Juan Ignacio ZOIDO ÁLVAREZ

Policy topics Juan Ignacio ZOIDO ÁLVAREZ is active on

What Juan Ignacio ZOIDO ÁLVAREZ has said (27)

• 2026-06-17 “(10:49:18 – 10:50:27): Centuries before, BC, It was said that you had to, be cautious and balanced when cooking a fish. And we have to have balance when it comes to EU and China. We're not looking for a commercial war nor do we want to close our market. We want to have a stable and mutually beneficial relationship. But at the same time, we have to predict problems before they happen and prevent confusion. It's true that there are major imbalances in our economic relationship. Overcapacity, subsidies, critical dependencies which endanger our industry, and a lack of reciprocity, which is having a major impact on our businesses. These asymmetries are not sustainable. We want dialogue. Yes. We want cooperation. Yes. But we want fair rules and clear rules.”
  Trade relations with China
• 2026-06-15 “Thank you, president. 250 years ago, The US was born, But Washington and Jefferson were not alone. Together with them, there were thousands of Europeans, Bernardo Alves, the Marcus Marcus of Lafayette. 200 years later, we continue to work together, The US and Europeans. We've always been allies, partners, and friends. We share history, values, and a way of seeing the world in spite of our disputes. And there's no tweet or tariff that can do away with all of that. Now the agreement that we're about to ratify is not perfect, but it is necessary. There was too much at stake, over 1 and a half billion euros a year and 5,000,000 jobs in Europe. So Europe has done its its bit. We negotiated responsibly, and we have shown that we're a responsible partner. Now it's up to Washington. It's time for Washington to show that it looks to the future for to another 250 years of the European US alliance.”
  EU-US trade relations
• 2026-03-09 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question Directive (EU) 2022/2555 [1] aims to increase the cybersecurity of entities operating in 18 critical sectors, including public administration. Under this directive, Member States must ensure that certain public administration entities take cybersecurity risk-management measures and report significant incidents. This directive does not apply to public administration entities that carry out their activities in the areas of national security, public security, defence or law enforcement. In the current global threat landscape, cyberattacks disrupt critical infrastructure and economic stability. Robust cybersecurity is paramount and the transposition of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 a strategic imperative. Spain must urgently advance with the full transposition of this directive. An infringement procedure [2] has already been initiated by the Commission in this respect. The urgency of the transposition is not just about the obligation under the law; it is fundamental to reinforce the cyber standards of our critical infrastructure. The Commission remains fully committed to assisting Member States’ efforts and helping them overcome any challenges in the transposition process, while respecting the ongoing infringement processes concerning the Member States that have not yet notified full transposition of Directive (EU) 2022/2555. [1] Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80). [2] INFR(2024)0270 Lack of transposition of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union by Spain, source: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_25_982 (Section 8. Digital economy).”
  Privacy & law enforcement · Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2026-02-04 “E-000433/2026 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. In the absence of the independent accident investigation report, which is still under preparation and is going to be delivered by the Spanish investigation body for rail accidents (CIAF), the Commission has no information that would allow it to assume that the MadridSevilla high speed railway line has been insufficiently renovated or maintained to remain in a safe state of operation. Under the supervision of the national safety authority (AESF), it is the responsibility of the Spanish infrastructure manager, ADIF, to ensure the safety of its network. 2. The national safety authorities of Member States issue safety authorisations confirming compliance of the safety management systems and application, with European or national law. These safety related responsibilities are established under Article 4 of the Directive 2016/798 1 and corresponding implementation measures are defined in the safety management systems of infrastructure managers, or railway undertakings. Moreover, after construction, renewal, or upgrade, the national safety authority authorises the placing in service of networks or other fixed installations which then are considered parts of the Union rail system. The Commission has no information that authorisations for placing in service of the line or the safety authorisation of the Spanish infrastructure manager, ADIF, have been revoked or suspended, in full or in parts, by AESF, or that a procedure in that respect has been opened. 1 Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on railway safety (recast) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 138, 26.5.2016, pp. 102–149: https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/798/oj/eng.”
  EU funding for transportation · EU support of rail transport · EU policy on aviation safety
• 2026-02-02 “E-000407/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission refers the Honourable Members to the answer provided to the parliamentary question E-000254/2026 ‘Irregularities in the EU-co-financed renovation works on the railway line where the Adamuz accident occurred’ 1 . As this reply states, both ex ante and ex post controls are applied to ensure compliance with EU standards in projects funded by the Cohesion Policy Funds and the Recovery and Resilience Facility. However, the primary responsibility for preventing, detecting and correcting irregularities lies with Member States, which are required to establish effective management and control systems, including anti-fraud measures. 2. Rail equipment has a long lifespan making possible the use of past or national technology no longer interoperable with present solutions but nevertheless safe for use. Taking this into consideration, national safety authorities may continue to accept that outdated assets or technology may be operated, provided that subsequent safety measures are put in place. The safe operation of the network and of each line by the infrastructure manager is validated by national safety authority before delivering the operator’s safety authorisation. Furthermore, the extensive renovation or upgrading of lines, as well as new constructions, also need to be authorised by national safety authorities, as indicated in Article 12 of the Rail Safety Directive (EU) 2016/798. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-11-13 “E-004521/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully aware of the evolving threats linked to drug trafficking, including in southern Europe. The most recent EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 1 highlights the growing sophistication and transnational nature of criminal networks involved in large-scale drug trafficking, including via maritime routes. Addressing these threats is a core priority under the EU Drugs Strategy 2 and the EU Action Plan against drug trafficking 3 adopted in December 2025. The Commission works closely with Member States, including Spain, through established operational platforms. Spain is an active member of the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics, which plays a crucial role in detecting and intercepting vessels used for drug trafficking in the Atlantic. In addition, Spain participates in the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats operational action plans targeting high-risk criminal networks and cocaine trafficking, as well as in joint initiatives facilitated by the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, which provides intelligence, analytical support and cross-border coordination to Spanish law enforcement authorities. These instruments ensure continuous operational cooperation to address emerging trafficking routes, including those affecting southern Spain. 1 https://www.europol.europa.eu/publication-events/main-reports/changing-dna-of-serious-and-organised-crime. 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/eu-drugs-strategy-0_en. 3 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/eu-action-plan-against-drug-trafficking_en.”
  Asylum & border control · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-01-20 “E-000221/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission European ports, as critical gateways for international trade and important hubs of activity, are essential for the success of EU industry and economy as a whole. This has notably been recognised in the Commission’s priorities through the planning of a new strategy that will highlight the role that European ports and maritime industry will play in the future EU economy. All sectors, including maritime transport, need to contribute to the EU climate neutrality objective. While there may be many different economic and operational factors influencing shipping companies’ routes decisions, the Commission takes the possible risks of evasive behaviour very seriously. A specific preventive measure against such risks had already been agreed during co-decision: it consists in disregarding, for the purposes of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), stops by containerships at certain neighbouring container transhipment ports that meet specific criteria. Tanger Med and East Port Said have been identified as such ports. Furthermore, the EU ETS Directive 1 includes a reporting and review clause that obliges the Commission to monitor and to report every two years on the implementation of the ETS extension to maritime transport, notably with the objective to detect evasive behaviours at an early stage and if appropriate, to propose measures to ensure the effective implementation of the Directive. The first report is expected in the coming weeks and the Commission will continue monitoring the situation very closely. 1 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275 25.10.2003, p. 32).”
  Trade relations with Morocco · Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2025-01-15 “E-000164/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is in regular contact with the Spanish authorities and is aware of the efforts of authorities on the ground to tackle drug trafficking, including on the phenomenon of increasing use of go-fast vessels to smuggle drugs in the Guadalquivir Region. The Commission has already mobilised the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics 1 to further support Member States in tackling drug trafficking on the sea, including via go-fast vessels. Moreover, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, Europol, is in close cooperation with the Spanish authorities in their operations against drug trafficking groups 2 . In addition, EU funding supports projects led by the Spanish authorities to tackle drug trafficking across the Atlantic and to disrupt criminal groups operating in Southern Spain 3 . To reinforce the fight against drug trafficking, in 2023 the Commission adopted an EU roadmap to fight drug trafficking and organised crime 4 which sets out actions to improve cross-border cooperation against drug trafficking. The Commission will put forward a new European Internal Security Strategy to better counter security threats, including by strengthening Europol’s operational capacity further and by revising the rules on organised crime. A targeted action plan against drug trafficking is also in preparation. 1 Funded by the Internal Security Funds (ISF) – Spain is a Member of the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N). 2 The latest one in January leading to the seizure of 7 tonnes of cocaine and the arrest of 22 suspects, https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/no-stone-left-unturned-72-tonnes-of-cocaine-andeur-6-million-seized-in-large-drug-sting 3 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-funded-project-helps-reduce-flow-international-drugs-2024-0725_en and https://fondoseuropeosparaseguridad.interior.gob.es/es/detalle/proyecto/Equipo-Operativo-EuropeoEOT/ 4 COM(2023) 641 final.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · Regulation of drug precursors in the EU
• “President. Ladies and gentlemen. Tariffs are a disaster. No surprise. That's economics 101. And the WTO has confirmed that it's clear prices have increased by roughly 12% for consumers. If that continues, we will see around $130 million being the price for this per year. And we're seeing this in jobs being cut. On the other side of the Atlantic. So it's clear tariffs are a failure. And that means that Mr. Trump's suspending them was made sense. It's necessary for him and the US. But that's not enough, really. We need to ensure they're really done away with, including the 10% tariff that we still have. We can't allow the tariff threat to hang over our head like a sword of Damocles. We can't continue to jeopardize the economic survival of thousands of European companies.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Thank you. Chair. Commissioner. Everyone has an opinion on Donald Trump. That's clear. He's a polarizing figure. And the extremes of this parliament are using this as a weapon to defend their party interests. On the one hand, the left is insulting him and vilifying him. They've called him fascist and Nazi. And although even though this is a caricature, these are probably not the best ways to diplomatically persuade the leader of our most important ally. On the other extreme, they praise Trump and they can't praise him enough. They ignore the damage he's done in the past to our farmers. And despite the tariffs that are threatening our companies. And I should recognize that praising the person who aims to cause damage on your countrymen doesn't seem very patriotic. This is why we need a moderate and strong approach so that we can react. But we also need to be flexible so that we can negotiate beyond the fact that he's the that he's sitting in the white House. We can't break relations because the US was, is and should continue to be our main ally. As President Reagan said on the beaches of Normandy, the transatlantic alliance is the best, was the best shield for prosperity and peace. Let us all work in Brussels and Washington, D.C., to keep that shield alive.”
  Relations with NATO
• “Thank you. Commissioner. President, businesses and families in Europe are going through times of extreme volatility. The price of gas and oil have spiked. We're seeing um shares and markets in volatility. And this has impact on inflation as well. Faced with this uncertainty we need to try and provide certainty and stability. We need stability in our trade agreements. And that we need to have nerves of steel and be pragmatic. We can't react with every change in the US to a change in our direction. We need to have an agreement which does guarantee a position which is beneficial for the EU compared with other exporters from all over the world. Now, when it's approved, we will continue to ensure that all commitments are being adhered to. Now is the time to be responsible. It's the time to support this trade agreement. Thank you very much.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• “Thank you very much, chairman. I'd like to thank you very much for your presentations on this topic. The problem of overcapacity in China is nothing new. It's something that industry here in Europe has been complaining about for a long time. Now it's important to talk about a reality that exists. And this is a phenomenon that is changing at speed. The sectors that are being affected will. The number will increase in the future. And so it's important now to act. We need to focus on how we can respond to the problem as well. I think it's right that the reform suggests better use of our trade defence Instruments together with an industrial policy and a multilateral framework. This is something that the parliament has defended as part of the economic security strategy. But we need to be realistic. To think that the WTO can provide an effective response to these challenges is perhaps not is not right. We need to react quickly, and the WTO may not be able to respond quickly enough. So I'd like to ask three questions to our experts now. In addition to electric cars and steel, in what new sectors should we be identifying? Risks of overcapacity take into consideration the speed at which this phenomenon is developing. For example, in the pharmaceutical Sector. Secondly, overcapacity affects China negatively as well. How is this being discussed in the new five year plan? Is there a will to tackle it? And thirdly, how should the EU respond when in addition to suffering the consequences of overcapacity, there are also American investigations under section 301, which is causing this very phenomenon. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with China · Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market
• “We have less than three weeks to reach a trade agreement with the US, but we shouldn't be accepting just anything, and we shouldn't be just trying to save some sectors while others are penalised unfairly and even less so when we're looking at sensitive sectors such as farming, and especially with products such as olive oil or wine, which depend so much on the US market. And I must confess that I am concerned very much about Spanish products. There are products which have been really hanging by a thread. And Trump has had differences of views with Pedro Sanchez, and that there has been a refusal to contribute economically to NATO, like other NATO partners. And I do hope that Spanish producers will not end up paying for this lack of solidarity on the part of Mr. Sanchez, but also when it comes to specific tariffs, we need to put an end to this uncertainty because it's already undermining exporters and importers and it is halting and suspending future investments and contracts. We need to ensure that we have a lasting agreement so that we don't have a return to demands for new concessions from the white House or threats of new tariffs over just a few months. So we need a definitive solution. We need to retrieve stability for producers on both sides of the Atlantic. But above all, we need to ensure that we can retrieve confidence in trade as a source of shared prosperity. Thank you.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Good afternoon. I will be speaking in Spanish. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr. Resonate for the presentation you have given us. This report confirms something very key. We're living in a fragmented and uncertain world, so trade policy is now a key instrument for economic security. The EU has shown that in moments of crisis, it can react quickly and flexibly. If we look at, uh, the, uh, 50 billion fall in euro exports, with Russia compensated by 200 billion in exports to countries with preferential trade agreements, this diversification has to be more than just a declaration of intentions. We need to speed things up. The report also shows a success with Andean uh countries, um, With all of the additional value this has generated since the entry into force of the agreement. We are talking about strategic partners here when it comes to raw materials, sustainability, energy, and we need to continue deepening our ties with those countries. Otherwise, uh, China is creating a lot of technical barriers, and they continue to use, uh, industrial and trade defence instruments in a more and more aggressive way. That is why we are looking forward to this, uh, new paper the commission will publish on Wednesday. It is important to have a strategy that maintains dialogue so that we can reduce tensions and to protect our companies from third countries and to diversify our supply chains and our partnerships in this context. Three questions how will this new policy of economic security have a different policy for China to respond to these coercive practices without blocking legitimate trade? If we look at the success with the Andean countries, will the Commission be strengthening or deepening areas of cooperation in sustainability and supply chains, for example, to try and make this into a real pillar for strategic autonomy? And then finally, the report on diversification. We see that it is working, but it's unequal. So what specific tools will this new policy include to help SMEs in particular to Reduce their critical exposure. Thank you.”
  EU-China relations
• “Thank you very much. Indeed, it was time to address this provisional situation that has been extended now for a year after two judgments handed down by the Court of Justice. The agreements that we are discussing involve huge changes when it comes to labeling, for example, and that allows us to overcome the shortcomings identified by the court. It is undoubtedly a necessary step forward in the right direction. However, the agreement introduces the term region of origin. Perhaps this is not sufficiently explicit. In line with the content of the judgment, I'd like to remind you that any agreement must be based on mutual trust and transparency in order to be solid. This is something that we have missed from the Commission's side during the negotiations, in the spirit of transparency. We want to call on the commission to closely monitor the market of specifically susceptible products, such as tomatoes and on cross-border areas. That's particularly important. We need to make sure that this is rigorously complied with so that we can protect our producers. Ladies and gentlemen, Morocco can be a trusted partner for the EU as a whole, and particularly for Spain. Well, managed trade agreements are important. They need to be based on trust and shared prosperity. As such, European farmers cannot turn into victims of policies that are completely far away from them. We need to do this to guarantee good cooperation with Morocco on solid foundations. It needs to be balanced and beneficial for both parties. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with Morocco
• “Thank you. Chair. I'd like to thank the Commission's representatives for this very rich information that they've shared with us this afternoon. For months, we've seen how the European Union has imposed additional duties of over 20% on Chinese electric vehicles as an outcome of this investigation on illegal subsidies. Now, to put this in context, the decision to accept the Volkswagen undertaking is a necessary and correct measure that should be interpreted as a specific response in a given situation. This is a particular case with a tailor made solution so that we do not endanger European industrial projects underway. And Cupra Tavascan is put together in China, but its industrial strategy is developed in Europe. Behind this project, there is investment to the tune of €2 billion in Spain and that is linked to electrification, this investment that will support thousands of direct employment opportunities throughout the value chain and will also support the manufacturer of other models and that are being assembled in Europe in this context. I had a couple of questions for you. Has the Commission identified other similar cases to Cupra? I'm thinking of cases where there are European, clearly European industrial components, even though the final manufacturing takes place in China. Second, what relationship does the Commission have with other European manufacturers in China following this agreement and. Third. And I'd like to stress Chinese tariffs on pork meat, which are very detrimental to our producers. When is the commission expecting to see real results in eliminating them? Thank you very much. And I do apologize that I am on my way to another meeting. And I would like to thank you very much. We're still waiting for answers, but thank you very much for that extensive information.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market
• “Thank you very much, president. Now, what's clear here is that the agreement with the US isn't the one we would have wanted here. But as Bismarck said, politics is the art of the possible, not the desirable. The agreement reached is possibly the best of that possible under the current Trump administration. And with this we avoid a greater shock with our main trading partner and we have more certainty for our manufacturers. So the work done by the negotiating team needs to be seen in a adverse context. There are deep reaching problems that we need to try and solve. Steel and aluminium tariffs are still a threat to our industry, and our agri food industries may well be less competitive. Competitive. If we don't stem the flow of US products, however, we need certainty. Certainty for all sectors. And that needs to be extended temporarily. Europe can't just stick to halfway house solutions. We need to defend our own interests and we can't leave any single sector behind.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Thank you very much. President. Commissioner. The European response to the growing trade friction with China should be threefold. Dialogue, defence and diversify. Firstly, dialogue. Our prosperity, like China's, depends on trade and quite simply, we are condemned to understand this. So we need to avoid an escalation of tension which could be mutually prejudicial. So we are pleased to see the decision of Beijing to lift controls on some minerals. But we must continue working to get rid of the outstanding restrictions which limit our industrial capacity. Secondly, Defence Europe cannot accept trade being used as a political weapon. Europeans have enough tools in our trade arsenal to prevent that, but we need to use those tools in a more coordinated way and more quickly in order to stand up for our interests. Thirdly, diversification. The best way to defend our autonomy is not autarky, but a broader and more balanced integration when it comes to global supply chains. We need to extend our network of critical raw material suppliers in Latin America and Africa, and we should strengthen alliances with partners like Japan, Canada and Australia. Ultimately, this is not about a confrontation with China. It is about building a more balanced, more predictable and more solid relationship a relationship in which trade can be a real source of shared prosperity and not a mechanism for exploiting our vulnerabilities. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with China
• “Thank you. President. In the US tariffs, China unfair competition and in Russia plain out plain war. If we look at the situation, what I've just described is what we're facing for Europe. Trade has always been an economic tool. But for XI Jinping, Trump and Putin, it's a political weapon. And our prosperity and security are being jeopardized as a result. We urgently need new markets. Mercosur is an opportunity for our exporters and we can diversify our supply chain. On top of that, however, we must not commit the results, the mistakes of the past. We must not sacrifice our farmers and livestock producers. We need to give them guarantees. I therefore welcome the fact that there are safeguards and reciprocity measures which will protect our primary sector. Even more importantly, the Commission wants to reduce green red tape and wants to simplify. That's all very good.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Thank you, Madam President. Will be holding a historic summit in a couple of weeks, the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the EU and China. These relations have brought us trade benefits, promoted investment and created jobs. Nonetheless, in the last few years we've been through turbulent geopolitical times and we have a growing imbalance. We need to redress that balance and make sure it is truly reciprocal. We need to maintain the multilateral international order and organization such as the WTO. There's industrial overcapacity. There are artificially low prices that prevent our companies from competing on a level playing field. We need to look at sensitive products such as dairy, pork products, wine. We need to look at critical raw material export restrictions that endanger our own security, and we need to be more responsible. Uh uh, call on China to be more responsible on the Ukraine conflict. So EU China relations. Let's give it a new impetus. Let's breathe new life into it. But let's ensure that it is a win win relationship. Let's not miss this chance. Thanks.”
  EU-China relations
• “Thank you very much. Thank you to the speakers that have been here. First question is on semiconductors soon. The European regulation on chips will have had its second anniversary. It's ambitious, but so far we haven't had many results from this. Not very promising. And we recently heard from Vodacom cancelling the building of a chip factory in Spain, which had been announced in 2023, and that would have been an investment of €850 €1 million. That is quite an illustrating example of the failure of some member states in terms of attracting concrete investment in Spain. There has been an overall budget of €12 billion for the potato chip programme for semiconductors to be developed for next, with next generation funds, but only a 113 million has been delivered less than 1%. Most of the of the budget is set aside for building a factory, but so far nothing has come to fruit and all we've had is, uh, R&D projects and, uh, university seats in France and Germany. We've seen better success, but none of this is enough for Europe to be able to properly compete with Asia and the US. Do you think we're going to get to 20% of the global, uh, um, goal as laid down in the regulation? My second question is to do with ads HTML over the recently, we've seen in the press about the advances of Chinese companies such as Huawei in terms of, uh, uh, developments for technology in this and the method for there's been, uh, a method used, um, for these chips, which is, uh, highly advanced, the idea being to start mass production from 2026 or 7 onwards. What do you think about those recent advances? Do you think that that that is reliable information. Could a. Uh. Make advances in terms of chips are supplying chips and is there a contingency plan regarding this possibility. Thank you.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• “Thank you chairman. Well, I think we can say that the Mercosur agreement is closer than ever. It's excellent news for Europe and for Latin America. After 20 years of negotiations, and thanks to the renewed commitment on the part of the Commission and the flexibility shown by some member states, including countries that were traditionally cautious France or Austria. Now we see real possibilities of closing the agreement by the end of the year. It's a lot more than trade. It's a strategic bet on our strategic and democratic alliance in a global context, a geopolitical context, uh, which is has been challenging with different standards to our own. At the same time, it's an agreement that reflects our commitment to trade policy with clear environmental commitments, more transparency, more political involvement. We've heard the concerns, particularly on agriculture and the final text that will include safeguards or follow up mechanisms and tools to support the most sensitive areas. On behalf of the rapporteur of this report, I can stress that we are facing an historic opportunity. This is not about just getting rid of customs duties. It's about creating links, pushing for sustainable growth and pushing the world towards rules of equity and cooperation. We celebrate this step forwards and we're working together to make it a reality. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Thank you. Chair. I'd like to thank the Commission's representatives for this very rich information that they've shared with us this afternoon. For months, we've seen how the European Union has imposed additional duties of over 20% on Chinese electric vehicles as an outcome of this investigation on illegal subsidies. Now, to put this in context, the decision to accept the Volkswagen undertaking is a necessary and correct measure that should be interpreted as a specific response in a given situation. This is a particular case with a tailor made solution so that we do not endanger European industrial projects underway. And Cupra Tavascan is put together in China, but its industrial strategy is developed in Europe. Behind this project, there is investment to the tune of €2 billion in Spain and that is linked to electrification, this investment that will support thousands of direct employment opportunities throughout the value chain and will also support the manufacturer of other models and that are being assembled in Europe in this context. I had a couple of questions for you. Has the Commission identified other similar cases to Cupra? I'm thinking of cases where there are European, clearly European industrial components, even though the final manufacturing takes place in China. Second, what relationship does the Commission have with other European manufacturers in China following this agreement and. Third. And I'd like to stress Chinese tariffs on pork meat, which are very detrimental to our producers. When is the commission expecting to see real results in eliminating them? Thank you very much. And I do apologize that I am on my way to another meeting. And I would like to thank you very much. We're still waiting for answers, but thank you very much for that extensive information.”
  Trade relations with China
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner. 2 billion tons. Well, that's the amount of steel that was produced in 2024. This is a tsunami of metal, and it's envisaged that it's going to increase by 140 million tonnes next year. Massive overcapacity which has made prices collapse and is destroying the European market. In addition, the US has reactivated its tariffs and countries like Turkey and South Africa have imposed new trade barriers, protectionist measures that are going to help to push this excess supply to the European market. And that's going to further undermine the competitiveness of our products. And that's why we believe that the action plan proposed by the Commission is a step in the right direction. But it's not enough. We can't continue not having safeguard measures that don't respond to the realities of the market. We need a new instrument that produces structural solutions to the crisis in the sector, and we need these measures now. If we continue waiting until the middle of 2026, it will be far too late for many factories and many of our workers. Thank you.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• “Thank you very much, miss Spanou as a Spanish MEP. I'd like to thank you for speaking so frankly on this policy for de-risking these matters in the EU. The especially with the case in Spain and with the Spanish government, especially concerning our security and our cyber security. The contracts of the Spanish government with Huawei seem to be going against what Spain, what Brussels has been saying, and it seems to put Spain at risk. But not only Spain, the entire of the European Union. European Union should be reducing its dependency on third countries. And yet Spain is doing the exact opposite of that when it comes to wiretaps. It seems strange that Huawei is being prioritized above European companies that could do the same provide the same services. The companies in China must send information through to the government. So what kind of guarantee are we going to have that these. The wiretap data will be kept confidential. It's very important that the. The that this topic is looked into because it could be very serious for cyber security. So I have a few questions. In general terms, when it comes to police wiretaps, if it if this is sent to Huawei, could this not affect the integrity of these police investigations. And then how is Spain implementing some measures when it comes to 5G networks to ensure security? Mr.. You have two minutes to answer.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• “Thank you very much. Madam president. Commissioner. During the Second World War, the British mathematician Alan Turing developed a method to decode communications, Nazi communications that talked about their manoeuvres. Thanks to that, allies could preempt what the axis was going to do, because they knew perfectly well that ins and outs of the conversations. Last week, Russia intercepted at least 12 European satellites that were used for government communications and military communications across Europe. In other words, Putin accessed intelligence or confidential information of EU governments. At the same time, there are mass cyber attacks against military and political leaders, ministers across the EU and senior officials in the EU. This kind of hacking would have affected uh, uh, messages shared at a very high level. So this is a warning. We have to boost cybersecurity, and it has to be a priority if we want intelligence to be protected, it has to be our first line of defense. Thank you.”
  Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
• “Thank you very much chair. Firstly I would like to thank the panelists. Since the publication of the Economic Security Strategy in 2023. We have a common framework to deal with our vulnerabilities in critical sectors. We can't carry on being competitive if we're shut off from the world. But it's also the case if we ignore the true risks. Bearing that in mind, the commission has come out with a review on the regulation on, uh, indirect foreign investment regarding investment that's coming out. According to the annual report for 2024. There are still differences in implementation of the instrument between member states and some, such as Greece, Belgium and Croatia, still have not implemented any kind of control mechanism. In addition, the report sets out the sectors most exposed to risk. Ai. Semiconductors. Quantum computing. Computing. Electricity networks. Defence technology. Protecting those sectors requires a coordinated response. And that's why I would like to firstly ask our expert, to what extent do you believe that the absence of control mechanism for investments in some member states, such as Belgium, Greece and Croatia, weakens a common European front? Secondly, I'd like to ask about, uh, uh, exiting in investments, outgoing investments. We've got, uh, ekm and other technological, uh, companies such as computing, um, companies, whether uh, relations on with strategic sectors such as quantum computing. Now, we've talked about countries such as Japan and Canada that are allied in terms of values and interests, but there isn't a a binding framework at a European level. Do you think we need to move towards a prior control system in Europe for, uh, investment in critical systems sectors such as quantum computing? And then a lot of the strategy needs, uh, strengthening our cooperation, uh, with other members. The recent agreement signed with Indonesia. To favour the value chain for critical raw materials is a good example. What other partners should we diversify and coordinate with in critical raw materials, and what should the next agreements be in order of priority? Thank you.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure