Dubravka Šuica

Policy topics Dubravka Šuica is active on

What Dubravka Šuica has said (80)

• 2026-06-09 “Dear colleagues, Ladies and gentlemen, Good afternoon. Today, we are launching the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy and Clean Tech Cooperation Initiative – T-MED. This is a crucial flagship of the Pact for the Mediterranean, which we launched last November in Barcelona. Bringing together investment and opportunity for the benefit of the whole region. Generating the energy that people and companies need, on all shores of the Mediterranean. --- This initiative comes at a critical moment. The energy crisis caused by the closing of the Strait of Hormuz shows once again that Europe and the world are vulnerable to energy shocks. The cost of fossil fuel dependence is simply too high. To achieve a competitive economy, an economy that empowers people to innovate, to create new businesses – we need more diversified sources of energy. We need energy that is consistently affordable, reliable, and sustainable. --- The good news is: if ever we wanted the perfect place to develop renewable energy, the Mediterranean basin is it. Our partners in the southern Mediterranean hold unmatched renewable potential. In fact, renewable energy is 30% to 40% cheaper to produce in North Africa, compared to Europe. At the same time, there is a big gap between resource potential and actual investment flows. Let me give you an example: Africa represents around 40% of global solar energy potential. Yet it attracted less than 2% of global renewable investment in 2024. This presents the region with a serious challenge. It is not easy to build something this big when capital flows do not reach you. But it also presents us with an opportunity. We can unlock this massive potential, powering up our whole region. And we can turn this potential into bankable investments, for the benefit of communities all around the Mediterranean. Following the principles of the Pact for the Mediterranean: Joint ownership. Co-creation. And shared responsibility. This is an opportunity we simply cannot miss. An opportunity to protect what matters – in particular our energy independence and our competitiveness. But also, an opportunity to do good and to add value. We know the benefits of clean energy are huge – stronger growth, more jobs, less pollution, better health. Even those countries in the southern Mediterranean that export fossil fuels know that, if they enhance their domestic production of cheap renewables, they are better insulated from shocks and better positioned for growth. We want this investment to happen – and they want this investment to happen. The economics are there for all to see. The numbers add up. Our interests are aligned. And I am proud to present to you today the result of our work together. T-MED. --- So, how will T-MED work, concretely? At its core, T-MED addresses the crucial challenge I just mentioned – the climate finance investment gap in our region. And it does so through the T-MED Investment Platform – which will be operational this September. This Platform brings together EU financial institutions, private investors, project promoters, and our partner countries. It connects projects with the capital to finance them – and with the legislators in a position to support the conditions for these projects to flourish. These connections are at the core of robust, transparent public-private partnerships, creating the predictable conditions investors need in order to thrive. At the same time, we know one of the biggest obstacles to accelerate investment is risk. For that, we have an ambitious financial envelope – over 5 billion euro in guarantee capacity – still under the current long-term budget of the EU. We can spur private investment by de-risking it. Unlocking up to 25 billion euro in investments, from renewables to upgrading grids, interconnections, and clean-tech. --- Already last April, I launched a Call for Expressions of Interest addressed to private investors. Our goal is to gather a strong network of financing partners ready to reap the rewards of this massive opportunity in the Southern Mediterranean. Today, we are tackling the other side of this equation. We are launching a dedicated Call for project promoters to identify bankable projects. We are looking for projects that address regulatory bottlenecks. Projects that support the development of industrial partnerships. Projects that address gaps in the energy system, reinforcing the infrastructure we need to finally generate and distribute all this energy. --- To support these projects, we will also work with our partners. We know investors need clarity on the regulatory environment that they invest in. They need transparent permits. They need grid access. And strong institutions with whom they can have a consistent and fruitful dialogue. That is why our investment Platform will include the T-MED Regulatory Accelerator. The Accelerator will support reform roadmaps, technical assistance, and regulatory dialogues to make clean energy projects faster, cheaper, and more attractive to finance. --- Dear friends, These projects will have a huge impact in the region. We are talking about high quality jobs – and people learning crucial skills to do them. We are talking about sharing expertise and transferring knowledge across the Mediterranean. And of course, there will be plenty of opportunities for young people. To make sure companies have access to the skills they need, as part of the Platform, we will work towards a T-MED Skills Agenda. What does this mean? It means we will link skills development directly to investments. Through vocational training. Through company-led programmes. And through university partnerships. Because the green transition can only accelerate if we have technicians, engineers, grid operators, and digital specialists. Make no mistake – the energy we are seeking can only be powered by people. Our goal is to train and upskill 100,000 workers in renewables, grids, and clean tech by 2035. And it will be these people – both from Europe and from the Southern neighbourhood – who will modernise energy systems, connectors, and grids. This is crucial, because ultimately, we want this energy to flow across borders. That means infrastructure and storage. --- Ladies and gentlemen, By launching T-MED, we intend to deliver a triple win. A win for our partner countries, bringing in crucial investment, generating sustainable jobs, sustainable growth, and sustainable prosperity. A win for Europe, providing a much-needed new source of reliable, affordable energy, strengthening our competitiveness and security. And a win for the planet, accelerating decarbonisation through renewables, green hydrogen, and clean tech. --- This triple win is already taking shape – through pilot projects and through our bilateral diplomatic work. Let me give you an example: In Egypt, we are already supporting one of the largest energy projects in the region: the modernisation and expansion of the national electricity grid. The EU contributed 90 million euro. We also provided a 600 million euro loan from the European Investment Bank. And together, these funds will support a total investment of more than 2 billion euro. So what will this money achieve? It strengthens Egypt's capacity to integrate renewable energy into its grid. It supports its objective of reaching 42% renewables by 2030, reinforcing its role as a regional energy hub connected to Europe. And it creates major opportunities for European companies. At the same time, this project enables other crucial projects – it has a multiplying effect. Take another example: the Ain Sokhna Green Ammonia Project, which is also already under development. With a total investment value of 575 million euro, the project will develop a 100-Megawatt electrolysis facility to produce renewable hydrogen. Europe is the main export market – and Egypt will benefit from developing new industrial skills and value chains. Crucially, the synergies between projects are the reason why T-MED is so valuable. One project is good, but it is a drop in an ocean of need. 25 billion euro worth of expected projects is an entirely different matter. It is a game changer – for the carbon emissions and for all the Mediterranean. And we expect these investments to generate at least 15 Gigawatts of additional renewable energy capacity by 2035. --- Ladies and gentlemen, We have done our homework – based on solid evidence. As I said, the economics make sense. Now, it is time to accelerate. This means the Mediterranean should not only deploy this clean tech. It should produce it. Assemble it. And maintain it. --- Years from now, people will marvel at what we have achieved. At an energy independent Mediterranean region. A powerhouse of renewables, where businesses on both shores of the Mediterranean addressing real, concrete needs. And the entrepreneurs we support, the companies we help, the people we up-skill, they will reap the profits of their crucial work. Building the infrastructure of our shared security, resilience, and prosperity. With benefits for all. The Mediterranean has always been a space of connection. Through T-MED, it can also become a shared space of clean energy, clean industry, and clean growth. Time to get to work. Thank you.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2026-05-29 “Excellencies, distinguished guests, dear friends, I would have liked to join you in person at the European Heritage Policy Agora 2026 but due to unavoidable institutional obligations I cannot be there with you. You understand very well how our Mare Nostrum has never simply been only a sea. Its unique history has made it a living space of exchange, trade, creativity, coexistence, and dialogue. Across centuries, the Mediterranean connected Europe, North Africa, and the Levant through knowledge, culture, and human encounters. Today, however, this shared space faces profound challenges: geopolitical tensions, armed conflicts, environmental degradation, and the accelerating effects of climate change. In this context, cultural heritage is not a luxury of the past. It is a strategic resource for the future. This belief lies at the heart of the Pact for the Mediterranean and its Action Plan. The Pact recognises culture and heritage as essential pillars for building resilient societies, fostering mutual understanding, and strengthening regional cooperation. Heritage can serve as a bridge in a unique and irreplaceable way. It can help restore trust, promote reconciliation, and reinforce the sense of shared responsibility that our region needs. Heritage and sustainability are inseparable. Coastal erosion, rising sea levels, biodiversity loss, and environmental deterioration threaten not only ecosystems, but also the cultural landscapes, historic sites, and living traditions that define the Mediterranean identity. This is why we must fully integrate cultural heritage into climate action and green transformation policies. We must strengthen Euro-Mediterranean partnerships, support digital innovation in heritage preservation, and empower young people and local communities through skills, creativity, and cultural cooperation. Cyprus offers a particularly meaningful setting for this discussion. Its history reflects both the pain of division and the enduring hope for reconciliation. It reminds us that heritage can become a powerful instrument for peace-building and dialogue. It is a powerful instrument for sustainable tourism and job creation, for all generations. Let us therefore reaffirm together that the soul of our Mare Nostrum lies not in what separates us, but in what we share. And let us ensure that cultural heritage remains a force for peace, resilience, sustainability, and human connection across the Mediterranean. Thank you”
  EU strategy for tourism development
• 2026-05-27 “Dear friends, Let me start by thanking Parliament Magazine for organising this first Mediterranean Forum – to discuss key challenges at the heart of my portfolio and of the Cyprus Presidency. We are living through a moment of rupture in the international order. Alliances that once were unshakable, are less certain. And the cost of war is already being felt across the world – from the gas pump to the dinner table. In moments like this – when trust and reliability are at a premium – it is crucial that we strengthen partnerships. That is the main goal of the Pact for the Mediterranean. To strengthen our ties with countries in North Africa, in the Middle East, and in the Gulf. To build resilience across our economies. And to share in the benefits of cooperation, building trust, and creating prosperity. Take energy, for example. Countries and citizens are struggling with energy costs. We know the southern Mediterranean has the conditions to produce renewables 30% to 40% cheaper than in the EU. Our partners need investment to produce more energy. And we need reliable energy to arrive at our shores. Because nobody can close the straits of sunshine and wind. This is why we have put forward the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy and Clean Tech initiative – T-MED. Supporting our partners to develop the infrastructure for this energy to flow. At the same time, we are working with our partners on other areas – from protecting this and other critical infrastructure from cyberattacks, to managing migration, to investing in skills, tackling skills gaps that companies face, north and south of the mediterranean. This is even more important when we realise the huge untapped potential of the many unemployed young people in the southern Mediterranean. Or the massive untapped potential of women – just as educated as men, but often un- or underemployed. This cost is currently estimated to be close to half a trillion euro per year. As you can see, the Pact focuses on long-term solutions. And it works in parallel with bilateral partnerships. We have signed strategic comprehensive partnerships with Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan. And we intend to move ahead with talks with Morocco and Lebanon, for example. We are also working towards peace where peace is most needed. In Palestine, seeking a two-state solution. In Syria, supporting socio-economic recovery. Or in Lebanon, focusing on crisis management and long-term stabilisation. We just put forward 1 billion euro to support the government-led emergency response. In parallel we are also deepening our cooperation with our Gulf partners, on energy as well as across a wide range of other issues both at regional and at bilateral level. I am looking forward to the EU-GCC Summit and EU-GCC Energy Ministerial later this year as well as in progress at our bilateral Strategic Partnership Agreements. These opportunities to develop relationships are priceless. We must not miss them. That is why Fora such as this one are so important. Because these partnerships cannot truly be accomplished without all of you. Without policy-makers complementing our work and building on it. Without investors taking advantage of the opportunities of the Pact. Without businesses exploring new markets that our diplomats open up. So, thank you all for your commitment – and I wish you a wonderful Forum.”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2026-05-22 “Dear friends, I cannot be there with you today, but I wanted to express my support to your Festival. Young people play a crucial role in the future we are building. And we need to create spaces to discuss how we can empower youth. On how we can create opportunities for education and research, for new businesses and start-ups, and for prosperity. Because it is up to us to decide if this really is – a country for young people. Along with all your efforts, for which we are grateful – the EU is working to create opportunities to realise this ambition. --- It is precisely in this context that I see the work of the Pact for the Mediterranean. We need to work with our partners across the sea – in the spirit of joint responsibility, addressing shared challenges. This is the case for education, where the Pact is strengthening cooperation between universities under the banner of the Mediterranean University. From micro-credentials to mobility and joint programmes, this initiative will help prepare young people with the skills and competences they need to succeed. At the same time, the Pact will create opportunities for young people to find fulfilling jobs, addressing skills needs across the Mediterranean. That's the role of StartUp4Med, an initiative to empower people to create their own business, especially women and young people. Of course, strengthening the economy is a key lever to empower young people. And we are leveraging our partnerships to make our societies less dependent on fossil fuels – protecting us from shocks like the one we are feeling now. That is why we are investing in renewable energy across our sea – from solar to liquid hydrogen – through our T-MED initiative. And it is why we are deepening economic ties with north Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf. Put together, these regions represent a market of over 600 million people. Tapping into it means a wealth of opportunity we cannot afford to miss. --- Dear friends, We must leverage our ties across the Mediterranean to make Italy – and all of Europe – a place where young people's skills find purpose in thriving economies. A place where their aspirations are not forgotten from crisis to crisis – and where their voices shape the present and determine their future. For my part, I am working to make sure young voices are integral to our Mediterranean policy and diplomacy. From listening to young people in our Youth Policy Dialogues to the Youth Parliamentary Assembly for the Mediterranean – which, by the way, is another initiative of the Pact. And we will keep listening. Because politics fails if it excludes those it claims to serve. I wish you a very fruitful conference.”
  Focus of EU policy on education (shaping workers vs citizens)
• 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question According to the information available to the Commission, the reported incident involved members of the Libyan Coast Guard, which operates under the authority of the Libyan Navy. As a military structure, the investigation falls within the competence of the Military Prosecutor and the Ministry of Defence. These institutions operate under the authority of the internationally recognised Government of National Unity based in Tripoli. The EU Delegation to Libya maintains regular contacts with Libyan counterparts, primarily through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has also engaged with the Ministry of Defence regarding the incident. The Libyan authorities have confirmed that an investigation is ongoing in accordance with Libyan law. During the 8th meeting of the EU-Libya Technical Mission on Migration on 3 February 2026, both sides agreed to continue exchanges on strengthening mechanisms for monitoring, investigating and reporting search and rescue (SAR) incidents. The EU also expects Libyan authorities to adopt standard operating procedures for SAR operations developed with EU support. Monitoring and dialogue mechanisms have been further strengthened for EU-funded projects in Libya through more frequent Technical Missions, reinforced on-the-ground verification and independent evaluations, on top of the already existing monitoring tools. Dialogue with the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, and the Attorney General’s Office has been intensified and made more systematic.”
  Asylum & border control · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2026-05-21 “Messieurs les Présidents, Mesdames et Messieurs les Députés, Honourable Members, It is an honour to address you today. I want to sincerely thank you for your invitation. Especially as France is a tireless defender of a strong Europe, working for peace and prosperity around the world. And particularly in the Middle East, the region I am responsible for in the European Commission. We are facing serious headwinds in pursuit of this goal. The situation in the Middle East is extremely uncertain. In Iran, the ceasefire seems to be holding, but it remains extremely fragile. The consequences of this conflict – especially around the closing of the strait of Hormuz – are already being deeply felt by European citizens – and by people worldwide. At the gas pump. With the electricity bill. In the grocery store. And this only reinforces one fact. When Europe's neighbourhood suffers instability, the EU suffers with it. --- I think we can all agree that the Middle East is crucial for European security. And I thank the French government for their leadership in the region – acting as a mediator and a responsible partner. There can be no stability without just and lasting peace. And there can be no just and lasting peace without respect for political boundaries. Defending our principles and defending a world order based on international law and human rights, is entirely in our interest – and in the interest of peace, stability, and prosperity. That means standing by Israel when they are attacked. And here I want to clearly condemn the horrible Hamas attacks of October 7th. Many citizens have died since in this terrible conflict. The EU has taken sanctions against extremist forces who are responsible for this war. We also oppose Israel's unilateral actions, in particular as they expand settlements in the West Bank – along with the intolerable violence that comes with this. The decision to move ahead with sanctions against violent settlers, at the Foreign Affairs Council last week, is an important European signal. But we must bear in mind – signals alone will not suffice. We need results. We continue to support the Palestinian Authority and implementation of its Reform Agenda. The European Union is the biggest donor to the Palestinian Authority. We have a 1.6 billion euro program of support for them over two years. And we are seeing some positive results in exceptionally difficult circumstances. We will assess this progress at the next Palestinian Donor Group meeting planned on 13 July. That will also be the opportunity to initiate discussions on the future governance of Gaza, and in particular on the coordination of early recovery efforts for the Palestinian citizens. But success here will also require further insisting with Israel to release the clearance revenues for the Palestine Authority and to extend the correspondent banking services waiver. Because the needs on the ground are immense. Together with the World Bank and the United Nations, we have just released the most recent Gaza Rapid Damage Needs Assessment. Recovery and reconstruction needs are estimated at over 70 billion dollars. I also had the chance to see these needs first hand last week, during a recent virtual visit to a UNICEF school in Gaza. Their work, under the hardest imaginable conditions, must continue – with our complete support. In fact, together with humanitarian assistance, the EU is already mobilising a short-term crisis response – on mines and rubble removal. Just as we are preparing a first early recovery package. Still, for these initiatives to be rolled out, we need better, sustained access to the Gaza Strip. Especially as the political situation remains extremely fragile. Negotiations to proceed with the disarmament of Hamas seem to have stalled. We need to work together to move forward on this point – committed as we are to supporting the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2803 on the Gaza Place Plan. --- The crisis in Lebanon is also deeply concerning. Here, too, the impact on civilians is massive. Over one million displaced people. And, despite the Lebanese Armed Forces' best efforts, together with UNIFIL, Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity is under threat. Not only from Hezbollah's illegal actions against Israel, which undermine the State's monopoly of force. But also from Israel's response. Let me take this opportunity to express my condolences for the loss of French and Indonesian peacekeepers in the South of Lebanon. The EU has responded to Lebanon's emergency needs with humanitarian aid and support to the government-led emergency response. And we are grateful for France's support, having contributed significantly to the 25 million euros, Team Europe Initiative for recovery in conflict-affected areas. We are looking forward to working on its delivery together with the French Agency for Development. This in addition to our offer to negotiate a Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership. --- The dramatic situations we are witnessing in the region show us two clear facts: First, our involvement is crucial – because nobody will defend our interests for us. And second, the EU's impact is greatest when we work together with our partners in the region. This is the fundamental logic behind the Pact for the Mediterranean. Together with our partners in North Africa and the Middle East, we are building strong partnerships based on mutual trust and joint responsibility. The Pact acts on three fronts: First, People. We are developing initiatives that support skills and people-to-people contacts, bringing our societies closer together. This is where we find initiatives like the Mediterranean University – inspired by the European Universities initiative. Because we need to support innovation, enabling people on both shores of the Mediterranean to have the competences our economies need. --- Second, the economy. We are developing initiatives that strengthen trade and investments, creating opportunities for our companies to profit. Not to the detriment of our neighbours, but together with them. This is where we find initiatives like T-MED – the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy and Clean-Tech Cooperation Initiative. It focuses on developing renewable energy projects in the southern Mediterranean. Because renewable energy is 30% to 40% cheaper to produce there, compared to Europe. This initiative – and indeed our relationship with our partners – is crucial for Europe to be energy independent. Because nobody can close the straits of sunshine and wind. And the competitiveness of European companies – French companies in particular – can only benefit from new opportunities for investment and cheap energy. We are working to attract and scale-up investment in the region, from connectivity and energy infrastructure to maritime trade, aligned with our EU-wide strategic priorities. And I would happily ask you to promote this message far and wide. --- Third, security, preparedness and migration management. You know very well how important our relationship with our partners in the southern Mediterranean is, if we want to succeed in limiting uncontrolled, illegal migration. So, the Pact puts forward initiatives to work with our partners in this area. Building capacity in law enforcement on all shores of the Mediterranean. Preventing illegal departures – and working on effective readmission. And effectively fighting migrant smuggling and organised crime. Stepping up our support on voluntary returns of migrants from partners to countries of origin is also an integral part of our approach – as is integrated border management. These initiatives work in tandem with efforts to have more effective legal pathways for EU countries to address labour market needs. This is where talent partnerships come in – for example with Tunisia, with Morocco and with Egypt. --- All the initiatives of the Pact work in tandem with our diplomacy – with our bilateral work with partners. For example, our efforts to attract investors to support initiatives like T-MED work in tandem with our cooperation with Egypt, where we are investing in the electrical grid and in liquid hydrogen production. It is important that we join forces in our diplomatic efforts in Algeria, where I was two weeks ago, working to create a better investment climate for EU companies. We signed a Memorandum of Understanding on renewables with Tunisia in 2023. We are negotiating a Deeper Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership with Morocco, addressing areas like security and migration, trade, or connectivity. And we are investing considerably in Syria, to enhance stability and to ensure peace. We recently had a very successful High Level Political Dialogue with the Syrian government in Brussels. --- We must also not forget the Gulf countries. The current situation offers us a unique opportunity to reinforce our partnerships in the region – because we are a reliable partner, and this reliability is especially valuable right now. We are exploring Strategic Partnership Agreements and Free Trade Agreements with several of our partners in the region. And we are keen on developing triangular cooperation between the EU, North Africa and the Middle East, and the Gulf. Allow me to point out that the market represented by these countries numbers around 600 million people. This is a huge opportunity for Europe. For European companies. For European people. And this opportunity is only compounded when we think about initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor – IMEC. And I must commend France's commitment and support of this path, having designated your Special Envoy Gérard Mestrallet to aid in this project. --- Honourable Members, The Pact and European diplomacy work hand in hand. And I thank France for your involvement in the preparation of the Pact and its actions. I stand ready to discuss with you where France can take a more active lead. But I also wanted to highlight one last message. Right now, we see the scale of the crisis. We see the damage being done as other actors choose a path different than ours – away from the three D's: de-escalation, diplomacy and dialogue. But we also see the importance of this approach – as well as the benefits we will gain if we keep at it. Our cooperation with the Mediterranean has never been more relevant. We must not slow this work down. That means that we need resources – beyond 2027. So that we do not suffer the consequences of inaction. The consequences of not being there to defend our European interests. And so that our competitors do not have the opportunity to fill in the gap, promoting their interests to our detriment. I would ask your support for a swift agreement on the new long-term budget of the EU – along with a strong Global Europe instrument and a strong Middle East and North Africa and Gulf Pillar in it. Thank you for your attention and commitment. I look forward to hearing your thoughts.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-05-20 “Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission 20.5.2026 Written question In 2026, the Commission announced EUR 124.4 million in humanitarian funding for Palestine [1] . This brings the total of EU humanitarian aid to Palestine to almost EUR 675 million. The EU is also delivering on its commitment to provide the Multiannual Comprehensive Support Programme (2025-2027) worth up to EUR 1.6 billion to foster Palestinian recovery and resilience [2] and to support the Palestinian Authority’s reform agenda. The EU has therefore been the largest international donor to the Palestinian people, both in humanitarian and development assistance. Regarding the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument -Global Europe (NDICI-GE) emerging challenges and priorities cushion, the remaining amount until the end of the Multiannual Financial Framework is of EUR 159 million until the end of 2027 [3] . The Commission stands ready to use, once conditions allow and access to the Gaza Strip is possible, additional funding under the remaining part of the cushion to further support efforts in Palestine, to address the most pressing early recovery and infrastructure needs in Gaza. At this stage, the situation remains fluid. The Commission is monitoring the situation on the ground to ensure it can adapt its response, including to support humanitarian needs and early recovery. As reiterated during the European Council of 19 March 2026 [4] , the EU stands ready to work on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2803 endorsing the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict [5] . [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_611. [2] https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-announces-multiannual-programme-palestinian-recovery-and-resilience-worth-eu16-billion-2025-04-14_en. [3] As per the notification to the European Parliament on the NDICI cushion mobilisation. [4] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/lwhk3itd/en-20260319-european-council-conclusions.pdf. [5] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4093207?v=pdf.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-05-11 “Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question The invitation to participate in the meeting was addressed to President of the Commission by the chair of the Board of Peace. The Commissioner for the Mediterranean participated on behalf of the Commission in the meeting. It is within the remit of the Commission to accept invitations of this kind as a matter of international courtesy. The EU is not a member of the Board of Peace and still has a number of questions about a number of elements in the charter of the Board of Peace related to its scope, its governance and its compatibility with the UN Charter. The Commissioner’s participation cannot be interpreted as amounting to an implicit endorsement of the Board of Peace by the Commission, let alone by the EU, nor an endorsement of the outcome of the meeting or of any resolutions that might be adopted by the Board Members. The participation by the Commissioner for the Mediterranean in the Board of Peace meeting focused on the discussions related to Gaza and its recovery and reconstruction. The objective of the participation was to help ensure coordination and complementarity between the EU and broader international efforts. The EU plays a key role as the provider of significant external assistance to the Palestinians and is a major donor for humanitarian assistance in Gaza. It is therefore important to engage with all actors aiming at providing aid in Gaza, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2803 [1] . [1] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4093207?v=pdf.”
  EU-US relations · International humanitarian alignment with UN
• 2026-05-06 “Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission 6.5.2026 Written question In 2026, the EU will sustain its support to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). On 16 April 2026, Member States approved the proposal from the Commission to allocate EUR 82 million [1] to the 2026 Programme Budget of UNRWA. Additionally, on 16 March 2026, the EU announced a substantial humanitarian aid package of EUR 124 million for Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. UNRWA will benefit from humanitarian funding, underscoring its indispensable role in delivering life-saving assistance to Palestine refugees. The Commission welcomes the outcome of the conciliation procedure on the 2026 budget, where a EUR 35 million reinforcement for the Southern Neighbourhood was agreed by the Budgetary Authority. The modalities and repartition of that reinforcement will be defined and adapted to the evolving situation on the ground. The Commission remains steadfast in its commitment and support to UNRWA to enable the Agency's capacity to fulfil its mandate. In parallel, the Commission continues to pursue pragmatic solutions in coordination with UN agencies and humanitarian partners, to safeguard the uninterrupted delivery of humanitarian assistance, ensuring operational continuity under all circumstances. [1] https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-announces-multiannual-programme-palestinian-recovery-and-resilience-worth-eu16-billion-2025-04-14_en.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Support for international humanitarian organisations · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2026-05-05 “Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question By adopting, in 2025, Presidential decree 4/2025 [1] abolishing the so-called ‘prisoners and martyrs’ payment’, the Palestinian Authority (PA) confirmed its commitment to its reform agenda, moving towards establishing a new social protection system based exclusively on need and vulnerability criteria. The PA has commissioned an independent audit — which is currently ongoing — to confirm that cash transfer payments are allocated based on socioeconomic criteria. The Commission has always excluded financial support to the prisoners and martyrs’ payment system in its financial support to the PA. All EU contributions to the PA under the Palestinian-European Socio-Economic Management and Assistance Mechanism (PEGASE) — including those targeting social welfare cash transfers — go through high standards of control applied through ex ante and ex post verifications. These verifications have been evaluated as robust by the European Court of Auditors [2] . The safeguards measures are detailed in t he financial review of EU assistance in Palestine of November 2023 [3] . Part of the financial support to the PA is explicitly linked to concrete reforms and is released based on confirmed evidence of achievement of agreed milestones. The presentation of a draft Palestinian constitution [4] signals progress towards political reforms and participatory democracy. The draft constitution under public consultation contains references to the caring for the families of inter alia martyrs, the wounded and prisoners, to meet their humanitarian needs but does not indicate reinstatement of former schemes. Subject to any revisions following the public consultation, the current provisions do not provide a basis for concluding that the abolished prisoners and martyrs scheme will be reinstated within the future Palestinian constitutional framework. Further analysis will be conducted once a final text will be available following the conclusion of the public consultation, in line with the EU’s established clear position as set out before. [1] https://mjr.ogb.gov.ps/Decrees/Download/?p=f696dd21-7507-4d72-a3fc-b3e140469b55.pdf&d=%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%85-4-%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A9-2025-%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86. [2] https://www.eca.europa.eu/lists/ecadocuments/sr13_14/sr13_14_en.pdf. [3] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/communication-commission-review-ongoing-financial-assistance-palestine_en. [4] https://dostor.ps/public/chapters.php.”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-05-05 “Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The Commissioner for the Mediterranean attended, as an observer on behalf of the Commission, the Board of Peace meeting on 19 February 2026 in Washington, District of Columbia. As the Commissioner attended as an observer, she did not intervene in the deliberations of the conference. The attendance of the Commissioner was not subject to a Council decision as the objective of the Commission’s participation was to foster coordination and complementarity between the EU and broader international efforts in relation to Gaza, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2803 [1] . The Commissioner was accompanied by the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process, alongside representatives of some 14 Member States who participated at Ministerial or senior diplomatic level. As the EU plays a significant role as a key provider of external assistance to the Palestinian people and is a major donor for humanitarian assistance in Gaza, it is important to engage with all actors aiming at providing aid in Gaza. In this respect, the meeting offered an occasion to showcase the considerable EU support for Palestine and for a reformed Palestinian Authority, as well as to confirm the EU’s readiness to support recovery and resilience in Gaza. As reiterated on several occasions, the EU is not a member of the Board of Peace and has raised a number of questions about a number of elements in the charter of the Board of Peace related to its scope, its governance, and its compatibility with the UN Charter. [1] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4093207?v=pdf.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU-US relations · EU diplomatic representation
• 2026-04-30 “E-000266/2026 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission implements rigorous safeguards to ensure that no persons or entities receive EU funding if these are subject to EU sanctions or are involved in any criminal or unethical practices, including terrorist financing and offences. These safeguards include ex ante and ex post risk assessment, monitoring and strong controls and audits. These include verification of eligibility of the request for payment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), screening of beneficiaries against international and ad hoc sanctions lists ahead of disbursement and auditing 100% of the payments executed by the PA. The European Court of Auditors certified the control and safeguard system of the PalestinianEuropean Socio-Economic Management and Assistance Mechanism (PEGASE) as ‘robust’. No evidence has been found to date that money has been diverted for unintended purposes, as reaffirmed during the financial review of EU assistance in Palestine that took place in November 2023. Following Hamas’ terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023, the EU carried out a thorough review of EU financial assistance 1 for Palestine 2 , including programmes implemented by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). The review showed that the Commission’s controls and existing safeguards in place work well, and no evidence has been found to date that money has been misused or diverted for unintended purposes. UNRWA is a pillar-assessed UN Agency and has been subject to a complementary pillar assessment in 2022. In the last years, the Commission has also been working closely with UNRWA to enhance the neutrality processes and controls systems in the Agency, among others by financing, in 2024, a project to reinforce the Department of Internal Oversight Services and Ethics Department. Furthermore, the Commission is also a member of the Working Group on Neutrality and Integrity Issues which aims, among others, at advising and supporting UNRWA in the implementation of the Colonna Report Recommendations 3 . 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/communication-commission-review-ongoing-financial-assistancepalestine_en. 2 This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of EU Member States on this issue. 3 https://www.un.org/unispal/document/colonna-report-and-unrwas-high-level-action-plan-for-implementationof-the-recommendations/.”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine · Support for international humanitarian organisations
• 2026-04-28 “E-000876/2026 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission In line with its 2023 Economic Security Strategy 1 , the Commission has been working steadily over recent years in ensuring resilient and diversified supply chains. The India–Middle East– Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is part of these efforts, which is why the Commission has played a key role in the revival of this initiative over the last year. The current military escalation in the region and the logistical and energy shocks resulting from this disruption make such a corridor even more relevant than before. Since May 2025, the IMEC signatories have been meeting regularly at senior official level (the latest meeting organised by Italy, one of the eight initial signatories, in Trieste on 17 March 2026) and at technical level, with the establishment of five technical working groups, whose current and future work will help operationalise IMEC. All IMEC signatories are already investing in, or supporting, soft and hard infrastructure projects that contribute to the objectives of IMEC, i.e. boosting connectivity between Europe, the Midde East-Gulf region and India, be it in terms of transport, energy and digital connections. The current aim of the IMEC signatories is to identify gaps and relevant projects to address these. Infrastructure investments and accompanying soft measures are key to the success of IMEC and while the private sector will be the main engine behind IMEC, all signatories are expected to contribute to this aim, including Italy. The Commission will use its existing tools and financial instruments in this respect. 1 2023 European Economic Security Strategy: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52023JC0020.”
  EU relations with Gulf countries · EU-India relations · EU policy on the Indo-Pacific region
• 2026-04-20 “E-000690/2026 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU is not a member of the Board of Peace. There are serious doubts about a number of elements in the charter of the Board of Peace related to its scope, its governance and its compatibility with the UN Charter. The EU is ready to work together with the US on the implementation of the comprehensive Peace Plan for Gaza, with a Board of Peace carrying out its mission as a transitional administration, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2803 1 . The EU is actively engaging with the US and the new Gaza governance structures on how to jointly reach this objective. As an observer, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean participated in the Board of Peace meeting in Washington DC. Her participation focused on the discussions related to Gaza and its recovery and reconstruction. The Commissioner attended alongside representatives of at least half of EU Member States, as well as other European partners and regional actors. The EU is committed to ensure coordination and complementarity between the EU and broader international efforts. The Commission’s meetings with interlocutors, such as the Tony Blair Institute, are part of its standard and wide engagement with key stakeholders contributing to a peace process in the region. The EU does not have any ongoing projects with the Tony Blair Institute. 1 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4093207?v=pdf.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · EU-US relations
• 2026-04-08 “Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission 8.4.2026 Written question In the Letter of Intent between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Commission dated July 2024 [1] , the PA committed to undertake substantial and credible reforms including for the education sector, with a focus on improving the quality of the education system that encompasses the development of educational materials and high-quality teaching and learning. The annex to the Letter of Intent listed the adoption by the PA of an action plan to improve quality education as key progress indicator by the end of August 2024. The said action plan was adopted in mid-August. In the following months, the PA developed, in coordination with the EU, a Joint EU-PA Reform Matrix that included a sequencing of clear benchmarks, as the basis for disbursements under the Multiannual and Comprehensive Support Programme for recovery and resilience for 2025-2027. The Reform Matrix agreed by the PA and the EU in November 2024 included milestones focusing on the education reform. These milestones complement and upgrade the benchmarks contained in the Letter of Intent. The PA President, at the UN General Assembly in September 2025, reiterated the commitment to fully transition to learning materials aligned to UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (Unesco) standards within the next two years. The PA has made initial revisions to grade 12 and more comprehensive revisions to grades one to four to align with Unesco standards. Revised learning material in the format of ‘educational packages’ has been published on the Palestinian Ministry of Education website in December 2024 and October 2025 respectively. Substantial changes in the curriculum for grades one to four have been noted and revisions are currently being assessed by experts contracted by the Commission. The EU remains engaged with the PA on curriculum and broader education sector reform and EU disbursements are linked to the PA’s achievement of key reforms identified in the Reform Matrix. [1] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/letter-intent-between-palestinian-authority-and-european-commission_en.”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-04-01 “E-003519/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes note of the European Parliament’s request for more detailed information on the monitoring of EU-funded activities in Libya. Due to the sensitive nature of the operations concerned and the volatile security context on the ground, certain operational details cannot be disclosed publicly. The Commission remains available to provide further information to the European Parliament in a confidential setting, where appropriate. Monitoring of the Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management programme in Libya (SIBMMIL) is carried out through several complementary mechanisms, including regular reporting from implementing partners, on-site verification missions, results-oriented monitoring and independent evaluations. Since 2019, a third-party monitoring framework has been in place in Libya, covering all EU-funded projects. This framework provides EU staff and relevant implementing partners with regular assessments of the operating environment, identifying risks, opportunities and potential human-rights implications. This contributes to applying the do-no-harm principle and supports a rights-based approach in programming and dialogue with Libyan authorities. Given the sensitive nature of the monitoring framework, public disclosure of the reports is covered by Article 4 (a) of the Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents 1 , which is applicable mutatis mutandis also to requests for information. However, the Commission remains open to confidential exchanges with the European Parliament where appropriate. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj/eng.”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood · EU competences on human rights
• 2026-03-25 “E-004158/2025 Answer given by Commissioner Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU is committed to continuing its support to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in carrying out its work. The EU has expressed its concern concerning the impact of the Israeli legislation on UNRWA for its operations in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and in Gaza. In 2024, following the fulfilment by UNRWA of all the conditions agreed for the 2024 EU funding, the Commission disbursed EUR 92 million to the Agency 1 . This came in addition to the EUR 48.5 million of EU humanitarian funding in 2024. In 2025, as a part of its multiannual and comprehensive programme for Palestine 2 2025-27 3 , the Commission disbursed EUR 82 million to UNRWA’s programme budget 4 . In 2025, the Commission also disbursed an initial contribution of EUR 28.5 million in humanitarian funding to UNRWA. The European External Action Service (EEAS) monitors Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) including disinformation including in countries neighbouring the EU as outlined in the Action Plan against Disinformation 5 . This includes disinformation targeting the UN and its agencies such as UNRWA. The EEAS shares the results of its monitoring of FIMI, including disinformation, through its yearly Reports on FIMI 6 . The EU strategy to tackle FIMI, including disinformation, is outlined in the FIMI Toolbox 7 which in a whole society approach focuses on situational awareness; capacity building and society resilience; disruption and regulations; and EU external actions. The Joint Communication on the European Democracy Shield adopted on 5 November 2025 will further strengthen the EU’s resilience and capacity to counter FIMI and disinformation 8 . 1 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-disburses-additional-eu10-millionpayment-unrwa-2024-12-20_en. 2 This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individuals positions of the Member States on this issue. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1055. 4 https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-provides-eu30-million-unrwa-sustain-vital-servicespalestine-refugees-2025-0729_en#:~:text=The%20European%20Commission%20disbursed%20%E2%82%AC30%20million%20to%20the, commitment%20to%20supporting%20essential%20services%20for%20Palestine%20refugees. 5 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/action_plan_against_disinformation.pdf. 6 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats0_en. 7 As noted by the Council in December 2023, EUCO Conclusions available here: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/68967/europeancouncilconclusions-14-15-12-2023-en.pdf. 8 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/2539eb53-9485-4199-bfdc97166893ff45_en?filename=JUST_template_comingsoon_standard_1.pdf.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Support for international humanitarian organisations
• 2026-03-23 “Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission 23.3.2026 Written question The Commission acknowledges the importance of addressing demographic trends in the EU. It also notes the challenges posed by declining birth rates and is committed to promoting policies that support families, whilst recognising women’s autonomy in deciding whether to have children or not. The Demography Toolbox [1] is the EU response to current demographic challenges. It includes a wide range of measures structured around four pillars, one of them devoted to help create favourable conditions for people to pursue their life and family aspirations, while fostering gender equality. In this respect, taking into account the division of competences with Member States, the EU has put forward the Work-Life Balance Directive [2] , the Pregnant Workers Directive [3] , the Child Guarantee [4] , the Council Recommendation on early childhood education and care [5] and the Gender Equality Strategy [6] . The Work-Life Balance Directive introduced the right to compensated paternity and parental leave, a right to carers’ leave and a right to request flexible working arrangements for all working parents. The assessment of the implementation of the Work-Life Balance Directive, due in 2027, will provide an opportunity to assess whether the rules still fit the evolving working practices. [1] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Demographic change in Europe: a toolbox for action COM/2023/577 final. [2] Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU. [3] Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers who are pregnant, have recently given birth or are breastfeeding. [4] Council Recommendation (EU) 2021/1004 of 14 June 2021 establishing a European Child Guarantee. [5] Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on early childhood education and care: the Barcelona targets for 2030 (2022/C 484/01). [6] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-equality/gender-equality-strategy_en .”
  Support for families · EU strategy on population growth · Sexuality and reproduction
• 2026-03-12 “E-004672/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission As noted in the EU position for the 13 th EU-Israel Association Council 1 , the EU strongly condemns the demolitions of structures funded by the EU or its Member States and always expects that Israel makes good the damages in accordance with international law. The EU considers that political engagement and open dialogue are the most effective ways to convey EU concerns and will continue to reaffirm its commitment to the applicability of international human rights and humanitarian law in the occupied Palestinian territory, for a just and lasting peace based on the two-state solution. The EU is informed by its humanitarian partners about demolitions which directly impact EU funded humanitarian operations. The humanitarian partners file an incident report containing all relevant information. On 18 December 2025 the EU released the report ‘One Year Report on Demolitions and Seizures in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem’. In 2024, 83 EU-funded structures were demolished or seized, representing EUR 377 784 in financial losses 2 . The report on figures for the year 2025 will be released in 2026. In Gaza, a realistic estimation of damages on EU-funded infrastructures in Gaza can only take place once hostilities have fully ceased and full access is granted. The EU is conducting a final rapid damage and needs assessment in partnership with the UN and the World Bank. The assessment, to be published in early 2026, will provide a comprehensive overview of recovery needs per sector. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2025/02/24/. 2 Figures regarding demolitions, settler violence, and abandonment remain underreported due to mobility and security constraints. Data may be subject to change at any time depending on new available data: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2025/documents/PALESTINE%20EU_annual%20demolitions%2 0report%201%20January%20%E2%80%93%2031%20December%202024%20%20Ares%282025%2911345216.pdf.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-03-12 “E-004220/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Gaza must be rebuilt, and Palestinians must be able to return to and live in a safe environment where governance is legitimate and the economy is relaunched. The Commission will contribute to and support all efforts towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, based on the two-state solution, by mobilising its humanitarian, security, diplomatic and cooperation tools. The Commission will continue providing humanitarian assistance and support the early recovery and reconstruction of Gaza, when conditions are met, in close coordination with the UN and in adherence with UN Security Council Resolution 2803 1 for a comprehensive plan to end the Gaza conflict and international law. The EU strongly condemns the demolitions of the structures funded by the EU or its Member States and expects that Israel makes good the damage in accordance with international law. The EU is conducting, together with the UN and the World Bank, a final Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment 2 , which will provide a comprehensive overview of damages, losses and needs per sector. The EU will continue to engage with Israel through a constructive and open dialogue as well as with other regional actors involved in the recovery and reconstruction of Gaza. The EU will also continue to urge Israel to respect its obligations under international law. This message was officially conveyed during the last EU-Israel Association Council meeting in February 2025 and repeated in various instances 3 . 1 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4093207?v=pdf. 2 The Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment is expected to be published in early 2026. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2025/02/24/.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2026-03-12 “E-004033/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Gaza must be rebuilt and Palestinians must be able to return and live in a safe environment where governance is legitimate and the economy is relaunched. The Commission will contribute and support all efforts towards a safe, sustainable and lasting peace, based on the two-state solution by mobilising the tools at its disposal and will continue providing humanitarian assistance and to support the early recovery and reconstruction of Gaza, when conditions are met. The EU strongly condemns the demolitions of structures funded by the EU or its Member States and expects Israel to make good the damage in accordance with international law. The EU, together with the UN and the World Bank, is finalising a Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment which will provide a comprehensive overview of losses until October 2025 ceasefire and recovery needs per sector 1 . The EU bilateral financial support to Israel remains suspended 2 . The Commission continues to support World Health Organisation with medical evacuations of paediatric patients from Gaza and Cairo to Europe under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) and, of the time of writing, 450 patients and 1240 companions have been evacuated with the support of 13 Member States (BE, DE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, MT, NL, RO, SI, SK) and three UCPM participating states (AL, NO, TR). The Commission will continue to advocate to expand receiving capacity, while calling on all parties to facilitate safe and timely patient movements. Additionally, a joint statement signed by several Member States, international partners as well as the High Representative/Vice-President, the Commissioner for Mediterranean and the Commissioner for Equality, Preparedness and Crisis Management was issued in September 2025 3 , calling for the restoration of the medical corridor from Gaza to the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. 1 Report expected to be published in 2026. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ov/SPEECH_25_2053. 3 https://via.ritzau.dk/pressemeddelelse/14593325/joint-statement-offer-to-assist-with-treatments-of-patientsfrom-gaza-in-the-occupied-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem?lang=en.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-03-02 “E-004366/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Respect for international and human-rights law, including the principle of non-refoulement and the protection of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, is at the centre of the EU’s engagement with Libya. EU support to Libyan authorities is intended to improve the protection of migrants and refugees, strengthen rights-based migration management and prevent loss of life at sea and in the desert. Whenever concerns or incidents are reported, the Commission raises them with the Libyan authorities and urges full compliance with national and international obligations. EU support is subject to continuous monitoring through regular reporting by implementing partners, monitoring visits by Commission staff, independent evaluations and, since 2019, a Third-Party Monitoring Framework. In parallel, the Commission maintains a regular technical dialogue with the Libyan authorities, in which compliance with international law and humanrights standards is consistently raised and specific incidents can be discussed. As regards the Italy–Libya Memorandum of Understanding, the Commission recalls, and consistently communicates to Member States, that EU law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights, needs to be respected in the initiatives they undertake in the field of migration.”
  Asylum & border control · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2026-03-02 “P-000052/2026 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU is aware of the demolition order issued by the Israeli authorities for the sports ground in the Aida refugee camp and is closely monitoring the developments. The EU calls on Israel to halt the demolition and ensure children are not deprived of their right to practice sport and develop in a safe and healthy environment. The EU has raised and will continue to raise its concerns at the highest level. As noted in the EU’s position for the 13 th EU-Israel Association Council 1 , ‘the EU calls on Israel to halt continued settlement expansion and related activities, including state land declarations as well as evictions, demolitions, confiscation and forced transfers’. The EU also urges Israel to respect its obligations under international law in the occupied Palestinian territory, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child, that Israel ratified in 1991 2 . 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6511-2025-INIT/en/pdf. 2 https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-02-09 “E-004317/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Pact for the Mediterranean (‘Pact’) sets out a framework of practical cooperation between the EU, its Member States and the southern Mediterranean partners in areas of mutual interest, including migration. It is built on the principles of co-ownership, co-creation, joint responsibility and flexibility. The latter principle allows for variable participation of Member States and Mediterranean partners in its initiatives and will ultimately determine the reach and the scope of the various initiatives under the Pact. In light of its multi-faceted nature and complex causes, the Pact addresses the migration phenomenon across its initiatives, aiming to address root causes of migration by promoting stability, enhancing preparedness and resilience of partners, supporting economic growth and creating jobs through investments. In addition, under its first and third pillar, the Pact promotes a comprehensive, whole-of-route and rights-based approach, with a view to prevent irregular migration and break smugglers’ business with enhanced border control, improve the protection of migrants in vulnerable situations, asylum seekers and refugees, pursue an effective return and readmission policy including safe and dignified returns and sustainable reintegration, as well as promote legal pathways in line with EU and national competences. This approach is complementary and in full coherence with the efforts and priorities of EU external migration policy carried out at bilateral level, including in the framework of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnerships, which have already achieved substantial results. Between January and September 2025, around 116 000 irregular arrivals to the EU were recorded along the three Mediterranean routes (Central Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean and Western Mediterranean) and the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands. This represents a 17% decrease compared to the same period in 2024 and a 42% decrease compared to the same period in 2023.”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood · Asylum & border control
• 2026-01-30 “E-004736/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Through its programmes in Syria, the EU is committed to support an inclusive and peaceful Syrian-led transition that guarantees human rights and fulfils the aspirations of all Syrians from all ethnic and religious backgrounds. On 23 June 2025, the Council adopted conclusions 1 which recalled that human rights and fundamental freedoms must be respected for everyone in Syria, without discrimination of any kind. The EU remains attentive to the actions of the Syrian transitional authorities in ensuring the protection of all Syrians and calls for accountability, inclusivity and respect for human rights, and for the full, equal and meaningful participation of all Syrians in all spheres of political life and society. Similarly, in Lebanon, the EU support focuses on strengthening national systems of delivery of public services benefitting the whole population in Lebanon, independently from their origin and religious background. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/06/23/syria-council-approves-conclusions/.”
  EU-Syria relations · EU-Lebanon relations · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2026-01-29 “E-004167/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Pact for the Mediterranean 1 promotes a comprehensive, end-to-end and rights-based approach to migration and mobility, which includes pursuing an effective return and readmission policy, as well as promoting legal pathways in line with EU and national competences. When applying for visas, including for study purposes, third-country nationals go through thorough security checks. As part of the general conditions set out under Article 7 of Directive 2016/801 2 , where third-country nationals are considered to pose a threat to public security, they should not be admitted. 3 Southern Mediterranean partners already benefit from existing opportunities under the international dimension of Erasmus+, funder under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument. As an instrument for brain circulation, not migration, Erasmus+ allows students from the Southern Mediterranean region to study in the EU for a limited period (2 to 12 months) as part of their studies in their home country and students typically return to their home country to finalise their studies. No additional funding is foreseen, and current funding allows to finance around 6 000 students per year. The Commission is legally bound to ensure that organisations and individuals that do not respect EU values, including the rule of law and respect for human rights, do not receive EU financial support. The Financial Regulation 4 includes an exclusion ground under the Early Detection and Exclusion System for entities engaged in activities contrary to the EU values. Should the Commission become aware of such activities, it may take appropriate action. 1 JOIN(2025) 26 final (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0026). 2 OJ L 132, 21.5.2016, pp. 21–57 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/801/oj/eng). 3 Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing. 4 OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng).”
  Governance of academic priorities within the EU · EU policy on Islam
• 2026-01-26 “E-004493/2025 Answer given by Ms. Šuica On behalf of the European Commission The Pact for the Mediterranean 1 , presented by the Commission and the High Representative, sets out a new ambitious strategy to strengthen EU relations with its southern Mediterranean partners, while also making Europe stronger and more resilient. The possibility for short term student exchanges from any region in the world, including the Southern Mediterranean, towards the EU is not new, it already exists under the international dimension of Erasmus+, financed out of NDICI/Global Europe, not from Erasmus+ core budget under Heading 2. For 2021-2027, NDICI – Global Europe 1 had already allocated EUR 175 million for student and staff mobility under the international dimension of Erasmus+ benefitting the Southern Mediterranean region 2 . Therefore, the Pact does not expand Erasmus+ at the expense of European students. As an instrument for brain circulation whereby students and staff from third countries return after their mobility, this funding allows around 6 000 higher education students and staff from the Southern Mediterranean to study, train or teach in the EU per year 3 . In addition, when screening grant applications for Erasmus+, the Commission is legally bound to ensuring that organisations and individuals that do not respect EU values, such as the rule of law and respect for human rights, do not receive EU financial support, in line with the 2024 recast of the Financial Regulation 4 . Moreover, when applying for visas, including for study purposes, third-country nationals go through thorough security checks. As part of the general conditions set out under Article 7 of Directive 2016/801 5 , where third-country nationals are considered to pose a threat to public security, they shall not be admitted. 1 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/1d7e2bec-d688-49a1-bcfba67ba667514d_en?filename=ad-mip-2024-c2024-7509-erasmus-annex_en.pdf. 2 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/1d7e2bec-d688-49a1-bcfba67ba667514d_en?filename=ad-mip-2024-c2024-7509-erasmus-annex_en.pdf. 3 As a point of comparison, the EU counts close to 20 million higher education students. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng. 5 OJ L 132, 21.5.2016, pp. 21–57 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/801/oj/eng).”
  EU and national cultural identities
• 2026-01-21 “E-004310/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Pact for the Mediterranean 1 (Pact) sets out an ambitious strategy to strengthen EU relations with its southern Mediterranean partners. It is built on the principles of coownership, co-creation, joint responsibility and flexibility. The latter principle allows for variable participation of Member States and Mediterranean partners in its initiatives and will ultimately determine the reach and the scope of the various initiatives under the Pact. By investing people’s choices for learning, growth and mobility, the Pact aims to reinforce the cultural, academic, social and economic ties that will make Europe stronger and more resilient. It is not possible at this stage to determine the exact number of mobilities expected by country. The possibility for short term learning exchanges from any region in the world, including the Southern Mediterranean, towards the EU already exists under the international strand of the Erasmus+ programme. Notably, Erasmus+ provides short term mobility opportunities for higher education students (up to one year) as part of their studies in their home country, and for academic staff (5-60 days). Participants return to their home countries after their mobility period, bringing back new skills, perspectives, and networks. Studies show concrete benefits of such mobilities for the EU, including by promoting the EU values. Overall, Erasmus+ promotes brain circulation, exchange and knowledge mobility, share of skills, and circulation of talent across borders, not migration. In line with the EU external migration policy, the Commission wants to support efforts in preventing illegal departures and ensure effective return and readmission within the framework of the Pact, contributing to broader cooperation on migration management. Cooperation to prevent illegal departures paves the way for legal and orderly pathways according to EU and national competences for international labour mobility and skills development. 1 https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-pact-mediterranean_en.”
  Legal migration · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2026-01-09 “P-003178/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Since 2000, the EU has provided more than EUR 1.25 billion in humanitarian aid to the occupied Palestinian territory, including Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Support has increased significantly since 2023 with around EUR 550 million disbursed, including nearly EUR 220 million in 2025. EU humanitarian assistance is delivered through humanitarian partner organisations, not governments. In addition, between 2004 and 2025 the Commission committed approximately EUR 6.8 billion in development assistance for the benefit of the Palestinian Territories 1 under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument for 2021-2025 as well as previous instruments 2 for 2004-2020, ensuring support to the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian population, as well as Palestine * refugees 3 . It is not possible to provide a breakdown by specific operational hub, as EU support covers the entire occupied Palestinian territory, and many actions address needs across both Gaza and the West Bank. The EU has a system of safeguards in place to ensure that EU funds are protected against misuse or deviation for unintended purposes, including terrorism such as the early detection and exclusion system. These general safeguards are reinforced by tailor-made measures specific to the West Bank and Gaza Strip context. The EU applies strict vigilance and accountability requirements to all partners, who must abide by strict ethical and professional rules, and have effective internal control and riskmanagement systems. EU-funded humanitarian aid organisations undergo a due diligence assessment prior to the disbursement of funds, assuring the Commission of their capacity to manage funds and mitigate risks such as aid diversion. For development assistance, implementing partners must pass the ‘Pillar Assessment’ process, ensuring systems and procedures equivalent to the Commission’s standards of sound financial management. The Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement with the United Nations provides the legal basis, verification and control provisions to ensure compliance with EU restrictive measures 4 . 1 Including approximately EUR 3.7 billion for the Palestinian Authority and approximately EUR 1.9 billion for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 2 European Neighbourhood Instrument for the 2014-2020 period, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument for the 2007-2013 period as well as a number of instruments for the period 2004-2006 such as Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership or Council Regulation (EC) No 1292/96 of 27 June 1996 on food-aid policy and food-aid management and special operations in support of food security. * This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of EU Member States on this issue. 3 For more details, Commission financing decisions are available on the Commission’s website: https://northafrica-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/countries-region/palestine_en. 4 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/communication-commission-review-ongoing-financial-assistancepalestine_en.”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2026-01-07 “E-004165/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Pact for the Mediterranean 1 (the Pact) builds on the collective input gathered through extensive consultations to ensure genuine ownership and mutual benefit for Member States and southern Mediterranean partners. The Commission has carefully taken into account the contributions from Member States in the drafting of the Pact. In that framework, Member States have largely emphasised the need for the Pact to focus on comprehensive migration management by addressing the root causes of migration and strengthening the migration governance capacities of partner countries, while making full use of existing EU instruments and policies. In line with the external dimension of the Pact on Migration and Asylum 2 , the Commission aims, under the third pillar of the Pact for the Mediterranean, to continue supporting a comprehensive approach to migration including through the prevention of irregular departures, the fight against smuggling and trafficking, and work on effective readmission of those with no right to stay. All this work paves the way for more legal pathways to address labour needs which are challenging EU competitiveness, notably through the first pillar. This two-fold approach ensures that mobility serves as a driver for growth, while preventing irregular migration and pursuing an effective return and readmission policy, among other aims. The Pact will be based on the principle of flexibility, which will allow for variable participation of Member States and partners in the implementation of the various initiatives, while taking into consideration their specificities. Furthermore, Member States will be involved in monitoring the implementation of initiatives. 1 https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-pact-mediterranean_en. 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum/implementingpact-migration-and-asylum_en.”
  Legal migration · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2026-01-06 “E-004176/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully aware of the demographic challenges that the EU and its Member States are facing. The impact of such challenges differs depending on national, regional and local circumstances. That is why in 2023, in full respect of the distribution of competences, the Commission adopted the Demography Toolbox 1 , a comprehensive strategy to support Member States in managing demographic change. The implementation of the Toolbox is ongoing. One of the key EU-level tools listed in the Toolbox is the Talent Booster Mechanism 2 , which supports EU regions to train, retain and attract people and to address the impact of the demographic transition. Family policies and policies to boost birth rates remain under the competence of Member States. However, the Demography Toolbox contains initiatives, tools and funding opportunities that can help create favourable conditions for people to pursue their life and family aspirations. Legal migration is an essential tool to address labour shortages and boost the EU’s global competitiveness. It is not a substitute for policies to support birth rates, nor a stand-alone solution to reverse population decline or ageing in the EU, but it is part of a comprehensive approach which includes mobilising the inactive EU population, reskilling and upskilling the existing workforce, improving the working conditions, and facilitating intra-EU mobility. 1 COM/2023/577 final - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023DC0577. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/communities-and-networks/harnessing-talent-platform/talentbooster-mechanism_en#inline-nav-1.”
  EU strategy on population growth · EU competences on demographic policy · Support for families
• 2025-12-11 “E-003295/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The P664 Houn Corrubia-class vessel has been refurbished under the EU-funded Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya (SIBMMIL) programme and donated to the Libyan Coast Guard in June 2023, which is still operating it. Since 2017, the programme aims to strengthen the Libyan authorities’ capacity to conduct search and rescue (SAR) operations in full respect of international standards and human rights, through the provision of equipment, training, and expertise for the development of standard operating procedures in close cooperation with Member States. The SIBMMIL programme provides support for vessel repair and maintenance activities, including the training of maintenance personnel from both the General Administration of Coastal Surveillance, under the Ministry of Interior, and the Libyan Coast Guard. Since 2023 approximately EUR 5.4 million were allocated to these activities. These funds were used by the project’s implementing partner, the Italian Ministry of Interior, to deliver maintenance services and training for the overall SAR fleet, to the benefit of the aforementioned Libyan institutions. Following similar incidents in the past, the EU had called for investigations by competent national authorities. Countries remain sovereign and responsible for their law enforcement bodies. The EU does not have investigative powers itself and does not comment on such investigations, though the EU finds the incident deeply concerning and have urged responsible authorities to investigate the event thoroughly. In this case, the Libyan authorities have confirmed that an investigation is ongoing. The Commission will assess the outcome of this investigation thoroughly in order to determine any further measures. The Commission considers that, to improve the situation on the ground, it is necessary to continue engaging with the Libyan authorities to improve the humanitarian conditions of migrants and to avoid deaths at sea and in the desert. The Commission is reinforcing its monitoring and dialogue mechanisms to ensure that human rights standards are upheld in all EU-supported activities. The EU remains fully committed to saving lives at sea in line with international maritime law and no rescuer should be put in danger while carrying out lifesaving work.”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood · Asylum & border control
• 2025-12-05 “E-003330/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU is committed to saving lives at sea in line with international maritime law and no rescuer should be put in danger while carrying out life-saving work. Following the reported incidents, the EU immediately raised the matter with the Libyan authorities, urging them to take all necessary measures to ensure full compliance with their national and international obligations. The Libyan authorities informed that they have opened an investigation into the incident, which they indicate took place within the Libyan search and rescue zone. The most recent technical dialogue with the Libyan authorities, held on 15 October 2025 in Brussels, provided a timely opportunity to raise the EU’s concerns regarding the reported incidents and to reiterate the need for thorough investigations and stronger monitoring mechanisms, to ensure that Libya’s search and rescue operations are fully consistent with international human-rights and maritime law. The Commission remains convinced that progress, including in the protection of migrants, can only be achieved through continued engagement, in line with the EU’s overall policy approach towards the southern neighbourhood region.”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood · Asylum & border control
• 2025-11-24 “E-001922/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has currently one ongoing grant contract with Sabeel as one of the cobeneficiaries under the European Peacebuilding Initiative 1 . 1. As regards checks before granting funding, the new Financial Regulation 2 introduced an explicit ground for exclusion from EU funding in cases of incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence against a group of persons or a member of a group or similar activities that are contrary to the EU values where the conduct may negatively affect the performance of the contract. Contractors are also checked to ensure that no other reasons for exclusions exist (e.g. previous mishandling of funds). 2. The Commission takes accusations on EU-funded partners very seriously and has verified all the elements of allegations highlighted in the written question and by NGO Monitor in accordance with its internal procedure. The conclusion is that none of the mentioned elements constitute a contractual breach related to incitement to hatred and violence. In particular with regards to the declaration of the former director of Sabeel, the quoted declaration comes from his book ‘Justice and only Justice’ published in 1989. The Commission considers that the organisation Sabeel should therefore not be taken accountable for it. The former director of Sabeel later clarified his views, reaffirming the importance of preserving Israel as a Jewish state, as referred in the same article used by NGO Monitor to justify their allegations. 3. According to the standard general conditions applicable to the EU grant contracts, the Commission may suspend the implementation of contracts if the suspension is deemed necessary to verify whether the beneficiary breached its obligations or committed irregularities. The verification may result either in lifting the suspension, or in the early termination of the contract, or in the exclusion of the beneficiary from future EU fundings. 1 Faithful Futures: Religious Leaders for Accountability, Justice and Peace through the Two-State Solution. 2 Article 138(1)(c)(vi) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024.”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism · Regulation of NGOs in Europe
• 2025-11-14 “E-003223/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission will continue to closely monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent Review Group 1 and the conditions agreed with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) under EU funding 2024 2 . As of June 2025, within a year from the publication of the Colonna report 3 , four out of eight recommendations on the neutrality of education were completed and four are in progress, including recommendation 35. UNRWA’s strict policy includes a thorough yearly review of host countries’ learning material. UNRWA has also developed self-learning material and a course on Human Rights, Conflict Resolution and Tolerance. The Commission attaches great importance to the full and swift implementation of all recommendations, including those on neutrality of education, which remains a key element of the Commission’s monitoring. The Commission’s assessment is that UNRWA remains fully committed to implement the recommendations, as shown during regular meetings with stakeholders, including UNRWA’s Advisory Commission and the working group on Neutrality and Integrity, where the Commission ensures active oversight. The disbursement of the 2024 allocation to UNRWA was conditioned 4 to the fulfilment of agreed milestones. In 2025, the Commission did not establish new conditions to EU funding to UNRWA, which showed continued capability to deliver its services, despite the legal and operational challenges. The decision to continue funding UNRWA was approved by the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) Committee 5 . Part of the 2025 allocation aims at strengthening organisational effectiveness and efficiency of UNRWA, especially related to neutrality. Moreover, the Commission welcomes the United Nations (UN) Secretary General's initiative for a Strategic Assessment of UNRWA and supports the approach to reflect on it as part of the UN80 reform process. 1 https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/unrwa_independent_review_on_neutrality.pdf. 2 Letters outlining the way forward with all the measures and procedures for the Commission’s conditional funding for UNRWA were exchanged on 1 and 6 March 2024. 3 https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/one-year-implementing-colonna-report-unrwa-annual-report. 4 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-statement-unrwa-2024-01-29_en. 5 Member States approved the Commission proposal unanimously at the NDICI committee meeting of May 2025.”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-11-11 “E-003623/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission In the annual State of the Union address on 10 September 2025 1 , the Commission’s President announced that the Commission will put on hold the bilateral support to Israel without affecting its work with Israeli civil society and Yad Vashem, the World Holocaust Remembrance Centre. The Commission’s bilateral institutional cooperation with Israel falls under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE) 2 for the period 2021–2027, as well as the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) 3 for commitments dating from 2020. Since mid-September 2025, approximately EUR14 million worth of adopted commitments have been put on hold. The commitments concern: - Twinning programmes and the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) that aimed to help approximating relevant legislation to the EU acquis and promote interinstitutional cooperation between Israeli and EU Member States public administrations. - Projects funded under the EU-Israel Regional integration and cooperation initiative 4 in the framework of the normalisation process (Abraham Accords). In addition, the process to adopt a planned commitment of EUR 6 million under the current Multiannual Financial Framework for 2025 was also put on hold for the time being. This funding is meant to reinforce the EU-Israel bilateral institutional relations. The Commission will regularly assess how the situation evolves both in Gaza and the West Bank to make a decision on the use of the funds. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/232/oj/eng. 4 Financing decisions can be found here: https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/middle-eastgulf/israel_en.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-11-06 “E-003724/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission In full respect of the distribution of competences between the Member States and the EU, the Commission has adopted a comprehensive strategy to address the challenges posed by demographic change. A wide range of policy options are outlined in the Demography Toolbox Communication 1 . It includes adaptation measures on the labour market, social infrastructure, health systems and long-term care provision, intergenerational fairness and territorial cohesion, along the four pillars of supporting parents, empowering youth, older people and where it is necessary attracting talent from outside the EU. The Demography Toolbox contains initiatives, tools and funding opportunities that can help create favourable conditions for people to pursue their life and family aspirations. The Commission is keen to promote an EU-wide dialogue and exchange on demographic issues, in line with the Commission President’s political guidelines and the relevant mission letter 2 . 1 Communication ‘Demographic change in Europe: a toolbox for action’ https://commission.europa.eu/publications/communication-demographic-change-europe-toolbox-action_en. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/24039223-f92e-40a0-a440-a27d9715051a_en.”
  EU competences on demographic policy · Support for families · EU strategy on population growth
• 2025-10-15 “P-003341/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU does not provide direct funding to the Libyan Coast Guard or other security forces in the country. EU support in Libya is channelled through United Nations agencies, international organisations, Member States’ agencies and non-governmental organisations working on the ground. Regarding the reported incident, the EU Delegation in Tripoli has immediately raised this matter with the Libyan authorities, urging them to take all necessary steps to ensure compliance with both national and international obligations. The Libyan authorities have confirmed that an investigation has been launched. Respect for international and human rights law – including the principle of non-refoulement and the protection of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers – remains central to the EU’s engagement in Libya. Cooperation is continuously reviewed, also through a technical dialogue on migration where these issues are discussed with Libyan counterparts. To further strengthen safeguards on human rights compliance, the Commission has introduced stricter provisions on both human rights and the transfer of equipment, such as boats and vehicles, into contracts with the partners implementing projects. These measures ensure that EU-funded assets are used solely for their intended purposes and are not diverted in ways that could undermine human rights.”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood · EU development aid (migration conditionality)
• 2025-10-09 “E-002994/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU is gravely alarmed by recent violent incidents in Syria and has strongly condemned the horrific crimes against civilians, including the coastal violence in March 1 , the terrorist attack against Mar Elias Church 2 and the violence in Southern Syria 3 . Therein, it has been repeatedly calling for a transparent, credible and impartial investigation, and for all perpetrators of grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law to be held accountable and brought to justice, with the support of relevant international mechanisms. The EU followed a gradual and reversible approach to sanctions relief to support Syria’s economic recovery and inclusive transition. In May 2025, the EU lifted economic sanctions on Syria, while maintaining sanctions related to the Assad regime and those based on security grounds 4 . It monitors and remains attentive to the actions of the transitional authorities. In May 5 and June 6 2025, the EU introduced sanctions against human rights violators. The EU urges a stepped-up dialogue to advance a truly inclusive and peaceful Syrian-led transition guaranteeing human rights of all Syrians from all ethnic and religious backgrounds. The EU will support Syrians’ path to stabilisation, reconstruction and an inclusive transition, with non-humanitarian aid tied to the country’s progress and the actions of the transitional government. The EU ensures effective use of funds through trusted partners, due diligence screening, and payment releases based on approved progress reports. Funds are subject to strict auditing and monitoring, with the EU Delegation and the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations Field Office in Syria ensuring thorough monitoring, oversight of operations and accountability in the allocation of resources. The EU, while cautious due to the volatile situation, is committed to creating conditions for safe, dignified, and voluntary returns to Syria, as per the European Council conclusions of 23 June 2025 7 , and will support those who voluntarily wish to return 8 . 1 Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the recent wave of violence, 11 March 2025; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/. 2 Statement by the Spokesperson on the terrorist attack in Mar Elias church in Damascus, 23 June 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesperson-terrorist-attack-mar-elias-church-damascus_en. 3 On 24 July 2025, the EU issued a statement on the violence in Sweida; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/24/syria-statement-by-the-high-representative-onbehalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-situation/. 4 Syria: EU adopts legal acts to lift economic sanctions on Syria, enacting recent political agreement, 28 May 2025; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/28/syria-eu-adopts-legal-acts-to-lift-economicsanctions-on-syria-enacting-recent-political-agreement/. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202501110. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202501255. 7 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/06/23/syria-council-approves-conclusions/. 8 Updated information is published by Frontex; https://www.frontex.europa.eu/.”
  EU-Syria relations · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2025-09-29 “E-003064/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission As part of the EU Multiannual and Comprehensive Programme for Palestine Recovery and Resilience (2025-2027) the EU has set apart up to EUR 620 million of direct financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for the years 2025-2027, partially linked to the PA’s commitment to reforms. EU support contributes to the payments of salaries and pensions of civil servants (including in the education sector), social allowances for vulnerable families and medical referrals to the East Jerusalem hospitals. On education reforms, the Commission has continued its constructive engagement with the Ministry of Education, which committed to achieving key reforms, including adopting its Development Education Strategy 2025-2027 in early July. The Ministry of Education has a continuous process of reviewing and amending textbooks used in Palestinian schools. The latest round started with grade 12 at the end of 2024 and has moved to earlier grades in recent months. Further disbursements scheduled before the end of the year will be partially linked to the PA’s implementation of reforms as agreed between the EU and the PA, including on education. The Commission and other donors remain engaged in a collaborative process aimed at supporting the education reform and the revision of textbooks and education materials, recognising that these efforts require time and sustained commitment, especially at a time of dire political and financial crisis.”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality) · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-09-29 “P-003428/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Respect for international human rights’ law – including the principle of non-refoulement and the protection of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers – remains central to the EU’s engagement in Libya. Cooperation is continuously reviewed, also through a technical dialogue on migration where these issues are raised and discussed with Libyan stakeholders. In addition to monitoring and evaluation activities conducted regularly by implementing partners, and on top of the European Court of Auditor’s Audit on the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, the Commission has carried out two specific results‑oriented monitoring missions of the programme supporting, among others, also the Libyan coast guard. One financial audit is ongoing, and two additional evaluations are planned by the end of 2026. Furthermore, implementing partners provide comprehensive and frequent analyses of operating environments in the country, including the human rights’ situation. On‑site verifications and third‑party monitoring have complemented these efforts since 2019 providing independent assessments of compliance with the do-no-harm principle. Regarding the reported incident, the EU Delegation in Tripoli has immediately raised this matter with the Libyan authorities, urging them to take all necessary steps to ensure compliance with both national and international obligations. The Libyan authorities have confirmed that an investigation has been launched. The Commission will assess the outcome of this investigation thoroughly in order to determine any further measures.”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood · Asylum & border control
• 2025-09-26 “E-002912/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission In addition to monitoring and evaluation activities conducted regularly by implementing partners, the Commission has carried out six result-oriented monitoring reviews relating to border management in Libya since 2019, with an evaluation currently planned to start in the fourth quarter of 2025. Furthermore, implementing partners provide comprehensive and frequent analyses of operating environments in the country, including the human rights situation. On‑site verifications and third‑party monitoring have complemented these efforts since 2019 providing independent assessments of compliance with the do-no-harm principle. The Commission maintains records of EU-funded equipment through detailed project reports, including on the allocation of budget, ensuring accountability and oversight. These documents provide information on all equipment and clarify whether such equipment has been transferred to the relevant stakeholders. Such systematic tracking allows the Commission to monitor distribution and use of equipment, ensuring compliance with project objectives and regulatory frameworks. The Commission ensures that EU-funded equipment is used as intended and in line with the do-no-harm principle through a comprehensive and robust framework that integrates human rights and conflict sensitivity considerations across all project phases, from identification to evaluation. Special attention is given to human rights, with specific clauses embedded in contracts and provisions to suspend or terminate should violations occur. The use of a rightsbased approach ensures that human rights are fully integrated into programme design, with a range of mitigating measures applied, including the provision of trainings on international law and human rights, to ensure awareness and compliance.”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality)
• 2025-09-10 “E-002762/2025Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges the importance of addressing demographic change as it has significant implications for our societies and economies. Demographic change is primarily determined by life choices of individuals and families. Family policies are a competence of EU Member States. However, EU and national policies should help ensure that people can fulfil their aspirations, and the Commission supports initiatives that aim to create favourable social and economic conditions to allow people to pursue these family aspirations in accordance with their free choices. Following the European Council conclusions of June 2023, which called for a toolbox to address demographic challenges and their impact on Europe’s competitiveness, the Commission has put forward a wide range of initiatives and funding opportunities within the Demography Toolbox to assist Member States in responding to demographic challenges. Legal migration alone cannot prevent population ageing and address labour force decline. While managed legal migration, in full complementarity to harnessing talents from within the EU, can help meet labour market needs, it is not a standalone answer. The Commission recognises the complexity of this issue and emphasizes the need for a comprehensive strategy that incorporates legal migration among other measures. Similarly, policy interventions to increase fertility are not sufficient on their own to reverse population or labour force decline. Therefore, the Demography Toolbox considers a wide range of adaptation measures in the areas of labour market, pension and health systems, intergenerational fairness and territorial cohesion, along the pillars of families, younger generations, older people, and legal migration.”
  EU strategy on population growth · Support for families · EU competences on demographic policy
• 2025-08-22 “E-002061/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU Financial Regulation provides that grant beneficiaries shall be excluded from EU funding, in case of ‘incitement to discrimination, hatred and violence against a group of persons or a member of a group, or similar activities that are contrary to the values on which the Union is founded enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) where such misconduct has an impact on the person or entity’s integrity which negatively affects or concretely risks affecting the performance of the legal commitment’ 1 . Specific clauses have been introduced in all grant contracts with beneficiaries managing EU funds in the occupied Palestinian territory and Israel. Grant beneficiaries shall not engage in activities included in Article 1(1) of the Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA 2 , which include incitement to violence or hatred. This prohibition is without prejudice to the respect of fundamental rights including the right of freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 6 of the TEU 3 . According to the Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 4 , the Commission cannot fund individuals or entities involved in terrorism and listed in its Annex in the current consolidated version 5 . All Commission contracts involving EU funding worldwide contain provisions that no funds or economic resources are made available directly or indirectly to, or for the benefit of, any entities, individuals or groups of individuals designated by the EU as subject to the EU restrictive measures. This includes, but it is not limited to, contractors, subcontractors, all natural persons linked to this contract, recipients of financial support to third parties. Grant beneficiaries are systematically audited after they submit their narrative report, financial report and expenditure verification report (for grants of more than EUR 100 000). The Commission will not hesitate to take appropriate measures if it establishes that any organisation has made inappropriate use of EU funds. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509. 2 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, pp. 55–58, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008F0913. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2016/art_6/oj/eng. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001E0931. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02001E0931-20250201.”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-08-21 “E-002551/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The INTAXMOD microsimulation model, developed by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), estimates inherited wealth and the potential long-term government revenues from inheritance taxation under various demographic and wealth projection scenarios. It has been applied to six EU countries: Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy 1 and Austria 2 . The model uses data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), coordinated by the European Central Bank. The JRC intends to expand it to all Member States with available HFCS data where studies on inheritance taxation can inform policy discussions. Extension will depend on data availability and policy relevance. The recent 2025 Annual Report on Taxation 3 of the Commission highlights growing concerns about wealth inequality and the role of taxation in addressing it. It underlines how the taxation of wealth transfers can contribute to reducing wealth concentration and improving equality of opportunity. The Commission and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are jointly working on a study on inheritance taxes and gifts and their implications for wealth, expected by December 2025. A study on wealth concentration and inequality is already available 4 . Drawing on this study, the Commission’s 2024 Annual Review on Employment and Social Developments in Europe 5 provides an in-depth examination of patterns of wealth. The Commission recognises the importance of intergenerational dynamics—such as the role of inheritances in shaping wealth distribution and access to housing—and will continue to monitor and analyse these issues in the context of broader policy efforts to promote fairness and social mobility across the EU. The Commission will also consider wealth-related issues in its Anti Poverty Strategy. 1 Krenek, A., Schratzenstaller-Atzinger, M., Grunberger, K. and Thiemann, A., INTAXMOD - Inheritance and Gift Taxation in the context of Ageing, European Commission, 2022, JRC128480. 2 European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Grünberger, K., Derndorfer, J. and Schnetzer, M., Inheritances in Austria: A model estimation of intergenerational wealth transfers up to 2050, European Commission, Seville, 2024, JRC138223. 3 Commission: Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, Annual report on taxation 2025 – Review of taxation policies in the EU Member States, Publications Office of the EU, 2025,https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2778/6367826. 4 https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/mapping-trends-and-gaps-household-wealth-across-oecdcountries_en. 5 https://op.europa.eu/webpub/empl/esde-2024/.”
  Priorities of taxation policy in the EU · Wealth taxation
• 2025-08-13 “E-001911/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The New Pact for the Mediterranean (‘the Pact’), whose preparation has been entrusted to the Commission, in close cooperation with the European External Action Service, aims to shape a concrete, respectful, and lasting partnership between the EU and the 10 partner countries of the Southern Neighbourhood 1 that reflects shared aspirations and priorities. This means going beyond broad principles to define together initiatives and flagship projects that can deliver tangible results. The Pact aims to pool existing resources and bring together the collective efforts of the EU and its partner countries to create a more stable and prosperous environment, conducive to investments from both the EU and the partner countries themselves. Regarding future funding for initiatives that will be launched in the framework of the Pact, the Commission cannot pre-judge the outcome of the interinstitutional negotiations on the composition of the Multiannual Financial Framework from 2028 to 2034. The Pact will also contain initiatives involving the private sector, international financial institutions and other partners to maximise its impact. Moreover, consultations on the Pact with stakeholders from both sides of the Mediterranean will support the Commission in framing it around priorities that are shared and that are mutually beneficial for the EU and the partner countries. Initiatives which will be undertaken in this framework should contribute to bringing the EU and the Southern Neighbourhood closer by addressing common interests which concretely benefit citizens. 1 The European Neighbourhood Policy includes 10 partner countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine*, Syria and Tunisia. *This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood · Funding for EU Neighbourhood
• 2025-08-12 “E-001766/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU follows closely reports regarding the conditions of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons and has raised its concerns repeatedly with the Israeli authorities, both publicly and privately. In the EU’s position for the 13 th EU-Israel Association Council 1 , the EU called on Israel to fully comply with its international human rights obligations including in the context of arrest, interrogation and detention, and recalled that states have a heightened duty of care to take any necessary measures to protect the lives of individuals deprived of their liberty. The EU addressed the specific situation of minors, calling on Israel to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of all Palestinian minors, especially those faced with arrest and detention, in line with its obligations under international law, specifically the United Nations convention on the rights of the child, and standards regarding the detention of children, including in cases of security offences, and ending the practice of administrative detention. The EU also expressed its concern about the recourse by Israel to indiscriminate arrests and administrative detention without formal charge. EU funding does not directly nor indirectly benefit Israeli detention facilities. EU funding is subject to strict rules and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that it is used exclusively for the purposes intended and in line with EU values and international law. Where relevant, the Commission applies robust due diligence procedures, including clauses in contracts and grant agreements to prevent the diversion of funds. Should credible information to the contrary arise, the Commission investigates thoroughly and takes appropriate measures. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6511-2025-INIT/en/pdf.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · EU competences on human rights
• 2025-08-06 “E-001909/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The New Pact for the Mediterranean (the New Pact) 1 is a strategic priority of the Commission, a renewed and ambitious effort to deepen cooperation with the EU’s Southern partners 2 and turn the region into a shared space of stability, prosperity and security. It will be founded on a partnership of equals, with a pragmatic approach focused on concrete initiatives and delivering real tangible benefits for people. This New Pact will endeavour to promote a unified and coherent strategy that reflects and respects the mutual interests of Member States and partners in the region, while meticulously adapting to the distinct regional characteristics and complexities, acknowledging that a onesize-fits-all strategy would not suffice. It will build on the foundations of pre-existing frameworks governing the partnership between the EU and the 10 countries pertaining to the Southern Neighbourhood, in particular the Agenda for the Mediterranean 3 as well as the related economic and investment plan, and target different areas of partnership, while also refocusing them on the most strategic initiatives arising from thorough consultations. This will be done by taking into account both bilateral and regional strands of cooperation and in complementarity with the strategic and comprehensive partnerships in place. These efforts thrive on collaboration and joint ownership, collective and cross-regional action, and the creation of concrete and innovative solutions. In some instances, initiatives which are implemented through bilateral partnerships may well be upscaled regionally, to allow the whole region to benefit from positive bilateral developments. 1 https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do_en#new-pact-for-the-mediterranean. 2 Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine* (this designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue), Syria and Tunisia. 3 Joint Communication Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood – A new agenda for the Mediterranean: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/joint_communication_renewed_partnership_southern_neighbourh ood.pdf.”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2025-08-06 “E-002332/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Family policies and policies to boost birth rates remain under the competence of Member States. The Commission put forward a wide range of initiatives, tools and funding opportunities within the Demography Toolbox 1 , notably to help Member States create favourable conditions for people to pursue their life and family aspirations. The implementation of the Toolbox is a priority for this Commission, along with support measures on the labour market, pensions, health systems, long-term care provision and territorial cohesion. These measures address the demographic challenge with a long-term restructuring and adaptation of socio-economic and territorial systems, rather than aiming for explicit population targets. To date there are no examples of government policies that have directly and effectively managed to curb the decline in birth rates. EU actions to address demographic challenges include initiatives 2 to mitigate the shrinking of the labour force 3 and preserve territorial cohesion in regions particularly affected by demographic decline 4 . These policies are supported by the EU Cohesion Policy, through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and the Just Transition Fund (JTF). Moreover, demographic change puts additional pressure on the sustainability of social systems, including pension systems. In this context, the Savings and Investments Union strategy announced measures to support further uptake of supplementary pension schemes. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/communication-demographic-change-europe-toolbox-action_en.; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023DC0577. 2 The Work-Life Balance Directive, the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child, the Council Recommendation on the revision of the Barcelona targets on early childhood education and care (ECEC). 3 The EU Action Plan for Labour and Skills Shortages and the Youth Guarantee. 4 The Rural Pact, the Rural Action Plan and the Talent Booster Mechanism.”
  Support for families · EU competences on demographic policy · EU policy on aging workforce and pensions
• 2025-07-22 “E-001465/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Palestinian Authority (PA) committed to the reform process, including the education sector, through a letter of intent in July 2024, which will be part of the Multiannual Comprehensive Support Programme to foster Palestinian recovery and resilience, announced on 14 April 2025 during the High-Level Political Dialogue with the PA. The education sector reform envisaged by the PA encompasses various aspects, including the revision of textbooks to align with United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) standards. In this context, it is noteworthy that the Ministry of Education has a continuous process of reviewing and amending textbooks used in Palestinian schools. The latest round started with grade 12 as of end 2024 and has moved in recent months to earlier grades. The Commission and other donors are also introducing technical assistance to monitor and support the education reform and the revision of textbook and educational material. Newly published books, adhering to UNESCO standards, are expected to be used for grades one to four starting in September 2025, with other grades following for the school year 2026/27.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Jewish culture and antisemitism
• 2025-07-18 “E-000365/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU is following closely the impact of the war in Gaza on the delivery of essential services to Palestinians, in particular its consequences on EU-funded projects and capacities of implementing partners to operate. On water, at the moment, there are no reports of destruction of the EU-funded water facilities in Gaza. The EU-funded Short Term Low Volume (STLV) desalination plant in the South of the Gaza Strip, run by United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), has been one of the major sources of safe water for the population in Gaza since October 2023. The STLV sea water desalination plant has remained operational since October 2023. However, it is not working at full capacity as it relies on available fuel for generators and on solar field, since its access to electricity through the Israeli feeder line ‘F11’ has been cut since March 2025. As of end of May 2025, its average production of water was of 2 500 cubic meter per day compared to a maximum theoretical capacity of 20 000 cubic meter per day. Production of water depends on whether the STLV is connected or not to the electricity feeder line or if it relies on generators and solar panels. The decision to apply restrictive measures (sanctions) under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is under the responsibility of the Council and not of the Commission.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-07-17 “E-001910/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The New Pact for the Mediterranean (‘the Pact’) represents a significant enhancement over existing mechanisms, providing a more comprehensive and dynamic approach to regional collaboration. Building on the foundations of the Barcelona Process, the Pact is designed to adapt to the rapidly changing geopolitical environment, ensuring resilience and growth for the EU and Southern Neighbourhood countries 1 . Its added value lies in its flexibility and responsiveness, allowing quick adaptation to emerging challenges and developments. The Pact also aims to deepen and refocus the partnership around key initiatives that bear the most potential to deliver concrete results, and which can be adapted as the context evolves. The preparation of the Pact is firmly rooted in an extensive process of dialogue and consultation. Southern Neighbourhood partners and Member States have contributed to the shaping of the Pact aiming for a partnership of equals. Additionally, the Pact involves voices from civil society, the private sector, and local communities to ensure diverse priorities are addressed and all implementors are fully engaged. This enriched dialogue strengthens social and cultural bonds across the region. In summary, the New Pact for the Mediterranean provides added value by being adaptive, inclusive, and forward-looking, better equipping the region to handle challenges and leverage opportunities for shared prosperity and stability. 1 The European Neighbourhood Policy encompasses the following countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Palestine* (This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a state of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue).”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2025-07-17 “E-002057/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission On 14 April 2025, during the High-Level Political Dialogue between the EU and the Palestinian Authority (PA), the Commission announced a proposal for a multiannual Comprehensive Programme for Palestine 1 (2025-2027) worth up to EUR 1.6 billion, which includes up to EUR 620 million in direct financial support to the PA. This support is anchored in the PA’s own reform agenda. EU funds to the PA are disbursed through the PalestinianEuropean Socio-Economic Management and Assistance Mechanism (PEGASE), one of the EU’s most rigorously controlled and audited frameworks. An incentive-based mechanism within PEGASE links disbursements to PA’s progress towards key reform milestones selected from the PA’s own reform agenda, as well as the related Reform Matrix agreed in November 2024, and building on the EU-PA policy dialogue on reforms. If reforms stall, disbursements will be delayed or reduced. This system creates a direct and transparent link between EU financial support and reform progress. All disbursements from the Commission to the PA are subject to strict ex-ante and ex-post verification, audit and screening procedures (including against EU restrictive measures and sanction lists) to ensure full traceability and compliance, guaranteeing necessary controls and safeguards for the final recipients of EU support. The EU has never contributed to the Palestinian ‘Martyrs Fund’ of the PA, which was discontinued with the new social protection law entering into force on 10 February 2025 2 . The Commission’s extended screening vetting system ensured that no EU funding went to the beneficiaries of the Prisoners Fund. The detainees and families (a list is provided by the PA) were categorically excluded from any payment made through PEGASE. The new social protection law regroups all allowance schemes under a single framework, where allowances are based only on vulnerability criteria, as requested by the EU 3 and other international partners. 1 https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-announces-multiannual-programmepalestinian-recovery-and-resilience-worth-eu16-billion-2025-04-14_en. 2 Decree-Law No (4) of 2025, which amends Decree-Law No (1) of 2019 regarding the Palestinian National Economic Empowerment Institution. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fi/statement_25_535.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2025-07-17 “E-001739/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU strongly opposes terrorism and any incitement to violence or hatred, as they are incompatible with advancing peace, which is what the EU promotes and seeks to contribute to through its efforts and cooperation in third countries. The Commission implements rigorous safeguards to ensure that no persons or entities receive EU funding if they are involved in criminal or unethical practices, including terrorist financing and terrorist offences. Due diligence and risk assessment are systematically conducted before funds are disbursed. All funding agreements include clauses prohibiting the diversion of funds to listed groups or individuals. EU restrictive measures are applicable to any of the Commission grant beneficiaries all over the world. Regarding specific checks and monitoring mechanisms to ensure sound financial management in Palestine 1 , the Commission has strong safeguards and procedures in place to ensure that EU funds are managed in a transparent and sound manner. For example, under the PalestinianEuropean Socio-Economic Management and Assistance Mechanism (PEGASE), auditors carry out ex-ante and ex-post controls and verifications. These include verification of eligibility of the request for payment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), screening of beneficiaries against international and ad-hoc sanctions lists ahead of disbursement and auditing 100% of the payments executed by the PA. The European Court of Auditors certified the control and safeguard system of PEGASE as ‘robust’. No evidence has been found to date that money has been diverted for unintended purposes, as reaffirmed during the financial review of EU assistance in Palestine that took place in November 2023 2 . Finally, the EU Financial Regulation, applicable to all partners in the EU and in partner countries, provides that grant beneficiaries and contractors shall be excluded from future EU funding in case of ‘incitement to discrimination, hatred and violence against a group of persons or a member of a group, or similar activities that are contrary to the values on which the Union is founded enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, where such misconduct has an impact on the person or entity’s integrity which negatively affects or concretely risks affecting the performance of the legal commitment’ 3 . 1 This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/communication-commission-review-ongoing-financial-assistancepalestine_en. 3 Article 138(1), point (c)(vi) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 23.9.2024.”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-07-16 “E-001978/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU provided fundings, together with other Member States, for the construction of the European Hospital of Gaza 36 years ago, in 1989, 18 years before the 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza. With the financial support of the EU, the hospital was built to provide secondary healthcare services to Palestinians in Gaza. The EU has never had any management responsibility for the European Hospital. Further to Israeli Defence Force order, the European Hospital, managed by the de facto Ministry of Health in Gaza, was evacuated in July 2024 and following the evacuation, reportedly looted. On 13 May 2025, Israeli airstrikes hit the compound of the hospital and the surrounding area causing a number of civilian casualties. The EU has unreservedly denounced and condemned Hamas' use of medical facilities and recalled their protection under international humanitarian law 1 . The EU has also reiterated repeatedly the importance of ensuring the protection of all civilians at all times, as well as of civilian infrastructures. Regarding specific checks and monitoring mechanisms to ensure sound financial management in Palestine 2 , the Commission has strong safeguards and procedures in place to ensure that EU funds are managed in a transparent and sound manner. The Commission implements rigorous safeguards to ensure that no persons or entities receive EU funding if they are involved in criminal or unethical practices, including terrorist financing and terrorist offences. Due diligence and risk assessment are systematically conducted before funds are disbursed. All financing agreements include clauses prohibiting the diversion of funds to listed groups or individuals. EU restrictive measures are applicable to any of the Commission grant beneficiaries all over the world. No evidence has been found to date that money has been diverted for unintended purposes, as reaffirmed during the financial review of EU assistance in Palestine that took place in November 2023 3 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/11/12/statement-by-the-high-representative-onbehalf-of-the-european-union-on-humanitarian-pauses-in-gaza/. 2 This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue. 3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/communication-commission-review-ongoing-financial-assistancepalestine_en.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-07-15 “E-002028/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Demographic evidence indicates there is no single solution to address population ageing and decline. The Commission demography toolbox 1 considers a wide range of instruments, resources and policy frameworks to help Member States respond to demographic changes, from adaptation and support measures on the labour market, to pension and health systems, child-care and to long-term care provision, with a view to ensuring intergenerational fairness and territorial cohesion. The Commission sees that migration can play a complementary role to address labour shortages in specific sectors, in addition to measures to activate and upskill the existing EU workforce 2 . The determination of the conditions for the naturalisation of third country nationals and acquisition of citizenship is an exclusive competence of the Member States. Family policies and policies to boost birth rates remain primarily under the competence of Member States. The Commission has put forward a wide range of initiatives, tools and funding opportunities that help create favourable conditions enabling people to pursue their life and family aspirations in the place they call home 3 . These are supported mainly through the cohesion policy funds 4 . Under the European Social Fund Plus, Greece will establish a National Observatory of Demographic Policy to contribute to the implementation of the national action plan for demography. The design of tax-benefit systems is within the competence of Member States. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/communication-demographic-change-europe-toolbox-action_en; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023DC0577. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0090. 3 For example: The Work-Life Balance Directive aims to improve the balance between work and family lives for parents and carers. The EU Strategy on the rights of the child aims to combat child poverty, improve access to childcare, education and healthcare, and support families in vulnerable situations. The European Child Guarantee aims to ensure that all children at risk of poverty or social exclusion have access to essential services such as education, care, healthcare, nutrition and housing. The Council Recommendation on the revision of the Barcelona targets on early childhood education and care (ECEC) encourages Member States to increase availability, affordability, accessibility and quality of ECEC. 4 The EU cohesion policy, through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and the Just Transition Fund (JTF) provides support for start-ups, local small and mediumsized enterprises, investment in public services and transport, thereby contributing to socio-economic and territorial cohesion. The Talent Booster Mechanism directly addresses brain drain and talent retention, including in Eastern and Southern Europe. The Youth Guarantee aims to ensure that young people receive a job, education or training offer within four months of becoming unemployed.”
  EU competences on demographic policy · EU strategy on population growth · Support for families
• 2025-07-14 “E-001644/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Having children is a matter of individual choice. The Commission supports Member States in creating favourable social and economic conditions for all Europeans to create a family. Indeed, as outlined, for example, in the Demography Toolbox 1 , demographic challenges can be addressed through a wide range of adaptation measures, including addressing gaps in labour markets, reforming pension and health systems, promoting the transition to a longevity society, and addressing territorial imbalances through Cohesion policy. The Commission is currently analysing the fertility gap, i.e. the difference between desired and actual children per woman, to explore how its determinants can be addressed, where this falls into the Commission competences. The Commission has conducted several studies on the impact of migration on population dynamics, labour markets, fiscal systems, and integration in cities. 2 There are no studies ongoing nor planned for the near future, that specifically look at the sociocultural impacts linked to migration from culturally diverse areas. The Action Plan on integration and inclusion 2021-2027 3 lays down the measures to be adopted by the Commission and Member States to support the integration of migrants. The Action Plan emphasises the importance of creating cohesive communities and considers the respect of the common European values an essential part of living and participating in European society. In that regard, the Action Plan promotes the development of civic orientation courses to help migrants gain an understanding of the laws, culture and values of the receiving society as early as possible, and places a specific emphasis on addressing vulnerabilities faced by migrant women. 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Demographic change in Europe: a toolbox for action, COM/2023/577 final. 2 Studies include, for instance, Demographic Scenarios for the EU https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC116398, A Demographic Perspective on the Future of European Labour Force Participation https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC141153, Projecting the net fiscal impact of immigration in the EU https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC121937 or Diversity, residential segregation, concentration of migrants: a comparison across EU cities https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC115159. 3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Action plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027, COM/2020/758 final.”
  Support for families · EU strategy on population growth · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2025-07-07 “E-002893/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Letter of Intent with the Palestinian Authority 1 (PA) signed on 19 July 2024 consisted of: (i) a short-term emergency financial support of EUR 400 million of grants and loans, (ii) a multi-year comprehensive programme for Palestinian recovery and resilience. As part of the EU emergency support package to the PA of EUR 400 million, the Commission has disbursed EUR 382.5 million between July and November 2024. The pending tranche of EUR 17.5 million was disbursed in February 2025. All the disbursements were linked to PA actions identified in the Letter of Intent. The PA reached all prior actions from the Letter of Intent. The Commission and the PA have agreed on the Reform Matrix 2 that will be at the core of the comprehensive programme for Palestinian recovery and resilience. The Reform Matrix, anchored on the PA’s own reform agenda, will be the basis for future disbursements under the comprehensive programme. The multiannual comprehensive support programme for Palestinian recovery and resilience for 2025–2027, was announced on 14 April 2025 during the High-Level Political Dialogue between the EU and the PA. It consists of up to EUR 1.6 billion: a grant amount of up to EUR 1.196 billion as well as guarantees from the Commission to enable EUR 400 million loans by the European Investment Bank. The milestones for future disbursements will be identified in the framework of the financing agreement between the Commission and the PA to be signed in June 2025. The Commission is also in discussions with other donors and partners, as their active participation and involvement is crucial for the sustainability of the support to the PA. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/597ce07b-fb47-4bd2-b7ef46c4401487de_en?filename=Letter%20of%20Intent%20-%20EU%20PA%20final.pdf. 2 The Reform Matrix has been developed in close cooperation between the PA and the Commission and based on the PA’s own reform agenda. It includes important fiscal, economic and governance reforms, as well as social protection.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-07-07 “E-001464/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission pursues a comprehensive approach in cooperation on migration with partner countries, based on a whole-of-route approach and includes a broad-spectrum of topics, such as return and readmission, border management and prevention of irregular arrivals, legal migration, fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, international protection. The Commission supports Lebanon in strengthening border management capacities and enhancing border governance, including with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. This is done in line with EU and international standards and through a human rights-based approach. Support in the broader area of security aims to contribute to long-term capability of Lebanon’s security forces, including the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). In 2025, a measure worth EUR 60 million was adopted through the European Peace Facility to support the LAF 1 . The Commission supports the people in Syria through an inclusive, peaceful, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led transition and is committed to play a proactive role in the stabilisation, socioeconomic recovery and future reconstruction of Syria. A package of EUR 175 million for 2024-2025 will be provided for recovery inside Syria. The EU aims to allow all Syrians, in the country and in the diaspora, to have an opportunity to reunify, stabilise and rebuild their country. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/01/21/european-peace-facility-council-adoptsthe-third-assistance-measure-in-support-of-the-lebanese-armed-forces/.”
  EU-Syria relations · Asylum & border control · EU-Lebanon relations
• 2025-06-25 “E-002605/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a robust policy in place to monitor and evaluate projects and programmes implemented under its financial support. Independent final evaluations provide information on the results and impact reached and help to inform EU’s programming. They notably systematically include cross-cutting themes of human rights and gender. The specific support to the Palestinian Authority (PA) channelled through PEGASE mechanism 1 directly benefits thousands of civil servants and vulnerable families by contributing to the payment of salaries, pensions and social allowances. Selection of beneficiaries follows a strict safeguard mechanism through ex-ante and ex-post screening. Within the framework of the EU’s cooperation with Palestine * for the period 2014-2021, for a total amount of EUR 2.4 billion, the EU’s strategy has been aligned with the needs of the most vulnerable Palestinian populations and has played a key role in support to the PA to provide basic services to end beneficiaries. Gender equality is a cross-cutting issue within the five pillars of the European Joint Strategy in support to Palestine 2021-2024 2 . The Joint Strategy implementation report for 2022-2023 3 showed progress in improving gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls through the PA gender transformative agenda, the fight against gender-based violence and the promotion of economic, labour and social rights. It noted challenges in achieving comprehensive gender equality, aggravated by the current conflict. The EU Gender Action Plan III for the period 2021-2025 is under implementation in Palestine 4 . 1 ‘Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d’Aide Socio-économique’ launched in 2008. * This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue. 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gazastrip/european-joint-strategy-support-palestine-2021-2024_en?s=206. 3 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EJS%20Implementation%20Report_2022%202 023.pdf. 4 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/eugender-action-plan-iii-country-level-implementation-plan-west-bank-and-gaza-2021-2025_en?s=206.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2025-06-20 “E-001300/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU continues to call for an end of violence across Syria and urges all parties to protect all Syrians from all backgrounds without discrimination. The EU, gravely alarmed by the violence in Syria’s coastal region, issued a statement strongly condemning the horrific crimes committed against civilians 1 . It also called for a swift, transparent and impartial investigation to ensure perpetrators are brought to justice and to prevent any such crimes from happening again and welcomed the commitments made by the transitional authorities, particularly the establishment of an investigative committee. The EU remains attentive to the actions of the new authorities in ensuring the protection of all Syrians without any kind of discrimination and consistently supports an inclusive, peaceful, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political transition grounded in the respect for international law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, pluralism and tolerance among all components of society. It continues to be a staunch supporter of accountability mechanisms working on Syria. The EU’s current approach, in terms of non-humanitarian assistance, is gradual and conditional to the steps taken by the transition government. Such EU assistance provided follows strict implementation parameters and is subjected to extensive monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, including third party monitoring and risk assessments. The EU delivers humanitarian assistance through pre-certified partners in all parts of Syria without discrimination, based on people’s needs, humanitarian principles, accountability to affected populations, transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/pdf/.”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · EU-Syria relations
• 2025-06-19 “E-002882/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU bilateral allocation for Palestine  under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe amounted to approximately EUR 1.36 billion for 2021-2024. During this period, commitments to the Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion de l'Aide Socio-Économique (PEGASE mechanism), for direct financial support to the Palestinian Authority (PA), amounted to EUR 516.75 million (yearly average approximately EUR 130 million). The overall EU funding for 2021-2024 supported the financing of the most essential services for Palestinians, contributed to the PA’s recurrent expenditures, via PEGASE, by supporting payments of salaries for civil servants, social allowance payments, funding for the East Jerusalem hospitals, and also supported various development projects and financial assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. The EU has never contributed to the Palestinian ‘Martyr Fund’ of the PA, which was discontinued with the new social protection law entering into force on 10 February 2025 1 . The PA was running the Prisoner’s Fund off-budget, while PEGASE contributed to the budget of the PA. The Commission’s extended screening vetting system ensured that no EU funding went to the beneficiaries of the Prisoners Fund. The detainees and families (a list is provided by the PA) were categorically excluded from any payment made through PEGASE. Finally, Member States’ contributions to the EU budget are not earmarked for specific purposes. Instead, they are pooled and allocated proportionally across all expenditure categories.  This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue. 1 Decree-Law No. (4) of 2025, which amends Decree-Law No. (1) of 2019 regarding the Palestinian National Economic Empowerment Institution.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2025-06-19 “E-003028/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The assessments of Legal Service of the Commission are part of the internal decision-making procedures of the Commission and they are not published. On the issue of demolitions, the EU's position for the EU-Israel Association Council's 13th meeting that took place in Brussels on 24 February 2025 stated that 1 ‘The EU calls on Israel to halt continued settlement expansion and related activities, including state land declarations as well as evictions, demolitions, confiscation and forced transfers of Palestinians, which have reached record levels in the past year. Furthermore, the EU strongly condemns the demolitions of the structures funded by the EU or its Member States and expects that Israel make good the damage in accordance with international law. Since 7 October 2023, increased access restrictions by Israel in the West Bank have gravely impacted socioeconomic conditions for Palestinians. The EU calls on Israel to allow for a tangible improvement of freedom of movement and access for the Palestinians, to enable accelerated Palestinian construction, as well as social and economic development in Area C, and reverse the worsening of living conditions for Palestinians in Area C’. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6511-2025-INIT/en/pdf.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-06-17 “E-001182/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission On 11 March 2025, gravely alarmed by the violence in Syria’s coastal region, the High Representative/Vice-President issued a statement 1 strongly condemning the horrific crimes committed against civilians. The EU called for a swift, transparent and impartial investigation to ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice. It welcomed the transitional authorities’ establishment of an independent investigative committee and called on them to allow the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to investigate all violations. The EU remains attentive to the actions of the new authorities in ensuring the protection of all Syrians without any kind of discrimination. The EU continues to call for an end to violence across Syria and urges involved parties to protect all Syrians. The EU supports a peaceful and inclusive Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition, upholding the universality and indivisibility of human rights and principles of equality and non-discrimination among all components of society. The EU Brussels Conference pledges ensure support to Syria and neighbouring countries, that host a considerable number of refugees. The EU’s non humanitarian assistance is subjected to extensive monitoring/evaluation mechanisms, including third party monitoring and risk assessments. The EU’s approach is gradual and commensurate with steps taken by the transitional government. The EU’s assistance follows strict implementation parameters. It aims to foster social cohesion by bringing together all Syrians without discrimination. The EU’s humanitarian aid is delivered through trusted partners in all parts of Syria. It seeks to respond to life-saving emergencies based on needs, accountability to affected populations, transparency, efficiency, effectiveness, and humanitarian principles (humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence) 2 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/. 2 EU Treaties and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, see Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, OJ C 25, 30.1.2008, p. 1–12, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A42008X0130%2801%29.”
  EU-Syria relations · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2025-06-04 “E-001062/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recognises the challenge of population decline and encourages Member States to develop integrated policies to manage demographic change. The Commission's Demographic Toolbox provides a set of tools that can support Member States and regions in these efforts. As part of the Demographic Toolbox, the Talent Booster Mechanism is targeted towards EU regions that are experiencing a decline in their workingage population and that are affected by the departure of young people. The EU Long-term Vision for Rural Areas also includes strategies to address demographic decline. Cohesion Policy is committed to reducing disparities between regions in different Member States, including Greece, ensuring inter alia that people can effectively stay in the place they call home. Some EUR 639 million has been allocated to the regional programme for Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, aimed among others at fostering entrepreneurship, strengthening education and social care infrastructure, and promoting the region’s natural and cultural heritage to boost the region’s attractiveness. These investments will create jobs and upgrade public infrastructure, improving quality of life of residents. Additionally, the region benefits from a programme under the European Social Fund Plus aimed at boosting employment. It improves job access and activation measures for all jobseekers, focusing on youth, the long-term unemployed, disadvantaged groups in the labour market, and inactive people. The program also promotes self-employment and the social economy with a budget of EUR 12.75 million. Current actions include supporting enterprises in hiring highly qualified unemployed individuals and helping unemployed people start businesses.”
  Cohesion and rural funding · EU policy on brain drain
• 2025-05-16 “E-000966/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU has been consistently clear in its position that settlements are illegal under international law and has repeatedly condemned Israel’s settlement policy and related activities, and the occupation of the Palestinian territory that began in 1967. This was also confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion issued on 19 July 2024 1 . EU positions and policies, including the ones described above, are fully aligned to United Nations resolutions regarding the status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and are consistent with the conclusions of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 19 July 2024. 1 https://www.icj-cij.org/index.php/node/204160”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-05-16 “E-000432/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU has condemned any attempt by Israel to abrogate the 1967 agreement between Israel and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or to otherwise attempt to obstruct its capacity to operate its mandate 1 . The EU has stressed the essential role of UNRWA, which provides crucial support to the civilian population in both Gaza and the wider region and committed to continuing its support to the Agency 2 . In 2024, following the fulfilment by UNRWA of all the conditions agreed for the 2024 EU funding, the Commission disbursed a total of EUR 92 million to the Agency 3 . This came in addition to the EUR 48.5 million of EU humanitarian funding in 2024. In 2025, the EU is committed to continuing its support for the Agency, and as a part of its multiannual and comprehensive programme for Palestine 4 2025-27 5 . The Commission is willing to propose to allocate EUR 82 million per year to provide services to Palestine refugees via UNRWA, both in the occupied Palestinian territory and the wider region. This will enable UNRWA to continue ensuring its crucial role both as a humanitarian and a development actor. The EU has been consistently clear that political engagement and open dialogue are the most effective ways to convey concerns, including to the Israeli government. The current EU-Israel Association Agreement 6 is the legal basis for the ongoing dialogue and cooperation with Israel and it provides a useful mechanism to discuss and advance the EU stance. In this regard, the Association Council meeting that took place in February 2025 7 was an opportunity to pass clear messages with regard to the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. The Commission keeps under constant review all EU agreements with third countries, and the principles and values upon which they are based. The EU is extremely concerned by reports on the humanitarian situation in Gaza, which suggest that food supplies brought in during the ceasefire are running out. Under international humanitarian law, humanitarian aid must reach civilians in need. The EU has repeatedly called on Israel to lift the blockade on Gaza to allow humanitarian aid to start flowing at scale into and throughout the strip 8 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6511-2025-INIT/en/pdf 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6511-2025-INIT/en/pdf 3 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-disburses-additional-eu10-millionpayment-unrwa-2024-12-20_en 4 This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individuals positions of the Member States on this issue. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1055 6 https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf 7 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6511-2025-INIT/en/pdf 8 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_1052”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Support for international humanitarian organisations
• 2025-05-14 “E-000728/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The ‘third-party monitoring mechanism’ in Libya is a tool to help the Commission better understand the situation on the ground, ensuring that EU-funded programs respect human rights and measures are taken when shortcomings in this regard are identified. The contractors’ reports track developments and identify risks. These reports are available to relevant Commission services, including the EU Delegations. The EU welcomes Libya's willingness to engage in dialogue on migration, uphold human rights, and improve detention conditions, especially for vulnerable individuals. The EU continues to raise these issues with Libyan authorities who are committed to working with the EU, the United Nations, and other partners to enhance conditions and procedures. EU funding does not go directly to Libyan authorities but is channelled through international organizations or Member States. Respect for international law and human rights, including non-refoulement and protection of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, is central to EU policy in Libya. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – GE) embed human rights in their design and implementation. The NDICI Regulation 1 stresses human rights as a key aspect of EU external action, making them a criterion for funding eligibility and programs implementation. The Commission monitors its programmes through regular reports from implementing partners, on-the-ground visits, independent expert evaluations and external monitoring. This information supports dialogue with partner countries on migration, asylum, and border management, strengthening a rights-based approach. For border management, the EU-funded Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya 2 action, implemented by Italy’s Ministry of Interior and the International Organisation for Migration, operates under a Memorandum of Understanding with Libya, ensuring compliance with the ‘do-no-harm’ principle and coordination on search-and-rescue activities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj/eng 2 https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/our-programmes/support-integrated-border-and-migration-managementlibya-firstphase_en#:~:text=The%20programme%20aims%20to%20strengthen%20the%20capacity%20of,and%20rescue %20at%20sea%20and%20in%20the%20desert”
  Asylum & border control · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2025-05-13 “E-000676/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Freedom of religion or belief remains high on the EU’s international human rights agenda, in line with EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief 1 . The Commission is aware of the situation of Bahá'í community in Egypt and is in contact with the Baha’i community in Brussels and in Cairo. Freedom of religion or belief was an important subject in EU Special Representative for Human Rights Skoog’s visit to Egypt on 4-5 November 2024, where he raised with government officials the situation and the administrative challenges faced by the Bahá'í 2 . The Commission will continue supporting Egypt’s national institutions and civil society through cooperation programmes to implement Egypt’s Human Rights Strategy and Universal Periodic Review recommendations. Overall, human rights remain a priority in the EU’s relationship with Egypt. The Association Agreement and the Partnership Priorities mutually agreed in June 2022 3 define the political framework for the EU’s bilateral relations with Egypt, where both parties commit to ‘further promote democracy, fundamental freedoms, and human rights, gender equality and equal opportunities’. This is also referenced in the Joint declaration of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership 4 . In the context of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership with Egypt, macro-financial assistance requires that ‘Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights’. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11491-2013-INIT/en/pdf 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/eu-special-representative-human-rights-mission-egypt_en?s=95 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-2803-2022-ADD-1/en/pdf 4 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-declaration-strategic-and-comprehensive-partnership-betweenarab-republic-egypt-and-european-2024-03-17_en”
  EU competences on human rights · EU-Egypt relations
• 2025-04-25 “E-000132/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Equality and non-discrimination are core values of the EU embedded in the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, including on the grounds of age. The Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC covers non-discrimination on the ground of age in the area of employment and occupation. A step towards better enforcement and implementation of the EU non-discrimination acquis was taken through recent legislation on equality bodies 1 . As regards the 2008 proposal for an equal treatment directive 2 which would extend the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of age beyond the area of employment and occupation, the Commission has announced in the 2025 Commission Work Programme its intention to withdraw it within six months given that there is no foreseeable agreement, awaiting now the legislator’s reaction to this announcement. The current Union of Equality strategies 3 adopted by the Commission in 2020 and 2021 stress the need to combat stereotypes, fight age-based discrimination within their respective remit, promote diversity and inclusion in the workplace, and give everyone equal chances to contribute and thrive. The European Care Strategy 4 and Council Recommendation on long-term care 5 support and call on Member States to ensure quality, affordable and accessible care services and improve the situation for both care receivers and the people caring for them, professionally or informally 6 . More initiatives are recalled in the Demography Toolbox 7 , where older persons constitute one of the pillars. Age-related considerations can thus be relevant in the implementation of legislation and policies as outlined and also as part of the Commission’s work on its priority on ‘Supporting 1 Directive 2024/1499 and Directive 2024/1500. 2 COM(2008)426. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/genderequality/gender-equality-strategy_en; https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combattingdiscrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-anti-racism-action-plan-2020-2025_en; https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combattingdiscrimination/roma-eu/roma-equality-inclusion-and-participation-eu_en; https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combattingdiscrimination/lesbian-gay-bi-trans-and-intersex-equality/lgbtiq-equality-strategy-2020-2025_en; https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1484&langId=en 4 COM/2022/440 final. 5 2022/C 476/01. 6 https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-and-activities/social-protection-social-inclusion/socialprotection/long-term-care_en 7 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/communication-demographic-change-europe-toolbox-action_en”
  EU competences on social policies · EU policy on aging workforce and pensions
• 2025-04-25 “E-000583/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission monitors its programmes through several means, including regular reports from implementing partners, on the spot verification missions, results-oriented monitoring exercises and external and independent evaluations. Implementing partners of migration programmes provide comprehensive and frequent monitoring and analysis of the context in which they operate in the country and on the situation of human rights. Moreover, they carry out risk analysis and identify preventive measures to mitigate the risk that EU assistance could result in the violation of human rights. The EU Delegation also monitors the situation through regular missions, meetings and policy dialogue with relevant stakeholders. All this information serves as a basis for dialogue and guides the implementation of EU actions. In line with its commitments and principles, the Commission reserves the possibility to adjust, reprogram, or review its assistance and cooperation with partner countries if values were not upheld. In its decision-making, the Commission also duly takes into account the cost of nonintervention, and any impact its actions or non-action could have on the Tunisian population, people on the move or displaced persons. The Commission supports projects and initiatives in the area of migration governance and protection of vulnerable people, with a specific focus on victims of trafficking and smuggled people. As Tunisia and Libya are not qualified as countries at war, the focus is not on establishing a legal-humanitarian corridor, but rather on providing legal assistance and support to access existing justice mechanisms.”
  EU-Tunisia relations · Asylum & border control · EU development aid (migration conditionality)
• 2025-04-24 “E-002022/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has currently two ongoing grant contracts with the European Feminist Initiative. The Commission is currently verifying all the elements reported in the quoted article and provided by NGO Monitor. After a complete review of these allegations, the Commission will act in line with contractual provisions and the EU Financial Regulation 1 . The Commission is bound to ensure that no persons or entities receive EU funding if they are involved in criminal or unethical practices, terrorist financing and terrorist offences. EU restrictive measures are applicable to any of the Commission grant beneficiaries all over the world. The EU is also strictly opposed to incitement of violence and hatred. Specific clauses have been introduced in all grant contracts with beneficiaries managing EU funds in the occupied Palestinian territories and in Israel. Pursuant to these clauses, these grant beneficiaries shall not engage in activities as defined by the Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law 2 , which include incitement to violence or hatred. This prohibition is without prejudice to the respect of fundamental rights as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on EU 3 (TEU) including the right of freedom of expression and information and the right of freedom of assembly and association as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 4 . Moreover, a new provision has been inserted into the EU Financial Regulation which provides that grant beneficiaries and contractors shall be excluded from future EU funding in case of ‘incitement to discrimination, hatred and violence against a group of persons or a member of a group, or similar activities that are contrary to the values on which the Union is founded enshrined in Article 2 TEU, where such misconduct has an impact on the person or entity’s integrity which negatively affects or concretely risks affecting the performance of the legal commitment’ 5 . 1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024. 2 OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, p. 55–58. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12016M/TXT 4 https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Convention_ENG 5 Article 138(1)(c)(vi) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism · EU engagement with civil society · Regulation of NGOs in Europe
• 2025-04-24 “E-000173/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission learnt from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA) in early 2024 about the very serious allegations against 19 UNRWA staff members regarding their possible involvement in the 7 October 2023 terrorist attacks. The Commission was also informed by the United Nations in August 2024 that the Office of Internal Oversight Service OIOS had completed its investigation of the 19 staff members. The investigation found that in one case, no evidence was obtained to support the allegations. In nine other cases, the evidence was insufficient to support claims of involvement. In the remaining nine cases, the evidence obtained by OIOS, if authenticated and corroborated, might indicate that the staff members may have been involved, and their employment was terminated in the interest of UNRWA. In response, the Commission has taken decisive action engaging with UNRWA’s Commissioner General to tackle the serious issues at stake. Among others, the Agency has adopted an Action Plan to implement the recommendations of the Independent Review Group 1 , and swiftly followed up on the UN OIOS report on the allegations against UNRWA’s staff. Among the measures agreed between the Commission and UNRWA, the Agency has reinforced its Internal Oversight Service and Ethics Department, increased the frequency of sharing staff information to a quarterly basis with host countries, including Israel, and continue to perform monthly screening of staff against EU and the UN Security Council Consolidated Sanctions List. These measures show the Agency's commitment to uphold the humanitarian principle of neutrality, to ensure rapid and adequate responses to such allegations, and to implement disciplinary sanctions on personnel who breach neutrality. The Commission will continue to closely monitor the implementation of the Action Plan stemming by the Independent Review Group report and the EU system audit, to guarantee that the Agency works in full compliance with humanitarian principles, including neutrality. 1 https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/colonna-report-and-action-plan”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2025-04-22 “E-002329/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission took note of the European Ombudsman’s decision to close its own-initiative inquiry and replied to its suggestions for improvements on 18 February 2025. The Commission ensures that the EU-funded projects are carefully monitored. This is done through several means, including regular reports from implementing partners, on-the-spot verifications, results-oriented monitoring exercises, and thorough external mid-term and/or final evaluations. The Commission is developing further practical tools in close cooperation with EU Delegations to enhance internal procedures in this area and strengthen the implementation of the human rights-based approach in all its interventions. Some key evaluations are published. For instance, all strategic evaluations on financial instruments are published 1 and in 2022, the EU Delegation in Tunis also published the evaluation of 10 years of cooperation with Tunisia. A website 2 established by the Commission provides access to information on the Commission’s support to partner countries in the area of migration and forced displacement. The respect of human rights is considered all along a project’s life from programming to final evaluation and risks-mitigating measures are applied. Implementing partners of EU-funded programmes are bound to ensure the respect and protection of human rights. Contractual provisions entitle the Commission to suspend or terminate any contract if it has evidence that, or needs to verify whether, the partner has breached any of its obligations. The Commission can also suspend any agreement with a partner country in case it breaches its obligations related to respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. 1 For instance here is the link for the evaluation of Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for 2024: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2ffe013e-6287-4a09-8b18e5f426dab2b5_en?filename=european%20unions%20external%20financing%20instruments%202014-2020MN0924364ENN%20%281%29.pdf 2 https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/eu-support-partner-countries-migration-andforced-displacement_en”
  EU competences on human rights · EU-Tunisia relations
• 2025-04-22 “P-000354/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not have any evidence related to the Israeli hostages being held in Gaza in the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East’s (UNRWA) premises and encourages those who have information on this allegation to formally notify UNRWA. The Commission notes that UNRWA was forced to vacate all its installations in the northern part of the Gaza Strip and had no control over them for months. In accordance with international humanitarian law, it is fundamental that the principle of neutrality – including as regards UNRWA’s installations – is upheld by all parties of the conflict. The Commission takes neutrality issues very seriously. The Commission has been working in the last months with UNRWA to enhance the neutrality processes and controls systems of the Agency. The Commission has been monitoring, in parallel, the implementation of the Action Plan presented by UNRWA on the recommendations of the United Nations Independent Review Group report 1 , as well as the recommendations stemming from the EU system audit. The Commission will continue to closely monitor the implementation of these actions to guarantee that the Agency works in full compliance with the principles of international humanitarian law, including neutrality. The EU remains committed to supporting UNRWA, providing both financial and political support, to enable UNRWA to fulfil its mandate. 1 https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/colonna-report-and-action-plan”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2025-04-22 “E-000265/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Algeria has in principle a right to establish standards for products sold within its territory and to select the conformity assessment bodies (CABs) it deems appropriate. This includes regulations on the use of specific labels related to compliance with religious requirements, such as Halal. However, Algeria must ensure that the selected CABs are able to conduct reliable assessments, avoid unnecessary delays and charge reasonable fees. In that regard, Algeria has decided to recognise only a single CAB within the EU (Grand Mosquée de Paris). The Commission has received feedback that there are important certification delays and high fees. The Commission is actively discussing these issues with the Algerian authorities. The Commission also remains in close contact with the Grand Mosquée de Paris, including through a recent meeting in December 2024, and has requested them to take concrete steps to minimise delays and reduce certification costs so as to ensure an efficient and cost-effective process for all EU businesses seeking to comply with Algeria’s Halal certification requirements. The EU-Algeria Association Agreement 1 does not include provisions on certification of CABs. Conversely, Article 17(2) of the Agreement prohibits new quantitative restrictions on imports, or any measure having equivalent effect. Should Algeria’s measures be found to constitute such restrictions, they would be in violation of the Agreement. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2005:265:TOC”
  Trade relations with Morocco · Export of EU agri-food products
• 2025-04-15 “E-000289/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s relationship with Algeria is multifaceted. The EU remains Algeria’s largest trade partner. Algeria is the EU’s third-largest gas supplier, and its vast renewable energy potential makes it a key partner in the green transition. Both also share a strategic interest in stabilising the Sahel. Algeria is a country of origin, transit and destination for migration. While many Algerians migrate legally to Europe, Algeria has also become a hub for sub-Saharan migrants – some settling, others transiting. It seeks closer cooperation with the EU on the voluntary return of sub-Saharan migrants, facilitated through the International Organisation for Migration. EU efforts to engage Algeria on the readmission of its nationals illegally staying in the EU remain challenging for several Member States. EU financial support is primarily channelled through international partners rather than the Algerian government. No financing instruments used for Algeria directly link funding to specific policy measures. As a result, political dialogue remains the primary tool for advancing cooperation on migration and security. EU development cooperation supports Algeria’s economic diversification, critical given its high hydrocarbon dependency and youth unemployment. Funds are allocated through pillarassessed partners (e.g. United Nations agencies, Member State development agencies) to ensure effective implementation.”
  EU-Algeria relations · EU development aid (migration conditionality) · Asylum & border control
• 2025-04-14 “E-003042/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU and Algeria regularly engage in migration dialogue in the framework of the Association Agreement 1 (2005). Algeria is also involved in the Rabat Process 2 , a regional platform for migration governance. The EU does not provide any financial support to the Algerian government, including for the building of ‘fortifications’ along Algeria’s borders. Algeria benefits from two EU-funded migration programmes under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe 3 : Between 2023-2024, the Migration, Protection, Return and Reintegration Program 4 (EUR 85.6 million) implemented by the International Organisation for migration (IOM) supported 8 540 assisted voluntary returns of migrants from Algeria to their countries of origin, provided protection and direct assistance to 784 beneficiaries, and supported the reintegration of around 90 returnees from Algeria. The Regional Police Cooperation programme 5 (EUR 5 million, run by the International Criminal Police Organization), focuses on building the technical capacity of law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute criminal networks engaging in migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. Both programmes operate across North Africa. The Regional Development Protection Programme supports the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) to provide protection and assistance to asylum seekers and refugees in Algeria. EU humanitarian aid provided to UNHCR focuses on providing potable water to refugees near Tindouf. IOM and UNHCR cooperate with the Algerian Red Crescent, which, does not receive EU funding. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents/treaties-agreements/agreement/?id=2002036 2 https://www.rabat-process.org/en/ 3 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/funding-and-technical-assistance/funding-instruments/globaleurope-neighbourhood-development-and-international-cooperation-instrument_en 4 Adopted in 2021 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a60afbe4-31cd-4ded-bdb80a92b552fb4b_en?filename=C_2021_9615_F1_ANNEX_EN_V2_P1_1639232.PDF, and topped up in 2023 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/ff5ece36-1ef3-4cfe-a40b1648431c90a6_en?filename=C%282023%294402_AD%202023.PDF, with an additional top-up foreseen under the 2024 budget https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/ab2f12b1-06cf-40a3-bc5673c76a54bf1c_en?filename=C_2024_7998_F1_ANNEX_EN_V2_P1_3737157.PDF 5 Adopted in 2022 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/08f7ebe5-4466-479a-9cbffbf5292cfa7f_en?filename=C_2022_6933_F1_ANNEX_EN_V1_P1_2132129.PDF”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood · Asylum & border control
• 2025-04-08 “E-000307/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU stands ready to support the new phase in Syria through a Syrian-led and Syrianowned peaceful and inclusive transition, grounded on human rights and international law. Coordination with all external actors and regional partners, including Türkiye, to reunite and rebuild Syria, in full respect of its sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity will be a crucial element. The recovery and reconstruction of Syria, in which the EU aims to actively engage, is a field where Türkiye plays a key role. It is therefore important that there is good cooperation and coordination between the EU and Türkiye. The EU intends to scale up its recovery efforts and support eventual reconstruction of Syria, provided that an inclusive transition continues. The EU’s approach will be gradual and proportionate to the steps taken by the interim authorities. The EU decided to suspend several restrictive measures on 24 February 2025 to facilitate engagement with Syria, its people and businesses, in energy and transport sectors, as well as to facilitate financial and banking transactions associated with such sectors and those needed for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes. The sanctions relief is gradual, conditional and reversible. The EU is regularly assessing if the conditions in Syria allow for further suspensions. Since 2011, the EU has been at the forefront of international efforts to support Syria. From 2011 until December 2024, the EU and Member States have mobilised over EUR 37 billion in support of the Syrian people and their host communities. The EU has organised the ninth edition of the Brussels Conference on 17 March 2025 to mobilise international support to help address Syria’s immediate needs, recovery and early stages of reconstruction, where the EU committed nearly EUR 2.5 billion for 2025 and 2026, while together with partners EUR 5.8 billion was pledged overall.”
  EU-Syria relations · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-04-08 “E-000062/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission On 18 February 2025, the Commission replied to the European Ombudsman by providing further clarifications on several elements of compliance with its human rights obligations. Concerning the possible suspension of contracts, the General Conditions for Contribution Agreements (Articles 11 and 12 1 ) stipulate that the implementation may be suspended when a violation of human rights in the respective partner country has been identified per a formal EU Decision. Suspension can be partial and is not the only means to address a potential breach. This can also be done by reinforcing dialogue with the authorities and taking mitigating measures, including trainings on international law and human rights. The Commission is working on enhancing internal procedures to ensure better mainstreaming of human rights in migration management and more effectively follow up on allegations of human rights violations. The Commission has strong monitoring mechanisms in place. Implementing partners conduct risk and context analysis and identify preventive measures to mitigate the risk that EU assistance results in violation of human rights. The EU Delegation also monitors the situation through regular missions, meetings and policy dialogue with relevant stakeholders, including Tunisian authorities and internal security forces. The latter assured that appropriate procedures are in place to address any instances of mistreatment or misconduct. Moreover, dedicated monitoring mechanisms have been deployed to further ensure adherence to human rights’ standards in EU funded projects related to migration and security. All this information serves as basis for dialogue with the authorities and guide the implementation of EU actions. The Commission is committed to the respect of human rights and attaches great importance to transparency and accountability and remains fully committed to engaging with the European Parliament on its activities in Tunisia. 1 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/005e7241-6726-4c5e-b8223b51c28a8819_en?filename=contribution-agreement-annex-ii_en.pdf”
  Activities of EU Ombudsman · Asylum & border control