Radan KANEV

Policy topics Radan KANEV is active on

What Radan KANEV has said (28)

• 2026-06-17 “@CHAIR (14:57:47 – 14:59:35): Thank you, president, commissioner, colleagues. In 1920, the Bolshevik dictator Lenin said that communism consists in electrification plus Soviet power. Perhaps this is the root of the bad tradition to turn the practical conversation on energy into a political conflict, which is the case today. The extreme of factions in this parliament have waged a cultural war. They, use cliches rather than conduct a pragmatic dispute based on facts. And what are the facts? Electrification is everywhere if the transport and and industry are to develop successfully from Sweden and Spain via France to Chile and even to communist China. Such successful development depends on several factors, and none of them includes heavy regulation, ambitious political goals, or political, dogmas. 1st of all, we need a high quality electricity mix, And this most often includes a strong nuclear power energy, market principles, and low costs and low prices. This is the direction we should go into. We should not choose heavy regulation and not Soviet power. Your colleague, Svetlina Vankova. Colleague, you have the floor.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-03-04 “Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 18.6.2026 Written question According to Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 [1] , it is for the competent authorities to ensure that, at least one year before the launch of the invitation to tender procedure, specific information on the envisaged award is published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Bulgarian authorities published two notices to comply with Article 7(2) for the tendering procedure aiming to liberalise rail passenger transport . A prior notice published on 31 October 2023 [2] was complemented on 4 August 2025 [3] . Bulgaria carried out tenders for three lots, which were awarded to two different operators, the incumbent Bulgarian State Railways and Ivkoni Express EAD. The Commission does not have indications that those tenders may have breached EU State aid or competition rules. Persons having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract may ask for a review of award decisions. A mechanism for a rapid and effective review is mandatory under Article 5(7) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. Public service compensation for the operation of public passenger transport services paid in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 shall be compatible with the common market. Such compensation shall be exempt from the prior notification requirement laid down in Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. In addition, Member States have a wide margin of discretion in organising the transport services required by their population. In the light of the above, the Commission does not plan at this stage any follow-up action either as regards an alleged breach of competition rules or the tender itself. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2007/1370/oj/eng. [2] https://ted.europa.eu/en/notice/-/detail/664188-2023. [3] https://ted.europa.eu/en/notice/-/detail/507109-2025.”
  EU support of rail transport · EU Competition policy
• 2026-01-07 “E-000022/2026 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission Coupled income support addresses structural difficulties that certain targeted sectors face; it does not address income losses due to severe meteorological events. Nevertheless, force majeure events may exempt a producer from certain legal consequences that would otherwise occur in an instance of non-compliance with coupled income support rules. For example, in accordance with Articles 59, 84 and 88 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 1 , no penalties are to be imposed and the beneficiary is to retain the right to receive common agricultural policy support where the non-compliance is due to force majeure or exceptional circumstances in accordance with Article 3 of the same Regulation. This is relevant in cases such as a severe natural disaster or severe meteorological event gravely affecting the holding. Whereas the application of force majeure is the responsibility of Member States, Member States should take the decision to apply force majeure based on relevant evidence and in light of Union agricultural law. Force majeure is an exception to the general rule of strict respect of obligations. Normally applied on a case-by-case basis, in cases of severe meteorological events that gravely affect a well-determined area, Member States may consider that a whole area is concerned, where it is clear that the farmers in the area are affected by an abnormal event whose consequences could not be prevented with all due care. Member States need, however, to determine the area at stake and the population affected by the event, in a manner that reasonably allows the presumption that the conditions of force majeure are individually met by the farmers concerned 2 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2116/oj/eng. 2 Communication from the Commission to the Council on force majeure and exceptional circumstances in Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, COM(2024) 225 final - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024DC0225.”
  Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1)
• 2025-07-05 “P-002749/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission As indicated by the Honourable Member, on 24 April 2024 the Commission sent an additional reasoned opinion to Bulgaria in INFR(2018)2268 for non-compliance of the Bulgarian legislation transposing Directive 2014/24/EU 1 . In its additional reasoned opinion, the Commission declared that the transposition of the definition 'bodies governed by public law’ with reference to hospitals funded for more than 50% by the State or regional authorities or subject to management supervision by those authorities infringed Directive 2014/24/EU. The Commission considered in particular that by maintaining in the national transposition law, a specific derogation exempting such hospitals from the obligation to hold public tenders regardless of whether the thresholds set in Directive 2014/24/EU were met, Bulgaria infringed that Directive. The Commission also stressed that the amendments introduced in the Bulgarian Public Procurement Act in 2023 failed to address this issue. In its reply of 18 September 2024, Bulgaria informed that an amending law has been drafted and was due for adoption in September 2024. The Commission services are actively seeking an update from the Bulgarian authorities on the state of play of the amending legislation. In case of further inaction of the Bulgarian authorities, the Commission may decide to refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union pursuant to Article 258 Treaty of the Functioning of the EU 2 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E258.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · State Aid
• 2025-06-17 “E-002429/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Water Resilience Strategy (WRS) 1 acknowledges the potential health costs of inaction in relation to per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), and the high costs of remediation. It emphasises the need to apply the polluter pays principle 2 and commits to action on promoting best practices including as regards that principle. Arriving at accurate estimates of remediation and other costs related to PFAS pollution is an important step towards taking effective clean-up action. Some methodologies and estimates 3 are available, but further work is needed. A study supported by the Commission to identify treatment methods for removing PFAS and other pollutants from drinking water will include a cost-benefit analysis and is expected to be published by the end of 2025. The Commission maintains regular dialogue and exchange with Member State authorities and with associations representing utilities involved in the delivery of water services across the EU. As regards the announced public-private initiative to achieve technological breakthroughs on the remediation of PFAS and other persistent pollutants, the establishment of the PFAS initiative will be based on a thorough strategic assessment, aimed among other things at identifying possible partners and their financial capacity. It will also involve stakeholder consultation, during which local governments will be encouraged to express their interest and capacity to participate. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/environment/water-resilience-strategy_en. 2 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/economy-and-finance/ensuring-polluters-pay_en. 3 E.g. https://foreverpollution.eu/lobbying/the-cost-methodology/, https://foreverpollution.eu/lobbying/the-bill/.”
  Water pollution · PFAs
• 2025-05-02 “P-001797/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission EU law requires the members of the national Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) to be appointed by means of a transparent procedure and that they have the qualifications, experience and skills, in particular in the area of the protection of personal data, required to perform their duties and exercise their powers 1 . The Commission has observed that heads of DPAs have a diversity of background and experience prior to their appointment, before effectively exercising their tasks. For instance, it is not unusual that in some Member States the heads of DPAs come from the high public administration. The Commission notes that the new members of the Bulgarian DPA have been elected by the National Assembly on 9 May 2025 by means of a transparent procedure 2 . As demonstrated by past actions, the Commission is attaching utmost importance to the requirement of independence of the DPAs. The Commission will therefore continue to closely monitor the situation in all Member States as regards the full and effective independence of national DPAs. 1 Article 53(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88. 2 https://www.parliament.bg/en/theme-site/ID/78.”
  Privacy & digital economy · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2024-10-22 “E-002220/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission As stated in a previous answer to Written Question E-004137/2022, the Commission already has multiple EU-funded innovation projects on non-intrusive inspection for customs security, also in collaboration with trusted partners under cluster 3 ‘Civil Security for Society’ of Horizon Europe 1 . EU-wide investment in civil security fosters Europe’s economic security and strategic autonomy. The Commission will continue investing in civil security innovation to support the competitiveness of Europe’s industry. As stipulated in the Customs Control Equipment Instrument (CCEI) regulation (Regulation (EU) 2021/1077 2 ), customs control equipment should be used primarily for customs controls, but may also be used for additional purposes, such as border controls and security. Directive 2009/81/EC concerning public procurement in the fields of defence and security applies to supply of sensitive equipment 3 . The assessment of the Directive must be done on a case-bycase basis to ensure that the equipment in question genuinely falls within the scope. The mission letter 4 to Executive Vice-President for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy pointed to a revision of the procurement Directives. The aims of the revision of the public procurement framework would be strengthening the strategic role of public procurement and the EU added value of public procurement through the security of supply for strategic technologies, products and services. Regarding customs control equipment, as envisioned in a previous reply E-003419/2023, the Commission has taken action to protect EU security by introducing additional measures in the second CCEI call. 1 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32021R1077 3 Defined in the Directive as equipment ‘for security purposes, involving, requiring and/or containing classified information’. The application of the defence procurement directive depends exclusively on the qualification of the equipment as sensitive and not on the character of the contracting authority: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32009L0081 4 https://commission.europa.eu/document/6ef52679-19b9-4a8d-b7b2-cb99eb384eca_en”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports · Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2024-10-10 “P-002016/2024 Answer given by Mr Gentiloni on behalf of the European Commission As of 31 March 2024, Bulgaria is a part of the Schengen Area. Since then, controls at Bulgaria’s internal air and sea borders with other Schengen countries have been lifted. The Commission has consistently underlined since 2011, that Bulgaria has met all the criteria for removing these controls. The decision to lift controls at the internal land borders rests entirely with the Council. The security of the customs control equipment is of utmost importance and the Commission has taken action to ensure this in the framework of the Customs Control Equipment Instrument (CCEI; Regulation (EU) 2021/1077 1 ). Regarding the Bulgarian CCEI grant agreement, the Commission is closely monitoring the implementation in its role of granting authority. It is the responsibility of the Member States to carry out the procurement procedures in line with EU and national procurement rules in order to benefit from the Commission grants. The applicable procedures may differ, based on exceptions justified by specific circumstances. A Member State may use its prerogatives under the Treaties to protect its national security interests, an exclusive competence of the Member States, where it is deemed necessary and only when proportionate. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1077/oj”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware · Enlargement of Schengen area
• 2024-09-17 “E-001736/2024 Answer given by Ms Simson on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has assessed the root causes for these high prices, which were attributable mainly to tight supply-demand balance during certain evening hours. This situation was explained by a lack of flexible assets in the region to compensate for the evening drop in solar generation, the lack of cross-border capacities available for trade between Central Eastern Europe (CEE) region and South-Eastern Europe (SEE) regions, limited hydro reservoirs and strong demand during the summer due to heat waves. The Commission observed that prices in the region have lowered significantly since midSeptember 2024, as the hydro generation in the region is recovering. The Commission will continue to closely monitor the situation. The Commission is also in discussions with the Member States in the region to discuss the necessary policy response. A dedicated discussion between Member States also took place at the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy (TTE) Council on 15 October 2024. 1 Reflecting the ambitions set out in the Political Guidelines 2 , the Commission is set to work on an action plan for affordable energy prices to help bring down energy bills for households and businesses. This policy response should include increasing flexibility in the energy systems of the region to improve their ability to absorb temporary price spikes. In addition, the situation highlights the need for a more integrated European energy system, with greater physical interconnection capacity between the CEE and SEE regions and fewer constraints on the use of available interconnection capacity for cross border trade. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13994-2024-INIT/en/pdf 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf”
  Energy (green transition)
• “This is a week ago and we are living in a new historical era after last week and the remarks of the American administration and the start of the negotiations directly between us and Russia. I would say after the moment when the United States started Behaving as Russia's ally, as Russia's supporter in the war between Russia and Ukraine. So, colleagues, speaking of heavy industries, energy intensive industries and energy as a whole, we can now have only one priority priority and only one lead market. And this market is called defense. And this priority is called defense. And defense has always been the main lead market for heavy industry and the main lead market for innovations in industry. So we have to completely reshape our focus. We have to change all our documents, even very recent ones leaked yesterday that we have all read and we know there is nothing in there. And we need to change our industrial course to defense driven economy. Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “Thank you. Thank you very much, chairman. Thanks to the commission for this presentation. Uh, we see that on one hand, the NAACP data is rather positive. Uh, so the member states and our industry seem to be, uh, more or less coping with the challenge of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, we see the significant delay for the member states of, uh, presenting their neck and the fact that roughly half of the member states are planning Within the targets. And I think we have this, this contradiction on the table due to a very simple but very serious reason. And it is we don't have this support from the public opinion. We don't have this political support for the decarbonisation agenda that we had 6 or 5 years ago. I would say far, far from that. And we can attribute this fact to many reasons. One could claim it's only disinformation, another could say it is only due to serious economic problems that we are facing. And the third 1st May be closest to my personal opinion. I would say the present US administration policy is limiting the credibility of the Paris Agreement goals, so we don't really see how we will achieve our climate goals goes without the biggest economy on on Earth, and it's making our efforts a bit more futile. But whatever the reason, and maybe it's a combination of them, we are facing the fact, and most importantly, we need to cope, to acknowledge the fact of shrinking public support and to cope with it. So I really hope that the Commission will do what they promised today, and it is to transform the noise in real investment plans, in showcase that we can be economically successful and competitive while decarbonising, because public opinion doesn't really trust in that.”
  Climate efforts
• “Thank you, chair, Mr. Vice president. Our decarbonisation policy has been based on so-called price signals or deliberate inflation of fossil based fuels for at least two decades now. Now, and for several years, we are living in a situation of the strongest possible price signal, which is not artificial, by the way, and not legislative compared to ETS. And we are already facing the even stronger market signal, which is shortage of fossil fuels. In this situation, the production of any kind of alternative fuels, from biofuels to hydrogen to synthetic fuels could be not only beneficial, but it could only be publicly accepted, which is not really the case for electrification. And here my question is, I don't see any priority on alternative fuels Modernization of refineries. Et cetera. Et cetera. In any of the commission documents and legislative proposals, I think this is a great gap that we should fix as a matter of hours and not months.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “I will speak in Bulgarian. Colleagues. It is easy to see that there is no majority in Parliament to support the proposal of the Commission for one simple reason. The general public is concerned with the ambitious 90% because of the inflation rates and because of the loss of industrial competitiveness, as well as the perception that we are all isolated in the world and we are the only ones who are environmentally ambitious. Let us look very seriously at what the rapporteur Says, let us not laugh at what he is saying and understand that what he says is what so many people in Europe believe. The Mario Draghi report. The proposal of the Commission. Focus on decarbonisation. That is all right. But there is strict conditionality is needed for these 90%. And the first precondition is a real international cooperation and to development of the European economy towards growth and competitiveness. Thank you.”
  Climate efforts
• “Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. Commissioner, I would like to say clearly that we should support this very sensible project to simplify the Value the regulation. We thank the rapporteur and the whole team responsible for this. Second, we should it should be noted that this is only a first step in the changes needed in Cbam because in as it is today, together with the entire customs policy, it poses a serious risk to the light industry in Europe. We import aluminium and steel at a very with very high customs duties, and if we add the cbam certificates it becomes a lot. At the same time, we we import processed products from steel and aluminium at 25%, electric boilers, thermal pumps and electrolysers. And we have only two options in this. One is to to ease the customs duties, which would be an in a reasonable in view of the dumping from China and the customs policy of the United States. The other option is to expand the scope of Cbam, including the light industry products. And this is something we should do promptly.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• “Thank you, thank you chair. Thank you, Commissioner, for being with us. So I'm I'm really happy that you mentioned the merits of competitiveness and energy diplomacy, a very, very strong point, and that you emphasize the role of classic heavy industry within the clean industry. And here I have a very, very precise questions on both competitiveness and energy diplomacy vis a vis the clean industrial Through deal first is on Ets2 mentioned already, but I think we did not stress enough the enormous political potential. If the so-called emergency brake on €40 per ton within Ets2 doesn't hold in the presidential year in France before the presidential elections. I think it is a path to to a political change that could really destroy our climate ambitions, effectively destroy them politically because of the because of the sensitivity of the public towards pro inflation measures. And here my very precise question is whether you have in mind strengthening this emergency brake, which was, by the way, my amendment in the Parliament, my proposal. And second, speaking of energy diplomacy, Shouldn't we put conditionality within our climate priorities for 2040 and further on the effective success of international efforts? Because I see our international partners promising but not delivering, which puts us out of the level playing field, out of the competitive advantages that we could have. Thank you.”
  Climate efforts
• “Thank you. Chair. Commissioner. Colleagues, we have spent the best part of the last two decades by incentivizing our clean tech through so-called price signals, or otherwise deliberately increasing fossil fuel prices and pumping inflation into the consumer's basket. But now, today, we have the strongest possible price signal, and it is natural. It is due to wars and global insecurity. And furthermore, we have an even stronger market signal coming around the corner, which is few shortages. But we also have answers, have short term solutions, have the technologies and have the corporate power in Europe. We simply need to double down on the production, stockpiling, refining of all types of alternative fuels, including biofuels. Cutting unnecessary administrative burdens and doubling down, as I said, on investment. Thank you very much.”
  Biofuels (RED II)
• “Thank you chair. In the 17th year after applied for permitting. So obviously I do agree that permitting in Europe is awfully, painfully slow, confusing and difficult and. Doesn't make environmental assessment and doesn't issue permits, doesn't make permitting. And clearly the stakeholders point that national authorities. Different national regimes, overlapping regulations. New layers of regulation. By the way, often deliberately designed to protect local industries or to please the public opinion. They openly mention lack of coordination on national level, lack of knowledge, lack of capacity. And I would add clear cases of corruption. So what can we do? What can Brussels do? It's the most simple and most difficult thing. We need to protect our businesses from our governments. Thank you.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you. Chair. Commissioner. Colleagues, we are very much tempted to solve all the problems by the criteria for public procurement because as we said many times, they are a powerful tool. We try to solve problems in the social sphere, technological sphere and environmental sphere. However, we should bear in mind that this is a dangerous field. Non-market criteria at public procurement have a very strong potential to strengthen both corruption and inflation. That is why we need to be very careful and focus on protecting the strategic sectors, as well as protection of the strategic autonomy of the European Union. This is a must nowadays. That is why I think that the rapporteur from the ECR Group has proposed a very balanced report, and we should stick to it. Thank you. **Nicolae ȘTEFĂNUȚĂ @Chair: We will now start the catch the eye procedure. We have four people on the list. First, Mrs. Suncana Glava from the EPP. One minute.”
  "Buy European" provisions
• “Thank you chair. As we all witnessed, there is really a very strong spirit of cooperation between the shadow rapporteurs and I hope all the MEPs engaged. Uh, I must say here first, I, I fully understand the reasons, uh, mainly of, uh, our colleagues for a very clear ring fencing, uh, of health, health budgets and also earmarking of health funds in other policy windows, uh, under the, the, the ECF, uh, and I'm sure we will find a solution together here because we look in the same direction. Uh, and then, uh, just to, to underline that one of my priorities as the rapporteur is to stay as strictly as possible within some competences, uh, which of course, we might have different understanding on, where where exactly where they stand. But I think that any overstepping with the competences of either E3 or Budget Committee here might only be counterproductive. I am in in very, uh, let's say cooperative relation with, uh, colleagues. Uh, and, uh, I think we, we must also cooperate with, with Butch as much as possible. For example, I'm very much interested in the whole exposome concept, uh, proposed, uh, within the, the opinion by the S and E colleagues. But, uh, as far as I understand it, I think it very much belongs to the horizon, uh, file and not to ECF. Uh, so I would be very helpful as, as much as, as I can to have it included there, but I'm not sure it really belongs in the ECF. Regulation as a whole and in the opinion specifically.”
  Conditions to access EU budget
• “It's okay. Now I'll focus on a on a really particular issue here. Uh, and it is the methodology of assessing greenhouse gas emission savings from renewable fuels, uh, as inseparable from the rules governing hydrogen production. I will not lose your time with repeating the importance of hydrogen for the decarbonisation of our economy. But I will point out that the delegated act adopted last month introduces a very serious concern. From 2041 onwards, carbon dioxide used in fuels through CCU through utilization of captured carbon, will no longer allow companies under the ETS to avoid surrendering allowances. Let's take a very simple example. An industrial cluster in northern Spain where seven factory captures it's it's carbon dioxide is combined with renewable hydrogen to produce e-methanol for shipping. It's a really perfect industrial symbiosis leading us to decarbonization. But after 2041, this won't be possible anymore. And such projects normally need a 20 up to 30 years investment cycle. So nobody will start investing now under the existing regulatory framework, we are forbidding the very, uh uh, very, uh, needed technologies that we want, uh, to, uh, to enhance, want to incentivize. Uh, so, uh, I really would like to hear the answer of the commission, uh, whether, uh, this, uh, this regulatory burdens, uh, for new investments, for new decarbonization investments, uh, are sustainable. And we see that there is, uh, 2031, uh, review clause. Uh, but 2031 is really far away from now. So, uh, if we want companies to invest today, we need to relieve them from administrative burdens today.”
  Carbon capture storage and utilisation
• “Thank you, thank you. Chair. I will speak in Bulgarian. Thank you very much for the detailed presentation of the Commission's position. And I also highly Appreciate the highest representation from the Commission, which correctly reflects the importance of this topic. However, I disagree with the political position of the Commission. The fact that the USA decided to drop out of the Paris Agreement and the behavior of China and India, which do not comply with their commitments, mean that we also need to change our position. Our constant refrain that we are the leading force. We need to be fully committed and responsible and the others will follow is just wishful thinking. This is not something that can apply to China and India. Therefore, all these subsequent goals for 2035 2040 need to meet a specific condition. And I disagree with the EPP coordinator, Mr. Peter Liese because he said not flexibility but conditionality of the European position. I believe that we should have all our future goals based on the condition that our partners will actually implement their commitments and not just undertake more and more commitments. This is how we are going to become more responsible, because otherwise our behaviour does not influence on the behaviour of other international actors. Thank you.”
  Climate efforts
• “Thank you. Thank you very much. First colleague. I very much agree with you that we should use our single market as a leverage, because it is a huge leverage in international and trade relations. But then I have two very brief questions to you. One is, do you say that Europe must be more united, that Europe must act together, that we need more and stronger Europe in order to defend together our interests? That is the main point. Thank you, Mr. Laszlo.”
  EU political integration
• “Thank you very much, chair. I will not talk about the Industrial emissions Directive. I'm sure we will have enough time for that. But in our previous communication with the Commission and personally with Madam Roosevelt, I have many times pointed out that in order to simplify environmental legislation and to make any fast track or fast permitting procedure really work. We need to touch upon environmental assessment and that many of the provisions of, for example, Critical Raw Materials Sector Net Zero Industry Act or the upcoming Industrial Accelerator Act are literally void without changing the models of impact of environmental assessment. So I must say, I'm happy to see it has been addressed. Still, I must say the legal instrument used is bizarre in my point of view, and hardly understandable even after some exchanges with commission officials. So I have two very concrete questions. Uh, this is first, the this, uh, is the new regulation on environmental assessment universal working across the board or it is only addressing chosen fast track industries. I really don't get it. And second, if it's not universal, if it's only working for industries that benefit from fast permitting under different, separate legislation, how do we ensure effective implementation on national level of simplification? Because we clearly see the risk to have a fast track and a slow track. If national authorities, who usually resist any attempt to be pushed to faster permitting, still keep the same policy. I would just give an example on the Industrial Emissions Directive. The national government simply did not allow negotiations on permitting. They said it's the thickest possible red line.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “I thank you, chair. I would just echo to the things that were already said by my colleague Yorubas. One is the risk of resource shuffling. I think we should take this very seriously because it's easy for our market to be flooded with so-called green steel or cement or other products, especially downstream. On 27 A already commented by by many colleagues, I think we as Parliament should impose a strict conditionality on this text on downstream. I have very concrete questions on products not included in the new annex. For example, why is big washing machine different from a small washing machine? I really can't get any explanation here. But more importantly, I would ask about water heaters and about heat pumps. Because these products are produced in Europe, they are under very strong competitive pressure and they are very important for the decarbonisation of our household, which is a great challenge. And last but not least, it won't be a question. It will be an unhappy statement. I think that the decarbonisation fund will simply not work. And this is a very, very poor solution to the big problem that we have with exports. Exports should be exempted in a way. It they should not be once charged when the primary products are imported and then under a very complicated procedure, may be released partially. Thank you.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• “Well, thank you, thank you. Adam. I don't think we. We need a whole minute. We're all busy. So I really thank all the shadow rapporteurs for the wonderful cooperation and for achieving a really broad consensus over our compromises. I think it's a strong sound position, and I hope we will successfully defend it before our colleagues. And then on the Trilogues. Thank you very much. Once again.”
  EU political integration
• “Thank you. Chair. Madam Minister, dear Commissioner, dear colleagues. I'm afraid there is a challenge we are overlooking here in this debate, and it is the widespread feeling of many of our citizens expressed, by the way, in a rather radical way, by our far right colleagues, that the EU is making big sacrifices to no avail. That we are leading the way of climate ambition while our global competitors are following only to stab us in the back. And there is certain truth in this. We must admit. But most importantly, we must address this public concern because it is serious. We might not agree with it, but we certainly need to communicate with the people who express it. And this, in my opinion, should happen exactly on the highest possible diplomatic level, which is the conference of parties in Brazil coming in in a few days only. And this should happen in a quite open and sincere way. In my point of view, by saying that our climate ambition is strong, it is sincere, but it is hardly unconditional, and that any new targets that we impose on our economy, society and industry should depend on China's India's, Brazil's reduction. But I mean effective reduction of emissions and not only reduction emission pledges. Thank you very much.”
  Climate efforts
• “Thank you. Thank you very much, chair. I will try to stick to less than than two minutes, although the the topic is so broad, but we know that that scarcity of water is all over Europe and things are getting worse lately. We even see that we have quite dry weather in Brussels lately, which is really bizarre. On the other hand, we have a number of quite ambitious Legislation and regulations in European and national level that don't seem to be extremely effective in managing water scarcity. Just recently, we adopted the revision of the Industrial Emissions Directive, which provides for mandatory water efficiency levels, the so-called environmental performance levels, mandatory exactly for water, so we could collect best practices all over Europe within the civil process and make sure that permitting is issued only to industries which really observe best practices in water efficiency. We also have in the Industrial Emissions Directive, the transformation plans, including water efficiency strategy based on best practices. But here comes my my main question. I'm afraid that European industries have so many transition and transformation plans that they are literally unable to abide to any, any one of them in some. Some big industries need to prepare for five six transition plans in the years to come. And my experience shows that if you have five transition plans aiming at the same goal, you normally abide to no one. You really need to have one integrated such plan, and furthermore, that such a plan should be a transition and investment plan showing the needed investments and possibly the possible public support. As you said, the two thirds are still public money involved in water management and the opportunities to involve private capital. So does your strategy foresee for such integrated transition and investment planning for industries to abide to best practices. Thank you.”
  Industrial emissions directive (IED)
• “Thank you. So it's the second time I hear from the ECN group that the RF has somehow sharply increased the European debt burden. But I look at facts and figures, and I see that during and after Covid, our debt has increased much more slowly than the Chinese and the US debt and is now below the Chinese and far, far below the US. So doesn't it seem, at the end of the day that the RF was a rather efficient financial instrument?”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets