Auke ZIJLSTRA

Policy topics Auke ZIJLSTRA is active on

What Auke ZIJLSTRA has said (46)

• 2026-06-23 “(15:49:31 – 15:51:42): you, chairman. This is very interesting proposal from the rapporteur regarding the harmonization of pensions. It's very clear, and we agree on a lot of points that there's a lot of pressure on pillar 1 because of aging population. Contributions are declining, and there's less room for maneuver than they used to be. Every single euro which is invested in pensions is very helpful, and investment in the pension sector is very useful. Therefore, we do need to continue to have a focus on that. We also need to address the issue of consumer confidence. It's important looking now at this 2nd pillar that we recognize that this is a private pension. It's not run by the social partners or a fund. It is an individual pension. And this means that it is more difficult people to have an overview of what is actually happening to their pension. They can't get the same overview as they could else in other pillars. We also need, therefore, to be very vigilant about making sure that we have the correct profile and that all participants who are contributing are aware of the risk, and they know exactly what the risk factors are, the policy that is being pursued by the company and what is going on in the world market because that also has an implication for the individual. And therefore, this is not really a basis for increasing the innovation and capital investment in the EU. We've seen developments in The Netherlands market in recent years, which I think would amount to a salutary warning about tinkering with this too much. So this is an extremely important issue. It's very important, obviously, to individuals whatever age they are, and it's something which we need to address carefully and in a coordinated way across all the member states. So I look forward to working with you on this. Thank”
  EU policy on aging workforce and pensions
• 2026-06-22 “Thank you. We know that we've had a long period of no change to interest rates in the European Union, and we've recently had an increase that is not just here in the European Union. But of course, you have data that we don't have. I would like to know what sort of interest rates you would think would probably be optimal, so that they wouldn't either stimulate or restrict the economy over many years. We've had very low, exceptionally low interest rates historically low. And now we are perhaps heading more towards the historic average. Some countries, such as Austria and others have got excessively high debt. And this is problematic, of course, for all of us. We then have structural challenges, and we have to look at things like pensions, which is a big issue that we've got to address. On top of that, of course, we need investment in defence. So how do you see these various factors coming together in terms of government policy in the eurozone countries? Do you think that there are risks that there's going to be a lot of political pressure to keep interest rates artificially low in order to make public debt more sustainable? And what do you think the implications are for pensions and for investment in defence? Thank you.”
  ECB monetary policy · EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2026-06-22 “Can I please thank you very much for your explanation. I gather from your point of view that at this moment, we're not past the situation of stimulating the actual economy. With regard to the, the amount of public debt, are you worried? That was my final question. Thank you.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2026-03-10 “E-000992/2026 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission EU legislation does not include a definition of offshore wind turbines decommissioning. The Waste Framework Directive 1 (WFD) requires that waste be managed without endangering human health and harming the environment. In particular, Article 13 paragraph 1(a) requires Member States to take necessary measures to manage waste without risk to water, air, soil, plants or animals. The Commission is carefully evaluating possible aspects related to circularity which may be relevant to wind turbines in the framework of the Impact Assessment for the Circular Economy Act 2 planned for adoption later in 2026. Moreover, the Marine Strategy Framework Directive 3 requires Member States to ensure that human activities, including decommissioning, do not adversely affect the Good Environmental Status of marine waters. Partial removal of offshore wind turbine foundations must be assessed against Descriptors 1 4 , 6 5 , 10 6 and 11 7 , ensuring no lasting harm to ecosystems or circular economy principles. Scientific studies 8 give some insight into how foundations of offshore wind turbine foundations can function as artificial reefs, possibly enhancing biodiversity. As examples, the abundance of Atlantic cod shows that rock protections around the foundations attracted most fish, and innovative ways to incorporate European flat oyster habitats into the design of offshore wind infrastructure are being tested. Understanding and minimising environmental impacts of offshore wind, including decommissioning, was also addressed in a recent call under Horizon Europe 9 . 1 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3–30, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/851 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 109–140 and Directive (EU) 2025/1892 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 September 2025 amending Directive 2008/98/EC on waste, OJ L, 2025/1892, 26.9.2025. 2 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy_en. 3 Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy, OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19–40. 4 Biodiversity. 5 Seafloor integrity. 6 Marine litter. 7 Energy and noise. 8 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165783624000018. 9 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/HORIZONCL5-2026-02-D3-08.”
  Circular economy · Off-shore renewables
• 2026-02-10 “E-000554/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Moldova is moderately prepared in the area of free movement of capital 1 , which includes the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT). The Commission recommends the country to continue strengthening the institutional capacity of the Office for Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering. Addressing technical deficiencies identified in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations remains essential, alongside reforms to facilitate AML/CFT regulation and supervision of virtual asset service providers. In June 2025, MONEYVAL 2 upgraded Moldova’s ranking for recommendations 22, 24 and 25 from partially compliant to largely compliant. Moldova is now rated compliant or largely compliant on 37 out of the 40 FATF Recommendations. However, Moldova’s monitoring of compliance by non-profit organisations with requirements of recommendation 8 is not riskbased 3 . Moldova should continue implementing MONEYVAL’s recommendations and further strengthen its system for the detection, investigation and prosecution of latent financial crimes, including money laundering, to ensure an effective and proactive response to financial criminality. The Commission monitors closely Moldova’s reforms on financial crime and compliance with EU and FATF standards, notwithstanding MONEYVAL's decision to cease enhanced monitoring. Regular EU accession reporting continues, guided by policy recommendations from annual enlargement reports and specific benchmarks on financial crime. In addition, the Moldova Reform Agenda outlines steps for each disbursement tranche related to Chapter 32 – Financial Control. The Commission will evaluate the progress of Moldova towards these steps twice a year. 1 Commission’s assessment, conducted in context of the EU accession process, see Commission Staff Working Document Republic of Moldova 2025 Report - Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy, SWD/2025/758 final: https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025SC0758&qid=1773248999590. 2 https://www.coe.int/en/web/moneyval/. 3 According to the MONEYVAL’s report.”
  EU relations with Eastern Neighbourhood · EU-Moldova relations
• 2026-02-10 “E-000555/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission welcomes Moldova’s integration into the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) schemes. This has enabled its payment service providers to use the SEPA schemes since October 2025, enhancing cross-border payment efficiency and integration with the EU’s payments market. In terms of impacts on Moldovan citizens, initial indication is positive. According to figures from the National Bank of Moldova, citizens and companies saved around EUR 3.85 million in the first three months after starting to use SEPA schemes, through which 70% of euro payments were processed. SEPA schemes are industry-driven and managed by the European Payments Council. The Commission’s role is therefore limited and does not include conducting a specific investigation into whether the standards for euro transactions under the SEPA schemes may incentivise a shift to non-euro currencies, informal payment channels, or non-transparent intermediaries. Participation in the SEPA schemes reduces the structural drivers of informality by paving the way for faster, cheaper and more transparent cross-border euro transfers within a regulated payment environment. The Commission is committed to supporting Moldova in ensuring that participation in SEPA schemes delivers broad benefits while safeguarding the integrity of the EU’s payment environment. The Commission is ready to work together with the National Bank of Moldova and the SEPA Steering Group, established to discuss SEPA implementation issues among enlargement countries, in order to identify solutions and address any challenges within its competence, ensuring that the SEPA schemes integration strengthens Moldova’s financial ecosystem.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · Anti-money laundering regulation · Financial regulation
• 2026-02-10 “E-000543/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments (MiFID II) 1 does not regulate how foreign-currency dividend income shall be paid. At the same time, MiFID II sets out rules on disclosures of all costs and charges of financial instruments that investment firms offer or market to clients, including costs and charges related to foreign exchange, where relevant to those financial instruments. According to Article 50(3) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 2 , where any part of the total costs and charges is to be paid in or represents an amount of foreign currency, investment firms are required to provide an indication of the currency involved and the applicable currency conversion rates and costs for any part of the total costs and charges. Investment firms shall also inform about the arrangements for payment or other performance in that regard. While MiFID II requires investment firms more generally to act in accordance with the best interest of their clients, the rules on best execution, as set out in Article 27 of MiFID II, relate specifically to the execution of clients’ orders. Consequently, those rules do not regulate how investment firms shall proceed with subsequent payments of dividend income, including foreign-currency dividend income, resulting from holding financial instruments. 1 OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, pp. 349–496. 2 OJ L 87, 31.3.2017, pp. 1–83.”
  Financial regulation · Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
• 2026-02-04 “E-000437/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The ECPS (European Centre for Populism Studies) is the beneficiary of one running grant for the implementation of the project Uncovering Neglected Truths and Outlining Legacies of Decolonization (UNTOLD Europe 1 ) awarded under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme (CERV) 2 . The funding earmarked for ECPS amounts to EUR 18 500. ECPS is a beneficiary of the grant for the completed project Unveiling emotional dimensions of politics to foster European democracy (ENCODE 3 ) awarded under the Horizon Europe programme 4 . Its share of funding amounts to EUR 269 125. The objectives of EU funding are defined in programmes such as the CERV Programme, which are adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. The programmes are implemented through work programmes approved by representatives of the Member States and open calls for proposals. Proposals are evaluated, based on pre-announced selection and award criteria along the rules and principles set in the Financial Regulation 5 . The award of a grant is the outcome of a highly competitive process at the end of which the highest ranked proposals that best align with the objectives of the programmes are selected for funding. The Commission is fully in line with all the transparency requirements as they were written by the co-legislators. Information about the beneficiaries of funding is published on the Financial and Transparency System and project related information is published on the Funding and Tenders portal 6 . The Commission refers to its replies to the Special Report 35/2018 of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) 7 . The Commission accepted three out of 1 Further details on the project are publicly available on the EU Funding & Tenders Portal https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projectsdetails/43251589/101196163/CERV?order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=10&sortBy=es_SortDate&keyw ords=101196163&frameworkProgramme=43251589. 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme (OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1); ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/692/oj. 3 Further details on the project are publicly available on the EU Funding & Tenders Portal https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projectsdetails/43108390/101132698/HORIZON?order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=10&sortBy=es_SortDate&k eywords=101132698. 4 Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/695/oj. 5 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast) ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj. 6 EU Funding & Tenders Portal https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projectsresults?order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=10&sortBy=es_SortDate. 7 https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_35/SR_NGO_FUNDING_EN.pdf., pp. 38-48.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Regulation of NGOs in Europe
• 2025-11-28 “E-004735/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is closely monitoring the recent developments around investigations conducted by Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. Those investigations show that anticorruption bodies are delivering on their mandate and building a track record of investigations, reflecting progress made under the enlargement framework and through the implementation of the Ukraine Facility. In line with the EU enlargement methodology and the negotiating framework adopted by the Council on 21 June 2024 1 , in May 2025 Ukraine adopted a roadmap for the rule of law, addressing an opening benchmark for Cluster 1 negotiations. The roadmap commits Ukraine to strengthen its capacity to tackle corruption. The importance of implementing these reforms was further highlighted in the Joint Statement between the Commissioner for Enlargement and the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, concluded on 11 December 2025 in Lviv and establishing a list of ten important reforms to be implemented as a matter of priority. The Commission regularly assesses Ukraine’s progress and issues recommendations through the annual country reports. In addition, several reforms in the areas of rule of law and anticorruption are funding conditionalities required and implemented under the Ukraine Facility, and payments can be partially suspended if the required reforms are not implemented. As a precondition for any payments, the Commission assesses that Ukraine continues to uphold and respect effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system and the rule of law. In its latest assessment on 17 November 2025 the Commission concluded that the conditions are in place. Any financial support from the EU includes anti-fraud measures allowing for controls of funds, with the possibility to take corrective action. The framework and the financing agreement between the Commission and Ukraine on the Ukraine Facility includes a system of audit and controls providing a multilayer mechanism of protection of EU’s financial interests. As part of the Ukraine Plan, Ukraine has committed to strengthen its audit and control systems. Finally, an independent Audit Board has been set up. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/hzmfw1ji/public-ad00009en24.pdf.”
  EU enlargement · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2025-10-17 “E-004098/2025 Answer given by Mr Micallef on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is deeply committed to promoting equality and preventing all forms of antisemitism, racism and discrimination. The Commission will continue to ensure that projects supported through Creative Europe promote equality, inclusion and mutual respect among people and cultures. Grant agreements signed under the Creative Europe programme include clear obligations for beneficiaries to comply with EU law, uphold the principles of transparency, equal treatment and sound financial management, and respect values and fundamental rights enshrined in the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which include the principle of non-discrimination to ensure that EU financial support is not used in a way that would undermine them. Following established procedures, the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) will assess whether these organisations’ actions are consistent with the conditions of their grant agreements and with the principles of non-discrimination and respect for fundamental rights. If a breach is identified, the Commission will take the appropriate measures in line with the EU Financial Regulation and the contractual provisions, which can include withdrawing funding or taking administrative action.”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism
• 2025-10-16 “E-004086/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s securitisation package has been carefully designed to maintain solid standards for the European securitisation market and for the banks involved. Through targeted measures it aims to eliminate undue obstacles, while preserving key safeguards established after the financial crisis. The package also builds on the advice of the European Banking Authority and the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities. Regarding capital requirements for banks, the package continues to uphold robust standards. It increases risk sensitivity, where capital requirements are reduced only for securitisations with demonstrably lower risk levels. All in all, capital requirements ensure that overall standards remain strong and reliable. The European Central Bank President has repeatedly called for a strong securitisation market as an essential component of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). For example, in her November 2023 speech she emphasised that ‘A genuine CMU would mean building a sufficiently large securitisation market, allowing banks to transfer some risk to investors, release capital and unlock additional lending’ 1 . Securitisation indeed serves as a critical link between the banking system and capital markets. It allows to increase bank lending to EU households and businesses, including small and medium-sized enterprises, while also enabling investors to diversify their investment opportunities. The Commission’s proposal is designed with a forward-looking perspective, to encourage banks to issue resilient securitisations going forward, fostering growth in the market within a sound framework. 1 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2023/html/ecb.sp231117~88389f194b.en.html.”
  European Banking Union · Financial regulation
• 2025-09-30 “E-003794/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. All agencies have been evaluated at least once, except for three agencies 1 . Evaluations are either carried out by the Commission or the agency, depending on the provision in the founding act. These provisions have been aligned over time with the Common Approach 2 according to which the Commission carries out agencies’ evaluations periodically, normally every five years. By now only one agency’s regulation (European Institute for Gender Equality) puts the obligation to commission an independent external evaluation on the agency itself. Evaluations are carried out even when the founding regulations do not provide for it 3 . The outcomes of the evaluations carried out by the Commission take the form of a Staff Working Document, which is publicly available 4 and contains lessons learned as recommendations. In total, 21 of such evaluations are publicly available 5 . These are the basis for possible follow-up action (e.g. improved guidance or closer monitoring of specific aspects or an impact assessment and a legislative proposal), where relevant. 2. The state of play of individual agencies’ evaluations can be monitored via the ‘Have your Say’ platform 6 . There are currently ten evaluations ongoing. In line with the Better Regulation guidelines and toolbox (in particular tool #47) 7 agencies’ evaluations assess agencies’ 1 Translation Centre for the bodies of the EU (CdT), the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). For CdT and EUIPO evaluations are ongoing and for EMA there was one in 2019 which focused on fees. 2 https://european-union.europa.eu/system/files/2022-06/joint_statement_on_decentralised_agencies_en.pdf (see point 60). 3 Only the founding regulations of CdT, the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), the European Environment Agency (EEA) and EMA do not contain such provisions. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/publications_en?f%5B0%5D=oe_publication_title%3Aevaluation. 5 The European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) (C(2014)242), the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Agency for Support for BEREC (BEREC Office) (SWD/2016/304), Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) agencies (the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound), European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), the European Training Foundation (ETF) and the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA)) (SWD/2024/222), the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) (SWD/2022/103), European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) (SWD/2022/103), the European Supervisory Authorities (the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)) (COM/2022/228), EEA (SWD/2024/205), the European Labour Authority (ELA) (SWD/2025/128), the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCCDA) (SWD/2019/174), the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) (SWD/2017/502), the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (SWD/2014/122), The European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA) (SWD/2017/249), the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) (SWD/2025/183), EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA) (SWD/2024/173), The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) (SWD/2024/75) and the Single Resolution Board (SRB) (COM/2019/213). 6 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives_en?category=EVALUATION (introducing ‘agency’ in the keywords field to filter). 7 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/88ebf8bb-79c1-4cf2-975bc643dcc766f8_en?filename=BRT-2023-Chapter%206How%20to%20carry%20out%20an%20evaluation%20and%20a%20fitness%20check_0.pdf.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Discharge of EU institutions and agencies
• 2025-07-08 “E-002761/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission Both the voluntary and involuntary termination of the participation of a beneficiary in an action is legally possible under Article 32(2) of the Model Grant Agreement. The beneficiaries may request such termination, and the coordinator must submit a request for an amendment. The granting authority will assess the propriety of the termination based on the reasons provided. Each termination will be assessed on its own merits and on the reasons provided, including the beneficiary’s opinion. Termination of participation based solely on the nationality of the beneficiary would amount to discrimination, which is prohibited under the Association Agreement. Horizon Europe rules entail that funding of research and innovation activities must have an exclusive focus on civil applications. However, it cannot be a priori guaranteed that such research could not eventually be exploited for dual-use products or technologies (usually used for civilian purposes but with possible defence applications) 1 . This is because project results may be developed outside the scope of the funded project, or after the project, into technologies with a dual-use potential, either immediately or with some adaptation, even if they were originally intended for purely civil applications. 1 During project implementation, beneficiaries must ensure compliance with applicable Horizon Europe horizontal rules, as well as with ethical principles and other relevant national, EU and international legislation.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2025-06-17 “E-002443/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Before the Commission adopted its proposal for a regulation on the digital euro 1 , the Commission conducted an impact assessment 2 to gauge the costs for various stakeholders, including payment service providers, merchants, users, and the Eurosystem. Banks, which will be required to distribute the digital euro to their clients, will incur costs but also benefit from related revenues. In particular, banks will incur some adjustments costs to adopt and implement systems needed for the digital euro, and ongoing costs associated with operating these systems and providing digital euro services. A basic estimate based on the impact assessment accompanying the legislative proposal on Instant Payments 3 suggested one-off costs for payment service providers of up to EUR 5.4 billion. In the meantime, the European Central Bank (ECB) is developing the digital euro scheme rulebook, containing the digital euro specific design features. In doing that, the ECB is re-using relevant existing standards, processes and infrastructure in order to keep costs to the minimum level. These costs can vary significantly among banks depending on their size (in terms of client base and balance sheet), specialisation (retail or business clientele), location, and level of digitalisation. At the same time, banks will be able to earn fee income. After every digital euro purchase made by their clients, distributing banks will receive an Inter-Payment Service Provider (PSP) fee, similar to those charged for card payments. The aim is for the compensation system to enable banks to cover their costs through these fees and also generate revenue from innovative, value-added services based on the digital euro. 1 COM/2023/369 final. 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/digital-euro-package_en. 3 SWD(2022) 546 final : https://ec.europa.eu/finance/docs/law/221026-impact-assessment_en.pdf.”
  Digital euro
• 2025-06-05 “E-002284/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Good neighbourly relations are a fundamental principle of the EU’s engagement with neighbouring countries, as set out in Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union. Hence, the Commission welcomes the close and constructive relationship between Romania and Moldova. The Commission is committed to supporting Moldova on its European path. This support takes many forms, such as political support, technical assistance, and indeed financial assistance. As an example of the latter, the Commission is providing EUR 1.9 billion under the Moldova Growth Plan 1 , which will help the country implement essential reforms and has the potential to double the Moldovan economy over the next 10 years. The disbursement of this – and other – financial assistance is conditional on agreed reform targets. The compliance assessment and decision to disburse or not is performed by the Commission. The Commission does not see a contradiction between its solidarity with Moldova and commitment to supporting the country on the one hand, and the principle of conditionality, which continues to guide the disbursement of financial assistance, on the other hand. 1 Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova, OJ L, 2025/535, 21.3.2025.”
  EU-Moldova relations · EU relations with Eastern Neighbourhood
• 2025-06-05 “E-002277/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The impact of interest rate increases on Dutch households in 2022 and 2023 was indeed relatively muted due to the prevalence of fixed-rate mortgages and strong nominal wage growth. However, the Netherlands’ tax system has incentivised the accumulation of illiquid forms of wealth and debt. The primary residence benefits from substantial tax subsidies, which are not available to other forms of wealth, such as shares and bonds. As a result, many households, particularly those in their most productive years, tend to hold limited liquid assets. Moreover, the Dutch household debt-to-Gross Domestic Product ratio is the highest among all EU Member States (92% in 2024), with mortgages being the primary component. In the event of an economic downturn, households with already high mortgage payments (and limited liquid assets) could face a significant squeeze on their disposable incomes 1 . This could happen irrespective of whether interest rates are fixed or flexible. A gradual reduction in tax benefits for primary residences could help discourage households from accumulating mainly illiquid wealth. This, in turn, could reduce high levels of household debt and mitigate the overvaluation on the housing market by removing demand subsidies on a supply-constrained market. It would also promote a more efficient allocation of capital, as investment decisions would be more based on expected returns and risks rather than tax considerations, ultimately benefiting the broader business environment in the long run. While in terms of storing value, owner-occupied housing can be a relatively stable option, as noted above, its limited liquidity can make households more vulnerable to income shocks. 1 See Ciurila et. al, 2020, “Are the savings of Dutch households optimal?”, CPB.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets · Wealth taxation
• 2025-05-20 “E-002006/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Since the start of the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) 1 and up to 27 May 2025, the Commission received in total 75 notifications from the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), with 64 active cases in court proceedings or on-going investigations. 80% of these notified on-going cases by the EPPO to the Commission relate to one measure in a single Member State. The discrepancy with EPPO’s 2023 Annual Report is due to the fact that the EPPO only notifies the Commission in specific circumstances such as where it has enough evidence to pursue judicial proceedings at the national level. Member States are required to report suspected fraud cases under the RRF not only through the management declarations accompanying payment requests submitted to the Commission, but also via other channels such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) or the EPPO 2 and keep records for five years 3 . The EPPO report confirms that Member States take their own obligations very seriously: 90% of newly opened EPPO investigations have in fact been launched upon notification by the national authorities. As of 27 May 2025, 34 cases of potential irregularities linked to the RRF were reported by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs to OLAF. These cases were identified during audit work, reported by Member States in the management declarations or by open sources. In turn, OLAF informed the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of 40 other cases, bringing the total number of potential irregularities to 74. These statistics demonstrate the robustness of both national and EU-level control systems in detecting and addressing conflicts of interest, fraud or corruption. The cooperation between institutions and Member States ensures a coordinated approach to protecting the financial interests of the EU. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en. 2 Under Article 24(1) of Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 - Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’), OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1–71. 3 Article 11.1(d) of the Financing Agreement.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Conditions to access EU budget
• 2025-05-15 “E-001964/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The management board of the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), of which the Commission is a member, addressed the matter referred to by the Honourable Members, and thoroughly discussed and examined all findings and recommendations made by the European Anti-Fraud Office as a result of its investigation. The management board has addressed a warning to the Executive Director of the EUAA, together with a formal request for concrete proposals of corrective actions to ensure more efficient and transparent procedures and to strengthen the overall human resources management in the Agency. The Commission will follow closely the implementation of the corrective actions by the Executive Director.”
  Discharge of EU institutions and agencies · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-04-11 “E-001510/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. The phrase ‘cooling-off period’ refers to the two- or three-year period mentioned in Article 11(2) of the Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission 1 . In line with Article 11(3) of the Code of Conduct, the Commission adopts the appropriate decisions on the notified post term of office activities, often imposing the conditions and/or limitations necessary to ensure the respect of the principles of integrity and discretion enshrined in Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and in the Code of Conduct. 2. The Commission’s decisions are based on the assessment of each individual activity, considering all the relevant elements. It is indeed exactly because advisory activities often do include lobbying that the Code of Conduct prohibits lobbying for the cooling-off period and that the post term of office decisions recall these obligations. 3. The former Members of the Commission are bound to thoroughly and scrupulously respect their obligations resulting from the Treaties, the Code of Conduct and, where applicable, any decisions adopted by the Commission on notified post term of office activities. These decisions are made public 2 . The applicable rules provide for a robust enforcement mechanism. In particular, in accordance with the Code of Conduct, former Members shall inform the President in a timely manner if they have doubts with regard to the application of this Code before acting on the matter relating to which the doubts arise. The primary responsibility of the former Members does not rule out the Commission’s duties and prerogatives deriving from Article 11 of the Code of Conduct. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32018D0221(02). 2 https://commission.europa.eu/about/service-standards-and-principles/ethics-and-goodadministration/commissioners-and-ethics/former-european-commissioners-authorised-occupations_en.”
  Transparency requirements for interest groups · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-04-10 “E-001488/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission 1. The President of the Commission has made the reduction of red tape a priority for the new mandate of the Commission. This includes a reduction of all burdens and a target to cut 25% of all administrative costs (35% for small and medium-sized enterprises) i.e. EUR 37.5 billion. The Commission’s 2025 work programme contains 11 legislative measures (out of 18) which contribute to simplification, with the first five Omnibus proposals adopted in February 1 , May, June and July 2025 2 . The Commission has a very ambitious simplification programme, but its proposals preserve the EU policy goals. 2. There are currently 33 decentralised agencies partially or fully funded from the EU budget, supporting the implementation of EU policies. They are set up by the legislator on the basis of a Commission proposal, preceded by an impact assessment. In line with the Common Approach 3 , the founding acts of agencies require the Commission to carry out an evaluation of the agency, normally every 5 years. The evaluation assesses the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance, and EU added value of the EU decentralised agencies 4 and therefore provides a basis to decide on possible amendments to the governance or mandate of the agency and whether to continue or not its mandate. 3. The Commission continuously strives to ensure an optimal allocation of its resources, reflecting its political priorities, legal and institutional obligations, while responding to the increasing workload generated by new and urgent needs and geopolitical crisis. Given the new policy initiatives and the growing responsibilities assigned to the Commission by the Colegislators, the Commission looks at deploying its resources in the most efficient manner, and to continue seeking synergies and efficiencies. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/commission-proposes-cut-red-tape-and-simplify-businessenvironment-2025-02-26_en. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1205, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1277, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1518. 3 https://european-union.europa.eu/document/download/d4199ff4-1e3d-45e6-af7e90cf1a7b10bc_en?filename=joint_statement_on_decentralised_agencies_en.pdf. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/better-regulation/better-regulation-guidelines-andtoolbox_en.”
  Size of EU budget · EU political integration
• 2025-04-08 “E-001426/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission Addressing migration is a joint responsibility and commitment between the EU, its Member States and EU’s partners based on the principles of solidarity and partnership. Fluctuations in irregular border crossings underscore the complex challenges of managing migration, which depends on variety of dynamic factors that require comprehensive and continuous efforts over the long-term. The EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) 1 has played a crucial role by addressing the root causes of irregular migration, which is now continuing under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation – Global Europe Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe). Recent data indicate a significant reduction of irregular border crossings via the Central Mediterranean route, with a 59% decrease in 2024 compared to 2023, and similar levels so far in 2025 2 . The Commission remains committed to the continuous evaluation and adaptation of its programmes to ensure their effectiveness in the ever-changing migration landscape. The data provided concerns the voluntary returns and reintegration supported by the EUTF in 2023 and is not related to the North of Africa region. In 2023, voluntary returns were funded under NDICI-Global Europe, through the Migrant Protection, Return and Reintegration programme 3 , and reached the number of 27 212 both from North and Sub-Saharan Africa while 23 823 were assisted for their reintegration in Sub-Saharan Africa. When considering the EUTF projects which created new jobs, most of them were in the private sector. The types of jobs 4 vary according to the region, and include mainly: agriculture, fishery, livestock production or processing sector, construction and infrastructure sector, education, healthcare and social services sectors. 1 https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/index_en, established on 12 November 2015. 2 European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). 3 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/programming/projects/migrant-protection-return-andreintegration-programme-sub-saharan-africa-mprrssa_en#:~:text=The%20Migrant%20Protection%2C%20Return%2C%20and%20Reintegration%20Programme% 20for,Africa%2C%20as%20well%20as%20within%20the%20African%20continent. 4 Source is the Monitoring and Learning System reports available on the EUTF website: https://trust-fund-forafrica.europa.eu/library_en.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Asylum & border control · EU development aid (migration conditionality)
• 2025-03-04 “E-000911/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Industry in Europe is under pressure, due to several factors, including high energy prices, international competition amidst rising geopolitical tensions, and overcapacities in third countries 1 . Decarbonising our economies is a global challenge that can be an economic opportunity, as flagged in the Draghi Report 2 . The European Green Deal 3 and the recent Clean Industrial Deal 4 provide the toolbox to strengthen the business case for decarbonisation in Europe. The Clean Industrial Deal puts forward concrete actions to turn decarbonisation into a driver of growth for European industries. Specific measures include the Affordable Energy Action Plan 5 , aimed at lowering energy bills while promoting the necessary transition to a lowcarbon economy, and the upcoming Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act, which will increase demand for EU-made clean products. The Clean Industrial Deal identifies seven indicators to measure progress, such as the annual installation of renewable electricity capacity and investment volumes under InvestEU 6 supporting industrial transition. The Commission is not considering the introduction of a direct carbon levy for citizens on top of the EU Emissions Trading System 7 . 1 2025 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report: https://single-marketeconomy.ec.europa.eu/publications/2025-annual-single-market-and-competitiveness-report_en. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en. 5 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/affordable-energy_en. 6 https://investeu.europa.eu/index_en. 7 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets_en.”
  Carbon leakage support · EU industrial funding · Climate efforts
• 2025-02-20 “P-000798/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the head of Moldova’s Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office’s resignation and of the draft law to merge the current specialised prosecutor’s offices on anticorruption and organised crime in a new Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Prosecution Office. Ensuring effective institutional arrangements and capacity for the fight against corruption and organised crime is essential, and delivering a track record of results in this field is a requirement in the EU accession process. Moldovan authorities are advised to ensure the compliance with European standards of any new arrangement they put in place. To this end, the Commission is working with the Moldovan authorities to strengthen the rule of law and fight against corruption and organised crime. The Commission will continue to closely monitor developments in Moldova. The progress of Moldova in rule of law will continue to be reflected in the Commission’s annual reporting as part of the enlargement process. The Reform and Growth Facility 1 for Moldova includes a strong focus on audit and controls systems and the Commission will carefully assess the situation and ensure that requirements in this respect are met before taking any decisions regarding the disbursement of the financial support, in line with the agreed conditions. 1 Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/535/oj/eng.”
  EU-Moldova relations · EU enlargement
• 2025-01-20 “E-000226/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission applies the principles spelled out in its ‘better regulation’ guidelines and ‘better regulation toolbox’ 1 . It thereby follows the commitments made in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-making 2 . An impact assessment is prepared for Commission initiatives that are likely to have significant economic, environmental or social impacts and where the Commission has a choice between alternative policy options. These principles are applied consistently but where an impact assessment would be appropriate but cannot be done for reasons of urgency, an analytical document in the form of a staff working document presenting the evidence behind the proposal and cost estimates is prepared within three months of the initiative’s adoption. 2. The Commission proposes new legislation only when the expected benefits outweigh the applicable costs. An impact assessment presents an objective analysis of evidence supporting the policy initiative, including the potential impacts of various options to address the identified problems and reach policy objectives. Therefore, there is no positive or negative outcome of an impact assessment. An impact assessment is an aid to policy-making and decision-making and not a substitute for it. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-regulation/betterregulation-guidelines-and-toolbox_en - in particular Tool #7 (What is an impact assessment and when it is necessary). 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016Q0512(01)”
  EU political integration
• 2025-01-16 “E-000186/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Moldova was granted EU candidate status in June 2022 and accession negotiations opened in June 2024. However, the current rate of economic growth and convergence with the EU risks holding the country back from progressing rapidly on its EU track 1 . The Commission proposal for a regulation establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova aims to address the underlying structural deficiencies holding back Moldova’s growth potential, accelerate alignment with EU laws and standards and facilitate the progressive integration of Moldova in the EU single market. The Commission defines disinformation as ‘false or misleading content that is spread with an intention to deceive or secure economic or political gain and which may cause public harm’ 2 . Moldova has a very active and vibrant civil society, and their organisations are operating in a broadly enabling environment, as the Commission assessed in its Enlargement report of October 2024 3 . EU financing of civil society organisations is regulated by the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the EU 4 . 1 Communication on the Moldova Growth Plan, eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52024DC0470. 2 COM/2020/790 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52020DC0790. 3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-adopts-2024-enlargement-package-2024-10-30_en. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/eu-financial-regulation_en.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU enlargement · EU-Moldova relations
• 2025-01-15 “E-000151/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission It is a key priority for the Commission to simplify rules and reduce the reporting burdens for undertakings, including financial institutions financial institutions. On 26 February 2025, the Commission presented an omnibus package 1 aiming at simplification in relation to sustainability reporting. The omnibus proposals delay by two years the reporting for companies that should have done so in 2026 or later and introduce a reduction in the scope of reporting under the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) 2 to large companies 3 with more than 1000 employees. This entails a change of scope of reporting under Taxonomy regulation 4 , which is aligned with the CSRD. In addition, the proposal will make Taxonomy reporting voluntary for companies in scope with a turnover below EUR 450 million. In parallel, the Commission also published for public feedback proposed changes to the Taxonomy Disclosures Delegated Act 5 significantly simplifying reporting requirements and introducing materiality thresholds, and changes to Climate and Environmental Delegated Acts 6 . As regards the green asset ratio, it is proposed to allow financial institutions to exclude from the indicators’ denominators the exposures that relate to undertakings with less than 1000 employees, which will not be obliged to report on EU Taxonomy information as per the Omnibus proposal. In addition, the Omnibus package will protect companies out of the scope of the requirements, 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/omnibus-i_en 2 Directive (EU) 2022/2464 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, Directive 2004/109/EC, Directive 2006/43/EC and Directive 2013/34/EU, as regards corporate sustainability reporting, OJ L 322, 16.12.2022, p. 15. 3 Large companies are defined in the Accounting Directive as companies that exceed at least two of the three following criteria: balance sheet of EUR 25 million, turnover of EUR 50 million and 250 employees. 4 Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) .2019/2088, OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13. 5 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2178 of 6 July 2021 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council by specifying the content and presentation of information to be disclosed by undertakings subject to Articles 19a or 29a of Directive 2013/34/EU concerning environmentally sustainable economic activities, and specifying the methodology to comply with that disclosure obligation, OJ L 443 10.12.2021, p. 9. 6 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139 of 4 June 2021 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing the technical screening criteria for determining the conditions under which an economic activity qualifies as contributing substantially to climate change mitigation or climate change adaptation and for determining whether that economic activity causes no significant harm to any of the other environmental objectives (OJ L 442, 9.12.2021, p. 1) and 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing the technical screening criteria for determining the conditions under which an economic activity qualifies as contributing substantially to the sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources, to the transition to a circular economy, to pollution prevention and control, or to the protection and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystems and for determining whether that economic activity causes no significant harm to any of the other environmental objectives and amending Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2178 as regards specific public disclosures for those economic activities (OJ L 2023/2486, 21.11.2023).”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-12-18 “E-003012/2024 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is not aware of any reports of non-cooperative behaviour by staff of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa). EUTF staff are recruited based on job descriptions linked to Trust Funds whose strategy is public. EUTF staff are bound by the obligations and responsibilities enshrined in the Staff Regulations 1 . The right to freedom of expression must be exercised with due respect to the principles of loyalty and impartiality 2 . As reflected in the Council conclusions of 17 October 2024 3 and in the Political Guidelines of the President of the Commission for 2024-2029 4 , migration management is at the centre of the EU’s political agenda. The Council called for action at all levels to facilitate, increase and speed up returns from the EU, using all relevant policies, instruments and tools. To this end, the Commission is urgently working on a new legislative framework on return. The EU is developing comprehensive partnerships with countries of origin and transit in which migration, including fostering cooperation on return and readmission, is embedded. The EU ensures that its interests are fully reflected in the partnerships. The Commission also regularly assesses third countries’ cooperation on readmission and may propose to the Council to adopt restrictive visa measures under Article 25a of the Visa Code 5 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20240701 2 Article 17 of the Staff Regulations. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 4 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf 5 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009R0810”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-12-12 “E-002903/2024 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission While security requirements introduced by the EU Payment Services Directive 1 , such as strong customer authentication, have had a positive impact on reducing payment fraud, malicious behaviours are constantly evolving and increasingly relying on the manipulation of the payment service user. Cases where users are manipulated by fraudsters into making a payment, or to disclose sensitive information which is used to commit fraud are becoming more widespread. Where the user is manipulated into making a fraudulent credit transfer, often the user bears the losses as the transaction is deemed to have been authorised. According to the latest European Banking Authority (EBA) risk assessment report 2 , the greatest increase in the total value of losses due to fraud borne by users of credit transfers was observed in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, but the issue is not limited to Eastern Europe. Combatting payment fraud is a key priority for the Commission. The Commission’s proposal on a Payment Services Regulation (PSR) published in June 2023 3 and currently in co-decision procedure, includes additional fraud prevention measures. It also proposes to introduce new redress rights for consumers, for example in case of bank employee impersonation fraud. Data quality issues often stem from incomplete data submissions or methodological misclassifications by reporting agents. It is primarily the role of competent authorities at national level to follow-up on such issues where they occur. To further enhance data quality, the PSR proposal mandates the EBA to develop technical standards on the reporting of payment fraud data. This also aims to foster a more consistent application of the legal requirements and a more effective enforcement by competent authorities. 1 PSD2: OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35–127. 2 https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-11/f03ee0c1-7258-4391-8bf1578924956049/EBA%20Risk%20Assessment%20Report%20-%20Autumn%202024.pdf, p. 101-102. 3 COM/2023/367 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023PC0367”
  Financial regulation · Anti-money laundering regulation
• 2024-12-12 “E-002909/2024 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission While it is not for the Commission to comment on the commercial decisions of companies to invest or abstain from investing in individual projects, closely monitoring the offshore wind sector is a priority to achieve energy objectives. The offshore wind investment market is mature and competitive. Nevertheless, the offshore wind industry has recently rising costs driven by inflation, higher interest rates, and supply chain bottlenecks, creating financial pressure for developers. In response, the Commission launched the European Wind Power Package 1 in October 2023 to accelerate permitting, improve access to finance, strengthen grid infrastructure, and scale up supply chains. These efforts are yielding results: over 20 GW of offshore wind is now installed in EU waters, with many new auctions and projects ahead. Economic conditions are also easing, with declining inflation and interest rates. The Commission continues to work with Member States and stakeholders to accelerate deployment. To limit public funding risks, a key focus is efficient planning and fair cost and benefit sharing solutions for offshore grids investments, typically financed via network tariffs. In June 2024, the Commission published guidance on collaborative investment frameworks for offshore projects 2 , supporting tailored mechanisms and dedicated regional approaches. Further discussions and engagement with Member States are ongoing. In 2025, the Commissioner for Energy and Housing will present the Clean Energy Investment Plan. On 18 December 2024, Member States reaffirmed offshore wind's role in EU’s energy security and transition, updating regional goals to 88 GW by 2030 and 360 GW by 2050, providing visibility and support to the sector. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5185 2 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/guidance-collaborative-investment-frameworks-offshore-energyprojects_en”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-12-10 “E-002849/2024 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Undersea communication cables operated by public telecommunication service providers, as the ones in question transporting financial sector data would be subject to cybersecurity measures under the Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2 Directive) 1 , which includes also their protection from physical threats. The Commission is closely following the recent incidents affecting submarine cables. It is reflecting on possible measures to improve security and resilience of this critical infrastructure, in cooperation with Member States, in addition to the recent Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 2 on the topic. The Commission is not aware of disruptions of a systemic nature in the provision of financial services as a result of the recent incidents affecting the submarine cables. In addition to the NIS2 Directive, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) 3 , referred to by the Honourable Member, is also relevant for enhancing the financial sector’s resilience against such kind of incidents. Under DORA, EU regulated financial entities are required to put in place contingency measures and plans (e.g. business continuity, etc.) to counter such incidents affecting their systems and networks, as well as to perform third-party risk assessments on the providers of information and communication technology (ICT)-services, including of communication and data transmission solutions. 1 OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80–152, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj 2 C/2024/1181, OJ L, 2024/779, 8.3.2024. 3 Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector and amending Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011, OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 1–79.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2024-12-05 “E-002781/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission As the question regarding ‘Huge increase in Frontex agency staff costs’ falls entirely under the responsibility of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the Commission has asked the Agency to provide an answer to the questions raised by the Honourable Members. The Agency’s reply will be sent to the Honourable Members by the Commission as soon as possible.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-12-05 “E-002779/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with Article 16(1) of its Founding Regulation 1 , the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) shall fulfil its tasks in complete independence. The implementation of the Agency’s budget falls under the responsibility of its Director, in line with Articles 15(4)(e) and 21 of its Founding Regulation. The Commission is not aware of the specific costs of the training the Honourable Members refer to. In 2022, the Commission published a Eurobarometer survey, which showed that, on average across the EU, 68% of respondents tended to overestimate the real share of immigrants in the population 2 . The Commission is committed to improving people’s understanding of migration and integration based on facts and data. The current EU Action plan on integration and inclusion 3 aims, among other things, at helping more Europeans to be well informed on integration and migration. It also underlines that working with media representatives, education institutions as well as civil society organisations is key to better inform Europeans about the realities of migration and integration. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, OJ L 53, 22.2.2007, p. 1. 2 https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/library-document/special-eurobarometer-integration-immigrantseuropean-union_en 3 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/legal-migration-resettlement-andintegration/integration/action-plan-integration-and-inclusion_en”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Asylum & border control
• 2024-10-03 “E-001933/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission The Commission together with national competition authorities, are responsible for the enforcement of competition rules contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The enforcement of such rules, including in payment markets, aims at making markets work better, by ensuring that companies compete equally and fairly on their merits. This benefits consumers, businesses and the European economy as a whole. The Commission takes note of the statement of Mr Cipollone, Executive Board Member of the European Central Bank (ECB), on 23 September 2024, relating to the European payment landscape and the views expressed therein. For the Commission to be able to launch a formal investigation, it needs to have sufficient indications that EU competition rules have been breached. The Commission will liaise with the ECB to understand the concerns expressed by the ECB Executive Board Member. The Commission also engages in ongoing constructive dialogue with the ECB with the view to harness a competitive European payments markets.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2024-09-15 “E-001716/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission is currently assessing the judgment of the Court of Justice relating to the Apple case and its potential impact on other State aid cases. It is however too early to draw any conclusions from the judgment. The Commission does not call into question the practice by the tax administrations of the Member States of providing tax rulings. On numerous occasions, it has recognised the importance of advance tax rulings as a tool to provide legal certainty to taxpayers (see e.g. Notice on the Notion of State Aid 1 , paragraph 169-170). So far, the Commission has looked into more than a thousand rulings but identified potential State aid issues only in a very limited number of cases. The grant of a tax ruling must, however, respect the State aid rules as also underlined by the Court in the Apple case. In particular, it cannot reduce the amount of tax which would normally have been payable by the recipient of the ruling if that recipient had been subject to the ‘normal’ tax system (see in particular paragraphs 296 and 306 of the Apple judgment). 2. The Commission does not intend to conduct an impact assessment on the economic consequences of the judgment. The case law of the Court of Justice is binding as to the interpretation of Union law for Member States and EU institutions. Accordingly, the Commission will take into account the ‘Apple’ judgment as part of the Court’s jurisprudence on Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in enforcing the Treaty’s State aid rules in the tax area. 1 Official Journal of the European Union (JOEU) 2016/C262/01.”
  EU competences on taxation · Tax Havens
• “Thank you very much, Mister Chair. I would like to continue in Dutch. Now Chairman, the Commission has put forward a package of measures on securitization to simplify securitization, to create more investment in the real economy. Now, if there isn't a strong enough capital market in Europe, then I could understand it. But we have a stress test from the ECB for the year 2025 that says the banks are working fine, they're well capitalized. We've heard that from Mrs Buch earlier on. So maybe the problem is rather a bad investment climate. If we are to improve that climate, it's not necessarily a question of banks that are not lending money. It's rather a problem of the kind of costs imposed by EU regulations like the Green Deal, and the rules are simply too complicated. At the same time, people are saying that these financial resources that would be freed up could end up being used for speculation. So let's look at the risk situation on the European market. We've got securitization which raises the risk that bad securitizations could cause problems. So the stress test in 2025 looked at the consequences on NPLs, and the situation would be worsened further by securitization. In some market sectors, the risks could even increase, for example on the real estate market. So has the Commission taken these costs into account? I'm particularly thinking about whether there can be some improvements.”
  Financial regulation
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. I will continue in Dutch. For the rapporteur. Thank you. Overall, I would agree with what the rapporteur is saying. The proposal doesn't have a clear direction. It's more about general aspects. The importance of implementation and the danger of overregulation. But it's not clear. When it comes to where the European finance actor currently stands. I does open up a lot of possibilities. Data analysis, improved processes, risk prevention, customer services could be improved. So financial services could also be improved. Be more affordable. Other tasks could be automated which can facilitate the matters. There's a better protection from fraud which is to the benefit of clients. It can also be used for market Its analysis, but I also bears challenges such as protection of privacy, automated automated decision making. So implementation of AI. Also requires significant investment, needs to be adapted to cultures, and larger corporations can bear this could implement this easier than smaller companies. We're facing a time of high interest rates. So cost factor is very important. We have to keep cost to a minimum in the context of an AI strategy. But by and large I would want to agree with the rapporteur. We have to focus on the opportunities and there is a lot of positive in there, so I'm looking forward to further fruitful collaboration with the rapporteur. Thank you.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• “(15:58:16 – 15:58:32): your My question is Please hurry up. What's the ECB view on this issue, especially regarding the national exception under the compensation model and additional cybersecurity and user protection safeguards such as ethical hacking during the pilot phase? Thank you very much.”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you Madam president. Protestant Brussels has got the automotive industry in a stranglehold. And they've done this by calling for the ban of sales of internal combustion engines in 2035. However, sales of electric vehicles haven't met expectations. Subsidies are now being wound down, and Germany is trying to represent 60% of its production in a weak market in a short time, and all the early adapters have already bought an EV. The new proposals seem to disregard the duration necessary for investments and total costs. The European Union just thinks about mandatory measures and subsidies. President, we're already seeing the first signs of long term economic decline. Economic investors are not just in this industry. Know that there are more barriers than opportunities in the European Union, and this is not going to change with our climate ideology going full swing.”
  Road transport environmental policy · 2035 ICE phase-out: strict zero-emission target vs. flexibility for carmakers
• “(15:56:30 – 15:58:16): Thank you, mister Zipolone. Thank you very much for your explanations. I'm speaking on behalf of mister Auk Silstra, Patriots other reporter on this file. Basically, what he wants to say is that the European Parliament is now approaching the final stage of its work on the digital euro package with the rapporteur aiming to bring the file to a vote before the summer recedes. As you are aware, the EPP rapporteur has decide to side with the left of the on the most conscious, issues. This concerns not only the bundling of the online and offline functionality, but also issues such as the compensation model and the safeguards accompanying the rollout of a digital euro. For instance, the parliament position, unlike the council's position, doesn't include exceptions for member states where the where transactions fees are very low, which means that digital euro transactions in these countries will be far more expensive than payments with car schemes. Another example is the issue of the pilot phase where the EBP also decide to side with the left and refuse amendments from the right asking for additional safeguards for vulnerable users, including the elderly and the visually impaired and rejected the suggestion to include the ethical hacking during the pilot phase in order to increase increase severe security. By doing so, the European Parliament seems to put a speed of Excuse me. Could you could you ask your question? You ask”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Um, if no one has a problem. I'll continue in Dutch. Uh. Chairman, I think the explanations given are very interesting indeed. Thank you very much for having made them available. But if we look at the comparison compared with the previous year. One wonders how we can actually implement the budget, bearing in mind the difficulties. I think we've overshot our budget already. It would appear to me. I have worked a lot in industry. And also in the government sector. And when you're talking about a state budget or a private market budget, you have to stick to it. We're talking about about 20%, uh, in, in sort of an increase. And if we don't use it or take it up, it will be lost or used by other institutions that budget heading. And we shouldn't forget that that is a burden as far as the European taxpayers concerned. So between expenditure on the one hand and revenue on the other, it's a little bit difficult to see how all this is going to work out. I have the feeling that for 2027, things are not going to be working out favorably. We've received a technical note or memo recently where we're informed 4.6 billion sort of flexibility will be built into the budget, but that will lead to increasing debt. We're not talking about savings after all. So quite honestly, I don't see how this is going to work out. And for 2027 the figure indicated well, there's all the events, visits as a whole host of activities that are going to have to be funded. And my group for years now has been issuing warnings saying that we need to be a little bit more prudent, a little bit more cautious. We need, um, um, uh, more sound management. Uh, I think between the P, s and D and others, I think we're allowing expenditure to run out of control and, um, there isn't enough money at the end of the day. But in spite of that, it would appear that the parliament is launching fresh initiatives. Uh, we're seeing more staff, more activities of all manner, and I think all that needs to be funded. Whereas in fact, we don't have sufficient money in order to fund all these. These are the general comments I wish to share with you, and I'll come back possibly to raise more technical issues. But those are my comments were more general in nature. I think we need greater moderation in terms of our general approach to the budget renewal.”
  Size of EU budget
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. If no one if it's not too much of a bother, I will continue in Dutch. The proposed harmonization of second pillar pension products connects up with many other subjects, and I hope that we will take the time we need in the negotiations to tackle those broader challenges. I'm just going to mention 1 or 2, and this continues our discussion last week. A redistribution system is a problem because of the way that our markets are developing. A second pillar pension is better. That's obvious. But this proposal doesn't encourage that governance transparency. There's a lot there that makes it more difficult to start a new fund. And in addition to that, the commission wants new rules. Opportunities for investment. Private equity. Other assets. All of those make sense. But this isn't a European problem. We have 1600 million. In the Netherlands, the possibility already exists. I think it's actually a German problem where there are strict rules about investment in different classes of assets. How can we stimulate this second pillar market in Europe? Well, economies of scale tax issues. But this isn't really an EU competence. There are some ideas that we could discuss, but I don't think we're ready for that yet. It is timely to look at two and three. I think what um, it was in 1995 that I was a pension manager, and the UK and France and Germany were not willing to take steps. I'm not so much in favour of scale consolidation. Transparency towards members. Yeah, I think we need that. But we need good results. Better. And the prudent person principle and flexibility. Yes, I'm open to that. But we need to take a far closer look at it. Thank you. ** Marlena MALĄG: Thank you very much, Madam Chair. The, um, changes to IOB two directive Follows the conviction of the European Commission that Europe needs to save better. We have a lot of savings, but we do not use them well enough. So the European Commission wants to channel those savings towards the capital market in order to support investment and economic growth. But we should highlight here that this proposed reform does not really respond to the need to change regulations or eliminate shortcomings. The iups, as they are at the moment, they function quite well in our member states. What we want to change is. To do something in order to have better support for investment. So we need those funds for investments. Let me remind you that national pension systems have developed for years, and they are very deeply rooted in the local legal and social rules. Any idea to try to impose some solutions without particular attention to those characteristics might backfire? We have already seen what happened to initiatives like the Pep product. This has failed as well, and it meant that we had higher administrative burden for those who wanted to participate in it, and the beneficiaries were not, um, flocking to the system. That is why we have many doubts. And any discussion on the changes to this directive should take into account not just macroeconomic goals, but the very realities of national systems and how it can impact the stability in the future. Thank you.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. I will continue in Dutch. At chair the Commission's proposal and what the rapporteur said on securitisation, you know, there are some strong elements and somewhat problematic issues. I'm going to focus on some of the issues that we think are important in the PFA. Generally speaking, I don't really see a convincing link between lowering capital requirements for securitization and on the other hand, a real increase in loans to the real economy. Banks need more liquidity. They need more capital. And therefore it's automatic that they need to get bang for their buck. If you look at the economic growth in Europe, it has less to do with the financing from banks and more to do with the structural factors such as growth expectations in the in the stronger EU countries, renewable energy and over regulation and the climate issues. If we really if we lower the capital requirements, then are we going to be coming into danger? Well, the current context is very, uh, in stable. And if you look at a. Certain, um, certain areas, they're less profitable than some would have us believe. And if we're looking at, um, watering down rules today, we might have to strengthen them up in the future. And so this creates an instability and a lack of security, and it could put people off.”
  Financial regulation
• “But if we're looking here at, um, making certain reporting, um, provisions, um, or watering those down, then that could be one way of moving forward. It's, um, unfortunate that this mindset has not been followed through on because we say that we want a stronger securitization, but the current, um, measures are essentially, um, inhibited by the Basel regulations. We have serious concerns about the very broad definition of public securitization, Where you have pretty much all securitization will be burdened with very complex and burdensome reporting requirements. And this increases the cost for investments. But also it makes a private securitization less up. Front and center. In conclusion, we are also worried about the penalties regime. This is stronger than we have in the current CRR and also in other relevant regulation. And we want to stimulate a securitization. But in the same vein, we are stigmatizing and putting heavy, heavier penalties on it, and that will act as a deterrent. So if I want to try and conclude here, this is a very technical of course, but it is a very important and significant file. Thank you.”
  Financial regulation
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. If you don't mind, I will continue in Dutch. The Chair Mr. Bailey, I've been reading this report. But there were a couple of things missing. You mentioned stablecoins, etc. I know you've got that under control. You've analyzed that. That was also reflected in your answers. However, in the FSB annual report from 2025, you mentioned about the impact of technological development. Cuba's stablecoins. But what about the digital euro? The central bank's digital currency. You know that the EU, the ECB are trying to introduce it swiftly. What about the impact on financial stability and the banks? The ECB tells us that digital euro Will cost 20 will amount to €2,426 billion. Savings banks don't have the capital requirements necessary. If half of savers were to use a digital euro. So could you tell us some more about this scenario? And then what about cooperation with the Islamic Financial Service Board? We've got more and more Sharia banks in Europe. The FSB and national authorities have pointed out the risks here and how this is tied in with financing of terrorism. They're very complex structures to generate profit. Different types of transactions. And it's very difficult to trace all these transactions, and there's not really a due diligence requirement within the system. What are your thoughts on these kinds of banks which are active in social aid, for example? They're not reflected in your report. So I wanted to hear your thoughts on that, please. Any comments? What does the situation look like and the effects on the banking system?”
  Digital euro
• “Madam chair, I will speak Dutch. Madam chair, the Association Agreement between the EU and Andorra and San Marino defines different economic aspects. And it defines a market as a liberal one. I can just, uh, applaud the work that has been done. Congratulate you on this. These agreements unequivocally recognize Andorra and San Marino as having a framework that does reflect their political reality and the reality at the institutional level, I think this is good. Moreover, Andorra and San Marino are outside of the Political spheres in the EU. Also, when it comes to Schengen and services and so on. So on this point, I don't agree with the rapporteur when he spoke about integration with these countries, enlargement to these countries, they don't want to be part of the EU. Moreover, I think it is not useful here to talk about concessions when it comes to climate change policy, for example, because what impact can these two countries really have in that area? Moreover, I commend the referendum organised in Andorra with a view to ratifying this agreement. We have to commend the bravery of the Andorran government for organising a referendum of this type. I think referenda are a very good instrument. I don't know very much about Andorra itself. I called the embassy and I was I was speaking to them and they invited me to go there. They were talking about four economic pillars tourism, construction. And they're maxing out on these pillars. That's worrying for that country. So we do hope that this agreement will generate investment for that country so that it continue advancing and progressing.”
  EU enlargement
• “Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I will continue in Dutch. So with great interest, I have followed, uh, what was presented by the Commission as far as sustainability. Daddy. So 70% reduction. Reduction costs a drop of 6 billion. And of course, that's something that ought to make us all happy. And it's something that we ought to welcome. But the taxonomy are. There. One is less ambitious than one is with CSD. So. We see a saving of €800 million and nothing with regard to the adhesion of the costs now. And the savings in other sectors as well. Does it mean that negotiation on the part of the Parliament has been effective, or that we ought to work in a more effective fashion to achieve some sort of maturity? Now, as far as the simplification of the criteria, of course there are numerous different consequences for the nuclear energy industry as well. This has been brought up by the Dutch government as well. There have been numerous different enterprises as well that have been involved in this particular aspect. But it goes only partially. It is only partially in harmony with toxic taxonomy. And the question is whether we have an activity which partially or fully in harmony with taxonomy, whether these particular activities are to be continued as such, or whether there ought to be some sort of adjustment.”
  Green Taxonomy