prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. The Article 23j B-VG of the Austrian Constitution governs its interaction with the provisions on the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy in the TEU. Finally, on democratic legitimacy, the Commission emphasises that the Treaties provide for decision-making processes that ensure the participation of Member States and their democratic institutions, including unanimity in the European Council for decisions related to common defence. The Commission remains committed to upholding the above-mentioned principles and ensuring that any future initiatives reflect the collective will of Member States and their citizens. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2008/art_42/oj/eng/.”
Relations with NATO · EU competences on defence
- 2026-03-24 “E-000530/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund’s (EDF 1 ) general objective is to foster the competitiveness of the entire European defence technological and industrial base. All eligible entities established in Member States and EDF associated countries can apply for funding through annual calls for proposals on equal and fair competitive terms and conditions, which are prepared with full transparency and in close coordination with the Member States. Proposals are selected for funding based on the same set of award criteria, as set out in the EDF Regulation 2 . The geographical distribution of EDF beneficiaries remains, to date, uneven across Europe. The EDF, like the other EU defence industrial programmes, pursues an objective of inclusiveness by fostering transnational cooperation and also incentivising the entry of new players in the defence sector. It remains that the levels of participation in the programmes depends significantly on the respective size, structure and maturity level of each national defence technological and industrial base. Each Member State is characterised by a different history and legacy in terms of its defence-relevant industry, with specific features and strengths. Nevertheless, the particular attention paid by defence programmes on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) plays in support of the broadest possible access to EU funding. In addition, the European defence innovation scheme 3 , which is funded with around 20% of the EDF annual budget, provides a range of measures designed to support innovation and SMEs. As a result, as highlighted in the EDF interim evaluation report 4 , 43% of unique participants in the EDF are SMEs, a significant proportion of which are established in Central and Eastern Europe. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj. 2 OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, pp. 149–177. 3 https://eudis.europa.eu/index_en. 4 COM(2025) 299 final of 17.6.2025 - https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defenceindustry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpage-european-commission/edf-interim-evaluation-report_en.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
- 2026-03-19 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 19.3.2026 Written question By the regulatory deadline of 30 November 2025, 19 Member States submitted their national defence investment plans under the Security Action for Europe Regulation (SAFE) [1] . These plans collectively account for nearly two years of defence equipment procurement for the EU-27 [2] , demonstrating a commitment to scaling up European defence readiness. Regarding the product categories, the submitted plans are comprehensive and cover all capability categories set out in Article 1 of the SAFE Regulation, which reflect the priority areas identified by the European Council. While the detailed breakdown of each activity remains sensitive due to the nature of the national defence data involved, the Commission can confirm that the requested funding involves both Category C and Category C products. In line with the EU's commitment to Ukraine's security, support to Ukraine is a core feature of SAFE. The vast majority of the submitted national plans include procurement activities involving in different manners Ukraine. On procurement structures, SAFE incentivizes cooperation. To date, there is a pre-dominance of cooperative procurement, which represents more than 65% of the total planned activities, amounting to approximately EUR 98 billion. It is worth mentioning that current single procurement projects include provisions to extend the benefit of the contract to additional SAFE eligible partners. The Commission is currently finalising its assessment of the remaining plans. A comprehensive report, which will provide additional detailed information on the implementation of SAFE and the specific breakdown of activities, is scheduled to be presented to the European Parliament in May 2026. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. [2] https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/2025-eda_defencedata_web.pdf.”
Defence spending · EU competences on defence
- 2026-03-05 “E-000194/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission can clarify that the total funding available under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation 1 is set at EUR 150 billion, as outlined in Article 6 of the Regulation. The Regulation does not foresee an ex ante distribution key among Member States for the financial assistance being provided to them. The Commission launched a call for expression of interest, requesting Member States to provide for an indicative loan amount based on their own assessment of risks, needs and other pertinent criteria. 2. The tentative allocation of financial assistance was based on the requests from the Member States and respecting the caveat of the Regulation in Article 13. The Member States submitted their requests for financial assistance before 30 November 2025. When submitting the proposals for Council Implementing Decisions on financial assistance to Member States, the Commission considers existing and expected financing needs of the requesting Member State as expressed in the requests for financial assistance, applying, in accordance with Article 8(5), the principles of equal treatment, solidarity, proportionality and transparency. 3. The Commission establishes guidance and procedures for all stages of the implementation of the instrument (assessment of the plans, assessments of requests for payments, amendments) that guarantee the proportionality of the controls and equal treatment of the Member States. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
- 2026-03-05 “P-000439/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The EU GOVSATCOM 1 provides satellite communication services for crisis management, natural and man-made disasters, humanitarian crises and maritime emergencies. Operations started in January 2026. Member States have now access to a wide catalogue of services from existing governmental systems that have already been used by civil protection agencies in events of crisis. The service catalogue will be further extended with additional existing services coming from commercial systems. GOVSATCOM does not include services for direct connections with personal devices and between citizens. The Commission is exploring the ways for providing direct to device services under the Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite (IRIS²) system 2 , including considerations on radio spectrum requirements. At the same time, the Galileo Early Warning Satellite Service to be available by end-2026, will transmit alerts directly to smartphones, or to any other navigation devices of citizens located in areas threatened by a looming natural or manmade disaster. GOVSATCOM resources are already available for all Member States since January 2026 irrespective of the Digital Networks Act (DNA) 3 . In this regard, the DNA proposal aims at establishing an EU authorisation regime for satellite networks and services, including for civil protection and disaster relief and foresees as a task of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications to adopt a ‘Union Preparedness Plan for Digital Infrastructures’ that should include crisis management practices and for which the role of GOVSATCOM and IRIS 2 could be assessed. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/govsatcom-satellite-communications_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/588/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52026PC0016.”
Surveillance equipment & spyware
- 2026-03-04 “E-000178/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The grant agreement signed with the consortium requires beneficiaries to notify the Commission in advance of any transfer of ownership or licensing of results to a nonassociated third country or entity. Compliance with this contractual obligation may be verified ex post by the Commission, in particular through audits. The assessment involves checking whether the third country is subject to any restrictive measures adopted by the Council in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (e.g. arms embargos, restriction on admissions, asset freezes and other economic measures such as restrictions on imports and exports). The assessment would also check whether the transfer could contravene the objectives in Article 3 of the European Defence Fund (EDF) Regulation 1 . Notifications made under Article 23(4) of the EDF Regulation are not intended to be made public. The assessment as to whether access is possible may take place following the submission of a request for access to documents, which is assessed in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 2 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj/eng.”
Arms export from the EU · EU competences on defence
- 2026-03-04 “E-004397/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes the safety of citizens and the prevention of accidents very seriously. Responsibility for authorising, supervising and enforcing safety requirements at defenceindustrial sites lies primarily with the competent national authorities, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. When it comes to legislation like the Seveso III Directive (2012/18/EU) 1 , EU law harmonises objectives, not operational supervision. The Military Mobility Package 2 puts forward proposals for a comprehensive set of measures to ensure the swift, coordinated and secure movement of military personnel and equipment across the EU. The proposal for a Military Mobility Regulation does not include any financing for industrial activities as such. Safety measures, including for industrial sites, are outside the scope of the Military Mobility proposal. However, safety measures foreseen at the EU level for different modes of transport will continue to apply. In fact, initiatives like the proposed European Competitiveness Fund 3 (Article 47) feature the ‘enhancement of the protection and resilience of infrastructures that are strategic for military mobility’ 4 . The Commission stands ready to engage with all national Greek authorities should substantiated concerns regarding the application of this specific piece of EU legislation be brought to its attention. 1 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/industrial-emissions-and-safety/industrial-accidents_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0846. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0555. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0555R(01).”
EU competences on defence · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
- 2026-02-26 “E-000177/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 1. The parliamentary question E-003832/2025 1 requested information on a concrete project. The Commission considered that the question fell within the remit of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 2 . Had the Commission received such a notification under Article 23(4) of the European Defence Fund (EDF) Regulation 3 , it would have previously consulted the recipient in line with Article 4(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 on its disclosure and assessed the potential impact on protected interests under Articles 4(1) and 4(2). 2. To date, the Commission has received no notification under Article 23(4) of the EDF Regulation. 3. To date, the Commission has issued no reply. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-003832_EN.html. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng.”
Arms export from the EU
- 2026-02-18 “E-003762/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 1 , the Commission recalled that even though Member States’ defence spending has grown by over 31% on aggregate since 2021, it remains far below US levels. Rebuilding European defence needs sustained public and private investment. Even with the additional budgetary leeway introduced by the ReArm Europe Plan 2 , the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) must considerably increase EU support to strategic European defence investments. The Commission considers that defence-related funding under the next MFF, notably in support to research and development (R&D), shall primarily be driven by these objectives, while considering, where relevant, potential dual-use applications, such as supporting related firefighting activities. The Commission’s report ‘Safer Together’ 3 highlights firefighters' role in emergencies, including in Ukraine and their need for modern technologies for situational awareness and safe evacuations. The future European Competitiveness Fund (ECF) 4 will provide significant support to investment in defence, security and space. As such, the Commission proposed a dedicated ‘Resilience, Security, Defence and Space’ policy window, under the ECF, with a EUR 131 billion budget. This window will address civil security industry needs. Defence industrial instruments and its budget cannot replace civil protection instruments. In addition, the Commission proposal for the next MFF foresees that dual-use R&D activities may be supported under the programme Horizon Europe 2028-2034 5 . Finally, in line with the Preparedness Union Strategy 6 , the Commission aims to boost the support to the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, notably for aerial-fire-fighting means. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readines s%202030.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2653/oj/eng. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b778739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0555&qid=1753802586340. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0543. 6 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/b81316ab-a513-49a1-b520b6a6e0de6986/download.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
- 2026-01-29 “P-004394/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Recent airspace violations over several Member States are being monitored in close cooperation with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and within the Council Horizontal Working Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats. Primary legal responsibility for countering hybrid threats rests with individual Member States. The Commission and the EEAS support Member States in their efforts. The EU legal framework for critical energy infrastructure consists of the Critical Entities Resilience Directive 1 and the Network and Information Systems Directive 2 (NIS 2) 2 , with the Commission developing guidelines for their implementation. Regarding drone incursions into the airspace, the Commission proposed a European Drone Defence Initiative, as well as the European Air Shield, European Space Shield and Eastern Flank Watch initiatives 3 . Member States’ endorsement will enable the Commission to proceed with their implementation. The European Defence Drone Initiative, in conjunction with Member States' capability coalition on drones and counter-drones, could significantly enhance Europe’s collective response. The Commission also plans to present soon an Action Plan on drone and counter-drone security covering areas such as security, aviation, research, critical infrastructure protection and civil-defence synergies. Furthermore, the ProtectEU Strategy tackles internal security threats, including hybrid threats. The EU supports Lithuanian efforts to develop and test, jointly with other European authorities and innovators, systems to detect, identify and mitigate unauthorised aerial threats used for smuggling, and/or hybrid threats 4 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022L2557&qid=1767776918378. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022L2555&qid=1767777141903. 3 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-836460afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf.. 4 See projects FOLDOUT: Through-foliage detection, including in the outermost regions of the EU, https://foldout.eu/; NESTOR: aN Enhanced pre-frontier intelligence picture to Safeguard The EurOpean boRders, https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101021851; BorderForce: Flexible system extending automated border surveillance by increased situational awareness adaptable to uncertain times with unforseen events, https://borderforce-horizon.eu/; and CROSSMARE: Advanced Cross-Border And Multi Domain Interoperability Framework For Improved Collaborative Operational Efficiency For Secure Maritime Borders, https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101225981; EU-HYBNET (Empowering a Pan-European Network to Counter Hybrid Threats, https://euhybnet.eu/).”
Surveillance equipment & spyware
- 2026-01-26 “E-004522/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation 1 is meant to provide financial assistance to Member States, enabling them to carry out urgent and major public investments in support of the European defence industry in response to the current crisis situation. The Regulation does not foresee an ex-ante allocation of resources. It requires Member States to express an interest in receiving financial support. Once it received expressions of interest from Member States during the summer 2025, the Commission allocated tentatively the loan amounts to the Member States by applying the principles of equal treatment, solidarity, proportionality and transparency. The Commission agreed on the tentative allocation of loan amounts on 9 September 2025 2 . Member States were requested to present a formal request for financial assistance, accompanied by a European defence industry investment plan by 30 November 2025, describing the plans to use the funds and ensure compliance with the provisions of the SAFE Regulation. The Commission is assessing Member States’ requests and how the conditions laid down in the Regulation would be fulfilled, in particular when it comes to the conditions to use the SAFE instrument and its eligibility rules. Member States remain responsible for their defence planning and defence procurement decisions, as well as for respecting international commitment taken in fora other than the EU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng/pdf. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/704924ae-3aa2-4bd3-9675e9cf1e5dfb96_en?filename=communication-to-the-college.pdf.”
Defence spending · Relations with NATO
- 2026-01-19 “E-004401/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Delegated Regulation 1 adopted by the Commission on 28 August 2025 concerning the InvestEU fund provides that in the area of defence final beneficiaries receiving more than EUR 10 million of EU funding shall be established in the EU or an associated country and shall not be controlled by non-associated third country entities unless they provide a guarantee approved by the country in which they are established. Such guarantee shall provide assurances that the involvement of the entity will not contravene the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States. Currently, only Norway and Iceland are associated to InvestEU. These countries have contributed to the InvestEU Fund on the basis of Article 81 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area 2 . In line with that Agreement, the amendments proposed in the Delegated Regulation of 28 August 2025 ensure that entities established in these associated countries benefit from similar conditions as entities established in Member States. As a candidate country to the EU, Türkiye participates in EU programmes and could in principle be associated to InvestEU. The specific conditions for its association would need to be agreed between Türkiye and the Commission based on the association agreement as ratified by the European Parliament. However, at this advanced stage of implementation of the programme, the Commission does not envisage the association of Türkiye or any other non-EU associated countries to InvestEU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2025/1774/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1994/1/oj/eng.”
EU competences on defence · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
- 2026-01-14 “E-003661/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The control of export of military equipment and technology is exercised by the Member States and subject to national legislations, the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 1 , and international instruments such as the Arms Trade Treaty 2 and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The export outside the EU of equipment and technology listed on the EU Common Military List 3 requires an export license by the relevant Member State. Licence applications for such equipment must comply with the criteria of the Council Common Position and international obligations and commitments of the licensing Member State. The national authorities of the exporting Member State are responsible for such assessment. As announced in the State of the Union address by the President of the Commission 4 , the Commission presented a proposal to the Council to suspend certain trade-related provisions of the Association Agreement between the EU and Israel 5 that fall within the EU’s common commercial policy. If adopted, this would mean that imports from Israel would lose their preferential access to the EU market and exports from the EU would lose their preferential access to the Israelian market. The Council, through its relevant working groups, works towards increased convergence between Member States’ arms export policies. Specifically, the impact of the conflict in Gaza on national arms exports policies of Member States is continuously on the agenda of meetings. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02008E0944-20250415. 2 https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-text.html?templateId=209884. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1499/oj/eng. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:22000A0621(01).”
Relations with Israel - Palestine · Arms export from the EU
- 2026-01-13 “E-003787/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument 1 aims at providing financial assistance to Member States to carry out urgent and major public investments in support of the European defence industry in response to the current crisis situation. Only Member States can request such financial assistance in forms of loans, guaranteed by the EU’s budget. The SAFE instrument has an open architecture. It foresees the possibility for third countries to participate in common procurement, but also to conclude bilateral agreements with acceding, potential candidate and candidate countries and other third countries with which the EU has entered into a Security and Defence Partnership in order to open the eligibility conditions of the instrument. Thanks to those bilateral agreements, defence industrial entities established in a third country would become eligible as contractors for procurements supported by SAFE, beyond the current rules foreseeing that the cost of the components originating outside the EU, European Economic Area, European Free Trade Association States and Ukraine shall not be higher than 35 % of the estimated cost of the components of the end-product. The Regulation also foresees that no component shall be sourced from a third country that contravenes the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States. When procuring with SAFE support, the contracting authorities supported by SAFE must perform this assessment. On 23 June 2025, Türkiye expressed its interest to discuss such a bilateral agreement with the EU. The Commission is currently assessing this request. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
"Buy European" provisions · Defence spending
- 2026-01-13 “E-004320/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Critical raw materials (CRMs) dependencies undermine the EU’s long-term competitiveness and transition objectives. They also risk hampering its defence readiness targets and support to Ukraine, thereby posing a direct security risk and undermining European security. EU institutions and Member States, in coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, should mobilise every possible lever at their disposal to expediently decrease CRMs dependencies from defence industrial value chains. The Commission takes seriously the risk stemming from dependency on China on the different stages of the raw materials process. The Commission adopted the RESourceEU Action Plan on 3 December 2025 1 . The aim of RESourceEU is to secure access to alternative sources of CRMs in the short, medium and long term for the European industry. The RESourceEU Action Plan includes a proposal for a new financing hub that will de-risk investment and coordinate different aims of funding, as well as proposals of adjustments to the EU-regulatory framework on permitting. Work on CRMs partnerships with resource-rich countries will continue, as well as coordination with like-minded countries in relevant multilateral fora. The above-mentioned avenues to address the CRMs dependencies’ risks are instrumental to strengthen defence capabilities, as well as defence readiness and industrial resilience by 2030. 1 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/01c448d6-dc93-40d7-9afe-4c2af448d00c_en.”
EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · EU-US relations
- 2026-01-08 “E-004130/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully engaged in maintaining and fostering the EU's autonomous, reliable and cost-effective access to space, as indicated in the EU Space Programme Regulation 1 and in the Mission Letter of the Commissioner for Defence and Space 2 . Access to space is a key enabler and indispensable element in the overall space value chain: without autonomous access to space, there is no credible and strategically autonomous EU space policy. The EU has regained its autonomous access to space thanks to the entry into service of the Ariane 6 and Vega C launchers which have already brought into orbit EU satellites for both Copernicus and Galileo EU systems. Additional launches of EU satellites with European launchers are planned throughout 2026. The EU ambition is to facilitate the aggregation of demand for European launchers, to foster research and innovation in technology, and to support European critical and strategic test and launch infrastructure, without prejudice to the European Space Agency (ESA)’s activities. The Commission is regularly engaging with ESA to ensure alignment of ESA’s activities with the strategic goals of the EU Space Programme. The EU and ESA are separate entities with different governance systems and decision-making procedures: ESA selects the launch service providers for the launch of ESA satellites while the EU selects the launch service providers for the launch of its own EU satellites. For the support of United States operators launching from EU territory, the Commission is not involved in any decision. The Commission is committed to ensuring an autonomous, secure and cost-efficient capability to access space, considering the essential security interests of the EU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj/eng. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/630c289c-7ff1-4fdd-944f0f596e7e7914_en?filename=mission-letter-kubilius.pdf.”
EU-US relations · "Buy European" provisions · EU competences on space policy
- 2026-01-06 “E-003409/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is fully driven by participating Member States. Decisions on project proposals, participation, and implementation are taken by national governments within the Council framework, supported by the PESCO Secretariat (European External Action Service, including the EU Military Staff, and the European Defence Agency). The EU institutions cannot steer Greece’s participation in PESCO, which is voluntary, and decision-making remains intergovernmental. The Commission supports the broader efforts on defence through simplifying the regulatory environment for defence industry, and through instruments like the European Defence Fund (EDF). Other initiatives reinforcing the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, such as the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) 1 and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) 2 , or the newly adopted European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) 3 , offer financial support for Member States’ collaborative defence efforts in view of strengthening defence readiness. The EDF promotes participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and nontraditional defence actors, allocating around 20% of its work programme 4 to the EU Defence Innovation Scheme. A network of EDF National Focal Points 5 provides additional support. Around 100 Greek entities are participating in 137 of the 287 projects supported by the EDF and its predecessor programmes between 2017 and 2024, half of which are SMEs. While EDIRPA applications are closed, joint procurement will be supported under EDIP, in line with the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 6 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1525/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024PC0150&qid=1765184118540. 4 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpageeuropean-commission_en. 5 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/network-european-defence-fund-nationalfocal-points-nfp_en. 6 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-836460afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf.”
Defence spending · EU competences on defence
- 2025-12-19 “E-004003/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) is a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation initiative concerning United States equipment. Neither the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) nor the Commission is directly involved. Regarding EU’s military support to Ukraine, the Qualitative Military Edge programme 1 (Commission’s Work Programme 2026 initiative) aims to ensure Ukraine’s fastest access to superior military equipment from the EDTIB. The Preserving Peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 2 noted past underinvestment in the EDTIB and invited Member States to aim for 55% EU defence procurement by 2030 and at least 40% jointly procured by 2027. EU instruments have boosted the EDTIB and EU strategic autonomy recently. The European Defence Fund (EDF) funded 163 Research and Development projects, engaging 1 385 European companies. The Act in Support of Ammunition Production 3 helped industry’s rampup to a two million/year shell production capacity, and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act 4 unlocked EUR 11 billion of joint procurement from the European industry. The Security Action for Europe 5 Instrument makes available EUR 150 billion in loans for the EDTIB. The co-legislators agreed on the European Defence Industry Programme key for the Defence Readiness Roadmap and its proposed flagships. The co-legislators also agreed to amend the EDF Regulation to allow Ukraine’s association to the EDF, including through the BraveTechEU initiative. The Commission’s proposal for a European Competitiveness Fund within the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028-2034, foresees up to EUR 131 billion investments for defence and space, a five-fold increase over the current MFF. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0870. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-836460afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1525/oj/eng. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
"Buy European" provisions · EU competences on defence · EU-US relations
- 2025-12-17 “E-004372/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Rockets and launchers are the same thing, and the terms can be used interchangeably. In addition, no United States (US) rockets are operated directly by the EU or a European public institution. Any US company intending to launch its rocket from the territory of a Member State would need to address itself to the Member State in question in order to obtain a licence to launch. Neither the Commission nor the European Space Agency (ESA) are the competent authorities to allow US or any other company to perform launch services from European territory. The Commission is fully engaged in maintaining and fostering the EU's autonomous, reliable and cost-effective access to space, as indicated in the EU Space Programme Regulation 1 . Access to space is a key enabler and indispensable element in the overall space value chain: without access, there is no autonomous EU space policy. The EU ambition is to facilitate the aggregation of launch service demand for the needs of the European programme, to foster research and innovation in technology, and to support European critical and strategic test and launch infrastructure, without prejudice to ESA’s activities. The Commission is regularly engaging with ESA to ensure alignment of ESA’s activities with the strategic goals of the EU Space Programme. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj/eng.”
EU-US relations · EU competences on space policy
- 2025-12-17 “E-004118/2025 Answer given by Mr. Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Critical raw materials (CRMs) dependencies undermine the EU’s long-term competitiveness and transition objectives. They also risk hampering its defence readiness targets and support to Ukraine, thereby posing a direct security risk and undermining European security. EU institutions and Member States, in coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, should mobilise every possible lever at their disposal to expediently decrease CRMs dependencies from defence industrial value chains. The risks stemming from China’s export licensing requirements on the rare earth elements (REE) export rules (those implemented on 4 April 2025, as well as those announced on 9 October 2025) to the European defence industry are serious. While the latter measures have been suspended for one year, they are not subject to an outright repeal. In addition, measures introduced in April 2025 and before on REE and permanent magnets continue to be in force. The EU and Member States should remain vigilant to further Chinese actions. The Commission adopted the RESourceEU Action Plan 1 on 3 December 2025. The aim of RESourceEU is to secure access to alternative sources of CRMs in the short, medium and long term for the European industry. The Action plan provides for measures to accelerate the deployment of CRMs projects, with EUR 3 billion of EU funds for next year. It also announces measures to support circularity of CRMs, notably by increasing access to rare earth scrap. From 2026, the EU CRM Centre will be set up and will be responsible for financing, joint purchasing, stockpiling and monitoring activities. Work on CRMs partnerships with resource-rich countries will continue, as well as coordination with like-minded countries in relevant multilateral fora. 1 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/01c448d6-dc93-40d7-9afe-4c2af448d00c_en.”
EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Defence spending
- 2025-12-15 “E-003822/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The guarantees that have been submitted to the Commission substantiated that: (i) control over the entity is not exercised in a manner that restricts its ability to implement the action or deliver results; (ii) access by the non-EU parent company to sensitive information is prevented with security measures applied where relevant; and (iii) ownership of intellectual property and results remain within the EU entity and is not subject to non-EU control or export without prior authorisation. In line with the European Defence Fund (EDF) Regulation 1 , the guarantees were approved by the Member State of establishment of the nonEU controlled entity and the Commission has assessed them and concluded compliance with the EDF Regulation. The measures to ensure compliance with the EDF Regulation have been recorded in the provided documents and are part of the grant file managed by the Commission. The Commission holds the right to audit projects (until five years after the final payment), informs the European Anti-Fraud Office or the European Public Prosecutor's Office when it becomes aware of any suspected illegal activity, terminates grants or recovers funds in case of non-compliance. At this stage, the implementation of the Advanced Capabilities and Certification of Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (ACTUS) project proceeds in compliance with applicable rules. Once cost claims will have been submitted, ex ante controls performed, and payments will be processed, it will be included in the population to be sampled, in the framework of the annual audit programme. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng.”
EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
- 2025-12-12 “E-003850/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The ‘Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ 1 clearly underlines that the proposed European readiness flagships require massive and coordinated investments into panEuropean projects that will shield Europe as a whole and thus benefit all Member States. The European Drone Defence Initiative, for example, will be designed with a 360 degrees approach. It will address threats that can reach any Member State. Investments into European readiness flagships do not come from a single, central funding source, on the contrary, funding will come from diverse sources, public and private. At EU level, possible defence industry related options for investments are the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Instrument 2 , the European Defence Industry Programme 3 (once in force), or the European Defence Fund (EDF) 4 . These programmes have clear governance rules that will be observed. Start-ups, scale-ups, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps play an important role in the overall European Defence Readiness agenda. EU defence initiatives encourage participation of smaller players and new defence actors. For example, nearly 40% of EDF beneficiaries are SMEs. On 19 November 2025 5 , the Commission put forward a Defence Industry Transformation Roadmap, that will focus on the role of innovation and the opportunities of such companies. This will include the issue of access to finance and contracts. Such an approach will be particularly inclusive and aims to promote and accelerate the thriving of national innovation ecosystems existing across Europe. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/readiness-roadmap-2030_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024PC0150. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 5 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/513de692-d08c-40cc-80c3cb6611ace178_en?filename=EU-Defence-Industry-Transformation-Roadmap.pdf.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
- 2025-12-12 “E-003851/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission On 23 October 2025 1 , the European Council invited the Commission to present options for financial support based on an assessment of Ukraine’s financing needs and invited the Commission and the Council to take work forward to revert to this issue at its next meeting in December 2025. In its deliberations, the Commission’s considerations include several key parameters, namely that funding must address Ukraine’s critical defence requirements, funding must be rapidly available, any new financial package must safeguard Ukraine's debt sustainability, funding must also be flexible enough to cater for the evolving defence needs and the significant uncertainties regarding Ukraine’s financing needs in the years ahead, as well as the need for a fair burden sharing with international partners. The Commission’s proposals will not discriminate against or favour the defence industry of any particular Member State. The final decision on the conditions upon which the EU will provide financial support to Ukraine will be taken by the co-legislators. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2025/10/23/.”
"Buy European" provisions · Arms export from the EU
- 2025-12-12 “E-003832/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with Article 23(4) of the European Defence Fund (EDF) Regulation 1 , the Commission shall assess whether a transfer of ownership to a non-associated third country or non-associated third country entity contravenes the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States, or the objectives set out in Article 3 of the EDF Regulation. Where such a transfer of ownership contravenes the security and defence interests, the support provided from the Fund shall be reimbursed. The Commission has in place a mechanism to assess whether a transfer of ownership to a non-associated third country or non-associated third country entity contravenes the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States, or the objectives set out in Article 3 of the EDF Regulation. Notifications made under Article 23(4) of the EDF Regulation are not meant to be public. Neither is the reply of the Commission to the entity notifying the transfer of ownership. A request for information from a third party on the existence of notifications cannot result in such notifications made public without the consent of the recipient of the EU funding. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng.”
Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
- 2025-12-12 “E-004046/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The satellites of Copernicus, the EU’s earth observation system feed the Copernicus Emergency Management Service, and the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) provide a continuous, multi‑sensor stream for detecting, mapping, and assessing wildfires and their impacts. As Copernicus’ programme manager, the Commission aims to continue its satellite-based monitoring, e.g. by integrating Sentinel-3 data in EFFIS to mitigate satellite decommissioning impacts, or by accelerating the low latency near-real time broadcast of Sentinel 3 data for wildfire detection. To ensure continuity, Sentinel 3 satellites will be replaced by Sentinel 3 Next Generation, featuring state-of-the-art technologies and improved data accuracy and coverage, complemented by expansion missions. These actions will strengthen the capacity of EFFIS. Copernicus ensures access to additional satellite data sources via the Copernicus Contributing Missions, that include commercial missions, to satisfy the whole range of observational requirements. Moreover, the Commission is evaluating the potential of the Meteosat 1 Third Generation – Flexible Combined Imager data to monitor wildfires in Europe and collaborates with the Canadian Space Agency, anticipating the integration of data from the future WildFireSat constellation. Horizon Europe supports the evolution of Copernicus services, space technology innovation and partnerships, advancing wildfire monitoring and management technologies, exemplified by CHAMELEON 2 or ForestFireAI 3 . Copernicus is included in the European Competitiveness Fund proposal 4 that is tightly linked to research and innovation to ensure a seamless investment journey. 1 MeteoSat means meteorological satellites, here geostationary Satellites of the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT). https://www.eumetsat.int/. 2 https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101060529. 3 https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101206950. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0555.”
EU policy on infrastructure for preventing climate-related disasters (floods, droughts, extreme weather etc.)
- 2025-12-12 “E-003449/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission According to the investigation and verification by the Bulgarian Air Traffic Services Authority, the aircraft carrying the President of the Commission to Bulgaria experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference. Despite this, the plane landed safely. The Bulgarian Prime Minister also issued a statement 1 confirming the radio interference during the President’s flight. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming and spoofing occurrences in Bulgaria and other eastern flank Member States have increased, impacting EU aircraft and vessels. This phenomenon is common in regions surrounding conflict zones, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. European aviation has set up operational procedures and mitigations to maintain safety in case of interferences of GNSS services. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has issued guidance with recommended mitigations to civil aviation authorities, pilots, air navigation service providers, and manufacturers. EASA is also closely monitoring the situation and is ready to mandate measures to ensure safety if it deteriorates further. To prevent future navigation disturbances and in line with Article 189 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2 , the Commission is exploring measures to strengthen resilience of EU GNSS system, including gradually deploying Galileo services 3 and reinforcing Galileo with Low Earth Orbits (LEO-PNT) component, included in the Commission proposal for a regulation for a European Competitiveness Fund 4 . This will ensure the safety and security of thousands of flights in civil aviation, while protecting the EU citizens and economy from increased GNSS interference threats. 1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUdi4z0l6D0. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016E189. 3 The Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) is a data authentication function for the Galileo Open Service worldwide users, freely accessible to all as of July 2025. The upcoming encrypted Public Regulated Service (PRS) will offer secure support to governmental users. 4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European Competitiveness Fund ('ECF’), including the specific programme for defence research and innovation activities, repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/522, (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/783, repealing provisions of Regulations (EU) 2021/696, (EU) 2023/588, and amending Regulation (EU) [EDIP]: https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0555.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU competences on defence
- 2025-12-04 “P-003855/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission shares the Honourable Members’ deep concern. Russia’s violation of Estonian airspace is not an isolated incident but part of a deliberate pattern to test and undermine European security. The EU’s security is under threat and defending it is a top priority for the EU and the Member States. The Commission is mobilising EU funding for air defence. The Communication on ‘Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap’ 1 designated air and missile defence a top capability priority. The Commission proposed the ‘European Air Shield’ as a European Readiness Flagship which builds upon the proposed European Drone Defence Initiative and Eastern Flank Watch. To fund this, the Commission will ensure that the European Defence Fund and European Defence Industry Programme dedicate significant budgets to air defence systems. The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument 2 will help Member States procure these assets jointly, leveraging up to EUR 150 billion in financing. Security and climate objectives are mutually dependent, not mutually exclusive. Without security, long-term climate goals are unachievable. Without tackling climate change, extreme events and devastations are inevitable. This is not an 'either/or' choice. Mobilising adequate resources for defence and using them efficiently is crucial. The Commission’s proposal for a new European Competitiveness Fund for the next EU budget is informed by this recognition: support to defence industry is at the centre of one of the four policy windows – ‘Resilience and security, defence industry and space’ 3 with an indicative envelope of EUR 131 billion for these priorities – ensuring effective funding to equip the EU for these pressing challenges and the new geopolitical reality. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-836460afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0555.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Defence spending
- 2025-11-24 “E-003311/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In the State of the Union Speech on 10 September 2025 1 , the President of the Commission announced the Eastern Flank Watch and Drone Wall initiatives. These have been included as proposals for European Readiness Flagships in the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 2 . They aim to create a strong and credible European defence posture, in particular along EU’s Eastern external borders. The Eastern Flank Watch entails surveillance capabilities, including from space, as well as the European Defence Drone Initiative. The Flagships will enhance the security of the entire EU. The Commission will support Member States to develop and procure the capabilities necessary, including capabilities to counter drones from crossing the border and entering Europe’s airspace, seas or territories through this initiative. The Commission will also support the effort through its security research and innovation programmes, the development of European drone and counter-drone technologies for civilian applications, thereby complementing defence-related initiatives and contributing to Europe’s technological and industrial autonomy. The President of the Commission also announced that Europe will frontload EUR 6 billion from the extraordinary revenue acceleration loan and establish a Drone Alliance with Ukraine, which will further strengthen security across the entire region. On 23 October 2025, the European Council asked 3 to focus in particular on concrete projects to reinforce Member States’ joint efforts to enhance their anti-drone and air defence capabilities, in a coordinated manner, by making full use of the Security Action for Europe 4 and European Defence Industry Programme 5 instruments and other relevant existing financial tools. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-836460afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/d2nhnqso/20251023-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024PC0150&qid=1762879127536.”
Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU competences on defence
- 2025-11-21 “E-003919/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Member States are and will remain sovereign for their national security and defence. They are responsible for defining the capability objectives required to ensure the readiness of their national armed forces so that they can fulfil their strategic-military missions, including those undertaken within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Commission aims, with its regulatory and budgetary capacity, to support them in enhancing defence readiness by 2030. On this basis, the Commission has put forward the Readiness 2030 plan 1 , whose main pillars are the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) 2 instrument and the National Escape Clause (NEC) within the Stability and Growth Pact 3 . The SAFE instrument aims to support financially Member States to procure defence products and other products for defence purpose. In doing so, Member States should also aim to address critical capability gaps and strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Conditionality is attached to ensure a balance between immediate readiness and long-term industrial strength using EU budget to derisk loans. When it comes to the NEC, it can be activated by Member States to increase defence expenditures, with a maximum of 1.5% of their gross domestic product. The Commission supports Member States in ensuring a robust defence industrial base while gaining immediate operational readiness. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readines s%202030.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 3 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a57304ce-1a98-4a2c-aed536485884f1a0_en?filename=Communication-on-the-national-escape-clause.pdf.”
"Buy European" provisions · EU-US relations
- 2025-11-21 “E-003689/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In a debate in the European Parliament on 9 September 2025 1 , the High Representative/VicePresident reiterated EU’s commitment to security guarantees and a comprehensive, just and lasting peace for Ukraine. Despite diplomatic efforts, Russia’s illegal war of aggression continues and there are no signs that Russia’s objectives to subjugate Ukraine has changed. The EU stands unwavering in its support of Ukraine, its sovereignty, and its right to chart its own future. Only by putting more pressure on Russia and supporting Ukraine, can Ukraine protect its interests—which align with those of the EU. The EU remains steadfast in the support of Ukraine and its people: So far, the EU and its Member States have provided EUR 177.5 billion of assistance, including almost EUR 63.2 billion of military support. Moreover, the EU provides training to Ukrainian soldiers through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine. According to the current mandate, all mission activities are located on EU soil. Member States contribute to the mission by offering training modules and personnel, with the equipment being funded through the European Peace Facility. The Commission supports Member States effort in supporting Ukraine, a vital European security interest. It also fosters closer defence industrial cooperation between the EU and Ukraine, as well as common procurement of defence products to aid Ukrainian defence against Russia’s illegal war of aggression. Through such gradual defence industrial integration, Ukraine, with its defence innovation, helps protect Europe as a whole. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2025-09-09-ITM-002_EN.html.”
Defence spending · EU competences on defence
- 2025-11-19 “P-003527/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In the State of the Union speech on 10 September 2025 1 , the President of the Commission announced that, building upon Ukrainian ingenuity and experience in drone warfare, the EU will form a Drone Alliance with Ukraine. The Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 2 , presented on 16 October 2025 sets concrete timelines and milestones. The roadmap focuses on strengthening EU and Ukrainian capacities in drones and counter drone technologies to meet real operational needs. The Commission has already invested over EUR 1 billion in 52 projects through EU defence industrial programmes, while the new BraveTech EU initiative will further accelerate drone innovations 3 . The Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President also propose a set of initial European Readiness Flagships including: the European Drone Defence Initiative, building on lessons from Ukraine on innovative drone and counter-drone ecosystems, linking Research and Development with scalable production capacity, continuous technological development and the Eastern Flank Watch, to strengthen Eastern border Member States’ capacity to face hybrid threats, Russia’s shadow fleet and potential aggression. The Commission will also advance implementation of its counter-drone programme set out in the Communication of 18 October 2023 4 focusing on harmonising Member States’ frameworks and upgrading the Joint Research Centre living lab into a Counter-Drone Centre of Excellence. The Commission will expand EU-funded training, pool and share capabilities, and set common performance standards and testing methods. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025JC0027. 3 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/bravetech-eu_en. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023DC0659.”
EU competences on defence · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · Defence spending
- 2025-11-03 “E-003361/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The support to space new entrants, startup and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is a key objective of the EU Space Programme 1 . To this end, the Commission created the CASSINI initiative 2 , with an investment capacity of up to EUR 1 billion for 2021-2027 complemented by an equivalent amount by private venture capital funds. Since 2021, the CASSINI initiative has channeled investment capital guarantees to 16 venture capital funds and made four co-investments directly into space companies. These funds have made more than 60 investments into space companies until the second quarter of 2024. The European Innovation Council has provided over EUR 300 million in support for space technologies. Within Horizon Europe, SMEs benefit from EUR 15.3 billion in Cluster 4 ‘Digital, Industry and Space’ with a lump-sum cost model, where there is no need to declare non-recurring costs separately. The European Investment Bank also provides venture debt to SMEs and mid-caps developing highly innovative technologies, solutions or platforms 3 . These financing solutions have proven to be successful in helping space SMEs accessing finance and thus also in funding their non-recurring costs. Looking ahead, the Commission, in close coordination with the European Space Agency, the EU Agency for the Space Programme and Member States, will: (i) set-up a CASSINI Growth Investment Facility and a Debt / non-dilutive Financing Facility, also addressing the scaleup phase; (ii) set up a Manufacturing Accelerator, offering advisory services for optimising manufacturing processes, logistics and sourcing strategies; and (iii) facilitate the expansion and modernisation of manufacturing and test facilities across the EU, in line with state aid rules. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj/eng. 2 with the European Investment Fund as implementing partner; https://www.cassini.eu/cassini-initiative. 3 https://www.eib.org/en/products/equity/venture-debt/index.”
EU industrial funding · EU competences on space policy
- 2025-10-20 “E-002209/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Türkiye cannot benefit from the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) 1 loans as only Member States can do so. However, in accordance with Article 2(3), as a candidate country, Türkiye can join Member States in procuring jointly defence products. In addition, the Turkish industry can provide, as any other third country entity, up to 35% of the estimated cost of the components of the end-product. Legal entities established in the EU and controlled by another third country or by another third-country entity may participate in the common procurement if subjected to a foreign direct investment screening or if the country of establishment provides guarantees. Article 17 provides for the possibility for the Turkish defence industry to further participate in procurement actions, subject to the conclusion of a bilaterial international agreement. On 23 June 2025, Türkiye expressed its interest to discuss such an agreement with the EU. Under Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Council may authorise the opening of negotiations and, following the negotiations led by the Commission in the name of the EU, if successful, conclude the agreement. The European Parliament needs to be informed at all stages of the procedure and has to give its consent to the agreement. At any rate, no component shall be sourced from a third country that contravenes the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States. This provision will have to be applied by contracting authorities of Member States. When it comes to the use of Article 122 of the TFEU as legal basis for SAFE, the Commission and the Council considered it as the appropriate legal basis for exceptional financial assistance to Member States, responding to crises or exceptional events. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
EU competences on defence · EU enlargement
- 2025-10-16 “P-003367/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) interference, including jamming and spoofing, occurs daily in the EU's Eastern territories, notably in areas close to conflict zones, affecting both Global Positioning System (GPS) and Galileo 1 or EGNOS 2 . This threat is not new, and the European Union Safety Agency (EASA) has issued guidance to aviation stakeholders to ensure safety during GNSS service disruptions. EASA is closely monitoring the situation and stands ready to implement safety measures whenever needed. The pilot flying the plane carrying the Commission President to Plovdiv, Bulgaria, reported a GPS issue to air traffic control and used an ILS (Instrument Landing System) during a safe landing. The Commission is committed to tackling this issue and works alongside its Member States to bolster the resilience of the EU Galileo system. Already world-class, Galileo declared in July 2025, the Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) to provide assurance that the received Galileo navigation message is coming from the system itself and has not been modified. In the near future, key measures will include deploying more satellites in low earth orbit to improve resilience, developing interference monitoring services, and supporting complementary position, navigation and timing services. The Commission will also increase cooperation with Ukraine on relevant anti-jamming and anti-spoofing technologies to mitigate a wide spectrum of signal interference. These steps will prevent future navigation disturbances and ensure the safety and security of thousands of flights in civil aviation, while also protecting the EU's citizens and economy from the increasing threat of GNSS interference. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/galileo-satellite-navigation_en. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/egnos-satellite-navigation_en.”
EU competences on space policy
- 2025-10-15 “E-003114/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission When taking action, the EU is particularly vigilant in ensuring the respect of the allocation of competences, as enshrined in the Treaties and fully respects the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. The recent initiatives put forward to address EU defence readiness do not depart from this position. In particular, proposals in support of EU defence industry are based on Article 173 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1 . Articles 42 to 46 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 2 deal with the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). More specifically, Article 42(2) of the TEU foresees the progressive framing of a common EU defence policy. Any decision leading to a common defence shall be taken unanimously by the European Council. The solidarity between Member States is reflected in Article 42(7) of the TEU, which sets out the obligation for Member States to provide aid and assistance in case one of them is the victim of an armed aggression on its territory. In accordance with Article 29 of the TEU, Member States’ national prerogative in terms of arms exports to non-EU countries are exercised consistently with Council’s Common Position 2008/944 3 , last updated in April 2025. It is for Member States to ensure that national decisions in this regard conform to that common position. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2016/art_173/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/compos/2008/944/oj/eng.”
EU-Turkey relations · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
- 2025-10-14 “E-003243/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The general objective of the European Defence Fund (EDF) 1 is to foster the competitiveness, efficiency and innovation capacity of the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB). This contributes to strategic autonomy by supporting collaborative actions and cross-border cooperation, particularly involving small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps. The EDF also aims to strengthen the agility of defence supply and value chains, and better exploit industrial potential in innovation, research and development. It encourages the participation of SMEs and non-traditional defence actors, including technologies with dual-use potential, such as unmanned vehicles, for which collaborative research and development (R&D) actions are underway. The defence sector is demand driven, since Member States and associated countries remain the only buyers and end users of the defence technologies and products. Consequently, the EDF annual work programmes aligns with the priorities set by the EDF programme committee, reflecting the needs of the armed forces of Member States and associated countries. The programme committee has not identified firefighting as an area to be addressed. Nonetheless, several ongoing EDF R&D actions may have dual use potential, such as unmanned vehicles, and the resulting product could be used by Member States military to support in national calamities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
- 2025-09-25 “E-002960/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) 1 instrument aims to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base and improve defence readiness of Member States by providing loans to Member States to invest in defence. SAFE encourages common procurement by Member States even with Member States that did not request any SAFE loans. By facilitating common procurement of defence equipment through coordinated planning and harmonised requirements, SAFE promotes better interoperability, cost-efficiency, and industrial coordination. German defence companies can benefit from increased demand and investment, that will contribute to job creation and innovation. The instrument further supports the standardisation and modernisation of capabilities across Member States, aligning with Germany’s defence policy priorities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
- 2025-09-24 “P-001514/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The recurrent hybrid threats, in particular at the EU Eastern border, pose new challenges. To guarantee security and territorial integrity, Member States must be able to act decisively. A strong EU response is also needed, in full respect of EU and international law. The Commission supports Member States in several ways. First, the EU supports Member States to build-up their defence capabilities and increase their defence readiness, through its whole toolbox, that includes defence industry-related instruments. Regarding the monitoring and reinforcement of the external border from a defence perspective, Member States could request financial support under the new Security Action for Europe instrument 1 or as part of the implementation of the future European Defence Industry Programme 2 , particularly since ‘The Eastern Border Shield’ has been identified by the White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 3 among priorities. The Commission has also engaged with Member States to explore additional options to support national efforts consented to strengthen EU external borders and the possible scope of magnitude of such support. Second, more broadly, the EU could also support Member States’ borders through funding instruments, such as the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 4 . It ensures funding for effective integrated border management at the external borders, to facilitate legitimate border crossings, prevent and detect illegal immigration and cross-border crime and to effectively manage migratory flows, in accordance with Articles 77(2) and 79(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. For instance, activities related to the automated border surveillance systems are part of Poland’s 2021-2027 BMVI programme. The BMVI does not provide support to Member States’ defence activities. In addition, the Interreg 5 Poland-Ukraine 2021-2027 programme supports the improvement of border mobility and is investing EUR 50 million to reconstruct regional roads and rails along the Polish – Ukrainian border with view of their dual use application. 1 OJ L, 2025/1106, 28.5.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024PC0150. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0120. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1148/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32021R1059.”
Asylum & border control
- 2025-09-10 “E-002267/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not intend to do so: Member States gather knowledge or documentation about unidentified anomalous phenomena according to the national security needs. The Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy remain dedicated to the safety and security of the space environment. In particular, the Commission is committed to enhancing the EU space situational awareness capabilities, within the remit of the EU Space Regulation 1 and in line with its recent proposals for the European Competitiveness Fund, without prejudice to national competences. Additionally, the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and national civil aviation authorities may receive safety reports on unidentified airborne objects that may endanger civil aviation safety. The collected safety occurrence reports are stored in a central repository and analysed for safety purposes only. Reporting, storing and analysis of civil aviation occurrences are governed by Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation 2 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32021R0696. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/376/oj/eng.”
Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU competences on space policy
- 2025-09-10 “E-002723/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The EU budget supports the competitiveness of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base via different programmes, supporting Member States or entities which are based and controlled in the EU. Neither Türkiye nor its defence industries are allowed to receive any funding from that source. In the current multiannual financial framework, EU defence programmes do not allow for the participation of third countries except where the legislation explicitly provides this. To this date, this has only been the case for countries being part of the European Free Trade Association that are also members of the European Economic Area (EFTA EEA), and for Ukraine. The Security Action for Europe 1 instrument provides financial assistance to Member States only. Based on the Regulation, some third countries (acceding countries, candidate countries and potential candidates, and other third countries with whom the EU has entered a security and defence partnership) can participate in common procurement with Member States as any other third country which means that they are allowed to buy defence products originating from the EU or from Ukraine and EFTA EEA countries in common procurement with Member States. This allows to increase the level of aggregation of the demand necessary to scale up the EU industrial capacity and at the same time ensures that Member States participating to the procurement obtain better prices. However, Türkiye’s industrial entities are not eligible for these acquisitions, unless an international agreement is concluded on this matter with the EU. So far, no such agreement has been concluded by the Council. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
Defence spending · EU competences on defence
- 2025-09-09 “E-003011/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund (EDF) 1 supports the EU’s strategic autonomy by funding only entities established in the EU and Norway. Israel-based entities are not eligible 2 . EU-based entities controlled by non-EU entities, such as INTRACOM DEFENSE, may participate only if robust safeguards are in place 3 . EDF rules require submitting guarantees, approved by the Member State of establishment, ensuring that the non-EU parent company cannot access sensitive information, and that results and intellectual property rights remain with the EU entity. The Commission assessed the submitted guarantees and concluded to compliance with the EDF Regulation. Moreover, any transfer of ownership of results of EDF actions outside the EU or Norway requires prior notification to the Commission and may trigger recovery of funds if it conflicts with the security and defence interests of the EU, its Member States or the objectives of EDF 4 . Furthermore, ethical screening is conducted for all projects under the EDF Regulation 5 . This process assesses ethical risks at project-level, focusing on its content, activities, and methodologies, not on participants’ corporate structure. Compliance with international law is also evaluated at project-level. The advanced capabilities and certification for tactical unmanned aerial vehicle systems (ACTUS) project underwent such screenings before grant agreement was signed. The Commission also holds the right to audit projects, launch European Anti-Fraud Office investigations, terminate grants, and recover funds in case of non-compliance with applicable rules. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 2 Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/697. 3 Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/697. 4 Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2021/697. 5 Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2021/697.”
Arms export from the EU · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
- 2025-09-09 “E-002865/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund (EDF) 1 supports the EU’s strategic autonomy by funding entities established in the EU and Norway. Israel-based entities are therefore not eligible 2 . EU-based entities controlled by non-EU entities, such as Intracom Defence, may participate if robust safeguards are in place 3 . EDF rules require submitting guarantees, approved by the Member State of establishment, ensuring that the non-EU parent company cannot access sensitive information and that results and intellectual property rights remain with the EU entity. The Commission assessed the submitted guarantees and concluded to compliance with the EDF Regulation 4 . Any transfer of ownership of results of EDF actions outside the EU or Norway requires prior notification to the Commission and may trigger recovery of funds if it conflicts with the security and defence interests of the EU, its Member States or the EDF objectives 5 . Ethical screening is systematically conducted at project-level, focusing on project-specific activities, not on participants corporate structure. Compliance with international law is also evaluated at project-level. The ACTUS project also underwent this screening. The Commission holds the right to audit projects, launch investigations of the European Anti-Fraud Office, terminate grants and recover funds in case of non-compliance with applicable rules. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 2 Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/697. 3 Article 9(4) of the EDF Regulation. 4 Ibidem. 5 Article 23 of the EDF Regulation.”
EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Arms export from the EU
- 2025-09-08 “E-002181/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with the Treaty on EU, the EU pursues in its actions the objectives of preserving the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States, including those of the Republic of Cyprus. Whilst Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 on Security Action for Europe (SAFE)1 does not include references to specific foreign policy situations or occupations, it aims at supporting the financial efforts of the Member States to increase their defence readiness in accordance with these objectives. SAFE also establishes eligibility conditions for the participation of defence entities in common procurement under that instrument, which ensures the preservation of the security and defence objectives of the EU and of its Member States. In SAFE, entities established in third countries or under the control of third countries (to the exception of Ukraine and countries of the European Free Trade Association also members of the European Economic Area) are, in principle, not allowed to participate in common procurement under the instrument. SAFE foresees the possibility for entities from third countries to participate in common procurements under SAFE only on condition that the third country in question is firstly an acceding, potential candidate or candidate country or has concluded with the EU a security and defence partnership agreement, and, secondly, an international agreement in accordance with Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. These agreements must ensure that there is no conflict with common foreign security policy’s interests. The EU has not concluded any agreement with Türkiye on these matters. It follows that Turkish companies are not authorised to participate in SAFE common procurements. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
EU competences on defence · "Buy European" provisions
- 2025-09-08 “E-003012/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund (EDF) 1 supports the EU strategic autonomy by funding only entities established in the EU and Norway. Israel-based entities are not eligible 2 . EU-based entities controlled by non-EU companies, such as INTRACOM DEFENSE may participate only if robust safeguards are in place 3 . EDF rules require submitting guarantees, approved by the Member State of establishment, ensuring that the non-EU parent cannot access sensitive information, and that results and intellectual property rights remain with the EU entity. It is for the competent authorities in the Member State to approve the guarantee and for applicants to submit it to the Commission. The Commission assessed the submitted guarantees and concluded compliance with the EDF Regulation. Moreover, any transfer of ownership of results of EDF actions outside the EU or Norway requires prior notification to the Commission and may trigger recovery of funds if it conflicts with the security and defence interests of the EU, its Member States, or the objectives of the EDF 4 . The Commission holds the right to audit projects, launch European Anti-Fraud Office investigations, terminate grants, and recover funds in case of non-compliance. Under EDF, the results of an action are owned by the beneficiary that generated them. Regarding the Advanced capabilities & certification for tactical unmanned aerial vehicle systems (ACTUS) project, the intellectual property rights will remain with INTRACOM DEFENSE as the EU-based beneficiary. The applicable safeguards ensure that the non-EU parent entity cannot access or exploit the technologies or results developed under the EDFfunded action. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 2 Article 9(1) of the EDF Regulation. 3 Article 9(4) of the EDF Regulation. 4 Article 23 of the EDF Regulation.”
EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Defence spending
- 2025-08-26 “E-002579/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The exceptional situation stemming from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its consequences on the security environment, justifies that the EU takes urgent measures to establish a temporary instrument aimed at providing financial assistance to Member States. The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) purpose is to support Member States that want to invest in defence industrial production to increase their defence readiness. The Commission does not oppose or choose between security and welfare; and social policies remain high on its agenda. The Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument 1 provides substantial financial means, e.g. via the Recovery and Resilience Facility 2 , rescEU 3 and EU4Health 4 . At any rate, decision prioritising their policy agendas remain ultimately the responsibility of the Member States. Participation of third countries to procurement supported by SAFE as buyers allows to increase the level of aggregation of the demand necessary to scale up the EU industrial capacity and at the same time, ensures that Member States participating to the procurement obtain better prices. Conditions for Ukraine and Türkiye industrial participation in SAFE are different. Ukrainian industry gets a standing that is as similar as possible to that of the EU industry. By contrast, the Turkish industry can only be made eligible though a bilateral agreement needs to be signed between Türkiye and the EU. The adoption of such an agreement rests with the Council, in accordance with the applicable legal basis and the decision with a vote to take place in line with the applicable legal basis and decision-making process. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32020R2094. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02021R0241-20240301. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EL/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022D0288#:~:text=Decision%20No%201313%2F2013%2FEU%20set s%20out%20the%20legal%20framework,an%20effective%20response%20to%20natural%20and%20manmade%20disasters. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/522/oj/eng.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
- 2025-08-19 “E-002202/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 on Security Action for Europe (SAFE) 1 aims at financially supporting Member States to increase their defence readiness. Loans can only be accessed by Member States. SAFE establishes eligibility conditions for participation of companies as contractors to common procurement under the Instrument. Entities established in third countries or under the control of third countries (except for Ukraine and countries of the European Free Trade Association that are also members of the European Economic Area) are, in principle, not allowed to participate to common procurement under the SAFE instrument. Entities established in the EU and controlled by third countries could only be eligible to participate in the common procurement as contractors if they fulfil security based conditions or if they have been subject to screening within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/452, and, where necessary, to appropriate mitigation measures. In addition, the Regulation states that for the purpose of procurements supported by SAFE, no component shall be sourced from a third country that contravenes the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States. The SAFE Regulation furthermore foresees the possibility for entities from acceding, potential candidate and candidate countries (other than Ukraine) and other third countries with which the EU has entered into a Security and Defence Partnership to participate as contractors to common procurements under SAFE only on the condition that the third country in question has concluded an international agreement with the EU as spelled out in Article 17 of the SAFE Regulation. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
EU competences on defence · EU-Turkey relations
- 2025-08-19 “E-002087/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 1. Industry inputs and Commission responses: the Strategic Dialogue with the European Defence Industry 1 aimed to address key objectives such as ensuring long-term visibility on defence procurement plans, simplifying regulatory frameworks, securing access to critical raw materials and components, enhancing financing options for defence enterprises, and tackling talent shortages. Industry representatives expressed the need for increased defence spending, a more integrated European defence market, regulatory simplification, and improved access to finance. There were also calls for supporting innovation and easing export controls. Inputs provided by the industry and by the trade unions have been taken into consideration for relevant initiatives, such as the Defence Readiness Omnibus 2 . 2. Selection of participants: The dialogue included 15 companies, two trade unions, and one defence industry association. Participants were selected based on geographical representation, company size, and their involvement in priority capability domains as outlined in the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 3 . This ensured a comprehensive inclusion of both large contractors and small and medium-sized enterprises in strategic discussions. 3. Future dialogues and transparency: although future Strategic Dialogues with the defence industry are not planned at this stage, the Commission is committed to continue ensuring diverse representation from across Europe in any future engagements, maintaining the relevance and focus of discussions. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/read_25_1181. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/defence-readiness-omnibus_en#relevant-links. 3 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/introducing-white-paper-european-defenceand-rearm-europe-plan-readiness-2030_en.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
- 2025-08-13 “E-002266/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The area of unidentified aerial phenomenon (UAP) is considered a competence of the Member States, allowing them to address these phenomena according to the national security needs. For example, France has established the Group for study and information on unidentified aerospace phenomena (GEIPAN). This notwithstanding, the Commission is committed to enhancing the EU space situational awareness capabilities within the remit of the EU Space Regulation 1 and without prejudice to national competences. This work will be crucial to elevating the EU situational awareness, improving the EU ability to detect, assess and respond to various risks in space. The Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy remain dedicated to collaborating with stakeholders to ensure the safety and security of the EU space environment. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/696, OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 69–148; ELI: https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj?eliuri=eli%3Areg%3A2021%3A696%3Aoj&locale=en.”
EU competences on defence · EU competences on space policy
- 2025-08-11 “E-001826/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has not concluded any contract for lobbying activities in the area of Common Security Defence Policy. In line with the competences conferred to it under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Titles XVII (Industry) and XIX (Research and technological development and space), the Commission supports the competitiveness and innovation capacity of the European defence industry. In particular, as a result of the first three annual rounds of European Defence Fund 1 calls for proposals, grant agreements for 162 projects were signed (amounting to EUR 3.117 million) with entities established in 26 Member States (all Member States excluding Malta) and Norway. With the objective to support the ramping up of ammunition production in Europe, 31 projects were signed under Regulation on supporting of ammunition production (ASAP) 2 involving entities from 14 Member States (Germany, France, Finland, Hungary, Sweden, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Latvia, Poland, Romania) and Norway; total grant amount of EUR 513 million). Under the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement 3 programme, which aims at incentivising cooperation in defence procurement, five grant agreements have been signed with national authorities of 17 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia), for a total of EUR 300 million. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092, OJ L 170, 12 May 2021. 2 Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP), OJ L 185, 24 July 2023. 3 Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA) OJ L, 2023/2418, 26 October 2023.”
Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU political integration
- 2025-08-08 “E-002024/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission took note of the findings of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies’ study on Securing European Military Fuels 1 . The Commission is aware that the long-term timely and sufficient supply of liquid fuels from the EU market is crucial for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The strategic nature of fuel and fuel infrastructure was already acknowledged and identified by the Action Plan on Military Mobility of 10 November 2022 2 . The White paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 of 19 March 2025 3 further proposed to identify immediate and future energy supply bottlenecks together with relevant partners, in particular NATO. Exchanges have already taken place between NATO, the European External Action Service and the Commission staffs to identify how the civil sector and the military could work better together on energy, and in particular fuel supply. In addition, military/civil fuel infrastructure and fuel supply, including of liquid fuels is addressed in the EU-NATO Structured Dialogues on Military Mobility and on Climate and Defence. The Commission is currently working on a military mobility package to be presented by 1 December 2025. It will consist of a joint communication, a proposal for a regulation and targeted amendments of existing EU legislation. On 12 June 2025, a targeted stakeholder consultation was launched. Stakeholders can contribute by providing their input. The findings of the study by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies will be a valuable source when it comes to fuel supply. 1 https://hcss.nl/report/securing-european-military-fuels-in-a-tense-security-environment-supply-distributionand-storage/. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/action-plan-military-mobility-20_en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0120.”
Relations with NATO · EU competences on defence
- 2025-08-06 “E-002019/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission During the week of 12 May 2025, the Galileo satellite navigation system underwent a programmed in depth test aimed at assessing its integrity, continuity and accuracy. It was not an anomaly. All planned events in the constellation and services are pre-announced by timely publication of notice advisory to Galileo users (NAGU) and service notices, notifications to specific user’s communities, and when necessary, announcement on the webpage of the Galileo Service Centre. In the specific case of this test, NAGU 2025016 1 , also referred to in the Honourable Member’s question, was issued in due time informing about the test. This one-off test involved willfully degrading or interrupting some services. The open service, although subject to a lesser accuracy than usual, was not interrupted. The critical life-saving search and rescue service forward link was never interrupted nor degraded. The situation was under the control of the Commission and EU Agency for the Space Programme at all moments: services and parameters were restored within the planned timeframe. 1 https://www.gsc-europa.eu/notice-advisory-to-galileo-users-nagu-2025016.”
EU competences on space policy
- 2025-07-29 “E-001352/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In the context of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), decisions related to security and defence are made by the Council of the EU acting unanimously. The European Council provides strategic guidance and sets the overall political direction for the CSDP. Paragraph 1 of the European Council conclusions of 6 March 2025 1 is very clear on the agreement amongst Member States that Europe must become more sovereign, more responsible for its own defence and better equipped to act and deal autonomously with immediate and future challenges and threats with a 360 degrees approach. The role of the Commission in this field is clearly defined in the EU Treaties. The Commission does not hold competences affecting the discretion of Member States to decide on actions of their armed forces. It is each Member States’ decision whether and how to coordinate with other countries, and whether to enter into any bi- or multilateral agreements creating rights and obligations with regard to their security and their armed forces. The Commission, together with the High Representative/Vice-President, put forward the White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 2 . It focuses on how to support Member States in filling their most urgent and critical capability gaps, backed by funding options presented by the President of the Commission on 4 March 2025 through the ReArm Europe Plan 3 . In this regard, it proposes actions and instruments in particular to financially support Member States, increase the European defence industrial readiness and work more closely with Ukraine and other partners. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/06/european-council-conclusions-oneuropean-defence/. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readines s%202030.pdf. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_673.”
EU competences on defence · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2025-07-25 “P-002191/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The ReArm Europe plan 1 provides for the flexibility needed by Member States to undertake greater defence investment in the short term, without compromising their macroeconomic stability in the medium term. On the one hand, the possibility offered for a coordinated activation of the national escape clause (NEC) of the Stability and Growth Pact 2 offers flexibility of up to 1.5% of the 2021 gross domestic product for each year of activation of the clause until 2029. On the other hand, Member States can benefit from financial assistance under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, 3 in the form of loans guaranteed by the EU budget. SAFE loans are long maturity (45 years), have a grace period of 10 years and benefit from the flexibility under NEC, if activated. In addition, EU defence industry programmes support the competitiveness of the European defence industry mostly through grants. The European Defence Fund 4 has been contributing to the research and development of European defence technologies and capabilities, whilst the Act in support of ammunition production (ASAP) 5 has provided support to the ramp-up of the European capacity of production of ammunition and missiles, and the programme for the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement (EDIRPA) has financially incentivised the common acquisition of defence products 6 . The proposed European Defence Industry Programme 7 is meant to integrate the intervention logics validated through the implementation of ASAP and EDIRPA and to propose additional intervention logics, to further support the defence industrial readiness of the European defence and technological industrial base. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_793. 2 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-and-fiscal-governance/stability-and-growth-pact_en. 3 Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj. 4 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpageeuropean-commission_en. 5 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en. 6 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52024PC0150.”
Defence spending · EU competences on defence
- 2025-07-25 “E-001725/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030 1 qualifies the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (‘United Kingdom’) as an essential European ally with which cooperation on security and defence should be enhanced in mutual interest. The EU-United Kingdom Security and Defence Partnership 2 outlines that the EU and the United Kingdom share the same challenging security environment and have vital interests in the peace, security and stability of Europe and beyond and provides a framework to facilitate regular highlevel dialogue and strategic consultations, joint initiatives, and possibilities for participation in specific EU defence initiatives. EU defence related programmes already provide for limited participation of third countries under strict eligibility conditions aimed at protecting the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States. This also applies to the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument 3 : the United Kingdom – like other third countries having concluded a Security and Defence Partnership with the EU – can participate in common procurements as buyer. Industrial participation (as supplier) is however conditional on the signature of a specific bilateral agreement between the EU and the third country in question, defining the rules and conditions of participation of the third-country entities, including additional safeguards to the EU and Member States’ security and defence interests. Regarding Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), decisions on the involvement of third countries are taken by the Council on a case-by-case basis acting by unanimity. Security and Defence Partnerships with third countries are fully in line with this policy. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readiness%2 02030.pdf. 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2025/EUUK%20Security%20and%20Defence%20Partnership.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
EU-US relations · EU competences on defence
- 2025-07-24 “E-002359/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Defence Readiness Omnibus 1 adopted by the Commission on 17 June 2025 includes a Commission proposal to amend, amongst others, Directive 2009/43/EC as regards the simplification of intra-EU transfers of defence-related products 2 . This proposal aims to improve the functioning of the intra-EU transfer mechanisms by ensuring their more uniform application by Member States. Neither this proposal, nor any other proposal under the Defence Readiness Omnibus includes any provision impacting the control of exports of military technology and equipment to third countries as referred to in the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 3 . Therefore, the Commission proposal does not increase the risk of ‘unwanted transfers of sensitive know-how’ related to the export of military technology and equipment to third countries. 2. The proposed changes to Directive 2009/43/EC do not influence the existing balance of responsibilities as regards exports of military technology and equipment to third countries as referred to in the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. They also do not modify the Member States’ obligations related to the assessment of export control licences in relation to exports to third countries established by the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_10604_2025_INIT. 2 COM(2025) 823 final. 3 Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, p. 99, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/2008/944/oj).”
EU competences on defence · Arms export from the EU
- 2025-07-22 “E-001235/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission respects the freedom and sole responsibility of professional organisations to choose as their representatives the individuals they consider fit for this purpose. The Commission notes that RTX Corporation is registered in the Transparency Register and declares in its registration Mr. Priem as their person in charge of EU relations 1 . In their relations with external stakeholders, Commission Members and staff members are bound by stringent rules and internal control standards, included in particular in the treaties, the Staff Regulations 2 and the Conditions of employment of other servants of the EU, as well as the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour 3 . These rules aim at ensuring the independence, impartiality, objectivity and loyalty of Commission Members and staff members in the exercise of their duties. In March 2025, responding to the start deterioration of the EU’s security context, the Commission proposed the European Readiness 2030 Plan 4 which includes the Security Action for Europe 5 (SAFE) instrument to enable urgent and major public investments in the European defence industry, to rapidly increase its production capacity, improve the timely availability of defence products, and speed-up its adjustment to structural changes. The SAFE regulation includes strict eligibility rules aimed at ensuring security of supply and strategic autonomy of the European defence industry. 1 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/searchregister-or-update/organisation-detail_en?id=87564644126-75. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1962/31(1)/2021-01-01/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3083/oj/eng. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_793. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
"Buy European" provisions · EU competences on defence · EU-US relations
- 2025-07-22 “P-002088/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The stark deterioration of the security context in 2025 requires Member States to massively increase their expenditures in defence industrial capabilities. In this context, the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation 1 aims to provide temporary financial assistance to Member States seriously threatened with severe difficulties by exceptional occurrences beyond their control. This objective is fully in line with the scope of Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The requirements set out in Article 122 TFEU in term of competence and procedure for the adoption of acts based on that legal basis have been fully respected. SAFE does not undermine the role of the European Parliament in Articles 12, 13 and 36 of the Treaty on European Union. The Commission recalls that it made extensive use of legal bases which involve the ordinary legislative procedure for all legislative proposals adopted in relation with the defence industrial policy since the beginning of Russia’s unjustified aggression of Ukraine and even before. This demonstrates the Commission’s commitment to ensuring both the respect of the competences of the different institutions, as enshrined in the Treaties, and the principle of sincere cooperation. In addition, the Commission has fully respected its commitment towards the European Parliament, as set out in the Joint Declaration of 22 December 2020 2 , by replying to the questions of its Honourable Members in two meetings held on 8 April and 19 May 2025. The Commission stands ready to regularly update the European Parliament on the implementation of SAFE and to continue providing answers to its questions. 1 OJ L, 2025/1106, 28.5.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj. 2 OJ C 444I, 22.12.2020, p. 5–5, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2020_444_I_0005.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
- 2025-07-17 “E-001888/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Member States are unanimously agreeing on European security questions, in particular through European Council conclusions. This ensures that the security and defence interest of each Member States are respected in any decisions relating to European defence. Over the past years, the EU has agreed a number of defence industrial programmes and instruments, such as the European Defence Fund 1 , European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act 2 , the Act in support of ammunition production 3 , or most recently the Security Action for Europe instrument 4 . Furthermore, negotiations are currently ongoing on a future European Defence Industry Programme 5 . These programmes and instruments support Member States who are and will remain in the driving seat for their defence, in particular for identifying the capabilities required by the armed forces. The legislative procedures governing the adoption of such programmes or instruments are in line with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. All of these programmes and instruments are open to all Member States irrespective of the share of their gross domestic product that they spend on defence. Moreover, these programmes and instruments all include conditions to ensure that the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States are respected. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1525/oj/eng. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202501106. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024PC0150.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
- 2025-07-04 “P-001157/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The serious and persistent nature of the hybrid threats at the Eastern EU border with Russia and Belarus pose new challenges for the whole EU. It calls also for a strengthened EU response, in full respect of EU and international law, which should be comprehensive, both addressing the threat of potential conventional military aggression and ongoing hybrid activities, including campaigns for weaponising migration and challenging the entire Schengen zone. The White Paper on the European Defence Readiness 2030 1 acknowledges that the defence of all EU land, air and maritime borders is important, in particular as regards the EU Eastern border. The Eastern Border Shield project is a noteworthy exercise by a number of Member States to confront the growing challenges in that region. The Commission would consider potential financial support for defence upon Member States request under the future European Defence Industry Programme 2 , the Commission has engaged with Member States undertaking national efforts in strengthening EU external borders to explore possible options and the scope of potential support. The Commission also supports Member States in ensuring strong European integrated border management and effective protection of the EU external borders through the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 3 . Activities related to the automated border surveillance systems are a substantial part of Poland’s 2021-2027 BMVI programme. The EUR 220.5 million allocated to the programme includes funding made available in December 2024 for ‘Enhancing border surveillance capabilities for countries bordering Russia and Belarus’ (currently being added to the programme) and will be increased by EUR 23 million from the mid-term review. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0120. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024PC0150. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32021R1148.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
- 2025-07-04 “E-001306/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Serious and persistent threats at the Eastern EU border may entail the weaponisation of migration which poses a challenge for national security of the concerned Member States, but also the security of the EU as a whole. This is what the Commission stressed in the Communication on the weaponisation of migration which recalled the legal context in which any exceptional measure to tackle this threat can be taken by Member States, including as arising from case-law 1 . The situation also calls for a resolute EU response which should be comprehensive, addressing both a potential threat of conventional military aggression and hybrid campaigns. The White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 2 acknowledges the importance of defending all EU borders, in particular the Eastern border. The project related to an Eastern Border Shield has been considered a noteworthy exercise by a number of Member States to confront the growing challenges in the region. The Security Action for Europe Regulation 3 , the European Defence Industry Programme 4 (subject to its negotiation by the co-legislators), and dual-use EU instruments (such as the Border Management Visa Policy Instrument) could provide the basis for additional efforts in support of Member States. The Commission has engaged in dialogue with Member States to explore possible options. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52024DC0570. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0120. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0122. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024PC0150.”
Asylum & border control
- 2025-07-03 “E-001065/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The ReArm Europe Plan foresees the possibility to incentivise defence-related investments in the EU budget. This has been deemed necessary to support Member States’ defence readiness as underlined in the Joint White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 1 . The ReArm Europe Plan has been devised, in light of the current geopolitical tensions, by the Commission to respond to a European Council tasking, notably to present a set of ‘developed options […] for public and private funding to strengthen the defence technological and industrial base and address critical capability gaps’ 2 . As part of this plan, the Commission adopted on 1 April 2025 measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review 3 of cohesion policy funds via amendments to existing cohesion policy regulations. Those aims at incentivising Member States to voluntarily adjust their cohesion programmes to invest in the EU’s emerging strategic priorities. In particular, the proposal enables Member States to make better use of current possibilities to build resilient infrastructures to foster military mobility and to support and enhance productive capacities of small and large enterprises in the defence sector. Furthermore, the proposal will also encourage skills development in the defence industry to narrow the existing skills gap. All proposals by the Commission respect the procedures foreseen in terms of impact assessment and stakeholder consultations, as outlined in the appropriate Commission Staff Working Document 4 . Rules for adoption of cohesion policy programme amendments are not modified and therefore will be subject to approval by the monitoring committees as applicable to ensure scrutiny by stakeholders. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readines s%202030.pdf. 2 European Council conclusions, 27 June 2024 (conclusion 26, p. 8). 3 COM(2025)123 final; https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/communication/mid-term-review2025/communication-mid-term-review-2025_en.pdf. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/d0bbd77f-bee5-4ee5-b5c46110c7605476_en?filename=swd2021_305_en.pdf.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
- 2025-07-02 “E-001156/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Member States remain in the driving seat for defence whilst benefitting from the added value offered by the EU programmes and instruments supporting cooperation between European defence industrial players and between Member States, and incentivising investment in defence capacities. In that respect, the Commission is particularly vigilant in ensuring the respect of the allocation of competences, as enshrined in the Treaties. The Commission is fully aware of the responsibilities of the individual mentioned in the parliamentary question within RTX Corporation, as both the organisation and the individual are registered in the Transparency Register 1 . However, the Commission respects the freedom of every professional organisation to be represented by whomever it considers fit for this purpose. As regards their relation with external stakeholders, Commission Members and staff members are bound by stringent rules and internal control standards, included in particular in the treaties, the Staff Regulations 2 and the Conditions of employment of other servants of the EU, as well as the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour 3 . These rules aim, in particular, at ensuring the independence, impartiality, objectivity and loyalty of Commission Members and staff members in the exercise of their duties. This includes the protection of any sensitive or classified information. Finally, the issue of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) is very high on the agenda of the Commission, especially in the context of recent Russian attempts to undermine the EU and its Member States’ democratic processes. FIMI is one of the key aspects of the recently adopted European Preparedness Union Strategy 4 and will be addressed in the upcoming European Democracy Shield. 1 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/searchregister-or-update/organisation-detail_en?id=87564644126-75. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1962/31(1)/2014-05-01/eng. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/about/service-standards-and-principles/ethics-and-good-administration/goodadministration/code-good-administrative-behaviour-and-complaints_en. 4 JOIN/2025/130 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0130.”
EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · "Buy European" provisions · EU-US relations
- 2025-07-02 “E-001294/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The classification of the functions of government (COFOG) is a classification of transactions designed to apply to general government and its subsectors. In the current version of the COFOG classification, which is used both globally and in Europe, there are 10 divisions, including division 02 Defence. The classification is centred on primary purpose of government expenditure. Thus, division 02 Defence captures all government expenditure with primary purpose of supporting and developing defence capabilities, but it excludes expenditure and investment that has other primary purposes, like climate change. The activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence 1 was justified by the exceptional circumstances created by Russia’s aggression of Ukraine and its major impact on Member States’ public finances. The activation is framed in scope, size, and time to cater for a quick transition to a higher defence spending regime while preserving fiscal sustainability. Member States should use the financial assistance provided under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation 2 to carry out common procurements. Eligible defence common procurement should relate to the list of priority areas identified by Article 1 of SAFE Regulation. In addition, Article 16 sets out eligibility conditions applying to contractors, subcontractors and products participating in common procurement supported by SAFE. Therefore, to be supported under the SAFE instrument, investments also contributing to tackling climate change need to fall into one of the areas identified in Article 1 of SAFE Regulation and be channelled through common procurement, which complies with the eligibility conditions set out in the Regulation. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a57304ce-1a98-4a2c-aed536485884f1a0_en?filename=Communication-on-the-national-escape-clause.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
Climate efforts · Defence spending
- 2025-07-01 “E-001541/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Member States that are also North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies have committed to spend at least 2% of their gross domestic product on defence. While not all Member States have reached this target yet, the trajectory over the past years is going in that direction. The White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 1 recognises this positive trend and notes a growth in the defence spending by Member States of more than 31% since 2021, reaching 1.9% of the EU’s combined gross domestic product in 2024. But this is not enough, in particular to compensate for decades of underinvestment in defence. In view of the growing geopolitical challenges EU faces, its security depends on this overall increase of defence spending and defence investments, as well as Member States closely coordinating and working together. The Commission therefore offers support to all Member States in this endeavour, including by offering the possibility to Member States to use the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact 2 for additional expenditure in defence up to EUR 650 billion, in a framed and coordinated manner. Finally, the Security Action for Europe Regulation adopted by Member States on 27 May 2025 3 will provide Member States with loans up to EUR 150 billion. Its recital (8) acknowledges that ‘… there is a growing need to accelerate, in a spirit of solidarity, the provision of Union support to those Member States that are likely to be threatened by serious difficulties due to the massive public investments needed, which may have an impact on their economic situation and that …, such solidarity is especially essential for those Member States which are most exposed to military threats’. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readines s%202030.pdf. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a57304ce-1a98-4a2c-aed536485884f1a0_en?filename=Communication-on-the-national-escape-clause.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202501106.”
Defence spending · EU competences on defence