Tomáš ZDECHOVSKÝ

Policy topics Tomáš ZDECHOVSKÝ is active on

What Tomáš ZDECHOVSKÝ has said (79)

• 2026-03-25 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission 10.6.2026 Written question The Commission is aware of the proposal to adjust compensation contributions for employers of persons with disabilities. The Commission emphasises that social inclusion and the integration of vulnerable groups into the labour market, notably through social enterprises, are core objectives of the European Social Fund Plus [1] and they are supported as such by the Programme Slovakia. The national project ‘Poskytovanie finančných príspevkov integračným podnikom’ [2] is set to last until the end of 2029. The Commission is not commenting on ongoing legislative negotiations at national level. As underlined by the mid-term review of the Social Economy Action Plan, adopted on 30 March 2026 [3] , the Commission continues to encourage the Member States to develop their social economy ecosystems to fully benefit from its potential to address societal challenges and deliver a positive social impact. [1] https://european-social-fund-plus.ec.europa.eu/en. [2] https://www.upsvr.gov.sk/europsky-socialny-fond/narodne-projekty-v-programovom-obdobi-2021-2027/narodny-projekt-poskytovanie-financnych-prispevkov-integracnym-podnikom.html?page_id=1343060. [3] https://social-economy-gateway.ec.europa.eu/eu-initiatives/seap-mid-term-review_en.”
  EU policy on disability inclusion & accessibility · EU expenditure on social policy · EU competences on social policies
• 2026-02-11 “E-000577/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission An anti-dumping (AD) investigation on cold rolled flat steel products originating, inter alia, in Taiwan, but not from South Korea has been ongoing since 18 September 2025. No measures have been imposed in that investigation. However, a 25% import duty is applicable to imports of the product category (HS code 72112900) from Taiwan under the EU’s steel safeguard measure as the duty-free quota for Taiwan was fully utilised for the first quarter of 2026. For South Korea, the duty-free quota for the first quarter of 2026 has not yet been fully utilised. Only imports above the quota attract a duty. In safeguard investigations, users’ interests are taken into account, and measures in the form of a tariff rate quota allow a certain volume to be imported duty free so that downstream users are not unduly penalised. Data on the quota usage is publicly available on the website of Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union 1 . The order numbers for the product category are given in the updated version of the Safeguard Regulation 2 . In AD investigations, the Commission also conducts an EU interest test to see if measures would be against the EU interest, including the impact on downstream users. The decision on EU interest relies on information submitted by interested parties, including users. The procedures are set out in Section 5.5 of the Notice of Initiation 3 . For small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the Commission reaches out to increase awareness through regular engagement with the SME community. Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security (DG TRADE) also has a dedicated webpage 4 for SMEs regarding trade defence. Finally, DG TRADE’s information page on each ongoing investigation 5 indicates the timetable for the steps in a proceeding. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/quota_consultation.jsp?Lang=en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/159/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202505025. 4 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/enforcement-and-protection/trade-defence/help-smes_en. 5 https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/ongoing.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2026-01-08 “E-000045/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Behavioural taxation stands at the intersection of several policy areas: health, internal market and revenue for national budgets. In this context, the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union is competent for advancing fiscal policies with a single market focus. The mission of the Behavioural Taxation and Other Indirect Taxes Unit within the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union is to ensure the smooth functioning of the EU harmonised excise framework (horizontal excise legislation and supporting IT systems), to contribute to EU tax policy development and coordination of indirect tax matters (other than value added tax), including alcohol and tobacco excise legislation, and to the fight against fiscal fraud. The Commission will use the findings of the report ‘Health Taxes from an EU Perspective’ to engage with stakeholders. Notably, as announced in the Safe Hearts Plan 1 , the Commission plans to establish a network of competent authorities to provide a forum for cooperation and coordination in the taxation of unhealthy food products to support the exchange of information and best practices among Member States, and to set up a database of such taxes in force in Member States. The Commission will assess which tools, including possible financial actions, could be deployed to support preventive public health and promote healthier consumer choices 2 . 1 https://health.ec.europa.eu/document/download/dfb60cde-21a5-426d-8616e394a326abc2_en?filename=ncd_com-2025-1024_act_en.pdf. 2 This will be informed by the outcome of the study on so-called ‘ultra-processed foods’ announced in the Strategy for European Life Sciences: https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/strategy-researchand-innovation/jobs-and-economy/strategy-european-life-sciences_en.”
  EU measures on lifestyle-related behaviours (smoking, drinking, eating, etc.) · Drinking regulation · Smoking regulation
• 2025-11-25 “E-004683/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is working at full speed on Digital Services Act (DSA) investigations (e.g. Temu, AliExpress, Shein) to reach swift yet legally sound conclusions on the cases. If the investigations confirm the existence of systemic risks on the platform, the Commission could adopt non-compliance decisions and ultimately impose fines or accept binding commitments. The Commission also coordinates ongoing enforcement actions by the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Network against Temu and SHEIN 1 in response to identified consumer law infringements. To make the current consumer enforcement framework more effective and more deterrent, the Commission plans to propose a revision of the CPC Regulation during the 4 th quarter of 2026 2 . The Commission continues the implementation of the eCommerce Communication with results of the first product safety sweep and the Priority Control Area expected to contribute to a more robust enforcement framework, as will the use of EU IT tools, targeted enforcement via joint actions, and new EU testing facilities. The upcoming EU Customs Reform, in final stage of negotiation, is expected to be adopted in 2026 to structurally reinforce the capabilities of EU customs and other enforcement authorities on e-commerce imports directly shipped to consumers. The EU Market Surveillance Regulation is planned to be revised as part of the European Product Act legislative package, aiming to ensure level-playing field for businesses and safety for consumers. The Commission will continue providing the Parliament with regular updates during the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection meetings to discuss the relevant Commission's services’ progress on online marketplaces regulation. 1 Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004, OJ L 345, 27 December 2017, pp. 1–26. 2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - 2030 Consumer Agenda and action plan for consumers in the single market 'A new impulse for consumer protection, competitiveness and sustainable growth', COM/2025/848 final.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports · Liability for online marketplaces
• 2025-11-12 “E-004498/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has already put forward or envisaged initiatives to support the media sector. The European Media Freedom Act 1 establishes unprecedented safeguards for media freedom, independence and pluralism within the EU internal market. Moreover, the Commission recently put forward a proposal, AgoraEU, to significantly boost funding for media as part of the next budget 2 . It also announced 3 that it will launch a new Media Resilience Programme to support independent journalism. In the context of the evaluation and review of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 4 , it will assess ways to strengthen the prominence of media services of general interest and modernise advertising rules with a view to foster the sustainability of EU media. Moreover, it just launched a study to support the review of the 2019 Copyright Directive 5 , among other to assess its impact on the relevant stakeholders, including the media sector. The Commission is also closely monitoring the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the media sector. This includes both opportunities and risks that AI brings, including loss of referral traffic, declining revenues and impacts on the sustainability of the media sector. The Commission is investigating these issues in the context of its enforcement of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) 6 , including in a recent investigation to assess whether Google Search site reputation abuse policy impairs in an unfair, unreasonable and discriminatory manner publishers’ freedom to conduct their business and their ability to freely decide on the means of monetising their websites and content 7 . Finally, the Commission launched on 9 December 2025 an investigation under article 102 TFEU of the way in which Google uses publishers’ content in its AI Overviews and AI Mode products 8 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act), OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024. 2 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the ‘AgoraEU’ programme for the period 2028-2034, and repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/692 and (EU) 2021/818. 3 COM/2025/870 final. 4 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, pp. 1–24, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/1808. 5 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, pp. 92–125. 6 Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, pp. 1–66. 7 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2675. 8 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2964.”
  EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
• 2025-10-29 “E-004246/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is bound by principles of neutrality and transparency and makes every effort to ensure equal treatment of all Member States and entities involved in EU-funded projects. Engagements with specific banks or companies are conducted with the intention of optimising project outcomes. If potential financial support is involved, all actors are subject to rigorous selection processes conforming to EU law and standards. For actions under the Global Gateway strategy 1 implemented in indirect management, the choice of the entrusted entity is made in accordance with Article 157(1) of the Financial Regulation 2 . These entities select their counterparts based on internal procedures that have been subject to an ex ante assessment in accordance with Article 157(3), ensuring equivalent protection of EU financial interests. For actions implemented in direct management, procurement, and grants, these are awarded through competitive procedures (call for tenders or call for proposals), except in limited cases in which direct award or negotiated procedures are possible. The selection of participants in any EU initiative, including the Global Gateway projects, is primarily based on criteria such as expertise, experience and capacity to contribute to the project effectively. The EU is reaching out to all Member States to attract both public and private investors, including government actors, banks and companies. There are no situations where companies of one Member State are favoured. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/international-partnerships/global-gateway_en. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/eu-financial-regulation_en.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-10-23 “P-004189/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recently carried out an Information Systems Security (ISS) audit at the Slovak paying agency. The audit detected no immediate threat to payment continuity or to the protection of EU financial interest. The paying agency is taking adequate measures to mitigate risks linked to the potential change of IT contractor and to ensure continuity of operations. It is the responsibility of the Member State to set up the aid application system in line with the legal requirements and to ensure that payments are fully disbursed to beneficiaries within the deadlines set by Union law. When Member States pay farmers outside the deadlines, the Commission may reduce the reimbursement to the Member State of the EU financing by up to 100%. So far the Commission has not been informed of issues related to non-payment and procurement irregularities involving the IT provider. When the Commission becomes aware of any suspected cases of fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the EU budget, it informs the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and, where applicable, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) without any delay.”
  Agricultural funding
• 2025-10-22 “E-004159/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to evidence-based policymaking. Furthermore, the Commission attaches the utmost importance to the adherence by the members of the Commission to the ethical framework applicable to them and notably to their full observance of the Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission 1 . Pursuant to Article 5 of the Code of Conduct, the members of the Commission must comply with the duty of loyalty towards the Commission. Without prejudice to their fundamental freedom of expression and the right of members to express their personal opinions, they are expected to abide by the restraint that their office requires. In particular, members shall not make any comments that would call into question a decision taken by the Commission or which may harm the Commission’s reputation. This being said, it is the Commission policy not to comment on hypothetical situations such as captured in the Honourable Member’s written question. The Commission does not have sufficient details to provide a relevant reply of the substance. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32018D0221(02).”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-10-22 “E-004157/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission 1. Directive 2014/24/EU on Public Procurement establishes the framework to enable fair market practices, providing the Commission the power to monitor and enforce compliance among Member States. Through the EU Financial Regulation 1 , the Commission is also tasked with ensuring proper use of EU funds, which includes verifying the adherence to procurement standards to promote transparency and efficiency in spending. The Commission holds the competency to investigate irregularities in the funding process and, if relevant, refer cases to competent investigative bodies 2 . The Joint Communication on strengthening EU economic security 3 encourages Member States and partners implementing national or EU budgets to prioritise support to EU businesses that reduce foreign dependencies in critical sectors. 2. The Commission’s main responsibility is to assess whether Member States have fulfilled the milestones and targets set in their Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs). The implementing body of the respective Member States is responsible for setting the rules for allocation of RRP grants at national level and for their implementation. The call for proposals 4 states that when awarding contracts funded by the subsidy, Czech Act No. 134/2016 Coll. on public procurement must be complied with 5 . Milestones and targets funded under the Recovery and Resilience Facility are closely monitored for compliance with public procurement, competition and funding rules. The Commission may also conduct audits of milestones and targets, including those associated with the implementation of the project in question, based on risk assessments. Should any irregularities emerge, the Commission will work with Czech authorities to address and rectify the issues. Where further examination is warranted, the Commission is prepared to engage relevant investigative bodies. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/eu-financial-regulation_en. 2 Investigative bodies such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). Additionally, for high-value tenders, Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies provides a mechanism for the Commission to scrutinise and address instances where bidders might gain an unfair advantage due to foreign subsidies, thereby safeguarding the integrity and competitiveness of the internal market. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025JC0977. 4 Call for applications under which the 'Support for Schools in the Context of Digitalisation’ project was awarded. 5 Additionally, Member States are required to ensure an effective internal control system, to regularly verify the proper use of the funds and the proper implementation of reforms and investments in accordance with the legislation for the protection of the financial interests of the EU.”
  EU industrial funding
• 2025-10-22 “E-004160/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Commission considers that mere filtration systems which do not use any active substance would not be covered by the scope of Regulation (EU) 528/2012 (BPR) 1 , as the regulation excludes products acting by ‘mere physical or mechanical action’ (Article 3(1)(a)). However, the Commission considers that the term ‘mere’ in the biocidal product definition implies that an action which is physical, but also biological/chemical, remains within the scope of the BPR. The Commission does not intend to clarify the current definition of ‘biocidal product’ as the Court of Justice already provided a legally binding interpretation of the EU law. The Court has adopted a broad interpretation on what constitutes a biocidal product under the biocides’ legislation (e.g. Cases C-420/10 2 and C‑592/18 3 ), with each case assessed on its own merits. Member States have a primary responsibility to monitor the application of the relevant legal provisions and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission monitors the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. In July 2025, the Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare engaged in an implementation dialogue 4 with stakeholders to gather feedback on the challenges facing the biocidal products sector and potential solutions. The dialogue focused, among others, on simplifying the regulatory framework and encouraging innovation. The issues raised will be considered during the upcoming evaluation of the BPR, which will assess the performance of the regulation in relation to its objectives and address both existing and emerging needs. The outcome will guide the Commission on whether further action or a revision is necessary. 1 Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products (OJ L 167, 27.6.2012, p. 1). 2 Case C-420/10, Söll: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=E28DF9EC0C15745B2B9EADAF97E665DD?te xt=&docid=119906&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1682570. 3 Case C-592/18, Darie https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=221808&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=l st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1682815. 4 https://health.ec.europa.eu/events/implementation-dialogue-biocides-2025-07-15_en.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2025-10-08 “E-003950/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission 1. As regards the interpretation of the Working Time Directive 1 , the Court of Justice of the European Union has held that periods of ‘on-call’ duty, during which a worker must remain at the workplace and be available to resume work in case of need, constitute ‘working time’ in their entirety; where a worker is not required to remain at a place determined by the employer, the ‘stand-by’ period only qualifies as ‘working time’ when the constraints imposed by the employer have an objective and very significant impact on their ability to freely manage the time during which their professional services are not required. 2. The Directive offers significant flexibilities to establish derogations 2 under certain conditions, notably in the case of activities requiring continuity of service 3 . The Court has held that the Directive may be temporarily disapplied for certain activities in circumstances whose gravity and scale are exceptional. Moreover, in specific circumstances, activities performed by members of military personnel are excluded from the scope of the Directive 4 . The Commission is engaging with Member States and social partners on the application of the Directive to military personnel in the Armed Forces, as a follow-up to the Commission communication accompanying the Defence Readiness Omnibus 5 . 3. In 2023 the Commission adopted an Interpretative Communication on the Working Time Directive 6 which aims to increase legal certainty and clarity, including as regards the application of the Directive to workers in the field of public safety and crisis management. 1 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ L 299, 18.11.2003, p. 9‐19 - https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/88/oj/eng. 2 From Articles 3 (Daily rest), 4 (Breaks), 5 (Weekly rest period), 8 (Length of night work), and 16 (Reference periods). 3 Article 17 of Directive 2003/88/EC. 4 Judgment in Case C-742/19, Ministrstvo za obrambo - https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-742/19. 5 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council — Defence Readiness Omnibus, COM(2025) 820 final, 17.6.2025 — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0820. 6 Corrigendum to Communication from the Commission, Interpretative Communication on Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ C 143, 26.4.2023, p. 8-77 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2023.143.01.0008.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AC%3A2023%3A143%3ATO C.”
  EU regulation of cross-border and posted workers · EU rules on hazardous working conditions
• 2025-10-08 “E-003951/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/351 1 has not changed any animal health requirements related to bovine semen used for embryo production. It made a more precise reference to the requirements outlined in the underlying Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/692 2 . Furthermore, the Delegated Regulation is the result of discussions in the relevant expert group 3 in 2018, which, given the available science, experiences and broader policy considerations, concluded that, to maintain the Union’s high animal health standards, semen should only be collected from infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBR) seronegative bulls, and these bulls should not be vaccinated against IBR for movements and entry of semen and embryos in the Union. In accordance with Article 234(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 4 , requirements for the entry into the Union of animals and germinal products should be as stringent as the requirements for comparable movements within the Union. The Union’s rules on movement and entry are fully aligned and currently compatible with this Regulation. Any significant change of the current Union policy on IBR and of the Union germinal products production system would require thorough discussion with the representatives of all concerned (e.g., the competent authorities of the Member States, experts, stakeholders, etc.) and would probably necessitate a risk assessment by the European Food Safety Authority 5 if deemed appropriate. Currently, the Commission has no new information that would warrant plans to further proceed on this issue. Moreover, there is still an opportunity to benefit from genetic material from third countries via oocytes, as the requirements for their entry into the Union are not dependent on semen. 1 OJ L, 2024/351, 9.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/351/oj. 2 OJ L 174, 3.6.2020, pp. 379–520, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/692/oj. 3 Expert group on Animal Health https://food.ec.europa.eu/animals/animal-health/expert-group-animalhealth_en. 4 Regulation (EU) 2016/429 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0429&qid=1760943624148. 5 https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/about/about-efsa.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2025-10-01 “E-003813/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU takes robust action to protect its industries from unfairly traded imports and, at present, has over 200 measures in place. As regards anti-dumping, the Commission takes action to defend EU industry from dumped imports on receipt of complaints from industry containing the necessary evidence of dumping that is causing harm. The Complaints Office of the trade defence services 1 examines every draft complaint received to ensure that any deficiencies are addressed and shortcomings are corrected by the complainant. In this way the Commission ensures that any anti-dumping or anti-subsidy investigations that are initiated meet the requisite standards. This is an important step given that the initiation of investigations can be subject to legal scrutiny in the courts. Under the basic trade defence regulations, the Commission is prohibited from confirming the existence of or from discussing any issues about possible draft trade defence complaints. The Commission imposes anti-dumping measures once an investigation has found that injurious dumping is taking place and it is in the EU interest to do so. Such measures can be subject to review and can be maintained for as long as is necessary to ensure the protection of an industry from unfairly traded imports. 1 trade-defence-complaints@ec.europa.eu.”
  Trade relations with China · Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market
• 2025-09-24 “E-003710/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission It is not the Commission’s role to investigate individual cases of possible non-compliance on food safety requirements. It is for the national authority where the food establishment is located to carry out such investigation. Accordingly, the Czech Authorities informed the Commission on their investigations and corrective actions taken. The Commission has requested the Czech authorities to distribute their findings to other Member States through the Commission’s Administrative Assistance and Cooperation Network in order to alert them on these infringements that may occur also on their territory. The Commission considers that current food hygiene and traceability rules provide sufficient guarantees to prevent related threats to public health. The enforcement of existing rules by the competent authorities of the Member States seems more relevant than imposing additional requirements.”
  EU policy on novel foods
• 2025-09-03 “E-003380/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission In 2024 the Commission published a Transition Pathway for a more resilient, digital and green retail ecosystem, co-created by a broad community of retail stakeholders including retailers organised in different business models and trade unions. All actors in the ecosystem had the opportunity to express their most pressing challenges in a thorough and comprehensive consultation process. Throughout this process, no specific issues concerning franchising have been identified as requiring an action. Consequently, the Commission does not intend to propose specific legislation on this issue. EU legislation lays certain ground rules to provide for legal certainty and fair conditions for franchisors and franchisees. For example, franchise agreements must comply with competition law, notably Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 102 TFEU. The Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 1 provides a safe harbour under Article 101 TFEU for franchise agreements that meet certain conditions (including agreements that provide for certain forms of territorial exclusivity) and the Vertical Guidelines 2 provide guidance for the assessment of franchise agreements that fall outside the scope of the block exemption. Franchising agreements fall also under the relevant national laws, for examples those governing contracts and employment conditions, including requirements deriving from EU Directives. 1 Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/720 of 10 May 2022 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 134, 11.5.2022. 2 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on vertical restraints, OJ C 248, 30.6.2022.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · EU restrictions on unfair commercial practices
• 2025-09-03 “E-003379/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not monitor domestic associations and groups within individual Member States. Such matters primarily fall within the remit of the national authorities, as national security is the sole responsibility of each Member State under Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union. It is for the competent Slovak authorities to investigate the organisation’s actions and to take measures in line with national legislation. The European External Action Service (EEAS) has taken a leading role in addressing Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), a growing security and foreign policy threat for the EU. The EEAS focuses its monitoring and analytical work on external actors (FIMI), in particular those stemming from the Russian Federation. While domestic groups within Member States do not fall under the scope of EEAS monitoring, the EEAS maintains close coordination with national authorities and EU institutions to ensure situational awareness and to share relevant insights in their efforts to address FIMI, including through close cooperation within the Rapid Alert System and by providing regular exposure and debunks of FIMI by hostile state actors via the EUvsDiSiNFO 1 platform. With the European Democracy Shield, the Commission will further boost the EU collective capacity to monitor, detect and anticipate information manipulation and disinformation campaigns and strengthen resilience through a whole-of society approach, building on existing instruments, networks, tools and structures 2 . The Commission is not considering a blanket ban or sanctions against domestic organisations, as such matters generally fall within the remit of individual member states. The EEAS on its part is able to submit proposals for listings under the Council’s horizontal framework 3 of restrictive measures in response to Russia’s destabilising actions. The sanctions regime targets those engaged in actions and policies by the government of the Russian Federation, which undermine the fundamental values of the EU and its Member States, their security, stability, independence and integrity. Decisions on specific listings under this sanction regime are taken by the Council. 1 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/. 2 JOIN (2025) 791. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/08/russia-eu-sets-up-new-framework-forrestrictive-measures-against-those-responsible-for-destabilising-activities-against-the-eu-and-its-member-states/.”
  Foreign interference in Europe · Disinformation & online freedoms · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-08-28 “E-003323/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and their rapidly advancing capabilities pose a growing security and cybersecurity risk, for example if being used for digital reconnaissance. The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) 1 provides for mandatory cybersecurity requirements for the design, development and production of products with digital elements. UAS, as products with digital elements, would be covered by these new rules, with the exception of those developed exclusively for national security or military purposes. The CRA also does not apply to products in the area of aviation, including UAS, that have been certified in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 2 . In addition, Article 22 of the Directive (EU) 2022/2555 3 establishes a legal basis to carry out coordinated security risk assessments of specific critical information and communication technology (ICT) services, systems or products supply chains, taking into account technical and, where relevant, non-technical risk factors 4 . As announced in the ProtectEU Strategy 5 of April 2025, the Commission is currently looking more broadly at the security and resilience of ICT supply chains and infrastructure in the upcoming revision of the Cybersecurity Act 6 , with a view to avoid critical dependencies and de-risk our ICT supply chains from high-risk suppliers. As set in the EU Drone Strategy 2.0, the Commission will define criteria and labelling schema for a voluntary’ ‘European Trusted Drone’ label. This label would be granted to drones that demonstrate secure design, encrypted communications, and protection against malicious interference throughout their lifecycle. This work is supported by the European Parliament Pilot Project. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act) (Text with EEA relevance) https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj/eng. 2 Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 (Text with EEA relevance.) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1139/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj/eng. 4 Such risk assessments are to be conducted by the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Cooperation Group, in cooperation with the Commission and ENISA. 5 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0148. 6 Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act) (Text with EEA relevance) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/881/oj/eng.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2025-06-26 “E-002584/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has carefully considered the possible indirect impacts on ammunition and medicine production before deciding to propose a ban on calcium cyanamide as fertiliser. The Commission followed the recommendations of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and its scientific committees, as well as the geo-political context following this evaluation, and went an extra step to avoid consequences for the EU’s strategic autonomy. The proposal (i) is limited to the fertiliser use, preserving all other uses, including defence and medical applications, and (ii) currently proposes longer transitional periods than those originally recommended by ECHA, providing additional time and flexibility to the company to reorganise its production and minimise impacts. Currently, discussions with the Member States in the REACH 1 Committee on the proposed restriction are ongoing, including on whether longer transitional periods are sufficient to minimise impacts for the company and ensure the EU’s strategic autonomy. In this context, additional evidence has been requested from the affected company and will further inform the decision-making process. Further changes may follow once the indirect impacts are fully assessed. 1 Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals.”
  Use of fertilisers · EU policy on pesticides
• 2025-06-11 “E-002344/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s attention has been drawn to the different types of identification numbers issued in Bulgaria to non-Bulgarian EU citizens (LN - ‘ličen nomer’) compared to Bulgarian citizens and third-country nationals who are issued with an ‘edinen graždanski nomer’ (EGN). The Commission contacted the Bulgarian authorities requesting more information on the reason for the issuance of different types of identification numbers and its possible impact. On the basis of the information received, the Commission understands that EGNs are issued when a person registers at the municipality and is entered in the national public register. EU citizens are registered only with the Ministry of the Interior but not in the national public register, which is the reason why an EGN is not assigned to them. Registration in national public registers is a matter that falls under the competence of the Member States. In exercising that competence, each Member State must however comply with EU law, in particular the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on the freedom conferred on all EU citizens to move and reside within the territory of the Member States. Possible differences in registrations must therefore not constitute an obstacle to the exercise of the right of free movement. According to the information available to the Commission, the LN and the EGN have the same format. The LN is used for communication with the public administration and that all enquiries and registrations in Bulgaria may be carried out with an LN or an EGN. The Commission found no indications that the Bulgarian system of EGN/LN and of the information provided by the Bulgarian authorities would create obstacles for the exercise of the right of free movement by EU citizens.”
  Electronic identity · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2025-04-23 “E-001612/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Maldives expressed interest in joining an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) during the third EU-Maldives Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) in 2022. The Maldives’ objective in joining an EPA is to benefit from duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market, especially for their main export product (tuna), which they lost after their graduation from the Generalised System of Preferences in 2015. At the fourth EU-Maldives SOM in 2023, the Maldives stressed their interest in joining the Samoa Agreement. This agreement provides a legal framework for EU relations with countries of Africa, Caribbean and Pacific, including a possibility of concluding with them economic partnership agreements. On 1 July 2024, the Maldives signed the Samoa Agreement. In subsequent meetings with representatives of the government of the Maldives the Commission provided a non-paper outlining the steps required to join the EPA between the EU and the five Eastern and Southern African (ESA5) countries, the most relevant one given the Maldives’ geographical position. To proceed, the Maldives need to (i) sign the Samoa Agreement (completed in 2024); (ii) join the ESA group in the Organisation of African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (status unclear); and (iii) submit a formal request to join the EU-ESA5 EPA and table a market access offer to the Commission. An accession to the EPA would eventually require a joint EU-ESA5 decision in line with the EPA’s procedures. Despite all the explanation provided by the Commission, to date, the Maldives have neither submitted a formal request to join the EPA nor tabled a market access offer. These steps are needed before a provisional timeline for the Maldives’ potential accession to the EU-ESA5 EPA can be established.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Fisheries access for developing countries
• 2025-04-02 “E-001369/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission Since the start of the new College, the Commission has been actively engaging with successive Council Presidencies and individual Member States to reflect upon the legal and practical issues raised by the earlier discussions between the co-legislators on the proposed Directive discontinuing seasonal changes of time and repealing Directive 2000/84/EC 1 , and to examine the possibilities for the resumption of those discussions. The Commission focus remains on fostering consensus among Member States. In this context, following discussions on the proposal initiated by the Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU, the Commission has decided to respond to Member State call for further analysis to be undertaken in support of decision-making on this matter. A study to support decision-making on this matter is expected to be launched in 2025. The European Parliament will be kept fully informed of its progress. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/84/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on health
• 2025-04-02 “E-001345/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Delivering on the EU’s climate targets 1 requires a swift decrease in greenhouse gas emissions from all sectors, including transport. The CO 2 emission standards Regulation 2 sets targets to reduce emissions for new cars and vans, which creates long-term predictability for manufacturers and investors, while giving industry the necessary lead-time to adapt. This supports competitiveness, as EU manufacturers are strongly investing in zero-emission technologies and a strong home market is a crucial enabler for them to regain leadership in this area. From 2025, the limit value curve used for calculating car manufacturers’ specific targets has changed, taking into account recent developments in the relationship between the mass and CO 2 emissions of new cars, including due to the increased uptake of battery electric vehicles. The CO 2 targets apply to vehicles’ tailpipe emissions. This ensures that manufacturers implement innovative technologies, which reduce emissions of the vehicles when driven on the road. Emissions from other lifecycle stages of vehicles are regulated under separate pieces of EU legislation 3 . By end 2025, the Commission is required to adopt a methodology for assessing and reporting life-cycle CO 2 emissions of vehicles. From June 2026, manufacturers may submit to the Commission life-cycle CO 2 emissions data for their vehicles, calculated according to that methodology. 1 Enshrined in the European Climate Law – http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/851/oj/eng. 3 Such as the EU Emission Trading System Directive – http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/87/2024-03-01 and the Renewable Energy Directive – http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/2001/2024-07-16.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2025-04-02 “E-001344/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Since March 2022, the Commission has taken unprecedented actions in response to Russia’s unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine. In close coordination with Group of Seven (G7) partners, the EU has adopted 17 packages of sanctions 1 . Many of the recent measures focus on reinforcements of existing sanctions in place since 2014, address circumvention and cut the remaining revenues that Russia draws from its exports. With the adoption of the 16 th package in February 2025 2 , the restrictive measures applicable to the financial sector were further strengthened. As a result of all such measures, some EUR 28 billion of private assets have been frozen in the EU under individual measures and more than EUR 200 billion of Russian Central Bank assets have been immobilised under sectoral sanctions. The Commission was not informed in advance about the alleged cash transfers by EU credit institutions to Russia mentioned in the investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. It is for the Member States, which remain competent for sanctions implementation and enforcement, to investigate whether the concerned transfers may have been used to circumvent EU financial sanctions, considering that in principle restrictive measures apply as of the day of entry into force in line with the legal acts. The Commission continues monitoring the implementation of sanctions by Member States, gives regular guidance to them and welcomes information about concrete sanctions violations to be followed up with the national competent authorities. Tackling possible circumvention attempts, including by the financial sector, is a key priority. The EU Sanctions Envoy continues his outreach to third countries identified as being high risk jurisdictions for circumvention. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russiasmilitary-aggression-against-ukraine_en. 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-16th-package-sanctions-against-russia-2025-02-24_en.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-04-02 “E-001346/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission identified replacing post-Soviet legacy equipment as one of the most pressing challenges in the Joint Communication on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward published on 18 May 2022 1 and initiated immediate actions to address it commonly in the spirit of solidarity proposing a regulation on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement 2 . The programme proved to be successful and the Commission has proposed its follow-up through the European Defence Industry Programme 3 , currently under consideration by the colegislators. Moreover, the Commission proposed on 19 March 2025 a new regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe 4 that would be instrumental in addressing the replacement of Member States’ legacy equipment. It will provide Member States with loans up to EUR 150 billion to pursue their rearmament plans. To address the issue of replacing post-Soviet equipment in a longer-term perspective, the Commission supports research and development actions through the European Defence Fund 5 . It supports the European Defence industry to provide Member States with new state of the art, innovative defence products and technologies. Decisions on the replacement of Russian helicopters and measures to ensure safety and security of their deployment are the responsibility of Member States, which remain obliged to comply with all the relevant restrictive measures (sanctions) in Council Decision (CFSP) 2014/512 6 and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 7 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52022JC0024. 2 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj. 3 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/edip-proposal-regulation_en. 4 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6d6f889c-e58d-4caa-8f3b8b93154fe206_en?filename=SAFE%20Regulation.pdf. 5 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpageeuropean-commission_en. 6 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/512/2025-02-25. 7 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/2025-02-25.”
  Defence spending · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-03-12 “E-001081/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Since 2011, the EU and its Member States have mobilised nearly EUR 7 billion in humanitarian aid in response to the Syrian crisis. EU humanitarian aid in Syria seeks to respond to life-saving emergencies such as health, protection, shelter, and strictly adheres to the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence, as outlined in the EU Treaties and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid 1 . The EU provides humanitarian aid to all people in need in Syria, without discrimination. Gravely alarmed by the violence in Syria’s coastal region, on 11 March 2025, the High Representative/Vice-President issued a statement 2 on behalf of the EU, strongly condemning the horrific crimes committed against civilians, many of which were allegedly perpetrated by armed groups supporting the security forces of the transitional authorities. The EU called for a swift, transparent and impartial investigation to be conducted to ensure perpetrators are brought to justice. It welcomed the transitional authorities’ commitments, in particular the establishment of an investigative committee. It further called on them to allow the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to investigate all violations. Everything must be done to prevent any such crimes from happening again. The EU remains attentive to the actions of the new authorities in ensuring the protection of all Syrians without any kind of discrimination and continues to call for an inclusive, peaceful, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political transition grounded on international law and upholding the universality and indivisibility of human rights and the principles of equality and nondiscrimination. 1 See Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, OJ C 25, 30.1.2008, p. 1–12, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A42008X0130%2801%29. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · EU-Syria relations
• 2025-03-05 “E-000944/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The reference to the possibility to exclude biomass combustion and hydropower plants from the designation of renewables acceleration areas was not part of the Commission’s proposal 1 . It was added by the co-legislators during the legislative process. It should be noted that under Article 15c, paragraph 1 of the revised Directive 2 , Member States are not obliged to designate renewables acceleration areas for more than one technology. The Commission has not identified inconsistencies between Article 15b (1) and Article 16 of the revised Directive. Small hydropower plants constitute a renewable energy source and, thus, benefit from the supporting policies and measures accelerating renewable energy development across the EU of the Renewable Energy Directive. 1 COM(2022) 222 final. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/2413/oj/eng”
  EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects · Energy (green transition)
• 2025-02-19 “E-000755/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Commission Impact Assessment 1 underpinning the initial legislative proposal assessed the costs of compliance. These are significantly lower than the expected benefits. The EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) 2 is expected to contribute to a minimum of 71 920 hectares of forest per year being less affected by EU-driven deforestation and forest degradation. This would mean a reduction of at least 31.9 million metric tons of carbon emitted to the atmosphere every year due to EU consumption. The potential impact on the prices of final consumer goods, including food, is expected to be limited, based on the findings of the Impact Assessment, other reports on cost estimates of due diligence legislation, and the previous regulatory experience on wood 3 . The Impact Assessment also assessed the risk that producers may be tempted to separate their supply chains, selling deforestation-free products to the EU while continuing to sell nondeforestation-free products to other markets. The benchmarking system provided in Article 29 of the EUDR is expected to create further incentives for producers to reduce deforestation and forest degradation and promote deforestation-free supply chains. Additional measures that are being put in place by the EU are expected to help tackle this risk of leakage, including partnerships with producer countries combined with technical assistance. Some industry sectors have shared evidence that EUDR deforestation-free requirements are being adopted by some companies for their global operations, not just for their EU sales. 1 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/forests/deforestation/regulation-deforestation-free-products_en. 2 Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010, OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 206–247. 3 Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market, OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 23– 34.”
  Climate efforts · Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2025-02-19 “E-000754/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3084 1 and the Commission’s Cloud Security Control Baseline, the Information System uses a data infrastructure located in the European Union. The Commission ensures the highest level of security for the Information System and the data it contains and does not consider it a security risk. The processing of personal data under Regulation (EU) 2024/3084 is subject to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 2 and Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 3 . The Data Protection Record and Data Privacy Statement of the system were prepared in close cooperation with the Data Protection Officer of the Commission 4 . During the drafting procedure of Regulation (EU) 2024/3084, the European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted and delivered an opinion on 5 November 2024. The EU Deforestation Regulation Committee comprising representatives of the Member States voted in favour by consensus on the draft Regulation (EU) 2024/3084 on 26 November 2024 during the examination procedure. The Information System is an independent module of the TRACES platform 5 established by Regulation (EU) 2017/625 6 . The Commission has put in place the necessary measures to ensure the security and integrity of personal data processed, including appropriate data access control and a security plan. The hosting service is provided as part of a framework contract of the Commission with specific guidelines to that effect, and a full contingent of technical measures are put in place as part of the infrastructure layer to ensure full security compliance of all hosted systems. The Commission follows strictly Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2017/46 7 and the related implementing decisions and guidelines that are defining its functionality. 1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3084 of 4 December 2024 on the functioning of the information system pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation, OJ L, 2024/3084, 6.12.2024. 2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88. 3 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC, OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39–98. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/about/departments-and-executive-agencies/data-protection-officer_en 5 https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal-topics/traces_en 6 Regulation (EU) 2017/625 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on official controls and other official activities performed to ensure the application of food and feed law, rules on animal health and welfare, plant health and plant protection products, amending Regulations (EC) No 999/2001, (EC) No 396/2005, (EC) No 1069/2009, (EC) No 1107/2009, (EU) No 1151/2012, (EU) No 652/2014, (EU) 2016/429 and (EU) 2016/2031 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulations (EC) No 1/2005 and (EC) No 1099/2009 and Council Directives 98/58/EC, 1999/74/EC, 2007/43/EC, 2008/119/EC and 2008/120/EC, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 854/2004 and (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Directives 89/608/EEC, 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC, 91/496/EEC, 96/23/EC, 96/93/EC and 97/78/EC and Council Decision 92/438/EEC (Official Controls Regulation), OJ L 95, 7.4.2017, p. 1–142. 7 Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2017/46 of 10 January 2017 on the security of communication and information systems in the European Commission, C/2016/8998, OJ L 6, 11.1.2017, p. 40–51.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU · Trade impact on forests
• 2025-02-18 “E-000736/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The statement referred to by the Honourable Member is based on the Commission’s assessment of the parameters of the formula calculating the remuneration of the beneficiary under the electricity purchase contract. The contract, in addition to providing revenue stability and limiting overcompensation, also ensures appropriate financial incentives to reduce production and plan maintenance when market prices are low and to increase production when market prices are high, within the boundaries of the technical flexibility potential of the nuclear power plant. Therefore, the Commission considers that the remuneration formula incentivises the power plant to use the available technical flexibility as efficiently as possible, reducing the distortive effect of the measure. For more details, please consult the Commission’s Decision 1 . The Commission did not conclude that limiting nuclear production in favour of renewables will lead to lower CO 2 overall emissions. The approved measure does not impose any limitation of such production. Where market conditions are such that prices are below marginal cost of production, the parameters of the formula calculating the remuneration of the beneficiary can create incentives to temporarily reduce output. For existing nuclear plants, periods of low demand and high renewable production have already resulted in operators voluntarily choosing to temporarily reduce nuclear output. This is a consequence of market operators being exposed to efficient price signals. The Commission cannot comment on the content or the identity of parties of the discussions concerning the State aid case on state support for the construction of the Dukovany II nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic (SA.58207). In the interest of transparency and legal certainty, the Commission has made public all relevant information in the State aid decision. 1 SA.58207 - Support for Dukovany II, a new nuclear power plant in Czechia https://competitioncases.ec.europa.eu/cases/SA.58207”
  Nuclear energy · Energy transition (state support)
• 2025-02-14 “E-000696/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission Regulation (EU) No 609/2013 1 regulates a limited number of categories of food that constitute a partial or sole source of nourishment for certain population groups and that are vital for the management of certain conditions and/or are essential to satisfy the nutritional requirements of certain clearly identified vulnerable population groups. Also, foods intended to replace the whole of the daily diet are covered as total diet replacement for weight control. Article 12 of that Regulation requires the Commission to analyse in a report, after consulting the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the necessity, if any, of special provisions for milk-based drinks and similar products intended for young children. The Report 2 , adopted by the Commission in 2016, concludes that there is no need for specific rules for this category of foods as the correct and complete application of existing measures of EU food law seems sufficient to adequately regulate the composition of young-child formulae and the communication on the characteristics of the products. In particular, the Report notes that there is no reported safety issue with regard to young-child formulae and refers to EFSA's opinion 3 whereby these products have ‘no unique role’ and ‘cannot be considered as a necessity to satisfy the nutritional requirements of young children’ when compared to other foods that may be included in their normal diet. In light of the Better Regulation principles and the rules on the internal market, the Commission does not intend to propose the adoption of specific rules on young-child formula. 1 Regulation (EU) No 609/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on food intended for infants and young children, food for special medical purposes, and total diet replacement for weight control and repealing Council Directive 92/52/EEC, Commission Directives 96/8/EC, 1999/21/EC, 2006/125/EC and 2006/141/EC, Directive 2009/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Regulations (EC) No 41/2009 and (EC) No 953/2009, OJ L 181, 29.6.2013, p. 35. 2 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on young child formulae, COM(2016) 169 final. 3 Scientific Opinion on nutrient requirements and dietary intakes of infants and young children in the European Union, https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/3408”
  Nutrition · Food labelling harmonisation at EU level
• 2025-02-14 “E-000695/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The 2024 Financial Regulation includes a clear definition of professional conflicting interests 1 , a formal obligation for authorising officers to verify the absence of professional conflicting interests before the award of a contract 2 and an explicit ground for rejection of economic operators (tenderers, subcontractors, other entities providing support) from public procurement procedures in such cases 3 . Any economic operator must submit a declaration on honour stating the absence of professional conflicting interests and provide relevant information when required 4 . The related Procurement Vademecum 5 , established by the Commission provides guidance on how to draft tender specifications and evaluate professional conflicting interests, including how to reject tenders where professional conflicting interests would affect the performance of the contract in an independent, impartial and objective manner. A new Guidance 6 defines the activities that should not be outsourced in the first place. It requires a careful scrutiny from authorising officers, including on potential professional conflicting interest before any outsourcing. For contracts requiring the utmost impartiality for the contractor, the templates provided to authorising officers in the Commission foresee the possibility to request additional information from an economic operator, in order to prevent any professional conflicting interests, including on the group of the tenderer, any subsidies received or other contracts in the field of the call for tenders or with any EU Institutions 7 . In addition, training for staff highlights the importance of correctly assessing any professional conflicting interests and provides tools to early detect and exclude tenderers proved to be in such a conflict. 1 Article 2(56) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast) (hereinafter ‘Financial Regulation’), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, defines ‘professional conflicting interests’ as a situation in which the previous or ongoing professional activities of an economic operator affect or risk affecting its capacity to perform a contract in an independent, impartial and objective manner: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj 2 Article 170 (1) (c) of the Financial Regulation http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj 3 Article 143(1)d of the Financial Regulation http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj 4 Point 18.4 of Annex I of the Financial Regulation http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj 5 https://eceuropaeu.sharepoint.com/sites/budgpedia/procurementDocuments/vademecum-public-procurementen.pdf 6 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/guidance-fundingdev-impl-monit-enforce-of-eu-law_en.pdf 7 https://eceuropaeu.sharepoint.com/sites/budgpedia/procurementDocuments/vademecum-public-procurementen.pdf”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-02-13 “E-000684/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission In line with the commitment in the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy 1 , the Commission is working on the revision of the Roadworthiness Package, comprising three Directives: the periodic technical inspection (PTI) of motor vehicles (2014/45/EU) 2 , the technical roadside inspection of heavy commercial vehicles (2014/47/EU) 3 , and vehicle registration documents (1999/37/EC amended by 2014/46/EU) 4 . The 2014 PTI Directive stipulates (in Article 4(1)) that responsibility for carrying out roadworthiness tests is a matter for the Member State of registration of the vehicles. This explains why insurance providers may not recognise roadworthiness certificates issued outside the Member State of registration. However, Article 8(3) provides for mutual recognition of a roadworthiness certificate in the case of re-registration of a vehicle already registered in another Member State. In addition, Article 10(3) provides that each Member State shall recognise proof a roadworthiness test provided by a testing centre or competent authority of another Member State for the purpose of free circulation. Revision of the Roadworthiness Package is a clear priority for the Commission. Possible measures on the recognition of technical inspections carried out in another Member State were assessed. Work is at a very advanced stage, and it is expected that proposals will be adopted in the coming weeks. 1 https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/eu-mobility-transport-achievements-2019-2024/sustainablesmart-mobility_en 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/45/oj/eng 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/47/oj/eng 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0046”
  Regulation of vehicles insurance · EU transport infrastructure integration
• 2025-01-29 “E-000393/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Territorial supply constraints can impede the good functioning of the Single Market to the detriment of consumers. They facilitate the maintenance of unjustified price differences between geographical markets in the EU for many products, including daily consumer goods. Competition law is an effective tool to fight territorial supply constraints if these are imposed unilaterally by companies that are in a dominant position or if they result from anticompetitive agreements between companies. This was demonstrated in the AB InBev and in Mondelez cases 1 where the Commission fined these companies for hindering the cross-border trade of certain products. However, territorial supply constraints may also occur outside these conditions. For those territorial supply constraints which are not captured by competition law, the Commission has launched a fact-finding exercise with the Member States to map their occurrence across the EU. In addition, as announced in the Retail Transition Pathway 2 , the Commission will organise on 7 April 2025, a stakeholder dialogue with retailers, manufacturers and consumers to hear their views. Against this background, the Commission will identify in the Single Market Strategy to be adopted at the end of May 2025 a way forward so that European consumers can enjoy the benefits of the Single Market, no matter where they reside. 1 https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/AT.40632. (regarding Mondelez), and https://competitioncases.ec.europa.eu/cases/AT.40134 (regarding AB InBev). 2 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/transition-pathways_en”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · EU Competition policy
• 2024-12-11 “E-002860/2024 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission Regarding the activities alleged in the corresponding press reports, the Commission cannot comment on operational security matters. However, it must be stressed that the Commission remains committed to protecting Commission information, staff and networks from illicit intelligence-gathering actions. There is also a strong cooperation with the other EU institutions and Member States, which are equally targeted by espionage threat actors. Under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union 1 , the Commission is bound to assist any staff member under its authority, in particular in proceedings against any person perpetrating threats, insulting or defamatory acts or utterances, or any attack to person or property to which the staff member or a member of his family is subjected by reason of his position or duties. In addition, the Commission’s competent services consistently reinforce the resilience of staff of all grades, functions and places of employment through extensive awareness-raising campaigns on various security and safety issues. More specifically, with respect to human and digital espionage, the Commission systematically organises dedicated security briefings to inform staff members that they may be the targets of intelligence-gathering attempts, both in their professional and their private life, including during their travels. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20240701”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware · Rule of law in Hungary · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2024-12-06 “E-002808/2024 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Draghi report recognises the merits of the EU pharmaceutical reform 1 as it envisages a ‘modern and simplified regulatory framework with faster authorisation of new medicines’ 2 . The report highlights elements such as simplification of the framework, speed of procedures, enabling the use of digitalisation and Artificial Intelligence, a conducive Research & Development (R&D) investment environment. The proposed reform will reduce administrative burden for medicine developers and authorities and make the framework simpler and future-proof. The reform also proposes increasing the speed and efficiency of the processes while maintaining high standards for quality and safety of medicines in the EU. 2. The Commission fully shares the Draghi report’s finding in relation to the intellectual property in the pharmaceutical sector. The report points out that ‘given the long development times of medicines, stability in the incentives offered by this framework is needed. At the same time, pharmaceutical markets are dynamic, driven by scientific developments. Their competitive functioning evolves in parallel, implying that future changes to this framework are likely.’ The Commission is following the discussions in the European Parliament and the Council, which will facilitate the agreement in this spirit. The future pharmaceutical legislation should support the creation of a new European health industry that is globally competitive and puts patients always in the centre. 1 https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/pharmaceutical-strategy-europe/reform-eu-pharmaceuticallegislation_en 2 The future of European competitiveness, In-depth analysis and recommendations (Sept. 2024), pg. 195.”
  GMOs
• 2024-11-20 “E-002604/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has always welcomed cooperation with Mongolia in the area of critical raw materials. A testimony to that are the multiple invitations the Commission has extended to Mongolia to join multilateral cooperation initiatives led by the EU such as the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) Forum in 2024. Mongolia has so far opted not to be a formal member of the MSP Forum. Nevertheless, the Commission remains open to partnering with Mongolia in critical raw materials, as well as in any other trade-related area. In this context, cooperation on critical raw materials is a subject often discussed at the meetings of the EU-Mongolia Subcommittee on Trade and Investment.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Trade relations with China
• 2024-11-20 “E-002605/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a robust policy in place to monitor and evaluate projects and programmes implemented under its financial support. Independent final evaluations provide information on the results and impact reached and help to inform EU’s programming. They notably systematically include cross-cutting themes of human rights and gender. The specific support to the Palestinian Authority (PA) channelled through PEGASE mechanism 1 directly benefits thousands of civil servants and vulnerable families by contributing to the payment of salaries, pensions and social allowances. Selection of beneficiaries follows a strict safeguard mechanism through ex-ante and ex-post screening. Within the framework of the EU’s cooperation with Palestine * for the period 2014-2021, for a total amount of EUR 2.4 billion, the EU’s strategy has been aligned with the needs of the most vulnerable Palestinian populations and has played a key role in support to the PA to provide basic services to end beneficiaries. Gender equality is a cross-cutting issue within the five pillars of the European Joint Strategy in support to Palestine 2021-2024 2 . The Joint Strategy implementation report for 2022-2023 3 showed progress in improving gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls through the PA gender transformative agenda, the fight against gender-based violence and the promotion of economic, labour and social rights. It noted challenges in achieving comprehensive gender equality, aggravated by the current conflict. The EU Gender Action Plan III for the period 2021-2025 is under implementation in Palestine 4 . 1 ‘Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d’Aide Socio-économique’ launched in 2008. * This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue. 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gazastrip/european-joint-strategy-support-palestine-2021-2024_en?s=206. 3 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EJS%20Implementation%20Report_2022%202 023.pdf. 4 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/eugender-action-plan-iii-country-level-implementation-plan-west-bank-and-gaza-2021-2025_en?s=206.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2024-11-07 “E-002470/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission Recommendation 1 on integrated child protection systems is a key deliverable of the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child and calls on Member States to develop data management methodologies to improve the availability and comparability of data related to child protection through research with the involvement of professionals, public authorities, civil society, families, care givers and children themselves 2 with the necessary procedural safeguards and data protection measures in place. The Recommendation invites Member States to engage in research on violence against children and integrated child protection systems. For the available data to be child-specific, research should also include, in a safe manner, children’s views. Measures and evidence generated on models for child protection should comply with the principle of subsidiarity and Member States are encouraged to develop and implement plans to improve the quality of their data and to actively share good practices, through the work of the EU Network for Children’s Rights. Eurostat operates as the EU’s statistical authority in the harmonisation of statistics in close cooperation with national statistical authorities. Eurostat collects data on social protection expenditure 3 for family/children benefits, where benefits cover, among others, shelter and board provided to children and families in a permanent basis such as nursing homes and foster families. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401238 2 In accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016). 3 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/social-protection”
  EU competences on social policies · Support for families
• 2024-11-07 “E-002468/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Since the adoption of the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox 1 , the Commission is working closely with Member States within the Network and Information Systems Cooperation Group 2 on the implementation of the toolbox to promote further alignment of national approaches. This includes regular exchanges of information and best practices on all toolbox measures, including on assessing the risk profile of suppliers and applying restrictions or exclusions on high-risk suppliers in the critical and highly sensitive parts of the network. In its Communication on the 5G Toolbox from June 2023 3 , the Commission assessed that Huawei and ZTE represent materially higher risks than other 5G suppliers. It urged Member States to accelerate their efforts and in particular to put in place as soon as possible restrictions on high-risk suppliers as necessary. The Commission considers that the current situation with regards to the 5G Toolbox implementation by Member States is not satisfactory. The second progress report on the 5G Toolbox implementation 4 from June 2023 highlighted that there is a clear risk of persisting dependency on high-risk suppliers in the internal market with potentially serious negative impacts on security for users and companies across the EU and the EU’s critical infrastructure. As emphasised also in the report by Mario Draghi 5 , further action is needed to avoid critical dependencies on single suppliers, de-risk the EU’s supply chain from high-risk suppliers and secure its critical infrastructure. In this regard, the Commission is analysing options to work with Member States to enforce the 5G Toolbox and enhance the resilience of the internal market, including exploring possible legislative avenues. 1 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cybersecurity-5g-networks-eu-toolbox-risk-mitigating-measures 2 Group established by the Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the EU (NIS Directive). 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/communication-commission-implementation-5g-cybersecuritytoolbox 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/second-report-member-states-progress-implementing-eutoolbox-5g-cybersecurity 5 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-lookingahead_en”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · 5G
• 2024-10-14 “E-002061/2024 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission In its 11 th and 12 th sanctions packages 1 , the EU has adopted measures to address the circumvention risks posed by the shadow fleet, such as the monitoring of tanker sales to third countries. In June 2024, in the 14 th sanctions package, the EU introduced a port access ban and maritime services ban targeting specific vessels that contributed to Russia’s war against Ukraine, with 27 vessels listed so far. These measures increase the cost for Russia to use such vessels and also deter the vessels’ presence near Member States’ coastlines. Some vessels have changed names, flags, and ownership to hide their identities, but the EU continues to track them, noting that only a few have successfully reloaded oil. The EU is continuously analysing data and stands ready to take further action, with any additional listings requiring unanimous Council agreement. The Commission is also engaging with third countries to address circumvention risks, including through the EU Sanctions Envoy. On 24 September 2024, during the fourth Sanctions Coordinators Forum, discussions focused on strengthening enforcement of the oil price cap and targeting the shadow fleet 2 . The EU remains committed to working with the G7+ Oil Price Cap Coalition to prevent circumvention, including through enhanced enforcement, joint outreach and additional sanctions. In parallel, the Commission, together with the European Maritime Safety Agency, cooperates with Member States to address the maritime safety and environmental risks posed by the shadow fleet. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russiasmilitary-aggression-against-ukraine_en 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/statement-fourth-sanctions-coordinators-forum-2024-09-24_en”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2024-10-14 “E-002052/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has been providing life-saving services in Gaza and across the region in line with the mandate adopted by the UN General Assembly 1 . The European Council reaffirmed repeatedly that these services were essential 2 . Following the very serious allegations against several UNRWA staff regarding their possible involvement in the 7 October 2023 terrorist attacks, the Commission reviewed its funding decision for UNRWA. The Commission has engaged with UNRWA’s Commissioner General and welcomed his commitment to tackle the serious issues at stake, including through the adoption of an Action Plan to implement the recommendations of the Independent Review Group (IRG) 3 , and the swift follow up on the UN Office of Internal Oversight Service report on the allegations against UNRWA’s staff 4 . Upon fulfilment by UNRWA of the conditions agreed for the 2024 EU funding, the Commission disbursed in three tranches a total of EUR 82 million, the last of which in October 2024. Additionally, a top-up of EUR 10 million was disbursed on 20 December 2024, following progress by the Agency on the implementation of the recommendations of the IRG and of the EU system Audit. In accordance with the Financial Regulation 5 , all relevant agreements concluded with recipients of EU funds include tools to ensure the sound financial management of the EU budget. Entities implementing EU funds also need to comply with EU restrictive measures 6 . Furthermore, as a follow up of the review of funding to Palestine 7 , some of safeguards have been further reinforced 8 . There is no role for the EU Agency for asylum - which assists Member States in applying laws related to asylum, international protection and reception conditions - in providing support to refugees from Palestine. 1 https://www.unrwa.org/content/general-assembly-resolution-302 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/70880/euco-conclusions-2122032024.pdf; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 3 https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/colonna-report-and-action-plan 4 https://www.un.org/unispal/document/unrwa-investigation-statement-05aug24/ 5 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024. 6 Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 7 This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue. 8 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/202311/Communication%20to%20the%20Commission%20on%20the%20review%20of%20ongoing%20financial%2 0assistance%20for%20Palestine.pdf”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2024-09-30 “E-001883/2024 Answer given by Ms McGuinness on behalf of the European Commission The Commission assesses the implementation of Anti-Money Laundering Directives and has taken enforcement action as set out in the report on the application of Directive (EU) 2015/849 1 . Anti-money laundering reforms will bring about more consistent implementation and supervision as of July 2027 and the new EU Anti-Money Laundering Authority will ensure high supervisory standards across the Union 2 . The requirements of obliged entities have been harmonised through a Regulation and the scope of legal privilege when reporting suspicions has been clarified 3 . The new Directive requires self-regulatory bodies that supervise legal professionals’ compliance to be adequately empowered and requires such supervision to be overseen by a public authority 4 . The Victims’ Rights Directive 5 ensures that victims of crime, including financial crime, receive appropriate information, support and protection and can participate in criminal proceedings. The Commission has scrutinised the transposition of this Directive and has confirmed that all essential elements have been transposed. A proposal to strengthen the Victims’ Rights Directive and improve victims’ ability to rely on their rights under this Directive is currently being negotiated by the co-legislators 6 . Without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, Member States are responsible for enforcing the application of EU law. In principle, the Commission intervenes only in cases of systemic failures or a general practice violating EU law. The Commission and Member States respect the principles of judicial independence and legal professional privilege. The Commission does, however, promote judicial training to ensure the coherent application of EU law 7 . 1 COM(2024) 112 final and SWD(2024) 50 final. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1620, OJ L, 2024/1620, 19.6.2024. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, OJ L, 2024/1624, 19.6.2024. 4 Directive (EU) 2024/1640, OJ L, 2024/1640, 19.6.2024. 5 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57. 6 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, COM/2023/424 final. 7 For further details see Justice Programme 2021-2027 available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/opportunities/portal/screen/programmes/just2027”
  Anti-money laundering regulation · EU policy on victims' compensation rights · EU policy on criminal justice
• 2024-09-27 “E-001860/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 1. The carbon price in the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) is not regulated by the Commission but determined by the market. However, the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) provides stability by balancing supply and demand in accordance with pre-determined rules. If the market is over-supplied, some allowances are withheld from circulation. If there are too few allowances, the MSR injects allowances back into the market. The ETS Directive 1 also contains a mechanism to address excessive price fluctuations. 2. Installations in sectors at risk of carbon leakage benefit from free allocation of allowances. In some sectors that will gradually be replaced by the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) from 2026, which will put a price on imports similar to the EU ETS price. Businesses can also benefit from the use of EU ETS revenues. The Innovation Fund, Modernisation Fund and the future Social Climate Fund are expected to provide at least EUR 160 billion to support projects and measures in all Member States. In addition, Member States are able to spend their EU ETS auction revenues to support firms’ decarbonisation, including in the form of aid to electro-intensive industries for indirect carbon costs in their electricity consumption. 3. Insights on expected price developments are provided by several independent carbon market analysts. The Commission itself does not provide such commentary as this would impact price and interfere with price formation in the market. However, the Commission reports regularly on the European carbon market as foreseen in EU legislation. This includes publishing the Total Number of Allowances in Circulation (TNAC) every year, which determines the amount of allowances to be added to or withdrawn from the MSR. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02003L0087-20240301”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-09-23 “E-001780/2024 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1. The provisionally agreed Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation strives for maximum harmonisation across the EU, focusing on increasing the sustainability and circularity of packaging, while leaving certain areas for Member States to adapt to national systems. For example, the Regulation provides for harmonised packaging labelling to improve consumer sorting, EU criteria for assessing recyclability based on a standardised design-for-recycling approach, and common rules on deposit and return systems for plastic bottles and cans. 2. The Regulation harmonises criteria for eco-modulation of fees under extended producer responsibility (EPR) schemes and streamlines national registration rules, reducing differences across Member States. It requires Member States to establish linked producer registers across the EU to simplify registration, reduce burdens and improve compliance for businesses selling packaging across the EU. The Regulation does harmonise EPR registration throughout the EU and introduces a system based on authorised representatives for fulfilling EPR obligations in Member States other than those where the producer is established, which is the case for other waste streams as well. 3. The requirements laid down in the Regulation take due account of the specificities of small and medium-sized enterprises, especially micro-enterprises. In addition, Article 44(8) provides that producers who have placed on the market less than ten tonnes of packaging in a given year, or their EPR representatives, can submit a simplified set of information to the authority responsible for the register, as outlined in Annex IX to the Regulation.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · Circular economy · Overall simplification of regulation in the EU (free access)
• 2024-09-12 “E-001689/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) 1 , adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, includes several provisions to cater for the particular needs of small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs). All SME operators are exempted from annual reporting obligations and are subject to lighter requirements in terms of risk mitigation. In addition, SME downstream operators are to collect only limited information on traceability of operators in their supply chains and they do not need to exercise due diligence and do not need to file due diligence statements for products that have been subject to due diligence further up the supply chain. Contrary to non-SME traders, SME traders do not need to check or submit due diligence statements for products that have been subject to due diligence before that up in the supply chain. 2. The Commission has presented a comprehensive package to support the implementation of the EU Deforestation Regulation, including the proposal of a 12-month phasing-in period to allow companies more time to prepare 2 . If the one-year extension is approved by the European Parliament and the Council, the obligations laid down in EUDR requirements will apply from 30 December 2025 for medium and large companies, and from 30 June 2026 for micro and small enterprises. 3. Most European businesses are SMEs, they provide jobs to more than 85 million European citizens and are at the heart of innovation and entrepreneurship, central to Europe’s competitiveness. The Commission is committed to supporting enterprises from the moment they start - throughout their lifetime. As stated above, the EUDR has specific clauses that cater to the needs of SMEs. 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010, OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 206–247. 2 https://green-business.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-regulation-amending-deforestation-regulationregards-date-application_en”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-09-02 “E-001594/2024 Answer given by Mr Reynders on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not have law enforcement powers in criminal matters, but the power to initiate infringement proceedings where it considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under EU law. The Commission understands that a judicial inquiry into the case referred to by the Honourable Member has been launched at national level but does not comment on such ongoing investigations. The General Data Protection Regulation 1 provides that controllers such as national authorities issuing identity or residence documents must ensure that personal data are not used for unlawful purposes. Amongst others, a controller must implement appropriate internal procedures and take data security measures. Member States have a primary responsibility to monitor the application of the relevant legal provisions and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. Enforcement of data protection rules lies, in principle, with the national data protection authorities and courts. Through the annual Rule of Law report, the Commission examines developments across all Member States, both positive and negative, in the justice system, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism and freedom, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1.”
  Rule of law in Malta · Electronic identity
• 2024-08-09 “E-001505/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 1. The rights of persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air are set out in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006 1 . In November 2023 the Commission adopted a legislative proposal 2 to review the passenger’s rights legislation, including this Regulation. The main aim of the proposal is to make it easier for such passengers to exercise their rights as they often do not fully benefit from their rights due to the shortcomings in the application of the legislation. 2. The Regulation establishes that assistance provided at airports shall, as far as possible, be appropriate to the needs of the passenger 3 . The Commission considers that the best assistance is to allow the use of personal wheelchairs to the greatest extent possible as they provide the greatest possible comfort and scope for maximum mobility, in particular when the airport’s wheelchairs are not suitable for their specific needs. The Commission recognises this as a best practice in its revised interpretative guidelines 4 according to which airports should allow passengers to use their own wheelchair until they board the aircraft and to receive it immediately after disembarking 5 . However, in order to comply with security rules or the handling procedures to ensure the safe loading of the wheelchair into the aircraft’s cargo compartment, passengers might still be required to hand over their wheelchair at the check in or at the boarding gate. 1 Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 concerning the rights of disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air (OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, p. 1). 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A753%3AFIN 3 See Article 7(7) of the Regulation. 4 The Commission approved the English language text of the revised interpretative guidelines on 25 September 2024 (see section 6.4 of C/2024/6546, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AC_202405687). 5 The interpretative guidelines also state that passengers should, where practicable, taking into account safetyrelated handling procedures, should receive back their own mobility equipment immediately after disembarking and should not be obliged to retrieve it at the baggage hall.”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• 2024-07-16 “E-001363/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission ArcelorMittal decided to sell the Ostrava plant, which the Commission approved subject to conditions. These included that the purchaser had to have an option to obtain ArcelorMittal’s stake in the energy supplier of the said plant, i.e. TAMEH and that ArcelorMittal would transfer the energy supply agreement to the purchaser. ArcelorMittal selected Liberty House Group as a purchaser and transferred the energy supply agreement with TAMEH to it. At the time it was not possible to foresee the issues that would arise, including negative repercussions on employment. The financial troubles of Liberty House Group’s main lender Greensill Capital materialised in 2021, about two years after the Commission’s approval decision 1 . The Commission is aware of Liberty House Group’s financial situation and continues to monitor it. Moreover, the Commission approved the appointment of a trustee to monitor ArcelorMittal’s compliance specifically with the commitments attached to the Commission's approval decision. The Commission continues to monitor the situation with a view to verifying that the parties comply with their respective binding obligations set out in the Commission’s decision concerning the approval of ArcelorMittal’s acquisition of Ilva and the approval of Liberty House Group as suitable purchaser of the divestment business. The failure to comply with a condition or an obligation imposed by a decision approving a merger subject to commitments may result in the imposition of fines. 1 The Commission’s assessment of the Liberty House Group as a purchaser is available in the Commission's public case register: https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/M.8444”
  EU Competition policy · EU policy on forced redundancies
• 2024-07-16 “E-001362/2024 Answer given by Mr Reynders on behalf of the European Commission A key element of the Commission’s actions to fight online disinformation is the renewed EU Code of Practice on Disinformation 1 , which is in the process of becoming integrated as a Code of Conduct under the Digital Services Act 2 . More information about the Code implementation is available on the Code’s Transparency Centre website 3 . The recently adopted Political Advertising Regulation 4 provides for legally binding measures to deter information manipulation, disinformation, and interference, through the disclosure of the political nature of advertising, the identity of its sponsors, the entities financing it and the public or private origin of the funds used. As part of the Defence of Democracy package, the Commission also put forward a Recommendation on inclusive and resilient elections 5 , which promotes democratic participation of all groups, including Roma, and seeks to build resilience and develop public awareness, media literacy and critical thinking to address information manipulation, interference and disinformation related to elections. Under the new European Democracy Shield announced by the Political Guidelines for the Commission 2024-2029, the Commission and the High Representative will work to counter foreign information manipulation and interference online. A strong focus will be put on societal resilience and preparedness, through increased digital and media literacy, and boosting prevention through pre-bunking. 1 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1–102. 3 https://disinfocode.eu/ 4 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024. 5 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 of 12 December 2023 on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament, C/2023/8626, OJ L, 2023/2829, 20.12.2023.”
  Engagement of Romani communities in Europe · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• “Yes. Perfect. Madam chair, everyone is tired also. I will tell you only one joke. So what? I have it. Only two people on the planet had it 10,000 likes on his profile one hour before their publish any any photo. And it was Chuck Norris. He dies and it was Viktor Orban. Also his still are still surviving. But it was thanks to to Russian propaganda and me as a former former person who was engaged in in the cyber security of the Czech Republic, I have to say that we were follow every time the the troll farms in Hungary and it. It is the school for everyone from Europe. How failed the state. If you have it, close cooperation with GRU agent. If the people from GRU follow Prime Minister on the all meetings and we have it clear evidence that Russian were presented everywhere last half year in in in Hungary that mean that we are losing democracy and our sovereignty. And at the end, I would like to thank openly JD Vance, to tell that EU is traitor. Thanks to JD Vance to for support for support of Viktor Orban, because he helped him to fall down because only two interferes in the Hungarian election were from the Russian and from the US. Also thanks to us, Mr. Trump. Mr. JD Vance that you are helping us to put down any other dictator. Also, I think it's a very good message after the Maduro he put down also the Auburn. Also, JD Vance is my star.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Thank you. Chair. Your pronunciation is great. I think much more better than my Romanian language. Also, I would like to thank you for this report and for the opportunity to talk. Sorry that I was a little bit late because I am also coordinator in Budgetary Control Committee and we were discussing very important issue linked with our reforms in EU. And I would like to say that this report what we can have it here and we can discuss it. It's excellent. And give us exactly that. Uh, the argues what we needed. Clear data and full pictures of the threat. But let me be very direct. The problem today is not lack of knowledge. Problem today is any action in European Union. And this is what we discussed in us. We know who is behind this operation. It's Russia, China, Iran, etc. we know how they work. We know what they target. And yet our response is still so slow and too fragmented. Also the gap between analysis and real reaction is becoming a serious weakness for the European Union. And I was also surprised by one things in a 40 page report. The EU Democracy Shield is mentioned two times. So my question is how do you see that EU democracy shield working in practice? And second question, more important is how will it make sure that it's real coordination and data sharing with existing EU institutions and member states? Because if we don't move from analysis to the action, even the best reports will not protect our democracy. And we saw it in Hungary. It's concrete example, and this is the things what we need to discuss here today, and the Democracy Shield must not become a more bureaucracy. It should be a platform that connect connected what we already have. Share data in real time and helps the EU and member member states work together. And you see that Putin, through the mobile of my colleagues never stopped me again. No, I'm joking, but you look so seriously after my speech. Also, I would like to make very good atmosphere. Thank you very much for the atmosphere.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “I'm ready. I was only running between budget and budgetary control. There are no members of European Parliament present here. Also. Thank you very much, chair, for giving me the floor. And first, I would like to thank Daniel Freud for the work he has put into this report. It's visible that he put in a lot of efforts and his personal views and experience. For the EPP, the discharge is a cornerstone of democratic accountability. Also its essential tools to ensure the European funds and manage responsibility transparently and in line with common rules. It's an institutional and legal exercise that must respect the treaties, established procedures and the rule of each institution. Our approach is based on four basic priorities and principles. Our first priority is to secure legal content, content, and constitutional feasibility of discharge. This means that the decision must be grounded in the exercise legal framework and cannot anticipate or replace other procedures. Secondly, our position will follow the coordinators agreement on discharge from October, ensuring fairness and equitable treatment of the discharge. Our goal is to protect the credibility and unity of the European Union. Third, we will focus on sound financial management, audit findings and systematic improvements to ensure report a currency. And finally, transparency, control and oversight are essential, but they must be applied consistently, consistently and in a way that strengthens trust between institutions. With these principles in mind, we took and we are looking forward to negotiate ahead, to working constructively with colleagues to reach a balanced outcome that safeguards both democratic scrutiny and institutional stability. Thank you very much.”
  Discharge of EU institutions and agencies
• “Okay? Sorry, I didn't understand your pronunciation, but sometimes very sorry. Sometimes problems also. Don't worry about it. Dear colleagues, estimate guests, I would like to address the recent development in Hungary that my colleagues, Mr. Tarr, already mentioned. The proposed law is a direct attack to the press. Freedom and freedom of speech. According to the law, the organizations, the criticize the government are foreign agents. We know this from Russia and its foreign agent law. This is how a. Red is used to stop independent media in the civil society. We can say that there is a clear Russian non-democratic influence on EU member states. Legislation. So-called office for Sovereignty Protection would be able to investigate and find organizations that do not follow the new rules. The fines can be up to 25 times the amount of foreign money on organization has received. This law is not about protection. Protecting the country. It's about stopping opposition and independent media. As a member of European Union, we must defend democracy, freedom of speech and rule of law. Dear guests, dear colleagues, I would like to express three question. Do you see such tendencies in other EU countries? Do you see it? Is a Russian influence on interference on Hungarian legislation? It is anything to do to prevent this to happen in other countries. Thank you very much for responding.”
  Rule of law in Hungary
• “Dear chairman. The vice commissioner, every one criticize you for any reason, but I would like to congratulate you. I would like to tell you that you did an amazing job to bring Uzbekistan close to European Union. It is your success. And Kayla, you can celebrate it. This day is your day. And I have to say that if I am so successful like you in this case, to bring Central Europe, Europe, Central Asia to Europe. I will celebrate all the days because this is our goal, to take our partners closer to the European Union and through our open dialogue, to make our goals what we want to do. And Uzbekistan is a real partner and really trust me that I am so, so social intelligent. If I do not mind that you made an amazing world, I will not repeat it in plenary of the European Parliament. Thank you very much.”
  EU policy on Central Asia
• “Thank you very much. I think that in the response of the commission was my questions what I would like to speak about the flexibility because I felt there that the flexibility is not very good. Sometimes we are waiting. Long time for the money from the European Commission sometimes doesn't function very well. Uh, especially this fund. Uh, I know it from the Czech Republic. We were there with, uh, other committees. And to see how really on the Ukraine crisis was not able to send it in very quick time. The money. And I think that flexibility is key issue, especially in the crisis. Also, from my point of view, I really I'm very happy that the commission is speaking about changing, and I think that the reform is needed also for the future. I am looking forward for the cooperation, for the For the close cooperation, and I think that it's very important to use much more. The expert from Ieso. We have it very good agency. What is growing? What has it? A lot of expertise. And I am really looking forward to reform a little bit. This cooperation and this found to be integrated as a part of the Security or Defence Defence Fund for the future, which will be much more flexible to give it money and react to the crisis. Thank you very much for a very good report and for for a very good discussion.”
  Conditions to access EU budget
• “Yes. Dear Commissioner Brunner, I love your enthusiasm. When you are first time on on discharge, uh, especially the commission, because there is a lot of criticism. And you came here so open also, I hope so that your feeling after this first discharge procedure will be so positive as your enthusiasm at the beginning. But my questions are much more linked to concrete things and I cannot here promote good cooperation between your DGs and between our political group EPP. But, um, my question are strictly linked to the frauds and to the to the financial control. Also, DG home manage over 4.5 billion annually with, uh, multi-level implementation and delegate management. Given Olaf's, uh, continuing investigation into irregularities in Amif and BMV funds. How will you ensure that the new internal control strategy prevents fraud and double funding across shared management schemes? And will the commission reinforce ex-ante checks Uh or uh, more in post-payment audits about Cepol and Europol. You know, our position as EPP. I think that, uh, that it's not possible to have it here.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• “It's a guest. I would like to first thank you very much for your, uh, for your efforts and for everything what you said. Uh, I totally agree with everything what we heard here. I think that it's really very important to have it here. Very open discussion about how China influence us, and we have had many experiences with our former, now former colleagues from AfD and his assistant. What were taking all the information from our meetings and send it to China? Also, it's quite really important to send a message that enough is enough. If you want to serve to China, go to China, but not be a member of European Parliament. And I have to be very clear, we have to we need to have it very clear roles. And really, for all the spying people, for the Russian or for Chinese Iranis, you are not invited to be part of democratic society. We are talking about the risk. Also. The risk and potential risk is very huge also. This is why we ask the European Commission why we use Huawei. We know that China is paying us through the technologies, and we are still buying the Chinese technologies to our security equipment for security, our buildings, for security, our tools. Although it must be stopped, and I think it needs to have a clear message. And before the EU-China agreement, we have to say that we have a respect to each other, but only we have respect to people who respect us. If China doesn't respect us, if China is paying us, if China is supporting all undemocratic movements against us, we don't want to cooperate. Only two questions how can EU made sure Chinese products meet our safety and cyber security rules before they reach consumers. My first question and second question and should the EU use trade defence tools when China ignore these rules and put our citizens and risk? Thank you very much for the response.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Sorry Madam Chair that I'm a little bit late but we have a very important hearing about next EPP or a boss also it was very important my presence there as a coordinator but I will switch to the Czech language and I will give you my overview ever about this report if is it possible good morning. Madam Chair colleagues first of all is it okay can you see can you hear the interpretation is it okay okay so I think I would like to speak Czech. So first of all let me thank the Commission for this proposal which recognizes the space as a strategic space for Europe as a strategic thing for Europe. I would like to thank also Mister Francois Calfon for his excellent work and let me underline the word excellent. The opinion is a very strong one. We would like to streamline everything. We would like to have a level playing field. We would like to deal with especially producers from third countries and we would like to have a one stop shop. These are priorities also for the EPP and we have always defended these priorities. We cannot add more complexities. We need to decrease the administrative burden. We need to cut the red tape especially small and medium enterprises and startups are fighting in a very competitive atmosphere so they need a very good system that would be that will be predictable and also friendly for businesses. We need clear definitions and we also need clean things that belongs to ESA to ESA and we also need to talk what is still in the competence of national states because unclear definitions can bring legal uncertainty and it can also undermine our competitiveness. We need a new space act that would focus not only on operators but also on services. We need to have a very strong internal market for space activities in Europe. We don't need a burdensome system. At the same time Europe must protect its data. Our satellites are a part of our critical infrastructure that's clear from the war in Ukraine. We need to protect our data and the data must be also resilient and protected against our enemies. Another point is the protection of consumers and cybersecurity. This is very important so that there is enough trust in the space ecosystem. Now regarding the competition there must be fair and equal conditions with operators from the third countries. Let me elaborate on that if we open our market that doesn't that can't be bad for our market and also equivalents must be also temporary. We need deadlines and we need streamlined procedures and it's it is not possible to have twenty seven legislation or regulation systems. We have also listened to the concerns of national parliaments and we took them into account. National parliaments have concerns about overlaps with MISTRO directive and they also talk about risks for national securities and we need to take into account these concerns. Last but not least Madam President Chair I would like to underline that if we want to pursue these objectives we need a strong organization but it already exists that's EUSPA. At the end let me also mention the environmental aspects in article twelve and that's all from my part. I would like to say that this act must be a new opportunity not a threat and I think that we have done a very good job. Thank you Pat.”
  EU competences on space policy
• “I have it some question and I came here with three questions, but I have it much more. The questions also. I don't know which you will respond or not, but, uh, let me tell you one of them. Uh, my question is the following. In your assessment, would you say that the number and quality of the reform, which the RF address is higher compared to the time when the RF didn't exist, or to put it over other views otherwise, do you think that RF address reform, which would have not been addressed in RF, uh, was not in place? Second question is another conclusion. Is that reform related to business environment phase delay, looking at the sample of the member states from the report. Would you say that the final target relating to the reforms in the business environment will be reached by the end of the implementation period. And last but not least, final question is, uh, because we are seeing that, uh, MFF proposal of the Commission want to replicate to a big extent to RF model. What would be your advice to the co-legislators for the upcoming period in order to ensure the reform and investment investments related to the business environment are adequately. Inserted and implemented in the National Regional Partnership plans. Thank you very much for your response.”
  Conditions to access EU budget
• “Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The success of the next EU anti racism strategy depends on how the money is spent. Too often the EU funds go to the projects. That looks good but nothing. I will give you one example from Slovakia from the Roma area. People in the 21st century don't have it. Clean water doesn't have it. Electricity? The children doesn't go to school. I don't speak about three, five, ten children. I speak about all the generation. We have it there more. 300,000 people are living in very bad condition and we plan as, as the EU that we will use the EU money for plant of the tree. Explain to me why that is not your support. We are wasting money and change new generation. I think that this strategy needs to include the clear rules on what project can get funding. Way to check if the project helps the people on the ground like Roma communities. Online tools to show where the money goes local level check to see real results and EU money must be tied to real impact, known as a paperwork. Also, my question for the commission is how you improve the check of the EU real goals and how you will check where the EU money are going. And from Member States, how you will check and look on the real impact in Member States, how they use the European money for your anti-racism strategy. Thank you very.”
  Engagement of Romani communities in Europe
• “Thank you. Chairman, I would like only ask you about the things today. We discussed the issue about disinformation last week. I was in Washington, DC and we discussed this issue with congressmen. And only one problem we don't want to establish any censorship. We would like only transparency of social media. Also, if you are fully transparent, you will high ranked for the discussion on the social media. I don't want that Russia will interfere in our democratic debate. I do not want to have it. Thousands and thousands of accounts on my social media from Russia. What are. Really? What are really I robots? Also, this is about that make it really. Social media transparent. Ban and stop this fake accounts. And this is the best. Response to all populists and to to all people who don't want any democratic debate.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “A dear colleague, thank you very much for your words. I have a question for you. Do you think that there should be a discussion that the discussion on social networks should be anonymous, giving space to troll farms and AI generated accounts? Should there be the option to flood politicians pages by this, or should this be verified by ID cards?”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for a very good pronunciation of my name. Uh, and really, there is a lot of improvement. But, uh, what you said before, colleagues, you are absolutely right. The anonymity is big threats, and, uh, I have it the same threats like you. I don't know what's happened with meta, with ex with others, that there is more and more robotics. Robotics accounts what are threatened? Me I didn't really play there any other game. I was in USA last week and it's quite interesting that in with under the photo from the white House, I had a lot of accounts what never had any followers, etc. and I managed the meeting with meta and we discussed if anonymity account has it the same strongness like account where you have it registered ID and you have it your photo and everything, and I think it's not time to make any censorship. It's time only say okay if you want to to discuss in on anonymity any account. You don't have the same rights as me. Who is there? Fully transparent.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Commissioner. Ladies and gentlemen. European democracy is under systematic pressure not only from foreign actors, but also due to irresponsible business models of very large online platforms. Let me mention one other topic. I will not react to the nonsense from Madam Andersson, who believes that we're introducing some kind of a totalitarian regime, which is not what we're doing. But I want to stress one thing. I want fair competition. Why is it that large platforms use the content of democratic media to enrich themselves, but the profits don't stay in Europe. The profits flow through Ireland somewhere into the US. This year. Well, is this fair? Can we continue? We could. But then let's tell each other. Let's agree. We will not have any media in Europe. We will only have content that will be regulated by these very large platforms. Right now we need to start thinking about changing that. If we let profits being generated using democratic content flow away somewhere into China, Russia or United States, then Europe will have a serious problem. We will have a very serious problem in that we will have no media freedom. Thank you, dear colleague.”
  EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
• “Thank you. Commissioner. The European democracy is not only under fire of drones from Russia, but also algorithms, troll farms and anonymous accounts. And we are pretending that anonymity on social media represents freedom. No, this is not freedom. This is a shield for perpetrators. Without a digital identity, we create a free space for those who. Um, masked by, uh, so-called democracy are trying to, uh, disband the democracy. A troll farms organized crime on the web. Uh, disinformation networks paid by Moscow, Tehran or Pekin? Yes. All of us believe that we know who is behind this. But none of you know anything. And you are now proposing a center whose task will be to coordinate and in this way, defend us against such disinformation. But I believe that no European center is going to solve anything. We have the data and information. We know who is behind this. We do not need another toothless European institution. What we need is to put our forces together and do something about the troll farms, cancel them, fight them, and search for efficient tools against troll farms. I think that we need to secure full transparency on social media. This is the recipe for a solution. Thank you.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Uh, do you think that, uh. We can prevent some systematic weakness and misuse, uh, or political capture before the countries joined the European Union and what we can do much more. Second question is how the Commission plan are planning to strengthen ex-ante and and expose controls, especially in regions with limited uh. Uh administrative capacity and, uh, fragile institutions and on link. Funding and um miserable reform in several accession countries. Process in governments and anti-corruption reform remains limited. This despite large EU financial support. Will the European Commission introduce. Stricter conditionality similar to RF model linked um disbursement and pre-accession found to verify verifiable milestone in rule of law and anti-fraud measures and about independency of national audit. Uh Um, audit authorities and institutions. We know it from some countries that really independence and professionalism is still very limited and it's influenced by government politicians. Do you see there what can be really our main goal in some countries we visited uh, also Albania and Montenegro, and we saw there some problems. And last but not least is the uh, question about, uh, cooperation with private sector. Also, Mr. Sekula, I have a question. Can the Commissioner elaborate how the global gateway will deepen, cooperate with the private sector in to deliver, uh, tangible, sustainable instrument outcomes? Thank you very much for your response.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. Colleagues. Democracy in Europe is threatened today more than ever before, physically as well as online. Russia finances extremist parties in Europe, which tell us who's an agent and who's not an agent. They spread Russian propaganda, carry out cyber attacks and misuse democracy to weaken the EU. China, meanwhile, delivers cheap technologies, invests in infrastructure and influences elections as well as the public debate, and this threatens the freedom of media and elections. In October, we will have elections in the Czech Republic. Social platforms have been threatened by trolls and spams. The solution is not censorship or control of the internet. We need informed democracy. We need to provide people with proven information and protect them from propaganda and lies.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Thank you very much for the political groups starting with EPP. Thomas. Thank you very much. I love this exchange of views about NRF because, uh, many of informations are every times new and uh, especially this report. I love it so much that today we have it 17 of, uh, November day of, Velvet Revolution, and I decided to come to the court and to hear how you will describe and explain what we are doing with this money. Also, this special report is not for me. The surprise. I would like to say that there is something new, but I feel that, uh, I heard today. Ivana. Dejavu. What? I had it many times when we are talking about RF, uh, and how we use this money for European, uh, for European people. And I think this special, uh, special report show us with many recommendations that, uh, sometimes the money are much more useless as useful. And I think that really we have something to do much more better because the trust to European people is. More and more. How to say? Fragile. Also, we need something to do with, uh, with this funds because, uh, without reform, I think that uh, is uh, will be for the, for the, for the future. The biggest problem of European Union. No, the biggest success from my point of view.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• “Like to ask the High Commissioner to delete all our private conversation on signal from the time when she was MEP. Uh, second things and all photos also. And second things. What I would like to tell you. This debate was every time about discharge and about the money. I am surprised that I hear to hear the second debate from the afet. Okay, I respect for respect. Everyone can say, but my question is my focus for the budget. In many in many countries we have it very good delegation, but we are using not European uh, European assets, especially cars are from the Japan or from other countries. Do you want to change it? And second things, how to provide much more security of our diplomats in very difficult countries? I will not specific the one of them, but many of them are very dangerous. And we have it here less security for our diplomats. And I think it needs a little bit much more changes.”
  Discharge of EU institutions and agencies
• “Thank you very much. Thank you for this very important discussion. I was followed this discussion from the beginning. In the car. I am after 18 hours of flight, but I think that this this discussion is so important that we have to really discuss this issue much more intensively because it's linked with our our money and our our credibility. Also fraud, irregularities and NGOs. Management is very important. I would like also ask executive Vice President Ribera. You responded the question, but I didn't hear. Could the commission clarify the what mechanisms are in place to prevent and detect potential irregularities or conflict of interest in section of implementation life projects, and what new anti-fraud safeguards or audit procedures have the Commission introduced in 2024 to straighten Member States capacity to detect, report and follow up the potential fraud cases in Common Agricultural policy and climate related programmes. And last but not least, is how does the Commission coordinate with Olaf and the European Public Prosecutor's Office in follow up the suspected cases of fraud or irregularities within the life programme? And to Commissioner Hoekstra, thank you very much for all your responses. Also, I understand that the Social Climate Fund will mobilise around 86 Billion and 82 costs to support most vulnerable households and SMEs, given large differences in energy poverty, income level and administrative capacity across member states. How will the Commission ensure that the fund is distributed and spend it in a truly fair way? And what concrete criteria will you use to assess whether national social climate plans target the most affected regions and groups, and prevent fund being diverted to general budget support? Thank you very much.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• “Thank you madam. Thank you madam chair. Thank you very much for this very, very interesting discussion. It's a pity that I don't have more time to really tell you much more about how huge influence and differences between Catholic Church and Orthodox Church because I studied theological faculty and with this knowledge you know that in Orthodox Church it's much more easy to manipulate with people who are part of them. But with respect of religious freedom we have to say that we don't want any foreign manipulation. If Orthodox Church systematically misuse religion, churches and all the buildings for the Russian operation in the Czech Republic, we have many examples in Karlovy Vary, in Prague and other cities. That's really, it's the base of Russian FSB. This is base of the Russian, this is the base of Russian operation in Central and Western Europe. You cannot be naive. I prepared my speech, wrong speech about that, that I have it questioned but I think that it's necessary to say openly Russia's model is other as ours and we are so stupid that we don't recognize that Russia totally misuses the Orthodox Church for the hybrid war and this is very important. This is very important to understand the mentality. Putin is coming to the church not because he's a religious person. He misuses religion to have people on his side and to continue with this war. Also my very important conclusion is people, if we won't win this hybrid war, we have to stop all the infiltration of our society through the religion, through the education or through NGOs what are coming and saying we would like to have freedom but we are not free. This is my opinion.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. Colleagues. Commissioner. I would say that your speech was brilliant. Only you forgot one aspect, and namely the Budgetary Control Committee, who tries that every single euro. From the. European taxpayer does not end up in oligarchs pockets, but in European projects. In our budgetary control committee, we have agreed that we need three mechanisms. First of all, the rule of law conditionality mechanism. This needs to be applied without hesitation. If there is no rule of law, we simply stop the inflow of European money. We also must be smarter in the fight against fraud. Tools such as Edis and Arachne must be compulsory. If you are not applying these tools, you are not receiving any money from the EU. And we need to say that the eppo, um, is in the front line of this fight and there must be no compromises. Thank you.”
  Conditions to access EU budget
• “What mercenaries are you talking about? You yourself have been supporting, uh, Russia and have been a mouthpiece of Iran. Uh, and the people you support haven't given any transparency about that. Do you know what Iran is trying to do here? Uh, are you aware of what they have been doing to try to influence decisions? And tell us a bit more about your contacts with the Russian ambassador? Maybe you can explain to us what the Communist Party in Czechia is doing.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “These two agencies would are divided also. Dg home uh supervises six included Europol and Cepol. In view of ongoing debates about effectivity and overlap in training and operational support. Are you are you considering merging cepol under Europol's administrative structure or introducing a joint governance model for law enforcement enforcement cooperation? And how would such, a consolidation effect, accountability, staffing and budgetary impotence independence in the both agencies. My proposal is to bring this to agencies together. It will help both of them. And last but not least, question is about implementation of the Migration and Asylum pact. Commissioner Bernard, in 2024 Annual Activity Report notes that the new Pact of Migration and Asylum entered into force in June 2024, and will apply from um middle 2026. Given the scale of administrative and IT investment required for for its implementation, particularly in a returned Turned asylum procedure and solidarity mechanism. How does DG home plan to ensure that the Member States have sufficient absorbed absorption capacity? And how will you guarantee that fund from MF and BMV are used effectively without creating new lawyers and bureaucracy or overlapping digital system? Thank you very much.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• “Thank you very much. I think it was discussed here many issues. I spent it last week in Washington, DC, and we openly discussed with meta what we will do with anonymous accounts, because what is threatening our democracy is AI generated content with anonymous account without any responsibility. And if someone treats me that he will kill me. I can survive. But if he someone threatens me that he will kill my children and he will have it. This I generic a generic context on the Facebook of my son who is 12 years old. It's huge difference. Although anonymous, it's a huge problem. And second problems. You are absolutely right. I don't want here someone who will really said what is it true? And who is what is it not true? I like my colleagues what are absolutely stupid and presented their stupidity on the social media. But I cannot ban it. But from my point of view, it's very important. Really? Really stop the anonymity. What it spreads stretched the democracy. I cannot read the Russian, Facebook and Russian view of everything. I can read normal people and interact with them.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• “(15:01:05 – 15:02:46): Thank you, mister chair. Thank you thank you, mister commissioner, and thank you, mister Ioannidis, for your presentation. I'm very happy that we can discuss it today because I think that immigration pact has to bring us the trust. This is most important between the country and citizens aspect better control of migration, a stronger identity checks, and less irregular movements across the European Union. But trust depend on the member states playing by the same rules. Today, we see serious problem in different parts of the European Union. In Malta, there are claims about the fake residence permits and identity documents. Another has decided to grant legal status to hundreds of thousands of migrants who previously had no legal status. This is the situation in Spain. And my question is simple. How can the pact achieve its goals if the same member states appear to be moving in the opposite direction? And does the commission believe that actions are in line with the objectives of the pact? And what concrete measures were taken, if national policies undermine trust in our common European migration systems? Thank you very much for your response.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Okay, Mr. Fitto, I will only tell you that, uh, sometimes from the amounts we pay ten times more than normally, you will pay it from from another fund, from the state subsidiaries. But I cannot repeat it. These cases, everybody can read it in the media. But please, one question. Why has the Commission not updated the guidelines to ensure full traceability of final recipient and mindful compliance checks, in line with the spirit of the regulation in the legislation intent? Second question is how does the Commission intend to strengthen performance monitoring under the RF insurer? The milestone achieves truly reflect economic and social results and are given to growing are readily reliant on milestone based district are. Bursement rather than cost based reimbursement. How does Commission ensure the reliability and auditable auditability of data reported by member states? And how can Parliament and ECA verify the funds are used efficiently, in line with the object of the facility? And about financing? I think you didn't response, but how the Commission ensure the SRF investment do not overlap the duplicate spending with cohesion policy funds because we saw it many cases. Where is it possible? And last but not least, Commissioner, the Court of Auditors found the Slovakia's control system under the SRF still suffers from fragmented responsibilities and limited risk based verification. How can the Commission guarantee that milestones and targets are verified on solid evidence rather than on paper, especially when the national authorities have not yet demonstrated effective fraud detection capacity? Thank you very much.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• “Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I think that really this is the most concrete presentation that we headed and what shows that we are under the attack, our democratic institution as European Parliament is under a huge attack of Russia, and Russia is really fighting against us. We have it here in some of groups. We know it, some of assistants which are very close linked with the with Russia, and they are really subject of investigation of our intelligences. And these assistants are systematically sharing the information from our democratic space and saying that we have to stop support of Ukraine. Ukraine is most corrupted country. Ukraine, uh, is stalling the places for our voters and how we act. We are only observing also. Now is the time and what Mr. Melnick presented. They are concrete facts. We know the structure, we He knows the people, everyone who has it. Google can find who is financing, who and who is behind who and who is real. Owner of many activities. Also through the Cyprus there is many operations through the Greece, through the Czechia. Concrete example, we can find many examples in Poland, many examples in Latvia, Estonia and now is the time to act. Colleagues, this is the wake up call for us. I know the Austrian Austrian intelligence is how they were infiltrated by Russian for long teams. They didn't have it. The highest protocol of the security. What has it all the intelligence in the Europe. And I think that really this is the wake up call for us here to do something more.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Thank you. You are talking about climate change. But can you improve the situation with more regulation? For years, we have found that we have more and more bureaucratic requirements imposed on us. And the result is absolutely nothing in real terms. We've got to achieve much more in terms of investment in projects which will really deliver the answer.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU