Dan Jørgensen

Policy topics Dan Jørgensen is active on

What Dan Jørgensen has said (80)

• 2026-06-26 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 26.6.2026 Written question The Commission is continuing work on the Grid Connection Network Codes and is currently focused on Regulation (EU) 2016/631 [1] , which sets out the rules on requirements for generators. Work on the other Grid Codes will follow. While these legal instruments are being finalised the Commission has, in the meantime, published a Guidance on grid connections as part of the Grids package [2] to support Member States, National Regulatory Authorities and System Operators in addressing grid connection queues within the existing legal framework. These measures can already be implemented in a safe manner, without creating system instability nor distortions of the internal market. The Commission aims to launch the comitology process in mid-2026 for the Grid Connection Network Codes, starting with Regulation (EU) 2016/631 and the subsequent adoption will provide regulatory certainty for all Member States. Since the drafting work continues on the Grid Connection Codes, the process is already underway and the Commission does not expect that interim or phased updates will be required. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/631/oj/eng. [2] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/infrastructure/european-grids_en.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration
• 2026-06-26 “(17:09:13 - 17:11:41): So obviously, the agreements in The Middle East that will hopefully lead to lasting peace and therefore also opening up the Strait will make it more feasible that we will not get security of supply issues on jet fuel, which is our main concern. If we look at the prices, on jet fuel and on crude oil, they have indeed gone down as a result of this agreement that's been made and that is now being negotiated further. We still have to acknowledge though that fact of the matter is that even if, which we hope, there is a peace and the strait will be opened, it will still take some months to get back to normal for oil and some years to get back to normal on gas because of the destruction of infrastructure in the region affected. So this also of course means that we need to be prepared for that. Now, on the short term, there will most likely be a more serious situation with regards to the commercial stocks when we reach the end of the summer. And we will of course monitor this. And if member states then want to release national reserves as they have indeed done so in the past, we will, as we always do, help facilitate and coordinate those efforts, taking into account, of course, all arguments, for and against also with regards to timing. On gas, we are also coordinating right now how member states can best fill the reserves. We need a high level to make sure that we are ready for next winter. On the other hand, we want to do it in a way so that it doesn't lead to increases in prices on the short term. Thank you. Yes. Fabio, let's take your 1st question. Last. Okay.”
  EU policy on gas storage targets
• 2026-06-26 “(17:12:24 - 17:13:34): So I am working on recommendations for member states on the methane. Also following today's discussion, it's very clear that some member states have expressed concern on the feasibility of implementation in the very short term and we want to help facilitate that they can actually do what they need to do. We stand very firm in not wanting to reopen the legislation. We think the legislation is extremely important for our clean transition in Europe. And we work on the basis of creating a level playing field where everybody has to fulfill the rules obviously. But as I said, we are taking concerns on implementation into our analysis and I will be putting forward recommendations quite soon. Thank you.”
  Climate policy
• 2026-06-26 “Thank you very much and let me start by congratulating the Presidency on your hard work and the very impressive results that you have managed to achieve. You have really been doing an excellent job in getting these very, very important files to a place where we can make such important decisions today. So, congratulations on that! The EU has three very, very clear objectives with our energy policy. One, we need to get the prices down. Our energy is two to three times more expensive than competitors in China and the US. Two, our security. We cannot be dependent on importing energy for more than €370 billion every year. It leaves us vulnerable and obviously it's not economically sustainable either. And three, I don't have to remind people on a very, very hot day like this where temperature records are being broken all over Europe that climate change is indeed real and we need to do far more to fight it. Now for all of these three challenges, the main answer is: get rid of our fossil dependency by replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy. Therefore, the decision that the Ministers made today was extremely important. Because the biggest barrier, as I see it, for this to happen, is the lack of grid capacity. We need far more grid capacity than we have today. We need to be far better connected than we are today. And we need to utilise the grids that we have far better than we do today. The package that was approved by Ministers today and the compromise made by Ministers today will take us far in that direction. The EU Commission will get the opportunity and the possibility of drawing up EU-wide scenarios. Today we have a situation where you can compare it to trying to build a jigsaw puzzle, without looking at the picture on the box. We need a collected plan for Europe. And this is what we will get in the future. So, better planning. Two: faster permitting I think probably there is not one issue that has been brought to my attention as many times as the problem of too long permitting times in the Member States. This, we will fundamentally change now. So today, it can easily take five years, sometimes even a decade, to get a permit for a new renewable energy project or grid expansion. In the future, we aim for this to be no longer than six months in general, and up to two years for very complicated situations. This will make a real and tangible difference. Thirdly we needed better rules and we need better rules for burden sharing among countries for interconnection projects. This package approved today will also bring us much closer to that. So all in all this is a very important day. Very important decisions have been made. Now, obviously negotiations between the Council and the Parliament need to take place. We, from the Commission's side, will help and facilitate as much as we can, because we really urge co-legislators to make an agreement as soon as possible. The second thing I will mention is the first-ever EU tripartite agreement on energy storage. We have brought together governments (22 Member States have signed), storage developers and manufacturers, renewable energy developers and energy consuming industries, that have signed a paper that will spark the spread of storage technology and increase the capacity in the short and medium term which is desperately needed. This is a new way of working, where instead of having very long and tiresome – sometimes necessary, but nonetheless, very long processes. We take the momentum and bring the actors together when fast decisions are needed. It's voluntary obviously, but nonetheless it sets a very clear direction and it brings together the actors that can make a real difference. So thank you so much, also to the Cypriot Presidency for also helping in that process. Thank you.”
  EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects
• 2026-06-26 “(17:01:54 - 17:07:19): Thank you. Thank you very much. And let me also start by congratulating the presidency on your hard work and the very impressive results that you have managed to achieve. You have really been doing an excellent job in getting these very, very important files to a place where we can make such important decisions today. So congratulations, on that. The EU has 3 very, very clear objectives with our energy policy. 1, we need to get the prices down. Our energy is 2 to 3 times more expensive than with competitors in China or The US. 2, our security. We cannot be dependent on importing energy for more than €370,000,000,000 every year. It leaves us vulnerable and obviously it's not economically sustainable either. And 3, I don't have to remind people on a very, very hot day like this where temperature, records have been broken all over Europe that climate change is indeed real and we need to do far more to fight it. Now for all of these 3 challenges, the main answer is get rid of our fossil dependency by replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy. Therefore, the decisions that the ministers made today was extremely important because the biggest barrier as I see it for this to happen is the lack of grid capacity. We need far more grid capacity than we have today. We need to be far better connected than we are today. And we need to utilize the grids that we have far better than we do today. The package that was approved by ministers today and the compromise made by ministers today will take us far in that direction. The EU Commission will get the opportunity and possibility of drawing up EU wide scenarios. Today, we have a situation where you can compare it to trying to build a jigsaw puzzle without looking at the picture on the box. We need a collected plan for Europe and this is what we will get in the future. So better planning. 2, faster permitting. I think probably there's not 1 issue that has been brought to my attention as many times as the problem of too long permitting times in the member states. This we will fundamentally change now. So today, it can easily take 5 years, sometimes even a decade to get a permit for a new renewable energy project or grid expansion. In the future, we aim for this to be no longer than 6 months in general and up to 2 years for very complicated situations. This will make a real and tangible difference. Thirdly, we needed better rules and we need better rules for burden sharing among countries for interconnection projects. This package approved today will also bring us much closer to that. So all in all, this is a very, very important day. Very important decisions have been made. Now, obviously, negotiations between the council and parliament need to take place. We, from the commission side, will help and facilitate as much as we can because we really urge co legislators to make an agreement as soon as possible. The 2nd thing I will mention is the 1st ever EU Tripartite Agreement on energy storage. We have brought together governments. 22 member states have signed. Storage developers and manufacturers. Renewable energy developers and energy consuming industries that have signed a paper that will spark the spread of storage technology and increase the capacity, in the short and medium term which is desperately needed. This is a new way of working where instead of having very long and tiresome sometimes necessary but nonetheless very long processes, we take the momentum and bring the actors together when fast decisions are needed. It's voluntary obviously, but nonetheless it sets a very clear direction and it brings together the actors that can make a real difference. So thank you so much also to the presidency, super presidency for also helping in that process. Thank you. Thank you, commissioner. With this, we are now ready to take the questions. Nico, let's start with you.”
  EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects
• 2026-06-26 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 26.6.2026 Written question Amid continued tensions in the Middle East and pressure on global energy markets, the Commission rapidly stepped up its coordinated response , building on the experience of the 2022 crisis and reinforced cooperation with Member States. Europe’s current energy supply remains stable, despite volatility of the global energy markets. It is also clear that Europe is more resilient when it acts together, and the Commission is now better equipped, with upgraded monitoring tools, a revised state aid framework [1] and closer coordination through dedicated energy coordination groups . Gas storage filling is progressing and the Commission invited Member States to make full use of available flexibilities in reaching sufficient levels ahead of the next winter season. On 22 April 2026, the Commission presented a comprehensive set of actions and measures as part of the communication AccelerateEU [2] . This communication brings forward short- and long-term measures that shield citizens and industry from price shocks while accelerating the shift to home-grown clean energy through electrification, energy efficiency and scale-up of renewables. AccelerateEU does not include the reactivation of an emergency intervention to address high energy prices as adopted by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 [3] . The Commission stands ready to propose the prompt reactivation of these measures if the situation requires it. [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_894. [2] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/accelerateeu-energy-union-affordable-and-secure-energy-through-accelerated-action_en. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1854/oj/eng.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-06-25 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 25.6.2026 Written question The EU internal electricity market delivers annually EUR 34 billion of benefits. The completion of the internal energy market could additionally deliver up to EUR 40 billion by 2030 and will be instrumental to further strengthen energy security and achieve the decarbonisation goals while at the same time decreasing price volatility and ensuring affordability. The Commission is currently in full swing implementing the Clean Industrial Deal [1] (CID), with many initiatives already published, such as the Affordable Energy Action Plan [2] , the Clean Industrial Deal state aid framework [3] , the strengthening of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, the adoption of the Commission proposal for an Industrial Accelerator Act [4] . In light of the Middle East conflict, the Commission also published the AccelerateEU plan [5] to strengthen EU energy resilience and adopted the Middle East Temporary State Aid Framework [6] . These initiatives combine a series of measures aimed at delivering a reduction in energy bills through the deployment of home-grown clean electricity and the transition of industries towards more efficient energy vectors. In parallel, to shield industrial consumers from high prices in the short term, targeted measures, including a legislative proposal on network charges and taxation will be proposed to mitigate the impact of high electricity prices compared to those of competitors. To further implement the CID, more initiatives will be launched in 2026, such as the Circular Economy Act, legislative proposal to revise the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) creating an Industrial Decarbonisation Bank to support decarbonisation investments in energy-intensive industries. [1] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en. [2] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/action-plan-affordable-energy-unlocking-true-value-our-energy-union-secure-affordable-efficient-and_en. [3] https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/contribution-clean-just-and-competitive-transition/clean-industrial-deal-state-aid-framework-cisaf_en. [4] https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/industrial-accelerator-act_en. [5] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/7fac9eea-5717-4182-a368-bd68c427ff4c_en?filename=Communication.pdf. [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/2593/oj.”
  Energy (green transition) · Overall simplification of regulation in the EU · Carbon leakage support
• 2026-06-12 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 12.6.2026 Written question The Commission monitors the main deadlines [1] applicable for energy-transition as well as the implementation of the National Energy and Climate Plans (NECP) through the bi-annually reports [2] . Each Member State is assessed for meeting its objectives [3] and targets as set out in its NECP [4] . Where the progress towards meeting the targets is insufficient, the Commission issues recommendations to the Member State concerned [5] . The Commission also monitors the progress of the Member States towards energy transition in the framework of the European Semester annual exercise, which coordinates the EU's economic and social policies including energy policy. The Commission is aware that permitting delays for renewable energy projects are reported in most Member States, including Italy. For this reason, it has put in place a series of actions to ensure that the permitting deadlines and obligations set in the revised Renewable Energy Directive [6] are respected, including launching infringement procedures against Italy [7] and other Member States for lack of transposition of permitting provisions of the revised Renewable Energy Directive. Other actions aim to improve capacity building of permitting authorities, e.g. via the Technical Support Instrument which provided support to Italy to streamline permitting procedures, strengthen administrative capacities, digitalise permits, and enhance public engagement [8] . The Commission also works to avoid slowdowns in the energy transition, coordinates the efforts across Member States to create a robust framework that catalyses public and private investment, supports corrective measures that remove bottlenecks for faster permitting, grid and storage expansion, and de-risking of clean-energy finance. [1] A not exhaustive list of deadlines related to this framework: — 30 June 2024 for final National Energy and Climate Plans, — 1 July 2024 for some renewables permitting rules, — 21 May 2025 for broader Renewable Energy Directive transposition (EU 2023/2413), — 11 October 2025 for the key provisions of the Energy Efficiency Directive (EU/ 2023/1791), — Commission takes action to ensure complete and timely transposition of EU directives (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_25_1842), — 29 May 2026 for the revised Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EU/2024/1275, EPBD), — 1 March 2026 for national diversification plans under REPowerEU. [2] The next assessment of progress will be published in 2027. [3] The assessment of the updated Italian NECP is available on the Commission's website: https://commission.europa.eu/publications/commission-assessment-final-updated-national-energy-and-climate-plan-italy_en. [4] Art. 29(1)b of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (Governance Regulation). [5] Article 34 of the Governance Regulation. [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/2413/oj/eng. [7] (INFR(2024)0232: https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/search-infringement-decisions/?lang_code=EN&typeOfSearch=byDecision&active_only=0&noncom=0&r_dossier=&decision_date_from=&decision_date_to=&DG=ENER&title=2023%2F2413&submit=Search&langCode=EN&version=v1&dg=ENER&page=1&size=10&order=desc&sortColumns=decisionDate&memberState=IT. [8] https://reforms-investments.ec.europa.eu/technical-support-instrument-0/green-transition/faster-permitting-renewable-energy-projects-italy_en.”
  EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects · Energy (green transition)
• 2026-06-12 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 12.6.2026 Written question The regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (REMIT) [1] requires national enforcement of market abusive behaviour as regards wholesale energy products in electricity, natural gas and hydrogen. It does not cover mineral oil markets. In light of ongoing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, the Commission will continue monitoring the evolution of the crisis and assessing its potential impacts. To address the impacts of the disruption of oil and gas transit, the Commission has put forward on 22 April 2026 its new initiative AccelerateEU [2] , proposing timely, targeted and temporary measures to bring relief to consumers, while avoiding fragmented national responses. It recalls that Member States can also take measures on the taxation of windfall profits to ensure social fairness while the Commission stands ready to assist and provide best practices on national measures as well as assess their impact on the single market. The opening of an investigation under the EU competition rules requires indications of anti-competitive agreement between market participants (Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) or abusive conduct by a dominant market player (Article 102 of the TFEU) that affects trade between Member States. While unusual price developments may warrant further scrutiny, a divergence between input costs and retail prices is not as such and taken in isolation indicative of a potential breach of EU competition rules. [1] Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/1227/oj). [2] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/accelerateeu-energy-union-affordable-and-secure-energy-through-accelerated-action_en.”
  Fossil fuels
• 2026-06-12 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 12.6.2026 Written question The importation of oil products into the EU must comply with any restrictive measures in force. The EU has in place restrictive measures concerning the situation in Venezuela (Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 of 13 November 2017 [1] ) on 217 product categories. However, those measures do not include restrictions on the importation of Venezuelan oil to the EU, either directly or indirectly. Exports of petroleum products from the US to the EU in the period from January to April 2026 were 1,8, 1,0, 0,9 and 1,5 million tons per month, respectively. The Commission has data on the breakdown of the oil products imported but does not have data on the origin of the crude oil from which those petroleum products are produced in US refineries. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2063/2025-01-11/eng.”
  Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights) · EU-US trade relations
• 2026-06-12 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 12.6.2026 Written question The relationship between prices paid for electricity and for natural gas is a key factor influencing electrification investment decisions by industry. These prices are the results of four components: energy costs, infrastructure charges, taxes and levies, as well as carbon costs. Member States can influence all of these variables, for instance by accelerating renewable energy investments or by modifying the tax regime in favour of electricity. The Commission has committed to adopt a legal proposal on network charges and taxation, ensuring inter alia , electricity is taxed less than gas. Member States can also make use of state aid to reduce the electricity costs of certain industries. The Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework [1] includes the possibility of adopting temporary electricity price reliefs for energy-intensive users, with certain conditions. To support the decarbonisation of industrial heat, the Commission launched in 2025 an EUR 1 billion auction under the Innovation Fund, which serves as pilot for the upcoming Industrial Decarbonisation Bank. The auction attracted 85 bids, amounting to EUR 1.4 billion of funding requested. In the upcoming Electrification Action Plan, the Commission will put forward a set of actions to accelerate the electrification of the EU energy system. The action plan will, inter alia , set an electrification target and measures to accelerate the uptake of electrification solutions. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3602/oj/eng.”
  Energy (green transition) · EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-06-04 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 4.6.2026 Written question To deliver affordable, secure energy and achieve climate goals [1] , the EU needs to — amongst several initiatives — significantly scale up renewable electricity generation [2] . In 2024, Member States updated their offshore renewable goals [3] . The North Sea Summit declarations align with this approach. Offshore wind is a stable source of electricity, with the capacity factor of new installations reaching 50%. This contributes to reduce greenhouse gas emissions [4] and pollution [5] . In line with the precautionary principle and EU environmental laws [6] projects likely to have significant effects on the environment, including projects for offshore renewable energy, are subject to an environmental impact assessment. Effective participation for the public in the decision-making process is a fundamental requirement. Europe has a solid position in the wind power value chain [7] and aims at maintaining this strategic autonomy [8] . The financial support at EU level is subject to project application, and independent scrutiny based on objective criteria in EU law [9] . Indeed, all net-zero and low carbon technologies need to contribute to reach the climate goals. Offshore renewables, just like nuclear, are an indispensable part of the net-zero energy mix. Member States have the right to decide which sources to include in their energy mix. For several Member States, nuclear energy is not only a decarbonisation tool, but also an asset to strengthen their energy autonomy and reduce external dependencies. The Commission recently adopted the eighth Nuclear Illustrative Programme [10] outlining the investment needs in nuclear by 2050. The Commission also adopted a Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) Strategy to accelerate the development and deployment of SMRs in Europe by early 2030s. [1] Regulation (EU) 2021/1119/EU. [2] Eurostat. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Electricity_and_heat_statistics. [3] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable-energy/offshore-renewable-energy_en. [4] https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/climate-strategies-targets/progress-climate-action_en. [5] Port electricity commercial model (project pilot) https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/60f97fad-70b5-11ef-a8ba-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. [6] Such as Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32011L0092, Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds. See also Regulation 2022/869/EU on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R0869 (see Article 9 and Annex VI). [7] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/draghi-report_en#paragraph_47059 . European original equipment manufacturers dominate the domestic market, with a 96% (100% in 2023) share for offshore installations. ‘ Wind Energy in the European Union — 2025 Status Report on Technology Development, Trends, Value Chains and Markets ’ JRC, 2025. [8] See i.a. https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-modes/maritime/eu-ports-and-industrial-maritime-strategies_en. [9] See i.a. Regulations on Horizon Europe, Connecting Europe Facility and Innovation Fund. https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe_en, https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/connecting-europe-facility_en, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02019R0856-20231121. [10] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1488.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Nuclear energy · Off-shore renewables
• 2026-06-04 “Distinguished guests, dear friends, It is my great pleasure to join you here this afternoon. Let me begin by congratulating everyone at Eurelectric, but also of course our hosts here in Finland. Let me congratulate the Finns in the audience for their victory in the Ice Hockey World Championship! I usually consider Finns to be very calm and collected but I heard there were people partying in the streets and dancing in the fountains – and that's amazing! Really though, I think we can learn a few things from the Finnish team. To become world champions, they needed drive, determination, and teamwork. But above all, they needed belief and ambition. And that brings me to the question that I would like to ask you today. How ambitious can we be in Europe? What should we aim for? What heights can we reach? For my part, I believe that we need to be as bold, brave, and ambitious as possible. I believe that our goal must be to transform Europe into the world's first electro-continent. But I am under no illusion about the work that this will take. At the moment, electricity accounts for just 23% of Europe's energy consumption. And this figure has remained stagnant for years. While we have stayed put, other fossil fuel importers across the globe have been moving forward. For example, China and Japan are approaching 30% electrification and beyond. But now, we have an opportunity to get back in the race. Because in the midst of our current fossil fuel crisis, we are seeing the first sparks of an electrification revolution in Europe. According to the industry, more than 500,000 electric cars were registered across the EU in the first quarter of 2026 – that is enough to reduce oil consumption by two million barrels per year. Meanwhile, in the same period, the combined sales of residential heat pumps in France, Germany and Poland surpassed 400,000 – representing a 25% increase compared to the first quarter of 2025. The people of Europe are ready and they are reading the signs: they are choosing electricity. We need to follow their lead and seize this momentum. This is what we will aim to do in our Electrification Action Plan. It will feature an ambitious electrification target for our Union, and it will focus on supporting those sectors that are stalling the most. For industry, we will help to expand the use of e-boilers, electric drying technologies, and small-scale electric furnaces. We will also promote innovation, to make new electrification solutions commercially viable for European industries. For transport, the benefits of electric vehicles are abundantly clear. For example, comparing fuel prices here in Finland, electricity costs €2.60 per 100km – while petrol costs €9.20! There is a difference, and it can be felt. To multiply these benefits, we will work together to advance vehicle-to-grid technologies, corporate fleet strategies, and new solutions for the maritime and aviation sectors. We will also continue our efforts to drive electrification in buildings. The expansion of heat pumps, batteries, and smart technologies offer game-changing possibilities. For example, heat pumps are up to 5 times more efficient than gas boilers, while smart meters can provide consumers with an energy savings of 10-15%. By installing these technologies in homes and buildings across Europe, we can make a huge difference in the lives of millions. But to deliver the full savings potential of electricity, we need to combine it with clean energy. Currently, over 70% of our electricity mix in the EU is based on clean, homegrown energy. This is a good number, but we need to aim even higher – because this will make our electricity bills lower. According to a recent study, consumers in the five EU countries with the biggest share of clean energy in their electricity mix (including Finland) will save up to €8.5 billion more on their electricity bills this year, compared to consumers in the bottom five. This really makes a difference. And it's worth noticing because we always speak about us in Europe paying 2 to 3 times more for our energy than the US and China – that is also true. But that is an average. And very few countries pay anything close to the average. The fact of the matter is that some Member States in the European Union are paying very competitive prices also on a global scale, while others pay very high prices, meaning that there are ways to bring the prices down. We need to spread these savings across Europe. We are therefore helping Member States to speed up and simplify permitting procedures for clean energy projects. Meanwhile, our Clean Energy Investment Strategy will help to de-risk projects and attract a wider base of investors, with support from the EIB. And we are stepping up our efforts to build a strong, inter-connected European grid, with the storage and flexibility capacities to enable our electrification goals. To reach these electrification goals, we need to cross the new frontiers of digitalisation. On the one hand, digital tools and AI are opening new, unmissable opportunities – from making our grid more efficient, to giving consumers greater control over their electricity use. On the other hand, data centres in the EU consume enough electricity to power nearly 20 million households per year. We need to embrace this power with responsibility. That is why, this week, I presented a Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI in our energy system. Our roadmap outlines how we can use AI to make our energy system cleaner, more secure, and more competitive. It also sets out how we can address the increasing energy demand of Europe's digital infrastructure. And here, again Finland is showing us the way, by working with data centre projects to capture waste heat and redeploy it for district heating in towns and cities. This is just one example of how we can drive our digital growth, while also driving down emissions and heating costs. Dear friends, Europe is at a very important moment. And at this moment, we need to look forward with ambition – otherwise, we will look back with regret. Now is the time to electrify industry, vehicles, and buildings across Europe. Now is the time to push fossil fuels out of our energy system. Now is the time to bring Europe's power to life. With ambition, determination, and electrification, we can succeed. Thank you.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2026-06-01 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 1.6.2026 Written question The Commission considers competitive and transparent markets as the best guarantee for fair consumer prices. It therefore pays full attention to the competitive situation in European petroleum markets on a continuous basis. The supervision of well functioning markets in the Member States is carried out by national authorities. The Commission is not aware of any general market failure or inefficiencies, including market distortions from presumed bad practices of wholesalers of petroleum products in the European market. The Commission has been taking various steps to improve transparency in energy markets and the European and global oil sector. The Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy publishes the Weekly Oil Bulletin [1] with retail fuel prices on the pump (and associated taxes) based on data provided by the individual Member State, and also monitors the wholesale prices on weekly basis. One important element of the final retail price of transport fuels, notably excise duty is subject to EU legislation. The Energy Taxation Directive [2] establishes the minimum excise duty rates that EU countries must apply to energy products for fuel and transport, and electricity. The EU legislation only sets harmonised minimum rates. Member States are free to apply excise duty rates above these minima, according to their own national needs, which allows for flexibility for situations like the current crisis. The Commission also closely monitors national measures taken by Member States to respond to fuel price increases. Where necessary, it may take action against measures violating the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaties. [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/weekly-oil-bulletin_en. [2] Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/96/oj/eng.”
  EU restrictions on unfair commercial practices · Fossil fuels
• 2026-06-01 “Distinguished guests, dear friends, It is a true pleasure to be here this afternoon. In some parts of the world, they say that summer begins today, on the 1st of June. Others say it begins on the 21st of June. In Belgium, they say that summer begins when the rain starts to feel warmer! Really though, I'm delighted to join you here in the “Mix”. And when it comes to energy, “Mix” is a key word. We need to increase the share of electricity in our energy mix. And we need to increase the share of clean energy in our electricity mix. And to achieve both of these objectives, we need a mix of both renewables and nuclear. Our analysis has shown that, by 2040, this mix has the potential to generate 90% of Europe's electricity consumption. This is our opportunity to free ourselves from the volatility of fossil fuels – the volatility that is causing so much damage in our society right now from the crisis in the Middle East. This is our opportunity to secure a level of autonomy never before experienced in Europe. To power households and businesses across our continent – with our own homegrown, and affordable energy. To deliver on these goals, Europe needs nuclear. But what do we need to do, to ensure that nuclear can play its part? First of all, we must guarantee safety and security of supply. These are the foundation blocks of the sector. When it comes to safety, we have an impressive record in Europe, and we need to maintain our global leadership. We must uphold the highest standards, aligned with the Euratom legal framework. We must take further steps in the safe and permanent disposal of radioactive waste. By leading on deep geological repositories, we can be a model of scientific responsibility, public trust, and sustainability. And we must work beyond our borders, by continuing to extend post-Fukushima safety assessments. Alongside safety, security of supply is vital. And here, diversification is a long-standing EU policy. Through REPowerEU, we have made substantial progress in diversifying nuclear fuel supplies for Russian-designed reactors in Europe. However, as you know, more work is needed. Further efforts are also needed to obtain spare parts and to develop alternatives in nuclear fuel services – such as for enrichment and conversion. We are working together with Member States and the industry to address these issues, and to ensure that the phase-out of Russian nuclear supplies is gradual and successful, across our Union. If safety and security of supply are the foundation blocks of the sector, then investment and innovation are the keys to its future. In March this year, the Commission published the final Nuclear Illustrative Programme, or PINC, as we call it. It provides an EU-wide assessment of the investments that are needed for Member States to realise their nuclear ambitions. Our assessment confirms many things, but let me highlight three in particular. First: the scale of the challenge is significant and the investment needs are substantial. In a base-case scenario of about 109 gigawatt of generated electricity [GWe] by 2050, total investment needs are estimated at around €241 billion. Second: the pathway ahead is not certain, nor is it one-dimensional. The 2050 scenarios range from 70 gigawatt of generated electricity up to 144 gigawatt of generated electricity. Member States may choose a combination of different options, from lifetime extensions and new large-scale reactors, to the gradual deployment of SMRs, AMRs, and other innovative technologies. From this varied combination, we must avoid complication. Investors must have confidence in Europe's ability to successfully execute these projects. This will depend on the ability of the nuclear industry to deliver projects on time and on budget. In short, we need to match our ambitions with certainty and delivery. Finally, the PINC also confirms the growing importance of innovative nuclear technologies. According to Member States' plans, Small Modular Reactor capacity across the EU is estimated to range from 17 gigawatt of generated electricity to 53 gigawatt of generated electricity by 2050. But none of this will happen without credible financing. A key pillar of our Clean Energy Investment Strategy is to de-risk private investment in innovative clean energy technologies. In other words, we want to bridge the gap between innovation and commercialisation. Public funding has a defined and targeted role. We must use it to support research, underwrite guarantees, and mobilise the private capital we need to deliver first-of-a-kind installations of Small Modular Reactors and Advanced Modular Reactors, such as the fourth generation technologies. In the short term, the Commission has pointed to €200 million to be made available for guarantees to de-risk investments into such innovative nuclear technologies. Going forward, various complementary instruments can also be used, such as EIB financing, the Scale-up Europe Fund, and the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework. 13 Member States have also endorsed a potential IPCEI candidate on innovative nuclear technologies, enabling its move to the design phase. Finally, public funding for research and innovation will remain vital. The Commission's proposal for the next MFF allocates €6.7 billion to the Euratom Research and Training Programme. And while investment will drive us forward, our SMR Strategy will set the direction. Our Strategy builds on the work of the European Industrial Alliance on SMRs, which now brings together around 400 members. We have set out a combined EU approach that avoids fragmentation and ensures global competitiveness. Our aim is to bring Europe's first SMR projects online by the early 2030s, and to become leaders in fourth generation advanced technologies. Three words I would like to highlight are focus, scale, and coordination. First of all, focus: EU efforts should focus on a limited number of the most promising and most innovative designs, strengthening European leadership, supply chains, and industrial capacity. Secondly, scale: SMRs can become major European industrial development projects. We will enable this potential by developing industrial standards, advancing modular manufacturing, and creating “SMR Valleys”. Finally, we need to foster coordination among Member States, so that our financial resources go further, and our regulations work more smoothly. When it comes to regulation, our strategy promotes joint early reviews, regulatory sandboxes, and an SMR coalition of interested Member States, to enable closer cooperation across borders. Overall, the objective of our strategy is not simply to support a technology, but to build our capacity, knowledge, and competitiveness in a strategic sector for Europe's energy future. Dear friends, We are at a decisive moment. In the coming weeks, the Commission will present its Electrification Action Plan. This will mark a turning point for Europe – in which we leave behind fossil fuel volatility, and accelerate towards a clean economy, energized by electricity. Along with renewables, we need nuclear power to make Europe's future electric. We need innovative technologies, industrial capacity, and skills. We need stronger and more European supply chains. We need investor confidence and continued cooperation between public authorities, industry, and finance. If we get this right, nuclear and renewables can become the joint guarantors of Europe's independence, security, and competitiveness. With this objective in mind, and with this opportunity within our grasp, I look forward to continuing our work over the months and years ahead. Thank you.”
  Nuclear energy
• 2026-06-01 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 1.6.2026 Written question The Commission is currently not planning to establish a European Housing Agency. Wherever new EU initiatives are proposed, assignment to an existing institution, agency or body is in general favoured. In accordance with Better Regulation, any proposals to establish a new housing agency would need to be justified by an impact assessment analysing the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance, and EU added value including interaction with already existing agencies, as well as costs and financing, including the Commission’s capacity to provide for additional services. Regarding the coordination of housing policies at the EU level, the European Affordable Housing Plan [1] proposed to set up a European Housing Alliance to strengthen cooperation on housing at EU level, better coordinate actions and share best practices. This Alliance is currently being rolled out and will unite all levels of government — from cities and regions to national and European institutions, together with key housing stakeholders — to drive forward a shared commitment to ensure affordable, sustainable and quality housing for all. The Alliance complements existing tools such as the European Semester. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC1025.”
  EU housing policy
• 2026-05-27 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 27.5.2026 Written question Data on evictions are collected, analysed and disseminated by national authorities in the Member States. Any potential future developments at EU level in this regard would need to meet the core quality requirements [1] . The Affordable Housing Database [2] developed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development includes data on evictions, however it has several limitations, related to different stages of an eviction process, timing of data collection, uneven coverage of jurisdictions, and gaps regarding mortgage foreclosures. The Commission is advancing the implementation of the European Affordable Housing Plan (EAHP) [3] , and as part of the actions thereof, seeks to identify successful models and best practices that align property rights protection with tenant security. Regarding EU funds available for housing, at least EUR 45 billion have been mobilised in housing related investment [4] . Overall, it is challenging to get more granular data per year on disbursement of funds given that no granular data collection on housing, nor on evictions, is available under the existing reporting setup. Housing supply is subject to many rules at various levels — most rules being set at Member State, regional or local level — which aim to preserve safety and quality of life, promote social and economic objectives, and protect environment and cultural heritage . But too often they lead to unnecessary administrative complexity resulting in unnecessary costs and delays, restricting the supply of housing where it is most needed. As announced in the EAHP, the Commission will contribute to cutting red tape to facilitate the supply of affordable and sustainable housing where it is most needed by presenting a housing simplification package in 2027. [1] Ones that would be aligned with the European Statistics Code of Practice. [2] https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/oecd-affordable-housing-database.html. [3] COM/2025/1025 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC1025. [4] This amount includes (1) the Recovery and Resilience Facility that supports housing investments and reforms for a total of EUR 19.6 billion, (2) the Cohesion Policy where EUR 10.4 billion is dedicated for energy efficiency and social housing and EUR 3.3 billion has been received from Member States and regions to reprogramme Cohesion funds under the Mid-term review, (3) the European Social Fund+ that finances a number of activities for a total of EUR 4.4 billion, (4) the InvestEU Fund that fosters public and private investment through an EU budget guarantee (app. EUR 7 billion mobilised by December 2025) and provides local project development support (EUR 25 million by December 2025) via the InvestEU Advisory Hub, (5) the LIFE programme that has devoted EUR 138 million by December 2025 for market uptake and capacity building activities and (6) the Horizon Europe programme that has invested EUR 540 million by December 2025 for research and innovation.”
  EU housing policy · EU expenditure on social policy
• 2026-05-26 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question The Commission is committed to supporting the decarbonisation of social housing in line with the European Green Deal. The Energy Efficiency Directive [1] and the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive [2] set a combination of obligations including provisions on enabling framework to remove administrative, technical and financial barriers. The European Affordable Housing Plan [3] proposed a housing simplification package for 2027. The Plan includes more flexible State Aid Rules to support affordable housing through the revision of the S ervices of General Economic Interest Decision [4] . The Commission is also reviewing the General Block Exemption Regulation [5] to facilitate the funding of energy renovation projects for social and affordable housing. The Cohesion Policy supports energy efficiency including social housing, while the mid-term review Regulation [6] allows Member States to allocate additional funding in affordable and social housing. The Social Climate Fund mobilises at least EUR 86.7 billion between 2026-2032 to fund investments in energy efficiency, decarbonisation of heating and cooling of buildings and sustainable mobility and transport. New funding possibilities for decarbonisation have been proposed in the next EU budget for 2028-2034. Provided that they respect minimum rates of taxation of energy products, Member States are free to introduce varied rates for natural gas and biomethane under the Energy Taxation Directive (ETD) [7] . To the extent that decarbonised gas falls within the scope of the ETD, a reduction in taxes thereon would be permissible [8] . In addition, the Commission’s 2021 ETD review proposal — currently under consideration by the Council — aims to further incentivise the uptake of fossil fuel alternatives. [1] Directive (EU) 2023/1791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on energy efficiency and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 (recast), OJ L, 2023/1791, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AJOL_2023_231_R_0001&qid=1695186598766. [2] Directive (EU) 2024/1275 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the energy performance of buildings (recast), OJ L, 2024/1275, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024L1275. [3] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions The European Affordable Housing Plan, COM/2025/1025 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC1025. [4] Commission Decision (EU) 2025/2630 of 16 December 2025 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest and repealing Decision 2012/21/EU, OJ L, 19.12.2025, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025D2630. [5] Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, pp. 1-7, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0651/. [6] Regulation (EU) 2025/1914 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review, OJ L, 2025/1914, 19.9.2025, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1914/oj/eng . [7] Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity, OJ L 283, 31.10.2003, pp. 51-70, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32003L0096. [8] Provided that all of the conditions of that Article 44 and Chapter I of the General Block Exemption Regulation are also fulfilled.”
  Energy performance of buildings · Energy transition (state support)
• 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The proposal in the Grids Package builds on Regulation (EU) 2019/943 [1] , which governs the use of congestion income . The objective is to provide stronger investment signals for cross-border energy infrastructure projects. This should also improve consistency and transparency, contributing to greater predictability for investors. Furthermore, using congestion income for network investments that reduce structural congestion will provide long-term benefits for consumers and industries. First, it should be clarified that only after priority objectives a) [2] and c) [3] have been fulfilled, would 25% of the remaining congestion income be reserved for investments in Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMIs). Second, the Commission’s proposal foresees no centralisation or EU-level pooling of congestion income. Congestion income remains nationally managed and retained within the Member State where it is generated, for PCI and PMI investments located within that same Member State, including internal infrastructure with PCI status, unless national authorities decide otherwise. Furthermore, the Commission supports the establishment of internal bidding zones where appropriate and acknowledges the specific circumstances of Member States that have implemented such systems. The Commission has already engaged with Member States to address these specificities where necessary and remains ready to continue doing so. The proposal is currently under discussion by the European Parliament and the Council. The Commission stands ready to support co-legislators in their discussions. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019R0943&qid=1775155216966. [2] Guaranteeing the actual availability of allocated capacity. [3] Compensation to offshore renewable electricity generation plant operators.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration
• 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question Europe is facing a serious situation when it comes to fossil fuels, which threatens to impose further costs on households and business. A united, coordinated European response is needed in order to avoid fragmented national approaches and disruptive signals to the market: solidarity, transparency, and cooperation remain critical. In response, the Commission presented on 22 April 2026 the AccelerateEU communication [1] with concrete measures to be taken immediately at Member States level in order to shield families and business alike, increase coordination and accelerate phase-out from fossil fuels, building on the lessons learnt with the 2022 crisis. These measures must be targeted — protecting the most vulnerable, temporary and avoid worsening supply conditions, focusing on energy savings. They should accelerate the phasing out of fossil fuels by increasing the efficiency of the energy system and accelerating deployment of electrification and homegrown clean energy, including by better leveraging storage and demand flexibility for the benefit of consumers. No EU-wide mechanism such as price ceiling is currently envisaged. Furthermore, the Commission will adopt a set of detailed recommendations to implement the Citizens Energy Package [2] , to help consumers bring down their bills. These recommendations will aim at preventing consumer disconnections, prioritise consumer protection and switching to cheaper contracts, as well as expanding support for self-consumption and energy communities. EU funds can play an important role in mitigating the impact of the current situation for example to support investments on energy efficiency; the setting up of an extraordinary fund to support Member States is not currently envisaged. [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/accelerateeu-strengthen-eu-energy-resilience_en. [2] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-boost-access-affordable-and-clean-energy-all-europeans-2026-03-10_en.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The Commission has been in close contact with the Portuguese authorities following the aftermath of Storm Kristin. Moreover, the competent authority under the regulation on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector [1] , the Directorate-General for Energy and Geology, shared with the Commission and other Member States information on the impact on the electricity grid and follow-up measures during an Electricity Coordination Group [2] meeting on 19 February 2026. The Commission does not set the standards for the quality and continuity of service. According to Article 59(1)(m) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 [3] as transposed into national law, national regulatory authorities set or approve standards and requirements for quality of service and quality of supply. Portugal reported that the national authorities and the transmission and distribution operators, in coordination with the Spanish transmission operator, were fully mobilised to prioritise system stability, safety and restoration, in line with the requirements of the Network Code on Electricity Emergency and Restoration [4] . Additionally, technical staff from energy operators from Ireland, Spain, France and Italy supported grid repairs. It should be noted that due to consecutive storms, the environmental and structural conditions in the most affected areas prevented accessibility and delayed repairs . The Commission intends to include a stronger focus on the impact of climate change and extreme weather events on the security of EU’s electricity system in the proposed revision of the energy security framework . [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/941/oj/eng. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2012_353_R_0002_01. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019L0944&qid=1647526750255. [4] Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/2196 of 24 November 2017 establishing a network code on electricity emergency and restoration (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2196/oj/eng).”
  EU energy infrastructure integration
• 2026-05-20 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 20.5.2026 Written question The AccelerateEU Communication [1] outlines the Commission’s immediate response to help Member States protect consumers from price shocks (including the adoption of a temporary state aid framework), alongside measures to address all electricity retail price components ((a) cost of electricity, (b) network/grid charges, (c) taxes and levies and (d) carbon costs). To end structural dependence on imported fossil fuels and in line with our long-term objectives, the Commission’s strategy is focused on electrification based on homegrown clean energy, resilient grids, flexibility, interconnections and energy efficiency. To this end, the Commission will present in the coming months an Electrification Action Plan. The general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact can only be activated in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the EU. While risks to the EU economic outlook have increased over recent weeks, it cannot be concluded, at this stage, that this condition has been or will soon be met. The Commission will continue monitoring the situation. The Commission will continue efforts prioritising security of energy supply and affordability, including in the areas raised by the European Council in its conclusions of 19-20 March 2026. To date, there is no energy security of supply issue thanks to diversification efforts. The Commission continuously assesses the evolution of the situation and its impacts. The Commission has no plans to suspend the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which will be reviewed by July 2026 notably to set out the emissions cap and decarbonisation trajectory beyond 2030, in line with the 2040 emissions reduction target agreed by the co-legislators . [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/accelerateeu-energy-union-affordable-and-secure-energy-through-accelerated-action_en.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · EU policy on gas storage targets · EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-05-19 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The Commission is closely monitoring the situation in the Middle East, its impact on energy prices and the EU’s security of supply in cooperation with the Member States, including Germany via the Gas Coordination Group. Currently, there is no immediate threat to the EU’s security of supply due to the war in the Middle East, with only 4% of the EU’s annual gas imports originating from the Region (Qatar, 11 bcm of liquefied natural gas (LNG)). Since 2022, the EU has equipped itself to mitigate and address potential supply crises. In answer to the 2022 crisis, among several other measures the EU adopted the Gas Storage Regulation [1] , creating a pan-European storage target in order to ensure that the EU’s gas storages would be filled for the winter. This regulation has been prolonged until 2027 and amended to grant more flexibility to the Member States in achieving their filling target in case of difficult market conditions. Since 2022 the EU has increased its import capacity in the last four years and improved supply diversification among Norway, the United States, Algeria, Nigeria, Azerbaijan, the United Kingdom, Angola, Trinidad and Tobago and other LNG exporters. The Commission presented on 22 April 2026 the AccelerateEU Communication [2] with immediate targeted actions aimed at better protecting households and industry from high energy prices. It includes structural measures to improve energy efficiency and accelerate electrification by reducing the four cost components of energy bills: energy supply itself, network charges, taxes and carbon costs. Finally, to sustain the EU’s competitiveness, the Commission is implementing the actions set out in the Clean Industrial Deal [3] to improve access to energy and reduce dependency on fossil fuels. [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-security/gas-storage_en. [2] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/accelerateeu-energy-union-affordable-and-secure-energy-through-accelerated-action_en. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0085.”
  EU policy on gas storage targets · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2026-05-12 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 12.5.2026 Written question Distribution system operators have the obligation to operate, maintain and develop a secure, reliable and efficient electricity distribution system pursuant to the EU rules for the internal market for electricity [1] . National regulatory authorities are required to ensure compliance by distribution system operators, including monitoring the time taken by distribution system operators to carry out repairs. Additionally, EU Directive 2019/944 requires Member States to take measures to protect customers in remote areas. Since climate change and extreme weather events are already affecting the resilience of EU’s electricity networks, the electricity risk preparedness regulation 2019/941 [2] requires national competent authorities to take into account rare and extreme natural hazards in their national electricity risk scenarios. The Commission intends to include a stronger focus on the impact of climate change and extreme weather events on the security of EU’s electricity system in the proposed revision of the energy security frameworks. As part of the Affordable Energy Action Plan [3] , the Commission has proposed a Citizen Energy Package [4] , which provides concrete actions, which are highly relevant for people living in rural regions, e.g., to enable and empower citizens to produce, store and share their own renewable energy as part of energy communities. Under the next multiannual financial framework 2028-2034, the Commission has proposed that the national and regional partnership plans need to foster ‘the attractiveness of territories to support the right to stay’, including support for ‘territorial services and infrastructure’. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/944/oj/eng. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019R0941. [3] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/action-plan-affordable-energy-unlocking-true-value-our-energy-union-secure-affordable-efficient-and_en. [4] COM/2026/115 final.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2026-05-12 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 12.5.2026 Written question On 4 March 2026, the Commission adopted the proposal for the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) [1] with purpose of strengthening Europe's industrial base by boosting manufacturing and the demand for low-carbon and European-made products and net-zero technologies [2] , including specifically two solar photovoltaic components , inverters and cells. The proposed provisions on origin requirements complement the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA) [3] , which already mandates the application of resilience requirements in public procurement and renewable energy auctions. The IAA reinforces the existing cybersecurity requirements for renewable energy auctions under NZIA, and, building on the proposed revision of the Cybersecurity Act [4] , it expands the limitations to prevent high-risk suppliers from supplying critical components in renewable energy auctions and other forms of public intervention. The Financial Regulation [5] provides the possibility to set specific conditions for the protection of security or public order. These restrictions need to be strictly limited. In the proposal for the Connecting Europe Facility [6] , the Commission set out that eligibility restrictions shall apply to high-risk suppliers, in line with EU law, for security reasons. The Commission is currently conducting a risk assessment of critical elements in the EU solar value chain. The results of this assessment, planned for the third quarter of 2026, will serve to identify possible gaps in current EU policy and propose new measures to mitigate concrete risks that will have been identified. The results will be published, with possible limitations envisaged by the regulation regarding public access to documents [7] . [1] Proposal for a regulation establishing a framework of measures for the acceleration of industrial capacity and decarbonisation in strategic sectors and amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1724, (EU) 2024/1735 and (EU) 2024/3110: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2026%3A100%3AFIN&qid=1772791153353). [2] The net-zero technologies included in the proposal are battery energy storage systems, solar photovoltaic technologies, heat pumps, onshore and offshore wind technologies, electrolysers and nuclear fission energy technologies. [3] Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 (Text with EEA relevance): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1735/oj/eng. [4] Proposal for a regulation on the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the European cybersecurity certification framework, and ICT supply chain security and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/881 (The Cybersecurity Act 2) COM/2026/11 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52026PC0011. [5] Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R2509&qid=1772791240498). [6] Proposal for a regulation establishing the Connecting Europe Facility for the period 2028-2034, amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2021/1153: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0547&qid=1772791356238. [7] Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32001R1049&qid=1772791830756.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2026-05-12 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 12.5.2026 Written question The EU remains committed to supporting Ukraine in the face of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression. The Commission has also actively supported EU Member States to effectively address ongoing energy disruptions in the Middle East and on the Druzhba oil pipeline following Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure and it continues to engage closely to ensure security of supply. At the Gas [1] and Oil Coordination Group [2] meetings of 26 and 27 March 2026, EU Member States, including Hungary and Slovakia, reported that there are no immediate risks to the security of their oil and gas supplies. Hungary and Slovakia also indicated that alternative crude oil supplies via Croatia and partial release of strategic stocks have prevented immediate shortages. In a joint letter of 16 March 2026, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission offered Ukraine technical and financial support to repair the Druzhba pipeline, which Ukraine has accepted. Discussions on implementation are ongoing. The Commission will continue close engagement with the concerned countries to ensure energy security in the region. [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/gas-coordination-group-confirms-readiness-prepare-upcoming-winter-season-2026-03-26_en. [2] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-and-eu-countries-discuss-latest-developments-concerning-energy-security-2026-03-27_en.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2026-05-11 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question In line with the Renovation Wave, Directive (EU) 2024/1275 [1] prioritises strategies that enhance buildings’ thermal performance during the summer period, with measures that avoid overheating, such as shading and passive cooling techniques that improve indoor environmental quality. The implementation of the directive is a matter for the Member State authorities. Assessing whether a city may be deviating from the trajectory outlined in the National Building Renovation Plan (NBRP) is outside the Commission’s responsibility. In its draft NBRP [2] , Spain highlights that planning of interventions in the building stock should anticipate future cooling needs, mitigate the urban heat island effect and promote passive comfort solutions, through strategies such as shading or the use of materials with high thermal inertia. The Commission published guidance in 2025 [3] on the implementation of Directive (EU) 2024/1275, including on indoor environmental quality, with indicators for resilience against heat waves. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024L1275&qid=1732227204189. [2] Spain submitted its National Building Renovation Plan (NBRP) on 29 December 2025 — https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/8f5f9424-a7ef-4dbf-b914-1af1d12ff5d2/library/2c613a06-3df2-4bdd-a61a-680b0351a777/details?open=true. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C_202506438.”
  Climate efforts
• 2026-05-11 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question The Commission will continue monitoring the evolution of the crisis and assessing its potential impacts across a range of plausible scenarios. While there are no immediate concerns for the EU’s security of supply, oil and gas prices, particularly for refined products like diesel and jet fuel, face significant price volatility. To address the impacts of the disruption of oil and gas transit, the Commission has put forward on 22 April 2026 its new initiative AccelerateEU [1] , proposing timely, targeted and temporary measures to bring relief to consumers, while avoiding fragmented national responses. This includes a set of concrete measures to save and protect consumers and promote immediate energy savings, alongside structural reforms. By scaling up homegrown, clean energy and improving energy efficiency, electrification, flexibility and interconnectivity, Europe will reduce fossil fuel imports and become more resilient. The Commission’s response includes measures for coordinated energy interventions, such as in the areas of gas storage filling, oil stock releases, scenario analysis and sharing of best practices. The Energy Union Task Force, the Oil Coordination Group, the Gas Coordination Group and other platforms will support such coordination. Among others, the Commission will also propose legislative action on network charges, taxation and carbon costs to further support lowering energy bills. [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/accelerateeu-strengthen-eu-energy-resilience_en.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Fossil fuels
• 2026-05-11 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question On 1 April 2026, the Commission announced the first concrete measure to strengthen the Emissions Trading System (ETS), proposing an amendment to the Market Stability Reserve (the ETS’s built-in stabilisation measure) [1] reinforcing its role as a buffer to support market stability better equip the reserve to respond to future market developments, including supply tightness. The ETS accounts for around 11% of retail electricity prices for industry and 5% for households, remaining smaller than fuel costs, network charges, and taxes. A comprehensive ETS review, to be presented by July 2026, will strengthen the carbon market, and ensure a fair, cost-effective contribution to the 2040 climate target. On 22 April 2026, the Commission presented the AccelerateEU Communication [2] outlining immediate, targeted actions for Member States to deliver rapid and lasting relief to households and industry facing high energy prices. It also includes structural measures to improve energy efficiency and accelerate electrification by reducing the four components of energy bills-supply costs, network charges, taxes, and carbon costs — also in the longer term. The crisis highlights that long-term affordability depends on accelerating the clean energy transition. Scaling up domestic clean energy and energy efficiency will reduce fossil fuel imports and strengthen Europe’s energy independence. In this context, the Commission has launched reflections on a post-2030 framework, including a revision of the Governance Regulation together with the renewable energy and energy efficiency frameworks to modernise the Energy Union and climate action. [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_666. [2] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/accelerateeu-strengthen-eu-energy-resilience_en.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question While physically located only in Finland, Kemijoki hydro-pumped electricity storage project (Kemijoki PSP) fulfils the significant cross-border impact criteria under the Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E) Regulation [1] (Annex IV, point 1(b)): the project is planned to provide at least 225 MW installed capacity and has a storage capacity that allows a net annual electricity generation of 250 GW-hours/year. As per Annex IV point 1(b) of TEN-E Regulation, the size of the project is used as evidence of the cross-border impact. This is confirmed by the synchronisation of Finland’s grid with the Nordic and Baltic electricity markets and the project’s potential contribution to regional energy balancing, grid stability and cross-border electricity trade. The environmental and climate impacts, including the effects on Natura 2000 sites, biodiversity and water are not part of the cost-benefit analysis under the selection process of Projects of Common Interest (PCI) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMI). These impacts are assessed as part of the environmental impact assessment and permitting process as mandated by both EU and national law . This process ensures that all legal criteria, including those pertaining to environmental sustainability and municipal governance, are evaluated before the development of the project proceeds. The fact that the project is included in the PCI/PMI list does not prejudge the results of the required environmental impact assessment or permitting process and does not automatically guarantee the project’s construction. The second Union list, which includes the Kemijoki PSP project, was adopted by the Commission on 1 December 2025 and published in the Official Journal of the EU on 9 April 2026 [2] . [1] Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32022R0869). [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202600764.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration · EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question Biofuels and biogas derived from intermediate crops offer significant potential to support the Union’s decarbonisation, economic growth, job creation, and resilience, provided they adhere to the environmental safeguards enshrined in the Renewable Energy Directive [1] . The Commission is committed to minimising the administrative burden of the certification framework and will publish a draft Implementing Regulation including the certification rules for public feedback, in accordance with Better Regulation principles. Additionally, the Committee on the Sustainability of Biofuels, Bioliquids, and Biomass Fuels will be formally consulted. Depending also on the length of the discussions process with the Member States, it could be expected that the act would be adopted by the end of 2026. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/2413/oj/eng.”
  Biofuels (RED II)
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. The EU also remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and its acquis. [1] In its 2025 Enlargement Report, the Commission has expressed concerns about the mentioned electricity interconnection project between Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot Community. This interconnection project is not included in the 2026 Ten Year Network Development Plan of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). The Commission is not aware of any contacts between the ENTSO-E and the Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation (TEİAŞ) on the potential project mentioned, however, will continue to pay highest attention to this matter. In the context of the Observer Membership Agreement with ENTSO-E, TEİAŞ committed to ensure cooperation with all European Transmission System Operators (TSOs) at pan-European, regional and bilateral levels. The fulfilment of this requirement entails that the process of developing any type of interconnection is done with the consent of the TSO certified for the island of Cyprus under EU law. The mentioned interconnection does not have Project of Mutual Interest (PMI) status and cannot benefit from EU funding. The Commission supports the development of an electricity interconnection between Greece and the island of Cyprus with the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI). It has been awarded the status as Project of Common Interest and a EUR 657 million grant under the Connecting Europe Facility. [1] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bb4ddd1-4f20-4ee0-92db-926996ec8dd1_en?filename=t%C3%BCrkiye-report-2025.pdf, p. 62-63.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The functioning of the EU electricity market does not prioritise certain types of generation over others. It ensures at all times that the cheapest generation assets required to meet the demand are producing. In line with the article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Member States are free to determine their own energy mix. This sovereignty is exercised within the EU framework of binding targets for climate, renewable energy and energy efficiency in order to decarbonise the European energy system. Member States outline their national targets, policies and measures for climate and energy in their National Energy and Climate Plans, taking into account in particular energy security and internal market aspects. Renewable energy sources bring cheap and clean energy into the system but also require flexibility to cope with their variability. The 2024 revision of the Electricity Regulation mandates a periodic assessment of flexibility needs to be done at national level [1] , following which the Member States can set objectives for non-fossil flexibility. This complements the resource adequacy assessments which are performed to monitor and plan security of supply [2] . Investments in generation should be market-based. However, Member States can use different tools to support additional capacity in order to preserve security of supply and achieve decarbonisation. In particular, Member States can introduce a capacity mechanism which provides payment to generators [3] , or apply support schemes for non-fossil flexibility [4] . [1] Electricity Regulation (EU) 2019/943, Article 19e. [2] Electricity Regulation (EU) 2019/943, Article 20. [3] Electricity Regulation (EU) 2019/943, Article 21. [4] Electricity Regulation (EU) 2019/943, Article 19g.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · EU approach to electricity market and prices · Nuclear energy
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The EU fully respects Ukraine’s right to self-defence against Russia’s aggression in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. This position is consistent with the framework of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The Commission condemns any potential interference against EU infrastructure, as a matter of principle. Russia continues to escalate its war of aggression against Ukraine and its attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. After four years of full-scale invasion, Russia has launched hundreds of massive attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Russia continuously attempts to attain goals it has not been able to achieve militarily, by terrorising the civilian population. The Commission closely cooperated with the authorities of Hungary and Slovakia to monitor oil supply disruptions affecting the Druzhba pipeline during summer 2025 and in January 2026, when a Russian attack on the pipeline led to Druzhba’s complete interruption of oil flow. The Commission engaged with the two Member States affected to facilitate provision of alternative supplies. The EU and its Member States remain committed to provide Ukraine and its people with all the necessary political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support, including through the EUR 90 billion Ukraine Support Loan. The loan will help to meet Ukraine’s urgent financing needs amid Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, which has now entered its fifth year.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The recast Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) [1] sets energy performance standards for buildings, while it remains the responsibility of Member States to ensure housing supply. It is not in the mandate of the Commission to assess and question the impact of national measures or laws. In line with the Better Regulation principles, the EPBD was preceded by an impact assessment [2] which showed that the worst-performing residential buildings are often occupied by vulnerable households and that the EPBD will help reduce their energy bills, even more so considering the current geopolitical situation. EU financing programmes channelled through national authorities, such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF), the Social Climate Fund and the Cohesion policy Funds, are available to support building owners carrying out building renovations. A recently adopted Commission’s report [3] highlights how the RFF has helped to multiply by 6.8 the EU funding allocated to energy efficiency. The Commission is also committed to support the mobilisation of private investment through the Energy Efficiency Financing Coalition [4] . Energy costs represent a major share of households’ overall living costs. The European Affordable Housing Plan [5] puts forward an integrated approach to ensure that Europe’s housing policies deliver lasting social, economic, and environmental benefits. The implementation of the EPBD by Member States starting by its transposition and the submission of their National Building Renovation Plan will contribute to increased availability of affordable housing. [1] Directive EU/2024/1275. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0453. [3] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-boost-access-affordable-and-clean-energy-all-europeans-2026-03-10_en. [4] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-efficiency/financing/european-energy-efficiency-financing-coalition_en. [5] COM(2025) 1025 final.”
  Energy performance of buildings · EU housing policy
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The Commission is not aware of any formal or informal talks about a possible restarting of the Nord Stream pipeline under US control. The reliance of the EU on Russian gas and Russia’s weaponisation of its gas exports to the EU in 2022 resulted in an unprecedented energy crisis. For this reason, in 2026 the EU has adopted Regulation (EU) 2026/261 [1] , aiming at a full phase out of Russian gas imports, both pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG), by the end of 2027. Previously, Russia has repeatedly disrupted supplies of natural gas through Nord Stream in order to coerce the Union and its Member States and undermine their support for Ukraine. Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 pipelines were damaged in September 2022 and are currently non-operational. In order to prevent the resumption or the establishment of natural gas supplies through those pipelines, with the 18th package of sanctions against Russia (Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1495) [2] , the EU introduced a restrictive measures banning any transaction that is directly or indirectly connected to the natural gas pipelines Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 and that concerns the completion, operation, maintenance or use of the pipelines or parts of the pipelines. The transaction ban also covers the purchase of natural gas transported via either pipeline. Those measures were put in place to prevent generating revenues for Russia and thereby enabling the continuation of its war of aggression against Ukraine. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32026R0261. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32025D1495.”
  Natural gas · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question On 11 March 2026, the Commission decided to open infringement procedures by sending a letter of formal notice [1] to Italy and 18 other Member States [2] as they failed to submit their draft National Building Renovation Plan (NBRP) by 31 December 2025 pursuant to Article 3 of the recast Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) [3] . The NBRPs are an essential tool for Member States to transform their building stock into energy-efficient, decarbonised asset by 2050. By creating predictable renovation pipelines and clear long-term trajectories, they support a cost-effective implementation of the EPBD at national level and give the necessary investment stability for national industries. The recast EPBD was preceded by an impact assessment showing that the worst-performing residential buildings are often occupied by vulnerable households and that the proposed measures will help reduce their energy bills [4] . Rather than imposing uniform rules, the recast EPBD already provides substantial flexibility to accommodate national specificities, especially for Member States with a significant share of historic or protected buildings such as Italy. It does not impose renovation obligations on individual homes but sets targets for reducing the energy consumption of the overall building stock. This allows Member States to determine the most appropriate and cost-effective pathways, including prioritising interventions where they are most feasible. As regards non-residential buildings, Member States can continue to exempt historic and protected ones from the renovation requirements. They can also set additional exemption criteria in light of serious hardship or an unfavourable cost-benefit assessment. [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/march-infringements-package-key-decisions-energy-2026-03-11_en. [2] Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, France, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden. [3] EPBD — Directive EU/2024/1275. [4] SWD (2021) 453, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Report, Accompanying the document, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the energy performance of buildings.”
  Energy performance of buildings
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The recast Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) [1] includes criteria to make energy performance certificates (EPCs) clearer, more reliable and visible, and more comparable across the Union while respecting the specificities of the building stock and climate of each Member State. It does not propose harmonising them. These criteria will benefit building owners, buyers and tenants and governments. Urban planning remains a competency of Member States, however, the European Affordable Housing Plan (EAHP) encourages Member States to simplify their national, regional and local planning and permitting rules to increase housing supply. The EPBD does not impose renovating individual residential buildings but provides a framework to encourage cost-effective energy renovations, which can substantially decrease households’ energy bills. The directive offers Member States the flexibility to adopt tailored rules and exemptions while designing social safeguards to avoid ‘renovictions’ such as caps on rent increases or rent support. The Commission supports Member States in implementing these requirements. The Emissions trading system for buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2) supports complementary measures and investments in clean heating and road transport. The Social Climate Fund (SCF) will mobilise EUR 86.7 billion between 2026-2032 and is designed with double solidarity: supporting a socially fair transition for vulnerable households and microenterprises, with lower-income Member States benefitting most. Member States must also target all national ETS2 revenues at measures and investments to support low- and middle-income citizens in the transition. [1] Directive (EU) 2024/1275 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the energy performance of buildings (recast), OJ L, 2024/1275, 8.5.2024. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1275/oj/eng.”
  Energy performance of buildings · EU housing policy · EU competences on social policies
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The Commission recognises the very positive role of labels as a way of certifying and promoting sustainable practices in different policy areas. The certification envisaged under the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) III [1] and secondary legislation aims at ensuring that the fuels certified comply with the applicable sustainability criteria. The process of certification takes into account all available information at the level of the economic operators concerned. Therefore, a label being awarded to an economic operator on some of the elements of the RED sustainability criteria would facilitate or have a positive effect on the process of RED certification. However, accepting a label as equivalent to a RED certification would be possible only if the criteria and methodology used as well as the certification process established under that label are the same as the criteria, methodology and process used for the certification of the same material or fuel under the certification framework established under the RED. The Commission is in principle open to consider, in cooperation with the certification schemes, whether existing labels could qualify and be fully or to some extent considered under the RED certification. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023L2413&qid=1699364355105.”
  EU framework for voluntary quality and sustainability terms in food marketing
• 2026-05-07 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 7.5.2026 Written question Commission Notice C/2025/6438 [1] providing guidance on new or substantially modified provisions of recast Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EU) 2024/1275 (EPBD Directive) [2] sets out the Commission’s understanding of these provisions and clarifies that, in the context of the calculation of energy performance pursuant to Annex I, primary energy factors ‘have an equivalent meaning’ as the weighting factors from the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN)/International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) overarching standards for the calculation of the energy performance of buildings. The weighting factors from the standards have a wider meaning, being either total, renewable and non-renewable primary energy factors, greenhouse gas emissions emission factors, or others. The provisions of EPBD Directive and the ISO 52000-1 standard do indeed allow for some flexibility in using weighting factors and primary energy factors. The main goal of EPBD Directive as laid down in Article 1(1) is ‘the improvement of the energy performance of buildings and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from buildings within the Union, with a view to achieving a zero-emission building stock by 2050 […]’. As such, the EPBD Directive does not prescribe the use of sustainable biomass or waste incineration technology but provides a robust legal framework for an efficient use of energy resources in buildings. It remains the prerogative of Member States to decide on their national energy mix and the most efficient use of energy resources in their national context. The Commission will ensure the proper transposition of the EPBD Directive through the infringement dialogue that will start after the transposition deadline on 29 May 2026. [1] OJ C, C/2025/6438, 18.12.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/6438/oj. [2] Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EU) 2024/1275, OJ L, 2024/1275, 8.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1275/oj.”
  Energy efficiency · Energy performance of buildings
• 2026-04-27 “E-000559/2026 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The transposition deadline of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) 1 is 29 May 2026. The Commission’s current priority is therefore to support Member States with a pragmatic and cost-effective transposition of the EPBD, including Article 14, into national law, i.e. through guidance 2 , dialogues and technical support to Member States. Therefore, the Commission is currently focussing on providing hands-on support in the implementation process. According to Article 28, the Commission will evaluate and review the EPBD by end of 2028 at the latest. The Commission will start the preparations of the EPBD review exercise in 2027 and consider possible simplification to the EPBD in that framework. The Commission will also take a pragmatic approach when ensuring the proper implementation and enforcement of the EPBD. When checking the transposition of Article 14, the Commission will take into account whether the objective of the provision, to ensure that effective recharging opportunities are provided at national level, is met. The assessment will be made on a case-by-case basis, also taking into account technological progress, such as fast charging infrastructure, and other relevant specific circumstances such as buildings with high turnover. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will monitor the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1275/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202506438&qid=1772032256012, Annex 9.”
  EV charging infrastructure · Road transport environmental policy
• 2026-04-24 “E-000654/2026 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. In this context, it remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded and the acquis 1 . The only project that the Commission is supporting politically and financially in order to terminate Cyprus’ energy isolation is the Great Sea Interconnector, which is also one of the eight Energy Highways set out in the Grids Package 2 , has the status as Project of Common Interest, and was awarded a grant of EUR 657 million from the Connecting Europe Facility. A potential interconnection project between Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot Community is not included in the 2026 Ten Year Network Development Plan of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). The Commission is not aware of any contacts between the ENTSO-E and the Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation (TEİAŞ) on the potential project mentioned, however, it will continue to monitor this matter. In the context of the Observer Membership Agreement with ENTSO-E, TEİAŞ committed to ensure cooperation with all European Transmission System Operators (TSOs) at panEuropean, regional and bilateral levels. Fulfilling this requirement entails that the process of developing any type of interconnection is done with the consent of the TSO certified for the island of Cyprus under EU law. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bb4ddd1-4f20-4ee0-92db926996ec8dd1_en?filename=t%C3%BCrkiye-report-2025.pdf, p. 62 and 63. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2945.”
  EU policy on Western Sahara · EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-04-17 “E-000727/2026 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Short-term rentals (STR) offer many benefits, however in some cities and tourist hotspots, limited housing supply growth combined with the rapid expansion of STR as well as speculative investment practices may be intensifying competition for limited housing stock. While the shortage of affordable housing is mainly attributed to other structural factors, increases in STR activity have been associated with higher prices in several European cities 1 . Transparency requirements are already addressed by the STR Regulation 1 , which obliges platforms to provide Member States with data on STR. This regulation will enter into application on 20 May 2026. To complement it and as announced in the Affordable Housing Plan, the Commission will propose an Affordable Housing Act, which will include a new legislative initiative on short-term rentals to enable public authorities to take a set of justified and proportionate measures in particular in areas of housing stress. In drawing up the proposal, the Commission will respect the subsidiarity and proportionality principles. As announced in the Plan, the Commission will also promote greater transparency in the residential property market and will present in 2026 an analysis of housing price dynamics, including available evidence of speculation patterns, data gaps and economic consequences in full respect of the subsidiarity. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on data collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 OJ L, 2024/1028, 29.4.2024.”
  EU housing policy · EU regulation of short-term rentals
• 2026-04-16 “E-000450/2026 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Child and Youth Guarantees are overarching and comprehensive policy initiatives to ensure respect of basic rights and access to services, related notably to education, training, employment or healthcare. The European Affordable Housing Plan 1 includes a targeted action to assess the feasibility of a guarantee scheme to help students, trainees and apprentices to find housing on the private rental market by reducing or eliminating the need for a security deposit. The European Affordable Housing Plan includes additional actions to support young people, such as mobilising investments for student housing, including through the Pan-European Investment Platform for sustainable and affordable housing 2 ; identifying and disseminating innovative accommodation models for students and young people; and launching a pilot scheme under Erasmus+ to increase availability of affordable and innovative housing solutions for mobile students from disadvantaged backgrounds. As regards the next Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034, the Commission proposed to prioritise support to social and affordable housing under the National and Regional Partnership Plans and other EU funding instruments. This would leave flexibility to Member States to design the investments and measures more adapted to their national and regional specificities. 1 https://housing.ec.europa.eu/european-affordable-housing-plan_en. 2 https://housing.ec.europa.eu/pan-european-housing-investment-platform_en.”
  EU housing policy · Youth employment & training
• 2026-04-16 “E-000494/2026 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is reviewing the EU’s energy security framework to adapt it to the current complex geopolitical context and to increase its resilience against emerging risks posed by climate change and security-related threats. On resilience, the Commission is looking at areas such as civil-military cooperation, security measures based on risk-assessments and ‘resilience by design’ considerations in new critical energy infrastructure. The Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) is a project of strategic importance aimed at ending Cyprus’ energy isolation. The Commission strongly supports the GSI, which is a Project of Common Interest (PCI) and to which a EUR 657 million grant under the Connecting Europe Facility has been allocated. The Commission is in regular contact with the parties involved, including on geopolitical risks, to facilitate timely implementation of the project. The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. In this context, the EU attaches the greatest importance to safeguarding the sovereign rights of all Member States, in full respect of international law. Unequivocal commitment to international agreements and the UN Charter, as well as abstaining from unilateral actions which violate international law and the sovereign rights of Member States, remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye. 1 1 JOIN(2023) 50 final, p. 2.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · EU energy infrastructure integration
• 2026-04-16 “E-000547/2026 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The stepwise ban of Russian gas imports introduced by Regulation (EU) 2026/261 1 pursues a different purpose than Union restrictive measures (‘sanctions’). Regulation (EU) 2026/261 is a trade and energy policy measure, meant to eliminate essential security risks for the Union resulting from trade dependencies with Russia, and to establish a monitoring and reporting framework to enhance the security of gas supply. The appropriate legal bases for such measure are Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (trade policy) and 194 of the TFEU (energy policy). This purpose is markedly different from the purpose of foreign policy measures, such as sanctions under Article 215 of the TFEU, which are, in the case of Regulation 833/2014 2 , to increase the costs of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and to put pressure to stop the aggression. The Commission, Parliament and Member States have designed Regulation (EU) 2026/261 in a manner that fully respects national sovereignty, enhances economic security in all Member States and avoids any hardship for individual countries. It is fully in line with EU law and obligations under international law. The Commission has been working intensively with Hungary and Slovakia to prepare the phase out of gas trade with Russia, in order to guarantee that the transition to more reliable suppliers can happen without any risks for supply security in both countries. Removing remaining dependencies on Russia will ultimately increase security of supply for all European countries. The Commission will continue its work with both Member States to facilitate the implementation of the Regulation. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/261/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/2026-01-16.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Natural gas
• 2026-04-15 “E-000258/2026 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recognises the importance of addressing territorial disparities and promoting balanced development, including in rural and peripheral areas. The Commission agrees on the value of job creation outside central cities and for that reason EU Cohesion and rural development policies as well as other policies and initiatives 1 are intended to foster job creation throughout the EU. Strengthening regional social economy ecosystems can be a way to stimulate job creation and foster community initiatives that help regions to thrive. Cohesion policy funds have significantly supported housing, transport, and other services to improve quality of life and attractiveness. In addition, the mid-term review Regulation 2 allows Member States to allocate additional funding for affordable housing 3 . The European Affordable Housing Plan 4 aims to tackle housing shortages, including in rural areas. Rural development support under the Common Agriculture Policy is also contributing to improving the quality of life and promotion of economic activity in rural areas, notably under LEADER approach 5 and investments in basic services in rural areas 6 . The proposed EU budget for 2028–2034 will further streamline funding, enabling targeted support for affordable housing, reforms, and broader priorities like social cohesion, climate goals, and demographic change. The objective of banking regulation is to ensure that banks operate their activities in a sound and resilient manner, thus contributing to the stability of the European financial system. Achieving an adequate degree of resilience for banks contribute to their capacity to withstand shocks through the economic cycle, thus contributing in a continuous manner to the financing of the economy. 1 E.g. Social Economy Action Plan; the ‘Talent Booster Mechanism’ set up as an initiative to harness talent in EU’s regions (see COM(2023)32 final of 17.01.2023) (https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/communitiesand-networks/harnessing-talent-platform_en). 2 Regulation (EU) 2025/1914 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review, OJ L, 2025/1914, 19.9.2025, https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1914/oj/eng. 3 This Mid-term Review Regulation provides flexibility and incentives for Member States to allocate funding for affordable housing beyond the already planned EUR 7.5 billion for energy efficiency and social housing. Furthermore, a new financial instrument model for housing was developed by the Commission and the European Investment Bank, to help Member States to leverage Cohesion policy funding with other resources. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC1025. 5 https://eu-cap-network.ec.europa.eu/networking/leader/leader-explained_en. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R2115&qid=1772195915416.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2026-04-14 “E-000597/2026 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Post-disaster housing is not part of the European Affordable Housing Plan 1 . This Plan focuses on affordable, sustainable and quality housing solutions on long-term basis as a response to the housing crisis in the EU. It aims to help tackle the structural causes of this crisis by increasing housing supply, triggering investment and reforms, and supporting the people and the areas that are most affected. The Plan also shapes a new way in which EU institutions, national, regional and local governments, financial institutions and stakeholders can work together to address the housing crisis. In case a Member State is overwhelmed by a disaster, it may request temporary shelter assistance through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). Temporary shelter capacities provided through the UCPM are often donated by the offering Member States during the response phase. For its own rescEU reserve of shelter items, the Commission notes that sustainability factors – such as the type and value of temporary shelters, which may justify retrieving and reusing them – should be considered, although operational conditions may not always allow their efficient reuse. Regarding funding for temporary accommodation following a natural disaster, the EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) 2 may be activated at the request of the affected State. The EUSF may cover part of the costs of emergency and recovery operations incurred by public authorities, including the provision of temporary accommodation for the population concerned. According to EUSF Regulation, it is for the beneficiary State to decide how to spend the awarded assistance while respecting the relevant regulatory provisions. 1 https://housing.ec.europa.eu/european-affordable-housing-plan_en. 2 Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3) as amended by Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 143) and by Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 March 2020 (OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9.): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002R2012.”
  EU housing policy · EU competences on social policies
• 2026-04-08 “E-000332/2026 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Short-term rentals (STR) offer many benefits: greater choice, additional amenities for consumers, extra income for hosts, an incentive to invest in renovation, and a boost to tourism, incomes and jobs. However, in some cities and tourist hotspots, limited housing supply growth combined with the rapid expansion of STR (which can in certain places represent as much as 20% of the dwelling stock) as well as speculative investment practices may be intensifying competition for limited housing stock. While the shortage of affordable housing is mainly attributed to other structural factors, increases in STR activity have been associated with higher rental and sale prices in some European cities 1 . As announced in the European Affordable Housing Plan 2 the Commission will propose a new legislative initiative on short-term rentals, as a central component of an Affordable Housing Act. This will enable public authorities to take a set of justified and proportionate measures, particularly in areas of housing stress, and tackle remaining issues such as consumer protection and distinguishing between professional and non-professional hosts. In drawing up the proposal, the Commission will fully respect the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, working on the basis of its legal competences in accordance with the treaties. 1 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the European Affordable Housing Plan ‘Understanding the Housing Crisis’. 2 https://housing.ec.europa.eu/european-affordable-housing-plan_en.”
  EU housing policy · EU regulation of short-term rentals
• 2026-04-07 “E-000364/2026 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission According to the Ecodesign Directive 1 , the Commission is obliged to find an appropriate balance between environmental and health benefits and users’ costs, and protect consumers from any significant negative impacts, including regarding affordability aspects. The Commission is reviewing the existing ecodesign measures on solid fuel heating and is preparing Evaluations and Impact Assessments for solid fuel local space heaters and solid fuel boilers, which have not been finalised yet. The Evaluations and Impact Assessments consider several policy options, some of them based on the implementation of emission-abatement technologies like electrostatic precipitators or catalytic converters. Since the assessment is ongoing, it is currently too early to say which limits for pollutant emissions could be required in the future. The main focus of the ongoing review is to improve real-life emissions of currently regulated pollutants, with particular attention to particulate matter and organic gaseous compounds, which are directly associated with premature deaths by cancer or cardiopathic diseases according to the European Environment Agency. The Evaluations and Impact Assessments include a thorough analysis of the test standards that are most often used by manufacturers to show compliance with the ecodesign rules. The implementation of a test cycle that is more representative of real-life operation is one of the main goals of the Impact Assessments that will feed into the preparation of the new regulations. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/125/oj/eng.”
  Air quality policy · Ecodesign & durability
• 2026-04-07 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 7.4.2026 Written question A year after its adoption, the implementation of the Affordable Energy Action Plan [1] is well underway. The Commission is progressing on all its commitments, including the revision of the state aid framework, the adoption of guidances, or new financing products with the European Investment Bank. Several of the measures fall in areas for which both the Commission and Member States are responsible for action. Therefore, achieving the full potential benefits of the action plan is dependent on measures implemented by Member States, notably on taxation, permitting streamlining or making use of the enhanced state aid framework. Many Member States have taken action during 2025. Frequently, measures taken will require some implementation time until impacts are reflected in the bills. Energy prices in Europe are significantly lower than during the energy crisis of 2022-2023. Price levels diverge among Member States subject to national conditions and measures implemented. While energy prices have decreased since the peak of the energy crisis, they remain at a high level and diverge among Member States. The Commission has therefore continued its action. In October 2025, the Commission recalled a set of seven actions to bring relief to consumers. The Commission will continue to collaborate with Member States to support effective action through the Energy Union Task Force and will adopt initiatives such as a recommendation on electricity taxes and levies, a clean energy investment strategy, a Citizens Energy Package and a support package for energy efficiency financing. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0079.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2026-04-07 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 7.4.2026 Written question The Commission adopted the first-ever European Affordable Housing Plan (EAHP) [1] on 16 December 2025. This Plan is accompanied by an analysis [2] that assesses the severity of the housing situation in the EU. The analysis reveals, for instance, that purchasing a home has become progressively more challenging over the past decade and that the rental market is characterised by a widening gap between new market rents and existing ones, with significant regional variations. The EAHP includes actions and tools — including on financing — that the Commission has or intends to put forward as well as ones the Commission encourages Member States, regions and local authorities to implement to strengthen affordable and social housing. These actions are for instance the development of a new pan-European investment platform; mobilising new investments in housing under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) and new opportunities to scale up housing investments under the next MFF; exploring voluntary, market-led investment framework for affordable and social housing; and providing guidance to Member States to assist them in designing financial and legal solutions to support social and affordable housing. Furthermore, on 16 December 2025, the Commission adopted revised EU State aid rules [3] that will make it easier for Member States to financially support affordable and social housing. As announced in the EAHP, the Commission will present in 2026 an analysis of housing price dynamics, including available evidence of speculation patterns, data gaps and economic consequences . Where needed, the Commission will propose follow-up actions, in full respect of the subsidiarity principle. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC1025. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025SC1053. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/2630/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on social policies · EU housing policy
• 2026-03-23 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 23.3.2026 Written question The recast Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) [1] does not ban the renting of worst-performing buildings, nor does it impose obligations to renovate individual residential buildings. In line with the Better Regulation principles, the recast EPBD was preceded by an impact assessment. This showed that the worst-performing residential buildings are often occupied by vulnerable households and that the proposed measures will help reduce their energy bills. Energy costs represent a major share of households’ overall living costs. Renovating dwellings that are in poor condition, including those with poor energy performance, will improve access to decent, sustainable and affordable housing, particularly for low-income households, as highlighted in the European Affordable Housing Plan published by the Commission in December 2025 [2] . Rather than imposing uniform rules, the recast EPBD gives Member States significant flexibility to address social and territorial specificities and challenges, including through tailored national measures and financial incentives. Member States can also rely on EU funding instruments, such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility [3] , the Social Climate Fund [4] and the Cohesion policy Funds [5] , to support building renovations. As announced in the Affordable Housing Plan, the Commission will put forward a housing simplification package to facilitate the supply of affordable and sustainable housing. [1] Directive EU/2024/1275. [2] COM(2025) 1025 final. [3] https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en. [4] https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-and-activities/funding/social-climate-fund_en. [5] https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/cohesion-fund_en.”
  Energy performance of buildings · EU housing policy
• 2026-03-23 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 23.3.2026 Written question The European Affordable Housing Plan [1] refers to the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) when it says that the EU is already mobilising at least EUR 43 billion housing related investment. This amount includes [2] the Recovery and Resilience Facility (EUR 19.6 billion for housing investments and reforms); Cohesion Policy (EUR 10.4 billion for energy efficiency and social housing, and at least EUR 1.5 billion to reprogramme Cohesion funds under the Mid-term review); the European Social Fund+ (EUR 4.4 billion); the InvestEU Fund (approximately EUR 7 billion mobilised by December 2025 to foster public and private investment through an EU budget guarantee, as well as EUR 25 million by December 2025 for local project development support via the InvestEU Advisory Hub); the LIFE programme (EUR 138 million by December 2025 for market uptake and capacity building activities related to housing); Horizon Europe (EUR 540 million by December 2025 for housing-related research and innovation). The future MFF 2028-2034 is under negotiation by the co-legislators. At this stage, it is not possible to indicate specific amounts for housing, nor those directly available to local governments. The distribution of funds will depend on the agreed MFF architecture and internal governance arrangements of the Member States. Member States should coordinate with regional and local authorities to tailor housing reforms and investments to local needs, while the Commission will work to simplify local access to EU resources [3] . [1] COM(2025) 1025 final. [2] Question and answers on the European Affordable Housing Plan, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_25_3049. [3] Inforegio — EU Agenda for Cities 2025/https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information-sources/publications/communications/2025/eu-agenda-for-cities-2025_en.”
  EU housing policy
• 2026-03-23 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 23.3.2026 Written question The Commission is aware of Framatome’s joint venture project [1] . The Commission remains committed to moving away from Russian supplies in the nuclear sector. The Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports [2] is setting out a coordinated and gradual approach. Euratom is supporting development of alternative water-water energetic reactor (VVER) fuels financially, having invested EUR 20 million into research on non-Russian nuclear fuel design alternatives [3] through research projects led by Westinghouse and Framatome [4] . The investment in Lingen is subject to licensing by independent national nuclear safety regulatory authorities in Germany, with nuclear safety and security concerns due to be taken into account in this process. The Commission continues engaging with all stakeholders. The Commission and the Euratom Supply Agency, in line with the objectives of the European Energy Security Strategy [5] and the Energy Union Strategy [6] to enhance security of supply and diversify energy sources, have long been highlighting the risk of such a dependence and called for, publicly and in contacts with stakeholders, a reduction of dependence on any single supplier in the nuclear value chain. [1] Cooperation between Framatome and Rosatom/TVEL started in 2017, and plans for the joint venture predates the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0440. [3] It is expected that these fuels will be fully licenced within the next three to nine years. [4] On 21 June 2024, Framatome received an EUR 10 million contribution from the EU under the Euratom Research and Training Programme to support the development of a European fuel design for VVER reactors. [5] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, European Energy Security Strategy, COM(2014) 330 final. [6] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank — A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, COM/2015/080 final.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Nuclear energy
• 2026-03-23 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 23.3.2026 Written question According to the relevant definitions, incomplete cabinets cannot be placed on the market or put into service as ‘refrigerating appliance with a direct sales function’ in the sense of Articles 2 of Commission Regulations (EU) 2019/2024 [1] and (EU) 2019/2018 [2] , since some essential elements, for example doors, are missing. Only products complying with the applicable requirements, either at the time of ‘placing on the market’ or ‘putting into service’, are subject to the regulations. However, the fact that incomplete cabinets are not within the scope of the regulations does not prevent free trade and supply on the market. According to the Commission’s interpretation of the relevant rules, ‘putting into service’ should be understood as the moment at which economic operators need to demonstrate compliance with the applicable requirements. It is relevant, for example, for products which can only be used after an assembly, an installation or other manipulation has been carried out. In case a body of a refrigerator is separately ordered from the doors, the natural or legal person who ‘puts the product into service’, has the same responsibilities as a manufacturer who ‘places a product on the market’. The Commission provides further information in the Blue Guide [3] . It means that this natural or legal person must ensure that the product complies with the above-mentioned Regulations and that the appropriate conformity assessment procedure has been carried out. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/2024/oj/eng. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/2018/oj/eng. [3] Blue Guide on the implementation of EU products rules, COM (2022/C 247/01), OJ C 247 of 29.06.2022 (p. 38).”
  Ecodesign & durability
• 2026-03-02 “E-004659/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Retail energy costs differ across Member States due to wholesale market conditions, network costs and congestion, national taxes and levies, the energy mix, and interconnection levels. According to Eurostat data 1 , household electricity and gas prices 2 in Greece in the first half of 2025 were below the EU average 3 . This does not preclude regional price pressures in southeastern Europe linked to tight supply/demand conditions during peak periods, limited non-fossil flexibility and structural interconnection constraints. In 2025, the Commission engaged with Member State authorities and stakeholders, including in Greece, inter alia through the Energy Union Task Force for South-Eastern Europe, and stressed the importance of accelerating grid and interconnection investments, efficient use of existing grids, and deploying storage, demand response and flexibility solutions. It also adopted the Affordable Energy Action Plan 4 with key actions to lower energy costs for EU citizens in the short-term. Regarding consumer protection, the Commission considers that lasting price stabilisation is best achieved through structural measures. The reformed electricity market design strengthens longterm contracts, reduces exposure to gas price volatility and supports investment in clean generation and flexibility, while allowing targeted protection in crisis situations. Member States may apply targeted support for vulnerable under EU law, complemented by EU funding instruments, notably the Social Climate Fund. To increase citizen participation in the energy transition, strengthen the social dimension of the Energy Union and improve access to affordable energy for households, the Commission will publish a Citizens Energy Package. 1 Electricity price statistics : https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?oldid=670662 and Natural gas price statistics : https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=Natural_gas_price_statistics. 2 Prices considered in absolute terms (prices in EUR), for the household consumption band referred to in the first paragraph of the parliamentary question. 3 In the first half of 2025, the value for electricity prices for households in Greece was EUR 22.6 per 100 kWh compared to the EU average of EUR 28.7. Household gas prices stood at EUR 8.6 per 100 kWh for Greece compared to an EU average of EUR 11.4. In real terms, adjusted for Purchasing Power Standard (PPS), the household electricity price in Greece during the first half of 2025 was PPS 27.8 per 100 kWh and 28.6 in the EU. 4 COM(2025) 79 final.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices · EU energy infrastructure integration
• 2026-03-02 “E-004432/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has not yet issued a proposal for new ecodesign requirements for solid fuel local space heaters and no policy conclusions have been drawn. However, the current Ecodesign Regulation 1 provides for a review of the existing measures, and the Commission has therefore launched a dialogue with industry and other stakeholders, including a Consultation Forum and a call for written input, to prepare the impact assessment that will evaluate possible changes. The impact assessment will include an analysis of the impacts of different heating options on affordability, along with analysis of other social, economic as well as environmental impacts of different options. The coherence with existing EU policies and legislative frameworks, including on climate, is an integral part of the impact assessment, which will duly consider the renewable nature of biomass. Regarding user education, one of the measures being considered is a quick user guide to be provided with the product, whereby the manufacturer of the appliance explains to the user how to operate the appliance to optimise fuel combustion and minimise the emission of pollutants. Other complementary measures such as awareness campaigns are not in the scope of ecodesign but could be considered at national level. 1 Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1185 of 24 April 2015 implementing Directive 2009/125/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to ecodesign requirements for solid fuel local space heaters (http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/1185/oj).”
  Energy (green transition) · Energy efficiency
• 2026-02-26 “P-004668/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission EU law is neutral regarding national systems of property ownership as stated in article 345 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. However, national legislation needs to be in line with the principles of the internal market, including competition rules. As regards electricity markets in particular, Member States shall ensure a level playing field for electricity undertakings and ensure that no undue barriers exist within the internal market for electricity as regards market entry, operation and exit 1 . The Electricity Regulation (EU) 2019/943 2 sets out principles and rules for well-functioning and integrated electricity markets which, among others, shall allow all resource providers non-discriminatory market access. Regulation of wholesale prices is prohibited by European legislation and Member States shall ensure that electricity prices are formed based on actual supply and demand 3 . Measures with regard to retail prices must comply with the conditions laid down in article 5 of the Electricity Directive (EU) 2019/944, according to which suppliers shall be free to determine the price at which they supply their customers unless Member State authorities ensure protection of energy poor and vulnerable households customers or for the purpose of a transition period towards effective competition, they can apply price intervention under certain criteria. 1 Electricity Directive (EU) 2019/944, article 3 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/944/oj/eng). 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/943/oj/eng. 3 Electricity Regulation (EU) 2019/943, article 3 and 10, op. cit.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices · Energy (green transition)
• 2026-02-18 “E-004589/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Great Sea Interconnector that has been included again on the latest EU list 1 of projects of common interest under the Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E) Regulation 2 , is one of the Energy Highway initiatives identified in the European Grids Package 3 to which the Commission will continue to give strong political and technical support. Whilst the project has encountered delays, the Commission is not aware of a new timetable for the implementation having been set and is working closely with the Cypriot and Greek authorities and the project promoter to overcome the delays. At the same time, regarding the funding that the project has received under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), the conditions set out in the grant agreement apply, including regarding timelines. The inclusion of the project on the EU list and the CEF funding entail that the project fulfils the criteria of the TEN-E Regulation, including a positive cost-benefit analysis. The Cypriot and Greek authorities are looking into certain economic parameters with the objective of accelerating project implementation. The Commission supports such an acceleration. The discussions between the Commission and the Cypriot and Greek authorities comprise geopolitical risks and the Commission is fully engaged to strongly emphasize the EU dimension of the project to third countries to prevent further implementation delays. The Commission also set out its expectations in the 2025 Enlargement report for Türkiye 4 accompanying the 2025 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy 5 . 1 C(2025) 8144 final. 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure. 3 COM(2025) 1005 final. 4 SWD(2025) 756 final, p. 57. 5 COM(2025) 690 final.”
  EU funding for transportation · EU transport infrastructure integration
• 2026-02-05 “E-003573/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027 supports sustainable energy through multiple programmes. Available data (in EUR billion) for key relevant MFF programmes is included below, structured as follows for each of the programmes: (1) funds committed (sustainable energy/fossil fuels); (2) total programme budget (2021-2027): - Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Energy: (1) 3.43/0.15[1]; (2) 5.8; - LIFE- Clean Energy Transition: (1) 0.69/n.a ; (2) 1; - Cohesion policy funds[2]: (1) 45[3]/ 0.9[4]; (2) 293; - Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)[5]: (1) 64[6]/1.6[7] (2) 650[8]; - InvestEU: (1) 9/n.a. (2) 30.4[9]. The next MFF is proposed with a streamlined structure and fewer programmes dedicated to specific policies. EUR 29.9 billion is proposed for specific energy objectives under CEF. Other key programmes – the European Competitiveness Fund (ECF), Horizon Europe (HE), and National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPPs) – are proposed to fund energy as part of broader priorities, e.g., Clean Transition and Industrial Decarbonisation in ECF (provisionally EUR 26.2 billion, complemented by EUR 25.3 billion for collaborative research in line with the ECF priorities under HE). The average annual energy-related investment needs 1 estimated within the framework of REPowerEU 2 and the Impact Assessment of the 2040 Climate Target 3 amount to EUR 680 billion for the MFF period (2028-2034) to reach the EU climate targets. This amount comprises demand-side measures that require on average EUR 380 billion per year, supply side measures, including power generation and storage, that would need EUR 195 billion per year, and energy infrastructure needs of EUR 105 billion per year, of which EUR 85 billion for grid infrastructure. 1 Excluding transport. 2 SWD(2022) 230 final. 3 SWD/2024/63 final.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration · EU industrial funding
• 2026-02-05 “E-004373/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission As far as question 1 is concerned, the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) 1 sets out an obligation to install solar energy equipment in certain categories of residential and non-residential buildings. This obligation includes both solar thermal and solar photovoltaic (PV) or the combination of solar PV and thermal (PVT) with clear deadlines. Although the EPBD does not set an obligation to deploy a specific solar thermal capacity, the Commission’s EPBD guidance on solar energy buildings 2 recommends that buildings’ energy needs – both heat and electricity – are taken into account when deciding between PV, solar thermal, or combinations of the two. In addition, as solar thermal energy differs from PV in terms of space requirements, the guidance further recommends that the available roof area be considered in the decision-making process. The combination of solar PV and solar thermal can reduce constraints on the electricity grid and contribute to the resilience of the energy system. In what relates to question 2, Article 10, provides flexibility for Member States in implementing the obligations to deploy suitable solar installations on buildings including allowing exemptions related to technical suitability, economic feasibility and functional feasibility of solar installations. Where grid-related concerns arise, exemptions from the solar obligation should not be automatically granted. Instead, alternative solutions such as selfconsumption, energy storage or energy sharing should be considered first. Deferral may only be considered if these options remain unfeasible due to grid concerns. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1275/oj/eng. 2 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/fd6f89fe-711b-4025-bc3776b99baaa3fe_en?filename=Solar%20energy%20in%20buildings%20%28Article%2010%29%20%20annex%208.pdf.”
  EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects · Energy performance of buildings
• 2026-02-04 “E-004679/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom 1 requires Member States to have in place a management system and adequate relevant administrative provisions for nuclear and radiological emergencies. It also requires them to establish in advance response plans for such emergencies, which must be tested, reviewed and revised regularly. While the Directive requires that national emergency plans or management systems include public information arrangements on the health protection measures and on the actions the members of the public likely or to be actually affected in the event of an emergency should take, the publication of the emergency plans is not a requirement under the Directive. The obligation only concerns the provision of appropriate information to the public, not the disclosure of entire operational emergency plans, which remains the responsibility of national authorities. The Euratom Treaty and the Euratom-based secondary legislation are only applicable to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and not to its military applications. According to EU case-law [Case 65/04 of 9 March 2006 Commission v United Kingdom; C-61/03 of 12 April 2005 Commission v United Kingdom], the use of nuclear energy for military purposes falls outside the scope of the Euratom Treaty and its secondary legislation. Therefore, the Commission has no mandate to address nuclear warheads or nuclear-powered military vessels. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013L0059.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · EU competences on defence
• 2026-02-04 “E-004196/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission While fossil fuels still represent the majority of primary as well as final energy consumption globally and in the EU, the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in the EU’s energy mix has doubled since 2009 1 , reaching 20% of primary consumption in 2023 2 . Globally, renewable energy capacity additions amounted to 582 GW against 57 GW for non-RES in 2023 3 . Replacing fossil fuels with home-grown RES, including wind, is a prerequisite for enhancing the EU’s strategic autonomy by reducing existing dependencies on fossil fuel imports and reducing energy prices for a competitive EU economy. It also helps reaching the EU’s energy and climate targets. According to the International Renewable Energy Agency IRENA, wind energy is the cheapest source of renewable electricity worldwide and 91% of all newly commissioned utility-scale RES projects delivered electricity at a lower cost than the cheapest new fossil fuel-fired alternative in 2024 4 5 . Up until now, the European wind supply industry is dominating the EU market 6 and the EU remains a net-exporter of wind turbines and generators, as well as equipment and components 7 . To address the challenges faced by the European wind industry, including increased competition from third countries, the Commission presented the European Wind Power Action Plan 8 in October 2023. It has been largely implemented, including with the creation by the European Investment Bank of a dedicated package of counter-guarantees to improve access to finance for the wind sector 9 . In addition, the Net-Zero Industry Act 10 adopted in June 2024 aims 1 Year of adoption of the first Renewable Energy Directive (RED). Note that the targets in the RED are expressed as shares of final energy consumption. 2 It should also be noted that renewable energy sources like solar and wind directly produce electricity, thus bypassing the conversion losses associated with fossil fuels, which need to be converted into electricity or heat. This makes the primary energy figure higher for fossil fuels and thus lowers the share of renewables in primary energy statistics. Going forward, electrification of end uses would systematically reduce primary energy consumption, leading to a rise in the share of renewable energy. 3 Renewable Energy Highlights 2025, IRENA, 2025, available at https://www.irena.org//media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2025/Jul/IRENA_DAT_Renewable_energy_highlights_2025.pdf. 4 Renewable power generation costs in 2024, International Renewable Energy Agency, 2025, https://www.irena.org/Publications/2025/Jun/Renewable-Power-Generation-Costs-in-2024. 5 Renewable Energy Directive, Environmental Impact Assessment Directive, Birds Directive and Habitats Directive, amongst others. 6 European OEMs dominate the domestic onshore market with an 88% share and monopolize the offshore market entirely. Source: Clean Energy Technology Observatory: Wind Energy in the European Union - 2024 Status Report on Technology Development, Trends, Value Chains and Markets, European Commission, 2024, available at https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/0882709. 7 European suppliers account for 83% of the supplier payments made by the European wind industry. The rest goes to suppliers outside of Europe, including overseas affiliates of European companies. Source: European Wind Energy Competitiveness Report, ETIP Wind, June 2025, available at https://etipwind.eu/wpcontent/uploads/files/publications/ETIPWind-competitiveness-report-2025.pdf. 8 COM(2023) 669 final. 9 https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2023-510-eib-commits-eur5-billion-to-support-europe-s-wind-manufacturersand-approves-over-eur20-billion-in-financing-for-new-projects. 10 Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724, OJ L, 2024/1735, 28.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1735/oj.”
  Off-shore renewables · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2026-01-26 “E-004299/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Energy security and the Mediterranean region are two important priorities for the Commission, as demonstrated by the recent adoption of the Pact for the Mediterranean 1 and by the upcoming revision of the EU energy security framework 2 . The Commission welcomes and supports the regional cooperation on interconnectivity projects in the Eastern Mediterranean via different frameworks, including Projects of Common Interest (PCI) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMI) projects provided by the TransEuropean Networks for Energy (TEN-E) Regulation 3 . The Alexandroupolis and Revithoussa liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals are already operational and can support the diversification of gas supply of South-East Europe. The terminals were co-funded through the European Structural and Investment Funds and the Connecting Europe Facility. The Commission also actively supports electricity interconnectivity in the region, as demonstrated by the inclusion of the Great Sea Interconnector in the new Energy Highways Initiative. The security of key energy infrastructure against hybrid or geopolitical threats is a high priority of the Commission and is covered by the Critical Entities Resilience Directive 4 . This is why since the mid-term review of the Cohesion Policy in September 2025 5 , critical energy infrastructure protection projects are eligible for Cohesion Policy financing. As the Commission’s proposal for the next multiannual financial framework translates the objective of ‘preparedness by design’ into its structure, it also addresses preparedness against emerging threats, such as hybrid attacks. Lastly, the upcoming European Grids Package will strengthen the resilience and security of cross-border energy infrastructure. 1 JOIN(2025) 26 final. 2 COM(2025) 870 final, Initiative 7. 3 Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure. 4 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC. 5 Regulation (EU) 2025/1914 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2025, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · EU energy infrastructure integration · Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2026-01-26 “E-004517/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The co-legislators agreed in 2024 on the European electricity market design reform to address high and volatile prices. The reform strengthens the role of power purchase agreements and two-way contracts for difference to promote long-term pricing tools, promotes non-fossil flexibility as an alternative to gas, and allows consumers to be less dependent on volatile short-term markets. The Commission supports Member States in their implementation. Furthermore, the Commission adopted in February the Action Plan for Affordable Energy that comprises short- and long-term measures to structurally lower energy prices 1 . In addition, the Commission is supporting the accelerated deployment of non-fossil flexibility. Already in 2025, annual storage investment volumes in Europe are catching up with China and the United States according to the International Energy Agency’s latest World Investment Outlook 2 . Via tertiary legislation, the Commission aims to address remaining regulatory barriers for non-fossil flexibility. It will also adopt a Clean Energy Investment Strategy, which will help accelerate investments into non-fossil flexibility. The recently adopted Grids Package ensures a more efficient and more interconnected European energy system, ultimately contributing to lower energy prices and lower price disparities among Member States. Finally, the Commission proposed a reinforced Connecting Europe Facility for Energy in the Multiannual Financial Framework proposal 3 , increasing the support of interconnection reinforcement from EUR 5.84 billion to EUR 29.91 billion for 2028-2034. Domestic grid projects will be eligible for funding under the National and Regional Partnerships Plans and the European Competitiveness Fund. 1 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/action-plan-affordable-energy-unlocking-true-value-our-energy-unionsecure-affordable-efficient-and_en. 2 https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2025. 3 MFF proposal COM(2025)570: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0570&qid=1753978048542.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2026-01-26 “E-004440/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The EU has put in place an extensive set of policies and strategies to deliver the clean energy transition and achieve climate neutrality by 2050. These initiatives aim to boost and create quality jobs and promote solidarity and fairness to ensure a just transition. Central to these policies is the goal to increase investments in renewable energy. However, they do not specify who the investors should be. The Renewable Energy Directive 1 contains a binding EU renewable energy target of 42% by 2030 with aspiration to achieve 45% and provides an enabling framework to boost deployment of renewable energy to achieve the target. It is thus essential that Member States put in place the necessary measures to transpose the Directive. In addition, the Commission monitors fossil fuel subsidies EU-wide and recommends their phase out in 12 countries through the European Semester 2 . To accelerate the energy transition, the Commission also promotes renewable energy investments through additional policies, funding and financial instruments. Beyond this, it is up to Member States to consider additional measures that further incentivise fossil fuel companies to diversify their portfolios by integrating more renewable assets and reducing the stranded assets risk. As set out in the Action Plan for Affordable Energy, the Commission is working on a Clean Energy Investment Strategy to mobilise private capital for the energy transition and help close the investment gap. The strategy will identify investment barriers and provide policy support to mobilise investments for grids, generation, energy efficiency, flexibility/storage, and research and innovation through a set of financial and non-financial actions at EU and national level. 1 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 82, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/2001/oj. 2 2025 European Semester: Country Reports: https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/2025-europeansemester-country-reports_en.”
  Energy (green transition) · Fossil fuels
• 2026-01-16 “E-004028/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes good note of the issues raised by the Honourable Member. On 3 November 2025, Greece submitted to the Commission a proposal to revise its Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP), as last amended in June 2025. The Commission will examine this proposal in the coming period, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241 1 , including whether the reasons put forward justify an amendment to the Plan. While this assessment is ongoing, the Commission cannot comment on the content of the submission or on specific proposals concerning the inclusion or exclusion of measures. The Commission recognises that the tight implementation deadlines under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (August 2026) may justify decisions by Member States to remove or rescope measures where implementation risks are high, provided this is due to objective circumstances 2 . Such amendments must still meet the Article 19 assessment criteria 3 and maintain the overall goals and level of ambition of the Greek RRP. In parallel to the ongoing revision process of the Greek RRP, and in particularly relevant for investment measures that may be removed or downscaled for various objective circumstances, the Commission encourages Greece to also use complementary EU instruments, such as the structural funds and the social climate fund, to continue supporting vulnerable consumers and energy community initiatives. Furthermore, the Commission invites the national authorities to ensure the meaningful participation of local authorities and civil society organisations, where relevant, in the design and governance of such programmes, to facilitate transparency, inclusiveness and timely delivery, and preserve the social and territorial objectives of the energy transition. 1 OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj. 2 In line with Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241. 3 Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241.”
  Energy (green transition) · EU expenditure on social policy
• 2026-01-15 “E-004553/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Annex IX to the Renewable Energy Directive (Directive (EU) 2018/2001 1 ) was amended through Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2024/1405 2 , which added additional feedstocks. Currently, no further amendments to the Annex are planned. The Annex includes several feedstock categories, including certain types of waste and residues. The Commission will continue to strive to ensure a harmonised interpretation of the coverage of the Annex. To this end, the Commission will assess whether the list of feedstocks set out in Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/996 3 , which includes feedstocks that can be considered to be already covered by Annex IX to the Directive, should be extended. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/2001/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir_del/2024/1405/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2022/996/2025-02-24/eng.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2026-01-13 “E-004277/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The EU has set up a comprehensive framework to scale up renewable hydrogen, with binding consumption targets for industry and transport 1 , support for dedicated infrastructure and a well-functioning hydrogen market 2 . The Commission is working with Member States on implementing this framework. Financial incentives are also in place, including with the Innovation Fund under the European Hydrogen Bank, Horizon Europe 3 , and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). Under CEF, the Commission allocated EUR 5.4 million to the Greek Hydrogen Backbone H2DRIA project in 2024 for preliminary studies. Once finalised, the project will be eligible to apply for CEF funding for construction. Other hydrogen projects in Greece, such as receiving terminals, storage facilities and electrolysers, can also apply to be included in the next Union list of Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMIs). PCI status makes the project eligible for CEF funding and supports development through faster permitting. The Commission supports EU’s electrolyser competitiveness and production through various measures. The new Clean Hydrogen Implementation Working Group under the SET Plan is aligning European, national and private clean-energy Research & Innovation (R&I) investments. At European level, R&I is channelled via the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking 4 , which manages an R&I programme with EUR 1 billion support plus EUR 200 million for Hydrogen Valleys such as the Trieres project. Further support is provided through the European Innovation Council 5 . Important Projects of Common European Interest, including EU electrolyser factories, receive state aid for hydrogen. The Net Zero Industry Act supports European content in auctions and public procurement. 1 Directive (EU) 2018/2001. 2 Directive (EU) 2024/1788 and Regulation (EU) 2024/1789. 3 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en. 4 https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/institutions-and-bodies/search-all-eu-institutions-andbodies/clean-hydrogen-joint-undertaking_en. 5 https://eic.ec.europa.eu/index_en.”
  EU industrial funding · EU energy infrastructure integration · Low-carbon hydrogen
• 2026-01-13 “E-004281/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Indeed, hydropower is an important energy source being the EU’s second largest source of renewable electricity, following wind power. Hydropower produces about 29.9% of all renewable electricity in the EU, having an important role for attaining the 2030 targets and the 2050 decarbonisation objectives. Besides renewable generation, the technology also provides system services that help integrating a growing share of renewables, such as flexibility and storage. Following the submission of the final Greek National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), the Commission published its assessment 1 , taking note of the information provided by Greece on hydropower. Please note that the European Semester Country Report is a document published by the Commission, which provides a detailed analysis of each Member State’s economic and social developments and challenges. Regarding possible EU funding, according to the information available to the Commission, this project has not been supported under any programme, e.g. Recovery and Resilience Facility, 2 , InvestEU 3 , European Fund for Strategic Investments 4 , or cohesion policy funds. Furthermore, no technical assistance has been provided to the project, under the InvestEU Advisory Hub or European Investment Advisory Hub 5 . 1 SWD(2025) 140 final. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en. 3 https://investeu.europa.eu/index_en. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/economy-works-people/european-fundstrategic-investments_en. 5 https://investeu.europa.eu/investeu-programme/investeu-advisory-hub_en.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects
• 2026-01-08 “E-003997/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Direct taxation, such as taxation of windfall profits of energy companies, including electricity companies, falls essentially within the competence of Member States. The EU-level temporary solidarity contribution 1 , which targeted surplus profits of Union companies or permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors 2 , was an extraordinary measure applied during the energy crisis of 2022-2023. Currently, the Commission does not plan to introduce any similar measure targeting profits of energy companies. However, the Commission supports other tools for a fair and affordable electricity market, such as Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and two-way Contracts for Difference (CfDs). As proposed by Mr. Draghi, such tools provide affordable electricity to consumers and thereby increasingly decouple the price of electricity for consumers from volatile fossil fuel generation costs. The Commission recently adopted a guidance helping Member States establishing CfD schemes and assessing barriers to the signing of PPAs. Furthermore, the Electricity Market Design reform introduced the concept of an electricity price crisis, during which Member States can implement temporary public interventions to set electricity supply prices. 1 Introduced by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices. 2 The relevant activities correspond to following NACE codes rev 2 in accordance with Regulation (EC) 1893/2006: 05.1 Mining of hard coal; 06.1 extraction of crude petroleum; 06.2 extraction of natural gas; 19.1 manufacture of coke oven products; 19.2 manufacture of refined petroleum products.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-01-08 “E-003923/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes note of the issues and concerns raised by the Honourable Member. The Commission put forward a European Affordable Housing Plan (EAHP) on 16 December 2025. It will also conduct an analysis of the impact of housing speculation and its economic consequences as well as propose follow-up actions where needed. Concerning auctions, the Commission notes that protection of primary residences, and regulation of electronic auctions as a way of acquisition of properties fall within the competence of the Member States. The Greek insolvency code 1 established a safety net for vulnerable debtors, with a temporary subsidy of their loan instalment in out-of-court restructuring and a sale-and-leaseback regime 2 . The Hellenic Asset Protection Scheme 3 is a scheme created and implemented by the Hellenic Government. Transfer of real estate between parties is regulated by national law and protection of consumers is a primary responsibility of national authorities and courts. There are no EU guidelines which would promote transfer of real estate. Comprehensive housing planning under the responsibility of Member States can indeed be a tool to evaluate national housing policies and offer solutions to the issues identified by such exercise. The Commission agrees that students and youth are particularly impacted by the housing crisis and the Commission intends to cover the matter in the EAHP. At the same time, the Commission notes that housing is a multifaceted issue. Most of the determinants influencing housing affordability fall largely within the competence of the Member States, and therefore any new avenue on housing will have to respect the principle of subsidiarity. 1 Law 4738/2020 transposing Directive (EU) 2019/1023. The new sale-and-leaseback regime aims to avoid past moral hazard behaviour and the adverse impact it has had in the cost of credit in Greece. An interim scheme has been established by the authorities to ensure a smooth transition until the sale-and-lease-back entity commences operations, according to which the state will provide financial support to eligible vulnerable debtors. 2 e.g. in case of insolvency or if their primary residence is about to be auctioned. 3 Also known as Hercules scheme, the aim of the scheme is to improve the asset quality of the banks by supporting securitisations of non-performing loan portfolios by providing state guarantees on senior tranches of securitizations. On the request of the Greek authorities, the Commission has approved the scheme as market conform (e.g. it does not involve State aid).”
  EU housing policy · Non-performing mortgages
• 2026-01-08 “E-004126/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recognises the need to mitigate the impact of gas prices on electricity bills. The Parliament and Council agreed in 2024 on the European electricity market design reform to address this issue. The reform strengthens in particular the role of power purchase agreements (PPAs) and two-way contracts for difference (CfDs) make electricity prices less dependent on volatile fossil fuel prices. The Commissions supports Member States in their implementation. In its Action Plan for Affordable Energy 1 published in 2025, the Commission has set out measure to support the development of long-term pricing instruments. The Commission has launched, with the European Investment Bank, a pilot program for an indicative amount of EUR 500 million to provide guarantees for counter-party risk in PPAs undertaken by companies for the long-term purchase of electricity. The Commission will also assess barriers to PPAs, issue guidance on their removal and assess the potential role of market platforms. In December 2025, the Commission adopted a guidance to Member States on the design of effective contracts for difference, including their combination with PPAs. As energy bills are also heavily influenced by other cost components, such as levies, network charges and energy taxation, these aspects need to be addressed. The Commission issued guidance in June 2025 on efficient network charges and will issue in the coming months guidance on energy taxation. These efforts will help to make the energy system function better and to bring down the cost for European consumers. 1 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/action-plan-affordable-energy-unlocking-true-value-our-energy-unionsecure-affordable-efficient-and_en.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-01-08 “E-003786/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen On behalf of the European Commission The Commission is monitoring the recent events in Spain and Portugal, and the importance of resilient energy and digital infrastructures in crisis situations. The network code on electricity emergency and restoration (Regulation (EU) 2017/2196) 1 requires Member States and transmission system operators to outline electricity restoration priorities in line with national emergency and restoration strategies. Risk preparedness Regulation (EU) 2019/941 2 allows Member States to designate users who receive protection against disconnection to ensure public safety and personal security. Commission Recommendation (EU) 2020/775 3 details categories eligible for protection, including digital and telecom services needing uninterrupted operation. These services are advised to implement robust business continuity arrangements to uphold service levels during electricity crisis, moving beyond risk-preparedness provisions. Directive 2018/1972 4 requires Member States to ensure the availability of voice communication and internet services during breakdown or force majeure situations. The Commission is exploring avenues to bolster resilience and preparedness across interconnected infrastructures, through tools like the Resilience of Critical Entities Directive (EU) 2022/2557 5 , the Preparedness Union Strategy 6 , and the Cable Security Action Plan 7 . Discussions to further enhance connectivity resilience are ongoing in the review of the Directive 2018/1972. EU funding instruments like the Connecting Europe Facility, Recovery and Resilience Facility, are vital for supporting investments in backup power and energy solutions. In 2026, the Commission will also adopt the revision of its energy security framework. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2196/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/941/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2020/775/oj/eng. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1972/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj/eng. 6 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/41857877-71e9-4477-9d69-131b0161bcce_en. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0009.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2026-01-07 “E-003918/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The political agreement 1 between the EU and the United States (US) includes a mention of the intention to procure energy from the US. This includes oil, gas, and nuclear technologies, fuels, and services. These energy imports are expected to have a total value of around USD 750 billion (ca. EUR 700 billion) through 2028. The governments of EU Member States, the EU, and the US government themselves do not buy nor sell energy. The purchases are intentional estimates that would be the result of commercial decisions by private companies, also considering existing contracts they might have with suppliers in the US and elsewhere. 1 Further reflected in this Joint Statement issued on 21 August 2025: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/jointstatement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreement-reciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-0821_en.”
  EU-US trade relations
• 2026-01-05 “P-004437/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Connecting Europe Facility for Energy (CEF-E) is the EU funding programme supporting investments in cross-border energy infrastructure, including electricity interconnections. Projects of Common Interest (PCI) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMI) are eligible to apply for financial support from CEF-E. Since its creation in 2014, CEF-E supported 124 PCIs with EUR 8 billion for works and studies. For the next multiannual financial framework, the Commission proposed 1 in July 2025 to increase the budget of CEF-E more than five-fold to EUR 29.9 billion, further incentivising investment in cross-border energy infrastructure benefitting the EU as a whole. In recent years, different permitting acceleration provisions have been introduced in the European energy legislation. However, electricity grids have always only been partially covered by such measures. The Commission adopted the Grids Package on 10 December 2025, which will propose streamlining permitting procedures for grids, renewable energy generation and storage projects, as well as recharging points. It also, among others, strengthens the cross-border energy infrastructure planning with the aim to ensure that all cross-border grid infrastructure needs are addressed whilst ensuring that current infrastructure is used in an optimised way. Moreover, one of the eight Energy Highways involves priority infrastructure projects across South-East Europe. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0547.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration · EU industrial funding · EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects
• 2025-12-22 “E-003876/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The EU economy-wide electrification rate is currently 21.3% while it should increase to 32% by 2030 12 . Increasing electrification 3 , contributing to lower prices and independence, results in increase in grid investment 4 , as illustrated by growing grid connection queues in at least 15 countries. In addition, European electricity grids are aging and need to be upgraded 5 . The EU framework for grid planning is regulated by the Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E) Regulation 6 and electricity market legislation 7 . Cross-sectorial and efficient grid planning is required at both EU and national levels. The Commission will put forward by the end of 2025 a European Grids Package, aiming to further improve planning, permitting, use and cost-sharing for EU energy infrastructure, to ensure cost-efficiency. Nuclear energy can also help build a resilient and clean energy system 8 . In June 2025, the Commission adopted the new Nuclear Illustrative Programme. 9 It assesses costs and investment needs covering the full life cycle of nuclear installations, upskilling, diversification and supply chains 10 11 . 1 COM/2025/85 final, Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation. 2 Clean Industrial Deal introduces a key performance indicator of 32 % of electrification rate for 2030, a steep increase from current situation in 2024. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0085. 3 As shown in the study on network development planning, tariff structures and connection requests for electricity distribution grids: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/08843617-9cf8-11f0-97c801aa75ed71a1. Study sees steep increase in grid connection queues as a consequence of growing demand for electricity grid connection. 4 The 2040 target impact assessment estimates the total electricity grid for the energy transition at about EUR 1.7 trillion between 2030 and 2050. This analysis is aligned with other studies on energy infrastructure investment needs. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024SC0063. 5 As stated in the Action Plan for Grids, 40 % of DSO grids have an average age of 40 years or more, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023DC0757. 6 Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EC) No 715/2009, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 and Directives 2009/73/EC and (EU) 2019/944, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32022R0869. 7 Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (recast). https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/944/oj/eng. Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02019R0943-20240716. 8 The Commission’s 2040 Impact Assessment presents nuclear capacity as it is stated by Member States’ policies, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024SC0063. 9 COM/2025/315 final. 10 The Nuclear Illustrative Programme (PINC) also assesses financing models for a faster development and safe deployment of new nuclear technologies such as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), Advanced Modular Reactors and microreactors in Europe. 11 Member States have the right to choose their own energy mix, including nuclear energy. Further, under the reformed internal energy market legislation, nuclear projects have equal access to financing schemes including Contracts for Difference and Power Purchase Agreements. The Commission has also announced the design phase of a new potential Important Project of Common European Interest candidate on innovative nuclear technologies. Based on the first deliverables of the European Industrial Alliance on SMRs, the Commission will”
  Nuclear energy · EU energy infrastructure integration
• 2025-12-19 “E-004217/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges the importance of tackling integration challenges due to nonstandardised interfaces and protocols. Under the Ecodesign Directive, a study 1 found significant benefits in adopting energy-smart appliances: enhancing grid stability, savings for consumers, and aiding the green transition. However, market conditions at the time suggested that regulatory action was premature. Thus, a voluntary Code of Conduct was initiated, with eleven major heat pump and white goods manufacturers committing to develop products with common energy-smart features 2 . Soon, details on these appliances will be listed in the European Product Registry for Energy Labelling (EPREL) database 3 . Efforts are ongoing to include electric vehicle (EV) chargers and photovoltaic inverters in the Code of Conduct. The Commission is also considering energy-smart information for energy labels, beginning with an icon on revised labels for space and water heaters 4 . Simultaneously, since adopting the Digitalisation of Energy Action Plan, the Commission is working on the Common European Energy Data Space, aiming to establish an EU coordination framework to improve system interoperability, supported by the Smart Energy Expert Group. This space will encourage data sharing, notably for flexibility services and smart, bi-directional EV charging. The Commission continues to evaluate the need for regulatory actions and updates on the flexibility and benefits of energy-smart appliances. 1 Available on CIRCABC: https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/1582d77c-d930-4c0d-b1634f67e1d42f5b/library/50ecf23c-081a-42b7-bb00-f85e76fa92e7?p=1&n=10&sort=modified_DESC, with a separate report on policy options: https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/1582d77c-d930-4c0d-b1634f67e1d42f5b/library/691805b7-5b3b-4701-8f2b-e59dd9281397/details. 2 More information on the Code of Conduct for the interoperability of Energy Smart Appliances can be found here: https://ses.jrc.ec.europa.eu/development-of-policy-proposals-for-energy-smart-appliances. 3 https://eprel.ec.europa.eu/screen/home. 4 Revised energy labelling Regulation for space and water heaters published on Have Your Say for feedback in November 2025.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · Energy efficiency
• 2025-12-19 “E-002985/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission provided accurate EU volumes and value aggregates of imported gas in its answer to written question E-002890/2024 1 . The most comprehensive official data source of international energy trade of EU Member States is Eurostat’s COMEXT database. COMEXT data only captures imported volumes and values at the initial entry point to the EU and therefore, it does not necessarily reflect the ultimate destination of imports, which are unrestrictedly traded within the EU. Information on the exact payment made by each Member State for net energy imports would require information on confidential contractual arrangements. The Commission has proposed measures to improve transparency, monitoring, and traceability of Russian energy products across EU markets and by Member States in the REPowerEU Roadmap 2 , the EU's strategy to fully end its dependence on Russian energy sources by 2027, and the proposal for a Regulation on the phase-out of imports of Russian natural gas currently being negotiated by the co-legislators. As regards external policies (development cooperation; neighbourhood and enlargement policies; partnership), between February 2022 and October 2025 payments to Russia amounted to approximately EUR 3.6 million under contracts concluded prior 2021, providing support through direct management for civil society and independent media. Regarding internal policies (research on sustainable food security; competitiveness/single market), less than EUR 30,000 were paid to Russian entities (monitoring/evaluation experts under Horizon Europe, meeting costs under the Single Market programme) during the same period. Between December 2024 and October 2025, no new commitments have been awarded to Russian legal entities. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html. 2 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/repowereu-roadmap_en.”
  Natural gas · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)