Julie RECHAGNEUX

Policy topics Julie RECHAGNEUX is active on

What Julie RECHAGNEUX has said (41)

• 2026-06-17 “In France, we are facing a permanent and systemic onslaught in our data. It's absolutely shocking. We are the 2nd, hardest hit country by these attempts to steal data. This was a major issue for employees of France Travail. Immigration officers' data was for sale on the dark web, And over 2 weeks, public data were accessed. So this is something that's happening every day in France. And it's not just the financial risk. It's people who are facing real threats to their safety, threats of kidnapping. And so data have become the new gold of the 21st century. For 20 years now, the, Europe has claimed to be a leader when it comes to protecting data. But protecting data is about building systems that are resilient to attacks. It's avoiding data being exposed at the 1st attempt. That really is the issue of our time, and we must live up to the challenge.”
  Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
• 2026-06-17 “In France, we are facing a permanent and systemic onslaught on our data. It's absolutely shocking. We are the Second hardest hit country by these attempts to steal data. This was a major issue for employees of France Travail. Immigration officers data was for sale on the dark web, and over two weeks public data were accessed. So this is something that's happening every day in France. And it's not just the financial risk, it's people who are facing real threats to their safety. Threats of kidnapping. And so data have become the new gold of the 21st century. For 20 years now, the Europe has claimed to be a leader when it comes to protecting data. But protecting data is about building systems that are resilient to attacks. It's avoiding data being exposed at the first attempt. That really is the issue of our time, and we must live up to the challenge.”
  Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
• 2026-02-12 “P-000618/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU wine package published on 26 February 2026 1 will provide a modernised policy framework to support a competitive, resilient and future-oriented EU wine sector. Although it does not contain a specific section on the common commercial policy, it will strengthen the sector’s capacity to seize emerging market opportunities. The wine sector also represents an offensive sector for the EU in its Free Trade Agreement negotiations, where EU wine exports are supported through tariff liberalisation, protection of geographical indications or addressing non-tariff barriers. Pursuant Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 2 , economic coercion exists where a third country applies or threatens to apply a third-country measure affecting trade or investment in order to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by the EU or a Member State, thereby interfering in the legitimate sovereign choices of the EU or a Member State. In the situations described, it seems that there is a restriction of trade that is however not intended to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act, thereby interfering in legitimate sovereign choices. Therefore, the Commission is currently not planning to activate the Anti-Coercion Instrument with regards to possible trade restrictions affecting the wine sector. Nevertheless, if such restrictions are in violation of international trade rules, different avenues are likely to exist to seek remedies, like the initiation of a dispute settlement under the World Trade Organisation Agreement, or under EU Free Trade Agreements. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/471/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2675/oj/eng.”
  EU-US trade relations · Trade relations with China
• 2026-02-10 “E-000559/2026 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The transposition deadline of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) 1 is 29 May 2026. The Commission’s current priority is therefore to support Member States with a pragmatic and cost-effective transposition of the EPBD, including Article 14, into national law, i.e. through guidance 2 , dialogues and technical support to Member States. Therefore, the Commission is currently focussing on providing hands-on support in the implementation process. According to Article 28, the Commission will evaluate and review the EPBD by end of 2028 at the latest. The Commission will start the preparations of the EPBD review exercise in 2027 and consider possible simplification to the EPBD in that framework. The Commission will also take a pragmatic approach when ensuring the proper implementation and enforcement of the EPBD. When checking the transposition of Article 14, the Commission will take into account whether the objective of the provision, to ensure that effective recharging opportunities are provided at national level, is met. The assessment will be made on a case-by-case basis, also taking into account technological progress, such as fast charging infrastructure, and other relevant specific circumstances such as buildings with high turnover. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will monitor the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1275/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202506438&qid=1772032256012, Annex 9.”
  Road transport environmental policy · EV charging infrastructure
• 2026-01-22 “E-000255/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission There is currently no harmonised EU legislation governing the on-road safety of electric micromobility products, except for speed pedelecs 1 . These products fall under the Machinery Directive 2 , covering i.a. battery safety, while enforcement is carried out by the national market surveillance authorities. Where products are not covered by harmonised legislation, the General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR) 3 requires those products placed on the EU market to be safe. Manufacturers bear the main responsibility for product’s safety. Under the GPSR, the Commission may take EU action against products posing a serious risk, including by prohibiting or restricting their sale or imposing testing or marketing conditions. Ensuring product compliance, notably for goods sold online and imported from third countries, remains a major Single Market challenge, as highlighted in the Single Market Strategy and the e-commerce communication. To address this, the Commission has announced a revision of the Market Surveillance Regulation 4 , as part of the European Product Act (EPA), also covering standardisation and conformity assessment. It aims to close regulatory loopholes in e-commerce, strengthen digital tools, enhance cooperation and pool resources. At the same time, the revision of the Union Customs Code 5 will reinforce enforcement, including by making online suppliers or platforms responsible for the financial and non-financial obligations related to the products they sell, through the ‘deemed importer’ concept, and EU-level tools such as the EU Customs Data Hub and the EU Customs Authority. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02013R0168-20241127. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02006L0042-20190726. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32023R0988. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02019R1020-20240523. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02013R0952-20221212.”
  Liability for online marketplaces · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2025-11-04 “E-004312/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission opened a safeguard investigation on manganese- and silicon-based alloys in December 2024. In the analysis it considered relevant imports, production costs, tariff classifications, raw material inputs and end uses. The investigation confirmed that silicon metal does not compete directly with ferro-alloys and that imports of silicon decreased during the most recent period. The conditions for safeguard measures for silicon metal were not met and it was therefore excluded from the product scope. The Commission remains ready to reassess the situation and to initiate a trade defence investigation based on a duly substantiated request. Currently, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) 1 can intervene only when redundancies are confirmed. In April 2025, the Commission proposed amending the EGF Regulation, as one of the flagship actions of the EU’s Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector, to allow anticipatory support for workers at risk of imminent redundancy due to major restructuring events. This proposal is under discussion with the co-legislators. The Commission has also adopted the Clean Industrial State Aid Framework (CISAF) 2 . Section 6 provides Member States with tools to support production of net-zero products 3 and to support new or recovered critical raw materials necessary for the production of the net-zero products. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/european-globalisation-adjustment-fund-for-displacedworkers-2021-2027.html. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:C_202503602. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02024R1735-20250817.”
  State Aid · Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market
• 2025-11-04 “E-004313/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Proposal for a Regulation addressing the negative trade-related effects of global overcapacity on the Union steel market 1 provides explicitly that the Commission should assess the necessity to adjust the scope of products covered by this regulation and, if deemed necessary, it should consider making a legislative proposal to add additional steel products, including products that are made of or contain a significant amount of steel. This commitment is reflected in the enacting terms of the regulation, namely Article 9(1). The final decision on this aspect of the proposal will depend on the outcome of the ongoing ordinary legislative procedure. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism’s (CBAM) 2 potential extension to downstream products 3 is guided by criteria including carbon leakage risk. In that context, the cost impact is duly considered. The impact assessment accompanying the proposal has provided additional analysis. The Commission proposed a temporary measure to address carbon leakage in the context of exports which entered into force on 1 January 2026. This measure is designed to support decarbonisation efforts of certain EU installations producing CBAM goods. Strengthening demand for low-carbon and high-quality industrial materials is essential for the competitiveness of the EU’s industrial ecosystem. Work is ongoing to prepare measures under the industrial decarbonisation accelerator act 4 that improve market conditions for such materials, including by promoting predictable, transparent and resilient value chains. These efforts aim to ensure that upstream and downstream segments of the steel value chain remain well aligned, while supporting the EU’s broader decarbonisation and competitiveness objectives. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)726&lang=en. 2 https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en. 3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A European Steel and Metals Action Plan, COM(2025)125 final; https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/european-steel-and-metalsaction-plan. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2025-06-26 “E-002586/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Imbalances in the power system are a result of incorrect forecast, either on supply or demand side, or a result of unplanned and unexpected events (such as power plant outage). While the Commission does not have a consolidated assessment of such incidents in the Member States, under the System Operation Guidelines 1 , the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) has an obligation to publish an annual report, which provides a pan-European overview of all the grid incidents from the previous year 2 . These reports also explain the causes of the most serious incidents and identify improvements that could possibly support long-term operational security. The assessment of the National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) revealed that Member States have significantly closed the gap to achieving the 2030 energy and climate targets, including reaching a share of at least 42.5% of renewable energy 3 . As outlined in the Affordable Energy Action Plan, a fast roll-out of clean homegrown energy will contribute to lower energy prices and enhance EU’s energy security. Meeting the EU’s renewable energy targets will require investments in grid infrastructure combined with a wider effort to enhance energy system integration and flexibility, including also storage and demand-side response. The existing EU legislative framework is designed to ensure that such developments take place. Complementing the NECPs and the existing legal framework, the Clean Industrial Deal and the Affordable Energy Action Plan aim to mobilise investments to make the best use of Europe's homegrown renewable potential and deliver lower and more stable energy prices over time. 1 Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1485. 2 https://www.entsoe.eu/network_codes/sys-ops/annual-reports/. 3 COM(2025) 274 final.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration · EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2025-02-03 “E-000460/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation 1 , adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, has entered into force and will apply from 12 August 2026. However, some obligations, including on reuse targets, will enter into force only as of 2030. The Commission has launched a study 2 to assess a possible exclusion of pallet wrappings and straps from the reuse targets for transport packaging as laid down in Article 29(2) and (3). The study relies on literature review and consultation of the relevant stakeholders to get primary information. The methodological approach to assess a possible exemption is based on the Commission’s empowerment outlined in Article 29(18). Therefore, food safety and hygiene issues, environmental issues and economic impacts (including possible supply chain disruptions) related to the exclusive use of pallet wrappings and straps in transport operations are being thoroughly assessed. In addition, the study is assessing the related administrative burden on concerned stakeholders. This comprehensive methodological approach ensures a high-quality outcome and a deep analysis of all relevant sustainability aspects. The study is to be completed by July 2025. Based on its results, the Commission intends to draft and propose the related delegated act under Article 29(18) of the Regulation before the end of 2025. This timeframe will ensure predictability for economic operators well before the application of the related targets, by 2030. 1 Regulation (EU) 2025/40 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 on packaging and packaging waste, amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2019/904, and repealing Directive 94/62/EC, OJ L, 2025/40, 22.1.2025. 2 Study launched under the ordinary Commission’s procurement procedure: Framework Contract No ENV.B.3/FRA/2023/0012.”
  Re-use of packaging · Sustainable packaging
• 2024-11-27 “E-002692/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully aware of the importance of the Chinese export market for EU cognac and brandy producers and the consequences of China’s retaliatory measures. In this context, the Commission stands ready to consider all possibilities available within the Common Market Organisation 1 to offer appropriate support to EU brandy and wine spirit sector. However, spirit drinks do not benefit of any EU aid for their production, apart from being eligible for promotion aid in third countries. The Commission will always stand firmly and fearlessly on the side of EU producers, industry, open and fair trade. The Commission has followed this investigation very closely since its initiation and intervened on a number of occasions to express its objections to the questionable nature of China's allegations and subsequent measures. The Commission has taken action over the imposition of provisional duties by challenging these duties at the World Trade Organization (WTO). By expressing its disagreement with China's WTO-incompatible measures already at provisional stage, the EU is taking strong early action to protect the interests of its industry and economy. In parallel, the Commission has engaged, and will continue to engage, with the Chinese authorities, Member States and relevant industry organisations to defend the interests of the EU’s cognac and brandy sectors in the face of the Chinese tariffs. 1 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671–854.”
  Trade relations with China · Export of EU agri-food products
• 2024-11-14 “E-002535/2024 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Agreement associating Canada to Pillar II, ‘Global Challenges and European Industrial Competitiveness’, of the Horizon Europe Programme 1 , was signed on 3 July 2024 and published in the Official Journal on 26 July 2024 2 . The European Parliament Committee on Industry, Research and Energy was regularly informed on the negotiations. Reciprocity and the possibility for legal entities established in the EU to participate in projects, programmes and activities of Canada equivalent to those under Pillar II is expressly provided for in Article 3 of the Protocol to the Agreement and is thus one of the conditions for the association of Canada to Horizon Europe. 2. Canadian entities participating in Horizon Europe must abide by the requirements set out in the calls for proposals and in the grant agreements. In addition, in line with Article 22(5) of the Horizon Europe Regulation 3 , the EU can put restrictions on the participation of Canadian entities (or of any third country’s entities) in Horizon Europe actions related to EU strategic assets, interests, autonomy or security (Article 2 of the Protocol to the Agreement). Furthermore,the Commission may request specific information or assurances in this regard, including whether reciprocal access to equivalent Canadian projects, programmes and activities has been or will be granted to EU entities, before deciding on whether Canadian entities can be considered eligible to participate in such restricted actions. 3. A non-exhaustive list of the existing equivalent Canadian projects, programmes and activities which are reciprocally open to the participation of EU entities is set out in Annex II of the Protocol. 1 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en 2 OJ L, 2024/2007, 26/07/2024. 3 OJ L 170, 12/05/2021.”
  Strategic Screening in International Research Cooperation · EU research funding
• 2024-10-28 “E-002277/2024 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission published on 27 September 2024 for feedback a draft delegated act 1 setting out the methodology for determining the greenhouse gas emissions savings of low-carbon fuels. The consultation closed on 25 October 2024. As required under Article 9(5) of the Hydrogen and Gas Market Directive 2 , the draft is consistent with the methodology agreed for determining the greenhouse gas emissions savings of renewable hydrogen and recycled carbon fuels 3 , including the same pathway that considers the emission intensity of electricity based on the annual electricity mix. The pathway for sourcing fully renewable electricity is specifically required by the Renewable Energy Directive 4 while no dedicated pathway for sourcing nuclear power is set out under the Gas Market Directive 5 . Nevertheless, the Commission intends to explore also these pathways in the context of a future review of the draft delegated act at the latest by July 2028. The Commission will take into account the feedback received and adopt the final text of the delegated act before submitting it to the European Parliament and the Council, which will have two months to examine the proposals and to accept or reject them. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14303-Methodology-to-determine-thegreenhouse-gas-GHG-emission-savings-of-low-carbon-fuels_en 2 Directive (EU) 2024/1788. 3 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/1185 of 10 February 2023 supplementing Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing a minimum threshold for greenhouse gas emissions savings of recycled carbon fuels and by specifying a methodology for assessing greenhouse gas emissions savings from renewable liquid and gaseous transport fuels of non-biological origin and from recycled carbon fuels. O.J. L 157/20, of 20.06.2023. 4 Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652, OJ L, 2023/2413, 31.10.2023. 5 Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on common rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Directive (EU) 2023/1791 and repealing Directive 2009/73/EC (recast), OJ L, 2024/1788, 15.7.2024.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-28 “E-002284/2024 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The services offered by Galileo 1 , Copernicus 2 , and in the future by the Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite (IRIS²) 3 are crucial to the competitiveness of the EU and its Member States and to delivering on EU priorities including security and defence. Guaranteed funding is essential to maintain, upgrade, and reinforce the EU's space assets. The Commission has started to develop, within the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, new funding mechanisms for space: through the CASSINI initiative 4 promoting the leverage of private capital for the growth and scale up of start-ups and small and medium enterprises; or, in the case of IRIS 2 , through a public-private partnership in the form of a concession agreement with industry 5 . In the next multiannual financial framework, new funding approaches may be considered. The European Space Agency (ESA) is a trusted partner for EU space initiatives and already assigned by the Commission with important tasks notably, for the implementation of Galileo, the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service 6 , Copernicus and IRIS². The Commission will assess the future role of ESA and other actors, considering the increased needs of the space sector in the evolving geopolitical landscape. The Commission - ESA integrated team for the IRIS² implementation is a useful blueprint. The upcoming EU Space Law aims to establish a single market for space, ensuring resilience, safety, and sustainability in space activities. This new set of rules for the EU and global players accessing the single market will provide clarity for the industry and it will boost the European space industry's competitiveness and position the EU as a global standards-setter in innovative markets. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/galileo-satellite-navigation_en 2 https://www.copernicus.eu/en 3 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/iris2-secure-connectivity_en 4 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/entrepreneurship_en 5 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/commission-takes-next-step-deploy-iris2-secure-satellite-system2024-12-16_en 6 https://www.euspa.europa.eu/eu-space-programme/egnos”
  EU competences on space policy
• “The main problem for housing in France is precarity. 75% of French could have social housing. And the reason for that precarity is the policies from the EU, which means that workers have too low income to be able to afford housing, and also constraints on construction, which was also adopted here, particularly constraints on energy renovation, which is why we want the European Commission to stop interfering.”
  EU housing policy
• “Merci. Thank you. The truth is, if we don't change directions, the destiny of our car industry will be sealed. Our companies are overwhelmed by standards, and they're being sacrificed. Whereas the European Commission has come up with new rules. China has built new factories. So the whole chain from from mine to manufacture. And this is undermining our industry and this reflects our powerlessness. We need to put our feet back down on the ground. We're. Skilled at thermal energy. And we need to invest this and not just try to invest only in electric.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “(09:17:07 – 09:18:30): Thank you. We know what our armies are currently lacking. We know that, many European countries are developing the technology we need. Now we need to narrow the gap between innovation proper and its deployment on the ground. That's the point of agile. The current, compromise improves the text. We welcome better structuring for financing, better support, the inclusion of, defense critical strategic technology components. We welcome a recognition of supply chain security in the award criteria. That will make the fund more useful for our armies. 2 points I'd like to recall here. Fund governance, we regret the fact that our amendment was rejected to better coordinate agile with the funding of the European Defense Agency. That would have avoided duplication and overlap. Second amendment concerning the role of member states. We believe that it is important to have better guarantees to steer funds towards the needs of our armies to strengthen capacity on the ground. That is what should guide the financing decisions for the fund to be truly agile, governance needs to be simpler, and we need to draw an expertise of member states. Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “(10:30:19 – 10:31:54): Thank you very much. All I can say is that we since the beginning, we've been against this temporary de decarbonization fund. We rejected it. Then we're registering it now. Why? Because right from the beginning, it was it didn't come forward with the right, conception. The result of all of this is that it doesn't protect. It penalizes us in the midst of the green deals regulatory frenzy. Nowadays, it's more expensive, and it's just more advantageous, profitable to invest elsewhere. And that's the exact opposite of what we intended. Commission, the only solution they have is to protect downstream what's weakened upstream. And tomorrow, every single sector is going to be asking to be exempted. So it's unmanageable, and that's quite ironic for a system that was supposed to simplify things and protect things. On the TDF, it's the same idea. Supposed to increase investment, but there's nothing that pushes forward efficiency. There's no visibility for those investing, and there's just extra complexity. And this, I think, makes it difficult to use. At the best, this will be a partial correction of the CBAM's negative effect. And therefore, we're clear. CBAM revenues have to be fully reallocated to member states because they're best placed to support their industries and enable genuine productive investments. Thank you.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• “Thank you very much. Every time Europe decides to take action, we have the same result. More regulation and more constraints at every crossroads of our existence. The Commission has done the same thing. They keep intervening and they keep failing. Today, the Commission has adopted a plan for affordable housing. But what we did not want was more intrusion in national legislation. What the housing sector really needs is, is structural changes to get out of the housing crisis. And that goes through a housing omnibus. So it's easier to get housing on the market and take away the excessive environmental Constraints and reduce the cost of construction by tackling it at the root. So we don't want the commission to keep interfering more and more. They should know that they should when they should step back, and they should avoid creating crisis, which they then try and solve.”
  EU housing policy
• “(17:59:56 – 18:01:18): I think that, what we're seeing today is, very, late coming in. We are looking at the opening of the market, those politically responsible while people others other countries are, setting up protective measures. I think that we should have a lot of responsibility here. We're looking at the steel industry, which is being penalized by our approach. What we're seeing is an increase in bureaucracy, which is having an impact on our manufacturers and which is leading to a very expensive industry. We have to look at those who are working in the steel industry. It feels as though they've been abandoned overnight, and, we need to have a proper and credible, project. We have no strategic approach here. It's time to wake up, but waking up should not lead to more technocratic measures. We are faced with a world of unfair competition, of protectionism. And at last, we need European protectionism to make sure that whether upstream or downstream, we protect our industry before it is too late. Mister Vander. Thank you for set of comment.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “I'll speak French. So I'm going to be the dissident voice in this harmony of agreement, because we're looking at fragmentation of the national systems, which is worrying because Europe is refusing to assume any kind of ambition in scientific terms, and we're not really addressing the problems. The threats on academic performance don't come from a lack of institutional autonomy, nor in some sort of idea of lack of independence of scientists and researchers. It's because there are certain university sectors which are increasing in a lack of consistency between the strategic national priorities and the agendas for research. We also refute the idea of the fifth liberty, applying to research and installing almost automatic circulation of sensitive data. That's dangerous, dangerous for sovereignty, security and defence. The objective in European Research Area that is integrated would apply the same logic, where the member states would lose command over their investments, and we reject this harmonisation. Any mechanism supervision system is something we would reject. This idea of mutual surveillance is one idea, but we see it becoming an implicit standard. That's why we don't want a prescriptive charter at European level. And we think that the university should be in charge of their own agenda. We express solidarity and complete support to Hungary, which is completely excluded from this era at the moment from Horizon and Erasmus as well defend the fact that Hungary needs to be reintegrated as soon as possible into this programme. Thank you.”
  Governance of academic priorities within the EU
• “I will speak in French, if you don't mind. Mister chair, rapporteur, I am taking the floor today on behalf of Julie. And I'd like to thank you for the quality of the work you've put into this report on the Euratom programme. The text is finally acting on what we've been calling for for many years. We want to get back to basics. For our energy policies, for far too long, the Commission has been waging an absurd ideological war against nuclear energy by excluding it systematically from so-called green energies. Now, this has set us back a long way and has led to a lack of skills, competencies and impacted our industrial sovereignty. Whilst other global powers have leapt forward with their energy technology, all of this to satisfy the dogma of a punitive green energy strategy. It's just window dressing. Today, von der Leyen is, uh, is exercising a U-turn and has accepted this was a strategic mistake. It is about time. Thanks to this report, we are finally a changing from a defensive approach that is waste treatment and instead embarking on a real industrial policy, and this is something that we can support. We want to relaunch the use of a fission and invest in research so that we can have new generation reactors, but we need to go further. We need to support nuclear energy, but this cannot be an isolated approach. Cofinancing needs to be open to other EU programs either electrification, securing critical materials or health applications. The EU needs to support member states like Belgium, who have taken the pragmatic approach and extended the lifespan of their existing power plants. We believe that we cannot restrict this to Brussels. We need to increase our competitiveness and our strategic energy across the EU. Thank you.”
  Nuclear energy
• “Thank you. We know what our armies are currently lacking. We know that, many European countries are developing the technology we need. Now we need to narrow the gap between innovation proper and its deployment on the ground. That's the point of agile. The current, compromise improves the text. We welcome better structuring for financing, better support, the inclusion of, defense critical strategic technology components. We welcome a recognition of supply chain security in the award criteria. That will make the fund more useful for our armies. 2 points I'd like to recall here. Fund governance, we regret the fact that our amendment was rejected to better coordinate agile with the funding of the European Defense Agency. That would have avoided duplication and overlap. Second amendment concerning the role of member states. We believe that it is important to have better guarantees to steer funds towards the needs of our armies to strengthen capacity on the ground. That is what should guide the financing decisions for the fund to be truly agile, governance needs to be simpler, and we need to draw an expertise of member states. Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Séjourné. Well, you've already partly answered the question that I wanted to put to you. The housing crisis. We're all aware of it. We know that the percentage of what people spend on rent is going up all the time. More and more people are forced into the outskirts, and things are difficult in rural areas as well. And this is Um, revealing on something more because the EU is partly responsible for the housing crisis due to the mistakes that it's made, environmental standards, for instance, that's made it more expensive to build, and it's meant that construction has lagged. Then there's the matter of posted workers and the EU regulations on that, which has been a problem for local job markets. And there's a rather lax migration policy, which has also added pressure to the housing market. Then the politics, the policy of urbanisation, which has led to overpopulation in the cities and depopulation of rural areas. And then there's the current concept of the EU energy market, which led to inflation, which has put more economic pressure on households. What the EU is trying to do is counter to what the member States are already doing. The EU has in fact suffocated local action and we already know what the solutions are, at least in France, the country I know best local actors know the best way forward. You said that competitiveness would be guiding your action, and to achieve that, well, you could make things easier in terms of simplifying standards in the construction sector and in France, you have to move away from the idea of zero land take. Then there's the matter of energy efficiency rules for buildings. If you look at the current trajectory, well, materials are becoming more expensive for owners. That has an impact on rents, and it means that.”
  EU housing policy
• “Yet again. The European Commission is proposing clean technology as a silver bullet. They're suggesting platforms that are to. But it's a failure. Our housing stock is ill adapted. The panels are being produced in China and our factories are closing. European batteries are three times as expensive as Chinese ones, and the market share is under 5% globally. This is a false solution all too often. And instead of admitting the failure, Russell continues. And the moving away from nuclear, which is the only steerable and competitive form of energy. Enough. We're ruining our own competitiveness, destroying our industrial bases and shying away from real, sovereign, local and efficient solutions.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you very much for organizing this. The competitivity of the European aerospace industry is not going to be taken for granted. We have China working methodically and is very sovereign, and we're also looking at vertical integration and the new emerging space giant. We're captive to U.S. markets, preventing any kind of upscale development of an industry, and we're also seeing companies not being able to meet external foreign competition. Now, how can we ensure that we become a real lever of competitivity? Should we perhaps have to have a European space platform? We are seeing a chronical overcapacity, redundance, and reduced profitability in the industry. We are emerging some very small actors which are interfering with the market, and we are seeing that we need a new movement forward. Thank you.”
  EU competences on space policy
• “Thank you very much. Thank you. Chair A woman chairman. The topic that we are discussing today is a serious one. It's very sensitive when we're talking about protecting victims of rape. Requires a legal framework that takes into the idea of consent. The Patriots of Europe pursues a simple objective that is protecting victims while ensuring legal certainty and national sovereignty. We are against signing the EU, a competence that is not theirs. We do not have a strong legal basis to harmonise the definition of rape when we're talking about cross-border challenges as well as organised crime. Uh, it's not something that the EU has to deal with. Uh, rape is something that falls within national legislative frameworks, and it's their constitutional authority. The EU cannot impose a uniform definition of rape on member states. In fact, we have the Istanbul Convention in article 93 that sets out a definition. Furthermore, France has also said that states can adapt their legislation based on evolving state of affairs. What we need is a protective framework. For example, within the definition of sexual exploitation, the introduction of sexual mutilation, forced marriage, cyber bullying, cyber harassment, etc. all of these issues infringe on the intimate lives and sexual intimacy and private lives of individuals. Rape, therefore, cannot be interpreted as a sexual exploitation of women or children. I'd like to like to remind you that all individuals, including men, are fall victims to rape. It's very important to ensure that all minors cannot provide consent. That is something that must be recognized. And we have to focus on sexual education of minors as well. We have two main principles that have to be taken up. Firstly, uh, national sovereignty and refusing ideology. So we have to ensure that this is something that is respected within our policy making. Thank you.”
  Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
• “Well, reality is cruel. International trade is not a neutral playground. It is this constant struggle. China, in the meantime, is protecting its It's industry, it's subsidizing it massively and it's overtaking us. It's even wanting to impose our electrical supply networks even though we have other plans. This is completely irresponsible. China has been a mystery for us, but it isn't really. It's been a power for years. We have to protect our market. Bring back production. Ensure and do what China has been doing for years. This is the price of our sovereignty. If Europe wants to remain a power, it's time that it started acting like one.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · Trade relations with China
• “Thank you. We welcome the spirit of iris squared, which is part of the big European tradition of Galileo and so forth. Mobilizing industrial giants is something that can bring Europeans together to work in a consortium model. Public private investment collaborations are very important and can deliver a lot. 30% of the SMEs operate in this way and this can be a positive way forward. We also, of course, need to look at autonomy and security and resilience from a strategic point of view, the ownership of the satellites and transmission rates is very important. Will they be the property of the European Union or the parties, or of the participants in the consortium or of the funders and contributors? It could be difficult to manage resources, to allocate responsibility and to manage capacity. If we're not clear about this, transmission is also a complex question. Data will be transmitted by satellite, but where private operators are involved, we will need to ensure that there's proper monitoring and control over the source and origin of the data. A lot of data is already stocked on American servers, and if we're going to decouple from America, perhaps you could comment on that too. What will be the cost for the security of our data and the cost full stop? Then the question of potential risks. You said 2030, 2031 was perhaps the our target time, but starting has already got many satellites in orbit, so we're already falling behind. How can we rectify this? Because we need to advance in telecommunications and aerospace research. We need to find partners who are up to the level of cooperation with us, so that we can really achieve our results.”
  EU competences on space policy
• “Thank you. Chair. I was speaking French and on behalf of my colleague Julio Chenu. Chair. It's an area where, as a French MEP, we need to be very attentive. Indeed. It's the Euratom treaty. Firstly, because it's a specific legal framework, distinct from European common law, founded on close cooperation between member states, where the national prerogatives are historically returned and they have a determining role. Also because France has a lot of experience in the sector. And it's a technology which has a lot of interest recognized by all of us. And we have every interest in making a success of this. And finally, because lines are shifting in Europe, more and more countries are opening up to nuclear. Italy is moving towards new generation technologies. A country like Denmark is also showing signs of moving forward. And the dismantling of Ignalina in Lithuania recalls to us how important decommissioning is in terms of securing nuclear sites. We regret, therefore, chair, that nuclear has been sidelined from the big priorities, European priorities for nearly 20 years, whereas it remains to this day one of the instruments which is the most effective to guarantee our sovereignty, our energy sovereignty and therefore our competitiveness, our industrial competitiveness. Therefore, I will have a couple of series of comments.”
  Nuclear energy
• “Good morning. Thank you very much, director. Europe is spending huge sums to protect its space sovereignty. Roughly €10.5 billion. A large part of that is coming from national public funds. These programs are hoping to guarantee autonomous access to space and ensure Europeans capacity in this space in the face of international giants. 30% of contracts are to go to SMEs and startups. That's good, but we need clear action. Who is really steering this program? What place really is there for Member States, and how can we avoid these projects being monopolized by large groups? The aim is also to ensure that the different space ecosystems are anchored in different territories, supported by and involving SMEs and local structures. Wafer space, for example, is a project and startups like eBay, SpaceX they're developing new solutions in order to strengthen Europe's autonomy when it comes to space. We hope that this energy and dynamism will be involved in the European project. Without this, Europe will be hamstringing itself. We hope that this will be funded on sovereignty, the EU preference and fully involving member states in its governance. Space cannot become a new domain for technocratic centralisation. We hope that this ambition will be set out in a clear framework that will respect national sovereignty. Thank you.”
  EU competences on space policy
• “Said that you needed good laws to have good wine. I'm from Bordeaux and I could of course have brought you some so that you could see what we need to do to improve the sector. I see on a daily basis the pain of these winegrowers who don't see the fruits of their labors in the same way that they used to, and we therefore need to act. Europe needs to support these people so that their wine is not just languishing in a cellar. We need these crisis reserve proposals. The wine growers need them so desperately, and we need to wake up and realize this. It isn't just a question of managing the crisis, though. We need to see the global context. We have seen too much condemnation of the consumption of wine. It is part of our heritage, and we therefore can't allow miss von der Leyen to abandon this sector in negotiations with, for example, the US. We need to protect this sector with courage and with determination, because it is an absolute pillar of our European identity. Thank you. Thank you very much indeed.”
  Agricultural funding
• “Energetic European electricity networks are the backbone of European energy systems, but they are fragile at the moment. Many of our networks are over 40 years old, and many parts of them need to be replaced within ten years. We're talking about €584 billion in investment, which will be necessary by 2030 and around 40 billion just with regard to distribution networks. But we need planning here. Brussels, under the diktat of lobbies, cannot respond to issues. Projects are taking ages up to ten years for some agricultural industrial products. And that's because you wanted to build a single electricity market without ensuring its stability, sovereignty or security. And you talk about interconnections, but what you do that around 10% of European electricity is wasted every year in Europe is lost. So we want to see a sovereign, flexible network. We want to see European investments, but we want to see them at the service of member states rather than a technocratic dogma. The electricity is not a good. It's something that relates to power and sovereignty. It's something that people need. We don't think that France's energy needs should be dictated by the European Commission.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration
• “I'd like to take the floor for Mr. Bailey, who is the rapporteur for the, um, Patriots group. We should not let this become just another program. Um. And that is disconnected from reality. It shouldn't be transformed into a Green Deal because we've had errors. Um, mistakes made of this in the past, and it weakens the competitivity of our productive capacity. We want jobs, energy security, technological development, and competitivity. We don't want dogmas issued by Brussels translated into extra bureaucracy and obstacles, some creating value, some not. We want to use our own resources and also to be able to meet global challenges. For this to be realistic, we need a simplification in the rules. We need practical, good sense and effective solutions. We would like to invest towards nuclear energy strategically for carbon neutrality and security in Europe. We want to bring this back to the heart of our policies. This would mean that innovation and research would open up the path towards solutions. And in this spirit, it's really urgent to try and use the cbam mechanisms in order to ensure that there is no brake set on competitivity. We also want to open up to new technologies looking at nuclear issues to the automobile sector, which is a strategic industry for millions of European workers, which needs to be promoted. Also, it continues to be penalised by short term and short sighted Solutions. We like a clear Parliament permission which meets the real needs of the European Union and its workers. And that is what we as patriots are here for. We thank you for the work that's been done up until now, and we hope that we will work fruitfully with you in the future to prepare a text which will constitute a clear response from Parliament to to a position on sustainable reality for the future. Thank you.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “The commission is Showing humility and going back on some of its rules. Wisdom is being shown here, but then they're going to scale back some reporting. But is it enough? But will this bring down all the administration that's created? You know, 50,000 companies are affected by CSR and it will cause huge costs for some companies. The commission says that it will simplify, but some companies will only be exempted temporarily. They're not. The commission isn't questioning its overall logic of red tape. So omnibus doesn't solve the problem. The problem is structural overregulation suffocating our economy today over compliance costs 3 to 4% of GDP, and European companies spend up to five times more on regulation than US counterparts. So the Green Deal is really causing problems. Until we talk about that, this will just be a mere anecdote, this omnibus zlotowski.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• “Thank you. Commissioner, we need to be serious here. Nobody can really believe that. We can catch up on all the previous years in three months. These are. This is proof here that the European Commission has changed its idea. You promise a regulation changes, but you're still focusing on the administrative burden. So how many obligations have you actually deleted and how many do you plan on deleting in the future? You talk about European preference in public procurement. It's time. But do you really have a will to act in this area, knowing that this type of measure would mean that you'd have to completely change the approach in competitiveness in Europe. And you'd also be faced with the situation in some member states who have members in the renew group. What protections in specifically are there to avoid a massive imports of subsidized products? Well, if we talk about nuclear as the French, as a French commissioner, you defend it, but your voice is very weak compared to those of some of your colleagues who are very much anti-nuclear. Nuclear is a pillar of our our energy sovereignty, and we absolutely have to support that. Europe should not have any hesitations in this. You've also announced 100 billion of investment to stimulate the economy within Europe. But will that have any. Will that actually help? Can you guarantee that every investment will really help our competitiveness and won't just disappear in delocalization strategies? We need. If words aren't enough, we need action. And in the next few days, can you guarantee that by the end of your mandate, you won't be here just telling us the same story over and over again?”
  "Buy European" provisions
• “Thank you. The idea of this compass is quite clear. Areas need to diversify their supply chains and protect their industrial infrastructure. This is supposed to deliver objectives. But of course, the question of the means to achieve this coordination needs to be something real. And resources need to be focused on infrastructure projects. The risk of having a scattered approach to this is really quite worrying. An intergovernmental approach is really important to make sure that we have a proper structure which will serve the member states and industry. Then there's the legal dimension. European law is running the risk of establishing a parallel system, which is in contravention with the legal sovereignty of the member states. The White Paper focuses on a single, a single aspect. But is there a proper legal framework underpinning this, and does it fit into the legislation we have in place? We need to have a proper legal framework and legal predictability for industry. Otherwise, this will threaten both legal sustainability and industrial sustainability. So this is an initiative which has got to be more clearly targeted. It mustn't it can't just be some high sounding declarations that doesn't actually help industry. Otherwise we will simply end up with excessive centralisation where Brussels is dictating to countries and regions, and where. Industry makes no progress, but on the contrary, simply declines. And we see. More bureaucratic rigidity rather than less, which will simply sound the death knell to. Competitiveness and to international sovereignty. Thank you.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• “There's a further issue as well. The reform of the EU energy market. But here too, I think I would have to turn to your colleague, Mr. Jurgensen, to have a proper discussion about that. Then there's the matter of social housing and public housing. That must become an exception. That would alleviate pressure on that sector. Social housing is a hot topic in France, and this has to be something that helps people back into work and ideally eventually propel people into buying their own homes rather than living in social housing for the whole of one's life. So you're faced with two choices, Mr. Séjourné. Your loyalty will go to Europeans first, which means that you will go against the natural slant of the commission, which loves eating up new competences to correct problems that it has contributed to creating. Or you'll be loyal to Europe. The speaker corrects. You will stay loyal to the commission and you'll do exactly what they've been doing. More commission rules. More of a technocratic vision. So my question for you is what choice would you make? Faced with these two possibilities. Thank you.”
  EU housing policy
• “Are you not ashamed? Because in reality, the commission that the commission has been pursuing over the past few years is of de-growth. It's not because the extreme left and the left and the greens, the ones you're representing today, that you've tried to breathe these policies across the board, including into innovation policies that you haven't realized this is a complete failure and it's time to leave it behind.”
  Climate efforts
• “Thank you. It's a very clear report. It shows that there is a high price volatility, Particularly because of renewables that cannot be steered and so do not follow demand. The price peaks appear when renewables fall and when demand increases, and so we need more cross-border exchange and to use more border mechanisms. Market mechanisms. However, for France this would not be suitable because we do have a decarbonized market. The National Assembly and Senate agree. The EU has weakened our energy system and undermined our pricing system. We don't need greater interconnections, more interconnections, because it is our neighbours who will be benefiting from the stability of our nuclear plants. We don't need this open market. We need to adopt true tech neutrality, however, because France does want to be integrated, but we want to re-establish regular price rates in France to demonstrate that we are in fact decarbonised energy system, because at present, France's interests are not being defended in this area. Thank you.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• “Yes. Thank you, Madam Commissioner. You described this as a strategy for start ups. But for 20 years now, EU has been promoting an innovation friendly atmosphere. More than a third of high potential companies have left Europe. And only 8% of scale ups are in Europe. Why is this? Well, it's not with the lack of ideas, but we're not offering the right environment to these companies. Too many rules, rules, too many invisible barriers. Administrative logic that often ignores national realities on the ground. We are talking about laboratories for companies, but the real questions haven't been answered. How can we give young companies access to capital, infrastructure, public funds, patents and so on? How can we really help entrepreneurs who are just getting started in EU? We're not talking about in big research companies, but rural areas that have been forgotten. We don't need another text. We need direct support to Member States to provide the education, administrative and fiscal environment for companies. And we need European politics that doesn't strangle national strategies. With the pretext of uniform, uniform, uniform ization. We need industrial innovation. We need tools that are adapted to the economic reality. I have a simple question. Given the exacerbated global competitiveness. Why don't we give priority access to companies established in Europe to funding, particularly when we're looking at member states that are vulnerable in this area?”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you. I'll be speaking on behalf of Madame Lapierre. Thank you to the rapporteur, Madame Mantella. We are looking forward to the meeting with the shadow rapporteurs, bringing together the political groups and stakeholders in the industry. This would be good in order to understand the expectations of the industry. We need to be clear about the current situation and the challenges. The biotechnology is still in Europe, is struggling to compete with the US and China. It's not about the future, it's about the current reality. The EU needs to create the good opportunities in this sector that it has in other sectors by 2050. The bioeconomy could represent one third of the global economy. The PSA will table some amendments around the financing of biotechnology. Technology. She will also call for a new law on biotechnology. Would you like to? She would like to understand why certain projects have failed, and why some have then had to leave Europe. It's clear that we need to not repeat the mistakes of the past. Thank you very much for the collaboration and we're looking forward to supporting this strategic sector in the future. Thank you.”
  New Genomic Techniques