Maroš Šefčovič

Policy topics Maroš Šefčovič is active on

What Maroš Šefčovič has said (80)

• 2026-06-17 “13:04 – 09:17:50): Thank you very much, chairman, Marilena, honorable members, good morning. It is a pleasure to discuss, with, all of you the preparation of the upcoming European Council meeting. So to start with the external affairs, the leaders will discuss the EU's continued support for Ukraine. Notably, the work on implementing the Ukraine support loan with the 1st tranche of €3,200,000,000 expected, to be disbursed already next week. This follows the 21st package of sanctions and the recent positive developments regarding the accession process for both Ukraine and Moldova. Leaders will also address the latest developments in The Middle East, including with regard to, Iran, Lebanon, and Palestine. On Armenia, the leaders will discuss the EU support package under preparation in face of the political and economic pressure on the country from Russia. The package will include immediate financial assistance worth over €50,000,000 with further measures under preparation. Leaders will also follow-up on the 8th EU Western Balkans summit on the June 5. The Western Balkans belong in the EU, and enlargement is both a geostrategic imperative and long term investment in our stability and security. Finally, leaders will discuss the need for EU wide cooperation in our response to the Ebola outbreak, following commissioner Slabib's visit, to the Democratic Republic Of Congo last week where she announced, €16,500,000 in additional EU support. Closer to home, the leaders will have an exchange of views on the next multi annual financial framework with a view to achieving the concrete results before the end of 20 26. This will be an opportunity to set the conditions for an agreement by the end of the year and to provide the political steer on key issues, particularly the questions of financial equation and the new owner resources. Leaders will take stock of our shared commitment to strengthening competitiveness across our union, in particular, on the 1 Europe, 1 market road map. Work on the union's competitiveness starts at home, in particular by lowering energy costs. And to this end, the commission will present the review of the ETS in July following our orientation debate in the college last week. But it is also imperative that we tackle the external challenges to Europe's competitiveness such as those caused by global macroeconomic imbalances. Leaders will discuss European defense and security with the recent drone incidents in the Baltics and in Romania, further underscoring the importance of our efforts, in, this domain. Work is advancing along different strengths, including on safe and the defense readiness omnibus. Leaders will take stock of progress on migration with the pact on migration and asylum being fully applicable as of 5 days ago. Overall, irregular arrivals towards Europe are decreasing. But work should continue to fill any gaps in our procedures to enhance, migration diplomacy. And finally, from, this part, leaders will call for the effective implementation of the EU drug strategy of essential importance given the increased negative impact of drugs in European health and security. On China, let me say that the commission's overarching approach remains de risking as decoupling is neither desirable nor realistic. China remains a critical partner, and engagement and dialogue should intensify, with a clear purpose of rebalancing. Ultimately, our trade and investment relationship must be reciprocal, fairer, and underpinned by level playing field. The EU should also continue its work on increasing effectiveness of its trade defense policy as well as strengthening diversification, by making use of the numerous free trade agreements. This is essential for strengthening the resilience of our economy and enhancing the competitiveness of of our industry. Mister president, if you allow, I will stop here, and I look forward into our discussion and exchanges this morning. Thank you very much.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU enlargement
• 2026-06-17 “39:40 – 09:42:25): Thank you very much, mister president. I will, of course, respect the time allocated to me, and I will be very, very brief. But I will touch up on the topics which are most frequently mentioned by the parliamentary leaders, mister Weber, Procaccini, madam Rehnke, and madam Ayyet. I mean, referring to our forthcoming discussions and the need to reset, rebalance our relationship with China. And I want to reassure you this is exactly the proposal commission is undertaking, and we would like to base it there on a couple of principles. First, we want to have much more regular engagement with our Chinese counterparts to make sure that we will find the solutions on how to reverse what we described also to them as the unsustainable growing trade deficit between the European Union and China. We want to rebalance our trade. We'll push for more reciprocity. And, of course, we will work very hard with our member states and our stakeholders to put more emphasis on diversification because we know that all dependencies are very expensive and we paid a very high price, especially in the field of energy. What would be very important and what I appreciate in the interventions from all political leaders is the call for unity because unity is our most precious currency. You heard me saying this when I was discussing other strategic relationships with our partners, but I would say in this particular case, this is even more important. If you allow me to respond to madam Garcia Perez and madam Manon Aubrey, I just would like to underline once again and very, very clearly, that we all agree that the EU remains strongly opposed to Israel settlement policies and activities. They are illegal under international law. They constitute an obstacle to peace, and they undermine the viability of the two-state solution. And as both madam Aubrey and madam Garcia Perez recalled, we already tabled very concrete proposals in this regard to suspend the trade-related provisions of the EU-Israel association agreement. And we had the discussion on this topic again on Monday among the foreign ministers where we called for the council to work on the necessary qualified majority. And I believe that there are the best endeavors from the Cypriot presidency to achieve that result. If you allow, mister president, because the debate is rather long, so I would reserve the remaining time for the end of the discussion. Thank you very much.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Trade relations with China
• 2026-06-17 “59:03 – 11:01:29): Thank you very much, madam minister, madam president, madam minister, honorable members. 1st, let me start by, appreciating the way how the plenary is running under the new, pilot rules. I find the debates more lively. I I find the attendance higher, and think I it's good for European democracy. And I will, of course, consult, my colleagues before sending commission's observation on this new scheme under the revised framework agreement in my capacity as commissioner for inter institutional relations and transparency. But thank you. Thank you very much for this new way. I also would like to reassure you that listen carefully to all your remarks, suggestions, and propositions, on Middle East, on migration, on agriculture issues, and, of course, on China. And we'll come back, to this important issue after discussion of the leaders, in the European Council and, of course, after my meetings with my Chinese counterparts, which should take place in the in the in the coming weeks. In the 2nd part of our discussion, most integration, we've also focusing on MFF, multi annual financial framework. And I'd like to highlight that the, Cypriot presidency, NEGOBOX, preserves the modernization that has guided the commission in our MFF proposals. We need to preserve a high level of ambition for our next budget, and I and I know that we share this ambition together with his house. The key issue would be how we would finance our policies. And for that, we need new own resources. And and I know that also on these very crucial issues, we can count on the support of this parliament. And if you allow me, madam president, to conclude, by thanking Cypriot's presidency, to minister Aona, dear Marena, but also to your outstanding team for excellent results brought by your positive, I would say, sunny Cypriot energy, but also by outstanding, personal relations you built across all the institutions because, this is how we managed to get across the finishing line. A lot of very important pieces of legislation and achieve the progress which is, so important, for the European Union. So I would wish you good luck for the next, 2 weeks, and thank you very much on behalf of the European Commission. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, commissioner. And now I will give the floor to the council and deputy minister for European affairs, miss Rona, please.”
  Own EU resources
• 2026-06-15 “Thank you very much, mister president, honorable members of the European parliament. 1st and foremost, I want to thank, my good colleague, executive vice president, kindly stepping in because I was delayed in a foreign affairs council in in in Luxembourg. But, what I heard from the discussion and what, my close collaborator, Sofia, was explaining to me, from the previous discussion, I would like to thank you 1st and foremost for what I feel will be broad support, tomorrow for the proposals we we put on the table. And I very much, appreciate also very close collaboration which, brought us to this point. I want to thank chairman Langhe. We spent a lot of hours together, sometimes in very lively atmosphere, sometimes in calm atmosphere, but what is very important that we find very important compromise, and I also want to thank, to all shadows, most of them been interviewing, intervening here today, madam Zhovko, mister Varbon, madam Kalzeboro, madam Cavazini, mister Benifei. And if I can underline just 2, 3 points in the remaining minute, I have, 1st and foremost, this step tomorrow is, very important for signaling how important we take this biggest, trade relationship, in in this world. And despite of all turbulence we went through the last year, let's not forget that our trade actually increased. Now it's more than $2,000,000,000,000, for our mutual trade. And, also, investment went up. So now we are talking about 6,000,000,000,000 of mutual investment on the both sides of Atlantics and millions of jobs, and businesses which depend on making sure that we would work, with our American partners in the best possible way despite of all the volatilities. All of you been highlighting, the the the measures, the safeguards, and all the instruments which are built in in the proposals as you as you propose them. Of course, we all know that we have to be vigilant, and I want to promise you that we will be. Thank you very much, mister president.”
  EU-US trade relations
• 2026-06-08 “Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 8.6.2026 Written question The existing anti-dumping measures on citric acid from China are in force since 2008. They are currently subject to an expiry review investigation initiated on 14 April 2026 [1] . The scope of an expiry review is to assess if there is a likelihood of continuation and/or recurrence of dumping and injury and therefore, if the measures need to be renewed for further five years. No amendment of the level and form of the measures is possible in this proceeding. Therefore, imports quotas or minimum import prices will not be considered in the proceeding. The Commission has no immediate plans to impose minimum content requirements for citric acid. Nonetheless, the Commission is exploring whether minimum content requirements for bio-based products, including citric acid, should be part of the ‘Biotech Act 2’ proposal, which is scheduled for publication by the end of 2026. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202602120.”
  Trade relations with China
• 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The Commission agrees that the proper functioning of crossing points at the EU’s external borders is of crucial importance. While the organisation of customs controls and the overall performance of the border crossing points are a responsibility of EU Member States, the Commission is open to considering leveraging existing monitoring tools (such as diagnostic studies carried out by its operational customs expert teams) to collect further information. Cooperation at all levels within the EU is very important and the Commission is in regular contact with all EU Customs Administrations, including Greek Customs, to ensure a strong and performing Customs Union. The recently agreed reform of the EU Customs Union should also contribute to this goal. There are several EU programmes under the current Multiannual Financial Framework offering funding opportunities to Member States seeking to reinforce their capabilities at border crossing points. These include the Integrated Border Management Fund, which is made of two components, i.e. i) the Border Management and Visa Instrument [1] (within its specific scope of border management and visa policy), and ii) the Customs Control Equipment Instrument [2] providing financial support for purchasing and upgrading customs tools; as well as the Customs Programme [3] supporting the development and operation of the central digital systems for customs, and the cooperation between customs authorities. Additional support is provided by the Internal Security Fund [4] , the Technical Support Instrument [5] , the Union Anti-Fraud Programme [6] and the Connecting Europe Facility [7] . Potential beneficiaries are regularly informed of upcoming funding opportunities. [1] Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy, OJ L 251, 15.7.2021, p. 48. [2] Regulation (EU) 2021/1077 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund, the instrument for financial support for customs control equipment, OJ L 234, 2.7.2021, p. 1. [3] Regulation (EU) 2021/444 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2021 establishing the Customs programme for cooperation in the field of customs and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1294/2013, OJ L 87, 15.3.2021, p. 1. [4] Regulation (EU) 2021/1149 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Internal Security Fund, OJ L 251, 15.7.2021, p. 94. [5] Regulation (EU) 2021/240 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 February 2021 establishing a Technical Support Instrument, OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 1. [6] Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014, OJ L 172, 17.5.2021, p. 110. [7] Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014 (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 249, 14.7.2021, pp. 38.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports · Asylum & border control
• 2026-05-13 “Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question Regulation (EU) 2018/1672 establishes a system of controls on cash movements of a value of EUR 10,000 or more when entering or leaving the EU, enabling their traceability. It complements the EU legal framework for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. Therefore, it does not apply to movements of cash within the EU, but to movement of cash with third countries even though they are part of the Schengen area. In Regulation (EU) 2018/1672, the threshold of EUR 10,000 applies per carrier, defined as a natural person, rather than per group or family. The regulation does not prevent Member States from introducing, under their national law, additional national controls on movements of cash within the EU, provided that such controls comply with the EU’s fundamental freedoms, in particular Articles 63 and 65 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Italian law seems to have introduced declaration requirements for movement of cash between Italy and other EU Member States which would be similar to the ones contained under Regulation (EU) 2018/1672 to cash movements entering or leaving the EU. The Treaty rules on free movement of capital do not preclude the export of banknotes from being made conditional on a prior declaration [1] . In that context, Member States may in principle also issue guidelines seeking to address the circumvention to such declaration requirements, as well as take other appropriate measures if circumvention is established. It is for the Member State, however, to demonstrate that any such national measures comply with the requirements set out in Article 65 TFEU, and in particular that they observe the principle of proportionality [2] . [1] Judgments of 23 February 1995, Bordessa and Others, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=ecli:ECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A1995%3A54&locale=en, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/redirect/?urn=ecli:ECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A1995%3A54&lang=EN&format=pdf&target=CourtTab, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/redirect/?urn=ecli:ECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A1995%3A54&lang=EN&format=html&target=CourtTab&anchor=#point31, and of 14 December 1995, Sanz de Lera and Others, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=ecli:ECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A1995%3A451&locale=en, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/redirect/?urn=ecli:ECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A1995%3A451&lang=EN&format=pdf&target=CourtTab, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/redirect/?urn=ecli:ECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A1995%3A451&lang=EN&format=html&target=CourtTab&anchor=#point10. [2] Judgment of the Court of 31 May 2018. Lu Zheng v Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, C-190/17, EU:C:2018:357, paragraph 37.”
  Anti-money laundering regulation
• 2026-05-13 “Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question There has been a significant increase in the demand for trade defence action to tackle unfair trade practices across many sectors. The Commission makes every effort within its resource constraints to meet this demand by adopting contingency measures and has managed to open almost three times the historical average number of new cases since January 2024. The Commission is aware of the challenges facing not only the net-zero technology industry sector but many strategic sectors in the EU and ensures that access to the trade defence instruments is open to all sectors that are facing unfair competition from imports. The Commission aims to initiate investigations as quickly as possible on the basis of complaints which meet the necessary legal standard. In this context, all potential complainants are advised on the process and all complaints received must be assessed in light of strict legal requirements, given that each step in an investigation, from initiation to the imposition of measures, can be subject to judicial review . The Trade Defence services have met with potential complainants from the net-zero technologies sector swiftly and continue to actively engage with them to provide full support in using the trade defence instruments. As regards tenders, this presents technical complexities in investigations and is addressed on a case-by-case basis examining the specifics of each proceeding.”
  "Buy European" provisions · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market
• 2026-05-13 “Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question In the case at hand, the initiation of the investigation that resulted in the increase of the applicable duties was announced on 19 December 2024 . T he Commission informed all interested parties on 26 November 2025 of the findings The regulation amending the duties was published on 6 February 2026 [1] and entered into force on the following day . This allowed for more than two months until the publication of the increased measures and more than 13 months after the initiation of the investigation. Moreover, since the initiation of the investigation, that is, for more than one year before the increase actually took effect, the interested parties, including importers, had been aware that the anti-dumping duties in question might change. The investigation was limited to the re-examination of dumping, as informed in the notice of initiation of the investigation published on 19 December 2024 [2] . The examination of EU interest is not covered as such. In all cases, a t initiation, the Commission contacts all known exporters, importers and representative associations, as well as representatives of the exporting country and the complainants and invites them to be registered in the investigation. Member States are also informed in advance of the initiation. As part of the procedure, during the investigations, the Commission informs all parties that come forward about the findings in advance of any decision and invites them to comment. Since recently, specifically to increase the outreach and contact the largest number of potential interested parties to the investigation, the Commission is requesting at initiation, to all the exporting producers in the country under investigation, the contact details of their customers in the EU. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202600274. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202407456.”
  Trade relations with China · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2026-05-11 “Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question While the Commission has not conducted a specific assessment on the risks of organised crime on EU-Mexico trade, it has taken measures to address threats related to organised crime, including illegal trafficking of drugs and other goods, as part of its broader strategy to enhance security. It has also strengthened cooperation on law enforcement and judicial matters with Mexico. The EU-Mexico Modernised Global Agreement [1] aims at providing a state-of-the-art legal framework for bilateral relations between the two parties. The modernised agreement includes a Protocol on the prevention of and fight against corruption in trade and investment which reaffirms the commitments under the United Nations Convention against Corruption and other relevant international agreements , including with regard to combatting bribery and money-laundering. Within the framework of EU-Mexico cooperation, the Commission recognises Mexico’s engagement in regional security programmes such as COPOLAD III [2] and EL PACCTO 2.0 [3] , as well as in platforms including the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs, la Comunidad de Policías de América (AMERIPOL) [4] and the Latin American Committee on Internal Security CLASI [5] . This reflects a shared commitment between the EU and Mexico to strengthening the rule of law, justice and security, and to addressing transnational organised crime, illicit financial flows and drug-related challenges through evidence-based approaches and operational cooperation. [1] https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)809&lang=en. [2] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/programming/programmes/copolad-iii_en. [3] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/programming/programmes/el-paccto-20_en. [4] https://ameripol.org/. [5] https://elpaccto.eu/en/el-clasi-y-sus-implicaciones-a-nivel-politico-estrategico-y-operacional/.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The EU takes robust action to protect its industries from unfairly traded imports and at present has over 230 measures in place, with almost half of those tackling unfair trade from China. Since June 2025, the Commission’s import surveillance task force [1] has been actively monitoring trade flows to identify import pressure and inform decisions and actions to protect the EU internal market. The Commission’s analysis covers all imports, including textiles, and has identified several textile codes as being potentially at risk of harmful import increases. The Commission calls on EU producers and associations to review the results and, where warranted, provide further market intelligence and data on the economic situation facing industry that will help assess whether certain products need protection through targeted, proportionate and timely action, while avoiding any unintended effects on other producers downstream. In that context, recently the Commission shared the results [2] of the Import Surveillance Task Force with the European apparel and textile confederation and is in contact with them regarding relevant market information to discuss the issues. As regards dumped or subsidised imports, the Commission takes action to defend EU industry where it receives complaints with evidence that such imports harm the particular industry in Europe. The Complaints Office of Trade Defence Services can be contacted to discuss the procedure [3] and obtain guidance on how to proceed with tackling unfair competition from imports. There is also comprehensive information regarding trade defence proceedings on the trade defence website [4] including guides on how to proceed, the evidence and information required as well as the time frame for investigations. [1] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/enforcement-and-protection/trade-defence/monitoring-trade-diversion_en. [2] https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/2e3865ad-3886-4131-92bb-a71754fffec6/library/e4b4b9cd-1485-491d-b5e9-aeb5e62002e1/details?open=true. [3] trade-defence-complaints@ec.europa.eu. [4] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/enforcement-and-protection/trade-defence_en.”
  Trade relations with China · Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question Israel has been a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since 1995. As such, it benefits from the most favoured nation treatment (MFN), as WTO members agree to give MFN status to each other. The bilateral trade relations between the EU and Israel are governed by the free trade provisions of the EU-Israel Association Agreement [1] . It gives Israel preferential conditions — compared to the MFN treatment — for accessing the EU market. On 10 September 2025, the President of the Commission announced [2] a set of measures the EU could take to address the catastrophic situation in Gaza and in the West Bank . These include proposals for a reinforced package of sanctions and a partial suspension of the Association Agreement on certain trade-related matters . The President also announced the decision to put on hold EU bilateral financial support to Israel, without adversely affecting work with civil society or Yad Vashem . The proposed measures on sanctions and trade have remained on the table for discussion in the Council as the number of supporting Member States is insufficient for their approval. Yet, if adopted and notified, the suspension would mean that imports from Israel would lose their preferential access to the EU market . [1] https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf. [2] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-05-05 “Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question 1. Sugar imports of Harmonised System heading 1701 from Everything but Arms (EBA) beneficiaries have fluctuated significantly over the past five years, reflecting EU market demand. After rising from 81 000 tonnes in 2021 to nearly 190 000 tonnes in 2023 — due to low EU production — EBA imports fell sharply as EU output recovered, dropping to 60 000 tonnes in 2024 and just 11 000 tonnes in 2025. Regarding countries of origin, while their export volumes fluctuate significantly year on year, the primary suppliers are Cambodia, Mozambique, Laos, Malawi and Myanmar. 2. The Commission is not aware of possible circumvention of rules of origin for sugar imported under Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) EBA scheme. No past or ongoing investigations for potential circumvention of rules of origin in relation to sugar imports from EBA countries have been conducted. Member States can use risk-based checks — verifying unusual trade routes or proofs of origin via administrative cooperation with GSP countries competent authorities — to prevent misuse of preferential tariffs . The Commission monitors third countries benefiting from preferential EU tariffs under the GSP scheme — also from the perspective of compliance with the rules of origin — to ensure that the declared origin is established correctly. By 2026, 32 GSP countries (14 EBA) were monitored, with visits to 16 GSP (6 EBA) countries. No evidence has come to light of sugar exported under preference from an EBA beneficiary country having the origin of another country.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports · Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2026-05-04 “Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 4.5.2026 Written question The information portal of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) [1] is based on data transmitted by the EU Member States to the Commission via the Customs Surveillance system [2] . The data in the Customs Surveillance system are generated in real time once transmitted by the national customs authorities. Official European statistics on imports of all goods are published by Eurostat [3] . These statistics are published with a delay of 1.5 months after the reference month. The Commission has opened infringement cases against Member States that have failed to comply with the reporting obligations related to the Customs Surveillance system [4] . In addition, the Commission is working together with the authorities of the Member States to ensure that missing datasets are completed and transmitted to the Commission as soon as possible. It should be noted that this technical issue is not related to the international framework of the EU-Morocco Association Agreement. Through an analysis of official data made available by relevant national authorities, the Commission regularly monitors the market of fruit and vegetables. The Commission also conducts consultations of experts in the dedicated tomatoes market observatory, including on the import of products into the EU market. [1] https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DashboardTaxud/TaxudWeeklyImport.html. [2] https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/online-services/online-services-and-databases-customs/surveillance-system_en. [3] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/6929f9ba-01b4-4dd2-b03e-f14b4a9ee3dc?lang=en&createdAt=2026-04-13T13:21:25Z. [4] https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/search-infringement-decisions/?langCode=EN: List of cases opened in relation to SURV 3: INFR(2025)2059; INFR(2025)2058; INFR(2025)2058; INFR(2025)2057; INFR(2025)2056; INFR(2025)2055; INFR(2025)2054; INFR(2025)2014; INFR(2025)2013; INFR(2025)2012; INFR(2025)2011; INFR(2025)2010; INFR(2025)2009; INFR(2025)2007.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2026-05-04 “Answer given by Commissioner Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 4.5.2026 Written question The Commission attaches great importance to respect for fundamental rights, including freedom of association, the right of collective bargaining and action, and fair and just working conditions. At the same time, the Commission applies strict transparency rules concerning its contacts and interactions with stakeholders on issues relating to EU decision-making and policy implementation. Members of the Commission, members of their Cabinet, and Commission staff holding management functions shall only meet interest representatives that are registered in the Transparency Register [1] . Information and minutes of all such meetings are published in accordance with Commission Decisions (EU) 2024/3081 [2] and 2024/3082 [3] . Amazon Europe is registered in the Transparency Register. Its registration [4] includes information on meetings held with the Commission in an interest representation context. All registrants commit to operate in line with the rules and principles set out in the code of conduct annexed to the applicable Interinstitutional Agreement [5] . The register’s Secretariat is tasked with evaluating registrants’ ongoing eligibility and observance of the code of conduct. To that end, it may carry out investigations and apply measures of an administrative nature. Any natural or legal person may lodge a complaint with the Secretariat concerning a registrant’s alleged non-observance of the code. Amazon Europe’s registration is currently not subject to any administrative measure by the Secretariat. [1] https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202403081. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202403082. [4] https://transparency-register.europa.eu/search-register-or-update/organisation-detail_en?id=366117914426-10. [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2021.207.01.0001.01.ENG.”
  EU engagement with civil society · Sustainable corporate governance · Transparency requirements for interest groups
• 2026-04-29 “E-001061/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission In response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has adopted a wide range of restrictive measures, including far-reaching trade restrictions which have played a significant role in reducing imports of strategic commodities from Russia. The measures in place reflect a careful balance between the EU’s determination to impact Russia’s ability to finance its war of aggression and to limit to the extent possible negative impacts on Member States and industry, taking into account shortages of certain critical raw materials. As regards aluminium, the 16th sanctions package 1 expanded the restrictions already in place to cover also primary aluminium, resulting in a ban on imports of primary aluminium from Russia as of 26 February 2026 with a remaining small quota of 50 000 metric tonnes to allow imports for contracts concluded before 25 February 2025 (i.e. one-year old contracts) still to be delivered only until the end of 2026. The Commission closely monitors the aluminium market situation, including EU imports of processed aluminium and is ready to consider appropriate actions, if necessary. EU sanctions are kept under regular review. Any decision to amend any of the existing sanctions in place or to add new sanctions is for the Council to take by unanimity. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202500394.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Trade relations with Turkey
• 2026-04-29 “E-000966/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Since the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 1233/2011 1 , the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been an integral part of EU law. The Commission conducts an annual review for the European Parliament on the basis of the Annual Activity Reports submitted by Member States on compliance with EU standards. Starting with the 2023 reporting year, this annual review includes detailed information on Export Credit Agencies climate policies and justifications provided by Member States for any remaining fossil fuel transactions. Additionally, the Commission led efforts to create a new transparency report with other participants to the Arrangement, providing exhaustive data on all energy sector transactions since 2015. The first report was published in November 2025 2 . Collectively, these initiatives ensure robust public scrutiny regarding Member States’ intentions to phase out export credits for fossil fuel energy projects 3 . Regarding the specific project mentioned, primary responsibility for due diligence lies with the individual Member State that must assess alignment with national, EU and international obligations, including the OECD Recommendation on Common Approaches for Officially Supported Export Credits and Environmental and Social Due Diligence, which is the benchmark for assessing human rights and environmental impacts. While the Commission does not intervene in individual project approvals, it pays attention to these issues when reviewing Member State reports under the Regulation, with a view to ensuring continued alignment with EU objectives. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/1233/oj/eng. 2 Export Finance for Future, Transparency Report 2025, Annex II; https://www.exportkreditgarantien.de/_Resources/Persistent/b/7/1/5/b715c13f8a6fc669f97c8313d277319089595 7d8/e3f-annual-transparency-report-2025.pdf. 3 Council conclusion on export credits, 15 March 2022; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2022/03/15/the-council-adopted-conclusions-on-export-credits/pdf.”
  EU policy on social & environmental impact of foreign investments · Climate efforts
• 2026-04-24 “E-000737/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Following the Australian elections in May 2025, the President of the Commission and the Prime Minister of Australia agreed to resume stock taking discussions on the EU-Australia Free Trade Agreement. Further to series of technical meetings and political level engagement in Brussels, the negotiations were finally concluded on 24 March 2026 on the occasion of the President of the Commission’s visit to Australia 1 . The Commission has been clear with Australia that the EU’s agricultural sensitivities not only remain but have heightened compared to 2023. On the other hand, the red meat sector, namely beef and sheep meat, has been Australia’s top offensive interest in agriculture, and overall in the negotiations, which has required a very careful handling. A very limited and controlled opening of the EU’s agricultural market, including sustainability requirements, combined with new export opportunities by eliminating tariffs on EU exports to Australia and by protecting geographical indications, represents a balanced outcome for the EU’s agricultural sector. For the most sensitive products the full volume of opening is very small, accounting for only a fraction of EU consumption (e.g. a quota of 30 600 tonnes for beef, representing around 0.5% of EU consumption; a quota of 25 000 tonnes for sheep meat, representing around 4% of EU consumption) and will be phased in over 10 and 7 years, respectively. The Commission has also secured a bilateral safeguard clause covering the most sensitive agricultural products to address any unexpected disturbances. The possible impact of the agreement was addressed in the context of the 2024 update of the study on the cumulative economic impact of trade agreements on EU agriculture 2 . 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_26_762. 2 https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC135540.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU · Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-04-23 “P-000943/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The decline of the EU’s sugar market is largely due to high production domestically, while imports have dropped drastically. In 2025, the EU also reinstated import quotas for Ukrainian sugar under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and suspended General Scheme of Preference Plus preferences for Pakistani ethanol. The agreement with Mercosur offers limited concessions on sugar, subject to strict safeguards, and is yet to be applied. As for the recently concluded EU-Australia Free Trade Agreement (FTA), negotiations were carried out in full transparency with text proposals and reports having been made publicly available. The Commission maintained regular exchanges with the Council and the European Parliament, as well as with interested stakeholders including the representatives of sugar industry. To mitigate possible market pressure, the Commission has ensured that the most sensitive agricultural products, including sugar, will only have a limited and controlled access to the EU market and will be subject to sustainability conditionalities. Under the EU-Australia FTA, the EU will open a tariff rate quota of 35 000 tonnes of raw sugar cane for refining to be imported duty-free. It is important to note that this represents less than 0.3% of EU sugar consumption. In addition, the EU can impose safeguard measures in case of a surge in EU agri-food imports from Australia if it causes or threatens to cause a serious injury to EU industry. As an additional layer of protection for farmers, a bilateral safeguard mechanism will be operationalised in a self-standing EU regulation that will ensure swift and effective protections, in the unlikely event of an unforeseen and harmful surge in imports or an undue decrease in prices for EU producers.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2026-04-22 “E-000817/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Trade Agreement between the EU and Colombia, Ecuador and Peru 1 entered into force on 1 November 2024. The Commission agrees with the Honourable Member that it would now be appropriate to initiate a reflection on how the Agreement fits with the current geopolitical and economic environment. Regarding the transformation into a modern strategic partnership, the Commission committed in the 2022 Joint Communication ‘A New Agenda for EU-Latin America and Caribbean Relations’ 2 to discuss the possible upgrade of the Agreement's provisions on sustainable development. To this end, the EU and the Andean countries have established a Working Group under the relevant Committee where discussions are still ongoing. A broader modernisation of the agreement could be considered. The Commission is exploring with various partners to extend the trade and economic cooperation to new fields. Any formal request for a negotiating mandate to the Council would require further scoping to ensure alignment with the EU’s strategic priorities. The conclusions of any deliberations in this regard will be fully reported to the European Parliament. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/eu-trade-agreement-with-colombia-peru-andecuador.html. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023JC0017.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-04-16 “P-001065/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission considers that business-to-consumer consignments that are artificially grouped and declared as business-to-business imports in the EU, constitute distance sales of imported goods, which shall be, from 1 July 2026, subject to the EUR 3 customs duty. This position is based on the interpretation by the European Court of Justice 1 who has ruled that in the case of consignments which group individual orders, each consignment is to be considered separately. 2. The Commission is currently working on the amendment of the Union Customs Code implementing regulation 2 . It would introduce new EU provisions providing Member States’ customs authorities a harmonised and common legal tool to identify these business-toconsumer consignments artificially classified as business-to-business goods. 3. An anti-abuse clause was included in this amendment of the Union Customs Code implementing regulation. This provision empowers and incentivises the national customs authorities to apply all the measures related to distance sales, e.g. the EUR 3 customs duty, where they verify during a control that a consignment is merely a grouping of individual orders which constitute distance sales. 1 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 2 July 2009, Har Vaessen Douane Service BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62008CJ0007. 2 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Union Customs Code.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2026-04-15 “E-000652/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the challenging situation of Tubos Reunidos, including the impact on its exports of the 50% duty applied by the US. In this respect, the Commission is engaging with the US on ring-fencing the EU and US markets from overcapacity and ensuring secure supply chains, including through tariff-rate quotas to improve access for EU steelmakers into the US market 1 . Under the Steel and Metals Action Plan (SMAP) 2 , the Commission focuses on six pillars addressing energy costs, carbon leakage, industrial capacity, circularity, jobs and investment. The Commission put forward a proposal to address the negative trade-related effects of global overcapacity in October 2025 3 , that is currently in co-decision and expected to be effective as of 1 July 2026. This measure will provide an effective level of protection against the negative trade-related of global overcapacity in the EU market, improving the economic performance of EU steelmakers. In March 2026, the proposal for the Industrial Accelerator Act 4 was adopted, creating lead markets for clean industrial products, like steel used in construction and cars under the CO₂ emissions performance standards framework. Finally, the SMAP places strong emphasis on protecting quality industrial jobs and supporting workers and regions in transition. The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) 5 provides support when restructuring is unavoidable. The Fund co-finances active labour market measures designed to help displaced workers re-enter employment. On 26 February 2026, the European Parliament and EU Member States reached a political agreement to enhance the EGF, introducing anticipatory support for workers at risk of redundancy. 1 Joint Statement on a United States-European Union framework on an agreement on reciprocal, fair and balanced trade - Trade and Economic Security: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-unitedstates-european-union-framework-agreement-reciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0125. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)726&lang=en. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52026PC0100. 5 Regulation (EU) 2021/691 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) and repealing Regulation (EU) 1309/2013 (OJ L 153, 3.5.2021, p. 48–70: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2021.153.01.0048.01.ENG).”
  "Buy European" provisions · State Aid · EU-US trade relations
• 2026-04-14 “E-000570/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission In line with the overall EU approach to trade and investment agreements, also in the ongoing negotiations with Southeast Asian countries (Malaysia. Philippines, Thailand), the Commission aims at reaching comprehensive deals that can bring growth opportunities for the EU economy and employment as a whole. The EU negotiating proposals are intended to address a wide range of issues. Notably, the EU pursues the establishment of effective rules underpinning a more level playing field across the board, robust and enforceable disciplines on trade and sustainable development, including with respect to fisheries-related issues, and meaningful market access for EU operators. As in all free trade agreement negotiations, for economically sensitive products, such as certain fisheries or agricultural products, the EU pursues carefully designed specific modalities for market access which aim at preventing any market disturbances.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-04-14 “E-000577/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission An anti-dumping (AD) investigation on cold rolled flat steel products originating, inter alia, in Taiwan, but not from South Korea has been ongoing since 18 September 2025. No measures have been imposed in that investigation. However, a 25% import duty is applicable to imports of the product category (HS code 72112900) from Taiwan under the EU’s steel safeguard measure as the duty-free quota for Taiwan was fully utilised for the first quarter of 2026. For South Korea, the duty-free quota for the first quarter of 2026 has not yet been fully utilised. Only imports above the quota attract a duty. In safeguard investigations, users’ interests are taken into account, and measures in the form of a tariff rate quota allow a certain volume to be imported duty free so that downstream users are not unduly penalised. Data on the quota usage is publicly available on the website of Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union 1 . The order numbers for the product category are given in the updated version of the Safeguard Regulation 2 . In AD investigations, the Commission also conducts an EU interest test to see if measures would be against the EU interest, including the impact on downstream users. The decision on EU interest relies on information submitted by interested parties, including users. The procedures are set out in Section 5.5 of the Notice of Initiation 3 . For small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the Commission reaches out to increase awareness through regular engagement with the SME community. Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security (DG TRADE) also has a dedicated webpage 4 for SMEs regarding trade defence. Finally, DG TRADE’s information page on each ongoing investigation 5 indicates the timetable for the steps in a proceeding. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/quota_consultation.jsp?Lang=en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/159/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202505025. 4 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/enforcement-and-protection/trade-defence/help-smes_en. 5 https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/ongoing.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2026-04-13 “E-000878/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Exemptions of the measures in the form of price undertakings are a statutory alternative to collection of countervailing duties, provided that the legal conditions are met. This includes that the proposed minimum import prices fully offset the effect of Chinese subsidisation in comparison to the countervailing duties, and that it is practicable and sufficiently mitigates the risk of cross compensation. Price undertakings are subject to regular monitoring, covering export and resale of each individual vehicle in the EU, and to on-site inspections. Such inspections may occur even after the end of the undertaking implementation period. Non-compliance with the terms of a price undertaking may result in the reinstatement of duties, potentially with retroactive effect, thereby imposing a significant deterrent effect. Additionally, imports from all countries are subject to both regular monitoring by the Commission and customs checks by Member States’ authorities to identify potential circumvention practices and incorrect declarations of product origin. To date, due to the complexity of the product and the diverse range of distribution channels, the Commission has only accepted a single price undertaking offer. This price undertaking includes a satisfactory minimum import price level, as well as effective measures to mitigate the risk of cross-compensation. Any price undertaking offer will be subject to the same thorough assessment and will need to meet identical legal criteria in order to be considered acceptable and practicable.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2026-04-13 “E-000346/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Countervailing measures were imposed in October 2024 on imports of battery electric vehicles from China following an investigation conducted in line with the EU’s anti-subsidy legislation. That investigation did not cover imports of hybrid vehicles. Trade defence measures are limited by the scope of the relevant investigation and cannot be imposed on or extended to imports of products which were not investigated. The Commission takes action to defend EU industry from unfairly traded imports where it receives a complaint from industry with evidence supporting allegations of injurious dumping/subsidisation. There is no ongoing investigation concerning imports of hybrid vehicles from China and the Commission cannot comment nor provide information as to potential complaints seeking the initiation of an investigation. The Complaints Office of Trade Defence Services can be contacted to discuss the procedure 1 . 1 trade-defence-complaints@ec.europa.eu.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · Trade relations with China
• 2026-04-13 “E-000751/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The anti-dumping procedure follows the standard time schedule. Since October 2025 imports are registered 1 , and provisional anti-dumping measures, ranging from 57,7% to 90,1% were imposed on 28 March 2026 2 . Definitive measures, if warranted, will be published by 25 September 2026, at the latest. The impact of anti-dumping measures on the downstream industries is analysed in the context of EU interest analysis. However, this requires cooperation of the users of polyamide yarns. Upon initiation, 140 users of polyamide yarns identified in the complaint were invited to cooperate. Only three users and one user’s association, registered themselves as interested parties. None of them filled in the user questionnaire. Only one provided comments concerning the product scope and not on the impact of measures on the downstream industry. Two other users (not registered as interested parties) provided general comments on the possible negative impact of the measures on the downstream industry, but these were not supported by any evidence or data. The trade defence instruments used by the Commission are designed for restoring the level playing field on the EU market when it is disrupted by unfair practices of dumped imports. Following the imposition of provisional measures, the Commission will further assess the effect of the measures on the EU producers and users of polyamide yarns. In case the downstream industry faces pressure from cheap imports, it can also submit a complaint and request an anti-dumping investigation. 1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1984 of 3 October 2025 making imports of yarns of polyamide originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration (OJ L 2025/1984, 6.10.2025: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1984/oj/eng). 2 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/734 of 26 March 2026 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of yarns of polyamide originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 2026/734, 27.03.2026: ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/734/oj).”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports · Trade relations with China
• 2026-04-10 “E-000641/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s proposal for a measure addressing the negative trade-related effects of global overcapacity of 7 October 2025 1 set out a product scope mirroring that of the existing safeguard measure (26 categories of steel finished products). On the basis of that product scope, the Commission carried out a public consultation and a detailed assessment of the market situation in its staff working document and an economic analysis 2 . The compromise text adopted by the Council on 12 December 2025 proposed to keep the same product scope 3 . The Commission is aware of the concerns of other EU steel producers of certain steel products currently not covered by the proposal, for example, steel lift guide rails, and other producers of products made of steel. For this reason, the Commission committed to its proposal (Article 9.1) 4 to assess the need for a potential amendment and expansion of the product scope within a certain time after the proposal enters into force. Concerns concerning product scope were last echoed by several stakeholders during the feedback period on the Commission’s proposal that was open from 10 October 2025 to 16 December 2025 5 . As to next steps in the process, the trilogues between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission have already started and are likely to consider the question of product scope among other issues. At this stage, however, we cannot prejudge the outcome of such discussions. Lastly, the Commission continuously monitors trade flows across the steel sector and remains available to assess, together with EU industry, potential attempts to circumvent in a certain product category the effectiveness of any trade measure in place and the appropriate remedies. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)726&lang=en. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2025)780&lang=en. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/12/steel-overcapacity-council-adoptsmandate-on-new-rules-to-protect-eu-steel-industry-from-global-overcapacity/. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0726. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14781-Trade-measure-addressing-thenegative-trade-related-effects-of-global-excess-capacity-on-the-EU-steel-sector_en.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2026-04-10 “E-000495/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges the significance of the concerns relating to the misuse of blasphemy laws in Pakistan, including false accusations that have led to violence and serious human rights violations. While criminal prosecutions fall under Pakistan’s sovereign responsibility, the EU expects the authorities to ensure accountability for abuses of these laws, including action against those who deliberately make false accusations. Respect for due process, protection of minorities and compliance with international human rights obligations remain essential elements of EUPakistan relations, including under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) framework 1 . As for any GSP+ beneficiary, Pakistan is subject to continuous monitoring of its implementation of 27 international conventions listed in the GSP Regulation 2 , including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The EU conducted a GSP+ monitoring mission in Pakistan in late 2025 during which the issue of false accusations of blasphemy was highlighted to the Pakistani authorities as one of the priority areas for corrective action. The Commission will continue to monitor developments closely and assess progress. A GSP monitoring report will be issued to the European Parliament and the Council by the summer of 2026. This will include the EU evaluation, incorporating also findings from UN bodies and civil society. If Pakistan re-applies for GSP+ under the new GSP Regulation, it will be required to devise a plan of action on the effective implementation of all GSP+ conventions under the new Regulation, including the ICCPR. The issue of false accusations of blasphemy will also be discussed in that context. 1 EU’s Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance of the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+). Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/978/oj/eng - https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/732/oj/eng. 2 Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008.”
  EU competences on human rights
• 2026-04-10 “E-000930/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges the critical situation faced by European silicon metal producers and understands their concerns. The Commission opened a safeguard investigation on six manganese- and silicon-based alloys, including silicon metal, in December 2024 1 . However, the conditions for safeguard measures for silicon metal were not met, as there was no increase in imports. In fact, imports of silicon decreased during the most recent period assessed. Therefore, silicon was not included in the scope of the safeguard measure imposed in November 2025 2 . Nevertheless, the Commission remains attentive to the industry's challenges. Although the current safeguard measure in force for other ferro-alloys cannot be altered to include silicon, the Commission is committed to exploring all viable options to help the industry, including through trade defence instruments. The Commission would like to stress that it takes the difficulties of EU silicon metal producers seriously and is continuously engaging with the industry with a view to identifying the most effective way forward. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202407541. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202502351.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · Trade relations with China
• 2026-04-09 “E-000350/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is in regular contact with the European Medicines Agency (EMA) to address its rental situation. As an autonomous legal entity, EMA is responsible for its relations with the landlords of its premises, including its former premises in London. The lease between EMA and the landlord of its former premises in London is a matter subject to English contract law. As such contractual issues are outside the scope of the Withdrawal Agreement or the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the issue is not discussed with the government of the United Kingdom in the framework of the implementation of those agreements. To fulfil the contractual obligations towards the landlord (Canary Wharf Group) of the premises in London, additional allocations from the EU budget have been granted to the EU subsidy to EMA: EUR 11.2 million were added to the EU contribution to EMA in the 2024 budget; EUR 13.3 million in 2025; EUR 13 million in 2026. For 2027, EUR 12.3 million is currently programmed to be included in the Commission’s proposal for the draft budget.”
  Discharge of EU institutions and agencies · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2026-04-07 “Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 7.4.2026 Written question Under the EU-Israel Association Agreement, products manufactured in Israeli settlements located within the territories brought under Israeli administration since June 1967 are not eligible for preferential tariff treatment [1] . Since 1 February 2005, the exclusion of settlement goods from preferential treatment has been implemented in the EU as follows: — In accordance with a ‘Technical Arrangement’ concluded by the EU and Israel, the postal code and the name of the city, village or industrial zone where production conferring originating status has taken place are to appear on all proofs of preferential origin issued or made out in Israel. — Member States' customs authorities check whether the postal codes appearing on Israeli proofs of origin presented to them correspond to any of the postal codes appearing in the list of non-eligible locations made available to them by the Commission and refuse preference where such is the case. An integrated Tariff of the European Union’s (TARIC) code is needed in the import declaration to confirm that the postal code appearing in the proof of origin corresponds to an eligible location. The Association Agreement provides mechanisms for Member States’ customs to check the correctness of the preferential origin declared. However, the Commission does not collect systematically information on goods entering the EU from Israeli settlements via the Customs Surveillance system [2] . [1] See Commission Notice to importers, OJ C 232 of 3 August 2012, page 5. [2] https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/online-services/online-services-and-databases-customs/surveillance-system_en.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-04-07 “Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 7.4.2026 Written question Products from Israeli settlements located in the territories brought under Israeli administration since June 1967 are not entitled to preferential treatment under the EU-Israel Association Agreement. Since 1 February 2005 a Technical Arrangement requires a proof of origin issued in Israel to indicate the name and postal code of the city, village or industrial zone of origin conferring production. A Notice to importers requires the postal codes on Israeli proofs of origin to be checked against a list of non-eligible locations made available by the European Commission. If the postal code corresponds to a non-eligible location, importers cannot claim preferential treatment. The list, initially published in 2012, is regularly updated to reflect changes in Israel’s postal code system and the expansion of settlements. An integrated Tariff of the European Union TARIC, code Y864, is needed on the import declaration to confirm that the postal code declared corresponds to an eligible location. The Association Agreement provides for administrative cooperation between the customs authorities to verify proofs of origin in case of doubts. The verification is conducted by the exporting party at the request of the importing party. The Commission does not collect systematically detailed information on controls carried out by Member States.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights)
• 2026-04-07 “E-000345/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission proposal on a Reparations Loan to Ukraine 1 refers to the bilateral investment treaties between certain Member States and the Russian Federation. In the Commission’s view, given the systematic disregard by the Russian Federation of internationally agreed norms, including with regard to its commitments concerning the protection of investments by investors from Member States in the territory of the Russian Federation, maintaining bilateral investment treaties between Member States and the Russian Federation is no longer consistent with the investment protection policy developed by the EU pursuant to Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2 . While approval by the co-legislators of that proposal is still pending, the Commission expects Member States to continue closely coordinating with the Commission services regarding their bilateral investment treaties in the light of their obligations under EU law, including on issues related to their agreements with the Russian Federation. In relation to claims against certain Member States based on their bilateral investment treaties with the Russian Federation, the EU has indeed ensured that the EU sanctions regime provides for procedural safeguards against any damages claims or arbitral disputes. The responsible Commission services are analysing the complaints referred to by the Honourable Member. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC3502. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT:en:PDF.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-Belarus relations
• 2026-04-01 “E-000460/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission concluded negotiations with India on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on 27 January 2026 1 . This agreement will strengthen the EU's trade relations with a key partner and is expected to be beneficial for the EU medical sector. The Commission does not expect the agreement to have a negative impact on EU production of medicines. Currently, the EU does not generally levy duties on imported medicines and thus the FTA will not further liberalise imports. Additionally, the agreement will uphold EU’s high standards on medicines. The Commission commissioned an independent Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) in support of the negotiations, which was published in December 2023. 2 This SIA concluded that the overall potential impact of the agreement would be minor on the right to health, also considering access to medicines. It also anticipated a slight decrease of production of medicines in the EU by assuming a reduction of the non-tariff measures applicable to bilateral trade in medicines, but such reduction did not materialise in the agreement. There is no contradiction between the objectives of the proposed Critical Medicines Act (CMA) 3 and the EU-India agreement. The CMA aims to strengthen the EU’s security of supply of critical medicines, which are essential for the functioning of public health systems. It will help to address vulnerabilities in the supply chains of these medicines, including by supporting investments into EU manufacturing capacities and procurement requirements that promote the security of supply in the Union. The CMA also proposes to form international partnerships to facilitate the diversification of the supply chains. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_184. 2 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/analysis-and-assessment/sustainability-impact-assessments_en. 3 https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/critical-medicines-act_en.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Pharmaceutical imports & exports rules
• 2026-04-01 “E-000670/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU has condemned in the strongest terms the military coup carried out in Myanmar on 1 February 2021. The EU calls upon the military to respect human rights, freedom of expression, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. Following the military coup, the EU has adopted several rounds of sanctions targeting individuals and entities related to the military leadership and their economic interests. The participation of Myanmar in the Everything But Arms (EBA) 1 arrangement of the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences continues to meet one of its key objectives, i.e. to contribute to the eradication of poverty in beneficiary countries. In the case of Myanmar, the Commission aims to ensure that the pursuit of that goal continues at a time of a dire humanitarian crisis in the country. Any adverse impact on the livelihood of Myanmar’s population, in particular vulnerable groups, as a consequence of a potential withdrawal of EBA preferences needs to be avoided. The benefits of EBA preferences to the military junta are deemed to be minimal (in terms of ownership, fiscal revenue, revenues from other sources (such as fees, rent) and port activity). In the meantime, the EBA enhanced engagement process with Myanmar continues, albeit without any contact with the government. The engagement takes place through contacts with business, non-governmental organisations, and democratic forces. The Commission and the European External Action Service are actively engaged with other stakeholders in Myanmar’s society, so that the channels of communication are kept open. The Commission re-assesses on a regular basis its policy on the EBA engagement with Myanmar and follows closely the developments on the ground to adapt accordingly. 1 Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/978/oj.”
  Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights)
• 2026-03-30 “E-003738/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with Article 5(1) of the Detailed Rules for the application of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, annexed to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission 1 (hereinafter, the ‘Detailed Rules’), ‘any content that constitutes important information that is not short-lived shall be registered pursuant to Article 7 of Commission Decision 2021/2121 2 ’. Article 5(2) of the Detailed Rules gives illustrative examples of how to apply the registration criteria of important and not-short lived documents. The Detailed rules also clarify that text messaging applications on corporate mobile phones shall not be used for important information that is not short-lived, unless where this is strictly required in the interest of the service and that they shall comply with the Commission’s information technology security recommendations for the automatic disappearance of messages (Article 5 paragraph 4). It is the professional duty of all Commission staff to make sure that these rules are properly followed and implemented. The Commission has a robust record-keeping policy as laid down in Commission Decision (EU) 2021/2121 on records management 3 , and in its internal guidelines, which provide for criteria for registration of documents, together with the above-mentioned provisions in the Detailed Rules. According to Article 3(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, a ‘document’ shall mean any content whatever its medium (written on paper or stored in electronic form or as a sound, visual or audiovisual recording) concerning a matter relating to the policies, activities and decisions falling within the institution's sphere of responsibility’. Both Commission Decision (EU) 2021/2021 on records management and the Detailed rules are applicable regardless the technical medium or storage of a document. On top of this, the Commission central expert services are available for support, tailor-made training and coaching when needed. 1 Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3080 of 4 December 2024 establishing the Rules of Procedure of the Commission and amending Decision C(2000) 3614 (OJ L, 2024/3080, 5.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3080/oj). 2 Commission Decision (EU) 2021/2121 of 6 July 2020 on records management and archives (J L 430, 2.12.2021, p. 30–41). 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2021/2121/oj/eng.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2026-03-27 “E-000472/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the issue regarding the exports of sardines from Morocco. At this stage, the Commission services and the Delegation of the EU to Morocco are investigating, and will assess how best to tackle the issue. In the meantime, alternative sources of supply from preferential partner countries exist via a large network of EU Free Trade Agreements. There is also supply from the EU vessels fishing in the EU waters and the EU production can be used to supply the EU canneries.”
  Trade relations with Morocco
• 2026-03-20 “E-000282/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU takes robust action to protect its industries from unfairly traded imports and at present has over 230 measures in place. Where measures in place are considered to be no longer sufficient to counteract the impact of injurious dumping, there is a possibility to have the issue examined by way of an interim review. Such a review can be initiated on request by an interested party who must show that there have been significant changes of a lasting nature in the circumstances relating to the dumping and/or injury. Interim review investigations can result in an amendment of the measures in place, if justified. The complaints office of the Trade Defence Services can be contacted to discuss the procedure 1 . As regards safeguards, in November 2025, safeguard measures were imposed on four ferro alloys. However, silicon is not covered by those measures, as the criteria to include the product were not met, namely, there was no increase of imports. Nevertheless, market conditions can change rapidly in the current volatile trading environment, and the Commission is ready to engage with industry to explore all possible options available under the trade defence instruments. The ferro alloys safeguard investigation showed that the sector, like many others, is facing challenges other than harmful trade practices, such as high energy costs. It is therefore necessary to explore also other policy options to help EU silicon producers operate on a sustainable basis. 1 trade-defence-complaints@ec.europa.eu.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · Trade relations with China
• 2026-03-20 “P-000784/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Indeed, in November 2025, safeguard measures were imposed on four ferro alloys. However, silicon and calcium silicon are not covered by those measures, as the criteria to include them were not met at the time, in particular, there was no increase of imports for silicon and calcium silicon was not produced in the EU. The safeguard instrument does not provide for changing the scope of measures, which are already in force. Nevertheless, market conditions can change rapidly in the current volatile trading environment. The Commission is ready to engage with industry to explore all possible options available under the trade defence instruments. These instruments can be applied in cases where an increase of imports causes injury to EU producers. For the anti-dumping or antisubsidy instrument, dumping and subsidisation also need to be demonstrated. As regards monitoring, the Commission has put in place the import surveillance tool in May 2025. This tool monitors any changes in import patterns in terms of volumes and prices. However, information on injury to EU producers, which includes data such as developments of production, sales, market share, profit/losses is not available to the Commission and can only be provided by the industry concerned.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports · Trade relations with China
• 2026-03-19 “E-000466/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission On 17 January 2026, the EU and Mercosur signed the Partnership Agreement 1 and the Interim Trade Agreement 2 , based on the political agreement reached on 6 December 2024. Against a background in which the EU has excluded a much larger number of agricultural products from full liberalisation than Mercosur countries, table olives represented one of the few defensive interests for the Mercosur countries, in particular Argentina, because of the high competitiveness of EU producers. Therefore, similarly to the cases where the EU protected its sensitive products, also Mercosur invoked an exception to the liberalisation of table olives. On the other hand, the Commission focused its offensive interests on olive oil, a product with a very large export potential in South America, and for which the EU obtained an excellent concession from Mercosur countries, namely the full elimination of tariffs, which are currently as high as 31.5% in Argentina. In any event, the Mercosur agreement stipulates the possibility of an amendment of the trade provisions, based on the outcome of a review that takes place three years after the entry into force of the agreement. Such a review would be an opportunity for the Commission to reassess the situation as regards tariffs on table olives. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8371-2023-DCL-1/en/pdf. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12417-2025-REV-1/en/pdf.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur · Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2026-03-19 “E-000309/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission There is no ongoing anti-dumping investigation into the disposable medical gloves sector. Any affected industry is invited to contact the Commission’s trade defence services 1 to discuss how to prepare a request for such an investigation. The Commission imposes antidumping measures where injurious dumping is found and it is in the EU interest to do so. Labour standards in third countries may be considered in anti-dumping investigations in selecting a representative country for calculating costs and also in deciding whether to accept undertakings. In addition, costs of labour standards borne by EU industry are taken into account by the Commission in calculating a target price for the industry concerned. Country reports, which describe distortions in exporting countries, may also include a chapter on labour standards, as is the case with the report on distortions on China 2 . The objective of the Forced Labour Regulation 3 , which bans from the EU market all products made with forced labour, is to improve the functioning of the internal market and contribute to the fight against forced labour. Once the Regulation starts applying in December 2027, the Commission will be able to investigate cases of potential forced labour linked to concrete products, including products originating from third countries. 1 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/contacts/trade-defence-enquiries_en. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2024)91&lang=en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3015/oj.”
  EU policy on labour exploitation in global supply chains · Trade relations with China
• 2026-03-19 “P-000618/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU wine package published on 26 February 2026 1 will provide a modernised policy framework to support a competitive, resilient and future-oriented EU wine sector. Although it does not contain a specific section on the common commercial policy, it will strengthen the sector’s capacity to seize emerging market opportunities. The wine sector also represents an offensive sector for the EU in its Free Trade Agreement negotiations, where EU wine exports are supported through tariff liberalisation, protection of geographical indications or addressing non-tariff barriers. Pursuant Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 2 , economic coercion exists where a third country applies or threatens to apply a third-country measure affecting trade or investment in order to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by the EU or a Member State, thereby interfering in the legitimate sovereign choices of the EU or a Member State. In the situations described, it seems that there is a restriction of trade that is however not intended to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act, thereby interfering in legitimate sovereign choices. Therefore, the Commission is currently not planning to activate the Anti-Coercion Instrument with regards to possible trade restrictions affecting the wine sector. Nevertheless, if such restrictions are in violation of international trade rules, different avenues are likely to exist to seek remedies, like the initiation of a dispute settlement under the World Trade Organisation Agreement, or under EU Free Trade Agreements. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/471/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2675/oj/eng.”
  EU-US trade relations · Trade relations with China
• 2026-03-18 “E-000479/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission EU citizens are protected by some of the strictest food safety rules. All food needs to meet sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, such as bans of hormones and antimicrobials for growth promotion. Pesticide residues that create an unacceptable risk for consumers are not allowed. Rigorous border controls and audits ensure compliance with EU rules, requiring corrective action if issues arise, potentially suspending entry into the EU. On 9 December 2025, the Commission announced plans to increase audits by 50% over two years and establish a task force to enhance import controls 1 . The Commission aims to align production standards of imports, especially for pesticides and animal welfare. Concerning labour and environmental conditions, the agreement includes the latest trade and sustainable development standards 2 . It includes commitments to combat illegal logging, tackle deforestation and promote sustainable supply chains. It addresses labour standards, with both parties committing to respect, promote and effectively implement International Labour Organization core labour standards. It provides a platform for dialogue and cooperation, and the binding commitments can be enforced through a specific dispute settlement procedure. The Commission notes that on 9 January 2026, the Council decided to have the EU-Mercosur agreements 34 signed and provisionally applied. It also takes note of the European Parliament's Resolution requesting the opinion of the European Court of Justice on the compatibility of the EU-Mercosur agreements with the EU Treaties. The Commission is committed to sincere cooperation among EU institutions, including regarding their role in the conclusion process. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2979. 2 Circabc (https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/09242a36-a438-40fd-a7af-fe32e36cbd0e/library/afa4395e-9d624958-8074-76c43f64e2b4/details?download=true). 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8371-2023-DCL-1/en/pdf. 4 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12417-2025-REV-1/en/pdf.”
  Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights) · Trade relations with Mercosur · Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2026-03-18 “E-000251/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU has reacted to the situation concerning Greenland, and the related threat of tariffs on six Member States, with determination and unity. This response proved effective in defending European interests and de-escalating the situation. The EU expressed unequivocal solidarity with Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark, it stood firmly with the six Member States threatened with tariffs; and it engaged actively with the US on multiple levels. The EU also signalled that it was well prepared to deploy trade countermeasures and non-tariff instruments if necessary. In sum, four key principles guided the response – firmness, outreach, preparedness and unity. This approach proved effective. Looking ahead, the Commission will be guided by these same principles. Going forward, the EU should continue cooperating with the US to advance the transatlantic trade relationship on all issues of common interest. The EU is fully committed to implementing in good faith the EU-US Joint Statement of 21 August 2025 1 . 1 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreementreciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en.”
  EU-US relations · EU-US trade relations
• 2026-03-04 “E-000235/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The negotiations of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with India were finalised on 27 January 2026 during the 16 th EU-India Summit. The FTA will positively contribute to EU output and employment. EU gross domestic product is expected to grow by up to EUR 47.9 billion. EU exports will significantly expand, including in important sectors such as chemicals, electronics, machinery, transport equipment, beverages, textiles, minerals and metals 1 . The FTA includes safeguards allowing for the temporary suspension of tariff preferences in case of a sudden surge in imports that could harm the EU industry. Such bilateral safeguards may be introduced during a period of 22 years from the date of entry into force of the FTA. The FTA fully preserves the possibility to apply trade defence measures against dumping, subsidised imports or import surges. Global safeguard measures such as those introduced in 2025 on ferroalloys will remain possible. It will not affect either the anti-dumping duties currently in place on ceramic tiles. The FTA will be no obstacle to the introduction of a stricter import regime for steel as envisaged in the Commission’s proposal of 7 October 2025 2 . The Commission nonetheless acknowledges that energy-intensive industries face particular challenges that are independent of the EU’s FTA policy. Those challenges require a multipronged strategy by public and private actors. The Commission’s Clean Industrial Deal 3 and other EU competitiveness initiatives are important elements in that regard. 1 Findings of the independent Sustainability Impact Assessment of 2023, available on https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/analysis-and-assessment/sustainability-impact-assessments_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0726. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0085.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs) · EU policy on labour exploitation in global supply chains
• 2026-03-03 “E-000141/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is grateful for the Honourable Member’s clarification following the Commission’s reply to another written question (E-003715/2025) 1 on the same subject. Under the Union Customs Code 2 , customs authorities may retain goods to carry out controls and audits necessary to ensure compliance with EU law. The responsibility for ensuring the legality, proportionality, and correct application of audits and retention measures lies with the competent Finnish authorities. They must ensure compliance with Regulation (EU) 2022/345 3 , which restricts certain transactions between Russian and EU entities. The assessment of potential breaches to this regulation, as well as the implications for value added tax, remains a matter of national competence. The Commission may, in case of systemic misapplication of EU law, engage with national authorities or initiate infringement proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union. Based on the information available, the present case does not seem to involve prejudice to the EU budget. The case appears to concern an individual customs case and disputes between private parties, which fall within the responsibility of the competent Finnish authorities. Economic operators may seek remedies before national courts or use EU-level mechanisms such as the SOLVIT network 4 . 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013R0952-20221212. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/345/oj/eng. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/solvit/index_en.htm; https://ec.europa.eu/solvit/what-is-solvit/index_en.htm; list of national Solvit centres: https://ec.europa.eu/solvit/contact/index_en.htm.”
  Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2026-02-27 “E-000271/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges the European Parliament's resolution and reaffirms its commitment to adhere to the rules and procedures set out in the EU Treaties. The Commission is dedicated to fostering sincere cooperation among all EU institutions, respecting the role of the European Parliament in the ratification process.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• 2026-02-26 “E-000185/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission fully respects the principle of sincere cooperation among the EU institutions and, in particular, the role of the European Parliament in the conclusion process of trade agreements. Through its proposals for Council decisions on the signing and conclusion, adopted on 3 September 2025 1 , the Commission upheld its political commitment to propose to the Council that the provisional application of the EU–Mercosur Interim Trade Agreement (ITA) occurs only once the European Parliament has been given the opportunity to express its consent. On 9 January 2026, the Council adopted a decision on signing and provisional application of the ITA 2 . According to that decision, the ITA shall be provisionally applied when one or more signatory Mercosur states have finalised their respective internal procedures and have notified the EU of the completion of their respective internal procedures necessary for the provisional application of the ITA and confirm their agreement to apply the ITA on a provisional basis. The step of notification of provisional application by the EU to the relevant signatory Mercosur states would not take place before that point in time. To date, no exchange of notifications has occurred, as the internal procedures necessary for the provisional application and/or ratification procedures in the Mercosur countries have just started. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0339&qid=1771342152814. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12417-2025-REV-1/en/pdf.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• 2026-02-23 “P-000226/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission fully adheres to the rules and procedures set out in the EU Treaties. The Commission has engaged constructively with both the Council and the European Parliament throughout the negotiation process, intent on ensuring all voices are heard and respected in accordance with the Treaties. It is a prerogative of the Council Presidency to decide on the timing and form of documents for approval of the Council, and the Commission has made no recommendations in this respect. The EU-Mercosur Interim Trade Agreement (ITA) provides for a possibility of provisional application in its Article 23.3. Article 218(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union foresees a possibility for the Council to adopt, alongside the decision authorising the signing, a decision authorising the provisional application of international agreements before their entry into force. The corresponding Council decision on signature and provisional application of the ITA was adopted on 9 January 2026. The provisional application does not negate the essential role of Parliament in the ratification process, and the ITA can only be concluded and enter into force following the Parliament’s consent. The Commission remains committed to upholding the principles enshrined in the Treaties. It will continue to engage actively with Members of the European Parliament to assist the Parliament to perform its essential role during the ratification process.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2026-02-20 “E-000356/2026 P-000406/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiated with India is not expected to have a major impact on the competitive situation on the EU market for ceramic products, while opening up new export opportunities for EU companies. The current EU import duties on ceramic tiles of heading 6907 of the Harmonised System are low (5%) and will be lifted at entry into force of the FTA or phased out within 5 years, depending on the tariff line. Indian duties are significantly higher (16.5%) and will also be phased out, thus levelling the playing field in terms of import conditions. At the same time, the FTA fully preserves the possibility to apply trade defence measures. Imports of ceramic tiles from India are currently subject to antidumping duties (6.7% to 8.7%): those duties are not affected by the FTA and can be renewed if the conditions set in the relevant EU regulation are met. In addition, the FTA envisages the possibility of suspending tariff preferences temporarily in case of a sudden surge in imports that could cause injury to the EU industry. Such bilateral safeguards may be introduced during a period of 22 years from the date of entry into force of the FTA. The Commission stands ready to monitor the implementation of the FTA in close cooperation with EU industries and, in respect specifically to the ceramics sector, to appraise the existing trade defence measures against the background of the envisaged elimination of import duties. The Commission acknowledges the fact that energy-intensive industries face particular challenges independently of the EU’s trade policy. Those challenges require a multi-pronged strategy by public and private actors. The Commission’s Clean Industrial Deal 1 and other EU competitiveness initiatives are important elements in that regard. 1 The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation; Brussels, 26.2.2025; COM(2025) 85 final; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0085.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-02-19 “E-000039/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The scope of the Commission’s proposal 1 and the Council’s compromise 2 text include the same 26 product categories subject to the currently existing steel safeguard measure. The proposed measure provides explicitly that the Commission should assess the necessity to adjust the scope of products covered and, if deemed necessary, consider making a legislative proposal to expand the product scope. This commitment is reflected in Article 9 (1) and Recital 26. It its proposal, the Commission aims to have such a review within maximum two years from the date of entry into force of the Regulation 3 , a period that the Council has proposed to shorten to a maximum of 18 months 4 . The final decision on this aspect of the proposal will depend on the outcome of the ongoing ordinary legislative procedure. Regarding the free trade agreement partners, the Commission may impose bilateral safeguard measures, which shall comply with the requirements of the applicable agreement. It should be noted that steel producers have strongly welcomed the proposal. Furthermore, a feedback period was opened on 10 October 2025 and closed on 16 December 2025 providing stakeholders the opportunity to express their views on the proposal5. The Commission, the European Parliament and the Council will discuss the text in the trilogues that will start in the first quarter of 2026. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)726&lang=en. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16080-2025-INIT/en/pdf. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)726&lang=en. 4 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16080-2025-INIT/en/pdf. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14781-Trade-measure-addressing-thenegative-trade-related-effects-of-global-excess-capacity-on-the-EU-steel-sector_en.”
  Trade relations with Turkey
• 2026-02-17 “E-000007/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the importance of these cases for both the European dairy and pig meat sectors and has intervened in these investigations from the start in support of the industries and Member States concerned. The EU has been using all means at its disposal to defend EU farmers and processors confronted with the abusive use of trade defence instruments, notably by taking action at the World Trade Organization (WTO) against China’s initiation of the anti-subsidy investigation on dairy. While the impact of the measures will be significant, it is too early to quantify in terms of trade impact since the additional duties from China have been imposed recently. As regards the concluded investigation on pork, the Commission’s interventions together with those of industry and Member States have achieved a reduction of the definitive measures compared to the provisional measures imposed. Concerning the ongoing dairy investigation, the Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States and the dairy industry submitted comments throughout the proceeding and also in reaction to the final determination issued on 30 January. It is noted that the final duties proposed are lower than the provisional duties. Nevertheless, the Commission considers that the whole investigation and the duties are unwarranted and will now consider any further steps. The Commission will explore all options to protect the interests of the EU industry, also in view of the compliance by China with its obligations as member of the WTO. The Commission will continue to monitor the economic impact of the Chinese duties on the affected sectors in the EU. If needed, steps may be taken to respond to market disturbances through EU measures financed under the agricultural reserve.”
  Export of EU agri-food products · Trade relations with China
• 2026-02-13 “E-003861/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. On the basis of the EU-UK Common Understanding, the Commission and the United Kingdom have concluded their negotiations on the United Kingdom’s association to Erasmus+ on 17 December 2025. The United Kingdom is set to join the programme as of 1 January 2027, subject to both sides formalising the conclusion of the negotiations in accordance with their respective procedures and legal framework. 2. The Commission and the United Kingdom agreed in the Common Understanding 1 to work towards a Youth Experience Scheme. The Youth Experience Scheme ‘should facilitate the participation of young people from the European Union and the United Kingdom in various activities, [...], studies…’. Following the adoption of the Council Decision (EU) 2025/1286 2 , the negotiations started in September last year. The level of tuition fees is an important factor determining whether young EU citizens will move to the United Kingdom to study. Therefore, the Commission has been raising this issue with the United Kingdom. 3. Once the United Kingdom joins the Erasmus+ programme on 1 January 2027, students who will be studying in the United Kingdom during the academic year 2027/2028 with Erasmus+ support, awarded further to the 2027 call for proposals, will benefit from the same conditions applying to Erasmus+ students in an EU Member State or another third country associated to the programme. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_1267. 2 Council Decision (EU) 2025/1286 of 20 June 2025 authorising the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for an agreement on a youth experience scheme, OJ L, 2025/1286, 1.7.2025.”
  EU volunteering programs
• 2026-02-11 “E-004313/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Proposal for a Regulation addressing the negative trade-related effects of global overcapacity on the Union steel market 1 provides explicitly that the Commission should assess the necessity to adjust the scope of products covered by this regulation and, if deemed necessary, it should consider making a legislative proposal to add additional steel products, including products that are made of or contain a significant amount of steel. This commitment is reflected in the enacting terms of the regulation, namely Article 9(1). The final decision on this aspect of the proposal will depend on the outcome of the ongoing ordinary legislative procedure. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism’s (CBAM) 2 potential extension to downstream products 3 is guided by criteria including carbon leakage risk. In that context, the cost impact is duly considered. The impact assessment accompanying the proposal has provided additional analysis. The Commission proposed a temporary measure to address carbon leakage in the context of exports which entered into force on 1 January 2026. This measure is designed to support decarbonisation efforts of certain EU installations producing CBAM goods. Strengthening demand for low-carbon and high-quality industrial materials is essential for the competitiveness of the EU’s industrial ecosystem. Work is ongoing to prepare measures under the industrial decarbonisation accelerator act 4 that improve market conditions for such materials, including by promoting predictable, transparent and resilient value chains. These efforts aim to ensure that upstream and downstream segments of the steel value chain remain well aligned, while supporting the EU’s broader decarbonisation and competitiveness objectives. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)726&lang=en. 2 https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en. 3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A European Steel and Metals Action Plan, COM(2025)125 final; https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/european-steel-and-metalsaction-plan. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2026-02-11 “E-004311/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the importance of the Chinese market for EU exporters and of the severe impact the recently imposed duties have for EU producers. Since the start of each investigation, it has intervened as interested party to defend the interests of the EU producers subject to these investigations: at technical level as well as at political level where these unwarranted investigations and measures are regularly brought up with the Chinese counterpart. While the Commission’s interventions together with those of industry and individual Member States have achieved a reduction of the definitive measures on European pork and brandy compared to the provisional measures imposed, the Commission continues to explore all options to protect the interests of the EU industry, also in view of the compliance by China with its obligations as member of the World Trade Organization. The Commission will continue to monitor the economic impact of the Chinese duties on the affected sectors in the EU. If needed, steps may be taken to respond to market disturbances through EU measures financed under the agricultural reserve. The Commission is seeking to rebalance EU’s trade and investment relations with China on the basis of transparency, predictability and reciprocity. The Commission will continue to engage constructively – for example through the upgraded Export Control Dialogue and technical talks on market access – but where engagement does not deliver, the Commission will not hesitate to defend EU industry and make use of EU autonomous instruments.”
  Trade relations with China · Export of EU agri-food products
• 2026-02-04 “P-000095/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges concerns about the EU-Mercosur Agreement and has taken steps to address them, including tariff quotas for sensitive agricultural sectors and robust safeguards. The EU co-legislators are working on a regulation to allow a prompt start and end of investigations, allowing a reduction or suspension of trade preferences in case of harm to domestic producers. It includes a quasi-automatic threshold to trigger investigations set at a 5% increase in volumes or reduction in import prices, enabling a quick response to a serious injury or threat to EU’s industry. Provisional measures can be imposed in three weeks. All food products placed on the EU market must comply with EU sanitary and phytosanitary requirements. These are enforced through rigorous border controls and audits of third countries. If a shortcoming is identified, the third country must put in place the necessary corrective measures. If insufficient, and there is a serious risk to human or animal health, the third country may be delisted and export authorisation to the EU may be suspended. The existence of a trade agreement as such does not alter this. The Commission will also pursue a stronger alignment of production standards for imports, establishing a principle that the most hazardous pesticides banned in the EU for health or environmental reasons are not allowed in via imported products. Besides, the Commission started an impact assessment for the modernisation of farm animal welfare rules, including introducing equivalent animal welfare standards for imports. Finally, the Commission announced a task force to further strengthen controls on imports and a 50% increase of audits in third countries over the next two years.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU · Pesticides & trade · Trade relations with Mercosur
• 2026-02-02 “P-000060/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission took note of the interim order granted by the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) on 24 November 2025 1 with regard to the implementation of the EU-Kenya Economic Partnership Agreement 2 (EPA). The Commission also took note of the statement of the Government of Kenya, adopted on 26 November 2025, in which it announced that it will appeal the Court’s ruling and in which it considers the EPA as not suspended. The interim measures request and the related application in the main case were directed against Kenya and the East African Community and concern the application and interpretation of the Treaty for the Establishment of the Eastern African Community. The Commission has been in contact with the Kenyan authorities, who assured that Kenya’s compliance with the EU-Kenya EPA is not put in question by the interim order of the EACJ. The EU-Kenya EPA is still being implemented. The Commission is confident that Kenya will be able to resolve any issues relating to the interim order of the EACJ, in collaboration with its partners. The Commission does not consider that the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change is immediately relevant for the ongoing proceedings before the EACJ, in particular, and trade agreements concluded between the EU and third countries, in general. To date, the Commission has not obtained a legal opinion on this matter as it does not consider that it raises legal questions for the EU that require clarification at this stage. 1 https://www.eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/APPLICATION-NO.-7-OF-2024-CLEP-EAST-AFRICAV.-THE-AG-OF-KENYA-THE-SG-EAC.pdf. 2 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/east-africancommunity-eac/eu-kenya-agreement_en.”
  EU policy on social & environmental impact of foreign investments · Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-01-23 “E-004187/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Dutch government’s decision to impose certain restrictions in relation to the governance of Nexperia was taken to address concrete security risks stemming from serious and wellsubstantiated concerns over the mismanagement of this company. The Dutch authorities have clearly stated that the ministerial order is a national measure taken under the Goods Availability Act and is based on the Netherlands’ own findings and assessment. The Commission took note of this initial decision to intervene and has been following closely all further developments, including the response taken by the Chinese side. In parallel, the competent Dutch Court continues assessing alleged misconduct. The Commission has been acting primarily as a facilitator in the ongoing bilateral negotiations, seeking to re-establish these critical supply chains and finding a long-term solution. As a result of these efforts, China has eased the restrictive export measures, allowing Nexperia products to be shipped. The situation remains however critical. The Commission continues to closely monitor the situation and act in accordance with the situational need and applicable rules.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · EU-US trade relations
• 2026-01-23 “E-004677/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU attaches great importance to the protection of labour rights in engagement with trading partners, including Panama. The EU-Central America Association Agreement (EUCAAA) 1 includes a chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD), which incorporates commitments to respect international conventions on labour rights. The EU regularly raises the importance of properly implementing commitments to labour rights. These exchanges take place in the framework of the EU-Central America Trade Committee, the TSD Board and the EU-Panama bilateral consultations. The EU has also engaged proactively on labour rights through a regular bilateral dialogue and is carrying out activities to promote and protect labour rights in Panama. Panama has ratified 8 of the 10 fundamental International Labour Organization Conventions. The EU closely follows developments and regrets lack of progress in setting up of the High Labour Council, for which the legislative proposal was presented to the Congress on 31 January 2024. This issue was discussed bilaterally and in the TSD Board in May and June 2025. The EUCAAA contains an essential elements clause requiring respect for human rights, which encompass fundamental labour rights. If a Party violates these provisions, the other Party may adopt appropriate measures proportional to the violation. In cases of continuous, systematic, and grave human rights violations, the Commission may propose to the Council the suspension of the Agreement as a last-resort measure. At this stage, the Commission does not consider that such conditions exist with Panama. Before considering suspension, the EU shall prioritise measures that enable an intensified dialogue, cooperation, and monitoring of labour rights. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:22012A1215(01).”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-01-21 “P-004641/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The measures on imports of candles, tapers and similar products were adopted to address the injury caused to the EU industry by unfairly priced Chinese imports, safeguard EU producers’ viability, and ensure fair competition. All stakeholders could comment, though no unrelated importers or users cooperated with the anti-dumping investigation. The Commission found that importers have alternative supply sources within and outside the EU whereby their viability is not exclusively reliant on Chinese imports. Since candles represent a small cost share for retailers and consumers, any price rise from anti-dumping duties should have minimal impact on purchasing or business operations. Overall, the limited negative effects of the measures on importers were found to be outweighed by the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping for the EU industry and to restore fair competition. The Commission is taking steps to correct competitive imbalances between EU economic operators and major e-commerce platforms by directing national authorities to enforce EU product safety and digital rules strictly 1 . Through instruments such as the Market Surveillance Regulation 2 , the Digital Services Act 3 and the broader customs reform, the EU ensures that all businesses selling into the EU face equivalent obligations and effective controls. In this regard, the EU will apply a EUR 3 customs duty to low value e-commerce parcels from 1 July 2026. 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions A comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable ecommerce, COM/2025/37 final; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0037. 2 Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on market surveillance and compliance of products and amending Directive 2004/42/EC and Regulations (EC) No 765/2008 and (EU) No 305/2011, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1020/oj/eng. 3 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng.”
  Trade relations with China · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2026-01-20 “E-004603/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The political agreement reached by the President of the Commission and the President of the United States on 27 July 2025 1 and the ensuing Joint Statement 2 , do not affect the EU’s ability to regulate in the areas of animal welfare, the use of antibiotics or plant protection products. These matters remain within the scope of EU legislation. The Commission will continue to ensure that the relevant legislation is properly implemented and enforced. The Vision for Agriculture and Food 3 reaffirms that food and feed safety, as well as animal and plant health, are non-negotiable elements of the EU’s policy on imports. The Commission will also pursue a stronger alignment of production standards applied to imported products, notably on pesticides and animal welfare, and a strengthening of import controls, drawing on expertise from the Commission and all 27 Member States 4 . On 25 November 2025, the Commission launched a study as part of an impact assessment to strengthen alignment of the EU’s production standards on most hazardous pesticides with requirements applicable to imported products, which aims to ensure a level playing field. The food and feed safety omnibus package 5 that was presented on 16 December 2025 further confirms the goal of stronger alignment of production standards. The Joint Statement does not question or undermine EU sanitary and phytosanitary requirements or food safety standards. The EU and the United States have committed to work on both sides’ long standing concerns affecting trade in food and agricultural products, not to altering the substance of EU and United States standards. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/trade/eu-us-trade-deal_en. 2 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreementreciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en. 3 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/overview-vision-agriculture-food/vision-agriculture-and-food_en. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2979. 5 The relevant documents have been published on this website: https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontaltopics/simplification-legislation_en.”
  GMOs
• 2026-01-19 “E-004503/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Given the upcoming expiry of the steel safeguard on 30 June 2026, conducting a full impact assessment would have seriously risked leaving a gap of protection of the steel sector between the safeguard and the new steel measure. In line with the Better Regulation Guidelines 1 , a derogation was granted. Instead, the Commission conducted a public consultation and a call for evidence. In addition, it prepared a detailed analytical document in the form of a Staff Working Document 2 (SWD), including an economic assessment presenting the evidence behind the proposal and cost estimates. The analysis focuses on the steel sector, including downstream users. The SWD finds limited impacts: the most restrictive scenario shows steel prices rising by 3.25%, downstream output effects remain modest and the increase in household consumption prices is estimated at 0.42%. The EU will engage with the relevant trade partners as part of Article 28 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 3 process. The SWD’s modelling already captures integrated value chains under existing Free Trade Agreements and shows no significant disruption for sectors relying on steel inputs Article 4(1)(c) (in the main document) of the proposal 4 and, where necessary, also adopt safeguard measures complying with the requirements of the applicable agreement as per Article 4bis of the proposal. On compensatory concessions, the SWD assesses cross-sector effects of tariff adjustments. The economy-wide impacts are small, with export changes of 0.1 to 0.3 percent point relative to baseline, indicating limited market-access risks for EU industries. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/better-regulation/better-regulation-guidelines-andtoolbox_en. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2025)780&lang=en. 3 https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.htm#art28_bis. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)726&lang=en.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2026-01-19 “E-004266/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The steel industry is a strategic industry for the EU’s economy, for its strategic autonomy and for supporting its successful decarbonisation. Therefore, on 7 October 2025 the Commission adopted a proposal to address the negative trade-related effects of global overcapacity on the EU steel market. The proposal seeks to substantially limit the volume of free-of-duty quotas and to increase the out-of-quota duty to 50%, applicable against all origins except the European economic area countries which are uniquely integrated through bilateral agreement. The proposed measure, if adopted, is independent from the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) 1 , that is entering into its definitive phase on 1 January 2026. If an item’s commodity code is covered by both sets of rules, both the proposed tariff measure and the CBAM financial liability would apply due to the distinct legal basis pursuing different policy objectives. The CBAM aims at addressing the risk of carbon leakage and the steel measure addresses the negative trade-related effects of global overcapacity, therefore both need to apply to ensure effectiveness of the respective instruments. The overlap between the Combined Nomenclature codes covered by the proposed Steel Safeguard Measures and the CBAM is 299 codes. Furthermore, on 17 December 2025, the Commission presented a comprehensive review of CBAM, as well as proposed a legislative initiative to extend to scope of CBAM to downstream goods and include additional anti-circumvention measures. 1 https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports · Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• 2026-01-19 “E-004409/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully committed to protecting EU industries from unfair competition from imports. At present, the EU has over 220 trade defence measures in place, including on foodstuffs such as citrus fruits from China 1 and sweetcorn from Thailand 2 both currently subject to expiry reviews. There is also an ongoing anti-dumping investigation on sweetcorn from China 3 . The Commission conducts investigations where it receives evidence from any EU industry that it is suffering from dumped and/or subsidised imports and that action is warranted. Any industry can contact the Commission’s trade defence services 4 to discuss such issues. The Commission imposes anti-dumping and/or countervailing measures once an investigation has found that injurious dumping or subsidisation is taking place, and it is in the EU interest to do so. There can be both provisional and definitive measures imposed. Moreover, where several legal conditions are met, definitive anti-dumping duty may be levied on products which were entered for consumption before no more than 90 days prior to the date of application of provisional measures, provided those imports were registered. However, this is a decision that is made only at the end of an investigation. Measures can be subject to review and can be maintained for as long as is necessary to ensure the protection of an industry from unfairly traded imports. 1 https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-history?caseId=457. 2 https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-history?caseId=369. 3 https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-history?caseId=2762. 4 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/contacts/trade-defence-enquiries_en.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU · Export of EU agri-food products
• 2026-01-16 “P-004725/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Morocco has introduced new Xylella fastidiosa (Xf) requirements, as notified to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Committee on 7 October 2021. It introduces a ban of ornamental plants from countries affected by Xf and regionalisation rules for fruit plants from these countries. Besides raising the issue regularly as a specific trade concern at the WTO SPS Committee, a technical meeting was organised with the four affected Member States (Italy, France, Spain and Portugal) in November 2024. During the meeting, Morocco clarified the approach used for regionalisation. If an outbreak is detected in a country, an export ban is introduced for host plants not only from the administrative region with the outbreak but also from the adjacent ones. The EU has since then requested Morocco to notify the legal act defining this approach and invited Morocco to consider the type of regionalisation applied in the EU. While Morocco has not yet been open for this, the EU will continue to pursue this approach. The Vision for Agriculture and Food invites the EU to be more assertive in promoting and defending strategically the exports of EU products as well as a reciprocal treatment to EU exports. Based on this, the EU follows closely the agricultural markets and will continue to defend EU farmers and exporters when confronted with the misuse of non-tariff trade barriers. The EU may also use various measures according to the applicable legislation, in cases of market disturbances. Furthermore, it is important to highlight that Member States have a broad array of interventions available through the common agricultural policy strategic plans 1 and through national schemes with the use of state aids. 1 OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj.”
  Export of EU agri-food products · Trade relations with Morocco
• 2026-01-15 “E-004428/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The reviewed EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) 1 is fair and balanced. It creates a situation where no economic reasons can be invoked to maintain national measures. The reviewed DCFTA provides additional market access for Ukraine, while limiting imports of sensitive products. For these products, the Agreement will lead to a significant decrease of imports as compared to the situation under the autonomous trade measures in place until June 2025. Ukraine also improved market access for European pork, poultry and sugar, and reduced further or eliminated import duties for other key products like dairy. In addition, the EU additional concessions are subject to a strong safeguard that can be invoked in case of negative effect in one or several Member States and are conditioned to the gradual alignment by 2028 of Ukrainian legislation to relevant EU production standards. In the past, some Member States have already received specific funds under the EU agricultural reserve to address the local disturbances caused by the logistical bottlenecks that emerged in 2022 and 2023, as a direct consequence of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. The Commission’s proposal for the new multiannual financial framework 2 includes a new Unity Safety Net for crisis measures, with a total budget of EUR 6.3 billion — effectively doubling the current agricultural reserve. If needed, this reinforced support will allow to respond to market disturbances and help safeguard the EU farmers affected by agricultural market crises. 1 OJ L, 2025/2130, 20.10.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/2130/oj. 2 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 COM/2025/565 final.”
  Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• 2026-01-15 “E-004255/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission On 10 September 2025 the Council adopted a Decision authorising the Commission to open negotiations with Morocco 1 . The Council informed the European Parliament of its Decision in accordance with Article 218(10) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). After negotiations, the Commission adopted a Proposal for a Council Decision on the signature and provisional application of the Agreement on 18 September 2025. The Parliament and Council were both informed of this Proposal. Article 218(5) TFEU allows for provisional application before entry into force if necessary. On 23 September 2025, the Commission presented its proposal to the International Trade (INTA) Monitoring Group for the Maghreb. As explained at this and subsequent meetings with the INTA Committee, provisional application of the Agreement was necessary to provide legal certainty for traders and ensure compliance with the ruling of the Court. Provisional application was therefore legally, economically and politically necessary. On 2 October 2025, the Council adopted a Council Decision on the signature and provisional application of the Agreement 2 . The Agreement signed on 3 October 2025 fully meets the requirements defined in the judgment in Joined Cases C-779/21 P and C-799/21 P 3 . As explained in the 2023 Report on the impact and benefits for the population of Western Sahara of the extension of tariff preferences to products originating in Western Sahara 4 , the jobs generated under the application of the 2018 Agreement represent over 18% of the territory’s active population in Western Sahara. There is no statistical data available allowing further estimations. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32025D2053&qid=1759502035328. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202502022. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1510/oj/eng. 4 https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/report-impacts-and-benefits-eu-morocco-agreement-extending-tariffpreferences-products-originating_en.”
  Trade relations with Morocco
• 2026-01-13 “E-003720/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. Any amendment to the EU Treaties needs to follow the procedures laid down in those same Treaties. Modifications of the EU Treaties would have to follow the various steps in the ordinary or simplified revision procedure laid down in Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), both of which require ratification by all Member States, in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Under Article 48(6) TEU, the simplified procedure is limited to ‘all or part of the provisions of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union relating to internal policies and actions of the Union’. The simplified revision procedure may not increase the competences conferred by the Treaties on the Union. 2. The Commission is committed to the subsidiarity principle and has made a subsidiarity assessment part of its Better Regulation agenda. The Commission supports national Parliaments in executing their role within the ‘Early Warning Mechanism’. It discounts the recess periods in August and at the end of the year in the calculation of the eight-week period for national Parliaments to submit reasoned opinions. It has revamped its portal on the opinions of national Parliaments and Commission’s replies to them. Moreover, it has committed to enhance the visibility of national Parliaments’ views by providing an aggregated response where a significant number of national Parliaments have raised similar concerns even where the threshold for a ‘yellow card’ is not attained 1 . The Commission will continue to engage with national Parliaments, facilitating their involvement in shaping EU policies. 1 As set out in the Communication ‘The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality: Strengthening their role in the EU’s policy making’, COM(2018) 703.”
  EU competences on health · EU competences on taxation · EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2026-01-13 “E-004549/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission does not exempt media companies from registering in the Transparency Register 1 . The rules governing the eligibility to register in the Transparency Register are set out in the applicable Interinstitutional Agreement 2 . The Transparency Register covers interest representation activities including organising communication campaigns or preparing communication or information materials. Where a media company is acting in its own interest with the objective of influencing EU policy or legislation or the Commission’s decision-making process, it is expected to register in the Transparency Register. Registration is mandatory, however, for holding any related meetings with the Commission. Press interviews or individual activities exclusively related to academic or journalistic purposes, or to exercise a right (including to petition the European Parliament), are not interest representation activities covered by the Transparency Register. 2. The Commission requires that all EU co-financed news media projects are transparent and mention EU co-financing on project communication and promotion materials. The journalistic work should be done in line with journalistic standards and with complete editorial independence, as set out in grant agreements. All recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge the origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received. 1 https://transparency-register.europa.eu. 2 OJ L 207, 11.6.2021, pp.1-17, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2021/611/oj/eng.”
  Transparency requirements for interest groups · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2026-01-08 “E-004377/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. The implementation of the EU-US Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) 1 is closely and jointly monitored by the EU and the United States (US) through regular coordination and review. Both sides monitor the implementation of validation and audit processes to ensure that operators benefit from comparable treatment. The Commission will continue to focus on proper implementation, ensured through regular coordination, review and monitoring by the Joint Customs Cooperation Committee to address any arising issues. 2. The two programmes and their mutual recognition are based on the international framework of the World Customs Organisation and aim to enhance the security and safety of the supply chains. Authorised Economic Operators (AEOs) are favourably considered in the risk assessment for controls related to security and safety, to the extent possible. The Commission’s priority is to ensure a consistent application and monitoring of the MRA. As customs simplifications, which are not related to security and safety, fall outside its scope, expanding the MRA in this direction is not currently envisaged. 3. The EU AEO programme 2 offers benefits, including reduced controls, to all AEOs regardless of size or sector, including engineering companies; however, for MRA purposes, benefits are related only to safety and security controls. Outside the AEO context, the Commission is engaging actively with the US regarding the administrative burdens on EU companies caused by the inclusion process for steel and aluminium derivative products under the US measures on steel and aluminium under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 1 Decision of the US-EU Joint Customs Cooperation Committee of 4 May 2012 regarding mutual recognition of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism programme in the United States and the Authorised Economic Operators programme of the European Union (2012/290/EU), Official Journal of the European Union L 144, 5 June 2012: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:22012D0290. 2 https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/customs/authorised-economic-operator_en.”
  EU-US trade relations · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2026-01-06 “E-004375/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has been in regular contact with the representative association of e-bike assemblers as well as individual companies and has been assisting companies in all matters linked to the regulatory framework. The implementation of market surveillance, the EU Customs Code, including general rules of interpretation lies, however, within the Member States customs and market surveillance authorities’ competence. The Commission has also been in contact with Member States regarding some of the concerns brought to the Commission’s attention by the e-bikes assemblers for appropriate follow-up. Anti-circumvention measures have been imposed on bicycle parts to tackle circumvention practices by Chinese exporters. Nonetheless, bicycle assemblers in the EU not circumventing the measures were exempted. Today more than 150 companies (many of which small and medium enterprises (SMEs)) benefit from the exemption. In parallel, the end use procedure allows e-bikes assemblers in the EU to import components duty-free. This system strikes a balance between the warranted protection of the EU industry from unfair competition and the supply of components needed for the bicycle assembly and has proven effective over the years. The measures on bicycles (both conventional and electric) have proven efficient and allowed the EU industry to prosper. Today, the industry is composed of several hundred SMEs and is accountable for thousands of jobs in the EU. It is an innovative industry constantly developing and investing in new technologies and in the parts production in the EU. This development was largely possible because trade defence measures shielded the industry from unfairly low priced Chinese imports.”
  Trade relations with China · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2026-01-06 “E-003920/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission As regards the matter raised by the honorable Member of Parliament, the Commission can confirm that the new Agreement fully meets the conditions set out by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 4 October 2024 (Joined Cases C-779/21 P Commission v Front Polisario and C-799/21 P Council v Front Polisario), in particular, in paragraphs 153 et seq. The Commission has transmitted the Commission proposals on the signature and conclusion of the new Agreement to the European Parliament. The European Parliament should also be seized by the Council with a view to obtaining its consent for the conclusion of the new Agreement. On 6 October and 4 November 2025, the Commission appeared before the European Parliament’s International Trade Committee. The Commission stands ready to appear again and when invited by the European Parliament.”
  Trade relations with Morocco
• 2026-01-06 “E-004513/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s countervailing duties are achieving the intended goal: to offset the impact of Chinese subsidies without closing the EU market. The European battery-electric vehicles market is demonstrating gradual, albeit slow, growth and sales of EU-made battery-electric vehicles have increased substantially since the imposition of definitive countervailing duties in October 2024. In 2020, the market was still in the early stages of its transition from combustion engines to electric vehicles and Chinese presence was only starting to become significant, representing less than 4% of the market. By the time the definitive measures were imposed in October 2024, the size of the market had tripled and the volume of Chinese imports had been multiplied by almost 20, with battery-electric vehicles from China representing almost 23% of the EU market. However, a comparison of volumes between the last 12 months (October 2024 to September 2025) since the imposition of provisional measures in July 2024 and the 12 months immediately before (July 2023 to June 2024), shows a decrease of roughly 15% in imports of battery electric vehicles from China. Despite this decline, Chinese products still account for a significant market share, at prices that remove the injurious effects of subsidisation. The imported battery electric vehicles from China are subject to countervailing duties, which reflects the level of subsidisation established during the investigation. Therefore, the prices of those vehicles, once imported into the EU, take already account of the duties to countervail the unfair subsidisation found. As an indicator of the effect of the measures in the EU, EU production has reversed trends since the imposition of the measures and is now growing.”
  EU-China relations · Trade relations with China
• 2026-01-06 “E-004055/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The provisional measures on imports of candles, tapers and the like were based on preliminary findings indicating the pressing need to address injury caused to the EU industry by Chinese imports, to safeguard its viability and to support fair competition within the internal market. The investigation is currently ongoing, with the Commission services continuing to gather and verify relevant data. All interested parties have been invited to submit comments and request hearings. As part of its assessment of the EU interest, the Commission examines closely the situation of all interested parties, including importers, and is considering all relevant information to ensure a balanced and proportionate final determination. Regarding the possibility for importers to react to the introduction of measures, the Commission points out that a pre-disclosure of proposed provisional duties was issued four weeks before imposition, giving parties time to assess potential impacts. Furthermore, at the provisional stage, the legal possibility exists in a number of Member States for duties to only be secured by a guarantee which will only be collected if confirmed at the definitive stage.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports · Trade relations with China
• 2025-12-22 “E-004427/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission EU agri-food exports peaked at EUR 235 billion in 2024, up 3% from 2023. Similarly, imports reached EUR 172 billion, an 8% increase compared to 2023 1 . Between January and July 2025, EU agri-food exports further rose 2% to EUR 139 billion, while imports increased by 15% to EUR 113 billion 2 . Growth in imports was mainly driven by higher prices for cocoa and coffee, as well as fruits and nuts to a lesser extent, leading to a moderate decline in the EU's agri-food trade balance. These commodities, along with oilseeds and protein crops, are the most imported agri-food products in the EU. Protein crops are essential for the sustainability of the EU's livestock sector and hence EU food security. In turn, tropical food imports are necessary to meet the demand of EU agri-food manufacturers and consumers for products not produced in the EU or which are in short supply. In the current complex trade environment, the Commission remains committed to an ambitious trade agenda with a diversified range of partners. 2024 trade data confirms that EU agri-food trade with preferential partners grew at a faster pace (+6.4%) than with nonpreferential partners (+2.8%) 3 , highlighting the importance of EU trade agreements for the competitiveness of the EU agri-food sector by lifting tariff and non-tariff barriers. Under the Multiannual Financial Framework 4 post 2027, agriculture will also continue to benefit from Horizon Europe, as well as from the new Competitiveness Fund which will support innovations driving competitiveness. 1 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/document/download/8e6be7cf-e1d2-48fd-911490c448e09643_en?filename=monitoring-agri-food-trade_dec2024_en.pdf. 2 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/documents_en?f%5B0%5D=document_title%3AMonitoring%20EU%20agrifood%20trade%3A%20development. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2569. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/eu-budget-2028-2034_en.”
  Export of EU agri-food products
• 2025-12-19 “E-004242/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission remains fully committed to ensuring a level playing field for the EU ferroalloy sector within the framework of EU trade defence instruments. Accordingly, the Commission imposed a definitive safeguard measure following an investigation that established that increased imports of certain alloys were causing serious injury to EU producers. The measure entered into force on 18 November 2025 and will remain applicable for a period of three years. Safeguard measures apply erga omnes, and no country contributing to the injury can be excluded. Furthermore, the Agreement on the European Economic Area 1 does not preclude the imposition of safeguard measures among contracting parties, if serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties of a sectorial or regional nature liable to persist are arising. Given the significant and increasing import volumes from Iceland and Norway, accounting for 47.4% of total EU imports, and their prices being below EU production costs, the Commission considers that imports from Iceland and Norway cause serious economic difficulties of a sectorial nature. Thus, they cannot be considered non-injurious and therefore cannot be exempted. The Commission is monitoring trade flows to ensure that existing sanctions on aluminium, steel, and iron imports from Russia remain fully effective and are not undermined through circumvention. In this context, any decision to extend sanctions to additional products, including ferroalloys is for the Council to take. Any proposal will be based on a thorough evaluation of evidence, consultation with Member States, and alignment with the EU’s broader strategic and economic interests. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1994/1/oj.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-12-17 “E-004466/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU is actively engaged with the international community and the regional stakeholders, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with the aim of reaching a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Sudan. In particular, the situation in Sudan has been discussed by the European External Action Service during the political dialogues and bilateral consultations with the UAE at various levels. The EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa has been engaging extensively with the UAE and the EU representatives have also raised concerns about reported UAE support to the Rapid Support Forces, while emphasising the importance of the UAE’s constructive engagement for reaching a sustainable cease-fire in Sudan. The EU continues this active engagement, in accordance with the Council Conclusions on Sudan from 20 October 2025 1 and the discussion of the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 November 2025 2 . Accordingly, the EU works in close coordination with the international community, using diplomatic tools and instruments to support the work of the International Criminal Court and of the United Nations in Sudan, while maintaining political dialogue with the UAE, including the Free Trade Agreement negotiations. The EU exercises its trade policy, including with respect to negotiation and implementation of trade agreements, in consistency with other EU external policies. In addition, an enhanced political dialogue will be a key tenet of the future Strategic Partnership Agreement 3 , reflecting the shared commitment of the EU and the UAE to promoting regional stability and prosperity. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/20/sudan-council-approves-conclusions-onthe-ongoing-conflict/. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/11/20/sudan-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-20-november-2025/. 3 Strategic Partnership Agreements; https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1874.”
  EU relations with United Arab Emirates · Free trade agreements (FTAs) · EU policy on Sahel and Sudan
• 2025-12-17 “E-004374/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is closely monitoring developments concerning the possible extension of United States Section 232 measures to canned food products. The Commission maintains regular communication with the United States authorities at both technical and political levels to ensure that the EU’s interests are fully taken into account. In this context, the Commission is requesting that the United States exempt EU exports from any further extension of Section 232 measures on steel and aluminium derivatives. This would preserve the spirit of the political deal agreed by the President of the Commission and the President of the United States, as reflected in the Joint Statement 1 . This would ensure that EU exports of canned goods and fruit compotes are only subject to the single, all-inclusive 15% tariff rate, and do not face any other duties or further administrative requirements. The Commission will continue to advocate for EU consumers, producers and exporters. The Commission is fully committed to protecting EU industries from unfair competition from imports. The EU has over 220 trade defence measures in place, including – since 2008 – antidumping measures on imports of prepared or preserved citrus fruits from China 2 , under expiry review since 21 October 2025. The Commission conducts investigations where it receives evidence from any affected EU industry of injury suffered from dumped and/or subsidised imports and that action is warranted. The peach compote industry is invited to contact the Commission’s trade defence services 3 to discuss the issues of concern. 1 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreementreciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en. 2 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2020/1534/2021-09-07. 3 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/contacts/trade-defence-enquiries_en.”
  Trade relations with China · EU-US trade relations
• 2025-12-17 “E-004178/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU-Mercosur agreement represents a strategic opportunity to enhance trade and cooperation with Latin America. It supports the EU’s geopolitical objectives, including diversification, and promotes sustainable agricultural practices globally. The agreement includes commitments to environmental standards, sustainable practices and ceasing deforestation by 2030. All imports must comply with EU sanitary and phytosanitary standards and regulations. The Vision for Agriculture 1 includes several accompanying initiatives, including pursuing a stronger alignment of production standards for imported products and more stringent controls on imports. The agreement has the potential of benefiting Member States, including for agri-food exports. Finally, through carefully calibrated tariff quotas and phased market openings, it protects European farmers, providing benefits for all Member States. The Commission’s Economic analysis of the negotiated outcome 2 projects an increase in the EU gross domestic product of EUR 77.6 billion by 2040, indicating widespread economic benefits, with Mercosur gradually eliminating tariffs on 91% of EU imports. The Commission will monitor implementation to ensure that the agreement does not generate disturbances on the EU market and has mechanisms to address adverse impacts, including bilateral safeguards in case of need. The Commission is also introducing the new Unity Safety Net for crisis measures, with a total budget of EUR 6.3 billion — effectively doubling the current agricultural reserve. This reinforced support will help safeguard EU farmers in times of market disturbances amid growing geopolitical uncertainties. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0075. 2 Economic analysis of the negotiated outcome of the EU-Mercosur partnership agreement (EMPA), Publications Office of the EU; https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/6f1a741f-677e-11f0-bf4e01aa75ed71a1.”
  Pesticides & trade · Import of agri-food products in the EU · Trade relations with Mercosur