João OLIVEIRA

Policy topics João OLIVEIRA is active on

What João OLIVEIRA has said (80)

• 2026-07-15 “(18:14:27 - 18:17:34): Okay. So I'll try to be brief on the different questions. On the seal of quality, on the fears from the member states. So this is mostly due a lot of mythology and scaremongering that is being done around the EU Inc. Letterbox companies are there. They are there. They are being created every day. You don't need the EU Inc to create one. You go to a country. There's one country in Europe. In less than 20 minutes, you create a company. So this is nothing new. Letterbox companies. There's no evidence that countries with notaries, countries with unity of seats, or countries also where there's codetermination that there is less fraud or circumvention. So let's be clear on that. Then what are the absolute red lines? Let's not discriminate the EU Inc in relation to national companies. Let's not create additional requirements because it will not be used. It will be useless. So this is important, keeping the regulation also and avoiding creating too many additional rules. Then in terms of, let's say, the fiscality, social rights, I mean, they are still of application. The EU Inc changes nothing on this. Then on the question on the goal of the EU Inc, facilitate investment, fight fragmentation. And by the way, Business Europe, we do not advocate for fragmentation. And I just heard just now saying member states will be hampered from adding new requirements. That's why we need the EU Inc because member states do not stick to regulations and especially to directives, and they keep adding fragmentation to the internal market. On the question on is the fact that we're applying the Lex Societatis as the referring factor for codetermination, this doesn't make it complicated. This makes it simple because it's exactly what the court of justice in the Tui case has determined. This is just applying the normal rules, and it's even the opposite is much worse. Imagine you have fluctuating workers in many member states, and then you have to change your corporate structure according because of fluctuations in country A, B, C, D, and F. So it makes it much more much more complicated. Now in terms of risks, risks are always there. Whether we have EU Inc or not, we will always have to face risks. We are always hoping that 99.9% of companies will do the right thing, but risks will always be there. And we need the safeguards, of course, but not discriminating against the EU Inc. Now it is not true that this is being only devised for scale ups and startups. This was not the plan of the commission, and people like Corrado and myself that were in the justice for growth meetings of last year have witnessed this. This has never been a decision. It is always meant to be an open regime for everyone. And just a couple of more seconds. Again, this is not the SE. This is not an SE statute. And the SEs, all these Shell SEs, 50% of the SEs are in one country, and most of them are Shell companies. So but there are a lot of serious SEs, but we should not mix this up. SE is a very complicated statute. €120,000 to create. Ask an entrepreneur if he wants one. Thank you.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2026-07-15 “(16:42:56 - 16:44:50): Thank you, chair. I'd like to begin by thanking Mister Salvaji and the European Court of Auditors for this report on the cohesion policy and on the measures in support of youth employment. The report says that these subsidies for hiring young people weren't always designed to ensure sustainable jobs for young people and that in some cases, they are clearly inefficient. And as a result of inertia and transfer, inertia is the effect that is identified by circumstances in which those jobs that are subsidized would have existed even without the support from European funds. And the shift results from situations where subsidies are actually causing employers to hire certain workers rather than others, therefore, leading to a crowding out. So caused by European funds. So this means that the use of these European funds is really more favorable to employers who find ways of getting jobs subsidized by European funds. And it doesn't really help specific employees because once the subsidies disappear, the jobs disappear as well. So the question I have is whether in the various member state systems that were assessed in this study, did you find any sort of a way out to resolve these problems, or are these problems systemic in the use of European funds in practice when they end up subsidizing employers and don't guarantee employment to young workers? Thank you.”
  Youth employment & training
• 2026-07-15 “(17:37:17 - 17:43:26): Thank you. Thank you, madam chair, and thanks very much, to for inviting Business Europe for this very important debate and timely debate. This is the 1st big hearing on this topic in in the parliament since the proposal was there. So, we're happy to be here. This is a big priority for Business Europe, the the EU wing, and for the wider business community. And this is not only Business Europe that is asking for this. This was, as my colleagues were mentioning mentioning the Draghi report, the letter report, the council conclusions on many on many occasions, and this house as well, which has supported and has committed to deliver an instrument. Plus, there is a grassroots movement of around 25,000 companies, most of them, small, startups and scale ups, which, of course, signed a petition, they're called Ewing petition, and together with venture capitalists that are really advocating for the need for this in Europe. So from our perspective, the Ewing project should be supported, if Europe wants to take a definite step towards being more competitive. This is also about the credibility of Europe to do so. Is the EU wing going to solve all the problems that businesses are facing in the internal markets? And we, Business Europe, have been advocating or and pointing to a lot of them. No. It is not. And we should stop pretending that to that we are going to turn the EU Inc. Into something that it has not been designed to do. So it is part of the solution. It is a help way to to for for businesses, an enabling measure. And, it's mainly addressing the different 27, let's say, corporate legislations that businesses face when they're setting up their, shop. And, and this is where the UWink can play can play a role. But, no, this is not supposed to solve every single problem. And, no, this is not an SE. The SE is a completely different instrument. It's an European company form, which the Ewing is not. So we need to make that distinction because this is not supposed to be, mixed up. So is it also an instrument to solve other problems that are being identified, whether in whether we are talking about frauds or money laundering or or many other abuses or conventional labor law. I mean, is this the main instrument for the EU? No. It is not. So we should not also use the EU ink to solve problems that affect all companies and all stakeholders. This is a company law instrument, an optional instrument that is not going to solve every single problem. So we from these 2 perspective, it's important that we make these distinctions. Now from Business Bureau perspective, to make this right, to make the proposal right, we think that we need to stick as much as possible to the commission original proposal. We think that the commission original proposal hit the right notes. It's not perfect. There are things that need to be improved. And, for example, insolvency is 1 of them where we have quite a few criticism, but the right elements are there. We need to keep this regulation because this is the best antidote against, let's say, gold plating and fragmentation in the internal market, which the Ewing is intended to solve. So we need to to to keep this. Needs to be simple. And I emphasize the word simple because we have seen the documents coming from this house, the 1st draft documents, which we think are adding a little bit of complexity that will make this very unattractive to use, digital by design, relying on once only, which and all of these things are not new. We have, as my colleague was mentioning, the 2025 directive on company law, which added most of these elements, the creation digitally or simple or recognition of documents. This is old. It's already existing in the internal market. It's just being implemented on member states right now. We also think that this should be open to all companies. So we are totally against a reduction of the, let's say, of the scope of this. Let's think that a company needs to be, reassured that when it chooses a company form, it doesn't come with an expiration date. This is wrong to have an expiration date. But where is the brand of you, Inc, if you know if you grow and you become more successful that you have to change legal form. So this is not valuing the brand. This is not making this system more attractive, and it doesn't give any legal certainty if you have to make changes when you are on the way to success. Then, we also like the fact that there is the list of prohibited practices. I think this is brings a big added value. And then my colleagues, earlier were mentioning about safeguards, and I dedicate just the next minutes of my intervention to safeguards. So I heard the the words, it provides little controls, and there's only 1 single article on preventive control. I mean, sometimes I have the impression I didn't read the same text. So it is not true that there is only article 14. The whole ACUI on company law, on anti money laundering, on tax, on labor, it continues to apply to the EU Inc. So the fact that it's not written in the proposal does not mean that the general EU acquis is not applicable. So we need to be very clear on this on this aspect and and not try to, to to mislead this, this this reading of of the article. We do agree that we need we need more, we need, safeguards. The right safeguards, they need to be there, but they should not discriminate the Ewing against other normal companies. So I finished my intervention to say we need to make this right, and, and we are happy to contribute to that endeavor. Thank you very much.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2026-07-15 “(17:37:17 - 17:43:26): Thank you. Thank you, madam chair, and thanks very much, to for inviting Business Europe for this very important debate and timely debate. This is the 1st big hearing on this topic in in the parliament since the proposal was there. So, we're happy to be here. This is a big priority for Business Europe, the the EU wing, and for the wider business community. And this is not only Business Europe that is asking for this. This was, as my colleagues were mentioning mentioning the Draghi report, the letter report, the council conclusions on many on many occasions, and this house as well, which has supported and has committed to deliver an instrument. Plus, there is a grassroots movement of around 25,000 companies, most of them, small, startups and scale ups, which, of course, signed a petition, they're called Ewing petition, and together with venture capitalists that are really advocating for the need for this in Europe. So from our perspective, the Ewing project should be supported, if Europe wants to take a definite step towards being more competitive. This is also about the credibility of Europe to do so. Is the EU wing going to solve all the problems that businesses are facing in the internal markets? And we, Business Europe, have been advocating or and pointing to a lot of them. No. It is not. And we should stop pretending that to that we are going to turn the EU Inc. Into something that it has not been designed to do. So it is part of the solution. It is a help way to to for for businesses, an enabling measure. And, it's mainly addressing the different 27, let's say, corporate legislations that businesses face when they're setting up their, shop. And, and this is where the UWink can play can play a role. But, no, this is not supposed to solve every single problem. And, no, this is not an SE. The SE is a completely different instrument. It's an European company form, which the Ewing is not. So we need to make that distinction because this is not supposed to be, mixed up. So is it also an instrument to solve other problems that are being identified, whether in whether we are talking about frauds or money laundering or or many other abuses or conventional labor law. I mean, is this the main instrument for the EU? No. It is not. So we should not also use the EU ink to solve problems that affect all companies and all stakeholders. This is a company law instrument, an optional instrument that is not going to solve every single problem. So we from these 2 perspective, it's important that we make these distinctions. Now from Business Bureau perspective, to make this right, to make the proposal right, we think that we need to stick as much as possible to the commission original proposal. We think that the commission original proposal hit the right notes. It's not perfect. There are things that need to be improved. And, for example, insolvency is 1 of them where we have quite a few criticism, but the right elements are there. We need to keep this regulation because this is the best antidote against, let's say, gold plating and fragmentation in the internal market, which the Ewing is intended to solve. So we need to to to keep this. Needs to be simple. And I emphasize the word simple because we have seen the documents coming from this house, the 1st draft documents, which we think are adding a little bit of complexity that will make this very unattractive to use, digital by design, relying on once only, which and all of these things are not new. We have, as my colleague was mentioning, the 2025 directive on company law, which added most of these elements, the creation digitally or simple or recognition of documents. This is old. It's already existing in the internal market. It's just being implemented on member states right now. We also think that this should be open to all companies. So we are totally against a reduction of the, let's say, of the scope of this. Let's think that a company needs to be, reassured that when it chooses a company form, it doesn't come with an expiration date. This is wrong to have an expiration date. But where is the brand of you, Inc, if you know if you grow and you become more successful that you have to change legal form. So this is not valuing the brand. This is not making this system more attractive, and it doesn't give any legal certainty if you have to make changes when you are on the way to success. Then, we also like the fact that there is the list of prohibited practices. I think this is brings a big added value. And then my colleagues, earlier were mentioning about safeguards, and I dedicate just the next minutes of my intervention to safeguards. So I heard the the words, it provides little controls, and there's only 1 single article on preventive control. I mean, sometimes I have the impression I didn't read the same text. So it is not true that there is only article 14. The whole ACUI on company law, on anti money laundering, on tax, on labor, it continues to apply to the EU Inc. So the fact that it's not written in the proposal does not mean that the general EU acquis is not applicable. So we need to be very clear on this on this aspect and and not try to, to to mislead this, this this reading of of the article. We do agree that we need we need more, we need, safeguards. The right safeguards, they need to be there, but they should not discriminate the Ewing against other normal companies. So I finished my intervention to say we need to make this right, and, and we are happy to contribute to that endeavor. Thank you very much.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2026-07-15 “(18:14:27 - 18:17:34): Okay. So I'll try to be brief on the different questions. On the seal of quality, on the fears from the member states. So this is mostly due a lot of mythology and scaremongering that is being done around the EU Inc. Letterbox companies are there. They are there. They are being created every day. You don't need the EU Inc to create one. You go to a country. There's one country in Europe. In less than 20 minutes, you create a company. So this is nothing new. Letterbox companies. There's no evidence that countries with notaries, countries with unity of seats, or countries also where there's codetermination that there is less fraud or circumvention. So let's be clear on that. Then what are the absolute red lines? Let's not discriminate the EU Inc in relation to national companies. Let's not create additional requirements because it will not be used. It will be useless. So this is important, keeping the regulation also and avoiding creating too many additional rules. Then in terms of, let's say, the fiscality, social rights, I mean, they are still of application. The EU Inc changes nothing on this. Then on the question on the goal of the EU Inc, facilitate investment, fight fragmentation. And by the way, Business Europe, we do not advocate for fragmentation. And I just heard just now saying member states will be hampered from adding new requirements. That's why we need the EU Inc because member states do not stick to regulations and especially to directives, and they keep adding fragmentation to the internal market. On the question on is the fact that we're applying the Lex Societatis as the referring factor for codetermination, this doesn't make it complicated. This makes it simple because it's exactly what the court of justice in the Tui case has determined. This is just applying the normal rules, and it's even the opposite is much worse. Imagine you have fluctuating workers in many member states, and then you have to change your corporate structure according because of fluctuations in country A, B, C, D, and F. So it makes it much more much more complicated. Now in terms of risks, risks are always there. Whether we have EU Inc or not, we will always have to face risks. We are always hoping that 99.9% of companies will do the right thing, but risks will always be there. And we need the safeguards, of course, but not discriminating against the EU Inc. Now it is not true that this is being only devised for scale ups and startups. This was not the plan of the commission, and people like Corrado and myself that were in the justice for growth meetings of last year have witnessed this. This has never been a decision. It is always meant to be an open regime for everyone. And just a couple of more seconds. Again, this is not the SE. This is not an SE statute. And the SEs, all these Shell SEs, 50% of the SEs are in one country, and most of them are Shell companies. So but there are a lot of serious SEs, but we should not mix this up. SE is a very complicated statute. €120,000 to create. Ask an entrepreneur if he wants one. Thank you.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2026-07-15 “(16:03:36 - 16:05:29): Thank you, chairman. I'd like to be brief and say that we talk about guidelines for employment policy, but that discussion shouldn't be done in a neutral fashion. It needs to have a purpose, and the purpose must be improving living conditions and working conditions, improving social protection under various circumstances in which access to employment is not ensured in a stable way where people have precarious temporary jobs. We need to have policies that are geared towards improving salaries and quality of jobs. Now this conversation over and above any proclamations 1 can make needs to be made in such a way that our guidelines tally with the decisions we make. What we've seen, particularly recently in European member states, is changes in legislation that worsen working conditions. In Greece, Belgium, Italy, and Portugal. Our government also tried, although it was defeated in that objective. So it is essential that we clarify the meaning that underlies the proclamation of the idea of improving living and working conditions. 2 specific comments having to do with the connection with the MFF. How do these guidelines fit in with the dis reimbursement of the funds for pensions and also specific issues deriving from the European semester with employment. And especially in Portugal, trends are really going counter to the interest of workers. So what is going to happen to these country specific recommendations? Are they going to be used as a reference or just be abandoned by the wayside? Thank”
  European Semester (social dimension)
• 2026-07-08 “(15:21:55 - 15:23:15): President, commissioner, Costa Cadiz. We need to act on 2 areas. 1st of all, we need to tackle, drug dependence and do away with this lucrative business of drug trafficking. And on the other side, we need to tackle the traffickers themselves. So we clearly have a role for the states that they need to carry out. We need to make sure they're effective when tackling drugs, dependence, provide robust social services and treatment and rehabilitation services. We also need, criminal policy, matters of criminal criminal policy. So where we're going to have effective, measures in customs services with professionals there and their services being strengthened so that they are operational and capable. At the same time, we need to stop any kind of restriction on the EU budget, which is, strangling the very budget that is needed here. We need we cannot use drug trafficking to be a pretext for militarization or violence, being perpetrated against citizens, or to promote xenophobic and racist, language as we have heard from previous speakers on the far right.”
  EU policy on criminal justice
• 2026-07-08 “(11:54:30 - 11:55:32): Thank you, president and commissioner Lebib. No. Fire prevention and firefighting require the increase in the value of, rural living and increase in the appreciation for firefighters and farmers. We see that the European funds and the cap funds should truly be supporting the producers and the farmers and the families who work to fight against the desertification of our rural areas, turning it into a real powder keg. We need to ensure state investment in public services in order to ensure that our public health services can respond as necessary, that our civil, protection services are up to par. All of this is needed to ensure a better response and better prevention to the risk of fire, but none of this can be done if the states do not take action and if they do not have the resources available in order to be able to meet”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2026-07-08 “(14:55:35 - 14:56:17): Looks like I was speaking Portuguese. Obregon, president. Thank you, president. Miss, Garcia van der Valle, in this debate, we have a far right Spanish MEP, Hermann Terch, distinguishing between the evil, drug trafficking that's worse in some countries than in others. But I think that's just unworthy. And I think we have this despicable trade of drugs. How can you distinguish this and take advantage, take this debate hostage to you know, we have people who were unfortunately killed when trying to tackle this problem. Isn't this a hijacking of this debate?”
  Regulation of drug precursors in the EU
• 2026-07-06 “Thank you, president. Well, the proposal that we're discussing aims to maintain social rights for pensioners, the unemployed, and people who are sick. And the idea is to coordinate the different rules in different member states. This is a positive proposal to try and find solutions to the situations of these workers. And I think it's pretty notable that the far right hasn't been present in this debate given that this is something that is in favor of is in something for the interests of workers. Now the fact is that in this proposal, there is no objective to harmonize social security systems, and that's a positive thing. But it's also important that we take account of the circumstances of other initiatives from the commission, and we need to look at how they call universal secure social security system systems into question. So we really need to look into that. There is an assault on the resources being used for social security in Europe, and we need to keep an eye on it.”
  EU competences on social policies
• 2026-07-06 “Thank you very much, president. Mister Dekrut, the European Investment Bank, needs to have as a priority objective promoting economic, social, and territorial cohesion. When you put the logic of competitiveness 1st, that goes against that goal because competitiveness produces asymmetries and means that the stronger get stronger, those who are in the best economic situation do best. Those that have the most scientific technological development keep moving forward. Then when you have a policy of supporting European champions, what that actually means is you're going to abandon SMEs. You're going to stop supporting those who need to be developed, and you're going to ensure that member states act in line with your priorities. You have militarization as a priority object objective, but what that means is that you're leaving behind social problems, housing, etcetera.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2026-06-23 “(11:15:54 – 11:17:01): Thank you, chair. So this 28th regime is offshoring. It's imposed over national regimes, and it will favor multinationals and big groups over SMEs and citizens. This creates conditions to circumvent and weaken legal protection mechanisms that are foreseen in national legislation. So we have the obligations of policies, we have the rules on workers representation, taxation and contribution rules, social security rules, insurance rules across different sectors and activities. This regulation is economic and social deregulation, and this is a dangerous step that we really shouldn't move with and should be rejected. Thank you.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2026-06-23 “Thank you very much, chairs, commissioners. The European semester remains a means of interfering in national decisions, particularly in fiscal policy. That's at the expense of workers and ordinary people to the benefit of large companies and multinationals. Look at the country specific recommendations for Portugal. First of all, we can talk about employment and salaries. Portugal is close to full employment, but 9% of workers are facing in work poverty, and Portugal's the worst country in the EU in that regard. There's a need to increase salaries, but there's not a single recommendation on that. It even says increases in salaries could have a negative impact on budgetary balance. So that is not going to be at the benefit of workers. Then on debt and deficit, there's a need for investment in housing, combating poverty, and public services. But the recommendation says that the national escape clause can be used only for defense expenditure. So how can war be a priority in a country which has such serious social issues? And then we're talking about a single social benefit that would reduce the levels of social protection even further in Portugal, including the obligation to do forced work for people with disabilities, with capacity well, income disabilities of less than 80%. So I would like a response from the European Commission. Is this the vision that you have for defending social protection?”
  European Semester (social dimension)
• 2026-06-17 “(09:49:24 – 09:50:37): Unlike the EPP, we are concerned about workers' rights, which are not being spoken about at this council. What about housing? What about eradicating poverty? What about improving living conditions? What about support for the productive sectors? None of this is on the agenda of the council. Energy and fuel prices penalize the poorest and make their life more expensive. There is nothing about this at the summit. And what caused this? The US attack on Iran. And what about a windfall tax on oil companies? You know, we see interest rates going up. We see the cost of living going up, and we see banks making more money. Where are the measures to help people? Instead, there are measures to help multinationals and to persecute migrants. We talk about all these issues, but when will you end the attacks on Palestine?”
  EU policy on banks profits · EU housing policy
• 2026-06-17 “(15:37:38 – 15:38:27): President. So my question then. Now we've seen recently that there's a major financial funds that have been making use of renewable energies as a pretext for making a profit and using these mega power plants in order to make a quick buck. But the installation of these mega solar farms actually is against the interest of the people. It destroys or makes use of farmland and destroys archaeological and architectural heritage. So renewable energies should not do this. We should be preventing the creation of these mega solar plants. We should be doing something in a way that's compatible with the interest of the citizens and our heritage. Thank you. Thank you. Obviously,”
  EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects
• 2026-06-17 “(10:21:50 – 10:22:33): Okay. Yes. Sure. Please. We strike deals with China, but these deals destroy our clothing industry, our footwear industry, that Europe the Portuguese industry is being destroyed. You don't care about protecting protect Portuguese industry. But then when it's the German or Italian industry that is at stake, then there are protective measures taken. What about the interest of Portugal and smaller countries? What about the interest of those countries? Thank”
  Trade relations with China
• 2026-06-17 “(15:23:12 – 15:24:31): You, president, commissioner McGraw. The promise of electrification is meant to ensure sustainable economic and social development while respecting the environment. The idea is to meet our people's needs, ensure national development, and not to satisfy the interest of the big multinationals, are using the energy sector in order to profit. It's about a question of public property and state strategic decisions about our energy market and moving away from privatization of the sector. It means support for national policies and supply and demand and distribution of energy that is in line with the needs and capacities at a national level. Also, price policies that are in line with people's needs and capacities and ensuring economic development and also ensuring renewable production in conditions that are in line with the people's needs and the public interest. Moving away from the solutions, moving towards solutions that work, not those solutions that simply is a matter of installing solar panels in order to make money. So, commissioner McGraw, please put an end to those mega photo, mega solar farms that are just to make money. Thank you. Thank you, mister Meseret.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-06-16 “(11:00:42 – 11:01:32): You. Thank you very much. Do you have your headphone on? So colleague, we heard from the high representative a position expressed which indicates that there there was no attack in The Middle East. There was no attack of The United States against Iran, for example. This is something which had, of course, serious consequences and cost. It affected energy cost and so on and so forth. The situation was not explosive in the Straits Of Hormuz before this particular attack. So how do you see this issue being resolved?”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2026-06-16 “Now thank you very much. The question I'd like to ask is, if replacing the large technologies, those large technological powers or superpowers, to what extent we'll be able to solve this particular technological issue because we are incarcerated essentially, incarcerated by the profits of these companies. And the question is whether we ought to invest, invest in public services, for example, in academic institutions and so on and so forth to be able to develop effectively? Thank you.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-16 “(11:52:36 – 11:53:42): You. Miss Kalas, neither The US nor Israel have reached their objectives, after this, aggression against Iran. The people are paying this, the price of this aggression in The Middle East and the rest of the world. The EU are subject to the EUS. We prepare repeat our declarations and statements. Miss Carlos, the European Union should take account of these thousands of, deaths and injuries by caused by Israel in Gaza with, killings and by, Israeli troops in West Bank. The people are paying the price of the situation and the also the increases in energy prices. So the question is is this, when will a position by the EU be seen to condemn Israel and The US, and where can we stop their actions?”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-06-16 “Now. Thank you very much. The question I'd like to ask is if replacing the large technologies, those large technological powers or superpowers, to what extent will be able to solve this particular technological issue? Because we are incarcerated, essentially incarcerated by the profits of these companies. And the question is whether we ought to invest, invest in public services, for example, in academic institutions and so on and so forth, to be able to develop effectively. Thank you.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-16 “(10:24:10 – 10:25:30): Thank you. Thank you very much. I'd like to thank you very much, vice president Virkunin. Indeed, we need greater cooperation on all fronts, particularly within the framework of a multi, a multifaceted approach. That's what we need, essentially. We don't need this capitalist, if you like, difference or disagreement that that has existed in order to reach a solution. What we need is to solve the problems that affect citizens, we have to make sure that all is there in order to guarantee peace for all and social welfare. If we give in to the multinational corporations, then we will not achieve anything. We'll enter into that logical downward spiral of the market. And where will we end up? Death and war will be the result. All countries have to promote technology, technological independence. And for that reason, we have to decouple ourselves from The United States on this particular front. And this is a this is the position of Portugal against France and Germany on this front.”
  US-EU tech coordination
• 2026-06-16 “Thank you. Thank you very much. I'd like to thank you very much. Vice President Virkkunen. Indeed, we need greater cooperation on all fronts, particularly within the framework of multilateral, a multifaceted approach. That's what we need, Essentially, we don't need this capitalist, if you like, difference or disagreement that that has existed in order to reach a solution, what we need is to solve the problems that affect citizens. We have to make sure that all is there in order to guarantee peace for all and social welfare. If we give in to the multinational corporations, then we will not achieve anything. We'll enter into that logical downward spiral of the market. And where will we end up? Death and war will be the result. All countries have to promote technology, technological independence, and for that reason, we have to decouple ourselves from the United States on this particular front. And this is a this is the position of Portugal against France and Germany on this front.”
  US-EU tech coordination
• 2026-04-28 “– Senhora Presidente, deixámos claras as razões da nossa discordância com esta proposta do próximo quadro financeiro, e não tem a ver apenas com a circunstância de haver um corte previsto de 12 % no envelope nacional de fundos para Portugal. Mas também não foi por falta de alternativa que foi aprovada esta má proposta para o próximo quadro financeiro. Na Comissão dos Orçamentos e neste plenário, apresentámos propostas para um caminho alternativo. Das muitas propostas que apresentámos, destacamos o aumento global do orçamento a partir do aumento das contribuições nacionais dos Estados‑Membros que mais beneficiam das políticas da União Europeia. Propusemos o corte das dotações destinadas à militarização e à guerra e a canalização desses recursos para a coesão, o desenvolvimento económico e social, a melhoria das condições de vida dos povos, a paz e a cooperação para o desenvolvimento. Propusemos um orçamento de 1 162 milhões de EUR para a coesão económica e social, com reforço dos fundos para as políticas de coesão, agricultura e pescas, mantendo a proporção de 65 % neste orçamento. Propusemos que o Fundo Social Europeu tivesse um orçamento de 198 mil milhões de EUR. Propusemos 50 mil milhões de EUR para financiar a estratégia de combate à pobreza e 35 mil milhões de EUR para dar resposta aos problemas da habitação, além do reforço de programas ambientais como o LIFE ou o POSEI, dirigidos às regiões ultraperiféricas. Não foi por falta de alternativa que foi aprovada esta proposta negativa para o próximo quadro financeiro.”
• 2026-04-28 “– Senhora Presidente, votámos contra este relatório sobre os investimentos do Banco Europeu de Investimento porque verificamos verdadeiramente a orientação política errada da ação do Banco Europeu de Investimento, particularmente com o destaque e a prioridade que é dada aos investimentos na militarização designados «segurança e defesa». Além disso, sublinha‑se a ênfase excessiva na competitividade, na produtividade, nos lucros e na desregulamentação das questões sociais e dos direitos dos trabalhadores. Este relatório congratula‑se com a decisão do Banco Europeu de Investimento de alargar os critérios de elegibilidade para os investimentos na militarização, limitando as atividades excluídas. É um capítulo inteiro dedicado à militarização, que salienta um conjunto de iniciativas integradas num objetivo transversal permanente de política pública, eliminando um limite máximo para o financiamento da militarização. Congratula‑se, além disso, com a forte cooperação com o Fundo de Inovação da NATO. Para a educação, limita‑se a projetos com uma relação custo-benefício demonstrável, também aqui mercantilizando aquilo que é o investimento social. É absolutamente contrária aos interesses dos povos e ao desenvolvimento da coesão social a orientação que o Banco Europeu de Investimento tem tido e que está refletida neste relatório.”
• 2026-03-16 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 27.5.2026 Written question In its Decision of 2022 the Commission authorised Portugal to grant a EUR 453 million aid to bring SATA Air Açores (‘SATA’) [1] , back to viability under its Guidelines for rescuing and restructuring undertakings in difficulty [2] . The decision finds that the aid avoids the risks of disruption of an important service and of exit of an undertaking with a systemic role in the Azores. The decision is subject to conditions to ensure a lasting financial recovery of SATA, particularly the implementation of a restructuring plan. To limit the distortions of competition brought by the aid, Portugal offered to divest at least 51% in Azores Airlines. Such divestment, committed by Portugal, does not require the sale of SATA’s operations in the Azores but only of a majority shareholding of its international business. TAP Air Portugal’s (TAP) privatisation is also a decision of the Portuguese authorities and was not imposed by the Commission decision approving restructuring aid to TAP [3] . The economic, social and territorial cohesion of the country and Azores can be preserved by the competition measures foreseen in the relevant decisions, which allow competitors to offer air transport services in competition with SATA/TAP, whereas all routes not economically profitable can be tendered by Portugal as Public Service Obligations [4] . Furthermore, the Commission approved under Article 107(2)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) social aid schemes adopted by Portugal to support air transport for residents of remote regions, including the Azores. Under the TFEU, the Commission cannot impose any privatisation but can only assess the state aid measures notified by the Member States (Art. 107 TFEU). [1] Commission Decision (EU) 2023/1229 of 7 June 2022 on the state aid SA.58101 (2020/C ex 2020/N) and SA.62043 (2021/C ex 2021/N) which Portugal is planning to implement for rescuing and restructuring the SATA Group, C/2022/3816, OJ L 160, 26.6.2023, pp. 39-91. [2] Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty, OJ C 249, 31.7.2014, pp. 1-28. [3] Commission Decision (EU) 2022/763 of 21 December 2021 on the state aid SA.60165- 2021/C (ex 2021/N) which Portugal is planning to implement for TAP SGPS, C/2021/9941, OJ L 139, 18.5.2022, pp. 19-71. [4] Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Recast), OJ L 293, 31.10.2008, pp. 3-20.”
  Funding for OCTs and outermost regions
• 2026-03-10 “– Senhor Presidente, o relatório que o Parlamento Europeu hoje vota sobre as questões da habitação é uma verdadeira desilusão para quem tinha alguma expetativa de que daqui pudesse sair alguma perspetiva de solução para os problemas da habitação. Este relatório, fazendo o diagnóstico do problema, insiste exatamente nas mesmas políticas que criaram o problema. Identifica‑se um problema com o funcionamento do mercado que retira do destino da habitação casas que são desviadas para fins turísticos, para fim de alojamento de curta duração. Aponta‑se o problema na origem do mercado, mas insiste‑se que é o mercado que há de dar a solução e recusa‑se a qualquer tipo de intervenção pública e do Estado para dar resposta a estes problemas. Apresentámos 14 propostas de alteração propondo: o reforço do investimento na habitação pública; o alargamento do parque habitacional público, para garantir a capacidade de acesso a habitação acessível; medidas de combate à especulação, de proteção dos direitos dos inquilinos; garantias de medidas que permitam a todas as famílias ter acesso a uma habitação acessível. Todas essas propostas, infelizmente, foram rejeitadas e as soluções continuam por aprovar.”
• 2026-02-18 “E-000700/2026 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission Several financial support options are available, both under the Portuguese European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) programme and State aid. EMFAF can be used for: (i) repair of destroyed maritime infrastructure, such as fishing ports, auction halls, landing sites and shelters, storage facilities; (ii) replacement of fishing, aquaculture, and seafood processing equipment, such as nets, refrigerated storage equipment, etc, and (iii) compensation for temporary cessation of activities for fishers, provided that Portugal officially recognises the storms as a natural disaster 1 . The purchase of new fishing vessels is not permitted under EMFAF, but where damage still allows for feasible repairs, EMFAF can support on-board investments aimed at improving working and safety conditions. Portugal may also consider granting State aid to support the fisheries sector: (i) under the "de minimis" Regulation 2 , aid of EUR 30 000/40 000 over three fiscal years per beneficiary may be granted to compensate for storm-related losses (e.g. repair costs) or, in the case of outermost regions, to finance new vessels under 12 meter; (ii) under a compensation regime pursuant to Art 49 of the FIBER Regulation 3 , without notification to the Commission: either to cover repair costs, or loss of revenue for fishers for six months if their production tools (i.e. their vessels) are destroyed, provided that Portugal officially recognises the storms as a natural disaster. The compensated costs must be directly linked to the storms damage and (iii) an exceptional compensation regime could also be notified to the Commission under the State aid Guidelines for fisheries 4 , following similar conditions and covering the same eligible costs as the FIBER aids. The aid must be notified to the Commission. 1 Within the meaning of Article 21.2.e of the Regulation (EU) 2021/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1004. 2 Commission Regulation (EU) No 717/2014 of 27 June 2014 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the fishery and aquaculture sector (OJ L 190, 28.6.2014, p. 45). 3 Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/2473 of 14 December 2022 declaring certain categories of aid to undertakings active in the production, processing and marketing of fishery and aquaculture products compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ L 327, 21.12.2022, p. 82). 4 OJ C 107, 23.3.2023, p. 1. (Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 1.1).”
  Funding for fisheries and aquaculture
• 2026-02-11 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 7.5.2026 Written question The EU continues to be worried about the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza and remains the largest provider of humanitarian aid in the Strip (over EUR 674 million since 2023). The EU has repeatedly called on Israel to allow immediate, unimpeded access and sustained distribution of humanitarian assistance at scale into and throughout Gaza; to enable the UN and its agencies, and humanitarian organisations, to work independently and impartially to save lives and reduce suffering; to reopen Gaza border crossings and to fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law. This call was recently reiterated at the highest level in the European Council conclusions of 19 March 2026 [1] . The EU continues to call on Israel to reverse its decision regarding the new international non-governmental organisation (INGO) registration framework, echoing the joint statement issued by the High Representative/Vice-President, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean and the Commissioner for Equality, Preparedness and Crisis Management in January 2026 [2] . The EU continues to raise this issue at all levels with Israeli counterparts and supports the operations of the INGOs affected. It will continue to follow the developments regarding the INGO registration framework, including the latest decision of the Israeli Supreme Court following the petition of the Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA) and its partners. The EU is committed to continuing its political and financial support to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) [3] . [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/lwhk3itd/en-20260319-european-council-conclusions.pdf. [2] https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-high-representative-kallas-and-commissioners-lahbib-and-suica-registration-2026-01-06_en. [3] https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/statement-commissioner-lahbib-demolition-unrwa-compound-east-jerusalem-2026-01-21_en.”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-02-11 “E-000609/2026 Reply In its conclusions of 19 December 2024, the European Council expressed its deep concern over the consequences of the Israeli legislation adopted on 28 October 2024 on UNRWA’s capacity to operate its mandate and stressed the essential role of UNRWA, which provides crucial support to the civilian population in both Gaza and the wider region. Furthermore, it reiterated its call for the urgent improvement of access and sustained distribution of humanitarian assistance at scale throughout Gaza 1 . Moreover, in its conclusions of 18 December 2025, the European Council stressed the need for the UN and its agencies to be able to work independently and impartially and called on Israel not to implement the NGO registration law in its current form 2 . As regards the EU-Israel Association Agreement, the Council recalls its replies to written questions E-002313/2025 and E-004880/2025. In its conclusions of 23 October 2025, the European Council deplored the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza and called on Israel to allow immediate, unimpeded access and sustained distribution of humanitarian assistance at scale into and throughout Gaza and to enable the UN and its agencies, and humanitarian organisations, to work independently and impartially to save lives and reduce suffering. Israel must fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law 3 . The European Union will support the rapid, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid in coordination with international partners, including via the Cyprus Maritime Corridor to supplement land routes 4 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/wqmknoh4/en-20251218-european-councilconclusions.pdf. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/d2nhnqso/20251023-european-council-conclusionsen.pdf. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/d2nhnqso/20251023-european-council-conclusionsen.pdf.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Support for international humanitarian organisations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-01-30 “Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission 4.5.2026 Written question The Commission, through the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, remained in contact with the Portuguese authorities, which proactively activated the Copernicus Emergency Management Service Rapid Mapping to provide satellite mapping, and used the European Flood Awareness System and scientific multi-hazard early warning and monitoring services to anticipate support. Any country may request assistance via the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) when a disaster exceeds national capacities. As Portugal did not request such assistance, no additional support could be provided through the UCPM, since civil protection is a national competence. The Commission co-finances projects supporting Member States in disaster prevention and preparedness, which Portugal may consider. Following a request from Portugal to mobilise the agricultural reserve, the Commission will examine the possibility to adopt exceptional measures under Regulation (EU) 1308/2013 [1] . Under the 2023-2027 Common Agricultural Policy Strategic Plan (CSP), Portugal has programmed up to EUR 23.6 million from the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development for restoring agricultural and forestry potential after disasters, and EUR 41 million for insurance. Member States may also mobilise CSP funding for crisis payments. The EU Solidarity Fund may be activated at Portugal’s request within 12 weeks, provided the thresholds in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) 2012/2002 [2] are met. It covers certain public emergency and recovery costs; private damage is excluded. The Commission remains ready to assist. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1308/oj/eng. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2002/2012/oj/eng.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2026-01-22 “– Senhora Presidente, em primeiro lugar, quero dizer que votámos favoravelmente esta moção de censura, porque consideramos que a Comissão Europeia merece censura - e o Mercosul é uma das razões para essa censura, porque a Comissão Europeia desrespeita os parlamentos nacionais, recusando ouvir a sua opinião e recusando ter em conta essa opinião que tem de ser dada, e, ainda por cima, prejudicando os agricultores e a produção nacional. Em segundo lugar, queremos sublinhar que temos estado do lado dos agricultores e votámos a favor desta moção de censura - porque não é pela falta do voto do PCP que a Comissão Europeia não é afastada de funções e, particularmente, que não se dá esse contributo para que o caminho em relação ao Mercosul possa ser outro. Mas queremos também aqui sublinhar, em terceiro lugar - e era esse o aspeto que queria explicitar -, a farsa que foi montada pelos partidos da extrema‑direita, que apresentaram esta moção de censura. Porque aqueles que hoje, neste Parlamento Europeu, querem dar uma imagem de que estão do lado dos agricultores são aqueles que traíram os agricultores nos governos nacionais que influenciam, aprovando o acordo com o Mercosul a partir dos governos, como aconteceu com o caso flagrante do Governo italiano. Portanto, que não haja ilusões, a extrema‑direita não está do lado dos agricultores, está apenas a montar uma encenação política para captar o seu apoio, apesar de trair os seus interesses ao nível dos governos nacionais.”
• 2026-01-20 “– Senhora Presidente, este relatório relativo aos medicamentos críticos suscita‑nos várias preocupações, desde logo, o facto de tratarmos de uma questão absolutamente fundamental para a defesa dos direitos dos cidadãos, que é a acessibilidade aos medicamentos, particularmente a medicamentos críticos. E a questão essencial em relação a esta matéria é permitir que cada Estado‑Membro, de acordo com a sua capacidade produtiva e desenvolvendo essa capacidade produtiva, desenvolvendo a ciência e a investigação que são necessárias, seja capaz de assegurar o acesso aos medicamentos aos seus cidadãos. Este relatório parte de uma base completamente diferente dessa, que é a base em que, hoje, os Estados‑Membros estão reféns da indústria farmacêutica - particularmente das multinacionais, que decidem a seu bel‑prazer as margens de lucro que querem obter, utilizando para isso uma questão que é absolutamente fundamental para qualquer país, que é a garantia do acesso aos medicamentos por parte dos seus cidadãos. Tivemos o exemplo dramático disso com a pandemia da COVID‑19 e, infelizmente, o caminho que este relatório aponta não é o de libertar os Estados e os povos do espaço da União Europeia desses grilhões que dificultam o acesso aos medicamentos.”
• 2026-01-20 “– Senhora Presidente, o relatório relativo ao 28.º regime jurídico que o Parlamento discute e aprova é um relatório que nos deixa com muitas preocupações. O 28.º regime jurídico é um offshore jurídico federal dirigido às multinacionais para criar um conjunto de facilidades em relação a matéria fiscal, em relação a matéria administrativa, inclusivamente em relação à legislação laboral, pondo em causa não apenas os direitos dos trabalhadores, que ficarão fragilizados por via do 28.º regime jurídico, mas também pondo em causa as condições de sobrevivência para as micro, pequenas e médias empresas, que continuarão a lidar com um conjunto de dificuldades para a sua atividade - com as quais, naturalmente, as multinacionais não terão mais de lidar. Esta proposta de 28.º regime jurídico constitui uma solução de natureza federal para garantir às multinacionais uma via verde que lhes permita passar ao lado das legislações nacionais, desrespeitando aquilo que são parâmetros absolutamente essenciais, não apenas de natureza económica, mas também de natureza laboral, e, por isso, para nós, é inaceitável.”
• 2025-12-17 “– Senhora Presidente, Senhores Deputados, votamos favoravelmente este relatório relativo à inteligência artificial no local de trabalho, por considerarmos que ele aponta um sentido que nos parece correto de proteção dos trabalhadores e dos seus direitos, relativamente à utilização da inteligência artificial. Mas queremos deixar sublinhados três aspetos. Em primeiro lugar, parece-nos que esta regulamentação deve ser feita a nível nacional, porque é da competência dos Estados-Membros tratar da regulação destas matérias, protegendo os trabalhadores e os seus direitos. Em segundo lugar, as medidas e orientações que possam ser consideradas a nível da União Europeia não devem pôr em causa a regulação nem servir de pretexto para uma desregulação ou uma diminuição das exigências da regulação em relação a estas matérias. Em terceiro lugar, pretendemos sublinhar uma contradição que existe entre este sentido de proteção que hoje fica afirmado, neste relatório aprovado pelo Parlamento Europeu, e as medidas que, na última sessão plenária, aqui foram aprovadas — que vão no sentido de alterar o Regulamento Geral sobre a Proteção de Dados e também o Regulamento da Inteligência Artificial de um modo que põe em causa os direitos e os interesses dos trabalhadores.”
• 2025-12-17 “– Senhora Presidente, Senhor Comissário, a decisão de pôr fim à importação de gás proveniente da Federação da Rússia não tem racionalidade económica, não tem racionalidade ambiental, é apenas a consequência de uma opção geopolítica e geoestratégica da União Europeia de se colocar numa posição de submissão e subalternização em relação aos Estados Unidos, com custos económicos ruinosos e com pesados impactos sociais que a UE impõe, de ânimo leve, aos povos. Não faz sentido, do ponto de vista económico, prescindir de gás que é comprado a preços mais baixos para ir comprar gás aos Estados Unidos, a preços três ou quatro vezes mais caros. Não faz sentido, do ponto de vista ambiental, substituir o gás russo por gás americano proveniente de fracking. Nem é possível substituir o gás por fontes de energia renováveis, como a Comissão Europeia tem proposto e como tem justificado esta decisão a partir de 2027. Esta decisão serve apenas para alimentar a propaganda de continuação da guerra na Ucrânia e serve apenas para alimentar essa estratégia, e essa opção estratégica da União Europeia, de submissão aos Estados Unidos, com os custos todos que ela implica para os povos no espaço da União Europeia.”
• 2025-12-17 “– Senhora Presidente, Senhoras e Senhores Deputados, não há nenhuma mulher que faça de ânimo leve uma interrupção voluntária da gravidez. E é importante que, fazendo essa opção, essa mulher não seja confrontada com a desumanidade de ter de fazer uma interrupção voluntária da gravidez de forma clandestina, pondo em causa a sua saúde, a sua vida, em condições verdadeiramente desumanas. E, para isso, é preciso garantir condições legais, seguras, com apoio médico e com o apoio social necessário para que essa interrupção voluntária da gravidez possa ser feita de forma segura. Votamos favoravelmente esta iniciativa porque ela aponta nesse sentido, e queremos deixar sublinhada a importância de se fazer o investimento adequado para que, além de a lei prever a possibilidade legal de interrupção voluntária da gravidez de forma segura, ela possa ser feita em serviços de saúde de acesso universal e gratuito, de qualidade, com todo o investimento público que é preciso fazer nos serviços de saúde — particularmente em países como Portugal, onde, apesar de essa possibilidade estar prevista na lei, não há, hoje, condições dignas, do ponto de vista do Serviço Nacional de Saúde, para que ela se concretize.”
• 2025-09-25 “E-003742/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission As part of the proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034, the Commission intends to establish National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRP Plans) 1 . The NRP Plans will promote economic, social and territorial cohesion and support sustainable agriculture and food security, rural development, fisheries, maritime and migration policies. The proposal dedicates Title VI to the outermost regions. Pursuant to it, the relevant Member States must include dedicated measures to support outermost regions in their NRP Plans through investments, reforms and compensatory schemes, which may be presented in a separate chapter. The proposal recognises the outermost regions’ unique constraints and enables them to combine resources across all policies covered by it. This includes a range of areas listed in Article 46 of the NRP Plans proposal, such as food security, housing, water and waste management, energy, education and skills, etc. This framework allows for dedicated measures for fisheries or transport as well. Moreover, even if the name ‘POSEI 2 ’ is no longer used, the proposal maintains the instruments of current POSEI toolbox – support for local production and specific supply arrangements - as mandatory measures under the new framework established with the NRP Plans. The Commission Work Programme 2026 includes a strategy for the outermost regions, to be complemented by a subsequent regulatory simplification package. This territorial approach is intended to enable outermost regions to address their specific needs and challenges, focusing on strengthening resilience, competitiveness, and the valorisation of the regions’ unique assets. 1 COM(2025) 565 final. 2 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/market-measures/outermost-regions-and-smallaegeanislands/posei_en#:~:text=Through%20the%20POSEI%20scheme%2C%20the%20EU%20aims%20to%3A,proce ssing%20and%20marketing%20of%20local%20crops%20and%20products.”
  Funding for OCTs and outermost regions
• 2025-09-15 “E-003540/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 1. In 2014-2027, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is supporting the investments in the forest of the mainland Portugal, with more than EUR 588 million to farmers, and private and public forest holders. Moreover, the Portuguese Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) allocates over EUR 600 million to forest management. Among its key investments is ‘Means to Prevent and Combat Rural Fires’ (EUR 89 million), funding the enhancement of infrastructure and equipment for both the Portuguese Air Force and the Institute for Nature Conservation and Forests (ICNF). This investment funds acquisition of firefighter helicopters and building construction (EUR 70 million), vehicles, machinery, equipment, and upgrades to the meteorological radar network (together EUR 19 million). Additionally, the ‘Landscape Transformation in Vulnerable Forest Areas’ (EUR 270 million) is a crucial preventive investment, backing initiatives like land management changes, vegetation adaptation, and ecosystem restoration. 2. The RRP also supports Portugal’s civil protection system with funding for the National Internal Security Network project (EUR 17 million), IT systems updates and a new data centre for national security. It also funds the State Emergency Communications Network (SIRESP) project (EUR 37 million), including ground infrastructure and a Disaster Recovery Centre. Finally, to support Member States under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, the Commission can coordinate peer reviews of disaster risk management and civil protection systems 1 . The Commission is also providing financial support for projects, exchanges of experts or technical assistance which can support policies and investments for wildfire prevention and preparedness. 1 https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/disaster-prevention-and-risk-management/ucpm-peerreview-programme.”
  Agricultural funding · EU policy on infrastructure for preventing climate-related disasters (floods, droughts, extreme weather etc.) · Management of EU forests
• 2025-09-15 “E-003541/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission Under the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), through both the 2014-22 Rural Development Programme (RDP) for the mainland and the 2023-2027 CAP Strategic Plan (CSP), EU support has been granted to Portugal for agriculture, forestry, environment commitments, climate actions, and the development of rural areas, for a total of more than EUR 13 billion over 12 years. In terms of prevention of natural catastrophes including forest fires, there are various possibilities under the CAP and other funds to support the affected Member States in the short, medium and long-term. CAP interventions are available to support farmers and forest-holders to overcome the effects of adverse weather events, including forest fires, and to mitigate economic losses caused by their negative impacts. Risk management tools are also available in the CSP to help farmers to manage production and income risks related to their agricultural activity. Under the Portuguese CSP, support is available for forest fires prevention and restoration of damage including this year wildfires. Portugal may also compensate farmers under EU State aid rules. Moreover, following the mid-term review of its Cohesion programmes Portugal is activating the new specific objective for regional emergency support for reconstruction (‘RESTORE’). Finally, the EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) is also available at the request of Member States. On a longer-term, CAP funded interventions for knowledge transfer are available to assist farmers and forest-holders in building skills and knowledge for climate change adaptation and mitigation, thereby increasing farm resilience.”
  Management of EU forests · Agricultural funding
• 2025-09-15 “P-003542/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission Extreme adverse weather conditions including wildfires and climate change are affecting and will continue to increasingly affect the EU agriculture sector. To help alleviate the vulnerability of farmers and forester producers, it is necessary to build a resilient, competitive, and sustainable farming system that can absorb these shocks. Under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Strategic Plan and the Rural Development Programmes, Portugal has programmed risk management tools (insurances) and interventions to support farmers and forest holders severely impacted by wildfires (or other catastrophic events), to restore agricultural and forestry potential. The EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) 1 can be activated at the request of Portugal which has a total of 12 weeks to submit it, as from when the first damage occurred. So far, Portugal has not requested EUSF assistance. Under the Mid-Term Review of Cohesion Policy, Portugal’s programmes Centro and Norte 2021-2027 are activating the new specific objective for regional emergency support for reconstruction (RESTORE), with an EU allocation of EUR 40 million and EUR 52 million respectively, to support investments for the reconstruction of the areas affected by the forest fires in 2024 and 2025. Likewise, EU State aid rules already provide several possibilities to enable Member States to compensate farmers, such as the Agricultural de minimis aid Regulation. Finally, as part of the CAP Omnibus simplification proposal, (in co-decision) new crisis payments have been proposed by the Commission, to help the Member States better address the increasing number of natural disasters and other catastrophic events. Portugal has expressed interest activating it once the co-legislators adopt the proposal. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3) as amended by Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 143) and by Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 March 2020 (OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002R2012.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-07-15 “E-002889/2025 Reply In its conclusions of 23 October 2025, the European Council welcomed the agreement reached on the first phase of the Comprehensive Plan to end the Gaza Conflict. To alleviate the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, the European Council called for immediate, unimpeded access and sustained distribution of humanitarian aid at scale into and throughout Gaza and for the UN and its agencies, and humanitarian organisations, to be able to work independently and impartially. The European Union will continue to contribute to peace efforts and to actively engage with partners on the next steps. It will support the rapid, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid in coordination with international partners, including via the Cyprus Maritime Corridor to supplement land routes. With regard to restrictive measures, to date, under the thematic EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EUGHRSR) adopted by the Council in December 2020, the EU has introduced measures targeting individuals, entities, and bodies, including both state and non-state actors responsible for, involved in or associated with serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide. In July 2024, Tsav 9, an Israeli organisation, was listed for having regularly blocked supply trucks delivering humanitarian aid, including food, water and fuel, to Gaza. Restrictive measures include travel bans for individuals, asset freezes for individuals and entities and a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to those listed.”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-07-15 “E-002890/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is deeply concerned by the catastrophic humanitarian situation and the unbearable level of suffering in Gaza and has been consistent in its response to improve the situation since the start of the conflict, using the variety of the EU’s toolbox 1 . The EU has been consistently urging Israel to improve the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza. The High Representative/Vice President launched – with the support of a majority of Member States - the review on Israel’s compliance with Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement 2 . This review concluded that there are indications that Israel would be in breach of Article 2. Following the review, the Commission has put on hold its bilateral support to Israel, with the exception of support to civil society and Yad Vashem. The EU welcomed the agreement on the first phase of the Comprehensive Plan to end the Gaza Conflict put forward by the President of United States to secure an immediate ceasefire, humanitarian assistance and the release of all hostages. The EU will continue to support the rapid, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid, working closely with the United Nations (UN) agencies and international non-governmental organisations, and in accordance with international law. The EU will continue to remind Israel of its responsibilities to uphold its commitments. It is essential that efforts to restore humanitarian aid to Gaza be carried out in full respect of international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles. The EU supports the International Court of Justice 3 , the principal judicial organ of the UN and considers it as of key importance in upholding international criminal justice and the fight against impunity. 1 This includes over EUR 550 million in humanitarian assistance since 2023 - making the EU the first humanitarian donor -, medical evacuations, and joint civil protection missions. 2 https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf. 3 https://www.icj-cij.org/node/204091.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Support for International Criminal Court
• 2025-05-13 “E-001905/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission SGL Composites S.A., the Portuguese unit of SGL Carbon located in Lavradio, received a total of EUR 624 514, from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) for two projects, through the Lisbon operational programme 2014-2020. In addition, the company received EUR 929 520 1 , as of May 2025, for the ’investment project for the decarbonisation of industrial activity and promotion of energy efficiency levels’ under the Portuguese Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP). According to the data published by the Portuguese authorities, both ERDF projects were finalised by end-2019, so there is no likely impact on the durability 2 of these operations. Following the SGC Carbon announcement of a restructuring of its carbon fibres business unit, justified by ongoing financial losses, in February 2025 3 , the company announced in May 2025 the closure of its production site in Lavradio, Portugal 4 . No further information regarding other possible closures has been released. The Commission promotes corporate social responsibility in the EU and encourages enterprises to adhere to international principles and to follow socially responsible management when restructuring. However, it does not intervene in the management decisions of private companies. In the event of dismissals, workers may benefit from European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) support in their search for new employment under the conditions set out by the Member State’s programmes. Additionally, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for displaced workers (EGF) can assist dismissed workers to help them to find new employment in the face of an unexpected major restructuring event. 1 The RRF is a performance-based instrument. This figure is according to the Mais Transparência website of the Portuguese authorities: https://transparencia.gov.pt/pt/fundos-europeus/prr/beneficiariosprojetos/projeto/02/C11-i01/2022.PC658685467-00471800/. 2 As provided by the Article 71 of Regulation 1303/2013. 3 https://www.sglcarbon.com/en/newsroom/news/press-report/adhoc-notification-sgl-carbon-decides-torestructure-its-carbon-fibers-business-unit-presentation-of-preliminary-figures-for-fiscal-year2024/?utm_source=chatgpt.com. 4 https://www.sglcarbon.com/en/newsroom/news/press-report/closure-of-sgl-carbon-production-site-in-lavradio/.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-04-23 “E-001614/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Competitiveness Compass 1 announced the initiative on the 28 th regime as one of the key measures to contribute to EU competitiveness and to make business easier and faster in Europe. The underlying problem is the fragmentation of legal frameworks across Member States, which leads to reduced business activity and forgone opportunities for companies in the Single Market to grow and expand. The recent Single Market Strategy 2 explained that the 28th regime will provide a single set of rules, potentially in a progressive and modular way. It would include an EU corporate legal framework, based on digital by default solutions, and will help companies overcome barriers when setting up and operating as well as attracting investment across the Single Market. The 28 th regime will aim to simplify applicable rules, and it will also address specific aspects within relevant areas of law, including insolvency, labour and tax law, with the overall objective to enhance competitiveness and help companies, in particular innovative ones, start-ups and scale-ups. At the same time, the measures under the 28 th regime must strike the right balance with other interests, such as those of employees, and ensure that the fight against tax evasion, tax avoidance and fraud is upheld. To achieve this, it will be carefully considered, also based on stakeholders’ views in the public consultation, what specific aspects should be addressed and how. 1 COM(2025) 30 final. 2 COM(2025) 500 final.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2025-03-06 “E-000985/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The European Council in March 2025 1 deplored the breakdown of the ceasefire in Gaza, and called for an immediate return to the full implementation of the ceasefire-hostage release agreement. It stressed the need for a ceasefire leading to the release of all hostages and a permanent end to hostilities. Joint statements by the High Representative/Vice-President, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean and the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management on the importance of lifting the blockade on humanitarian aid into Gaza were issued on 12 April 2025 2 and 7 May 2025 3 . The EU has been consistently calling for the immediate resumption of humanitarian aid at scale into Gaza and encouraged all similar appeals. The EU remains committed to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the two-state solution in accordance with the international law and relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The EU continues its efforts promoting a political process through the Global Alliance for the implementation of the two-state solution. The EU also continues to support the Palestinian Authority 4 to address its most pressing needs, build institutional capacities, and implement its reform agenda. At the EU-Palestine High-Level Political Dialogue, which took place on 14 April 2025 in Luxembourg, the Commission proposed a multiannual Comprehensive Support Programme 5 worth up to EUR 1.6 billion, to foster Palestinian recovery and resilience for 2025-2027. It is structured around three pillars: 1) Support to services for Palestinian people (EUR 620 million in grants of direct assistance); 2) Support to recovery and stabilisation of the West Bank and in Gaza (EUR 576 million in grants, including EUR 82 million per year for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East); and 3) Support for the private sector (up to EUR 400 million of European Investment Bank in loans). 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/viyhc2m4/20250320-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf. 2 https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-high-representative-kallas-andcommissioners-suica-and-lahbib-humanitarian-situation-2025-04-12_en. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/statement_25_1155. 4 This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1055.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-03-06 “E-000983/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/4 1 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of titanium dioxide from China entered into force on 10 January 2025. The impact on the costs of production of paints and coatings and of printing inks producers was calculated based on the detailed information reported by three users active in these industries, which included data on their costs of production and sources of supply of titanium dioxide. This and other data showed that the measures will not have a significant impact on paints and coatings industry, but that they could have a bigger impact on printing inks producers. While it was necessary to protect the EU producers of titanium dioxide from dumped imports, as they were already loss-making, the duties were ultimately set as fixed amount per kilogram instead of a percentage rate to lessen the impact of duties on all users, while titanium dioxide used in production of white printing inks was allowed to be exempted from duties. The Implementing Regulation will remain in force until 11 January 2030. Before that date, the EU producers of titanium dioxide may submit a substantiated request to the Commission to investigate if the measures should be extended for another five years. In addition, after 11 January 2026, any interested party or a Member State could request a review of the measures, if a significant change in circumstances of a lasting nature occurred since their imposition. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/4/oj/eng”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2025-03-06 “E-000982/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission According to the information forwarded by the Portuguese authorities, Bioadvance received EUR 3,7 million from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 1 under the COMPETE 2020 programme 2 to build an industrial plant to produce biodiesel from used food oil. Under the ongoing COMPETE 2030 programme 3 , Bioadvance’s application for a project to invest in the production of second-generation bioethanol from the residues of biomass has been approved for an ERDF amount of EUR 9,9 million. In accordance with Article 9(4) of the Common Provisions Regulation for the EU shared management funds 4 , the objectives of these Funds shall be pursued in full respect of the Union environmental acquis. The Commission expects that the responsible authorities conduct a robust environmental impact assessment to ensure that the project complies with the applicable legislation. In any case, without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, Member States are primarily responsible to ensure compliance with EU law. National means of redress are available, and, in case of alleged breaches of the law, the competent national Courts could order the suspension of the project, where appropriate. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 60). 2 https://www.compete2020.gov.pt/documentacao/detalhe/POCI-vrs-adaptada 3 Compete 2030: https://www.compete2030.gov.pt/ 4 Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159).”
  Biofuels (RED II)
• 2025-02-21 “P-000802/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The reform of the Stability and Growth Pact 1 that entered into force last year foresees scope to accommodate spending on common priorities of the EU while maintaining sound and sustainable public finances in Member States. It explicitly indicates that social and economic resilience, including the European Pillar of Social Rights, is a common priority in the EU. As a result, increase in social and public services spending may be put forward in Member States’ medium-term fiscal-structural plans within a package of investments and reforms that underpin a more gradual fiscal adjustment, up to seven years instead of four years, thereby creating substantial additional fiscal space for such expenditures. At the same time, the geopolitical situation has significantly worsened in recent months. This requires a fast and strong increase in spending on defence in the EU. The activation of the National Escape Clause, in line with the conditions of Regulation 2024/1263, would allow Member States to transition to a higher level of defence expenditure without reducing the fiscal space for other expenditures in the coming years. 1 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-and-fiscal-governance/stability-and-growth-pact_en”
  Size of EU budget · EU competences on defence
• 2025-01-30 “E-000432/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU has condemned any attempt by Israel to abrogate the 1967 agreement between Israel and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or to otherwise attempt to obstruct its capacity to operate its mandate 1 . The EU has stressed the essential role of UNRWA, which provides crucial support to the civilian population in both Gaza and the wider region and committed to continuing its support to the Agency 2 . In 2024, following the fulfilment by UNRWA of all the conditions agreed for the 2024 EU funding, the Commission disbursed a total of EUR 92 million to the Agency 3 . This came in addition to the EUR 48.5 million of EU humanitarian funding in 2024. In 2025, the EU is committed to continuing its support for the Agency, and as a part of its multiannual and comprehensive programme for Palestine 4 2025-27 5 . The Commission is willing to propose to allocate EUR 82 million per year to provide services to Palestine refugees via UNRWA, both in the occupied Palestinian territory and the wider region. This will enable UNRWA to continue ensuring its crucial role both as a humanitarian and a development actor. The EU has been consistently clear that political engagement and open dialogue are the most effective ways to convey concerns, including to the Israeli government. The current EU-Israel Association Agreement 6 is the legal basis for the ongoing dialogue and cooperation with Israel and it provides a useful mechanism to discuss and advance the EU stance. In this regard, the Association Council meeting that took place in February 2025 7 was an opportunity to pass clear messages with regard to the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. The Commission keeps under constant review all EU agreements with third countries, and the principles and values upon which they are based. The EU is extremely concerned by reports on the humanitarian situation in Gaza, which suggest that food supplies brought in during the ceasefire are running out. Under international humanitarian law, humanitarian aid must reach civilians in need. The EU has repeatedly called on Israel to lift the blockade on Gaza to allow humanitarian aid to start flowing at scale into and throughout the strip 8 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6511-2025-INIT/en/pdf 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6511-2025-INIT/en/pdf 3 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-disburses-additional-eu10-millionpayment-unrwa-2024-12-20_en 4 This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individuals positions of the Member States on this issue. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1055 6 https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf 7 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6511-2025-INIT/en/pdf 8 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_1052”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Support for international humanitarian organisations
• 2025-01-30 “E-000431/2025 Reply While the full extent of the consequences of the Israeli legislation adopted on 28 October 2024 on UNRWA’s capacity to fulfil its mandate in the occupied Palestinian territory is not yet clear, the EU has recalled 1,2 its deep concern in this regard, has repeatedly stressed 3,4,5 the essential role of UNRWA, which provides crucial support to the civilian population in both Gaza and the wider region, and has condemned any attempt to obstruct it. Continued implementation of the UNRWA Action Plan is key 6,7,8 . The EU has deplored the breakdown of the ceasefire in Gaza, which has caused a large number of civilian casualties in recent air strikes. It has called for an immediate return to the full implementation of the ceasefire-hostage release agreement, and stressed the importance of unimpeded access and sustained distribution of humanitarian assistance at scale into and throughout Gaza 9 . Since 7 October 2023, the EU and its Member States working as Team Europe have acted quickly to mobilise over EUR 1.16 billion in humanitarian assistance, which has been channelled through humanitarian partners on the ground (international and local humanitarian organisations). 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/viyhc2m4/20250320-european-councilconclusions-en.pdf 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 5 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/qa3lblga/euco-conclusions-27062024-en.pdf 6 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf 7 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 8 https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/ist_012025_progressreport_ 01202025.pdf 9 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/20/european-councilconclusions-on-middle-east-oceans-andmultilateralism/?utm_source=brevo&utm_campaign=AUTOMATED%20-%20Alert%20%20Newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_id=3318”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2024-11-23 “E-002643/2024 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission is not aware of any specific request from the Portuguese Government for the deployment of additional EU resources related to spread of bluetongue virus. As referred to in reply to Written Questions E-001845/2024, E-002156/2024, E-002019/2024 and E-001850/2024 bluetongue virus being a subject to optional eradication, EU funding for Bluetongue Virus, including vaccination, is not planned for the 2025–2027 period for eradication programmes in accordance with EU rules 1 , nor for emergency measures. Financial resources are allocated to the control and eradication of other major priority animal diseases. As mentioned in reply to Written Questions E-001819/2024, P-002410/2024; E-002019/2024 and E-002156/2024, support to farmers can be provided under the Common Market Organisation, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Strategic Plans, rural development programmes, and in line with Union state aid rules. 2. CAP financial rules 2 already allow farmers who have been unable to fulfil all their CAP requirements due to exceptional and unforeseeable events outside their control not to lose CAP support. The application of this concept is decided by Member States based on relevant evidence and the legal requirements for its application. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/690 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing a programme for the internal market, competitiveness of enterprises, including small and medium-sized enterprises, the area of plants, animals, food and feed, and European statistics (Single Market Programme) and the work programmes (adopted as Commission Implementing Decision C(2024) 2098 of 2.8.2024 for 20252027). 2 Articles 3(2) and 59(5)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 187.”
  Animal diseases prevention and management in the EU · Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1)
• 2024-11-23 “E-002644/2024 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission A decades-long farm consolidation is part of a deeper trend observed in major market-based economies, including the EU, driven by a combination of factors, such as economies of scale, technological advancements, access to capital, as well as demographic trends. The Guardian article grossly overestimates the amounts received by the largest Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) recipients. The Eurostat Farm Structure Survey shows that the average physical farm size of Portuguese farms increased from 12.6 ha in 2007 to 13.7 ha in 2020 (+8.2%), while the EU-27 average farm size increased from 11.6 ha to 17.1 ha over the same period (+ 47.5%). Regarding distribution of direct payments in Portugal, in 2022, the 20% largest beneficiaries (by the amount of payment) received 80% of direct payments. However, these 20% largest beneficiaries were farming 87% of the land. Yet in 2015, the 20% largest beneficiaries received 84% of direct payments and farmed 86% of land. Thus, the concentration of direct payments slightly decreased between 2015 and 2022, despite the fact that the concentration of land has increased. This shows the first results of the current redistribution mechanisms, including a redistributive payment (CRISS) and an increase of the payment under the Small Farmers Scheme (SFS). Under the current CAP, Portugal allocated a total of EUR 348.6 million to CRISS. A total of EUR 319.5 million was allocated to SFS. Lastly, the Commission recently proposed to strengthen the position of farmers in the food supply chain, both via the Common Market Organisation and the new Unfair Trading Practices cross border enforcement regulations. The CAP post-2027 will further consider how to better target the distribution of the CAP funds.”
  Agricultural funding · Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1)
• 2024-11-23 “E-002641/2024 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission As the Commission pointed out in its reply to written question E-000814/2023 1 , in line with the EU Vaccines Strategy 2 , the Commission and the Member States have taken a common EU approach to securing COVID-19 vaccine supplies and facilitating their distribution. An Agreement 3 was concluded between the Commission and the Member States allowing the Commission to procure COVID-19 vaccines on behalf of the Member States and related procedures. This Agreement established a Steering Board, where all Member States are represented, to provide guidance throughout the evaluation process, as well as a Joint Negotiation Team composed of Commission officials and Member States representatives to carry out the negotiations. In accordance with the Agreement, individual Commissioners, including the President of the Commission, did not have any role in negotiations. Agreements concluded by the Commission on behalf of the Member States have been signed by the Commissioner for Health and Food Safety, following a decision of the Commission as a college. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0245 3 COM(2020)4192 final: https://commission.europa.eu/publications/commissions-centralised-eu-approach_en”
  Covid-19 vaccines procurement · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2024-11-23 “E-002642/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes note of the concerns raised by the Honourable Member about the potential impact of a future Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Thailand on the EU tuna processing industry. In line with the overall EU approach to trade and investment agreements, also in the negotiations with Thailand the Commission aims at reaching a comprehensive deal that can bring growth opportunities for the EU economy and employment as a whole. In the negotiating rounds held so far, the EU and Thai negotiating teams have focused on advancing on the consolidation of the texts establishing the normative framework for the future trade relations, and have not yet discussed the treatment for individual products. Detailed and sector specific market access negotiations will start in the coming months, and will include consultations with relevant stakeholders in line with the usual EU practice for FTA negotiations. As in all FTA processes, economically sensitive sectors are subject to carefully designed specific modalities for market access which aim at preventing any market disturbances. Furthermore, as the negotiations enter a more advanced stage, a sustainability impact assessment will be carried out in support of the negotiations in order to provide an in-depth analysis of their potential economic, social, human rights, and environmental impacts.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2024-11-23 “E-002645/2024 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Regulations on the European Defence Fund (EDF) 1 , in support of ammunition production (ASAP) 2 and on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA) 3 explicitly provide that actions related to the development, production or procurement of lethal autonomous weapons, without the possibility of meaningful human control over selection and engagement decisions when carrying out strikes against humans, shall not be eligible for EU financial support. EU military assistance for Ukraine falls under the responsibility of the Council of the European Union. Under the programmes implemented by the Commission to strengthen the EU's defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), the eligibility conditions as established in the EDF, ASAP and EDIRPA imply the exclusion of Ukrainian entities from the possibility of receiving EU funding. The Commission proposal for the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) Regulation 4 envisages that entities established in Ukraine may be recipients of EU funding, but actions related to lethal autonomous weapons without the possibility of meaningful human control would not be eligible for funding. Within the limits of the powers conferred on it by the Treaties, the Commission is to oversee the application of EU law. The application of and compliance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law arises from the respective treaties under international law to which Ukraine is a contracting party, e.g. the European Convention on Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1525/oj/eng 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj/eng 4 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/edip-proposal-regulation_en”
  Artificial Intelligence for military purposes · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2024-11-15 “E-002558/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The Commission confirms that, according to the Portuguese authorities, cohesion policy funding was recently decided for Carris to support the acquisition of rolling stock (articulated trams) to enhance Lisbon’s public transport service. The total cost of the operation was EUR 40.6 million, with a contribution from the Cohesion Fund through the programme Sustentável 2030 1 of EUR 29.5 million. The conditions for using the funds are in line with the eligibility rules of the programme and the provisions of the cohesion policy regulations. The additionality principle was included in Article 95 of Regulation (EU) 1303/2013 2 , which governed the implementation of cohesion policy in the 2014 to 2020 programming period. The principle is no longer included in the Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 3 , which governs implementation in the 2021 to 2027 period. Carris is also receiving funding under Portugal's recovery and resilience plan 4 (RRP), which includes two investments related to tenders by Fundo Ambiental. Investment C15-i05 aims to purchase zero emission buses and charging infrastructure in Lisbon and Porto Metropolitan Areas. Carris was selected for 33 buses and charging stations and received EUR 6.38 million from the RRP. With Investment C21-i12, Carris aims to acquire 44 buses and charging stations, receiving EUR 11 million from the RRP. The investment is expected to be completed in 2026. The additionality principle 5 ensures that support under the Recovery and Resilience Facility is additional to other EU programs and instruments. 1 https://sustentavel2030.gov.pt/ 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1303/oj/eng 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj/eng 4 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resiliencefacility/country-pages/portugals-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en 5 Article 9 Regulation (EU) 2021/241.”
  EU funding for transportation · Conditions to access EU budget
• 2024-11-14 “– Senhora Presidente, o agendamento deste debate e a correspondente resolução inserem-se na lógica de instigação e promoção da confrontação e escalada do conflito no Leste da Europa, com os sérios perigos que comporta para os povos ucraniano e russo, mas também para os povos da Europa. A resolução confirma-o, desde logo, pela insistência no reforço das sanções e na omissão das suas consequências no agravamento da situação económica e social em diversos países, agravamento que está a ser pago pelos trabalhadores e pelos povos. Também, por isso, nos distanciamos da resolução apresentada pelo nosso grupo. O que é urgente é a criação de iniciativas que promovam o diálogo e a solução política do conflito, para a qual a presente resolução não contribui, antes pretende obstaculizar. É uma resolução que evidencia a hipocrisia do Parlamento Europeu que, em simultâneo, encobre e sustenta a política genocida de Israel contra o povo palestiniano. Precisamos de paz e não de mais guerra.”
• 2024-11-07 “E-002461/2024 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRP) is the responsibility of Member States. Member States decide and execute the individual actions, such as the development of the ‘Hub Azul’, through their national or regional authorities in order to fulfil the milestones and targets established in the Council Implementing Decision (CID) of each RRP. The description of that project in the CID does not include any specifications or requirements related to the fishing sector. Questions about potential alternatives or support for the fishing community should be addressed to the national authorities responsible for managing the project and implementing the measures of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). With regards to potentially relevant funds, local fisheries communities can receive EU support for the implementation of projects through local partnerships, called Community-led local development (CLLD). This happens in the scope of the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF 2021-2027). EMFAF programmes are implemented under shared management by the Member States. More information concerning these funding opportunities is available on the website of the MAR 2030 Programme 1 . The Honourable Member is also invited to contact the Portuguese Managing Authority 2 directly for more information on concrete support options in Portugal. The Commission will continue to monitor the implementation of the RRPs and to work with Member States to ensure that the objectives of the plans are achieved and serve the benefit of citizens. 1 https://mar2030.pt/ 2 Edifício dos Pilotos, Doca do Bom Sucesso, 1400-038, Lisboa; Tel.: 211 165 700; info@mar2030.pt”
  Funding for fisheries and aquaculture
• 2024-10-22 “E-002218/2024 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission Small and medium sized Portuguese wine-growers, as well as other Portuguese wine operators and organisations can benefit from different wine sectoral interventions as provided for in Regulation (EU) 2021/2115, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Strategic Plan Regulation 1 , which sets the Portuguese financial allocation in the wine sector at EUR 62 670 000 per financial year. The Portuguese CAP Strategic Plan (CSP) provides the following interventions to the wine beneficiaries: restructuring and conversion of vineyards (including for organic wine), harvest insurance, distillation of by-products of wine making, improving market knowledge, information on quality schemes, promoting wine tourism and promotion in third counties. In 2025, after the adoption of the last CSP amendment, investments in tangible and intangible assets and green harvesting will be also available. In addition, in view of the accumulation of wine stocks, EUR 15 million from the agricultural reserve have been exceptionally granted to Portugal in 2024 for crisis distillation measures under the Common Market Organisation (CMO). As far as a review of the CMO for wine is concerned, a High-Level Group on Wine Policy has been set up with representatives from Member States to explore challenges and possible solutions to secure the wine sector’s long-term competitiveness and sustainability. A document with conclusion and policy recommendations was endorsed by Member States and presented to stakeholders in the meeting on 16 December 2024 and made public on the Europa website 2 . This document may inspire future legislative proposals, which will then be subject to adoption by the European Parliament and the Council. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj 2 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/news/high-level-group-wine-outlines-policy-recommendations-future-eu-winesector-2024-12-17_en”
  Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1) · Agricultural funding
• 2024-10-22 “E-002224/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), in case C-779/21 P, has annulled the Council decision concluding the 2019 exchange of letters providing preferential tariffs to goods originating in Western Sahara. However, the effects of this decision have been maintained by the Court for a period of twelve-months from 4 October 2024, the date of delivery of the judgment. Accordingly, the tariff preferences provided for under the EU-Morocco Agreement continue to be valid. During this period, products originating in Western Sahara continue to benefit from the effects of this agreement. The judgement does not affect preferences already granted prior to the ruling. The Commission has taken note of the CJEU’s judgment in joined cases C-778/21P and C798/21P, and C-779/21 P and C-799/21P and is currently analysing it in detail. It is therefore too early to comment on any possible measure or talks following the CJEU’s ruling.”
  EU policy on Western Sahara · Trade relations with Morocco
• 2024-10-22 “E-002213/2024 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The new Economic Governance Framework supports Member States in achieving fiscal sustainability as well as sustainable economic growth. Both are critical for the EU’s economic strength in today’s challenging global environment. In particular, the new framework encourages reforms and investments that will lay the foundations for long-term economic stability and sustainable growth. As part of the implementation of the new framework, the Commission recommended on 26 November 2024 to the Council to endorse the fiscal path contained in Portugal’s mediumterm fiscal-structural plan, which corresponds to an annual fiscal adjustment of 0.1% of Gross Domestic Product for the period 2025-2028 1 . The new framework differentiates between Member States according to their fiscal position. As stipulated in Regulation 2024/1263 2 , the Commission applies a replicable, predictable and transparent methodology to assess the plausibility of whether the projected public debt ratio is on a downward path or remains at prudent level. For the first round of medium-term plans, this methodology is described in the Debt Sustainability Monitor 2023 3 . The prior Commission’s guidance to Member States, derived from the Commission debt projection framework, is published when the medium-term plan is submitted, in accordance with Article 9 of the Regulation, together with spreadsheets allowing to reproduce the calculations. A working group for debt sustainability analysis has been established to explore possible methodological improvements. 1 See : https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-and-fiscal-governance/stability-and-growthpact/preventive-arm/national-medium-term-fiscal-structural-plans_en#portugal 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263 3 See: https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/debt-sustainability-monitor-2023_en”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2024-10-22 “E-002216/2024 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The first-ever European Affordable Housing Plan, announced by the President of the Commission in the Political Guidelines 2024-2029 1 , will support cities and Member States in tackling the housing crisis by offering technical assistance and focus on investment and skills needed. To promote investments in affordable and sustainable housing, the Commission has established a new taskforce on housing and will work closely with international financial institutions, notably the European Investment Bank, national promotional banks and other relevant stakeholders on a pan-European investment platform to induce more private investment for social and affordable housing. It will also work on a proposal allowing Member States to double the planned cohesion policy investments in affordable housing. Various EU Funds are already available for Member States to support social and affordable housing 2 . To assist Member States in harnessing the available EU funding opportunities, the Commission published a toolkit 3 . The Commissioner for Energy and Housing has also been tasked with making proposals aimed to tackle systemic issues with short-term accommodation rentals and the inefficient use of the current housing stock. The Commission is working on the implementation of the recent short-term rental regulation 4 . It foresees the provision of reliable data on short-term rental, to help Member States designing the most appropriate and targeted measures. All these actions should help EU citizens to access more affordable housing. 1 See ‘Political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024−2029’: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf 2 Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRP) include measures worth at least an estimated EUR 21.3 billion that contribute to social housing and other social infrastructure for social inclusion purposes alone. In addition, the RRPs also cover measures promoting affordable housing. (Estimated expenditure is based on the pillar tagging methodology for the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard and corresponds to the measures allocated to the policy area ’Social housing and other social infrastructures’ as primary or secondary policy area). The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) focuses on the provision and improvement of physical housing infrastructure, including through energy efficiency measures. EUR 10.4 billion in total investment is planned, involving an EU budget contribution of EUR 7.5 billion (from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), Cohesion Fund (CF) and Just Transition Fund (JTF)). This support primarily focusses on energy efficiency measures to reduce energy costs. The InvestEU programme is mobilising public and private investments in affordable social housing. EUR 2.8 billion is earmarked for the Social Investments and skills window (including other priorities such as microfinance, social finance and social impact) and EUR 9.9 billion for the sustainable infrastructure window. The European Social Fund+ (ESF+) can support Member States in facilitating access to housing and promoting integrated services, in line with the European Pillar of Social Rights. An exact amount indicating the amount of the ESF+ funds allocated only to housing-related actions cannot be determined. Nevertheless, EUR 16.8 billion is programmed for access to services which can include housing, and more are still available from an envelope of EUR 45.6 billion envisaged for social inclusion. 3 Social Housing and beyond. https://european-social-fund-plus.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-launchestoolkit-support-social-housing-member-states 4 Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on data collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724, OJ L, 2024/1028, 29.4.2024 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024R1028”
  EU housing policy · EU regulation of short-term rentals
• 2024-10-22 “E-002214/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully aware of Member States’ challenges in providing affordable, decent, and sustainable housing for all. While mobile students tend to reside in urban areas with higher rent prices, the share of mobile students tends to be relatively low compared to the overall student and local populations. The Commission carries out systematic reviews of Erasmus+ 1 individual support rates to make sure that programme participants receive adequate funding to meet living costs in their host countries. The last comprehensive review was carried out in 2023 and led to the increased individual support for Erasmus+ participants and the differentiation of support amounts according to the living costs in various destinations. Moreover, by complying to the Erasmus Charter for Higher Education 2 , whose award is a prerequisite to participate in the Programme, all higher education institutions commit to providing active support to incoming participants in finding accommodation. Furthermore, the Commission supports investment in student housing as a priority under the InvestEU 3 Fund and provides substantial support through the NextGeneration EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility 4 , which allocates EUR 447 million in loans for the construction or rehabilitation of buildings and the modernisation and expansion of existing residences for higher education students, notably in areas where housing pressure is most acute. This is complementary to the Portuguese national plan for housing in higher education 5 adopted in 2019. From 2021 to 2026, a 78% increase in capacity of housing for higher education students is expected in Portugal. 1 https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/ 2 https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/resources-and-tools/erasmus-charter-for-higher-education 3 https://investeu.europa.eu/index_en 4 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resiliencefacility/country-pages/portugals-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en 5 https://pnaes.pt/”
  EU volunteering programs
• 2024-10-22 “E-002215/2024 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Commission proposal 1 to adapt the protection status of the wolf under the Bern Convention 2 is based on analysis of the wolf situation in the EU, published in December 2023 by the Commission, which includes the scientific data and information underpinning the proposal 3 . The analysis shows that the populations of wolves have significantly increased in the last two decades and they are occupying ever larger territories. There are more than 20 000 wolves with generally increasing populations and expanding ranges, and breeding packs in 23 EU Member States. This is a conservation success, made possible by protective legislation, more favourable public attitudes and habitat improvements. The Commission recognises that Portugal has implemented a robust national legislation to protect the wolf and that the specific situation of the Iberian wolf in Portugal requires a tailored approach. A potential change of the protection status of the wolf in the Habitats Directive 4 would not remove the obligation for Member States to reach or maintain good conservation status of wolf populations. It will rather provide additional flexibility to the Member States that need it, without obliging other Member States, such as Portugal, to change the protection status of the wolf at national level. 1 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-council-decision-position-be-taken-eu-bern-convention_en 2 https://www.coe.int/en/web/bern-convention 3 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/env/items/813295/en 4 I.e. moving the species to Annex V of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50.”
  Large Carnivores
• 2024-10-22 “E-002219/2024 Reply The Council would refer to its reply to Written Question E-001779/2024. As last discussed at the European Council on 17 October 2024 1 , the European Union has reiterated its unwavering commitment to a just, comprehensive and lasting peace based on the two-state solution and the Union’s support to the Palestinian Authority to help address its most pressing needs and support its reform agenda. The European Union will actively support and engage with international partners on concrete irreversible steps towards the two-state solution reviving a political process to this end, including through the holding of an international peace conference as soon as possible. The EU has stressed that a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood is a crucial component of that political process. The EU has also recalled the need to fully implement the International Court of Justice orders. As regards the issue of the supply of military or related material to Israel, the Council refers to its reply to Written Question P-003630/2023, and recalls that the control on the export of arms by Member States is subject to national legislation, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 2 and the Arms Trade Treaty 3 (ATT). The competent authorities of the Member States take the final decision whether to authorise or deny an individual licence for the export or transit of military equipment, in accordance with the said legal frameworks. The Council, through its competent Working Party, works towards increased convergence amongst Member States’ arms export policies, including recently through exchanges of views on the application of the criteria set out in the Common Position, in the light of the conflict in Gaza. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008E0944 3 https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-text.html?templateId=209884”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2024-10-22 “E-002225/2024 Reply At its meeting of 17 October, the European Council took note of the judgements by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and in its conclusions reaffirmed the high value the European Union attaches to its strategic partnership with Morocco and reiterated the need to preserve and continue strengthening close relations with Morocco in all areas of the Morocco-EU partnership 1 . 1 www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf”
  Trade relations with Morocco · EU policy on Western Sahara
• 2024-07-16 “E-001358/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU has been consistently clear in conveying its concerns through political engagement and frank and open dialogue, including to the Israeli partners. The Association Agreement with Israel 1 is the legal basis of the ongoing dialogue with the Israeli authorities and provides important mechanisms to discuss issues and advance the EU point of view. In that regard, the EU is looking forward to convening an Association Council with Israel as soon as possible. 2. The recognition of states is the competence of the Member States. The EU has a longstanding commitment to a just and comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on the two-state solution. The EU will continue its strong support to the Palestinian Authority, including through a multi-year support package on the basis of agreed reforms to help pave the way for a two-state solution. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A22000A0621%2801%29”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2024-07-16 “E-001359/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU toolbox on 5G cybersecurity of 23 January 2020 1 (the ‘5G Toolbox’) was adopted by the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Cooperation Group (composed of representatives of the Member States, the Commission and the EU Agency for cybersecurity – ENISA) and endorsed by the European Council 2 and the Commission 3 . On 15 June 2023, the NIS Cooperation Workgroup published the second progress report on the implementation of the 5G Toolbox 4 . This report recorded that 24 Member States had adopted or were preparing legislative measures giving national authorities the powers to perform an assessment of suppliers and impose restrictions, concluding that Member States should achieve the implementation of the 5G Toolbox without delay. In complement to the progress report, the Commission adopted a Communication 5 where it underlined strong concerns about the risks posed by certain suppliers of mobile network communication equipment to the security of the EU. 2. Imposing restrictions is a process decided by each Member State. In assessing the risk profile of suppliers, Member States consider the objective criteria recommended in the 5G toolbox. 5G suppliers exhibit differences in their characteristics, in particular as regards their likelihood of being influenced by specific third countries which have security laws and corporate governance that are a potential risk for the security of the EU. 3. As imposed restrictions are decided by Member States, the Commission cannot be involved in possible requests for compensation from operators. At the same time, the Commission considers that decisions adopted by Member States to restrict or exclude certain suppliers from 5G networks are justified and compliant with the 5G Toolbox 6 . 1 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cybersecurity-5g-networks-eu-toolbox-risk-mitigating-measures 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32023H0120(01) 3 Communication of the Commission of 29 January 2020, COM(2020) 50 final. 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/second-report-member-states-progress-implementing-eutoolbox-5g-cybersecurity 5 Communication of the Commission of 15 June 2023 on the implementation of the 5G cybersecurity toolbox, C(2023) 4049 final. 6 Idem.”
  5G
• “Thank you. President, Minister, Commissioner. At tomorrow's council, there's still time to meet the challenge and ensure that this council meeting is not hiding from people's concerns once again. Middle East housing migration policy. Don't use those to window dress and pretend that you're dealing with people's concern. Let's have some political commitments to investment with timetables to ensure access to housing, to ensure that we have a humanitarian migration policy. Peace in the Middle East. Respect for the people of Palestine, a permanent ceasefire, the end of genocide and the creation of a state of Palestine. Mrs. von der Leyen spoke to us this morning in detail about investment packages for arms, weapons, militarisation, prolonging the Ukraine war, giving money to big arms multinationals. But what about the other concerns of people combating poverty? We didn't hear anything about that eradication of poverty by 2050. We didn't hear anything about that. This is not the way to deal with people's concerns.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Thank you very much, president. The first 100 days of this commission have been marked by more military, military more, and the European Commission hasn't found the time to criticize what's happening in Palestine, to talk about what's happening in Netanyahu's Israel. They haven't found the time to find peace and solutions for Europe. They haven't found the time or resources to deal with the problem of housing, to work on health and education, and to help member states. They haven't found time or resources for any of that. But what they did find was €800 billion for defense and to to extend the war in Ukraine. In these 100 days, the Commission hasn't found solutions for SMEs or to protect, protect the resources of each country. But they found a solution for competitiveness for the large multinationals, but they and they also haven't found time to respect member states when it comes to their own powers. And the president is interrupting the speaker.”
  Defence spending
• “Obrigado, president. Thank you very much indeed, president. Commissioner Seraphin. Of course, the MFF is important, but about sending migrants to third countries, it would seem international development and. The budget for 2026 reflects those decisions and the real problems of individual people and countries are forgotten. How about social cohesion, fighting poverty, affordable housing, rising cost of living, investment in social services, healthcare, transport, culture, you know, how do you support national policies to have productive resources and environmental balance. And you know, and it's the opposite here. War armament international companies that seems to make up the lion's share of the budget. And. Behind it is an imbalance an injustice Stirs and people are forgotten. There is no cohesion. And what is available for cohesion has been cut. And you want to militarize. And you say that this is done for security. Uh, cohesion funds are now going to militarization. And that's certainly not just. It's backtracking and it's social injustice. And social inequalities will only rise.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• “Thank you very much. Thank you. President. Inequalities are growing in the European Union. And these growing inequalities are leading to a further concentration of wealth. But accumulation of wealth does not lead to redistribution. No. We should be better sharing out wealth. And since this isn't the case now, inequality is growing, becoming ever more extreme. And we are also faced with a phenomenon of growing poverty affecting more and more households. This is the result of political decisions taken by neoliberalism, the privatisation of our strategic sectors. These policies designed to pander to the needs of major companies. I have now become a strategic policy direction for the European Commission. This choice has led to the dilution of important social rights, including changes to employment legislation. In my own country, Portugal, for example, the Portugal. The conservative government changed the Labour code, thereby watering down labour protection and rights, leading to ever greater job insecurity. And this led to falling income rather than growing income. In parallel to this, we've seen a rise in the cost of living inflation for prices and stagnating pay. This, once again is the result of deliberate political choices. Policy makers refuse to intervene in pricing policy.”
  Wealth taxation
• “Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Madame Toussaint. You emphasized the that it's a program that's more interested in construction companies and so on and so forth than funds and banks. So my question is the following. Don't you believe that there is a lack there's a missing strand as well. And that is the increase in social housing, state housing, in order to deal not only with poverty but to deal with alienation, exclusion as well for certain sectors of the population which cannot pay for housing. Don't you feel that that's been forgotten, that particular strand, that particular dimension?”
  EU housing policy
• “President. Jorgensen. Thank you very much. Thank you, chair. Indeed, this is a member state competence, but the European Union needs to be supporting member states. I have two questions for you on the proposals. So firstly, having specific financing, €35 billion that would be part of the new MFF for the member states. This would be allocated towards efforts to tackle poverty and guarantee access for families who are finding it difficult to to rent a housing. And then the second question has to do with calculations of debt. There are two proposals that together, I think, will offer a more robust response to the housing crisis. Because this is a social need. Housing cannot be considered just a commodity like any other, because that is the whole root of the crisis that we're currently going through. Thank you.”
  EU housing policy
• “Thank you. President. Now, you mentioned the good intentions of the transport policy, but the debate that we are carrying out here is based on a communication which is about public transport, based on an approach about competitiveness and efficiency and not really the needs that people have. And this is what guarantees the funding for European transport networks. What it doesn't mean is that you can really support local transport. That is the criterion, which means that we don't have transport when it comes to autonomous regions. This is what stands in the way of more frequent public transport services, for example. And instead of that, people are packed in like sardines. And we don't even talk about the rights of workers in the transport sector. So how can you ensure that we also meet the needs of people and their rights and mobility, given the criteria based on competitiveness and efficiency?”
  EU cohesion/structural-fund architecture: consolidation vs ring-fenced separate funds
• “How will the budget grow with the impact of these new own resources? Third, what is your analysis of the rebate system which allow the. Net contributors? Off some of their contributions? How have you analysed that? What is your analysis of the issuance of debt for the next generation? I am coming to a conclusion. I have to conclude now. Okay. Thank you. Chairman. I have a question. Do we have a legal basis today to diversify on a gradual basis? The GNI contribution of the member states. With the aim of reducing inequalities and tax evasion. In mind, we know that amongst the values of the EU, you've got social justice, tax justice, equality. Member States have received a lot of funds over the years to reduce disabilities. And I think. If they haven't used those funds, well, they should pay a little more in JNI. I'd like to understand if there's any legal mechanism to achieve that. Thank you.”
  Own EU resources
• “Thank you very much, president. Commissioner McGrath. Inequality between men and women is one of the most evident demonstrations. That inequality is the basic factor of the system we live under. We've got persistent pay gaps. They've got more precarious work, lower salaries and patience and pay and pensions. But the problem is that there is no solutions within the neoliberal system because it increases the gap. What we need is alternative policies that reduce inequalities. We need more fair policies for redistribution of wealth that reduce the pay gap between men and women. We need general policies to give value to labour, to workers, to guarantee more equality in working conditions as well as in pay. We also need better public services, which should be universal and high quality. They are much more effective in reducing inequality between women and men. I think reinforcing these policies is the biggest contribution we could make in helping women in their fight for equality.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• “Thank you. Chair. Commissioner Serafin. The position of this Parliament for 2026, for the budget is wrong in certain areas and doesn't meet the needs of the people. The conclusion of the discussion with the Commission and Council has confirmed this result. The detailed amendments in the discussion for the budget for 2026 do not change the basic options, which are headed in the wrong direction and against the interests of the people. The final version of the budget is still lacking a response to improving living conditions and wages. Fighting poverty. Housing. Social cohesion. Investments in public services to ensure access to health, education, transport, horticulture. We've seen 1 million being added on as a token gesture at the last minute. We've criticised the European Union in terms of its industrial production and technology, but the budget is still denying the support to take advantage of the resources that we have towards the ecological to the green change, a green transition. The options that have been chosen in the mid-term review of the MFF have moved towards rearming Europe, helping multinationals and economic groups expelling migrants from our borders. These are the options that are being invested in heavily. Even cohesion funds are being used to fund militarism. The people need a progress budget and one for justice, social justice. And this is not that budget.”
  Size of EU budget
• “Thank you. President. President Costa, the council conclusions indicate that the war in Ukraine will continue. Military spending. Support for NATO. An arms race. We have the omnibus proposal. More funding for major companies in the single market. Simplifying rules for major multinationals. And less support for SMEs. Nothing about the housing crisis. Poverty. All those factors that make lives difficult for citizens. And then the European Union is showing itself complicit in Israel's actions in Gaza. Where is our investment in true peace and prosperity?”
  Defence spending