Wopke Hoekstra

Policy topics Wopke Hoekstra is active on

What Wopke Hoekstra has said (80)

• 2026-06-16 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 16.6.2026 Written question 1. Direct taxation, such as taxation of windfall or excess profits falls essentially within the competence of Member States. Every Member State remains currently fully competent to address excess profits generated by energy companies in national tax law provided it respects the fundamental freedoms laid down in the Treaties. The Italian excess profit tax but also the EU-level temporary solidarity contribution laid down in Chapter III of Council Regulation (EU) No 2022/1854, which targeted surplus profits of EU companies or permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors, was an extraordinary emergency measure applied during the energy crisis of 2022-2023 and justified by a specific set of circumstances at that time. 2. It is the position of the Commission that the EU should stay the course on its long-term strategy of diversification, decarbonisation and Russian fossil fuels phase out. Abandoning it would make the EU more dependent, more vulnerable and weaker. In line with this, the Commission is committed to facilitating the implementation of the REPowerEU Gas Regulation. On 18 March 2026, in light of the conflict in the Middle East and its impact on global energy markets, the Commission published updated guidance [1] on the implementation of the regulation, with a view to reducing any unnecessary barriers to non-Russian gas imports into the EU. [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-publishes-updated-guidance-repowereu-gas-regulation-2026-03-18_en.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Fossil fuels · EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-06-12 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 12.6.2026 Written question The Commission's position on deliberate large-scale interventions in the Earth’s natural systems (referred to as ‘geoengineering’) is clearly set out in the Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative on the Climate-Security Nexus of 28 June 2023 [1] . It notes that such technologies are attracting more attention, and states that ‘the risks, impacts and unintended consequences that these technologies pose are poorly understood, and necessary rules, procedures and institutions have not been developed’. The Joint Communication also stresses that the EU, guided by the precautionary principle ‘will support international efforts to assess comprehensively the risks and uncertainties of climate interventions, including solar radiation modification, and promote discussions on a potential international framework for its governance, including research related aspects’. In 2024, following a Commission request for advice on solar radiation modification, the Group of Chief Scientific Advisors issued a scientific opinion [2] , while the European Group on Ethics delivered an ethical perspective [3] . Both groups stressed that these technologies are not ready to be deployed and cautioned the Commission to maintain the primary goals of its climate policy: reducing emissions and adapting to inevitable changes. The Commission’s Strategic Foresight Report 2025 [4] also points to the need for the EU to show ethical and science-based leadership in responsible and precautionary approaches for such new controversial technologies, including by fostering global collaborative governance structures to deal with potential risks, benefits and distributional effects. In this context, the Commission is monitoring the issue. [1] JOIN/2023/19 final. [2] https://scientificadvice.eu/advice/solar-radiation-modification/. [3] Commission: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Opinion on solar radiation modification — Ethical perspectives, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/951016. [4] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategic-foresight/2025-strategic-foresight-report_en.”
  Climate efforts
• 2026-06-03 “Ladies and gentlemen, Let me start by thanking Serge for your kind words, warm welcome, and for organising this important event. Very much appreciated. I was just in Luxembourg a few weeks ago and was really impressed by the collaboration and friendship of Luxembourg and the incredible job the government is doing on climate. From ambitious mitigation plans to some truly innovative resilience projects like the Pétrusse. And this is so critical right now. Collectively we all need to be more like Luxembourg, punching above our weight. The numbers speak for themselves. 2024 was the hottest year on record, 2025 is set to be the second hottest. 2026 is already above average, with heatwaves in Europe reaching unprecedented levels. We are no longer talking about future risks, we are living them. Europe is only one example: this goes far beyond our borders. Because climate change doesn't discriminate. The window for action is unfortunately closing faster than our financing pipelines are opening. Every year of delayed investment in climate action adds trillions to the long-term climate bill, and transfers that bill to the most vulnerable. It's true that coordinated climate action has rarely been so difficult, precisely when we need it most. The geopolitics in this world are extremely volatile. I don't have a crystal ball, but my guess is that it will stay like this and potentially become worse. From trade tensions to shifting alliances to the latest war in the Middle East. But if the Iran war has made one thing clear, it is that phasing out fossil fuels is no longer a choice. It is a climate imperative, a security and independence necessity, and an economic no-brainer. Our continued dependence on fossil fuels is dangerous. It means higher and more volatile energy bills, exposure to external shocks, and weaker competitiveness. In Europe alone, EU's fossil fuel imports bill in 2025 was nearly EUR 400 billion. Since the escalation in the Middle East, the EU has spent an additional EUR 24 billion on energy imports due to higher prices – without receiving a single extra molecule of energy. If we take the thought experiment further though, we also notice that without our investment in clean energy in the past years, this number would have been much higher! According to a new IEA report, the EU saved EUR 51.4 billion in 2025. Looking beyond the EU, then, we know that higher interest rates and tighter fiscal space make climate investment more difficult, in many emerging economies. With all of this considered, how do we – together – go forward? Let me share two thoughts. First, on leadership. Those countries in a position to do so must lead: not as charity, but as a reflection of institutional capacity and access to capital markets. Meeting the New Collective Climate Finance Goal agreed at COP29 requires using public money to move private money at a ratio we have not yet achieved consistently. The EU takes this seriously. We contributed EUR 31.7 billion in 2024, mobilising an additional EUR 11 billion in private finance. But we are equally clear that leadership does not mean acting alone. First, more countries with the ability to do so must contribute. Second, all actors need to be part of the solution: Multilateral Development Banks, sovereign wealth funds, institutional investors, national development banks. These banks have a unique and irreplaceable role: they bridge the gap between public mandate and financial credibility. It's worth pointing out the fantastic job the EIB has done. Its green financing outside the EU has grown from EUR 2.8 billion in 2021 to EUR 4.7 billion in 2024. It now representing nearly two thirds of its total financing outside the EU. Thirdly, philanthropic capital, sovereign wealth funds, and institutional investors managing trillions in assets must treat climate risk for what it is: a financial, fiduciary, and reputational threat. Investments matter. Second point today: The EU's way of doing things is already delivering on the ground. By 2024, our Global Gateway strategy had already mobilised more than EUR 300 billion, with half of the flagship projects targeting climate and energy. This is blended finance working as designed: the public sector absorbs some of the risk and in return, private capital steps in to invest at scale. There are some other really important initiatives too. Take the pioneering work by our host Luxembourg with their Global Trust Fund. There is also the EU's Global Green Bond Initiative implemented with the EIB, EBRD, and the Green Climate Fund. This supports green bond market development in emerging economies. It mobilises institutional capital where it is needed most. And it helps build market architecture. It is a market-making signal as much as a financing instrument. There are two other instruments that also deserve more attention: • The Currency Exchange Fund tackles what remains one of the most stubborn structural barriers to cross-border investment in frontier markets: currency mismatch. • And the DFCD AYA Scalable Solutions facility operates as a blended finance vehicle. It has stacked up to EUR 105 million in guarantees with debt, equity, and technical assistance to crowd in private capital across agriculture, forestry, water, and renewable energy in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Dear friends, We have the frameworks. We have the instruments. We have the political commitments. Imperfect, contested, but it is real. We now need to get to work. And make sure we make it happen in the real world. The institutions in this room have the balance sheets, the expertise, and the credibility to move this from high-level aspiration to ground-level infrastructure. The EU is ready to be your partner in this endeavour, in structuring deals, sharing risk, and defending the multilateral climate finance architecture. I wish a great conference. Thank you very much for hosting.”
  Fossil fuels
• 2026-05-12 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 12.5.2026 Written question The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is an environmental measure aimed at addressing the risk of carbon leakage. Carbon leakage arises when EU production is moved to third countries with less ambitious climate policies, or when EU production is replaced by carbon-intensive imports. Since adoption of the original CBAM Regulation, the Commission has taken further action to address carbon leakage risks and reduce the regulatory burden for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Notably, companies importing less than a certain threshold (currently set at 50 tonnes) on a yearly basis are exempt from CBAM obligations [1] . This is expected to especially benefit small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) importing only limited quantities of CBAM goods. This threshold thereby exempts over 90% of companies importing CBAM goods into the EU, while maintaining over 99% of emissions in scope. Following the simplification adopted in October 2025, the Commission may also publish default carbon prices for third countries where carbon pricing rules are in place. This change constitutes a major simplification for importers. For the proposed downstream extension, the use of default values is facilitated by the introduction of a zero mark-up for complex downstream goods. The Commission furthermore facilitates the implementation of the CBAM by providing guidance to importers and other stakeholders [2] , and will continue to cooperate closely with industry stakeholders and national authorities to monitor the implementation of the CBAM. The Commission will publish its next report on the application of the CBAM and its implementation in 2027. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2083/oj/eng. [2] https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism/cbam-legislation-and-guidance_en.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2026-05-12 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 12.5.2026 Written question On 22 April 2026, the Commission presented the AccelerateEU Communication [1] to accelerate the delivery of the Energy Union, outlining immediate, targeted actions for Member States to deliver rapid and lasting relief to households and industry facing high energy prices. It also includes structural measures to improve energy efficiency and accelerate electrification by reducing the four components of energy bills-supply costs, network charges, taxes, and carbon costs — also in the longer term. European climate policy aims to reduce dependency on expensive, foreign fossil fuels, replacing them with clean, homegrown electricity. Carbon pricing is one of the core and most successful components of our climate policy. The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) puts a price on pollution, stimulating investments in low-carbon production technologies and raising revenues that can be used to finance these investments as well as shield vulnerable households. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) ensures a level playing between European producers and importers, to avoid relocation of European installations to countries with less ambitious climate policies. The Commission has assessed the impact of ETS on inflation up to 2027, covering also the impact of the CBAM, in the European Economic Forecast, Autumn 2025 [2] . The Commission will present a review of the ETS in July. The legislative proposal will be accompanied by a thorough impact assessment as well as an in-depth evaluation of the past functioning of the ETS, including an analysis of its economic impacts. [1] COM(2026) 370 final. [2] https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/european-economic-forecast-autumn-2025_en, see special issue 3”
  Climate efforts · EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-05-12 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 12.5.2026 Written question The Emissions Trading System (ETS) has reduced greenhouse gas emissions from power and industry by 50% compared to 2005 [1] , contributing to substantial health benefits from improved air quality [2] . The revision scheduled for July 2026 will determine the cost-effective emission reductions for 2031-2040, in line with the economy-wide 2040 emission reduction target. ETS2 is scheduled to become fully operational in 2028. Its trajectory is set to bring emissions down by 42% by 2030 compared to 2005, complementing other EU and national policies to decarbonise buildings and road transport. The environmental and economic impacts were assessed in the impact assessment [3] . More than three quarter of ETS auction revenue goes to national budgets and must be used for clean energy, decarbonisation and just transition activities. The Commission closely monitors this spending to ensure revenues are effectively and swiftly allocated. The remaining revenue is invested through EU-level instruments in industrial innovation, energy modernisation, energy security and — in particular from future ETS2 revenue — through the Social Climate Fund. An overview can be consulted on the Commission website [4] . The Social Climate Fund, mobilising at least EUR 86.7 billion, is available to Member States to reduce energy and transport poverty through investments to reduce households’ vulnerability to increasingly volatile imported fossil energy prices and providing direct income support to mitigate short-term impacts of ETS2. Member States must also use national ETS2 revenues to fund climate action and support households through the transition. S trong safeguards are in place to ensure a smooth start to ETS2 with stable prices and support vulnerable households. [1] 2025 Carbon Market Report: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/news-other-reads/news/2025-carbon-market-report-eu-ets-lowers-power-sector-emissions-and-expands-maritime-transport-2025-12-03_en. [2] https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2319908121. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0601. [4] https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/carbon-markets/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/how-do-member-states-use-ets-revenues_en.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme · Air quality policy · Energy (green transition)
• 2026-05-11 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question 1. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) addresses the risk of carbon leakage by placing a carbon price on imports of covered goods equivalent to that paid by EU producers under the EU Emission Trading System. It is an environmental measure, preventing more carbon-intensive imports from undermining the EU’s climate goals. 2. The EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) preserves the EU’s ability to protect its industrial base while supporting diversified and resilient supply chains. It maintains the possibility to implement trade defence instruments. Additionally, it includes a bilateral safeguard mechanism by which the EU may temporarily raise duties up to Most-Favoured-Nation level for two years if a significant increase in preferential imports causes or threatens serious injury to the EU industry. The Commission also ensures that the EU’s trade policy is aligned with the objectives of the Critical Raw Materials Act [1] — the expansion of the EU network of FTAs strengthens the resilience and diversification of EU critical raw materials’ value chains. 3. The proposed Industrial Accelerator Act [2] supports the EU aluminium industry’s decarbonisation by creating lead markets for aluminium. The proposal introduces low-carbon and EU-origin requirements in public procurement and support schemes for strategic sectors. For aluminium, at least 25% of the total volume covered must be both low-carbon and EU-origin. The Industrial Accelerator Act defines low-carbon aluminium as those meeting the relevant requirements that will be set out in the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation Delegated Act on aluminium, which is planned for adoption in 2027. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02024R1252-20240503. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52026PC0100.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2026-05-11 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question The geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and their impact on energy markets underline the dangers of Europe’s dependency on imported fossil fuels and on the volatility of global markets. Against this background the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) is a key instrument for reducing Europe’s dependency, enhancing resilience and ensuring long-term price stability. The Commission will present a review of the ETS by July to strengthen the carbon market and ensure it delivers a fair, cost-effective contribution towards the recently agreed 2040 climate target [1] , as well as addressing carbon price volatility. The impact of carbon costs on electricity prices is the smallest major component of electricity bills (11% for industry and 5% for households). On 1 April 2026, the Commission proposed an amendment to the Market Stability Reserve to enhance the stability and predictability of ETS prices [2] . On 22 April 2026, the Commission presented the AccelerateEU Communication [3] , outlining immediate, targeted actions for Member States to deliver rapid and lasting relief to households and industry facing high energy prices. It includes structural measures to improve energy efficiency and accelerate electrification by reducing the four components of energy bills-supply costs, network charges, taxes, and carbon costs. It also includes a state aid temporary framework to support some of the sectors most exposed to price spikes. To permanently reduce energy costs in the EU relative to its main economic competitors, the EU needs to accelerate electrification, the roll out of additional domestic clean energy production and the energy transition. The EU’s legal commitment to climate neutrality remains unchanged. [1] Regulation (EU) 2026/667 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2026 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 as regards the setting of a Union intermediate climate target for 2040. [2] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_666. [3] COM(2026) 370 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European economic and social Committee and the Committee of the Regions : AccelerateEU — Energy Union Affordable and Secure Energy through Accelerated Action.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices · Climate efforts · Energy (green transition)
• 2026-05-11 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question The Commission acknowledges the serious threat posed by Missing Trader Intra-Community (MTIC) fraud largely driven by organised crime, with results in estimated annual value added tax (VAT) losses from EUR 12.5 billion to EUR 32.5 billion between 2010 and 2023. MTIC fraud is mentioned in the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats [1] . While Member States hold the primary responsibility for fighting VAT fraud, the Commission actively supports these efforts. The digital reporting requirements and the central VAT information exchange system as part of the ‘VAT in the Digital Age’ package [2] will provide Member States as of July 2030 with real-time information on cross-border transactions that enhance the detection of MTIC fraud. The Commission has also proposed a targeted amendment to the regulation on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of VAT [3] that strengthens collaboration between tax authorities, t he European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and t he European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). Additionally, the Commission provides technical and financial support to Eurofisc [4] . Finally, to strengthen the response against criminal networks in the context of the ongoing anti-fraud architecture (AFA) review [5] , the Commission is assessing ways to improve the protection of the EU’s financial interests, including through better prevention and combatting VAT fraud. A Commission Communication on the AFA review is planned for the end 2026. The Commission is also exploring possible amendments to the founding regulations of key anti-fraud actors, such as OLAF, EPPO, Eurojust [6] and Europol [7] , and to the directive on the fight against fraud to the EU's financial interests by means of criminal law [8] . [1] The European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/law-enforcement-cooperation/empact-fighting-crime-together_en). is a security initiative driven by EU Member States to identify, prioritise and address threats posed by organised and serious international crime. [2] https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/news/adoption-vat-digital-age-package-2025-03-11_en. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/904/oj/eng. [4] The EU network of Member State experts combating VAT fraud https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/taxation/vat/vat-and-administrative-cooperation/eurofisc_en. [5] Launched with the White Paper of 16 July 2015 — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0546. [6] European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation. [7] European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. [8] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj/eng.”
  VAT harmonisation
• 2026-05-06 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 6.5.2026 Written question The Commission strongly condemns the disruptions brought to the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial transit for global trade, and calls for full respect of navigation rights and freedoms of merchant and commercial vessels in accordance with international law. The disruptions highlight the vulnerability of the maritime sector to geopolitical situations in critical maritime chokepoints, and the ripple effect these have on commodity markets and global supply chains. The sector will see higher transport costs due to increases in freight rates for the shipping of fuels, prices of bunker fuels and insurance premiums [1] . Additional impact in the form of increased costs stemming from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) linked to the re-routing of voyages is expected to be low considering notably the relatively limited reliance of the EU on energy imports transiting through the Strait of Hormuz. It should also be noted that when ships are involved in voyages between the EU and third countries, the ETS surrender obligation only applies to 50% of relevant emissions, thus limiting possible further increase in ETS costs. The Commission continues to monitor the implementation of the ETS for maritime transport, including with regards to transport costs. Past analysis has shown that the ETS has limited impact on total transport costs or commodity prices. The Commission is working on a number of initiatives including a review of the ETS, to modernize the system in line with the 2040 emissions reduction target agreed by the co-legislators. The ETS is a key tool to achieve a higher degree of energy security and independence, which in time will ensure lower, more stable energy and carbon costs, including for the maritime sector. [1] Strait of Hormuz Disruptions — Implications for Global Trade and Development; UNCTAD; 10/03/2026.”
  Decarbonisation of maritime transport · Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• 2026-05-05 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The European Union continues to address climate change issues, including its security and defence implications, through various initiatives and studies. The EU regularly commissions research and reports on the security and defence risks posed by climate change. This is part of its broader strategy to integrate climate considerations into security, foreign and defence policy frameworks. The first European Climate Risk Assessment [1] (EUCRA, 2024) considered the repercussions of climate change for the European Union. It identifies 36 climate risks that pose a threat to Europe’s energy and food security, ecosystems, infrastructure, water resources, financial stability, and people’s health. In the next EUCRA report, due for 2028, security may be addressed more directly. The Commission is currently preparing a comprehensive risks and threat assessment under the Preparedness Union Strategy [2] , foreseen for summer 2026. The EU recognises climate change as a threat multiplier that impacts resource scarcity, migration, and geopolitical stability. The Joint Communication ‘A new outlook on the climate and security nexus: Addressing the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on peace, security and defence’ [3] was adopted in 2023 and continues to guide the Commission work [4] . The focus on security and defence aspects is often reflected in the work of the European External Action Service and other relevant agencies that collaborate on assessing climate-related security threats. [1] https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/eu-adaptation-policy/key-eu-actions/european-climate-risk-assessment. [2] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/preparedness_en. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023JC0019. [4] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-communication-climate-security-nexus_en.”
  Nature protection and restoration in the EU
• 2026-05-04 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 4.5.2026 Written question The Commission has no plans to suspend the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The Commission is accelerating its work on the upcoming review of the ETS, notably to set out the emissions cap and a decarbonisation trajectory beyond 2030, in line with the 2040 emissions reduction target adopted by the co-legislators in 2026. This will provide more emissions space for industry compared to the legislation currently in force. The Commission has also presented a proposal to increase the firepower of the Market Stability Reserve, so that it can more effectively address excessive price volatility and keep prices in check. The functioning of the market is monitored by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) [1] and, according to their latest assessment, it is stable and operating in line with market fundamentals. The ETS for fuel combustion in buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2) will complement national and EU measures to support Member States’ emission reductions as from 2028. Price and impacts have been assessed in the impact assessment [2] , in supporting publications [3] and as part of the preparation of the Social Climate Plans. Several measures will strengthen the stability and affordability of the system, responding to proposals by many Member States. In addition to the one-year postponement of ETS2, this includes proposals to ensure earlier and stronger market and price intervention [4] and to accelerate prior investments by Member States, including via an earlier start of ETS2 auctions and a EUR 3 billion European Investment Bank ETS2 Frontloading Facility [5] . [1] ESMA Market Report. EU carbon markets 2025. https://www.esma.europa.eu/document/market-report-eu-carbon-markets-2025. [2] See in particular Sections 6.3.3.2. and 6.3.5., and Annex 13.47 of the impact assessment accompanying the 2021 proposal for the revision of the ETS Directive: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52021SC0601. [3] For example: European Commission: Joint Research Centre, Noka, V., Cludius, J., Kenkmann, T., Hünecke, K., Unger, N., Dolinga, T. and Neugebauer, J., Vulnerability in the context of the ETS 2: Existing data and instruments in the housing sector, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2025, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/6437307, JRC140866. [4] https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)738&lang=en. [5] https://climate.ec.europa.eu/news-other-reads/news/unlocking-eu3-billion-investment-opportunities-decarbonisation-buildings-and-road-transport-2026-02-04_en.”
  Energy (green transition) · Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• 2026-04-29 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 29.4.2026 Written question Member States are encouraged to spend their Emission Trading System (ETS) revenues swiftly and effectively to maximise their impact to address the climate and energy transition. The Honourable Members note correctly that since the entry into force of Directive (EU) 2023/959 [1] in June 2024, Member States are obliged to spend all their auction revenues [2] on the climate and energy purposes listed in Article 10(3) of ETS Directive [3] , except for any revenue that they spend in aid for indirect carbon costs compensation. The Commission analyses the spending by all Member States. It publishes the analysis of the Member States’ reports in the yearly Carbon Market Report [4] and the Climate Action Progress Report [5] . In 2025, Member States reported for the first time for a full year that is subject to the new spending requirement [6] . These reports are available on the website of the European Environment Agency [7] . The Commission is closely monitoring compliance with the new spending obligation to ensure all ETS revenue is truly spent in line with the provisions of the ETS Directive. The Commission is aware that not all Member States have spent the full amount of their latest auction revenues on climate and energy purposes as of now. For Italy, on the basis of its reports not all revenues have been allocated to climate purposes. The Commission will follow up with Member States, as appropriate. On the recent Italian ‘Energy Decree’, the Commission is working very closely with the Italian Government, to assess whether the decree complies with state aid rules and EU legislation. [1] Directive (EU) 2023/959 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading system (OJ L 130, 16.5.2023). [2] Or an equivalent financial value. [3] Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community (OJ L 275, 25.10.2003). [4] Latest report available here: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/ddc1b1de-652b-49ed-8f15-d9fa8badd39f_en?filename=com_2025_735_en.pdf [5] See Section 8 of the Staff Working Document available here: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/climate-strategies-targets/progress-climate-action/eu-climate-action-progress-report-2025_en [6] For the year 2024. [7] https://reportnet.europa.eu/public/dataflows (search ‘auctioning’ in the dataflow name).”
  Energy transition (state support) · Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• 2026-04-29 “E-000883/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission currently holds data from 2018 pertaining to specific types of fuel fraud and covering only a few Member States. To gather updated and comprehensive data, the Commission launched in early 2026 an external study aiming to quantify the excise revenues that are lost due to fraud and non-compliance, including but not only on supplies of fuel. This quantification is a preliminary step towards identifying the most affected areas within the EU and tracking the issue over time. The next phase will involve examining the structural factors contributing to this phenomenon. This ongoing study is carried out in cooperation with Member States, focusing on methodological issues and extending to the exchange of experiences regarding new fraud patterns, risk indicators, and control measures. The completion of the study is envisaged in early autumn 2026. Its results will feed into the 2026 edition of the ‘Mind the Gap’ Report 1 . As regards coordination among national authorities, a Fiscalis Project Group was set up in early 2026 to enhance technical cooperation and allow for the exchange of information. The first meeting of the group will be held on 20 April 2026. Regarding a strategy to address the issues at hand, technical discussions with Member States, facilitated by the Fiscalis Project Group, will aim to identify consensus areas for further harmonisation to mitigate fraud risks. 1 https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/taxation/vat/fight-against-vat-fraud/mind-gap-report_en.”
  VAT harmonisation · Tax Havens · EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2026-04-28 “E-000568/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 1. Directive 2006/112/EC allows the application of a reduced value added tax rate to the supply of books, newspapers and periodicals 1 . Member States may apply the reduced rate selectively subject to compliance with the principle of fiscal neutrality, which precludes similar goods being treated differently. Goods are similar where they have similar characteristics and meet the same needs from the point of view of an average consumer, and where the differences between them do not have a significant influence on the latter’s decision to use one or other of those goods. The similarity between publications in different languages must be assessed by the competent national authorities and courts in each concrete situation 2 . 2. The Commission is committed to ensure fundamental rights are protected in the context of implementation of EU law. In particular, the Commission recalls that Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU prohibits any form of discrimination on the basis, inter alia, of language. Any limitation to such fundamental right should be made in compliance with Article 52(1) of the Charter. 3. Latvia has fully transposed the Racial Equality Directive 3 , which provides protection against discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin in specific areas, including access to goods and services. Language as such is not a ground of discrimination on which the EU is empowered to legislate and the Court of Justice of the European Union has clarified that ‘ethnic origin’ is based on a combination of multiple factors, including common nationality, religious faith, language, and cultural and traditional origins and backgrounds 4 . 1 Article 98 and Annex III, point 6, of Directive 2006/112/EC, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/112/oj/eng. 2 See for instance the judgments of 11 September 2014, K Oy, C-219/13, EU:C:2014:2207, paragraphs 21-25 and 30-31; and of 9 November 2017, AZ v Minister Finansów, C-499/16, EU:C:2017:846, paragraphs 22-24 and 30-33. 3 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, pp. 22–26. 4 Judgment of 4 September 2015, "CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria" AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, C-83/14, EU:C:2015:480, paragraph 46; judgment of 6 April 2017, Jyske Finans A/S v Ligebehandlingsnævnet, acting on behalf of Ismar Huskic, C-668/15, EU:C:2017:278, paragraph 17; and judgment of 18 December 2025, Slagelse Almennyttige Boligselskab Afdeling Schackenborgvænge and Others v MV and Others, C417/23, EU:C:2025:1017, paragraph 74.”
  EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination · EU and national cultural identities
• 2026-04-27 “E-000388/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission committed in the Ocean Pact 1 to ensure that coastal communities and islands are protected and empowered so that they can adapt to the impacts of climate change. It plans to deliver a strategy on coastal communities and a strategy on islands by mid-2026. These upcoming strategies will provide a coherent approach towards supporting the development of coastal areas and communities through its sectoral policies, regional policy and planning tools. The European Integrated Framework for Climate Resilience 2 , to be adopted by the end of 2026, will set out a more ambitious, comprehensive and coherent EU approach to climate resilience and preparedness to become better prepared for and more resilient to the inevitable impacts of climate change. The Commission’s proposal for the next multiannual financial framework introduces national and regional partnership plans, combining EU funds implemented by Member States and regions. They will simplify rules and provide more flexibility to adapt to regional and local needs. Plans will support European objectives, such as promoting climate resilience. Each plan will have to meet a 43% climate and environment spending target. Moreover, the ‘do no significant harm’ principle will apply. The EU Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change 3 provides support to pioneer regional and local authorities to become climate resilient. This includes supporting the exchange of good planning practices, technical assistance, funding, as well as implementing and monitoring climate adaptation solutions. Also, several EU-funded Interreg programmes 4 support projects targeting islands and climate adaptation. This topic is also included in the Interreg Plan proposed under the next MFF. 1 COM(2025) 281 final. 2 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/news-other-reads/news/have-your-say-shape-europes-future-world-affectedclimate-change-2025-12-01_en. 3 https://mission-adaptation-portal.ec.europa.eu/index_en. 4 Such as the EUROMED Interreg programme, Baltic Sea Region Interreg programme.”
  Climate efforts · Funding for OCTs and outermost regions
• 2026-04-24 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 24.4.2026 Written question The Commission sees the offshore shipping sector as being of strategic importance for Europe, especially in the areas of energy, telecommunications and digital connectivity. Decarbonisation drives economic players, including the offshore maritime sector, to become independent of fossil fuels and thus strengthen competitiveness. It is in everyone’s interest to ensure legal certainty and a level playing field for the sector and a fair contribution towards EU climate goals. The Commission recognises the heterogeneity and specific nature of offshore activities, when it comes to Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) and Emissions Trading System (ETS) obligations. To address the issues that have been raised by offshore operators, the Commission has included additional clarifications in the guidance document [1] accompanying the MRV Regulation [2] and the EU ETS Directive [3] . Technical discussions on practical implementation matters pertaining to this sector with regards to MRV and ETS obligations continue to be held in the offshore workstream that meets under the auspices of the European Sustainable Shipping Forum (ESSF). This workstream brings together offshore shipping operators, Member States’ authorities and the Commission. In the context of the ongoing review of the ETS Directive, the Commission is also assessing what additional measures may be adopted to further facilitate compliance by offshore operators while ensuring a level playing field. [1] Guidance Document ‘The EU ETS and MRV Maritime — General guidance for shipping companies’; updated version, 18 November 2025. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/757/oj/eng. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02003L0087-20240301.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• 2026-04-24 “E-000317/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The question of whether the application of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) agreement between Belgium and the United States (US) is consistent with EU law, in particular with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 1 , is currently pending with the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling based on a decision by the Brussels Market Court of 26 November 2025 (case C-804/25). It must be recalled that FATCA Agreements are bilateral agreements concluded between each Member State of the EU and the US. As the EU is not a party to these agreements, the Commission is not entitled to discuss or negotiate amendments to them with the US. The EU-US Joint Statement of 21 August 2025 2 defines the main elements of the ongoing engagement in the area of trade between the EU and US. Tax matters are not covered by this framework for cooperation. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1–88. 2 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreementreciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en.”
  Tax Havens · EU regulation on financial data access
• 2026-04-21 “P-000901/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Owing to the vulnerability resulting from importing a significant share of fossil fuels from unstable regions, the impact of the situation in the Middle East has already cost Europeans an additional EUR 22 billion in fossil fuel imports in 44 days of the Iran conflict alone 1 . Speeding up the production and integration of low-carbon, home-grown energy in Europe’s energy system is one of the most effective ways to reduce the impact of fossil fuels on price setting. The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) is a key tool to achieve a higher degree of energy security and independence, which in time will ensure lower, more stable energy and carbon costs. The Commission has no plans to suspend the ETS. A review of the ETS is planned by July 2026 notably to set out the emissions cap and a decarbonisation trajectory beyond 2030 in line with the 2040 emissions reduction target set by the co-legislators. On 1 April, the Commission has proposed to increase the firepower of the Market Stability Reserve 2 , so that it can more effectively address excessive price volatility and keep prices in check. The Commission will also work on an ETS Investment Booster to fast-track support to energy intensive industries as they modernise and decarbonise. The Commission is also taking steps to lower energy prices and other costs for businesses in the context of the Clean Industrial Deal and its Affordable Energy Action Plan. For example, the proposed European Grids Package will allow for the integration of clean energy, lowering prices for industry, and the Clean Industrial State Aid Framework provides the possibility to give electricity price relief to industries. The Commission is also working on a toolbox of targeted, temporary measures to address recent price spikes in energy prices. 1 Statement by the President of the Commission of 13 April 2026, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_26_800 2 EU reinforces the stability and predictability of its carbon market https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_666”
  Climate efforts · Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme · Decarbonisation of maritime transport
• 2026-04-17 “E-000454/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra On behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission has no plans to suspend the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The Commission is accelerating its work on the upcoming review of the ETS, notably to set out the emissions cap and decarbonisation trajectory beyond 2030, in line with the 2040 emissions reduction target agreed by the co-legislators. This will provide more emissions space for industry compared to the legislation currently in force. 2. The Commission is taking steps to lower energy and business costs in the context of the Clean Industrial Deal and its Affordable Energy Action Plan. Examples include the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework supporting industries’ energy costs and decarbonisation, and the European Grids Package. By accelerating the expansion and interconnection of EU electricity grids, it will further increase the integration of EU electricity markets, already delivering approximately EUR 34 billion in annual benefits to consumers. To shield consumers from gas-driven price spikes, tools such as Power Purchase Agreements with renewable generators are encouraged under the Electricity Market Design. Furthermore, industry decarbonisation and consequent long-term reduction of energy costs is supported by the substantial revenues generated through the EU ETS. 3. Protection against carbon leakage risk is provided by free allocation and, for a number of sectors, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which is gradually replacing the free allocation of allowances for these sectors. In December 2025, the Commission proposed measures to further strengthen CBAM. The future of carbon leakage protection under EU ETS will be assessed as part of the Impact Assessment accompanying the ETS review.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme · Carbon leakage support · Energy (green transition)
• 2026-04-10 “E-000397/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission proposed on 17 December 2025 to extend the scope of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to selected steel and aluminium-intensive downstream goods. This scope extension covers intermediate goods and final goods and aims to address the risk of downstream carbon leakage. The Commission has proposed an entry into force date of 1 January 2028 for the downstream extension. This allows time for the legislative process and subsequently for developing and amending the relevant implementing acts. Furthermore, it allows all stakeholders involved, including importers, national authorities and third country producers, sufficient time to prepare for the downstream extension. The Temporary Decarbonisation Fund is an environmental measure. It will provide support to EU producers of certain CBAM goods to reduce their exposure to a remaining carbon leakage risk. Support will be granted for the production years 2026 and 2027. EU producers will have to demonstrate decarbonisation efforts to receive support. The forthcoming EU Emission Trading System (ETS) review will provide the opportunity for a comprehensive review of how best to address the issue of the remaining risk of carbon leakage from 2028 onwards. It should be recalled that that the CBAM is phased-in gradually, meaning that there is only a small reduction in installations’ free allocation in 2026 and 2027 for the production of goods in scope of CBAM (2.5% and 5% respectively). The transitory character of the Fund precludes any interpretation that it may constitute a precedent, a model or a reference point for the EU ETS review. Accordingly, the existence, operation or cessation of the Fund shall not create any expectation, legal or otherwise, regarding the EU ETS review.”
  State Aid · Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2026-04-09 “E-000709/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Reparation, Ombyggnad, Tillbyggnad (ROT) tax deduction allows Swedish homeowners to deduct 30 per cent of labour costs up to an annual limit of 50 000 Swedish Krona for repairs, conversions and extensions directly on the invoice of the contractor who carries out the relevant works and then claims the amount deducted from the Swedish Tax Agency. The setting of the eligibility criteria for the ROT deduction falls within the competence of the Swedish legislature, as long as it observes its obligations under the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA). The material and procedural conditions for the deduction may not discriminate on the grounds of nationality or, impose unjustified restrictions on the exercise of the freedoms granted under the TFEU and EEA Agreement. Hence, Swedish homeowners must not be discouraged or deterred from soliciting services of potential contractors established in other Member States and EEA European Free Trade Association States. Requirements that the latter should be registered, paying tax or have established their operations in Sweden may restrict the free provision of services under Article 56 of the TFEU and Article 36 of the EEA Agreement. In this regard it may in particular be recalled that any national measure, even if applicable without distinction to national providers of services and those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous the activities of providers of services established in another Member State, must be deemed to constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services 1 . 1 See for instance, judgment of 9 November 2006, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium, C-433/04, EU:C:2006:702, point 28 and case law cited; and judgment of 8 June 2017, Van der Weegen and Others v Belgische Staat , C-580/15, EU:C:2017:429, point 29.”
  EU competences on taxation · EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2026-04-07 “E-000672/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission welcomes the report by the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC), which underlines the urgency of action to strengthen resilience to climate change both through horizontal and sector measures, reinforcing the messages in the European Climate Risk Assessment. The Commission is developing an Integrated European Framework for Climate Resilience 1 , planned for the end of 2026, and has collected evidence through various channels, including a Call for Evidence and an Open Public Consultation 2 . The ESABCC report and its recommendations are an important element for preparing the Integrated Framework, including its messages regarding the need for a coherent, cross-cutting and science-based framework. As part of the Impact Assessment that will accompany its proposal, the Commission will carefully assess the balance of approaches and measures, including the use of legislative obligations and implementation mechanisms. The Commission confirms that nature-based solutions and ecosystems resilience are central for European climate adaptation and mitigation. The importance of stepping-up nature-based solutions for adaptation is addressed in horizontal adaptation policies 3,4 and guidance documents 5,6 , and the Integrated Framework should also look at incentives for nature-based solutions 7 . It is also a core part of EU climate mitigation policies, for example the Carbon Removals and Carbon Farming (CRCF) Regulation incentivises nature-based practices and the Commission will set up an EU Buyers’ Club to stimulate private investment in naturebased solutions. 1 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/adaptation-and-resilience-climate-change/european-climate-resilienceand-risk-management-integrated-framework_en. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14770-European-climate-resilienceand-risk-management-integrated-framework_en. 3 Communication on the EU adaptation strategy, COM (2021) 82 final. 4 Communication Managing climate risks – protecting people and prosperity, COM(2024) 91 final. 5 European Environment Agency, 2021, 'Nature-based solutions in Europe: Policy, Knowledge and practice for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction', EEA report 01/2021, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, ISBN 978-92-9480-362-7, ISSN 1977-8449, doi: 10.2800/919315. 6 European Investment Bank, 2023, 'Investing in nature-based solutions, State-of-play and way forward for public and private financial measures in Europe’, pdf: QH-04-23-551-EN-N ISBN 978-92-861-5572-7 doi: 10.2867/031133. Available at: https://www.eib.org/attachments/lucalli/20230095_investing_in_nature_based_solutions_en.pdf 7 The Mission letter of Commissioner Hoekstra of 1 December 2024 states that the European Climate Adaptation Plan ‘[…] should, for example, cover the impact on infrastructure, energy, water, food and land in cities and rural areas. You should also look at incentives for nature-based solutions’.”
  EU policy on infrastructure for preventing climate-related disasters (floods, droughts, extreme weather etc.) · Climate efforts
• 2026-04-07 “P-000544/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission As outlined in successive conclusions adopted by the European Council, the EU and its Member States support and are determined to engage with partners countries to support the global transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner, in line with the outcomes of the Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement. The EU works to maintain the momentum on the global clean energy transition, which is at the core of the Global Energy Transitions Forum that was launched by the President of the Commission in Davos in 2025. Together with the core group of participant countries, the work on the Forum will continue in 2026, including through an electrification campaign leading up to COP31. The Commissioner for Climate, Net Zero and Clean Growth is currently scheduled to participate in the First International Conference on the Transitioning Away From Fossil Fuels, with final participation details still being confirmed. At EU level, climate and energy acquis have been leading the reduction of domestic fossil fuel consumption and the EU is staying the course on its climate and environmental goals. This is reflected in the updated EU Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) as well as the legally binding intermediate 2040 target of 90% net greenhouse gas emission reductions in comparison to 1990 levels. The EU also continues to work closely with its suppliers (e.g. on the EU Methane Regulation 1 ) and enhances importer-exporter cooperation on the transition away from fossil fuels, including through its partnership with the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1787/oj/eng.”
  Climate efforts
• 2026-03-25 “P-000656/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The side-by-side agreement does not suspend ’minimum tax instruments for US companies’. The US corporate tax framework comprises mechanisms that achieve taxation of global foreign profits and secure a minimum level of taxation, similarly to the Pillar 2 standard for a global minimum tax. The side-by-side agreement provides for a coordination mechanism to ensure the coexistence of the US corporate tax framework and the Pillar 2 standard for a global minimum tax. It ensures that US companies in the EU remain subject to the domestic minimum tax, i.e., qualified domestic minimum top-up tax (QDMTT), implemented by the Member States under Pillar 2. The side-by-side agreement is expected to establish a level-playing field for companies on both sides of the Atlantic and worldwide. It is expected to prevent a race-to-the bottom that would undermine global trade and economic relations, while allowing EU Member States to maintain their levels of tax. This is achieved, for instance, by the framework for the treatment of tax incentives and refundable tax credits and ensures that the excessively large capacity of certain jurisdictions to grant subsidies to multinational companies is neutralised or, at least, significantly mitigated. The Commission will assess the implementation and effect of the application of the global agreement on the side-by-side package for the EU. This will ultimately be completed by the same deadline as the stock-take exercise, due to be completed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2029.”
  Tax Havens · EU competences on taxation
• 2026-03-23 “E-000253/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Over the period 2017-2024, vehicle prices in the EU have increased slightly faster than inflation. Various market dynamics impacted the sector, related to higher energy costs, shortage of key components such as chips, and lower domestic demand, which impacted price and cost structures in the automotive sector. The Commission’s impact assessment for the revision of the CO 2 standards for cars and vans 1 shows cost impacts and confirms that electric vehicles have a cheaper total cost of ownership, due to lower operating costs. The Commission has taken measures to support the competitiveness of EU industry and stimulate the deployment of affordable clean vehicles, in particular via the Action Plan for the European automotive sector 2 and the Automotive Package 3 , which includes an Omnibus that will bring annual cost cuts of about EUR 700 million for industry, and a Battery Booster to enhance cost competitiveness of the EU battery value chain. Such measures also include the Industrial Accelerator Act 4 , Action Plan for Affordable Energy 5 and the Critical Raw Materials Act 6 . The proposal to amend the CO 2 standards for cars and vans provides industry with more flexibility, enhancing technology neutrality while maintaining a strong signal towards zeroemission mobility, which is key to competitiveness as electric vehicles is the only growing segment globally. It also supports the deployment of small affordable electric cars through ‘super credits’. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:52025SC1058. 2 https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/action-plan-future-automotive-sector_en. 3 https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/action-plan-future-automotive-sector/automotive-package_en. 4 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/industrial-accelerator-act_en. 5 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/action-plan-affordable-energy-unlocking-true-value-our-energy-unionsecure-affordable-efficient-and_en. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401252.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · Climate efforts
• 2026-03-23 “E-000485/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission As EU law stands at present, direct taxation falls within the competence of Member States. The Member States have considerable autonomy in the negotiation, conclusion, application and termination of bilateral treaties on the prevention of double taxation. The Commission has no competence to intervene in the area of treaties on the prevention of double taxation since these matters concern inter alia arranging the taxing rights and bilateral relations between two Member States. Moreover, EU law does not preclude double taxation of the same income by several Member States. Bilateral treaties on the prevention of double taxation usually provide for a mutual agreement procedure. According to such provisions, residents of the contracting States can submit cases of double taxation to the competent authorities, which will endeavour to resolve them by mutual agreement. Article 24 of the Double Taxation Treaty between Ireland and France contains such a provision. In addition, and as an alternative means to solve tax disputes, taxpayers can take recourse to Directive (EU) 2017/1852. This Directive has been transposed by all EU Member States, including Ireland and France. It lays down rules for a mechanism to resolve disputes between Member States when those disputes arise from the interpretation and application of bilateral treaties on the prevention of double taxation. Member States are obliged to resolve the disputes in a concrete timeframe as provided by the Directive.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · EU competences on taxation
• 2026-03-20 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 20.3.2026 Written question Social and distributional aspects are addressed in EU climate policies [1] . The polluter-pays principle underpinning the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) ensures fairness in the transition. Member States can use ETS auction revenues to support those most affected. The EU funded Just Transition Mechanism addresses the social and economic effects of the transition, focusing on the regions, industries and workers in the territories where economic diversification and reconversion is most needed . The EU ETS has been covering the aviation sector in Europe since 2012. Private jets are included in the ETS above certain thresholds. The EU ETS has been extended to maritime transport since 2024, including yachts above 5 000 gross tonnage, in respect of their emissions from voyages for commercial purposes . In accordance with the ETS Directive requirements, the Commission will evaluate the climate impact of exempted small maritime and aviation operators. It may propose additional measures as appropriate. Some Member States have voluntary ‘opted-in’ emissions from leisure boats within the ‘ETS2’. The new ETS for buildings and road transport (ETS2) places emphasis on fairness. It will generate revenues that must be reinvested in climate action. The Social Climate Fund addresses the social impacts of the ETS2 on vulnerable groups, by devoting more than EUR 86 billion to support those affected by energy and transport poverty. The revision of the Energy Taxation Directive aims to broaden the scope of energy taxation to cover more sectors including aviation and maritime through removing existing exemptions. The proposal remains under consideration by the Council. The Commission stands ready to continue supporting the adoption. [1] See, for example, Annex 8 of the impact assessment for the 2040 Climate Target — SWD(2024) 63 final, Part 3/5, and more specifically Section 2.4.1 ‘Fuel expenses, energy and transport poverty, distributional impacts’, Section 2.4.4 ‘Changes in relative prices and distributional impacts’ and Section 2.4.5 ‘The equity dimension’.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme · Climate efforts
• 2026-03-12 “E-000139/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the potential impact of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) on the costs of imported nitrogen-based fertilisers by the agricultural sector, where fertiliser costs represent in average, all sectors combined, around 9% of the total costs of production. In December 2025, the Commission adopted the detailed rules 1 for the definitive phase of the CBAM including the methodology for calculating embedded emissions, default values and the rules for the free allocation adjustment. This allows the calculation of the CBAM obligation for imported fertilisers. The CBAM Regulation 2 provides that the definitive phase of the CBAM commences on 1 January 2026. No postponement is foreseen. The implementation of CBAM is essential to level the playing field between EU and non-EU fertiliser producers. The Commission is taking several steps to support farmers. Given the impact of high fertiliser prices, under CBAM, it has recently introduced a lower, 1% mark-up for the default values that may be used to calculate the CBAM obligation for fertilisers. The Commission has proposed to suspend, for one year, the most favoured nation duties on imports of several key nitrogen fertilisers and inputs for their production (ammonia, urea). The tariff suspension 3 will be implemented for all countries, except Russia and Belarus, through duty-free tariff rate quotas. Lastly, the Commission is monitoring the availability and affordability of fertilisers in the EU through the Fertilisers Market Observatory and will, in the first half of 2026, propose an action plan for fertilisers 4 . 1 The list of relevant implementing acts can be found under ‘Implementing acts and related annexes’ on the CBAM website, https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism/cbam-legislationand-guidance_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02023R0956-20251020. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2026)99&lang=en. 4 RESourceEU Action Plan, COM(2025) 945 final, https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/01c448d6-dc93-40d7-9afe-4c2af448d00c_en.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2026-03-10 “E-000195/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Advanced biofuels are defined in Directive 2018/2001/EU 1 (Renewable Energy Directive) as those biofuels that are produced from the feedstock listed in Part A of Annex IX to that Directive. The most recent data show that, in 2024, the total EU demand for advanced biofuels in transport was 5.3 Million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) (according to the SHARES database). This represents an increase of 1 Mtoe compared to 2023. This is about 30% of the total demand for biofuels in all transport modes. For comparison, the liquid fuel demand in road transport was 241 Mtoe in 2023, according to data reported by Eurostat. According to an ongoing modelling exercise, supporting also the quantification of the baseline of the Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal to amend the regulation on CO2 emission standards for cars and vans, a significant and growing share of biofuels used in road transport will be advanced biofuels. This is in line with the findings of the Impact Assessment supporting the 2040 Target Plan communication 2 , which states that ‘the use of biomass and waste is projected to increase by 30%’ and that ‘this evolution is mostly driven by advanced liquid biofuels and biomethane’. At the same time, the recently adopted Strategic Framework for a Competitive and Sustainable EU Bioeconomy 3 , adopted in November 2025, recognises that the availability of sustainable biomass remains finite and its use is most effective in hard-to-abate sectors. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02018L2001-20240716. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024SC0063. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0960.”
  Road transport environmental policy · Biofuels (RED II)
• 2026-03-09 “E-000045/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Behavioural taxation stands at the intersection of several policy areas: health, internal market and revenue for national budgets. In this context, the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union is competent for advancing fiscal policies with a single market focus. The mission of the Behavioural Taxation and Other Indirect Taxes Unit within the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union is to ensure the smooth functioning of the EU harmonised excise framework (horizontal excise legislation and supporting IT systems), to contribute to EU tax policy development and coordination of indirect tax matters (other than value added tax), including alcohol and tobacco excise legislation, and to the fight against fiscal fraud. The Commission will use the findings of the report ‘Health Taxes from an EU Perspective’ to engage with stakeholders. Notably, as announced in the Safe Hearts Plan 1 , the Commission plans to establish a network of competent authorities to provide a forum for cooperation and coordination in the taxation of unhealthy food products to support the exchange of information and best practices among Member States, and to set up a database of such taxes in force in Member States. The Commission will assess which tools, including possible financial actions, could be deployed to support preventive public health and promote healthier consumer choices 2 . 1 https://health.ec.europa.eu/document/download/dfb60cde-21a5-426d-8616e394a326abc2_en?filename=ncd_com-2025-1024_act_en.pdf. 2 This will be informed by the outcome of the study on so-called ‘ultra-processed foods’ announced in the Strategy for European Life Sciences: https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/strategy-researchand-innovation/jobs-and-economy/strategy-european-life-sciences_en.”
  Drinking regulation · Smoking regulation · EU measures on lifestyle-related behaviours (smoking, drinking, eating, etc.)
• 2026-03-06 “E-000008/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 1. Regulation (EU) 841/2018 1 sets an EU-wide net removals target in 2030, aiming to increase the EU’s net removals by about 15% and reverse declining trends. This EU target means that Members States must meet binding net carbon removal national targets, leading to a better performance of the Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector. Member States are responsible for implementing the appropriate policies and measures to achieve these targets. 2. The accounting of greenhouse gas emissions and removals across all sectors, including LULUCF, are based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Guidelines 2 as adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change or the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement. 3. While the Commission advocates for protecting and rewetting of peatlands, as an effective way to curb greenhouse gas emissions and increasing resilience towards the risks of floods, droughts, and fires, the replacement of peat with other materials can pose challenges in the horticultural sector. To take account of such challenges, the Commission is for example considering specific provisions regarding the use of peat in growing media under the afforestation methodology currently under discussion in the Expert Group on Carbon Removals in the context of the Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 3 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/841/oj/eng. 2 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, Volume 4 ‘Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use’. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202403012.”
  Climate efforts
• 2026-03-05 “E-000247/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Social fairness is addressed in EU climate policies and in their preparation. The objective of the Social Climate Fund 1 is to address the social impacts of the new emission trading system for buildings and road transport (ETS2) on vulnerable groups in the EU, especially those affected by energy and transport poverty. The ETS auction revenues can be used by Member States for these same purposes. Lower income Member States benefit from proportionally higher shares of these revenues, which aims to support them in their transition 2 . The Modernisation Fund 3 supports the modernisation of energy systems and the improvement of energy efficiency in 13 lower-income Member States. The Effort Sharing Regulation 4 recognises the different capacities of Member States to take action by differentiating targets according to gross domestic product per capita. The Just Transition Mechanism, funded by the EU budget, addresses the social and economic effects of the transition, focusing on the regions, industries and workers in the territories where economic diversification and reconversion is most needed 5 . The EU solidarity fund 6 and EU Civil Protection Mechanism support countries in Europe and beyond when struck by climaterelated emergencies. Internationally, the EU, its Member States and the European Investment Bank are together the world’s biggest contributor of public climate finance to developing economies 7 . The EU monitors, estimates and reports on emissions at national level, as required under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The impact assessments of climate policy initiatives include analyses of the social and distributional impacts, i.e. impacts on the various income groups and the most vulnerable groups, 8,9,10 through the use of economic modelling tools. 1 https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-and-activities/funding/social-climate-fund_en. 2 10% of ETS allowance is specifically distributed to the lower income Member States for the purposes of solidarity. 3 The Modernisation Fund is funded by ETS revenues, https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-funding-climateaction/modernisation-fund_en. 4 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/effort-sharing-member-states-emission-targets/effort-sharing-2021-2030targets-and-flexibilities_en. 5 The Just Transition Fund allocated nearly EUR 20 billion to invest in diversifying economies and reskilling workers in vulnerable regions. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europeangreen-deal/finance-and-green-deal/just-transition-mechanism_en. 6 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/solidarity-fund_en. 7 In 2024, they contributed EUR 31.7 billion in climate finance from public sources and mobilised an additional amount of EUR 11.0 billion of private finance. 8 See the assessments for the 2030 Climate Target Plan and the Fit for 55 package: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:749e04bb-f8c5-11ea-991b01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_2&format=PDF. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/climate-action/delivering-european-green-deal/fit-55-deliveringproposals_en. 9 See SWD(2024) 63 final Part 3/5, Annex 8 and more specifically Section 2.4.1. Fuel expenses, energy and transport poverty, distributional impacts, Section 2.4.4. Changes in relative prices and distributional impacts’ and Section 2.4.5 The equity dimension. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:6c154426-c5a6-11ee-95d901aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_3&format=PDF.”
  Climate efforts · Energy (green transition)
• 2026-03-05 “P-000326/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Regulation (EU) 2025/2083 1 introduced the 50 tonnes de minimis threshold as a major simplification measure for the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Its introduction will allow to exempt 90% of importers, mostly small and medium-sized enterprises, from unnecessary compliance costs, while keeping more than 99% of emissions in the scope of CBAM. It should be noted that the introduced de minimis threshold is an annual cumulative threshold which applies to cumulative imports over a calendar year, not to single consignments. Based on customs import data from the surveillance system, the Commission is continuously monitoring the situation to ensure that the de-minimis threshold is not used for circumvention. The risk that the Honourable Member is referring to is therefore being closely monitored. Moreover, the CBAM regulation includes several safeguards: Firstly, the Commission is tasked by the CBAM regulation to carry out an annual assessment, based on the latest trade and emissions data, to check that in the past 12 months, the 50 tonnes threshold allowed to capture more than 99% of emissions. Whenever this is not the case, the threshold will be updated for the following year. Secondly, a review clause foresees that the Commission should assess the robustness of the de minimis threshold by 2027 in a report to the European Parliament and Council. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2083/oj.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2026-03-05 “E-000094/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission In line with its mandate under Article 7a of Regulation (EU) 2019/631 1 , the Commission has worked since the beginning of 2024 on a draft delegated act laying down a methodology for the assessment and consistent data reporting of the full life-cycle CO 2 emissions of passenger cars and light commercial vehicles. Two extensive stakeholder workshops were organised on 11 December 2024 and 2 July 2025, gathering input from representatives of the vehicle, vehicle parts, fuels, and recycling industries, as well as Member States, non-governmental organizations, and academia. Developing a life-cycle CO 2 emissions assessment methodology is a highly complex endeavour, as demonstrated by past experience in other regulatory contexts. This is particularly true for products such as passenger cars and light commercial vehicles, with very high complexity in materials and parts used, and global value chains. The methodology under preparation pursuant to Article 7a of Regulation (EU) 2019/631 is intended to account for emissions across the full life cycle of a vehicle, starting with raw material acquisition and preprocessing, followed by the production of vehicle parts and components, vehicle assembly, the use phase, the fuels and electricity cycle, and end-of-life treatment. In addition, several elements of the methodology are linked on substance to elements falling under other EU legislation in preparation. This will need to be taken into account for regulatory consistency. The draft methodological framework will be subject to a public consultation process on the ‘Have your Say’ website before its finalisation. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/631/oj/eng.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2026-03-03 “E-000245/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has been exploring innovative options to broaden the sources of concessional finance for climate action, in line with the 2025 Council Conclusions on International Climate Finance 1 . This includes solidarity levies from the fossil fuel sector. The Commission is a partner of the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force, established at the 2023 UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) by the governments of Barbados, France and Kenya. The Task Force promotes the implementation of solidarity levies as a source of finance to support climate and development goals. At the 2025 UN Climate Change Conference (COP30), it launched the Premium Flyers Solidarity Coalition, aiming to introduce levies on business class, first class and private jets in the aviation sector. The EU will also contribute to the implementation of the New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance, and the call on all actors to work together to scale up financing for developing countries to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year 2035. This includes advocating for broadening the donor base and improving domestic resource mobilisation. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13732-2025-INIT/en/pdf.”
  Climate efforts · Environmental crimes and justice
• 2026-02-20 “P-000018/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Reducing emissions from fossil fuel-dependent sectors is pivotal for competitiveness. The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) recognises the challenges faced by islands and includes specific derogations to preserve their connectivity. The Commission also assesses regularly the ETS social and economic impacts on their aviation and maritime sectors. 93% of flights departing from Malta Airport in 2024 were subject to EU ETS costs 1 . Compared to 2019, the number of passengers has increased, highlighting the limited impact of increasing ETS costs on connectivity over the same period and limited risk of internal carbon leakage. ETS-financed support is available under the Innovation Fund scheme and airlines using eligible sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) on flights departing from the island are eligible for higher financial support, to cover 100% of the price differential between SAF and fossil kerosene. The 2021 impact assessment for extending the EU ETS to maritime transport indicated that commodity prices increase would be less than 1% by 2030, with low impact on demand. A 2024 analysis by the Central Bank of Malta estimated modest increases in consumer prices in Malta linked to ETS-related costs for shipping companies, of between 0.11% and 0.25% 2 . It should also be noted that Malta, due to its large maritime sector, receives additional allowances to support decarbonisation of maritime activities. Finally, protection for island economies, workers, and households is ensured through the targeted use of ETS2 revenues, notably the Social Climate Fund. The Commission is currently assessing Malta’s Social Climate Plan and will apply provisions, such as Article 8(6)(p) 3 , to ensure that national geographic specificities are duly considered. 1 Including intra-EEA (European Economic Area) flights and flights to UK and Switzerland (Source: Eurocontrol). 2 Depending on the EU ETS carbon price. The study considered EU ETS C-prices of EUR 90/tCO 2 , EUR 150/tCO 2 and EUR 200/tCO 2 . Current carbon price is around EUR 90/tCO 2 . 3 REGULATION (EU) 2023/955 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 10 May 2023 establishing a Social Climate Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1060.”
  Decarbonisation of maritime transport · Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme · Decarbonisation of aviation sector
• 2026-02-16 “E-004348/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes note of the report from Oxfam 1 . The Commission launched in December 2024 a study on wealth-related taxes to have a better understanding of the effective taxation of high-net-worth individuals. It is foreseen to be completed in the first half of 2026. It will provide further information on the overall context and on the effectiveness of wealth-related taxes targeting high-net-worth-individuals in both EU and non-EU countries. Moreover, to have better insights, the Commission can build on the EUROMOD 2 microsimulation tool, i.e. the EU tax-benefit microsimulation model. This tool estimates the effects of changes in taxes and benefits on household income. It also assesses work-related incentives across the population of each country and for the EU as a whole. The Commission has taken several actions to achieve fairer outcomes. A major achievement aimed at curbing tax avoidance and evasion is the Directive on the Administrative Cooperation 3 and its numerous updates that improve transparency, administrative cooperation and exchange of information between Member States as well as the European Semester Country specific recommendations 4 on aggressive tax planning. 1 Putaturo C., and Desiderio J., A European agenda to tax the super-rich: A solution to inequality in the European Union, OXFAM EU, October 2025. 2 https://euromod-web.jrc.ec.europa.eu/. 3 https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/taxation/tax-transparency-cooperation/administrative-co-operation-andmutual-assistance/directive-administrative-cooperation-dac_en. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2025-european-semester-country-specific-recommendationscommission-recommendations_en.”
  Tax Havens · Wealth taxation · Priorities of taxation policy in the EU
• 2026-02-12 “E-000034/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware that the Industrial Emissions Portal Regulation (IEPR) 1 provides aggregated information on fluorinated gases (F-gases), including any reported emissions from facilities in Sicily. The Regulation (EU) 2024/573 on fluorinated greenhouse gases 2 has reinforced rules on measures to be taken to prevent emissions for all F-gases. Intentional emissions are prohibited, and operators need to take all measures that are technically and economically feasible to prevent emissions that are technically necessary for the intended use. Similarly, all necessary precautions to prevent release need to be taken during production, storage, transport and transfer of gases, and leakage needs to be minimised and repaired when detected. A strong legal framework for the covered gases is therefore firmly in place. The Commission does not have any infringement cases against Italy in relation to the F-gas Regulation. Four Member States and Norway submitted a restriction dossier covering all per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) under the Regulation for the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) 3 . The scientific assessment is on-going at the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and the Commission will receive an opinion by the end of 2026. The Commission will prepare a restriction proposal as soon as possible after receiving the opinion. This restriction will complement existing ones on PFAS such as the restriction on PFHxA, adopted in 2024 or the restriction of PFAS in firefighting foams adopted in 2025. 1 The Industrial Emissions Portal Regulation (IEPR) replaced the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register Regulation (E-PRTR). http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1244/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/573/oj/eng. 3 Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02006R1907-20250901).”
  Air quality policy
• 2026-02-10 “E-004383/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Following the adoption of the proposal 1 for the 2040 climate target, the Commission is preparing a review of the Emission Trading System (ETS) Directive, the proposal being scheduled for the third quarter 2026. The Commission is analysing the impact of a number of elements, including potential measures to prevent the risk of carbon leakage, as well as measures for supporting the decarbonisation of industry via the Innovation Fund or the Industrial Decarbonisation Bank. As part of this process, the Commission will take fully into account the provisions relevant to carbon leakage in the final amendment to the Climate Law. In addition, the Chemicals Industry Action Plan 2 outlines further action that the Commission is taking to modernise and strengthen the competitiveness of the chemicals sector, including a Critical Chemicals Alliance to address risks of production capacity closures, simplification options via the ‘omnibus’ packages, and action to support low-carbon fertilisers produced from renewable or low-carbon hydrogen or bio-based chemicals, including digestate from biogas production, as a source of organic nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus. Lastly, the Commission is monitoring the availability and affordability of fertilisers in the EU through the Fertilisers Market Observatory. In the first half of 2026 the Commission will propose an action plan for fertilisers 3 . As regards the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), the Commission’s approach is to find a good balance between preventing the risk of carbon leakage by ensuring equivalent carbon prices between domestic and imported fertilisers and to maintain prices for imported fertilisers affordable. 1 European Climate law amendment proposal: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e1b5a957-c6b94cb2-a247-bd28bf675db6_en. 2 A European Chemicals Industry Action Plan. COM(2025) 530 final. 3 RESourceEU Action Plan- COM(2025) 945 final: https://single-marketeconomy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/01c448d6-dc93-40d7-9afe-4c2af448d00c_en.”
  Use of fertilisers · Carbon leakage support
• 2026-02-02 “E-004386/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the potential impact of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on the costs of imported nitrogen-based fertilisers by the agricultural sector, where fertiliser costs represent around 9% of the total costs of production. To account for the specific challenges facing the agricultural sector, including high prices and substantial import dependency, the Commission adopted a differentiated treatment to fertilisers in the setting of default values. Compared to other CBAM sectors, the mark-up for default values required by the CBAM Regulation was set at a much lower level (1%) for fertilisers and without increase over time. This will significantly mitigate the price impact of CBAM on imported fertilisers. In its legislative proposal amending the CBAM Regulation, the Commission has also included a measure 1 that, if adopted by the co-legislators, would allow for the temporary suspension of the application of CBAM for specific goods, as a safeguard in case of unforeseen circumstances. In addition, the Commission will temporarily suspend the remaining Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) tariffs on ammonia, urea and, where needed, certain other fertilisers, with a view to further reducing the impact of CBAM. Furthermore, in the first half of 2026 the Commission will propose an action plan for fertilisers 2 . Following the November 2022 Communication 3 on availability and affordability of fertilisers, the Commission is also monitoring the availability and affordability of fertilisers in the EU through the Fertilisers Market Observatory and is ready to examine other mitigating and flanking measures if necessary. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0989. 2 RESourceEU Action Plan- COM(2025) 945 final: https://single-marketeconomy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/01c448d6-dc93-40d7-9afe-4c2af448d00c_en. 3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Ensuring availability and affordability of fertilisers, COM/2022/590 final/2.”
  Use of fertilisers
• 2026-01-27 “E-004368/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not intend to delay or repeal the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) or to exclude aluminium from its scope. CBAM is a tool to protect against the risk of carbon leakage by ensuring equivalent carbon pricing for imports and domestic products. In December 2025, the Commission presented proposals to extend the CBAM scope to certain downstream goods in the steel and aluminium sectors and to address circumvention risks. The recently introduced de minimis threshold of 50 tonnes per importer per year exempts more than 90% of importers from the obligations of the CBAM, while maintaining more than 99% of emissions in scope, thereby simplifying CBAM and maintaining its environmental integrity. The Commission will closely monitor compliance with the threshold and assess every year whether it needs to be updated. The Commission aims to boost the uptake of high-quality secondary aluminium by preparing recycled-content obligations in key sectors for aluminium-containing products under the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation 1 and the future Regulation on end-of-life vehicles 2 . As per the RESourceEU Action Plan 3 , by the second quarter of 2026, the Commission will also propose targeted measures to ensure sufficient availability of aluminium scrap in the EU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02024R1781-20240628. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_3043. 3 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/01c448d6-dc93-40d7-9afe-4c2af448d00c_en.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) · Trade relations with Turkey
• 2026-01-27 “E-004439/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA) relied for the evaluation on information and data submitted by the project promoter, including both technical and feasibility studies, which include the project's relevant environmental impacts. The quality and comprehensiveness of these claims was assessed by independent experts. The STEP Seal is awarded to projects that exceed all Innovation Fund evaluation criteria minimum thresholds. The Gama project was deemed to satisfy these criteria, based on the documentation submitted, and received the STEP Seal accordingly. Once awarded, the STEP Seal cannot be withdrawn by the Commission, except in the event that CINEA’s initial positive evaluation is subsequently revised and results in a negative assessment. The STEP Seal ceases to be valid if the project has not started within five years of the award. However, once STEP Seal projects are selected for funding by the Innovation Fund or through other support instruments, there are several project development steps including obtaining the necessary regulatory permits before implementation, to which the collected expert assessment can be of relevance. The Commission welcomes the careful attention to the evaluated projects and is committed to maintaining rigorous evaluation standards in all European funding instruments.”
  EU policy on sustainability criteria in public funding · Water pollution · Industrial emissions directive (IED)
• 2026-01-26 “E-004371/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The requirements in the Delegated Regulation 2023/1185 1 are essential to ensure that these fuels provide genuine climate benefits and contribute to meeting the EU’s climate target. This Regulation does not exclude any industrial carbon dioxide (CO2) sources, but fossil CO2 needs to meet conditions to be considered as avoided emissions. A sunset clause limits the use of fossil CO2 at the latest by 2041. By then, the CO2 feedstock for renewable fuels should be sourced from sustainable sources to ensure compatibility with the 2050 climate neutrality objective. These dates are subject to review considering the implementation in the sectors covered by Directive 2003/87/EC 2 of the Union-wide climate target for 2040. The criteria applies for the certification of all renewable fuels of non-biological origin (RFNBO) consumed in the EU, even if produced in a third country, including the UK. The criterion for carbon pricing was considered necessary to keep the environmental integrity of the accounting for greenhouse gas emissions and to put EU producers, which are subject to the Emissions Trading System price, on a level playing field with non-EU producers on the EU market. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2023/1185/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02003L008720240301&qid=1766395872451.”
  Carbon capture storage and utilisation · Decarbonisation of aviation sector
• 2026-01-21 “E-004721/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The term ‘sport’ is not defined in the VAT (value-added tax) Directive 1 . The Court of Justice clarified that an activity such as duplicate bridge, which is characterised by a physical element that appears to be negligible, is not covered by the concept of ‘sport’ within the meaning of that provision 2 . Further, the Commission notes that chess shares similarities with bridge in relation to the involved physical activity. As guardian of the Treaties, the Commission regularly monitors the correct implementation of EU law. However, the Member States have the primary responsibility for transposing, applying and implementing EU law correctly. The collection of VAT 3 is a task entrusted to Member States. The Commission lacks data to assess the impact of subjecting to VAT the practice of mind sports in Denmark. 1 Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, OJ L 347, 11.12.2006, pp. 1–118. 2 Case C-90/16. 3 Case C-132/06.”
  VAT harmonisation
• 2026-01-19 “E-004153/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission All sectors, including maritime transport, must contribute to the EU objective of climate neutrality by 2050. The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) 1 is key to this goal. The Commission fully acknowledges the specific situation of the EU’s outermost regions and their dependence on air and maritime connectivity. Accordingly, the EU ETS includes derogations benefitting these regions. In line with Article 12(3-b) of the ETS Directive, until 31 December 2030, there is no obligation to surrender allowances for emissions from voyages between a port in an outermost region and another port in the same Member State. This derogation applies to voyages between ports within or between outermost regions, and emissions from port activities related to such voyages. Under the EU ETS, each voyage segment between two ports of call is treated as a separate voyage for monitoring, reporting and compliance purposes. Thus, if a ship departs from a port of call in one Member State (not located in an outermost region), makes an intermediate call in another port of the same Member State (also not in an outermost region), and then proceeds with a port of call located in an outermost region of the same Member State, it will result in two distinct voyages under the EU ETS. Only the emissions from the second voyage connecting to the outermost region would meet the conditions to qualify for the derogation and be exempt. However, if the stop at the intermediate port does not qualify as a port of call under the EU ETS (e.g. stop for the sole purposes of refuelling), emissions from the two legs would be considered as part of a single voyage, which would qualify for the derogation. Additionally, outermost regions benefit from EU funding 2 for the green transition and ETS revenues may also finance maritime projects in these regions. 1 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275 25.10.2003, p. 32). 2 Such as European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and LIFE programmes.”
  Decarbonisation of maritime transport
• 2026-01-19 “E-004259/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Council of the EU approved a significant reform to the Value added tax (VAT) rates system in 2022 1 . During this process, the Member States unanimously agreed on revised wording for the category relating to goods for disabled persons 2 . This category now includes medical equipment, appliances, devices, items and aids, as well as protective gear, such as health protection masks, which are intended for use in healthcare or by disabled persons, and goods that are essential for overcoming or compensating for disability. In addition to repairs, the Council decided to include the adaptation, rental and leasing of such goods within the scope of eligible transactions. While the goods mentioned by the Honourable Member might be regarded as compensating for or overcoming disability, it must be emphasised that when adopting the VAT rates reform, the Council did not specify the distinct types of goods that fall under this category. As the decision to apply and set VAT rates based on the provisions of the VAT Directive is at the discretion of the Member States, it is also up to them to define the specific transactions eligible for reduced VAT rates in their national law. 1 Council Directive (EU) 2022/542 of 5 April 2022 amending Directives 2006/112/EC and (EU) 2020/285 as regards rates of value added tax, OJ L 107, 6.4.2022, p. 1. 2 Category (4) of Annex III of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ L 347, 11.12.2006) - the VAT Directive.”
  VAT harmonisation
• 2026-01-14 “E-004704/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of Stardust Solutions´ activities but lacks detailed information on the company’s commercial plans. The Commission is closely monitoring developments related to solar radiation modification (SRM). The Commission has funded projects to investigate ethical and governance aspects of SRM and related research 1 . The Commission requested the Group of the Chief Scientific Advisors to conduct a scientific risk assessment of SRM technologies. The Group delivered its Opinion 2 on 9 December 2024, reviewing studies on the effect of SRM on e.g. precipitation, temperature, stratospheric ozone, renewable energy, agriculture, hydrological cycle, etc. The Commission recognises the potential environmental, public health and geopolitical risks associated with SRM, particularly when those technologies are being advanced without a clear international governance structure. The Commission’s position on SRM is set out in the Joint Communication of the Commission and High Representative on the Climate-Security Nexus of 28 June 2023 3 which states that ‘risks, impacts and unintended consequences that these technologies pose are poorly understood, and necessary rules, procedures and institutions have not been developed’ and stresses that the EU, guided by the precautionary principle, ‘will support international efforts to assess comprehensively the risks and uncertainties of climate interventions, including solar radiation modification and promote discussions on a potential international framework for its governance, including research related aspects’. 1 See, in particular, TechEthos (https://doi.org/10.3030/101006249), GENIE (https://doi.org/10.3030/951542) and Co-CREATE (https://doi.org/10.3030/101137642). 2 https://scientificadvice.eu/advice/solar-radiation-modification/. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023JC0019.”
  Climate efforts
• 2026-01-14 “E-004202/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to transparency in its relations with interest representatives, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other stakeholders. Interest representatives carrying out activities to influence EU policy or legislation must register in the Transparency Register, irrespective of their country of establishment. The Commission requires prior registration for any related meetings with its decision-makers at political and administrative level or for participating in Commission expert groups. EU and third-country NGOs are required to provide in the register the information, including financial information, set out in Annex II to the applicable Interinstitutional Agreement 1 . To increase the transparency and democratic accountability of activities impacting EU decision-making processes, the Commission also adopted in 2023 its proposal for a Directive on interest representation on behalf of third countries. The proposed harmonised transparency requirements would apply to entities carrying out interest representation on behalf of third countries, regardless of their legal form. The proposal is currently being discussed by the colegislators. The Commission exercises the necessary scrutiny and due diligence when selecting NGOs with which it partners in the use of EU funds. The Financial Regulation includes a definition of NGO to ensure the reliability and transparency of information in the Financial Transparency System, where information on recipients is available. In the event of incorrect implementation or in cases of fraud, irregularities, substantial errors or serious breach of contractual obligations, including the violation of EU values, the grant may be suspended, terminated or reduced and funds may be recovered. 1 OJ L 207, 11.6.2021, p.1.”
  EU-China relations · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2026-01-13 “E-004285/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission assesses annually 1 the progress made by Member States towards their targets under the Effort Sharing Regulation 2 , and can request corrective action plans if progress is not sufficient. The Commission maintains regular contacts with Member States to support and help them in meeting their 2030 targets. If the compliance checks foreseen in 2027 and 2032 reveal that a Member State has exceeded the limit set for any year, taking into account the use of flexibilities, the quantity of emissions in excess is multiplied by 1.08 and the result will be added to the emissions of the subsequent year. If in 2032 it is found that the limit set for 2030 is exceeded, despite the available flexibilities, the general framework provided for in the treaties will apply. The Commission will be entitled to initiate a formal infringement procedure, potentially leading to the case being brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union, which could ultimately result in financial penalties being applied to the Member State at stake. The initial step would be for the Commission to send the Member State in question a letter of formal notice. There is no general predetermined time frame for the initiation of the infringement procedures or their duration. The Commission has no plans to propose a legislative amendment to the Effort Sharing Regulation foreseeing financial penalties or pricing for excess emissions for individual countries failing to meet the Effort Sharing Regulation. 1 In its annual Climate Action Progress Report. 2 Regulation (EU) 2018/842 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 (OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 26); ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/842/2023-05-16.”
  Climate efforts
• 2026-01-13 “E-004534/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Climate finance is part of the Official Development Assistance provided by the EU to developing countries, with an overview presented in the annual reports on the implementation of the EU’s external action instruments 1 . Additional information on international climate action is available in the Climate Action Progress Report 2 . The total level of climate finance committed by the Commission to non-EU countries over the period 2019-2024 is approximately EUR 19.4 billion. A breakdown of these figures can be found on the European Environment Agency website 3 . The official 2024 figures will be updated in January 2026. The allocation of the Commission’s climate finance to non-EU countries is done as part of the programming of the EU’s external instruments, including through thematic, regional and national financial envelopes. The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)-Global Europe includes a climate spending target of 30%. The funding of specific projects and programmes is determined as part of the Commission’s programming process. Priorities are set out through the Multi-annual Indicative Programmes 4 . Project and programme objectives are tracked using both the Commission’s own methodologies, and internationally agreed OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) methodologies such as the OECD’s Rio Markers. A database of EU projects and programmes is available on the Commission’s website 5,6 . 1 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/publications-library/2024-annual-report-implementationeuropean-unions-external-action-instruments-2023_en. 2 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/climate-strategies-targets/progress-climate-action/eu-climate-actionprogress-report-2025/chapter-8-international-clim. 3 https://climate-energy.eea.europa.eu/topics/climate-finance/assistance-to-developing-countries/data. 4 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/funding-and-technical-assistance/funding-instruments/globaleurope-programming_en. 5 https://team-europe-explorer.europa.eu/oda/explore-oda_en. 6 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a3916ee0-79bd-4b87-912ed1cb2f3c6711_en?filename=ClimateFinanceCOP30-factsheet-final.pdf.”
  Climate efforts
• 2026-01-08 “E-004623/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Achieving the EU’s 2050 net-zero climate target requires all economic sectors to contribute to decarbonisation. Emissions from municipal waste incineration (MWI) installations are currently mainly covered under the Effort Sharing Regulation 1 and subject to national emissions reduction targets and measures but have grown since 2005. Some waste incinerators are currently already covered under the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), such as industrial waste incinerators, and municipal waste-to-energy installations in some Member States 2 . Under the 2023 revision of the EU ETS, all MWI installations above the 20 megawatts threshold are required to monitor and report emissions from 2024 onwards. As part of the upcoming review of the EU ETS Directive scheduled for July 2026, the Commission is required to assess the potential inclusion of MWI installations and the possibility of including other waste management processes, in particular landfills, which are responsible for the largest share of waste sector emissions 3 . The work on the impact assessment is currently ongoing. In the context of the stakeholder consultation 51% of respondents were in favour and 30% opposed the inclusion of MWI into the EU ETS 4 . The Commission is further assessing the impact of a potential extension of the EU ETS to waste management processes in terms of incentivising cost-effective emission reductions, ensuring a level playing field between sectors and Member States, and contributing to the circular economy, proper waste management and minimising landfilling. It is also assessing the scope, design elements and abatement options in case of an extension. The results of the impact assessment will feed into the legislative proposal for the EU ETS review. 1 Regulation (EU) 2018/842 of 30 May 2018 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013. 2 Denmark, Lithuania and Sweden have included municipal waste incineration (MWI) installations in their national implementation of the EU ETS, while Germany included waste incineration installations in its national emissions trading system. 3 Review clause in Article 30(7) of the EU ETS Directive: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02003L0087-20240301. 4 Details on the process and outcome of the open public consultation can be consulted on: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14549-EU-emissions-trading-systemfor-maritime-aviation-and-stationary-installations-and-market-stability-reserve-review/public-consultation_en.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2026-01-08 “E-003664/202 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Making energy more affordable is a key aim of EU energy policy. On 26 February 2025, the Commission presented the Action Plan for Affordable Energy 1 alongside the Clean Industrial Deal 2 . The Plan outlines eight measures to lower energy costs and attract investment. Implementation is already underway. Key measures include guidance on more efficient network charges and lowering electricity taxes, that can offer immediate relief especially for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), as taxes and network charges make up around 40% of electricity costs. Additional initiatives include guidance on two-way Contracts for Difference (CfDs) to stabilise prices and boost clean energy investment, and the launch of Tripartite Contracts for offshore wind, grids, and storage to unlock investments for affordable homegrown energy. The European Grids Package, adopted on 10 December 2025 3 , included further measures aimed at lowering energy prices by enabling energy to flow more efficiently across all Member States, integrating cheaper clean energy and accelerating electrification. Climate policies are designed to keep costs to industry in check, including through carbon leakage protection and targeted use of Emission Trading System (ETS) revenues. Member States can also use their ETS revenues to address energy costs by supporting industrial decarbonisation investments and providing aid for the indirect carbon cost passed on to electro-intensive sectors in line with the State aid rules. In the new ETS for buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2), impacts on the most vulnerable consumers are also being addressed through the Social Climate Fund and accompanying Social Climate Plans 4 . 1 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/affordable-energy_en. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en. 3 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/infrastructure/european-grids_en. 4 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/carbon-markets/social-climate-fund_en.”
  Energy (green transition) · EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-01-08 “E-004213/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of recent reports by non-governmental organisations regarding the data collected by the European Environment Agency on the CO 2 emissions of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs). The data shows a large gap between the real-world measurements for PHEVs and the CO 2 values stated in the Certificate of Conformity and communicated to vehicle owners, and that these vehicles are currently not realising their potential, largely because they are not being charged and driven electrically as frequently as anticipated. Still, according to the report quoted by the Honourable Member, average real-world CO 2 emissions of PHEVs were 19% lower than those of conventional cars. The ‘zero- and low-emission vehicle’ (ZLEV) classification is based on the calculated CO 2 emissions during type-approval and is independent of the vehicle powertrain. ZLEVs are defined in the CO 2 standards Regulation 1 as light-duty vehicles with tailpipe emissions from zero up to 50 grammes CO 2 /km. In 2023, the Commission introduced changes 2 to the utility factor calculation, applicable as of 2025, to ensure that the official CO 2 emissions determined for PHEVs are representative of real driver behaviour. This factor determines the expected share of distance driven electrically based on the electric range of a PHEV. It is used for calculating the fuel consumption and CO 2 emissions during their type-approval. The Commission has accelerated the work on preparing the review of the CO 2 standards, which will be based on a fact-based analysis, taking into account all relevant technological developments, including as regards plug-in hybrid technologies, and the importance of an economically viable and socially fair transition towards zero-emission mobility. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02019R0631-20231203. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32023R0443.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2026-01-08 “E-004154/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Emissions Trading System for fuel combustion in buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2) complements other national and EU policies and measures to achieve Member States’ overall emission reductions under the Effort Sharing Regulation 1 . With a one-year delay of the start of ETS2 to 2028, following the provisional agreement of the European Parliament and Council on the EU Climate Law announced on 10 December 2025, Member States remain legally obliged to meet their 2030 targets, further underlining the role of complementary measures in these sectors. The ETS2 framework supports complementary measures and investments in clean heating and road transport. The Social Climate Fund (SCF) will mobilise EUR 65 billion, plus national contributions, as of 2026, designed with double solidarity: supporting a socially fair transition for vulnerable households, with lower-income Member States benefitting most. Member States must also target all national ETS2 revenues at measures and investments to support low- and middle-income citizens in the transition. Member States can also access a range of other EU instruments and tools, such as InvestEU, the Recovery and Resilience Facility or Cohesion Funds. Finally, in partnership with the European Investment Bank, the Commission is exploring a new frontloading facility for Member States, which could offer the possibility to accelerate early investments to support low- and middle-income households in reducing their heating or mobility bills, on top of national ETS2 revenues and the SCF. The impacts of ETS2 on energy and fuel prices across all Member States have been assessed as part of the impact assessment for the review of the Emissions Trading System (ETS) Directive 2 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2018/842 of 30 May 2018 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013. 2 See in particular Sections 6.3.3.2. and 6.3.5., and Annex 13.47 of the impact assessment accompanying the 2021 proposal for the revision of the ETS Directive: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52021SC0601.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme · Energy (green transition)
• 2026-01-06 “E-004234/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission fully supports the objective of providing stability for businesses in the context of the implementation of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in its definitive phase from 1 January 2026. To this end, the Commission has adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/486 of 17 March 2025 laying down the conditions and procedures related to the status of authorised CBAM declarant and has made the Authorisation Management Module in the CBAM registry available as of 31 March 2025. Further procedures depend on national arrangements. Authorised CBAM declarants will purchase CBAM certificates on the common central platform as from 1 February 2027. The obligation to buy CBAM certificates corresponds to the emissions embedded in the goods imported into the EU as from 1 January 2026. The price of CBAM certificates will be calculated to reflect closely the prices of allowances auctioned in the Union’s Emission Trading System (ETS). For the emissions embedded in goods imported in 2026, the Commission will calculate the price of CBAM certificates on a quarterly basis (thus 4 prices in 2026). From 2027 onwards, the Commission will calculate the price of CBAM certificates based on a weekly average of ETS prices. The Commission will store the CBAM certificates in an electronic format in the declarant’s account in the CBAM registry. Declarants may buy CBAM certificates at any time, provided that they have on their account a number of CBAM certificates, at the end of each quarter, which corresponds to at least 50 % of the embedded emissions in all goods they have imported into the EU since the beginning of the calendar year.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2026-01-05 “E-004248/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission fully supports the objective of providing stability for businesses in the context of the implementation of the Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). To this end, the Commission will adopt by the end of 2025 several implementing and delegated acts to implement CBAM’s definitive phase from 1 January 2026. These will include the default values, benchmarks and the methodology to calculate the prices of CBAM certificates from 2026 onwards. For each quarter in 2026, the Commission will calculate and publish the prices of CBAM certificates which will apply to imports of CBAM goods into the Union. Therefore, importers will know the default values, benchmarks and applicable price of CBAM certificates as soon as possible during the year of imports, thus helping them manage their financial liability ahead of the sales of CBAM certificates which will only start on 1 February 2027. Finally, as a climate measure, the CBAM has been designed from the outset in full compatibility with the Union’s legal obligations, including World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The CBAM implementing rules will continue ensuring CBAM fully aligns with core principles such as non-discrimination, transparency, and proportionality by mirroring the EU Emissions Trading System.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2025-12-22 “E-003983/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has accelerated the review of the CO 2 standards for light-duty vehicles. The review will be based on a fact-based analysis, taking into account all relevant technological developments, including as regards plug-in hybrid technologies, sustainable and renewable fuels and the importance of an economically viable and socially fair transition towards zeroemission mobility. The review will also carefully consider the competitiveness and innovation capacity of the EU automotive industry, in line with the Union’s broader climate and industrial objectives. An inclusive public consultation on the revision of the CO 2 standards for light-duty vehicles has been completed 1 . It gathered input from a broad range of stakeholders, including national administrations, industry, non-governmental organisations, consumers, and academia, to strengthen the evidence base for the review. The feedback is now being analysed and will inform the ongoing work. However, the Commission cannot prejudge the outcome of the review. 1 Link to the public consultation: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14765Revision-of-the-CO2-emission-standards-for-cars-and-vans/feedback_en?p_id=19981.”
  Climate efforts · Road transport environmental policy
• 2025-12-22 “E-004097/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 1. Cash revenues generated in 2027 from the new Emissions Trading System for buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2) will become available for spending shortly after the auctioning of ETS2 allowances, as soon as the proceeds will be transferred to the auctioneer appointed by the relevant Member State. However, the Manual on Government Deficit and Debt (MGDD) provides that ETS revenues are recorded as government revenues in the year when allowances are surrendered. To the extent that the spending of ETS2 proceeds is already recorded in 2027, it may temporarily increase government deficits in that year. The reformed EU fiscal rules have a medium-term approach that is well-suited to cater for temporary fluctuations in annual budgetary outcomes. 2. It is important that national resources stemming from the operation of the ETS2 can be quickly mobilised to support investments in decarbonisation and shield vulnerable consumers in all Member States, including those with a more limited fiscal space. This is one of the reasons why the Commission is proposing to start auctioning ETS2 allowances before the ETS2 market starts in 2028, following the provisional political agreement of the European Parliament and Council on the EU Climate Law announced on 10 December 2025. The European System of Accounts (ESA) establishes the principle that in national accounts revenues are recorded when economic value is created, transformed or extinguished, or when claims and obligations are transformed or are cancelled. The MGDD, developed in close cooperation with the statistical community follows this principle and foresees common implementation methods ensuring consistency across Member States.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2025-12-15 “E-004267/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The deadline for transposing into national law the provisions of Directive (EU) 2023/959 concerning the new emissions trading system for buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2) 1 was 30 June 2024. Member States which did not notify complete transposition by that date have received letters of formal notice on 25 July 2024, the first step in infringement procedures. The Commission continues to monitor closely the progress of all Member States and will, where necessary, proceed to the next step of the procedure by sending reasoned opinions to those still failing to comply. Recital (17) of Regulation (EU) 2023/955 establishing the Social Climate Fund (SCF) 2 encourages Member States to submit their Social Climate Plans by 30 June 2025. Funding under the SCF is allocated to the Member States and implemented in accordance with their Social Climate Plans. The Commission and Spain have been discussing possible investments and measures, as well as other elements of the future plan. Discussions are ongoing to ensure that Spain’s plan, effectively supports those most affected by the ETS2, in line with the SCF Regulation. The Commission underlines that swift transposition of the Directive and adoption of the plan are key so that funding can reach those most in need. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/959/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/955/oj/eng.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme · Energy transition (state support)
• 2025-12-12 “E-003943/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s climate policies strongly contribute to the objectives of enhancing energy security and independence, and are therefore well suited to the current geopolitical context. The REPowerEU Plan 1 is a notable example of how accelerating the clean energy transition supports security, competitiveness and climate objectives. The Draghi report 2 highlights that decarbonisation policies can be a powerful driver of growth when well-integrated with industrial, competition, economic, and trade policies. The Clean Industrial Deal 3 presents a comprehensive set of actions aimed at strengthening the business case for decarbonised production in Europe. At the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Belem, Brazil (COP30), the EU played a central role in advancing global climate efforts by pushing for higher ambition on mitigation and adaptation and for progress on climate finance. The proposed amendment to the European Climate Law 4 sets forth a pragmatic and flexible 2040 target, on the path towards climate neutrality. The proposal is based on most recent scientific evidence, including the latest reports of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and an in-depth impact assessment 5 , and takes into account the recommendations of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change. In designing the post-2030 climate and energy policy framework, the Commission will consider enhanced flexibility to support achievement of targets in a cost-effective way, considering national circumstances and specificities. The proposal is now being considered by the European Parliament and the Council 6 . 1 COM(2022) 230 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0230. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en. 3 COM(2025) 85 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:52025DC0085. 4 COM(2025) 524 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0524. 5 SWD(2024) 63 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52024DC0063. 6 The Council reached a General Approach on 5 November 2025; the European Parliament adopted its position on 13 November 2025.”
  Climate efforts · EU-US relations
• 2025-12-12 “E-003971/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The delegation of the EU to the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30) in Belém is composed of 125 representatives and official staff of EU institutions and bodies, amongst which 53 representants of the Commission and 39 representants of the European Parliament. The delegation also includes six technical contractors strictly for audiovisual support (three hired by the Commission and three hired by the European Parliament). By definition, the EU as a Party is not including in its delegation non-Party stakeholders. It should be noted that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat gives the liberty to each Party and Observer to nominate the representants of its delegation and does not allocate a fixed quota of accreditations to any Party delegation, including to that of the EU. The UNFCCC Secretariat published the list of participants accredited under each Party and Observer organisation, including the EU on 10 November 2025 1 . The Commission will continue, in all its engagements with the UNFCCC Secretariat, Parties and stakeholders, to maintain transparency and inclusiveness in the UNFCCC process while ensuring the integrity of EU participation in line with the Paris Agreement and the EU’s climate objectives. 1 https://unfccc.int/documents/653224.”
  Fossil fuels · Climate efforts
• 2025-12-11 “E-004161/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Regulation on Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action (GR) 1 required Member States (MS) to prepare their long-term strategies (LTS) with a perspective of at least 30 years 2 by 1 January 2020. Updated strategies are to be submitted by 1 January 2029 and every 10 years thereafter. In 2019, under the GR, Member States also submitted their final integrated national energy and climate plans (NECPs) for the period 2021-2030. The plans were then updated in 2024. By October 2025, all the MS, except Poland, had submitted their national LTS, which can be found on a dedicated website together with summary tables for each MS 3 . The latest Commission’s assessment of the national LTS can be found in chapter 11 of the Staff Working Document accompanying the Climate Action Progress Report 2024, including an overview of the strategies (Table 11.2) 4 . A rough estimate based on LTS points to a reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 5 of around 86% by 2050 for the EU: this means that roughly 630 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent would still need to be cut or absorbed to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. The summary tables for each MS include the total amount of emission reductions, the investments, and the expected energy savings, when available. The Commission published its latest assessment of the updated NECPs 6 in May 2025. The aggregation of the projections submitted by MS shows that the EU is on track towards meeting the EU 2030 climate goals. GHG emissions are expected to decline by 54% by 2030 compared to 1990. On investments, MS provided only partial information. Hence, it is not possible to provide an aggregate figure for the EU. The information included in the NECPs is not sufficient to provide an estimate of the overall expected savings by 2030. 1 Regulation (EU) 2018/1999. 2 Ibid, Article 15. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/energy-climate-change-environment/implementation-eu-countries/energy-andclimate-governance-and-reporting/national-long-term-strategies_en. 4 SWD(2024) 249 final. 5 Excluding Land Use Land Use Change And Forestry (LULUCF). 6 COM(2025) 274 final.”
  Climate efforts
• 2025-12-09 “E-003476/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission opened infringement procedures against Greece since this Member State did not transpose on time Directive (EU) 2020/285 (introducing changes to the value added tax (VAT) special scheme for small and medium-sized enterprises) 1 and Directive (EU) 2022/542 (which introduced changes in the area of VAT rates) 2 . Letters of formal notice were sent on 31 January 2025 3 , followed by reasoned opinions sent on 17 July 2025 4 . The Commission received replies from Greece on 11 and 12 September 2025 which are now being carefully assessed. 2. Member States have a primary responsibility to monitor the application of the relevant legal provisions and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will continue monitoring the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. The Commission aims to swiftly follow up on systemic issues involving the application of EU law in EU countries. However, one-off instances are better dealt with at national level, as long as there are available remedies, including judicial ones. In these cases, it is up to the national courts to apply and enforce citizens' rights under EU law. 1 Council Directive (EU) 2020/285 of 18 February 2020 amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax as regards the special scheme for small enterprises. 2 Council Directive (EU) 2022/542 of 5 April 2022 amending Directives 2006/112/EC and 2020/285 as regards rates of value added tax. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_25_273. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_25_1628.”
  EU competences on taxation · VAT harmonisation
• 2025-12-08 “E-003841/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) Regulation (EU) 2023/956 will fully apply from 1 January 2026. The Commission is currently preparing the implementing acts for the post-transitional period of the CBAM, which will include the default values and the CBAM benchmarks. The Commission strives to ensure that the respective acts are adopted as soon as possible. In order to adequately mirror the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), the CBAM benchmarks will be based on the respective ETS benchmarks. The Commission expects that the updated ETS benchmarks for the period 2026-2030 will be adopted in early 2026. Given that CBAM benchmarks will be derived from these ETS benchmarks, the Commission expects that they will also be adopted in early 2026. Nevertheless, the Commission will provide before the end of the year additional guidance to stakeholders through provisional CBAM benchmarks. Impact assessments are carried out for initiatives expected to have significant economic, social or environmental impacts or entailing significant spending and where the Commission has a choice between alternative policy options. Therefore, the Commission has not carried out an impact assessment on the potential risks of publishing the default values by the end of 2025 and of publishing the ETS and CBAM benchmarks in early 2026. During the period 2021 to 2025, the updated ETS benchmarks were equally only adopted in the first quarter of the period in which they applied.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2025-12-08 “E-003726/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The EU is committed to reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, and to achieve climate neutrality by 2050, as enshrined in the European Climate Law 1 . Achieving these targets requires ambitious policies and decisive actions to ensure a swift and sufficient decrease in emissions across all sectors. This transition will bring co-benefits to air pollution and contribute to reducing Europe’s reliance on imported fossil fuels. To achieve these aims, the transport sector must reduce its emissions by 90% by 2050. The Fuel Quality Directive 98/70/EC 2 (FQD) establishes minimum quality requirements for petrol and diesel fuels placed on the EU market. Under the current provisions, the maximum permitted ethanol content in petrol is set at 10% (E10), thereby prohibiting the placing on the market of E20. The current Commission work programme does not envisage a revision of the FQD or an assessment of an introduction of E20. The EU-Mercosur agreement contains trade provisions that make it easier and cheaper for EU companies to import certain biofuel-related products from Mercosur countries (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay). Specifically, ethanol and ETBE (ethyl tertiary-butyl ether) are exempted from tariffs or subject to reduced tariffs. In addition, Mercosur countries commit to removing any export duties previously applied to these fuels. By facilitating imports of ethanol and ETBE, which are bio-based and lower-carbon alternatives to fossil fuels, the agreement can help decarbonise the transport sector faster. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0080. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1998/70/oj/eng.”
  Biofuels (RED II) · Road transport environmental policy
• 2025-12-04 “E-004201/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Emissions Trading System for fuel combustion in buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2) complements national and EU policies and measures to reduce emissions in these sectors by 42% by 2030 compared to 2005 1 , helping to achieve Member States’ overall 40% emissions reduction target under the Effort Sharing Regulation. The European Parliament and Council proposals to postpone the start of ETS2 by one year to 2028, subject to a final agreement between the co-legislators, further underlines the importance of complementary national measures to ensure Member States meet their binding 2030 targets under the Effort Sharing Regulation. The operational impact of ETS2 on the Commission budget is explained in section 3.2.2. of the Legislative Financial Statement accompanying the 2021 proposal 2 . The costs for national public authorities were assessed in section 6.3.4 of the impact assessment 3 . Member States are not required to share administrative and staffing budgets related to the implementation of specific EU policies. ETS2 is a key component in a mix of policies and measures supporting EU competitiveness by helping to reduce dependence on fossil fuel imports and creating opportunities for cleantech companies. Fossil fuel imports cost the EU nearly EUR 400 billion in 2024 and this dependence on volatile global markets has been a driver of high energy prices for EU companies and households alike. The EU is a global leader in clean innovation, such as heat pumps and batteries. In 2024, Europe's clean tech exports reached EUR 80 billion, generating opportunities and additional jobs in clean industries. 1 Details can be consulted in section 6.3.1. of the impact assessment accompanying the 2021 proposal for the revision of the ETS Directive: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:7b89687a-eec6-11eb-a71c01aa75ed71a1.0001.01/DOC_1&format=PDF 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52021PC0551 3 Impact assessment accompanying the 2021 proposal for the revision of the ETS Directive: https://eurlex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:7b89687a-eec6-11eb-a71c01aa75ed71a1.0001.01/DOC_1&format=PDF.”
  Road transport environmental policy · Climate efforts · Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• 2025-12-02 “E-003863/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recognises that climate change is a risk for the EU economy and competitiveness, as set out in detail also in the European Climate Risk Assessment 1 . The Commission has committed to improving the systemic resilience of the EU supply chains to climate change 2 , and setting up further action to strengthen the resilience of supply chains in the context of the Preparedness Union Strategy, notably on public-private cooperation (e.g. key action 18). In line with the Preparedness Union Strategy and the Affordable Energy Action Plan, the Commission is revising the EU energy security framework. The revision builds on lessons learned from recent crises and adapts the framework to today’s geopolitical context and the ongoing electrification of the EU’s energy system. It will also address emerging risks, such as climate change impacts, cyber-attacks, and vulnerabilities in critical energy infrastructure. Furthermore, the Commission is developing a European Climate Resilience Integrated Framework 3 , planned for the fourth quarter of 2026, to ensure that the EU improves its resilience to climate impacts as part of the comprehensive EU competitiveness and security agenda, and that climate resilience becomes a driver of EU competitiveness. 1 European Environment Agency, European Climate Risk Assessment, 2024: https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/publications/european-climate-risk-assessment. 2 COM(2024) 91 final. 3 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/adaptation-and-resilience-climate-change/european-climate-resilienceand-risk-management-integrated-framework_en.”
  Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights) · Climate efforts
• 2025-11-28 “E-004174/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission All sectors, including maritime transport, must contribute to the EU climate neutrality goal by 2050 and the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) is key to achieve this objective. Based on the information available at the time, the first Commission report 1 does not find any evidence of major changes in the market directly attributable to the introduction of the EU ETS to maritime transport. As mandated by the EU ETS Directive 2 , the Commission will continue monitoring closely the implementation of the EU ETS extension to maritime transport, notably with the objective to detect possible evasive behaviours at an early stage. If appropriate, the Commission will propose measures to ensure the effective implementation of the Directive. With regards to the use of ETS revenues, Member States are required to use the revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances (or an equivalent financial value) to support climate action and energy transformation, including measures supporting maritime decarbonisation. The Commission closely monitors compliance with this obligation to ensure all ETS revenues are genuinely spent for these purposes. In addition, EUR 20 million allowances 3 will be deployed up to 2030 to support the decarbonisation of the sector through the Innovation Fund 4 . Finally, the FuelEU Maritime Regulation and the EU ETS Directive both include dynamic review clauses designed to take into account future developments at the International Maritime Organization. Pending the activation of these review clauses, both legislations will continue to apply as planned, driving emissions reductions, creating demand for sustainable fuels, and supporting innovation across the sector. 1 COM(2025) 110 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0110. 2 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275 25.10.2003, p. 32). 3 Worth about EUR 1.5 billion with a price of EUR 75 per EU allowance. 4 This includes another European Hydrogen Bank auction with a dedicated budget of EUR 300 million for the production of hydrogen with off-takers in the maritime and aviation sectors that the Commission will open in early December 2025.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme · Decarbonisation of maritime transport
• 2025-11-20 “E-003473/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Since the ratification of the Paris Agreement on climate change, commitments by countries around the world have contributed to reducing projected global warming from 3.7 - 4.8°C to 2.4 - 2.6°C 1 . This shows the importance of ambitious leadership and concrete climate action, such as that of the EU and its Member States, to avoid uncontrolled global warming and the damages it brings for economies, ecosystems, well-being, ultimately contributing to political instability 2 . The European Climate Law (ECL) and its climate targets ensure that the EU remains a global climate leader. Investments are necessary regardless of the EU decarbonisation pathway, to replace ageing assets and infrastructure and to respond to growing energy needs. Delivering on the targets under the ECL provides certainty and boosts such investments in a modern EU energy system, independence, strategic autonomy and enhanced security, while limiting the costs of climate inaction which far outweigh investments needed 3,4,5 . The Clean Industrial Deal and Net-Zero Industry Act 6 outline concrete actions to turn decarbonisation into a driver of growth for European 7 industries. Limiting global average temperature is a collective effort, all countries must act to reduce emissions. Climate targets reflect global cost-effective Greenhouse gas pathways aligned with the Paris Agreement temperature goals. EU climate policy gives credibility to the EU’s calls on others to act and accelerate decarbonisation 8 . The EU, with almost 6% of global population 9 , is a showcase for successful climate action. Total Net Greenhouse Gas Emissions have been reduced by 37% compared to 1990, with our economy growing by 71% over the same period 10 . 1 Projected global warming by the end of the century. See: https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/climate-issues/degrees-matter. 2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) AR6 WGII. Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FullReport.pdf. 3 The report shows that by reducing the risks of climate-induced events, climate action could prevent significant economic losses and raise global Gross Domestic Product by up to 13% by the year 2100. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2025). Investing in Climate for Growth and Development: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/investing-in-climate-for-growth-and-development_16b7cbc7-en.html. 4 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (2024). Climate damage projections beyond annual temperature. The study shows a global Gross Domestic Product loss of 10% if the planet warms by more than 3ºC: https://iiasa.ac.at/news/apr-2024/what-are-economic-costs-of-climate-inaction. 5 European Central Bank (2025). Climate risks: no longer the tragedy of the horizon. It states that climate events could cause euro area Gross Domestic Product to fall by up to 5% by 2030 – a downturn similar in magnitude to the economic impact of the Global Financial Crisis. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/date/2025/html/ecb.blog20250709~aed804c955.en.html 6 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en. 7 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/sustainability/net-zero-industry-act_en. 8 The joint EU-China press statement on climate change shows the importance of EU’s role in building the trust needed for others to commit and engage in climate action: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2025/07/24/joint-eu-china-press-statement-on-climate/. 9 https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/facts-and-figures-european-union_en. 10 Climate Action Progress Report 2025: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/abb61407-e976-482cb309-2c36625df8c1_en?filename=capr2025_report_en.pdf.”
  Energy (green transition) · Climate efforts
• 2025-11-12 “E-003032/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Emission Trading System for buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2) is key not only to support emission reductions alongside other policies and measures, but it will also raise revenues to finance the Social Climate Fund (SCF) and support lower and middleincome households in the transition. While the ETS2 framework already foresees strong safeguards to ensure a smooth start and keep prices in check, the Commission takes concerns regarding the future price levels and price volatility very seriously. The Commission welcomes constructive proposals put forward by Member States and other stakeholders, including suggestions related to the Market Stability Reserve. In the Commission’s assessment, forecasts exceeding EUR 140/ton CO2 are generally based on unrealistic scenarios that do not take into account complementary policies in addition to ETS, in particular at national level. These measures are key to reduce emissions in buildings and road transport, and to provide citizens opportunities to heat and cool their houses and travel in a sustainable way. Finally, the Social Climate Fund will start in 2026, one year before ETS2, financed with 50 million allowances provided by the ETS1. This creates financial room for national measures being deployed before the start of the ETS2, contributing to keeping ETS2 prices in check. In addition to the SCF, Member States are encouraged to use the ETS revenues to support vulnerable citizens and middle class to buy or lease heat pumps, to improve isolation in their houses and to have better access to public transport and affordable electrical vehicles.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme · Energy performance of buildings
• 2025-11-11 “E-003621/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission In its recent public consultation 1 , the Commission gathered views from a broad range of stakeholders, including producers and importers of goods further down the value chain from Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) basic goods (i.e. downstream goods). This input will feed into the Commission work as laid out in the European Steel and Metals Action Plan 2 . More specifically, the Commission will present a proposal that covers an extension to steel and aluminium-intensive downstream goods. Furthermore, the Commission will also present a comprehensive review of CBAM before the end of this year. When considering a potential scope extension, the Commission assesses the risk of carbon leakage, the relevance in terms of emissions and technical feasibility, as outlined in the CBAM Regulation. In that context, it should be noted that downstream goods are not typically covered by the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) but face a cost push from the phase-out of free allowances for their inputs and from the phase-in of CBAM. On 16 July 2025, the Commission presented its proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), including CBAM as one of five new own resources. The proposal on CBAM-based own resources is for 75 % of CBAM revenues to enter the EU budget. Furthermore, as announced in the Communication on Delivering on the Clean Industrial Deal I 3 , by the end of 2025, the Commission intends to table a proposal on using the CBAM revenues to support production at risk of carbon leakage. The scheme would be in place for an initially defined period, with a review in 2027, its scope would be based on objective criteria and subject to deliverables on long term decarbonisation. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14748-Carbon-Border-AdjustmentMechanism-CBAM-downstream-extension-anti-circumvention-and-rules-on-electricity-emissions/publicconsultation. 2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A European Steel and Metals Action Plan, COM(2025)125 final. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/european-steel-and-metalsaction-plan. 3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Delivering on the Clean Industrial Deal I, COM(2025)378 final. https://commission.europa.eu/publications/delivering-clean-industrial-deal-i.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2025-11-11 “E-003838/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission already proposed 1 giving more flexibility to Member States in the setting of value added tax (VAT) rates which resulted in a comprehensive reform recently adopted by the Council 2 . 2. Reducing the level of the VAT standard rate in the VAT Directive 3 is in itself unlikely to bring down the price level, because all Member States apply a standard rate higher than the minimum set in the directive; and as for reduced rates, Member States already enjoy considerable leeway after the last reform. As such, the level of VAT actually applied derives from Member States’ decision rather than from EU rules. 3. Member States decide the level of VAT applied at national level leading to the VAT-based own resources due to the EU budget. They jointly determine the size of that budget via the multiannual financial framework. The total expenditure is largely financed through Member States’ own resources contributions including traditional, VAT-based, and plastics own resources, with the Gross National Income-based own resource acting as a balancing tool ensuring all authorised expenses are paid. Consequently, changes to the national VAT rates do not change the size of the EU Budget. 1 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards rates of value added tax (COM(2018) 20). 2 Council Directive (EU) 2022/542 of 5 April 2022 amending Directives 2006/112/EC and (EU) 2020/285 as regards rates of value added tax (OJ L 107, 6.4.2022, p. 1). 3 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ L 347, 11.12.2006, p. 1).”
  Own EU resources · VAT harmonisation
• 2025-11-11 “E-003889/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Recital (17) of Regulation (EU) 2023/955 establishing the Social Climate Fund (SCF) encouraged Member States to submit their Social Climate Plan (SCP) by 30 June 2025 1 . By this date, the Commission received the SCP of one Member State, namely Sweden. On 14 July 2025, it also received the SCP of Latvia. In addition, most Member States have submitted draft Plans that have been or are in the process of being reviewed by the Commission. More plans are expected to be officially submitted before the end of 2025. The Commission is fully engaged to have in place as many Social Climate Plans as possible before 1 January 2027 when the Emission Trading System for buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2) will be fully applied. The Commission regularly engages with all Member States in horizontal meetings within the SCF formation of the Expert Group on Climate Change Policy (CCEG) as well as in bilateral meetings, to assist in the development of the Social Climate Plans. Furthermore, the Commission has published three guideline documents: Guidance on the Social Climate Plans 2 , Do No Significant Harm Technical Guidance to the SCF 3 and its Annexes 4 , Guidance on the implementation of the SCF 5 . To facilitate the exchange of views and mobilise all stakeholders, the Commission has published several documents for good practices 6 for drafting the Social Climate Plans and as general preparation of the Fund implementation. The Commission continues the intensive exchanges with Member States to assist them in preparing and submitting their Plans. 1 No penalties for late submission are foreseen in the SCF Regulation. 2 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9fbce2e3-5052-4d61-874a54af0c7dbf55_en?filename=c_2025_881_part_1_en.pdf. 3 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2f3269ea-fb02-4481-a1d53453ba3172ea_en?filename=c_2025_880_part_1_en.pdf. 4 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/5244b32c-419a-41b4-8932b431755d6584_en?filename=c_2025_880_part_1_annexe_en.pdf. 5 https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/7f23666f-5556-455a-b0f5-4c150994ce10_en 6 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/carbon-markets/social-climate-fund/good-practices-social-climateplans_en.”
  Climate efforts · Energy (green transition)
• 2025-11-10 “E-003693/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The proposal to revise the Tobacco Taxation Directive 1 complies with the principle of proportionality as set out in Article 5(4) the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 2 . The proposed amendments do not go beyond what could be helpful to ensure that the internal market functions properly, while ensuring a high level of human health protection. Increasing minimum EU excise duty rates for tobacco products will contribute to achieving the goals of Europe's Beating Cancer Plan. Higher tobacco taxes and prices have been demonstrated to be the single most effective measure to reduce overall tobacco use, particularly by young people and produce additional public health benefits. It is in the interest of uniform and fair taxation that tobacco related products be subject to a harmonised excise duty framework within the EU. This would also reduce regulatory fragmentation across Member States. While reduced tobacco demand may impact EU tobacco growers, the effect could be mitigated by switching to other crops, a common practice in agriculture. The common agricultural policy 3 support instruments also remain available to them. Employment in tobacco manufacturing has been declining due to automation and mechanisation. To address potential negative effects, Member States could implement retraining programs for tobacco sector workers. Excise taxes apply when the goods are released for consumption in the EU thus at the level of importers or manufacturers, whereas exports are not subjected to excise duty. Foreign and domestic operators are therefore equally impacted by the increase of EU minima. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32011L0064. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2016/art_5/oj/eng. 3 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy_en.”
  EU competences on taxation · Priorities of taxation policy in the EU
• 2025-11-04 “E-003502/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The initiative of the Industrial Decarbonisation Bank announced in the Clean Industrial Deal 1 Communication will aim to fund with EUR 100 billion the deployment of decarbonised technologies in industry. The goal of the Industrial Decarbonisation Bank will be to support the transformation of energy intensive industry in Europe, including the chemical industry, beyond early-mover projects. The Industrial Decarbonisation Bank will be proposed as part of the upcoming EU Emissions Trading System review. However, already at the end of 2025, the Commission will under the Innovation Fund open a pilot auction for decarbonisation of industrial process heat (via electrification or geothermal, solar thermal solutions), where all industrial sectors will be eligible and carbon abatement will be the metric for providing support. It should be noted that the EU emissions trading system already recognises competitive challenges from extra-EU countries by providing sectors facing this ‘carbon leakage risk’ a higher share of free allowances compared to other industrial installations. The EU soda ash producers belong to this group of sectors having their competitiveness supported. 1 COM(2025) 85 final.”
  Carbon leakage support · EU industrial funding
• 2025-11-04 “E-003567/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission In 2023, the Commission and the European External Action Service adopted a Joint Communication on the Climate-Security Nexus 1 demonstrating that, by integrating climate and defence concerns in its policies, the EU can secure a credible military deterrent and advance its economic and environmental objectives. Industrial innovation, lower dependency on imported fossil fuels and increased circularity can enhance EU’s competitiveness, strategic autonomy and resilience. Under the Commission’s better regulation policies, impact assessments support evidencebased policy making for Commission legislative proposals. It is the competence of individual Member States to decide on national defence budgets and increases thereof. Therefore, Member States’ increased military spending does not fall within the scope of the Commission’s better regulation policy. Investments in European defence industry can have long term beneficial economic effects in terms of innovation, resilience and job creation. Europe’s industry can become a global leader in decarbonised industrial goods such as batteries or low-carbon steel and cement. Innovation in the defence sector, including growth in clean tech manufacturing, could foster the creation of high-quality jobs and enhance EU’s economic resilience. 1 JOIN/2023/19 final.”
  Military emissions reporting · Climate efforts
• 2025-11-03 “E-003490/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 1. Multiple peer-reviewed papers 1 establish a strong link between climate change and the increase in frequency, intensity, and destructiveness of forest fires. Warmer climates create conditions more conducive to large and severe wildfires, such as drier vegetation, longer fire seasons, increased fire weather (e.g. heat waves), and more dry fuel associated with higher tree mortality. Other studies on recent increase in fire weather conditions found that Europe has experienced a marked increase in the intensity of fire-prone weather conditions 2 , and another found an increase in the area affected by severe fire weather conditions, especially in central Europe and the Mediterranean in spring and summer 3 . For Spain, statistics collected by the European Forest Fire Information System 4 show a clear increasing trend for both the number of fires and the area burnt since the measurements began in 2006. 2. Greenhouse gases spread globally affect the planet's climate universally (but differently across the globe), regardless of their origin. Local emissions reductions are crucial as every reduced tonne slows down global warming. However, more reductions in one region do not mean stronger local effects. 3. The Commission is familiar with the concept of ‘climate shelter’, and there are some EUfunded projects/initiatives 5 supporting these spaces in different regions. However, the Commission does not have a position nor criteria to classify a territory as such. 1 1. Burton, C., Lampe, S., Kelley, D.I. et al. Global burned area increasingly explained by climate change. Nat. Clim. Chang. 14, 1186–1192 (2024): https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-024-02140-w; Costa, H., de Rigo, D., Libertà, G., Houston Durrant, T., San-Miguel-Ayanz, J., European wildfire danger and vulnerability in a changing climate: towards integrating risk dimensions, EUR 30116 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020,ISBN: 978-92-76-16898-0, doi:10.2760/46951, JRC119980 https://joint-researchcentre.ec.europa.eu/projects-and-activities/peseta-climate-change-projects/jrc-peseta-iv/wildfires_en; Dennison, P. E., S. C. Brewer, J. D. Arnold, and M. A. Moritz (2014), Large wildfire trends in the western United States, 1984–2011, Geophys. Res. Lett., 41, 2928–2933, doi:10.1002/2014GL059576. Flannigan, M.D., Amiro, B.D., Logan, K.A. et al. Forest Fires and Climate Change in the 21 ST Century. Mitig Adapt Strat Glob Change 11, 847–859 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-005-9020-7. 2 Hetzer, J., Forrest, M., Ribalaygua, J., Prado-López, C., & Hickler, T. (2024). The fire weather in Europe: Large-scale trends towards higher danger. Environmental Research Letters, 19(8), 084017. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ad5b09. 3 Torres-Vázquez, M. Á., Di Giuseppe, F., Moreno-Torreira, A., Gincheva, A., Jerez, S., & Turco, M. (2025). Large increase in extreme fire weather synchronicity over Europe. Environmental Research Letters, 20(2), 024045: https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ada8c2. 4 https://forest-fire.emergency.copernicus.eu/apps/effis.statistics/estimates. 5 For example: https://eu-mayors.ec.europa.eu/en/Valencia-Climate-SheltersNetwork?utm_medium=website&utm_source=archdaily.com and https://climateadapt.eea.europa.eu/en/mission/solutions/mission-stories/storytelling-for-climate-action-in-athens-story62.”
  Climate efforts
• 2025-11-03 “P-003934/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The rules on the distance selling of excise goods are set out in Article 44 of Council Directive (EU) 2020/262 laying down the general arrangements for excise duty. The Commission is aware of the need to simplify and harmonise procedures for the distance selling of alcoholic beverages, as highlighted in the Letta report. Under the Fiscalis 1 programme, a group of Member States is currently working on the development of a more efficient solution partially based on a one-stop-shop system for the payment of excise duties in the country of departure. The Commission will examine the conclusions of their work with a view to simplifying the legal framework and removing tax obstacles currently affecting the functioning of the internal market. A detailed cost/benefit analysis of the solutions put forward should then be conducted before the amendment of the above-mentioned legislation can be envisaged. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 establishing the ‘Fiscalis’ programme for cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1286/2013https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0847.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU · EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2025-10-30 “E-003680/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The decarbonisation of the EU economy implies a steep reduction of fossil fuel imports 1 and associated costs, which will allow to invest in the deployment of decarbonised energy supply and energy efficiency, reinforcing our energy security and creating new economic opportunities and jobs. The impact assessment accompanying the 2040 climate target provides an analysis on the exposure of EU regions to climate change impacts 2 and to the transition on the basis of their economic activity. The implications of the EU-wide 2040 target at Member State level will depend on the design of climate policies, the broader enabling framework as well as on how Member States implement it. Impacts will also depend on national policy choices and decisions. The assessment of the post-2030 policy framework will be possible once the Commission starts developing the proposals for specific policies to deliver the 2040 target. The policy proposals will be accompanied by impact assessments 3 . The Commission's analyses will embed, to the extent technically possible, the national policies and measures as expressed in the National Energy and Climate Plans. 1 See for instance section 2.6 of Annex 8 in Part 3/5 of the impact assessment of the 2040 climate target (SWD/2024/63 final): Securing our future, Europe’s 2040 climate target and path to climate neutrality by 2050 building a sustainable, just and prosperous society. 2 Section 2.3 and 3.3 of the Annex 7 in Part 2/5 of the impact assessment of the 2040 climate target (SWD/2024/63 final). 3 As per the Better Regulation system: https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/betterregulation_en.”
  Climate efforts