- 2025-09-24 “And our focus at the moment is really on, um, is really on, uh, seeing whether we can conclude agreements with other partners. Canada is one we are looking at because we are quite like minded. And what we've done with Korea and Singapore should be doable with them as well. They are interested. Um, there is no particular I mean, we are developing our own regulatory framework on AI still in the EU. I mean, this is and the technology is in full evolution. What I think is important is that in the digital trade agreements, we conclude, we define and we create and define policy space that allows us to regulate in the interest of public policy. So the LPO legitimate public policy objectives, if it doesn't have an abbreviation, it doesn't exist. So this one has an abbreviation. So you can be assured that we take that we take care of that. Now on is Chile the model for the future? I mean, the Chile model was invented to deal with the problem of the past. Because you will remember, you know that this. The association agreements with Latin America came from the 1980s or 1990s. I'm exaggerating 1990s. I don't think that we have any of these type of association agreements in the in the pipeline where everything was, you know, bundled together in one agreement. So the idea to do standalone trade agreements.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs)
- 2025-09-24 “And that is an enormous task because we have to build that arsenal a lot more than we used to have to do it in, in the past. Uh, but that is not to say that we cannot also do what you said, which is that we should work with like minded partners, reliable partners on supply chain resilience. By the way, this is also something we want to take to the Cpdp, um, which is also a diverse group, but where we have, uh, quite a lot of, of support for this. Um, and it is, of course, something which we are discussing with partners like, uh, like Canada, like Japan. Uh, so, I mean, we are doing also these initiatives, especially in the area of energy, raw materials, critical raw materials, there are cooperation elements which are very much linked to securing supply chains for critical goods and technologies with like minded, uh, Uh, partners. Um, now, uh, I've taken note on the, on the issue of, of of settlements. Um, but as I said, the commission also tries and, and we are at the stage of analysis on this, so I cannot tell you, uh, how this might evolve in the commission, but I'm sure you will appreciate that there is a difference in terms of saying our privileged trade relations with Israel are built, you know, on a certain understanding of shared values which are set out in the agreement.”
Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights) · Sourcing of critical raw materials
- 2025-09-24 “We are ready to discuss with you any concerns you may have, and I think we can demonstrate that we have taken them on board, both within the agreement, but also in the flanking measures around it. When we submitted our proposals at the beginning of this month, we announced that we would supplement the agreement with a legislative proposal that will operationalise the safeguard that is contained in the agreement itself, and this operationalization provides guarantees to Member States and industry alike that investigations can be launched at speed, including when the industry concerned is concentrated only in one or few member states. The Commission will follow market trends closely in order to be able to identify any risks ahead of time, allowing more time to react. It will send a monitoring report to the European Parliament every six months to assess the impacts, and I assume that that will not only be looked at in the agri committee, but also in Inter. Um, and of course, this is in addition to the many other initiatives that have been announced, alongside including what we set out in the vision for agriculture and food, uh, where we are taking steps towards potential alignment of production standards, notably on pesticides and animal welfare. We are going to step up our SPS import controls, including by increasing the number of audits and checks in third countries. So at source then I remind you of the unity safety net for crisis measures, which is worth €6.3 billion for the next MFF period, 2028 to 2034.”
Import of agri-food products in the EU
- 2025-09-24 “As I said earlier this month, at a time when the US is attempting to erect universal barriers, a partner which accounts for 17% of our trade, it is an imperative that we focus on the other 83%. We do need to do this not just for economic, but also for geopolitical reasons. And our agreement with Mercosur is an example of how we can deliver on both. This agreement offers us a chance to create a market of over 700 million people. It will bring savings of over €4 billion a year. And it will see EU exports to Mercosur countries surge by 39% by 2040. And this is not just about our bilateral trade flows. It's also about our competitive position with Mercosur vis a vis its other partners. China's trade with Mercosur has increased by a factor of 18 since 2003. So today, China is the bloc's biggest trading partner and it accounts for around 27% of Mercosur external trade. We remain in number two, but we have seen the proportion of our trade of Mercosur trade with us fall from 20% in 2018 to just under 17% today. The agreement can offer us a first mover advantage in seeking to reverse that trend and allow us to cement our dialogue with Mercosur when it comes to discussions of global governance, governance, and that relates also to climate and forest protection, etc., uh, to investments in critical raw materials, all of which are crucial to our broader trade and economic security agenda and indeed to our global agenda more broadly.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Trade impact on forests · Free trade agreements (FTAs)
- 2025-09-24 “So this will be a complicated legislation to, to, to put into place. And I think I have, I hope, responded, no, sorry. There was on Mercosur the non-violation complaint mechanism that, uh, Miss Vieira raised. So just to be very clear, this does not this is just something that we already have in the WTO, where there is a measure that does not violate the agreements, but which has a negative impact on expected benefits of the agreement. The threshold is very, very high And it is higher in Mercosur than in the WTO. And it has never worked in the WTO, and it does not apply to legislation that could already be foreseen at the moment of the conclusion of the agreement. So deforestation is not foreseen there. We have a cooperation we have established in the empire a cooperation with the Mercosur countries on deforestation, including also on helping them navigate the deforestation regulation. So we are certainly not derogating from it. As I said, we can't do that. But I really think there is absolutely no reason for concern for these non-violation complaints because we have some experience how it works in the WTO. It's something that cuts both ways, which I think is important, because there may be a temptation on either side to develop legislation that has an impact. But our Green Deal legislation was already announced and on the table by the time we concluded the negotiations, and I stop here. Thank you.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Trade impact on forests
- 2025-09-24 “Um, to address any market imbalances. This is we don't think that we need these guarantees, but it is important that they are there so that we deal with, uh, apprehensions and we can show that we have belts and braces and insurance and whatever else you need. We are ready to engage in technical discussions. I think they have not yet really started, uh, in detail, uh, so that we can facilitate your assessment and analysis of the texts, uh, in, in detail. Now, Mercosur tends to overshadow another important agreement, which is Mexico, and it is an agreement that will benefit EU agri food exports to Mexico, help facilitate investment opportunities and make it easier for EU companies to bid for government contracts in Mexico. For the moment, just above 1% of our total food and drink exports go to Mexico. €2.7 billion in 2024. The deal can only help to boost these further. There are, for example, still 100% tariffs on poultry exports, which will be removed entirely. We also have a quota of 20,000 tonnes that will be able to enter Mexico tariff free. Today there are tariffs of 45%. So also the Mexico agreement will work not just for our industry that it has already done in the past because but through the modernisation even more also for the agriculture side. Now let me turn to yesterday's trade headlines, which saw Commissioner Shevchuk and his Indonesian counterpart, Coordinating Coordinating Minister Airlangga announced the conclusion of the negotiations of the EU Indonesia Cepa and we sent to the committee the information in advance.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Export of EU agri-food products
- 2025-09-24 “And I think the chief negotiator, Fabian Gill, has also kept MEPs informed. This is a hugely important deal and it is an excellent deal that will solidify the EU's trading links with the regional powerhouse. Indonesia is not only the biggest economy in the region, but it is the 17th largest global economy. So I think this is something we need to to keep in mind, and the deal will eliminate 98% of tariffs and account for almost 100% of our trade flows. I just give you a few examples. On cars, there is currently a 50% tariff which will be removed over five years. Most dairy products, which currently face tariffs of up to 10%, will benefit from elimination of duties at entry into force. Meat products currently face 5 to 20% tariffs. Also to be eliminated, mostly at entry into force and the current tariffs of 90% to 150% on wines and spirits will get an in-quota duty of 5%, and the quota rate is set at the current level of exports. That is an excellent result, and that is complemented also by elimination of tariffs on processed food. So you will be able to check all of that for yourself. But it is really an excellent agreement and one that deserves your full support and where we will have to discuss also with you.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Asia-Pacific · Export of EU agri-food products
- 2025-09-24 “China's state capitalist system is not captured by these rules. Uh, we have a lack of clarity of the interaction between trade and climate, which leads to acrimonious debates and where I think we could probably aim for a clarification of rules. Um, so there is a lot that we need to do in order to reform the WTO. But for that we need allies. And that is where the CPTPP comes in play. They are, of course, also a partner of choice on their own from an EU CPTPP perspective. There is a lot we can do with these countries, including, for instance, in the area of digital trade. So we will also want to enhance our bilateral trade and investment Government relations with the Cpdp. But we also see them as a very interesting group to engage with in order to build an alliance for the reform of the WTO. So we have several engagements planned for the autumn, where we will also try and see whether we can land on shared lines with a view to MC 14. It's too early to say what exactly the market will bear, but I'm encouraged by the fact that a lot of our trading partners do not want to lose what they have, and we may all be clear about where the WTO needs to be improved, but we also need to look at what would we lose. So I think we also have to make the case for, you know, the cost of WTO, because I think there are many things which we are simply taking for granted, and we are too focused on the tariffs only.”
Trade relations with China · Asia-Pacific
- 2025-09-24 “Then of course, we have new forms of engagement the Clean Trade and Investment Partnership with South Africa. That is something we are aiming to conclude in November. Um, and then, uh, you know, we now have the Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement with Angola in place. Others are also interested in negotiating that with us, including in North Africa and of course, the digital trade agreements with Singapore and Korea. And now I come to the Plurilateral and the multilateral track because of course, we need to shore up the system. We need to avoid we. I think we need to accept the fact that nobody is able to trade with the US on WTO terms, because the US has turned its back on the WTO. What we need to do is to preserve the system for the others, and so that the rest of the world still sticks to their commitments in this respect. And there are positive signs in this respect. We are investing in enlarging the mpia, the, you know, stopgap solution, which is now increasingly developing into an alternative to the dispute settlement in the WTO. And we have new members joining. And I think that is indeed very good news. Um, and of course, we want to also push the reform in the WTO because there are areas where the WTO rules are not fit for purpose, not fit for the 21st century. We've been discussing this in this committee as well. There are problems with level playing field.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Asia-Pacific · EU-US trade relations
- 2025-09-24 “But there are valuable elements like the customs valuation agreement. Nobody ever talks about it. But if it wasn't there, we would have arbitrary application of whatever tariffs, because there would be no understanding on how you evaluate goods at customs. So there are a lot of these examples which show that the WTO is still a very valuable underpinning of global exchanges. And then we have to build the reform on top of what we have. But we should not throw the baby out with the with the bathwater. Now, um, let me come to trade relations with China. Uh, we had the summit on the 24th of July, which saw the 25th summit against the backdrop of the 50th anniversary of EU-China diplomatic relations, but also against the backdrop of deteriorating bilateral trade relations. We highlighted our long held concerns about China's export oriented growth model, which is underpinned by state subsidies and the contribution that this makes to global overcapacities and to. To an unlevel playing field. Now the summit uh registered limited progress basically procedural when it came to. Our market access issues. But it has resulted in an upgrade of our export control dialogue, which is very important in the current situation because we are trying to engage China on its global application of export licences on rare earths, which is a clear example of what I mentioned in the beginning, the weaponization of dependencies.”
Trade relations with China · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
- 2025-09-24 “All right. I'll start with the first with the WTO. Um. I mean, the WTO has more life in it than we give it. Credibility. Credibility for, um, and credit for. And we have seen that with the agreement on fisheries, which is the most ambitious multilateral sustainability related trade agreement ever. It's more ambitious than any of the regional agreements. And it was concluded fish one was now ratified as a multilateral agreement. So we now need to focus our attention on, uh, on on fish two. But also indeed on integrating plurilateral agreements. So we are ready to work with the co-conveners on every creative idea to overcome the barriers that others are putting in the way. Now, we hope that there is a possibility we are more confident that it may be easier to come to an incorporation of the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement as a first case, but it would have systemic implications which would show that plurilateral agreements can work in the WTO. But we also need to make sure and that is where the whole alliance building with the CPTPP, but also others, comes into play. We also have to show that the rest of the world is not willing to continue living in a situation where 1 or 2 countries can block progress for the rest of the world. So we also need to say, if we cannot take plurilateral agreements to the WTO, we will have to make them work outside.”
Asia-Pacific · Intellectual property rights (IPR)
- 2025-09-24 “But we have finally seen the executive order implementing the 15% duties on the 1st of August retroactively, and the 1st of September for aircraft and aircraft parts. Now colleagues are still looking at all, you know, the customs codes because the devil is in the detail. Uh, but I think, uh, that is that was a good step. And now we are working on, uh, addressing the problem of the steel derivatives, where we see that through this inclusion process of products that maintain an element of steel, they are extending the 50% duty to a large array of products. And that is not a breach of the agreement that we have with them of of the of the it's not a breach of the joint statement, but it goes against the spirit from our point of view. And, you know, it hollows out what we have agreed on. So that's why we are seeking a discussions there. And there are a lot of, um, a lot of, uh, exemptions. We are still which we have signalled to the US, which we are still seeking, where the joint statement leaves the door open without making firm commitments. So that is work we still have to do. Now, this will not amount to an FTA. And I think if we were to go to the US and say, could you agree with us that the objective is to transform this into a fully WTO compatible FTA? I think the answer would be a resounding no.”
EU-US trade relations · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
- 2025-09-24 “So you do audits, you audit the systems so that you are clear that the country concerned has the ability to detect when there is a problem and stop the exports. By the way, that is already functioning with Mercosur countries. We've had cases with Brazil. Um, they acted. Commissioner Varela did not hesitate a split second to take action. That is what we need to do. We also need to obviously increase our vigilance for this, so that there is no, uh, that there is no problem in this respect. And we have to upgrade our cooperation with the Mercosur countries in on these matters as well. So that is part and parcel of what we are, what we are doing. As I said, we are also moving towards demanding more on imported products, independent of whether we have trade agreements with these countries or not. So there is an increasing number of legislation on production methods that also our trading partners need to respect. And by the way, that creates some resentment, which we will have to handle. So we have to be very sure of our case that this is justified. We cannot do this because it suits us. We cannot do it for competitiveness reasons, but we can do it when it is for a global public good uh, for health, environment, public order, etc.. So that is why we need to do impact assessments before we go further on these issues. Now there is no exemption on sustainability or any other legislation Desolation through trade agreements.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights) · Free trade agreements (FTAs)
- 2025-09-24 “But in terms of the proposal, we have gone for the proposal to suspend the trade part of the Association Agreement. Um, now on, uh, on the Gulf. Um, indeed. Already at the summit last year, we opened the door to go also bilateral. So we don't close the door to an FTA with the GCC, but we are ready to also conclude bilateral agreements. The UAE has been the first in line asking for it. Um, and they are we are very engaged. And there is a very, uh, fast rhythm of these negotiations. But there are also quite some problems because some of the things we attach importance to in our trade agreements, uh, whether that is, you know, disciplines on state owned enterprises and subsidies, uh, rules on energy and raw materials, trade and sustainable development provisions. Um, so there is a whole host of issues where the UAE has quite a different approach from ours, and where for the moment we do not see much progress on substance. So we are continuing. Um, but this does not exclude, as I said, an agreement with the GCC. Um, and actually, you know, um, trade agreements are competitive game. So the moment we said we are open to do bilateral agreements, the GCC secretariat came and said, don't forget about us. We also want to revive the negotiations. So it's also possible that this goes the way. Like with Asean, we say we do bilateral, but they can be building blocks for a for a region to region agreement.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · EU relations with Gulf countries · EU relations with United Arab Emirates
- 2025-09-24 “And let's see how that how that advances. Um, then I think I think that was it on the sectoral part. Sorry. On the geographical part. Now on agriculture. On agriculture. I think we need to have another session where we come and present the cumulative study of the impact of our trade agreements, those concluded and those under negotiation. Because what this cumulative study shows is that EU trade policy is good for EU agriculture. We have the figures to support that. We are looking at that in each and every case. So we need to base. I understand that there are apprehensions, but we need to base our debates on facts and figures. And there is absolutely no evidence for trade agreements having been negative. I mean, let's just keep in mind we are the world's largest agricultural exporter. Our agriculture also depends on imports in order to function. That's often forgotten. So we need to look at the whole value chain there again. And we need to look at what our trade agreements actually do. And that is a very good story. Uh, we we can tell they're now on the SPS side. We have it's not about controlling 100%. I mean, at every stake that arrives, it's about having in place systems. You can rely on systems in third countries that you can check.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Export of EU agri-food products
- 2025-09-24 “Trade agreements cannot give derogations from EU legislation. That is simply not possible. That applies to our digital regulation. It applies to our, uh, to our environmental legislation, uh, etc.. So, um, there are also no exemptions for the US in the joint statement. What we can do with trading partners is cooperate to facilitate the respect of our legislation, to help them to meet the requirements, because the objective is not of this legislation is not to keep foreigners out. It is to make sure that the products respect the qualities we want them to respect. So from that point of view, trade agreements can be platforms of cooperation, but they can not derogate from EU legislation. Now, um, on turning to our EU Legislation. Deforestation. Now, the delay is from what I understood, and I was surprised to hear this as well. It is due to an IT system not being up to handling the amount of applications it would have to handle. So this is a technical problem, and I think rather than frustrating everyone by having by submitting and then having the system break down, it is bound to take more time. It's a pity that this problem has turned up so late. Yeah, but it does not detract from the fact that we are committed to the legislation. And that we have. But we have to make sure that we actually have the infrastructure in place for it to function for our own operators as well as for our trading partners.”
Trade impact on forests · Free trade agreements (FTAs)
- 2025-09-24 “And if that is no longer the case, then there is a case for suspending or to go towards a full, a full boycott that has different connotations in different member states as well. So if we also want to have a chance to maintain some unity in the EU, I think we should now focus our attention first without ignoring the issues. And I said, we are analyzing, but we should focus first on the on the proposal that is on the table and which has also a much bigger, not an enormous, but is also economically a lot more relevant. So if you if you are looking for a link between, uh, between the instrument and the objective, I think what we've put forward, uh, would have, would have a stronger, a stronger impact, um, bound. I'm very embarrassed that I can't answer the question of the chair. I looked into this halal business months ago, but I haven't looked into what the final outcome was. So I will have to come back to you on that one. Uh, on digital data flows, um, I mean, we have now in different formulations, but more or less the same model with different partners.”
International data transfers
- 2025-09-24 “Okay. Thank you very much for these additional questions. Um, Mr. Van Brempt, I take good note on on the point you make about the implementation of the deforestation regulation and the link to Mercosur. I understand that politically, as I said, in terms of the agreement, we have what we need. We have a commitment, a legally binding commitment to halt deforestation. And we have cooperation provisions. And of course, Brazil, like everyone else, will have to comply with the deforestation regulation as we apply it. Um, so, uh, on, uh, on Russian oil, um, now, This is not the first time that we use article 207 to cut Russia off a certain, or to cut off certain Russian exports. We've done that with agricultural products as well as with fertilizers. Um, and this is something that where we are cooperating with with DG energy. So this is not new. I think in all the sanctions packages, um, the intention has always been to gradually wean ourselves off Russian oil. So from that point of view, this is a continuation. And it is not, uh, is not an a new instrument that we have never used before. Sorry. Now, um, we we live in a world that is getting more and more complicated. And unfortunately, the respect of international law is on the retreat. Um, that is a reality we have to live with. Now, the question is, and I'm not saying that this is an easy answer, and I'm not in favor of black and white answers.”
Trade impact on forests · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2025-09-24 “I know what we have agreed with Mercosur countries, and I can tell you we have published what we have agreed with Mercosur countries, and that is the agreement itself. You have that that is as a new element. The text on how we operationalize the safeguards, that reads like a legal text, because the intention is to come very quickly with a legislative proposal on the basis of article 207 to accompany the signature and conclusion of the Mercosur agreement. We'll have to work through the procedures for that, but we will come with that very quickly. You have that text already that was published as well. Then I was referring to the vision for agriculture, where we announced the impact assessment on pesticides and animal welfare rules being applied to imported products. So that's in the public domain as well. And then I refer to the Unity Safety Network, which is a funding which was proposed as part of the MFF proposal. So that is public as well. And that is that amounts to €6.3 billion for the period 2028 to 2020 2034, which, if I'm not wrong, is 900 million per year. And that is for competitiveness, losses, problems created as a result of international competition. So obviously the details for that, for accessing that, that will be part of your work as budgetary authority on the MFF. But the Commission has done its work in this respect.”
Trade relations with Mercosur
- 2025-09-24 “So all these are public documents. So you have everything and we are ready to, uh, come and present this in detail, discuss this in detail with you either in the monitoring group or in a committee meeting. Your choice. Uh, but we are happy to ensure full, full transparency on this because we really think that on agriculture in Mercosur, we have the belts, which is the quantitative restrictions on what we let in in sensitive products. We have the braces and we have reinforced them quite a bit. Now on the safeguards to reassure, uh, member states. And I think we have never, ever tied our discretion as commission on when to initiate to such an extent. And, you know, this will have enormous resource implications because I mentioned just the reporting requirements. But I think we will have a lot more investigations than we otherwise would have had. Uh, but that is, you know, that's the braces. And then on top of that, we have an insurance policy with the Unity Safety Network, and we are working to increase, uh, the requirements on imported products to fulfill our, production standards. And that last element is independent also of any agreement, whether this is from a trade partner and an FTA partner or from another country, every imported product from anywhere has to respect these these rules.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Import of agri-food products in the EU
- 2025-09-24 “Eu only. That is something that we are committed to already since the European Court of Justice opinion on Singapore. It was just, you know, that we had this the we carried the luggage, you know, of the of the history of the association agreements. So this was very specific for this region. I don't see any other, uh, situation where this arises because there we already split this from the beginning. So there is no. Exactly, exactly. So the EU only where we can. By the way, this reminds me of an interesting innovation I wanted to draw your attention to. We have also concluded with Indonesia an investment protection agreement. Eu only, which means it doesn't have portfolio investment and it doesn't have investor state dispute settlement. That's a new model which you may want to look at. And I think I will stop there. Sorry. On the question I don't have the legal text in front of me. It is really you can see it in the legal drafting, but we will get back to you bilaterally to explain to you the difference in the drafting of the standard between the WTO and the and the Mercosur agreement. But I would have to do it on the basis of legal text I don't have in front of me now, but we will get back bilaterally also on Morocco. I will check where it is.”
Intellectual property rights (IPR) · Trade relations with Morocco
- 2025-09-24 “Um, but I think we need to continue engaging also with countries that do that are not fully like minded and are not fully respecting what we would like them to respect because otherwise we will be pretty lonely pretty soon. The point is that we need to deploy the whole panoply of our instruments. Trade instruments are important. They are extraordinarily important for the EU because we lack foreign policy instruments that nation states have. But that cannot lead us to the situation where we try to fix every global problem, and there are lots of them to fix with trade policy. And as I said, this is not a black and white response because obviously we have seen, you know, on Israel that is a trade policy tool at the disposal of a, uh, uh, of, of a foreign policy, human rights objective. And we can do that where this is the case, where we give preferences, etc., that is not excluded. But if we decide that we cannot have any trading relations or trade agreements with countries that otherwise pursue, uh, actions we disagree with and which are problematic, and I think I know who you are talking about with this militia, so I certainly don't want to belittle that, but is that not exactly something which can only be solved through a diplomatic initiative? So I really think that we have to get better at linking up all our foreign policy instruments, even if they are not as developed at European level as at national level.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · EU competences on foreign affairs · EU foreign policy approach
- 2025-09-24 “That is not the preferred option. But if we have to talk about a plan B, then that is it. What we cannot. We cannot go into. Mc 14 or any WTO discussion saying we want this. But one country says no, you can't. And then we say, ah, we tried. And then what is the alternative? So we prefer multilateral agreements. The second best is open plurilateral ism inside the WTO. But the third best is plurilateral rules wherever we can anchor them. And there are alternatives available. So I think that's as far as I want to go. But this is we are now engaging with a number of countries. We will have the G20 trade ministers meeting, which provides an opportunity. Uh, Doctor Ngozi will be there. So we will discuss this in detail. And as we move forward, we should, of course, also work with the European Parliament. You were also at the public forum. So I think you could also take the temperature. So there's a lot, a lot to be done there. Then I turn to the geographical. Let me start with the US. The further process the focus is on implementation. And you will have Mathias Jorgensen here to talk to you, notably about implementation on our side. But we are very much engaging with the US in order to make sure they deliver. And today, just before I came here, it's a coincidence. I don't think they did that to please me and make my life easier in Inter.”
Asia-Pacific · EU-US trade relations
- 2025-09-24 “So we've tried to find ways and we have made consecutive proposals in other areas like on the horizon, etc., which we thought may be a better place to receive a full support from the Member States. But now we've put forward this proposal, and of course we will defend this proposal and explain this proposal. But in the end, everyone has to take their responsibility. The commission has taken its its responsibility. There is the question of the settlements. Now, the now. The settlements have not benefited from trade preferences for quite a while. There's not much trade happening, actually. So economically, this is not very important. We understand that symbolically it's important. There are a number of member states that have announced that they are taking that they intend to take national measures. We are in touch with them. And we have said in principle this is a matter of common commercial policy. But there are exceptions. So member states have the possibility to take certain trade restrictive measures on grounds of, among others, public morality and public policy. So it is up to the Member States to justify any national measures they take in in this respect. Our focus is on the proposal that is on the table. But we are, of course, also asked to assess the compatibility of our trading arrangements with the settlements with the ICJ opinion. So we are doing this analytical work.”
Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights) · Relations with Israel - Palestine
- 2025-09-24 “And I think it's important to keep that in mind, because I hear too little from the industry recognizing the link between the increased market share and the measures that we have taken. Now, China and its rare, rare earth export restrictions brings me neatly to the issue of economic security, where we will come forward with an economic security doctrine towards the end of the year. I have already promised to my colleagues in the commission a bottle of champagne if they come with a better name than doctrine, because it doesn't. The term doctrine doesn't travel very well across different languages. So, you know, I'm, I'm I'm interested in finding a better expression. What this is about, though, is that we look now what are the threats around us? What are the tools we have to deal with them across the three pillars promote, protect, partner and that we then look at how can we move from a reactive attitude to a proactive attitude, one where we are not just trying to protect ourselves against weaknesses, but where we are also leveraging our strengths? Um, and I think that will be an interesting announcement in this communication, because it shows that it's not only that we have dependencies that others weaponize, but others are also dependent on us. So I think that needs to be handled with care, and that is the message we have to send. We will look at where do we have, you know, where do we need to have a clearer ideas on how to strategically use our, uh, our tools, but also where do we have gaps in our tools that we still need to feel? And I'm looking forward also to the discussions with the European Parliament on these matters, because I think this is very important, and it is important that we move from risk assessment and risk risk identification and assessment to mitigation because the risks are materialising as we are analysing them.”
Trade relations with China · Sourcing of critical raw materials · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
- 2025-09-24 “Uh, earlier this month, we've also seen China announced that it would be imposing provisional duties against EU exports of selected pork products. These duties have been applied as of the 10th of September, and they range between 15 and 62.5%. They target around 3 billion worth of EU exports to China. So this is substantial. Um, we filed, uh, last week, comments on these provisional measures, highlighting the significant shortcomings of the findings and requesting China to end the investigation. We are now assessing these provisional measures and will consider all options to protect the EU industry and our economic interests. It's important, too, that we keep in mind the broader circumstances of this case, which is linked to the EU's Anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese electric vehicles. I recall that our approach keeps the EU market open to Chinese battery electric vehicles. Indeed, in the first nine months since the imposition of definitive measures, there were over 200,000 Chinese cars that were exported to the EU. So we cannot be accused of simply closing our markets. But the measures have done exactly what they were supposed to do, which is to create space for our own industry to develop. And we have seen that the production of BEVs in the EU increased by 19% in that same period, while sales of BEVs produced in the EU have increased by 28%. And we see that European brands are gaining market share. That would not have been possible without these anti-subsidy measures.”
EU-China relations · Trade relations with China
- 2025-09-24 “Wow. I'm impressed. Thank you so much. Um, this is my second time in less than a month, and I think that's a record. Although I'm a regular here in the committee, but I think this is a record, and I think it shows the environment in which we live and work. Um, and that indeed, uh, times are, uh, characterized by fast paced change where multiple countries, including our biggest trading partners, are openly using economic tools to pursue their geopolitical objectives. Dependencies are weaponized, unjustified tariffs are imposed, and arbitrary trade defence investigations are launched. It's a situation that did not disappear, that did not appear out of nowhere. Growing tensions have been evident for a number of years now, and we are not going to go back to anything close to the past situation in the coming years, and that is why we need to look. Indeed, what is our strategy moving forward? How do we adapt to and advance in this new world? And let me go straight into things and start with the FTAs, because the trade agreements, uh, that is still the hallmark of our trade policy, because working with partners around the world on rules based trade is still what lies at the core of our trade policy. And we have to go there through different means. Um, and this commitment to rules based trade through bilateral engagement. And I'll come to the plural and multilateral track later. That is not despite the changing global trade environment. It is actually more important because of it.”
Trade relations with China · Free trade agreements (FTAs) · EU-US trade relations
- 2025-09-24 “But first of all, with Council, how we can speed up the time between the conclusion of an agreement and its entry into force. Because. Because we are losing too much time with that. So, um, of course we are also So continuing, uh, at an almost frantic pace with India, um, as we are trying to see that we can meet the deadline of 2025, that was set for the conclusion. But here, Christophe Quina, our chief negotiator, will update you in detail tomorrow as he is just back from Delhi from the 13th round. And you know, after the round is before the round, the next one is already next week. So, um, we are also engaged in FTA negotiations with a number of other partners. I'm not going to go into the detail, but there are overall working really well with the Philippines, with Thailand, Malaysia and also the United Arab Emirates. We are still trying to see whether we can conclude with Australia. There is a top level political interest in doing this from both sides. However, there is still an unrealistic expectation on the Australian side what they can get in terms of access for sensitive agricultural products. So we will have to see whether we can mutually align expectations, because I think it would be good if we could conclude this agreement and we will. We have several staging posts of engagement at both political and technical level in the coming months, so hopefully we will have a clearer picture then.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · EU-India relations · EU relations with United Arab Emirates
- 2025-09-24 “So I think that that is an important, uh, change now. I'm already over time, I wanted to say a word about the FDI screening and the GSP, but I think you have debriefed the committee this morning. I just wanted to say from the commission side, we are absolutely in favour of concluding both files before the end of the year and it is within reach. And on FDI screening, I think yesterday we saw the contours of a deal emerging on the GSP. The number of issues outstanding is extremely limited, but it is very important that we give certainty and predictability to our developing country. Trading partners, 65 of them depend on the GSP, and there's not a single one that doesn't raise these issues when when they meet with me. So. And I'm sure you have the same contacts. So from that point of view, full support. The Commission will play its role of honest broker in order to land these two files. And I will stop there and looking forward to the discussion.”
EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
- 2025-09-24 “And we have we have tried that when we when we proposed zero for zero. So I think that is not the option. And I think we have to accept that at this stage the agreement does not fulfill the conditions of article 24, but no agreement with the US. No understanding with the US at the moment fulfills that. So what we want to make sure is that this is a time limited exemption. So we need to continue working on this. But I also I mean, I don't want to take the easy road and say, yes, we are going to transform this into an FTA because I don't think that that would be credible. So we have to work with what we got here. Um, and so as I said, well, we are continuously willing and committed to improving, uh, our access to the US market. Um, and that is what we need to continue working on, on, uh, Israel. Um, an agreement is suspended the same way that it is concluded. And just like you would not want anyone to steamroller over the rights of either the Parliament or the Council in concluding agreements. Can you steamroller over the responsibilities of the institutions in suspending the agreement? The Commission has taken its responsibility. We have exercised that in a very reflected manner, because the objective cannot be to unnecessarily divide the EU or expose divisions.”
EU-US relations · EU-US trade relations
- “Thank you very much. And first of all, thank you very much for the debate, which has to be lively and it has to be open, and we have to bring all these issues to the to the table. And I can understand a lot of the points that have been made. But let me also say, it's not as if we hadn't considered the alternative. You know that the alternatives have been discussed. You know, that the Commission had put forward, and we had even introduced countermeasures which were suspended. But it is also clear that faced with a concrete situation, the choice to take countermeasures and then accept an increase in the tariffs, there was no support for this. The other issue we need to be aware of is should we really have worked in a manner that would have polarized the debate even more inside the EU and risk to split the EU? That would not have helped us. And we have, and this is a long term game that we have to play. That is another thing we need to keep in mind. We need to find a way to work with this US administration, which pursues many policies which are not our policies. We have to take the responsibility for their policies. We have to take the responsibility for our replies or our responses. But we always have to keep in mind what is the impact of what we are doing.”
EU-US relations · EU-US trade relations
- “And I think it's important to keep that in mind, because I hear too little from the industry recognizing the link between the increased market share and the measures that we have taken. Now, China and its rare, rare earth export restrictions brings me neatly to the issue of economic security, where we will come forward with an economic security doctrine towards the end of the year. I have already promised to my colleagues in the commission a bottle of champagne if they come with a better name than doctrine, because it doesn't. The term doctrine doesn't travel very well across different languages. So, you know, I'm, I'm I'm interested in finding a better expression. What this is about, though, is that we look now what are the threats around us? What are the tools we have to deal with them across the three pillars promote, protect, partner and that we then look at how can we move from a reactive attitude to a proactive attitude, one where we are not just trying to protect ourselves against weaknesses, but where we are also leveraging our strengths? Um, and I think that will be an interesting announcement in this communication, because it shows that it's not only that we have dependencies that others weaponize, but others are also dependent on us. So I think that needs to be handled with care, and that is the message we have to send. We will look at where do we have, you know, where do we need to have a clearer ideas on how to strategically use our, uh, our tools, but also where do we have gaps in our tools that we still need to feel? And I'm looking forward also to the discussions with the European Parliament on these matters, because I think this is very important, and it is important that we move from risk assessment and risk risk identification and assessment to mitigation because the risks are materialising as we are analysing them.”
Trade relations with China · Sourcing of critical raw materials · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
- “There are other products where which we have exempted, like certain generics etc., where the MFN tariffs are very low. So that's in reply to the question what tariff level are we talking about? It's between 0 and 2 or 3% depending depending on the on the product. Um, so what what we have put in front of you is the tariff element and you have. Please compare what is in front of you to the alternative situation in reality, and not to the situation when the US was respecting MFN rates in the WTO because that is no longer the case. So that is a reality we have to to have to work with on WTO compatibility. I wanted to draw your attention to the last sentence in the first or the second paragraph of the joint statement, which says that the United States and the European Union intend this framework agreement to be a first step in a process that can be further expanded over time to cover additional areas and continue to improve market access and increase their trade and investment relationship. Now what we are. So for us, this means that we are striving for WTO compatibility going forward. The US was not ready to sign up to that precise commitment, just as they were not ready to sign up to a zero for zero approach. That is a reality.”
Intellectual property rights (IPR) · EU-US trade relations
- “That is a relatively broad category, and I think you can imagine what this might, uh, include as well. So I think we have catered for all and we have signposted because, of course, we could always suspend through a new legal act. In any case, here we are creating this possibility to do that easier in case the conditions of what we have agreed are not respected. So but you know, this is something we can discuss in in more detail. Now, the issue of our regulatory autonomy, we have not conceded anything on our regulatory autonomy. Our rules, our standard, our legislation are sacrosanct. And that has been set at each and every level. So we are not compromising on SPS standards on pork. And yes, we are aware that there are SPS issues which are which prevent the US from exporting pork to the EU, which is the reason why they've not been able to use their WTO quota. We will not change our standards now, insisting on our standards and the respect of our rules for anything that enters the EU, insisting on our right to regulate, for digital, for health, for environment, for everything does not prevent us to cooperate on administrative facilitation to show that you respect the other side's rules. And that is exactly what we have written.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · EU-US trade relations
- “But at the same time, we also have to recognize that nobody is trading with the with the US on WTO terms because they have walked away from them. So nobody is doing that now. What we are doing here is, in tariff terms, a preferential treatment. Every preferential treatment is a derogation from WTO, MFN rules. Every one of them. Which is the reason why in order to make this compatible, you would have to cover substantially all trade. We are doing that on our side. The US is not doing it on their side, but we will be working on that. But we have to accept that, at least for a certain period. This is not fully in line with article 24 of the gut. But that doesn't mean that we are giving up on the WTO. But I said we should also not underestimate how difficult it is. And we've seen that in recent years how difficult it is to actually reform the WTO. And we have. And it's not just the US that is calling into question the respect of WTO rules. Some are doing it, uh, in letter and some are doing it in spirit. So we have a hard task ahead of us, and we need to work with partners. We need to create alliances inside the WTO in order to move forward on a rules based system that is fit for the 21st century.”
Intellectual property rights (IPR) · EU-US trade relations
- “We should not underestimate that task, but we should also not be distracted from that task by having a life and a trade conflict that is, uh, that risks spiraling out of control with our biggest trading partner. So this deal also liberates us to work on the 80%, as I said. And that is what we are doing with bilateral deals. That is what we are doing with the CPTPP. So we are working on these issues, but this is not something that will happen from one day To the next. So I think we have to live with this reality and then try to change it with others over time. Now then there was a question why is there no, uh, sunset clause? Now, I wanted to draw your attention to what is in the agreement, and that is an explicit possibility for the EU to suspend the agreement or actually the implementation of the tariff reductions in whole or in part for a variety of reasons. And these reasons include non-compliance and undermining of objectives of joint statement, undermining access of EU operators to the US market or other disruptions of trade and investment relationship, or the threat of such actions. We have also introduced a safeguard clause if there would be harmful import surges that would risk a serious injury on the EU market and to EU industry, and also in case of change of objective circumstances that existed at the time the joint statement was issued.”
EU-US trade relations · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
- “But it doesn't go further than that. Yeah. And this is something where we will have to come back work and see whether this actually works and how we would implement it. So but this is not in front of you today. But let me be crystal clear. We are not compromising on our laws, regulations, standards or their applications. This remains in the hands of the EU and this was never, ever called into question by anyone from the EU side at every level. We have been crystal clear about that, and we will continue to be crystal clear about that. Um, then what else did I have? Um, uh, yes. Uh, on the, uh, investments. These are not investments by an EU sovereign wealth fund. These are this is an aggregation of intentions to invest by EU companies. That is what it is. And we have spoken to companies, and they have told us what they have in mind. And if you look at it, it is formulated in a rather prudent manner in exactly. European companies are expected to invest an additional 600 billion, etc.. Same for purchases of energy. And yes, we have an energy transition to manage. But what we are talking about is also things which we need at least as bridging, uh, to a future which will be greener and cleaner. So we are here again, aggregating the demand and the expectation of what will be imported.”
EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
- “And they also intend to use 301 in the future. So this is not over. We need to continue to be very vigilant to see what is happening. We need to continue defending our EU interests in a situation where we are faced with policies which are not our choice and with which we disagree, But where we have to manage the fallout in the best interest of of the EU, and for that the Commission needs the support of this House. The politicians are not shying away from this discussion. You will have both Commissioner and President von der Leyen in the plenary next week, and there is a lot to discuss. And of course, to all those who say we need to learn the lesson and work on our autonomy, on our sovereignty, on our freedom, that is exactly what the EU intends to do. This is what the the issue that is at stake on what we do on the internal market. This is what we need to do looking at our tech sovereignty. So we have a lot of work ahead of us in the trade field, but also beyond. But the solution is not Europe falling back on its own, closing in on its own. We need to remain open to the world. We need to work with partners, and we need to construct a new system that is fit for purpose. Thank you.”
EU digital & tech sovereignty · EU-US trade relations
- “So all these are public documents. So you have everything and we are ready to, uh, come and present this in detail, discuss this in detail with you either in the monitoring group or in a committee meeting. Your choice. Uh, but we are happy to ensure full, full transparency on this because we really think that on agriculture in Mercosur, we have the belts, which is the quantitative restrictions on what we let in in sensitive products. We have the braces and we have reinforced them quite a bit. Now on the safeguards to reassure, uh, member states. And I think we have never, ever tied our discretion as commission on when to initiate to such an extent. And, you know, this will have enormous resource implications because I mentioned just the reporting requirements. But I think we will have a lot more investigations than we otherwise would have had. Uh, but that is, you know, that's the braces. And then on top of that, we have an insurance policy with the Unity Safety Network, and we are working to increase, uh, the requirements on imported products to fulfill our, production standards. And that last element is independent also of any agreement, whether this is from a trade partner and an FTA partner or from another country, every imported product from anywhere has to respect these these rules.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Free trade agreements (FTAs)
- “As I said earlier this month, at a time when the US is attempting to erect universal barriers, a partner which accounts for 17% of our trade, it is an imperative that we focus on the other 83%. We do need to do this not just for economic, but also for geopolitical reasons. And our agreement with Mercosur is an example of how we can deliver on both. This agreement offers us a chance to create a market of over 700 million people. It will bring savings of over €4 billion a year. And it will see EU exports to Mercosur countries surge by 39% by 2040. And this is not just about our bilateral trade flows. It's also about our competitive position with Mercosur vis a vis its other partners. China's trade with Mercosur has increased by a factor of 18 since 2003. So today, China is the bloc's biggest trading partner and it accounts for around 27% of Mercosur external trade. We remain in number two, but we have seen the proportion of our trade of Mercosur trade with us fall from 20% in 2018 to just under 17% today. The agreement can offer us a first mover advantage in seeking to reverse that trend and allow us to cement our dialogue with Mercosur when it comes to discussions of global governance, governance, and that relates also to climate and forest protection, etc., uh, to investments in critical raw materials, all of which are crucial to our broader trade and economic security agenda and indeed to our global agenda more broadly.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Trade impact on forests · Free trade agreements (FTAs)
- “But in terms of the proposal, we have gone for the proposal to suspend the trade part of the Association Agreement. Um, now on, uh, on the Gulf. Um, indeed. Already at the summit last year, we opened the door to go also bilateral. So we don't close the door to an FTA with the GCC, but we are ready to also conclude bilateral agreements. The UAE has been the first in line asking for it. Um, and they are we are very engaged. And there is a very, uh, fast rhythm of these negotiations. But there are also quite some problems because some of the things we attach importance to in our trade agreements, uh, whether that is, you know, disciplines on state owned enterprises and subsidies, uh, rules on energy and raw materials, trade and sustainable development provisions. Um, so there is a whole host of issues where the UAE has quite a different approach from ours, and where for the moment we do not see much progress on substance. So we are continuing. Um, but this does not exclude, as I said, an agreement with the GCC. Um, and actually, you know, um, trade agreements are competitive game. So the moment we said we are open to do bilateral agreements, the GCC secretariat came and said, don't forget about us. We also want to revive the negotiations. So it's also possible that this goes the way. Like with Asean, we say we do bilateral, but they can be building blocks for a for a region to region agreement.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · EU relations with Gulf countries · EU relations with United Arab Emirates
- “So you do audits, you audit the systems so that you are clear that the country concerned has the ability to detect when there is a problem and stop the exports. By the way, that is already functioning with Mercosur countries. We've had cases with Brazil. Um, they acted. Commissioner Varela did not hesitate a split second to take action. That is what we need to do. We also need to obviously increase our vigilance for this, so that there is no, uh, that there is no problem in this respect. And we have to upgrade our cooperation with the Mercosur countries in on these matters as well. So that is part and parcel of what we are, what we are doing. As I said, we are also moving towards demanding more on imported products, independent of whether we have trade agreements with these countries or not. So there is an increasing number of legislation on production methods that also our trading partners need to respect. And by the way, that creates some resentment, which we will have to handle. So we have to be very sure of our case that this is justified. We cannot do this because it suits us. We cannot do it for competitiveness reasons, but we can do it when it is for a global public good uh, for health, environment, public order, etc.. So that is why we need to do impact assessments before we go further on these issues. Now there is no exemption on sustainability or any other legislation Desolation through trade agreements.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights) · Free trade agreements (FTAs)
- “Not a single one. And I think this is important to keep in mind, because this was only possible because we were able to negotiate on behalf of 450 million people in 27 member states. And that explains why, relatively seen, we are better off than others. And in trade policy and in market access. It is all about relative market access. Of course we would. We we have pursued we have pushed zero for zero from the beginning. But that was not possible because that is not where this administration is trade policy wise. So at some stage you also have to decide not to bang your head against the wall expecting the wall to move. But you have to see how can you lower the wall, reduce it, climb over it, etc.. And this work is not over with this deal. That's why I'm saying there is an inbuilt agenda here. There are things that need to be that are formulated as intentions on both sides, that need to be filled with life. That is for instance, the case on steel and aluminium. That is also the case on a number of products that we are pushing to have exempted from the reciprocal tariffs, where we want the US to go back to zero or close to zero, because that was the MFN rate before.”
EU-US trade relations · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
- “Our car exports have really dropped during that time, and that is because they were not subjected to a 15% tariff, but to 27.5%. So there is a level we don't know where that is. I think the US is currently testing where that is where a tariff becomes prohibitive and trade will no longer flow. But with the 15% all inclusive, that is not where we are. So the fourth reason I want, I think this is a deal worth supporting is that it creates a platform for engagement. I said we have created a measure of predictability and stability, but we also know that policymaking in the US is in full swing. So it is very important that we have secured a platform from which we can engage in order to build on this agreement, and in order to come to a situation where we can continue to enhance bilateral trade and investment with our most important partner, and that we come to a point where we can also use this agreement as a platform to discuss all the issues which are of relevance in the transatlantic relationship, which cannot be reduced to its trade in goods dimension. So I really wanted to summarize this. Now, why have we put forward these proposals? I already referred to the fact that we have this problem in the car sector. That's why it was important that we came still in August with this proposal.”
EU-US relations · EU-US trade relations
- “So please look at what is the alternative to this deal and are you willing to take the responsibility for that? So again, what is in front of you is legislative proposals on tariffs. Nothing else. And we will have to come back to you on what we do with the other elements. We are, first of all, Commissioner Shevchuk is in daily contact with his counterparts in order to make sure that the US follows up on the things that they have promised to do. So this relates to the cars, and we are not very hung up about the date by which they will adopt this lowering of the tariffs to the 15%, because we have a firm commitment that this will be applied retroactively, and it is perfectly normal that you then have a reimbursement of tariffs. This is something that happens on a regular basis. All customs authorities are used to that. So that's why we are not hung up about it. But of course we would like to see this as quickly as possible, just like we want to build on what we have discussed with them, which is to widen the scope of products that are exempt from the 15% and go back to MFN tariffs. We have achieved that for aircraft, which is zero because aircraft was at zero, aircraft and aircraft parts at zero on an MFN basis.”
EU-US trade relations · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
- “Eu only. That is something that we are committed to already since the European Court of Justice opinion on Singapore. It was just, you know, that we had this the we carried the luggage, you know, of the of the history of the association agreements. So this was very specific for this region. I don't see any other, uh, situation where this arises because there we already split this from the beginning. So there is no. Exactly, exactly. So the EU only where we can. By the way, this reminds me of an interesting innovation I wanted to draw your attention to. We have also concluded with Indonesia an investment protection agreement. Eu only, which means it doesn't have portfolio investment and it doesn't have investor state dispute settlement. That's a new model which you may want to look at. And I think I will stop there. Sorry. On the question I don't have the legal text in front of me. It is really you can see it in the legal drafting, but we will get back to you bilaterally to explain to you the difference in the drafting of the standard between the WTO and the and the Mercosur agreement. But I would have to do it on the basis of legal text I don't have in front of me now, but we will get back bilaterally also on Morocco. I will check where it is.”
Trade relations with Morocco
- “Um, but I think we need to continue engaging also with countries that do that are not fully like minded and are not fully respecting what we would like them to respect because otherwise we will be pretty lonely pretty soon. The point is that we need to deploy the whole panoply of our instruments. Trade instruments are important. They are extraordinarily important for the EU because we lack foreign policy instruments that nation states have. But that cannot lead us to the situation where we try to fix every global problem, and there are lots of them to fix with trade policy. And as I said, this is not a black and white response because obviously we have seen, you know, on Israel that is a trade policy tool at the disposal of a, uh, uh, of, of a foreign policy, human rights objective. And we can do that where this is the case, where we give preferences, etc., that is not excluded. But if we decide that we cannot have any trading relations or trade agreements with countries that otherwise pursue, uh, actions we disagree with and which are problematic, and I think I know who you are talking about with this militia, so I certainly don't want to belittle that, but is that not exactly something which can only be solved through a diplomatic initiative? So I really think that we have to get better at linking up all our foreign policy instruments, even if they are not as developed at European level as at national level.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · EU foreign policy approach · EU policy on social & environmental impact of foreign investments
- “And you've all followed announcements that pointed in the direction of rather high tariffs to be applied in these sectors. So I think it is important that we secure this clarity as well, recognising our shared challenge and the benefits of joint action. The EU and the US intend to collaborate to shield our economies from overcapacity in the steel and aluminium sectors. This will also include work to establish trqs by the US for EU exports of steel and aluminium, and to ensure security of supply in these critical industries. On our side, the EU agreed to remove tariffs on all US industrial goods and expand market access for certain US seafood and certain non-sensitive agricultural products. At the same time, throughout this process, the Commission has defended EU sensitivities. We have not put forward tariff concessions for goods that are sensitive to our businesses, citizens and farmers, and I think this is important to keep in mind as well. We also made it clear that we are not compromising on our regulatory autonomy, our rules and our ability to legislate in the public interests remain unaffected, whether it is about rules for food, health or safety standards or digital protections our citizens rely on and expect from us. So let me summarize in four points why I think this agreement deserves your support, and these legislative proposals deserve your support. In any negotiation, you need to look at what is the alternative.”
State Aid · EU-US trade relations
- “So this will be a complicated legislation to, to, to put into place. And I think I have, I hope, responded, no, sorry. There was on Mercosur the non-violation complaint mechanism that, uh, Miss Vieira raised. So just to be very clear, this does not this is just something that we already have in the WTO, where there is a measure that does not violate the agreements, but which has a negative impact on expected benefits of the agreement. The threshold is very, very high And it is higher in Mercosur than in the WTO. And it has never worked in the WTO, and it does not apply to legislation that could already be foreseen at the moment of the conclusion of the agreement. So deforestation is not foreseen there. We have a cooperation we have established in the empire a cooperation with the Mercosur countries on deforestation, including also on helping them navigate the deforestation regulation. So we are certainly not derogating from it. As I said, we can't do that. But I really think there is absolutely no reason for concern for these non-violation complaints because we have some experience how it works in the WTO. It's something that cuts both ways, which I think is important, because there may be a temptation on either side to develop legislation that has an impact. But our Green Deal legislation was already announced and on the table by the time we concluded the negotiations, and I stop here. Thank you.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Trade impact on forests
- “And we have looked at the data for our exports in the second quarter of this year. Admittedly, we need to continue monitoring, but our exports have held firm. They have even partly increased. Why is that the case? Because the US will not be able to produce all these products, which it has now made more expensive to import. They will not be able to produce all these products themselves, so they will have to continue importing. So here our competitiveness depends on the duty we pay. Not in the abstract, but in comparison to others. And that's why I'm saying this is the best deal, because nobody else got a better deal. And as I said, 15% our our exports at 15% have held up. Why am I saying 15%? Because you will reply. But you had a reciprocal tariff of 10%. Here I come back to the issue of stacking, because 15 is the new ten, or rather, 15 is the old 14.8%, because the 10% reciprocals that we paid came on top of an average MFN duty of 4.8%, which is the reason why the data for the second quarter of this year is a good indicator of how our exports will be able to keep up in a situation where we will have an all inclusive tariff of 15%. There is one big exception to our exports holding up and that is cars.”
EU-US trade relations · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
- “Thank you very much. You're a hard taskmaster. Um, I think listening to this debate, I have the impression that you want to give us the responsibility for the US tariff policy. No, I mean, I understand your complaints about the US tariff policy. We are not responsible for this tariff policy. And I've said in my introduction that this is not where we are. We think tariffs are taxes on citizens and on businesses. And introducing tariffs is a bad thing. The point is confronted with a Trump administration that is determined to use tariffs as a. Instrument to pursue various policy objectives. Confronted with that the the question for us is how do we best defend EU interests in this respect? And that is what we have tried to do. And I would argue we have succeeded. And it depends on the yardstick. I understand all those who say if we compare 15% to 2.3%. Yeah, of course that is not a good development, but that is not a development that is in the hands of the EU. That's what I meant. What is in our hands is to see how can we react to that, and how can we limit the impact on the EU. And here, before you fall into the mindset that some of you quoted, that the EU has not defended the EU interests yet, that is simply not true. And that is why I was saying there is no one, not a single country that got a deal that is comparable to ours.”
EU-US relations · EU-US trade relations
- “We are ready to discuss with you any concerns you may have, and I think we can demonstrate that we have taken them on board, both within the agreement, but also in the flanking measures around it. When we submitted our proposals at the beginning of this month, we announced that we would supplement the agreement with a legislative proposal that will operationalise the safeguard that is contained in the agreement itself, and this operationalization provides guarantees to Member States and industry alike that investigations can be launched at speed, including when the industry concerned is concentrated only in one or few member states. The Commission will follow market trends closely in order to be able to identify any risks ahead of time, allowing more time to react. It will send a monitoring report to the European Parliament every six months to assess the impacts, and I assume that that will not only be looked at in the agri committee, but also in Inter. Um, and of course, this is in addition to the many other initiatives that have been announced, alongside including what we set out in the vision for agriculture and food, uh, where we are taking steps towards potential alignment of production standards, notably on pesticides and animal welfare. We are going to step up our SPS import controls, including by increasing the number of audits and checks in third countries. So at source then I remind you of the unity safety net for crisis measures, which is worth €6.3 billion for the next MFF period, 2028 to 2034.”
Import of agri-food products in the EU
- “Um, to address any market imbalances. This is we don't think that we need these guarantees, but it is important that they are there so that we deal with, uh, apprehensions and we can show that we have belts and braces and insurance and whatever else you need. We are ready to engage in technical discussions. I think they have not yet really started, uh, in detail, uh, so that we can facilitate your assessment and analysis of the texts, uh, in, in detail. Now, Mercosur tends to overshadow another important agreement, which is Mexico, and it is an agreement that will benefit EU agri food exports to Mexico, help facilitate investment opportunities and make it easier for EU companies to bid for government contracts in Mexico. For the moment, just above 1% of our total food and drink exports go to Mexico. €2.7 billion in 2024. The deal can only help to boost these further. There are, for example, still 100% tariffs on poultry exports, which will be removed entirely. We also have a quota of 20,000 tonnes that will be able to enter Mexico tariff free. Today there are tariffs of 45%. So also the Mexico agreement will work not just for our industry that it has already done in the past because but through the modernisation even more also for the agriculture side. Now let me turn to yesterday's trade headlines, which saw Commissioner Shevchuk and his Indonesian counterpart, Coordinating Coordinating Minister Airlangga announced the conclusion of the negotiations of the EU Indonesia Cepa and we sent to the committee the information in advance.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Export of EU agri-food products
- “But there are valuable elements like the customs valuation agreement. Nobody ever talks about it. But if it wasn't there, we would have arbitrary application of whatever tariffs, because there would be no understanding on how you evaluate goods at customs. So there are a lot of these examples which show that the WTO is still a very valuable underpinning of global exchanges. And then we have to build the reform on top of what we have. But we should not throw the baby out with the with the bathwater. Now, um, let me come to trade relations with China. Uh, we had the summit on the 24th of July, which saw the 25th summit against the backdrop of the 50th anniversary of EU-China diplomatic relations, but also against the backdrop of deteriorating bilateral trade relations. We highlighted our long held concerns about China's export oriented growth model, which is underpinned by state subsidies and the contribution that this makes to global overcapacities and to. To an unlevel playing field. Now the summit uh registered limited progress basically procedural when it came to. Our market access issues. But it has resulted in an upgrade of our export control dialogue, which is very important in the current situation because we are trying to engage China on its global application of export licences on rare earths, which is a clear example of what I mentioned in the beginning, the weaponization of dependencies.”
Trade relations with China · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
- “Uh, earlier this month, we've also seen China announced that it would be imposing provisional duties against EU exports of selected pork products. These duties have been applied as of the 10th of September, and they range between 15 and 62.5%. They target around 3 billion worth of EU exports to China. So this is substantial. Um, we filed, uh, last week, comments on these provisional measures, highlighting the significant shortcomings of the findings and requesting China to end the investigation. We are now assessing these provisional measures and will consider all options to protect the EU industry and our economic interests. It's important, too, that we keep in mind the broader circumstances of this case, which is linked to the EU's Anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese electric vehicles. I recall that our approach keeps the EU market open to Chinese battery electric vehicles. Indeed, in the first nine months since the imposition of definitive measures, there were over 200,000 Chinese cars that were exported to the EU. So we cannot be accused of simply closing our markets. But the measures have done exactly what they were supposed to do, which is to create space for our own industry to develop. And we have seen that the production of BEVs in the EU increased by 19% in that same period, while sales of BEVs produced in the EU have increased by 28%. And we see that European brands are gaining market share. That would not have been possible without these anti-subsidy measures.”
EU-China relations · Trade relations with China · State Aid
- “So I think that that is an important, uh, change now. I'm already over time, I wanted to say a word about the FDI screening and the GSP, but I think you have debriefed the committee this morning. I just wanted to say from the commission side, we are absolutely in favour of concluding both files before the end of the year and it is within reach. And on FDI screening, I think yesterday we saw the contours of a deal emerging on the GSP. The number of issues outstanding is extremely limited, but it is very important that we give certainty and predictability to our developing country. Trading partners, 65 of them depend on the GSP, and there's not a single one that doesn't raise these issues when when they meet with me. So. And I'm sure you have the same contacts. So from that point of view, full support. The Commission will play its role of honest broker in order to land these two files. And I will stop there and looking forward to the discussion.”
EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
- “But we have finally seen the executive order implementing the 15% duties on the 1st of August retroactively, and the 1st of September for aircraft and aircraft parts. Now colleagues are still looking at all, you know, the customs codes because the devil is in the detail. Uh, but I think, uh, that is that was a good step. And now we are working on, uh, addressing the problem of the steel derivatives, where we see that through this inclusion process of products that maintain an element of steel, they are extending the 50% duty to a large array of products. And that is not a breach of the agreement that we have with them of of the of the it's not a breach of the joint statement, but it goes against the spirit from our point of view. And, you know, it hollows out what we have agreed on. So that's why we are seeking a discussions there. And there are a lot of, um, a lot of, uh, exemptions. We are still which we have signalled to the US, which we are still seeking, where the joint statement leaves the door open without making firm commitments. So that is work we still have to do. Now, this will not amount to an FTA. And I think if we were to go to the US and say, could you agree with us that the objective is to transform this into a fully WTO compatible FTA? I think the answer would be a resounding no.”
EU-US trade relations · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
- “And our focus at the moment is really on, um, is really on, uh, seeing whether we can conclude agreements with other partners. Canada is one we are looking at because we are quite like minded. And what we've done with Korea and Singapore should be doable with them as well. They are interested. Um, there is no particular I mean, we are developing our own regulatory framework on AI still in the EU. I mean, this is and the technology is in full evolution. What I think is important is that in the digital trade agreements, we conclude, we define and we create and define policy space that allows us to regulate in the interest of public policy. So the LPO legitimate public policy objectives, if it doesn't have an abbreviation, it doesn't exist. So this one has an abbreviation. So you can be assured that we take that we take care of that. Now on is Chile the model for the future? I mean, the Chile model was invented to deal with the problem of the past. Because you will remember, you know that this. The association agreements with Latin America came from the 1980s or 1990s. I'm exaggerating 1990s. I don't think that we have any of these type of association agreements in the in the pipeline where everything was, you know, bundled together in one agreement. So the idea to do standalone trade agreements.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs)
- “Okay. Thank you very much for these additional questions. Um, Mr. Van Brempt, I take good note on on the point you make about the implementation of the deforestation regulation and the link to Mercosur. I understand that politically, as I said, in terms of the agreement, we have what we need. We have a commitment, a legally binding commitment to halt deforestation. And we have cooperation provisions. And of course, Brazil, like everyone else, will have to comply with the deforestation regulation as we apply it. Um, so, uh, on, uh, on Russian oil, um, now, This is not the first time that we use article 207 to cut Russia off a certain, or to cut off certain Russian exports. We've done that with agricultural products as well as with fertilizers. Um, and this is something that where we are cooperating with with DG energy. So this is not new. I think in all the sanctions packages, um, the intention has always been to gradually wean ourselves off Russian oil. So from that point of view, this is a continuation. And it is not, uh, is not an a new instrument that we have never used before. Sorry. Now, um, we we live in a world that is getting more and more complicated. And unfortunately, the respect of international law is on the retreat. Um, that is a reality we have to live with. Now, the question is, and I'm not saying that this is an easy answer, and I'm not in favor of black and white answers.”
Trade impact on forests · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- “And I think the chief negotiator, Fabian Gill, has also kept MEPs informed. This is a hugely important deal and it is an excellent deal that will solidify the EU's trading links with the regional powerhouse. Indonesia is not only the biggest economy in the region, but it is the 17th largest global economy. So I think this is something we need to to keep in mind, and the deal will eliminate 98% of tariffs and account for almost 100% of our trade flows. I just give you a few examples. On cars, there is currently a 50% tariff which will be removed over five years. Most dairy products, which currently face tariffs of up to 10%, will benefit from elimination of duties at entry into force. Meat products currently face 5 to 20% tariffs. Also to be eliminated, mostly at entry into force and the current tariffs of 90% to 150% on wines and spirits will get an in-quota duty of 5%, and the quota rate is set at the current level of exports. That is an excellent result, and that is complemented also by elimination of tariffs on processed food. So you will be able to check all of that for yourself. But it is really an excellent agreement and one that deserves your full support and where we will have to discuss also with you.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Asia-Pacific · Export of EU agri-food products
- “By European, now, by European, what it does will depend on how it will be actually developed in legislation, and that discussion has yet to take place. So if you ask me, what is the commission position on this, I don't know. The only commission position I know is what the president said in the state of the Union speech, because the work on how to translate that is still has only just started, and I think it will. The idea is not to have a uniform approach to this. It really depends on, um, what we are trying to achieve. And I could very well imagine that there are areas where we say this is not by European, this is by European and by from European partners. So that we would actually where we have FTAs, we would actually give a benefit to FTA partners in this respect as well. But that is our initial thinking. But I think we need to I mean, this is a debate that does not take place in a vacuum. We have taken international commitments in the WTO, but also in our bilateral FTAs. And of course, you know, we are presenting ourselves as the reliable trading partner for the rest of the world. And of course, that also means that we have to honour our commitments in this respect.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · "Buy European" provisions · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
- “So that is why we have to wait till today to do this meeting. But I'm very happy to be able to now have this discussions. Now, we all know that trade relations with the United States have been volatile over the past few months, and here we needed to take action. The situation we faced was highly damaging for our economic and trade interests. What we needed most was to restore some degree of stability and predictability for our citizens and businesses, in order to protect jobs and firms in the EU that rely on trade with the US, and to reduce the risks posed by uncertainty and the political agreement which was concluded between president von der Leyen and President Trump, uh, at the end of July, brings this measure of predictability, and it opens the door to strategic collaboration with the US at a time when unity and partnership are more important than ever across the Atlantic and across the entire spectrum of our trade, of our transatlantic relationship. This delivers confidence and predictability. So I join you in saying it's a day of confidence while strengthening the broader transatlantic bond. So let me look at the outcome as it was of our discussions as it was set out in the joint statement which was issued on the 21st of August. So this establishes the key parameters for our trade and investment relationship going forward.”
EU-US relations · EU-US trade relations
- “So this is not a commitment by the EU or by the Commission because we don't have that money and we don't buy energy, nor do we buy, nor do we make investments. And that has been respected and shout if you have if there's something I really haven't answered, I try to cover everything. But there were lots of points here. Ah, yes. Sorry. There's one point I still have to reply to. Uh, several of you have said, uh, but what happens if the US courts, uh, basically declare, uh, the, uh, reciprocal tariffs, uh, to be null and void to be illegal? Well, we have some court rulings, but it is also clear that President Trump intends to bring this to the Supreme Court. So I will not make a prediction about what this, uh, what this would entail. I cannot speculate on where the Supreme Court will come down. What I can say, though, is if you look at it, you can see that part of the reciprocal, reciprocal tariffs, what would be declared illegal or what has been declared illegal is the legal base. There are other legal bases available. So even a condemnation or a ruling by the Supreme Court that these tariffs, these reciprocal tariffs are illegal, does not automatically mean that they fall. And we also see that the US administration has increasingly used the 232.”
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) · EU-US trade relations
- “We are doing with other people and it's these others we need to focus on. And that is why we are coming forward today with the proposals on Mercosur and Mexico. Like minded partners who care like us about a rules based order. Because I say the old order is gone. That doesn't mean that we want to go for a Hobbesian world where might is right. No, but we need to accept that we need to construct a new order. The contribution to this to rules based trade in the foreseeable immediate future will come from bilateral agreements. Our bilateral agreements shore up the basic tenets of the WTO. That is where the link is. And of course, we will continue working in the WTO. But again, the future here is open plurilateral. And that is why, in addition to our bilateral agreements agenda that we are pursuing. We are also entering into a structured cooperation with the CPTPP group of member states of members of WTO members who care like us, about rules based trade. And Commissioner Sefcovic is investing in this at ministerial level in the autumn. So this is the coalition that we need to build in order to recreate confidence in the multilateral trading order, strengthen the the WTO and reform it. So I think there we have an enormous task ahead of us.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Asia-Pacific
- “Wow. I'm impressed. Thank you so much. Um, this is my second time in less than a month, and I think that's a record. Although I'm a regular here in the committee, but I think this is a record, and I think it shows the environment in which we live and work. Um, and that indeed, uh, times are, uh, characterized by fast paced change where multiple countries, including our biggest trading partners, are openly using economic tools to pursue their geopolitical objectives. Dependencies are weaponized, unjustified tariffs are imposed, and arbitrary trade defence investigations are launched. It's a situation that did not disappear, that did not appear out of nowhere. Growing tensions have been evident for a number of years now, and we are not going to go back to anything close to the past situation in the coming years, and that is why we need to look. Indeed, what is our strategy moving forward? How do we adapt to and advance in this new world? And let me go straight into things and start with the FTAs, because the trade agreements, uh, that is still the hallmark of our trade policy, because working with partners around the world on rules based trade is still what lies at the core of our trade policy. And we have to go there through different means. Um, and this commitment to rules based trade through bilateral engagement. And I'll come to the plural and multilateral track later. That is not despite the changing global trade environment. It is actually more important because of it.”
Trade relations with China · Free trade agreements (FTAs) · EU-US trade relations
- “So we've tried to find ways and we have made consecutive proposals in other areas like on the horizon, etc., which we thought may be a better place to receive a full support from the Member States. But now we've put forward this proposal, and of course we will defend this proposal and explain this proposal. But in the end, everyone has to take their responsibility. The commission has taken its its responsibility. There is the question of the settlements. Now, the now. The settlements have not benefited from trade preferences for quite a while. There's not much trade happening, actually. So economically, this is not very important. We understand that symbolically it's important. There are a number of member states that have announced that they are taking that they intend to take national measures. We are in touch with them. And we have said in principle this is a matter of common commercial policy. But there are exceptions. So member states have the possibility to take certain trade restrictive measures on grounds of, among others, public morality and public policy. So it is up to the Member States to justify any national measures they take in in this respect. Our focus is on the proposal that is on the table. But we are, of course, also asked to assess the compatibility of our trading arrangements with the settlements with the ICJ opinion. So we are doing this analytical work.”
Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights) · Relations with Israel - Palestine
- “I know what we have agreed with Mercosur countries, and I can tell you we have published what we have agreed with Mercosur countries, and that is the agreement itself. You have that that is as a new element. The text on how we operationalize the safeguards, that reads like a legal text, because the intention is to come very quickly with a legislative proposal on the basis of article 207 to accompany the signature and conclusion of the Mercosur agreement. We'll have to work through the procedures for that, but we will come with that very quickly. You have that text already that was published as well. Then I was referring to the vision for agriculture, where we announced the impact assessment on pesticides and animal welfare rules being applied to imported products. So that's in the public domain as well. And then I refer to the Unity Safety Network, which is a funding which was proposed as part of the MFF proposal. So that is public as well. And that is that amounts to €6.3 billion for the period 2028 to 2020 2034, which, if I'm not wrong, is 900 million per year. And that is for competitiveness, losses, problems created as a result of international competition. So obviously the details for that, for accessing that, that will be part of your work as budgetary authority on the MFF. But the Commission has done its work in this respect.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1)
- “And if that is no longer the case, then there is a case for suspending or to go towards a full, a full boycott that has different connotations in different member states as well. So if we also want to have a chance to maintain some unity in the EU, I think we should now focus our attention first without ignoring the issues. And I said, we are analyzing, but we should focus first on the on the proposal that is on the table and which has also a much bigger, not an enormous, but is also economically a lot more relevant. So if you if you are looking for a link between, uh, between the instrument and the objective, I think what we've put forward, uh, would have, would have a stronger, a stronger impact, um, bound. I'm very embarrassed that I can't answer the question of the chair. I looked into this halal business months ago, but I haven't looked into what the final outcome was. So I will have to come back to you on that one. Uh, on digital data flows, um, I mean, we have now in different formulations, but more or less the same model with different partners.”
International data transfers
- “That is not the preferred option. But if we have to talk about a plan B, then that is it. What we cannot. We cannot go into. Mc 14 or any WTO discussion saying we want this. But one country says no, you can't. And then we say, ah, we tried. And then what is the alternative? So we prefer multilateral agreements. The second best is open plurilateral ism inside the WTO. But the third best is plurilateral rules wherever we can anchor them. And there are alternatives available. So I think that's as far as I want to go. But this is we are now engaging with a number of countries. We will have the G20 trade ministers meeting, which provides an opportunity. Uh, Doctor Ngozi will be there. So we will discuss this in detail. And as we move forward, we should, of course, also work with the European Parliament. You were also at the public forum. So I think you could also take the temperature. So there's a lot, a lot to be done there. Then I turn to the geographical. Let me start with the US. The further process the focus is on implementation. And you will have Mathias Jorgensen here to talk to you, notably about implementation on our side. But we are very much engaging with the US in order to make sure they deliver. And today, just before I came here, it's a coincidence. I don't think they did that to please me and make my life easier in Inter.”
Asia-Pacific · EU-US trade relations
- “Then of course, we have new forms of engagement the Clean Trade and Investment Partnership with South Africa. That is something we are aiming to conclude in November. Um, and then, uh, you know, we now have the Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement with Angola in place. Others are also interested in negotiating that with us, including in North Africa and of course, the digital trade agreements with Singapore and Korea. And now I come to the Plurilateral and the multilateral track because of course, we need to shore up the system. We need to avoid we. I think we need to accept the fact that nobody is able to trade with the US on WTO terms, because the US has turned its back on the WTO. What we need to do is to preserve the system for the others, and so that the rest of the world still sticks to their commitments in this respect. And there are positive signs in this respect. We are investing in enlarging the mpia, the, you know, stopgap solution, which is now increasingly developing into an alternative to the dispute settlement in the WTO. And we have new members joining. And I think that is indeed very good news. Um, and of course, we want to also push the reform in the WTO because there are areas where the WTO rules are not fit for purpose, not fit for the 21st century. We've been discussing this in this committee as well. There are problems with level playing field.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Asia-Pacific · EU-US trade relations
- “China's state capitalist system is not captured by these rules. Uh, we have a lack of clarity of the interaction between trade and climate, which leads to acrimonious debates and where I think we could probably aim for a clarification of rules. Um, so there is a lot that we need to do in order to reform the WTO. But for that we need allies. And that is where the CPTPP comes in play. They are, of course, also a partner of choice on their own from an EU CPTPP perspective. There is a lot we can do with these countries, including, for instance, in the area of digital trade. So we will also want to enhance our bilateral trade and investment Government relations with the Cpdp. But we also see them as a very interesting group to engage with in order to build an alliance for the reform of the WTO. So we have several engagements planned for the autumn, where we will also try and see whether we can land on shared lines with a view to MC 14. It's too early to say what exactly the market will bear, but I'm encouraged by the fact that a lot of our trading partners do not want to lose what they have, and we may all be clear about where the WTO needs to be improved, but we also need to look at what would we lose. So I think we also have to make the case for, you know, the cost of WTO, because I think there are many things which we are simply taking for granted, and we are too focused on the tariffs only.”
Trade relations with China · Asia-Pacific
- “And we have we have tried that when we when we proposed zero for zero. So I think that is not the option. And I think we have to accept that at this stage the agreement does not fulfill the conditions of article 24, but no agreement with the US. No understanding with the US at the moment fulfills that. So what we want to make sure is that this is a time limited exemption. So we need to continue working on this. But I also I mean, I don't want to take the easy road and say, yes, we are going to transform this into an FTA because I don't think that that would be credible. So we have to work with what we got here. Um, and so as I said, well, we are continuously willing and committed to improving, uh, our access to the US market. Um, and that is what we need to continue working on, on, uh, Israel. Um, an agreement is suspended the same way that it is concluded. And just like you would not want anyone to steamroller over the rights of either the Parliament or the Council in concluding agreements. Can you steamroller over the responsibilities of the institutions in suspending the agreement? The Commission has taken its responsibility. We have exercised that in a very reflected manner, because the objective cannot be to unnecessarily divide the EU or expose divisions.”
EU-US relations · EU-US trade relations
- “And let's see how that how that advances. Um, then I think I think that was it on the sectoral part. Sorry. On the geographical part. Now on agriculture. On agriculture. I think we need to have another session where we come and present the cumulative study of the impact of our trade agreements, those concluded and those under negotiation. Because what this cumulative study shows is that EU trade policy is good for EU agriculture. We have the figures to support that. We are looking at that in each and every case. So we need to base. I understand that there are apprehensions, but we need to base our debates on facts and figures. And there is absolutely no evidence for trade agreements having been negative. I mean, let's just keep in mind we are the world's largest agricultural exporter. Our agriculture also depends on imports in order to function. That's often forgotten. So we need to look at the whole value chain there again. And we need to look at what our trade agreements actually do. And that is a very good story. Uh, we we can tell they're now on the SPS side. We have it's not about controlling 100%. I mean, at every stake that arrives, it's about having in place systems. You can rely on systems in third countries that you can check.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Export of EU agri-food products
- “Trade agreements cannot give derogations from EU legislation. That is simply not possible. That applies to our digital regulation. It applies to our, uh, to our environmental legislation, uh, etc.. So, um, there are also no exemptions for the US in the joint statement. What we can do with trading partners is cooperate to facilitate the respect of our legislation, to help them to meet the requirements, because the objective is not of this legislation is not to keep foreigners out. It is to make sure that the products respect the qualities we want them to respect. So from that point of view, trade agreements can be platforms of cooperation, but they can not derogate from EU legislation. Now, um, on turning to our EU Legislation. Deforestation. Now, the delay is from what I understood, and I was surprised to hear this as well. It is due to an IT system not being up to handling the amount of applications it would have to handle. So this is a technical problem, and I think rather than frustrating everyone by having by submitting and then having the system break down, it is bound to take more time. It's a pity that this problem has turned up so late. Yeah, but it does not detract from the fact that we are committed to the legislation. And that we have. But we have to make sure that we actually have the infrastructure in place for it to function for our own operators as well as for our trading partners.”
Trade impact on forests · Free trade agreements (FTAs) · EU rules on digital competition
- “And that is an enormous task because we have to build that arsenal a lot more than we used to have to do it in, in the past. Uh, but that is not to say that we cannot also do what you said, which is that we should work with like minded partners, reliable partners on supply chain resilience. By the way, this is also something we want to take to the Cpdp, um, which is also a diverse group, but where we have, uh, quite a lot of, of support for this. Um, and it is, of course, something which we are discussing with partners like, uh, like Canada, like Japan. Uh, so, I mean, we are doing also these initiatives, especially in the area of energy, raw materials, critical raw materials, there are cooperation elements which are very much linked to securing supply chains for critical goods and technologies with like minded, uh, Uh, partners. Um, now, uh, I've taken note on the, on the issue of, of of settlements. Um, but as I said, the commission also tries and, and we are at the stage of analysis on this, so I cannot tell you, uh, how this might evolve in the commission, but I'm sure you will appreciate that there is a difference in terms of saying our privileged trade relations with Israel are built, you know, on a certain understanding of shared values which are set out in the agreement.”
Sourcing of critical raw materials · Relations with Israel - Palestine
- “All right. I'll start with the first with the WTO. Um. I mean, the WTO has more life in it than we give it. Credibility. Credibility for, um, and credit for. And we have seen that with the agreement on fisheries, which is the most ambitious multilateral sustainability related trade agreement ever. It's more ambitious than any of the regional agreements. And it was concluded fish one was now ratified as a multilateral agreement. So we now need to focus our attention on, uh, on on fish two. But also indeed on integrating plurilateral agreements. So we are ready to work with the co-conveners on every creative idea to overcome the barriers that others are putting in the way. Now, we hope that there is a possibility we are more confident that it may be easier to come to an incorporation of the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement as a first case, but it would have systemic implications which would show that plurilateral agreements can work in the WTO. But we also need to make sure and that is where the whole alliance building with the CPTPP, but also others, comes into play. We also have to show that the rest of the world is not willing to continue living in a situation where 1 or 2 countries can block progress for the rest of the world. So we also need to say, if we cannot take plurilateral agreements to the WTO, we will have to make them work outside.”
Asia-Pacific · Intellectual property rights (IPR)
- “Uh, there was one question, uh, about what is the tariff revenue foregone? Um, that is in the, uh, around €4.7 billion, uh, which has to be seen against the overall volume of US exports of €360 billion. So that is a little bit more than 1%. So I think we have to put that in comparison. Uh, let's also keep in mind already 67% of industrial exports from the US already entered the EU tariff free beforehand. Uh, so I think we also need to put these questions in context. You're getting nervous. I still have two minutes. Um, so in terms of sensitive. I watch your body language. Now, the real question is the bigger picture about this and questions about a global order. Are we in a new global order? No. We are in a state of global disorder. And Mrs. Zovko has indicated some elements of that. And I'm afraid we are in a situation where the old order is gone, and it will not come back. And where we have the task as Europe to design a new order, which also means that we have to manage our relationship with our biggest partner, not just in trade, but also on other issues. But this is not the whole world. If you look at trade, the US accounts for what, 20% of our trade? That's 80%.”
EU-US relations · EU-US trade relations
- “Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Dear Bernd, thank you very much, honourable members, for having come in big numbers to this meeting, and I'm very happy to have this first opportunity for an exchange after the Commission has presented the legislative proposals on the implementation of the tariff element of the joint statement. But let me start with basics, because I think it's good to keep in mind what we are talking about here. We are talking here about the biggest trade, trade and investment relationship in the world. In 2024, EU, US trade surpassed €1.7 trillion. In other words, over €4 billion of goods and services crossed the Atlantic every single day. The US is our most important trading partner and also our most important partner in many other fields. And in the current climate that we are facing, this is something we also need to keep in mind. But remember the figures because I will come back to those at the end. Commissioner Shevchuk has regularly debriefed you on the latest developments in Eu-us trade relations, both in this committee and in the plenary. He was in Inter in January and March. He addressed the plenary in February, May and July. But indeed, it is true that the joint statement appeared during August, and that is for many in the institutions, a moment when they are not in the office and when the institutions are not sitting.”
EU-US trade relations
- “So we are ready to come to you, probably starting with the monitoring group, but happy to come back any at any time to inter to explain in detail how we constructed the tariff rate quotas and why we assess that. Liberalising the 33% of industrial goods exports of the US that were still subject to relatively low tariffs on our side, is not a high price to pay for what we have gotten in in return. So I think this is something to keep in mind. Um, you said confidence day. It's the beginning of a process. We are at the start. The joint statement is also the beginning of a process of engagement with the US. There are still many issues to discuss, and Commissioner Sefcovic is in permanent contact with his counterparts in order to make sure that what we agreed is delivered, but also in order to move the discussions forward where we have not yet been able to get to results. And of course, this is also the beginning of the legislative process here in the European Parliament and of the parliamentary discussions. And we are at your disposal to answer any questions, react to any comments you may have, and I will stop here and I'm looking forward to the discussion. Thank you.”
EU-US trade relations · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
- “We are pushing to have this treatment for wines, spirits, for beers. We are pushing a lot of other products. What the joint statement captures is what the US was willing to accept at this stage, but they know that we will be coming back, and that is why it's so important that with this joint statement, we have created a platform. Now, let me also be clear. This is not a legally binding agreement. And that brings me to the process questions. And that is also why this is not your standard trade negotiation. Because we are we were not in a situation where we had a mandate, where we organized, you know, the negotiation over years in rounds, etc. because I go back to the fact that the most important thing was to defend the interests of the European Union, and that required us to be fast. Procedures are there to serve a purpose, and sometimes you have to take the political decision to go for a joint statement which does not bind the European Parliament or the member states at this stage, despite all the transparency we try to ensure. But it is clear this is not a legally binding agreement and a lot of the implementation we have to discuss. For the moment, both sides are implementing parts of this joint statement through autonomous instruments. The US through executive orders.”
EU-US trade relations