Teresa Ribera

Policy topics Teresa Ribera is active on

What Teresa Ribera has said (80)

• 2026-06-17 “Good morning. Welcome to Brussels, the capital of the rule of law, respect for human beings, and the land of human-centred progress and prosperity in the world. That does not mean that we are alone; there are many other places in the world where the aspirations are the same. But this means that we have a special duty to preserve and to grow on those bases. So, thanks a lot, Evelyn, for inviting me to join this very important gathering. Thanks Maria, Agustin, Analil, Carchi, Mete, Dirk, and all of you for being here. It is so good and so important to think about this very bright idea of building the European Competition Forum in Brussels, thinking and working together as a community, teamwork, as you said. Thank you, Commissioner and Prime Minister Mario Monti, for being with us today, and thank you to all the national competition authorities that are joining us. Thank you to the whole competition family joining this relevant gathering to discuss different perspectives: enforcers, judges, academics, practitioners, and business. It is important to find the time to meet and discuss. This is part of our duty, part of what we need to do to keep building on the legacy that we got from our parents and grandparents, and to do it together. Now, we realise that we cannot take our legacy for granted. We realise that combining the different pieces of a complicated puzzle, with competition policy as a vital piece, is very important. This dialogue matters particularly today, but I would like to use this opportunity to look at the broader picture: why competition policy matters and why it is not something that we can take in isolation. Of course, we need to remain technical and true to our mission, but it is also important to bear in mind the world around us. The world we know is changing. Inequalities keep growing faster and faster. Think of the wealth created since 2020: 26 trillion out of the new 42 trillion created was captured by just 1% of people. We live in a world in which access to semiconductors becomes a geopolitical weapon and energy prices are shaped by wars and conflicts far beyond our borders. Global supply chains, once celebrated as instruments of efficiency, have become instruments of leverage. When economic power becomes concentrated, political will follows, and democracy and respect for people go increasingly under threat. This is a world in which access to advanced artificial intelligence can be restricted by political decisions taken thousands of kilometres away. Yet, this is precisely the world in which the European Union operates today. This is precisely why our duty is to keep on building a predictable and respectful world. Over the last 562 days since this Commission took office, we have witnessed growing tensions between major powers, threats to multilateralism, conflicts affecting trade routes, and an accelerating technological race centred on artificial intelligence. Economic power, technological power, and geopolitical power are becoming increasingly intertwined. A modern competition policy can help address these challenges. We can consistently work to ensure that the benefits of growth, innovation, and productivity reach workers, consumers, and citizens when preserving contestable markets and curbing excessive market power. That raises a simple question: how can we, the competition family, use competition tools to ensure they evolve consistently to contribute to prosperity and security while staying true to their principles and values? For many years, competition policy operated in a relatively stable geopolitical environment where efficiency was the dominant concern. Globalisation was expected to deliver resilience, technology was expected to spread, and concentration was viewed primarily as an economic issue. Most of those assumptions are now being challenged simultaneously. The challenge before us is not to abandon our principles and values; they remain our compass. The challenge is to update our instruments while remaining faithful to openness, fairness, opportunity, and the rule of law. That is what we have tried to do over these last 560 days through different updates and enforcement decisions. Think about the update of our State aid framework, both the Clean Industrial State Aid Framework and the response to the Middle East crisis. Think about the enforcement of new tools like the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, or the ongoing review of the Merger Guidelines. Different tools, one objective: to ensure that competition policy remains relevant in a world that is becoming more fragmented, more technological, and more contested. For decades, competition policy focused primarily on economic efficiency. Efficiency remains very, very important, but efficiency alone is not enough. An algorithm may seem to optimise decisions, but remember, we are a people-centred community of values. An algorithm cannot replace democratic accountability. A platform may organise information, but it cannot substitute the social contract on which our societies are built. The challenge posed by digital markets is not simply unprecedented corporate power; it is that economic, technological, and informational power are increasingly concentrated in the very same few hands. Artificial intelligence is accelerating this trend. Some of these mega-powerful companies are worth more than the entire nominal GDP of some of the biggest European economies. The question raised by AI is whether democratic societies are comfortable becoming dependent on a handful of private actors for technologies that influence economic activity, access to information, and even public debate. This is not merely a competition question; it is a question about fairness, social cohesion, democracy, and sovereignty. Europe cannot remain prosperous if it becomes technologically dependent. We cannot remain secure if critical technologies are controlled elsewhere. This is why digital regulation and competition enforcement matter. The objective is to ensure innovation remains open to all, new entrants can challenge incumbents, and yesterday's market power does not determine tomorrow's technological winners. This is the logic behind the DMA. In digital markets, waiting until we decide an infringement case is often too late. Its purpose is to preserve contestability before markets become closed. This is why speedy enforcement and interim measures count. For example, the Commission recently imposed interim measures on a company to ensure competing AI chatbots can access customers through WhatsApp without paying private fees. This allows challengers to grow while our investigation continues. Recent years have taught us that efficiency alone does not guarantee resilience. Dependencies have costs that become visible precisely when crises occur. This requires us to rethink our assumptions. For decades, we viewed State aid primarily as an exception, but today's realities are more complex. Other global powers pursue active industrial strategies with massive public investments. The question is no longer whether public intervention should exist, but whether it is properly designed to serve the public interest while protecting the level playing field. This is the philosophy behind the Clean Industrial State Aid Framework. It is about framing public support around clearly defined objectives: accelerating clean energy, supporting clean technologies, and reducing strategic dependencies. While State aid contributes to the level playing field internally, we also use the Foreign Subsidies Regulation to protect it externally. European industry that complies with our values and regulations, social, environmental, or transparency, needs to compete under the same conditions as foreign companies. Just as CBAM protects from carbon leakage, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation prevents talent, tech, and revenue leakage. Europe does not suffer from a shortage of ideas or talent. Our challenge is turning innovation into scale. We are good at inventing, but we are shy in growing. Recent visits to Torino, Helsinki, and Tallinn reinforce this: Europe is not lacking ambition, but we must reward those who innovate and invest. Competition policy contributes to this through Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs). These demonstrate how European cooperation can create strategic capabilities in areas where no Member State could succeed alone. Approved State aid plus expected private investment for current IPCEIs amounts to over €92 billion. We are also working on a future IPCEI on artificial intelligence involving 18 Member States. However, competition policy cannot create venture capital or finance scale-ups. Europe faces a structural weakness where households save enormous amounts, yet those savings often leave Europe or remain in low-yield assets instead of financing innovators. Too often, a company starts and innovates in Europe but scales elsewhere. This is mainly a Single Market and fragmentation problem. Completing the Single Market is an urgent priority. Cross-border mergers of large European banks could help, and Member States should applaud such deals for the overall good. A truly integrated European capital market would allow innovative companies to access funding at every stage of development. Scale is not only about the size of companies; it is about the size of the market in which they operate. We cannot expect global champions to emerge from 27 fragmented markets. This is why we need to think beyond silos. Competition policy, industrial policy, and innovation policy are connected. This brings me to mergers. We are reviewing our Merger Guidelines, not to weaken control, but to ensure our analysis reflects the realities of global competition and technological transformation. We need a more holistic analysis that takes into consideration different contexts, such as how efficiencies and innovation contribute to competitiveness. Take telecoms: does the industry need better access to finance to challenge cloud hyperscalers, or is the proposition that increased consumer prices are needed for infrastructure costs? These are different stories requiring different assessments. A modern competition policy must support both competition and Europe's long-term competitiveness. The world is changing at an unprecedented speed. Technological disruption, geopolitical fragmentation, climate change, and economic coercion have become common. We saw this recently with events related to Anthropic matters and tensions in the Strait of Hormuz. We, the competition family, cannot stay blind. The European Union stands at a critical juncture. Our ability to remain prosperous while remaining true to our values can no longer be taken for granted. We need to keep our eyes and minds open and stay true to our core mission. The debate today is not just about legal tests or market definitions. Competition policy must be connected to the wider challenges facing Europe: innovation, resilience, energy security, and technological sovereignty. It is a tool to help Europe remain prosperous, respectful, reliable, democratic, and free. The principles of openness, fairness, opportunity, and the rule of law remain valid, but our instruments must evolve to respond to today's realities. I am committed and engaged, but I count on you, researchers, practitioners, lawyers, judges, and authorities. We need to work together to modernise competition policy, challenge old assumptions, and connect the dots. Together, we can deliver a more innovative, resilient, and reliable Europe for our citizens. Thanks a lot.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2026-06-17 “Thank you all for hosting me today and for placing this very important topic on your agenda. It is a great pleasure and a great honour to be here with you today. You represent European society as a whole. You also represent Europe's best efforts to build common ground when we need to deal with the difficult challenges ahead. So I feel that I am standing before an institution that embodies something essential about the European project: the conviction that progress is stronger when we act together, when we define and find common landing zones, and when we identify, beyond the differences we may have among ourselves, the points of consensus on which we can agree. It is also a great pleasure for me to be standing here, in this place, in Brussels. Because in these times, we also need to remind ourselves that we are still the place, the capital, where the rule of law matters and is defended with pride. A place where respect for human beings, and Europe as the land of people-centred progress and prosperity in the world, are key elements of our identity. When I say this, I do not mean that we can take this for granted, or that there are no challenges, disruptions or infringements of these very key principles in our behaviour. What I mean is that it is essential to be fully aware of the importance of defending them. It is essential to stand up and be aware that we cannot take them for granted forever. On the contrary, these times show the extent to which they may be threatened by others. There are many other places in the world where these aspirations are the same. So let us join forces. Let us find our way. Let us keep building on this model, which is so important, and take it as part of our duty. The duty that comes from the legacy our parents and grandparents built, a legacy that we need to respect and continue to grow. The European Economic and Social Committee has, for decades, provided the space where employers, workers, civil society organisations and citizens can engage in dialogue and confront different perspectives. And in times of profound transformation, that role becomes more important than ever. Your success is good evidence of our success, because we are living through a period of change with unprecedented challenges, both in terms of scale and complexity. Climate change is accelerating. Global competition is intensifying. Technological transformation is reshaping entire sectors of our economy. Geopolitical tensions, and the temptation to weaponise whatever is within reach, are becoming a reality. And this has an impact. Citizens are asking legitimate questions about jobs, affordability, fairness, their place in the future we are building, and the credibility and reliability of our model: an open market economy with high social and environmental standards, committed to a high quality of life for Europeans. In this context, the title of today's event captures perfectly the challenge before us and the core of my mandate: how do we drive a transition that is, at the same time, just, competitive and ecological? There may be people who think that this is incompatible. I think it is quite the opposite. We cannot think of competitiveness if it is not fair. We cannot think of long-lasting prosperity if it does not take into consideration planetary boundaries or people's aspiration to improve their quality of life. We cannot think of creating wealth if we break competition rules, innovation opportunities and the right combination of skilled people working for smart companies. There may be others who suggest that we need to choose between economic growth and social justice. This is not true either. Sustainability cannot be a luxury that we can no longer afford. Europe's challenge is not to choose between these objectives. Our challenge is how to achieve them together and seize opportunities, overcoming difficulties, anticipating eventual risks and building solutions, so that we can keep creating wealth. The future of Europe depends precisely on our ability to integrate these dimensions into a coherent project. And that project must be built around a simple reality. The transition is not something happening to Europe. This transition is the way Europe secures its future, its model and its DNA. The transition towards climate neutrality, circularity and sustainability is not a burden imposed on our economy. It is a driver for innovation, decent jobs, well-functioning companies and the creation of wealth. It is becoming the organising principle of our future prosperity. We know that the old model is no longer sufficient. But that does not mean that we can renounce it from one day to the next. That does not mean that things are easy or automatic. The model based on excessive resource consumption, fossil fuel dependency and growing environmental degradation does not provide long-term security either. It creates vulnerabilities, dependencies and difficulties. It undermines the competitiveness of our continent and economy. It exposes our citizens and businesses to volatile energy prices, for instance. It increases our dependence on external suppliers. It weakens our resilience in a world that is becoming increasingly fragmented and uncertain. The circular economy offers a different path. It is connected to the very simple idea of being wise in the use of the resources that are within reach. It is a path that allows us to create more value with fewer resources. A path that strengthens Europe's strategic autonomy by reducing dependence on imported raw materials. A path that stimulates innovation, creates new markets and generates quality employment. A path that recognises that competitiveness in the 21st century will increasingly depend on efficiency, sustainability, resilience and participation. Participation in the positive results and in the benefits. Participation that is perceived as a positive experience by everybody. This is why circularity must not be viewed as a niche environmental policy. It is our industrial strategy and a core part of our security strategy. But it is also a social strategy. And this is why, as for any other European project, workers and employers need to work together towards the same goal. Because every product repaired rather than discarded, every material reused rather than wasted, and every industrial process redesigned to minimise resource consumption contributes to a stronger and more resilient European economy. It helps lower costs and burdens, and frees up resources to be reinvested in people or in innovation. Yet we must also recognise a fundamental truth: the success of this transformation will not be measured only by emissions reduced or technologies deployed. It will ultimately be measured by whether people experience the transition as fair. Because no transition succeeds without societal support. Bringing opportunities to everybody, and ensuring a fair distribution of investments, costs, efforts and benefits, is very important. Understanding the challenge and being part of the solutions is the only way to ensure this backing. Today's circular economy already employs 4.3 million people across the European Union, but secondary materials account for only around 12% of European material use. Citizens need to see opportunities, not only obligations, difficulties and burdens. Workers must see prospects, not only disruption. Regions undergoing industrial transformation must see investment, not abandonment. Young people must see a future that is more secure and more prosperous than the one they inherit today. This is what we mean when we speak about the just transition. It is part of my mandate, but it is also a crucial part of the mandate of all my colleagues. And this is where your contribution, the contribution of the European Economic and Social Committee, is indispensable. You represent the organisations and communities that experience these transformations first-hand. You understand the concerns of workers, businesses and regions. You hear the challenges encountered by businesses adapting to new regulatory and market realities. Your expertise helps us identify risks before they become crises. And your opinions help ensure that European policies remain grounded in social reality. This is why shaping the answers together is so important. Think about innovation. It is often portrayed as the work of exceptional individuals or breakthrough technologies. But Europe's experience teaches us something different. Innovation is a collective endeavour. It depends on education systems, research institutions, workers, entrepreneurs, investors, public authorities and citizens. The clean technologies that will drive Europe's future competitiveness are the result of decades of collective investment. These technologies are creating opportunities that would have seemed unimaginable only a few years ago. They can help optimise energy systems, improve industrial efficiency, reduce waste, accelerate the development of circular business models, and support more sustainable patterns of production and consumption. But it is not technology alone. We must ensure that the benefits are broadly shared. We must invest in skills and support workers through change. We must continue strengthening social dialogue. Here again, you play a crucial role. There is another dimension that deserves particular attention. The transition is not only an economic and technological challenge. It is a democratic challenge. Successful transitions require trust in institutions, in science and in public policies. Trust that the benefits and costs will be distributed fairly. At a time when misinformation, polarisation and uncertainty are growing, organised civil society becomes even more important. People are more likely to support change when they feel heard, and when they feel part of the decision-making process. We are more likely to embrace new solutions when we understand their purpose. We are more likely to participate when we see that our voices matter. Participation is one of the conditions for success. And again, you represent a unique setting. Let me conclude. Europe has often advanced by transforming challenges into opportunities. The transition towards a circular and climate-neutral economy is not simply an environmental necessity. It is a competitiveness agenda. It is a security strategy. It is the field where we need to invest if we want to continue developing, creating decent jobs and generating wealth for all. Because it is a social project. It will require cooperation between European institutions and Member States, businesses, workers, public authorities, civil society, investors and regulators. It will also require a candid and honest dialogue between generations. Because whatever we do today, we either create or derail the opportunities of tomorrow. So we have this duty. We need to build that cooperation. We need to anticipate the challenges. No matter how difficult the problems we face may be, the only way forward is to address them, to face them, to discuss possible solutions, and to ensure that together we can provide the right answers. The worst thing we can do, the costliest thing we can do, the most harmful thing we can do, is to deny or hide the challenges that we have already identified. Thank you very much.”
  EU engagement with civil society
• 2026-06-09 “Thanks a lot to all of you for being here so that I can share with you that today we have adopted interim measures requiring Meta to restore free access to WhatsApp for rival AI assistants. Until January this year, Meta allowed AI assistants to interact with WhatsApp users, just as it allows other businesses to do, like online travel agents. This means that users could interact with their preferred AI assistants on WhatsApp. It could be Meta's own assistant, or those of others such as ChatGPT, Perplexity or smaller ones like Luzia or Poke. But, as you may remember, in October last year, Meta announced that it would ban all competing AI assistants from WhatsApp from 15 January 2026. All except its own assistant. And so it did. From 15 January, only Meta's assistant, Meta AI, remained accessible on the platform. The Commission opened an abuse of dominance investigation and, after we issued a Statement of Objections on 6 March in our interim measures proceedings, Meta announced that it would give rivals access to WhatsApp again, but that access could be subject to a fee. The problem is that this fee is so high that, in practice, it is not economically sustainable for competitors. The result is that access remains, in practice, blocked for all AI assistants except, of course, Meta's own assistant. Meta gave no convincing justification for its policy changes. It seems that Meta expects to leverage the vast reach and likely dominance of WhatsApp to benefit its own AI assistant and to foreclose rivals. It is now a critical time. AI markets are developing exceptionally fast, and AI assistants are expected to become an important way for consumers all across Europe to access and use AI. We cannot let large digital incumbents leverage their dominance of the past to dictate who in Europe gets to compete and who gets to innovate in AI. You know that we respect the laws and procedures with full guarantees. You know that our competition investigations can take time, because our system is one that respects the rule of law and rights of defence. Therefore, when the damage can happen quickly and there is a risk of companies being forced to leave the market, we need to use our tools. We need to take action to protect the status quo. This is why our interim measures powers exist. It is true that we do not use these powers very often. The last time was in 2019. When we do use interim measures, we make sure that they are necessary and that we do not impose a disproportionate burden. But when it is necessary to use these interim measures, like it is in this case, we use them. And let me be clear: this will be the case again if similar circumstances arise. Today's measures will remain in place until our investigation is done or, at the latest, until June 2029, three years from now. In doing so, we do not ask Meta to do something new, to implement some new technical engineering solution, or to put in place something technically burdensome. It is quite simple. We just ask Meta to go back to what they were doing by themselves until January this year. Nothing more. This will allow the Commission to investigate this matter in depth while safeguarding competition in the growing market for AI assistants. In our main investigation, we will take account of all arguments, including those being provided by Meta. But, importantly, we will be able to do so without the risk of serious harm to competition that could be almost impossible to repair. Without these measures, it could be too late by the time the investigation is over. The market could have tipped, as we saw in digital markets in the past. AI assistants, large and small, existing ones as well as solutions that are still being developed, will now be able to retain free and open access to WhatsApp as a key access route to users in Europe in that period. We are preserving choice for citizens across Europe on the AI assistants they want to use with WhatsApp, without that decision being made for them. Just to give you a figure, there are about 6,700 AI start-ups in Europe. We are an innovative continent, and we want to bet on this digital economy. And we hope many of them will seize the opportunity to benefit from these interim measures and bring their innovative solutions to EU citizens. What we do not want to see is that they do not even have the chance to try. Non-European companies can, of course, do the same. In fact, half of the complainants in this case are AI companies from the United States, because our rules do not intend to be protectionist or to close our markets. Our rules try to be fair. They do not care about nationality. They care only about the interests of European consumers and ensuring a level playing field. We have learned our lessons from developments in technology markets in the past. Failure by competition authorities to act quickly enough in some cases might have meant that dominant players became so entrenched that markets were no longer contestable. That is what we want to avoid. We cannot let this happen in AI. There is too much at stake. Preserving contestability in AI markets is essential to safeguard innovation in Europe, our strategic autonomy and, of course, choice for European citizens. So I think that this is an important measure to communicate personally. We hope that we can solve this case following our investigation process, according to the law, respecting the rights of defence, and deciding on this case before the end of this three-year period. Thank you.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2026-06-04 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 4.6.2026 Written question The Commission is closely following the developments in the Middle East as well as their impact on the EU economy and businesses. On 29 April 2026, the Commission adopted the Middle East Crisis Temporary state aid Framework [1] (METSAF) to address the effects of the crisis on particularly affected sectors — namely agriculture, fishery, and transport — where small and medium-sized enterprises ( SMEs) are highly represented. EU State aid rules allow Member States to introduce support schemes to assist companies, including SMEs in various ways, including the de minimis Regulation based on which Member States may grant up to EUR 300 000 over any period of 3 years [2] . SMEs can also receive state aid that is exempted from prior notification to the Commission and can be implemented directly by Member States based on one of the state aid block-exemption Regulations [3] . Energy intensive users can benefit from state aid pursuant to the recently revised Emission Trading System State Aid Guidelines [4] or the price-support provisions of the clean industrial deal state aid framework [5] . In addition, the EU is providing support for the decarbonisation of SMEs, including for energy efficiency investments through the InvestEU Programme [6] , inter alia via the European Investment Fund’s Sustainability Guarantee [7] , as well as the European Investment Bank’s ‘Energy Efficiency for SMEs’ initiative [8] aiming to provide EUR 17.5 billion in financing to help up to 350 000 SMEs lower their energy costs and reduce their carbon footprint. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202602593. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202302831. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02014R0651-20230701; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/state-aid-agricultural-and-forestry-sectors.html; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:4646029; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R2586. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020XC0925(01). [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/clean-industrial-deal-state-aid-framework.html. [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:4516649. [7] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021XC0713(02). [8] https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2025-331-more-than-350000-european-companies-to-get-energy-efficiency-support-under-major-eu-financing-initiative.”
  Energy transition (state support) · EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-06-02 “It is a pleasure to welcome you all to the Berlaymont and to be here with my very good friend and colleague Jessica Roswell. Someone as committed as you all to innovation, to high quality of life, to teamwork to identify how we can do better every single day to improve the quality of life of everybody. And of course, this means that we still need to unlock the huge potential that it exists in every single territory. We need brave people, brave members of institutions, brave researchers, brave and committed citizens that identify how to connect the dots to use the strengths, the potentiality, the cultural heritage, the knowledge, the differentiated added value of each of the territories to do better. So, thinking about place-based transformation is a great idea. It is why the preparatory action on innovation for place-based transformation matters, and I welcome and commend the work of the Joint Research Centre, Bernard and the whole team. Your involvement has been absolutely key. Today around 200 territories across Europe are already participating. 200 sources of potential. 200 territories having new ideas and betting and investing in their people. Territories that may be experimenting with cleaner energy on circularity, food security, and digital public services. Territories that are helping the new European Bauhaus to take place. When it can seem abstract at first, it ends up providing, supplying, coming up with solutions. They are not doing this alone. They are doing this together. We are doing this together. It could be very difficult to do things alone. But the energy at the very single scale, at the very single layer, does help to join forces and transform through creativity, the realities, the problems that we may be facing. Different territories that have different strengths, different industrial traditions, different cultural heritages, natural resources, and human entrepreneurial talent. And our challenge is not to make every single territory to look the same. Our challenge is to ensure that everyone does its best to build on what it already is, on what it already has. This is also how we strengthen Europe's resilience and competitiveness, variety, and diversity. We enhance the protection of the resources that we count on. But this requires the right framework. Innovation does not flourish in a vacuum. We need investment. We need the skills. We need infrastructures. And yes, we need the right context, including the right conditions, to ensure that it happens. Regulation may create predictability, may facilitate the proper reading of the different signals to build the direction of trouble. It helps when it is properly designed. It helps when it takes into consideration the different challenges ahead either if they are technological or physical things that change at a very fast speed, and this is why the support and the involvement of the joint research centers is so key. Your ambition to further develop collaborative approaches for regulatory experimentation and learning is helping in this exercise. We need spaces where territories, business researchers, startups, regulators, citizens can work together, experiment new ideas, testing what they mean in practice and where failure can also be part of the learning process. It is very difficult to achieve everything at the very same first time. We learn from failure. We need to do things so to prevent to the extent possible failure, but we need to learn when it happens and to improve in the next phase. The initiative we are discussing today is therefore much more than a collection of projects. It is an opportunity to learn together how we can do better. How innovation is about people, places, there is no single path to success. There may be many different views, many different paces to succeed. It helps to build trust and confidence. The two conditions that we require to ensure that innovation and transformation can happen turning back into people. It is not only technology. It is experimentation. It is stress. It is confidence. It's doing together. It's creativity. The results to be presented today confirm that our territories burst with ideas, that these ideas can be turned into local successes, and that local successes can be turned into European strengths. So, congratulations, my most sincere gratitude to you all and let's keep on doing. Let's keep on working together. Thanks a lot.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2026-05-27 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 27.5.2026 Written question The Commission is aware that the situation in the Middle East has direct consequences and dire economic and social implications for the EU, in particular for primary agricultural production and fisheries. To face this crisis, the Commission acts in two directions, in close coordination with Member States to follow the most exposed sectors and assess further developments. First course of action: more flexibility for Member States mobilising national funds. On 29 April 2026, the Commission adopted [1] the Middle East crisis Temporary state aid Framework (METSAF) [2] which allows for temporary limited amounts of aid for the undertakings active in primary production of agricultural, or fishery and aquaculture, products. Member States may use the METSAF, in addition to the standard state aid rules applicable to the agricultural and fishery sectors, to alleviate the consequences of exceptionally severe increases in the price of fuel and fertilisers caused by the current crisis. Second course of action: channelling existing EU funds towards affected undertakings. This is illustrated, regarding fisheries, by the activation of Article 26(2) of the European Maritime Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) Regulation [3] . This crisis mechanism was previously activated to compensate for additional costs and income forgone arising from the disruption caused by the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine in 2022. On 16 April 2026, the Commission activated [4] the compensation mechanism provided under the EMFAF Regulation. [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_894. [2] Communication from the Commission on the Middle East Crisis Temporary State Aid Framework (OJ C, C/2026/2593, 5.5.2026): http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/2593/oj. [3] Regulation (EU) 2021/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1004 (OJ L 247, 13.7.2021, p. 1). [4] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_824.”
  Funding for fisheries and aquaculture · Agricultural funding
• 2026-05-27 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 27.5.2026 Written question In its Decision of 2022 the Commission authorised Portugal to grant a EUR 453 million aid to bring SATA Air Açores (‘SATA’) [1] , back to viability under its Guidelines for rescuing and restructuring undertakings in difficulty [2] . The decision finds that the aid avoids the risks of disruption of an important service and of exit of an undertaking with a systemic role in the Azores. The decision is subject to conditions to ensure a lasting financial recovery of SATA, particularly the implementation of a restructuring plan. To limit the distortions of competition brought by the aid, Portugal offered to divest at least 51% in Azores Airlines. Such divestment, committed by Portugal, does not require the sale of SATA’s operations in the Azores but only of a majority shareholding of its international business. TAP Air Portugal’s (TAP) privatisation is also a decision of the Portuguese authorities and was not imposed by the Commission decision approving restructuring aid to TAP [3] . The economic, social and territorial cohesion of the country and Azores can be preserved by the competition measures foreseen in the relevant decisions, which allow competitors to offer air transport services in competition with SATA/TAP, whereas all routes not economically profitable can be tendered by Portugal as Public Service Obligations [4] . Furthermore, the Commission approved under Article 107(2)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) social aid schemes adopted by Portugal to support air transport for residents of remote regions, including the Azores. Under the TFEU, the Commission cannot impose any privatisation but can only assess the state aid measures notified by the Member States (Art. 107 TFEU). [1] Commission Decision (EU) 2023/1229 of 7 June 2022 on the state aid SA.58101 (2020/C ex 2020/N) and SA.62043 (2021/C ex 2021/N) which Portugal is planning to implement for rescuing and restructuring the SATA Group, C/2022/3816, OJ L 160, 26.6.2023, pp. 39-91. [2] Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty, OJ C 249, 31.7.2014, pp. 1-28. [3] Commission Decision (EU) 2022/763 of 21 December 2021 on the state aid SA.60165- 2021/C (ex 2021/N) which Portugal is planning to implement for TAP SGPS, C/2021/9941, OJ L 139, 18.5.2022, pp. 19-71. [4] Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Recast), OJ L 293, 31.10.2008, pp. 3-20.”
  Funding for OCTs and outermost regions
• 2026-05-18 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 18.5.2026 Written question The Commission does not possess any information on the specific guarantee issued by Credendo. If a guarantee would not have been provided on market terms and constituted state aid, Belgium would have had to notify the measure to the Commission. When it comes to the rules against social dumping, including as part of the Mobility Package [1] , their enforcement is primarily ensured by the Member States’ competent authorities and the Commission monitors their correct and on time application and enforcement. If necessary, the Commission may launch infringement procedures against Member States. The Commission takes into account social objectives and regulations in several EU-level financial instruments. For instance, instruments issued under the European Social Fund Plus aim at contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, to support jobs and create a fair and socially inclusive society. Further, financial instruments issued under InvestEU support financing projects in social infrastructure, social innovation, social enterprises, integration of migrants, refugees and vulnerable people, for example. [1] For further details please see: https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-modes/road/mobility-package-i_en.”
  EU policy on social criteria in public funding · EU Competition policy · State Aid
• 2026-05-05 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The Commission is monitoring Amazon’s compliance with Article 5(3) of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) [1] , including by investigating Amazon’s pricing practices [2] . It has sent several requests for information to Amazon and is in an active regulatory dialogue both with Amazon and interested third parties. At the same time, the Commission has cooperated closely with the Bundeskartellamt within the framework of cooperation and coordination provided under the DMA and competition rules. Article 5(3) DMA does not cover all pricing practices but only those that prevent business users from offering the same products or services via different channels at prices different from those they offer via the gatekeeper. To the extent they amount to an abuse of a dominant position, pricing practices can also run afoul of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) or national equivalent competition laws. For any conduct not covered by the DMA, the Bundeskartellamt can apply the stricter abuse control provisions under Section 19a of the German Competition Act in addition to Article 102 TFEU and national equivalent, which always remain applicable next to the DMA. The Commission remains committed to ensuring effective implementation and enforcement of the DMA. The Commission continues its supervisory and enforcement work in relation to Amazon’s compliance with the DMA, and it will not hesitate to take any measure necessary if justified by the results of an ongoing investigation. [1] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, pp. 1-66. [2] This includes the pricing mechanisms the Bundeskartellamt briefly explained under point 4 of the Questions and Answers accompanying the press release for its decision of 5 February 2026 , available at https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Others/Amazon_QandA.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=8.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2026-05-05 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question 1. Where national law grants consumers (private persons or companies) standing, they can bring an action before the competent national courts in relation to unlawful aid, including asking to order its recovery. Under EU law, if aid is later approved, it does not have to be paid back. However, interest must still be paid for the time the aid was unlawful, to remove any unfair advantage obligation (Article 108(3) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) . This interest is paid to the State budget, not to consumers. Consumers may still seek compensation separately under national law. 2. Under EU law, national authorities and courts must remove any unfair advantage gained from unlawful aid. In practice, this means beneficiaries must pay interest for the period during which they wrongly had access to the aid. The exact amount of interest is calculated under national law by the Member State concerned and the Member State must quantify the exact amount of interest to be recovered.”
  Energy transition (state support)
• 2026-05-05 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The main goal of the Merger Guidelines revision is to modernise EU merger policy. Mergers can have positive and negative effects for the competitiveness of the EU economy. Through this revision the Commission will provide a clear and modern assessment framework so that companies, of all sizes, have the necessary predictability when engaging in mergers. Importantly, the revised Guidelines will include positive guidance on which acquisitions involving start-ups are pro-competitive and do not warrant intervention. This ‘innovation shield’ will provide predictability and legal certainty for smaller companies when considering exit strategies. The revised Guidelines will also include clear and concrete guidance on those rare acquisitions of nascent or small innovative companies that can instead stifle innovation and merit intervention. It is critical to prevent killer acquisitions. Therefore, the Commission supports Member States’ efforts to review such mergers and will consider appropriate referrals under Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation referred by competent Member States. The Commission will not adjust the merger control notification thresholds since the EU Merger Regulation is not subject to review. The revised Merger Guidelines will instead provide updated guidance on the Commission’s assessment criteria for all mergers, including non-horizontal ones. The fundamental objective of merger control will not change: preventing harmful mergers that lead to too much market power in the hands of too few companies — harming innovation and growth. However, there will be new guidance on pro-competitive scale and a new framework to assess dynamic efficiencies that may be pertinent to mergers in strategic technology sectors.”
  EU Competition policy
• 2026-04-30 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 30.4.2026 Written question The Commission decision of 9 February 2026 approving the rescue aid to Acciaierie d’Italia S.p.A. in Amministrazione Straordinaria is based on Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), under which aid can be approved if it contributes to the development of an economic activity or an economic area and provided that it does not adversely affect competition and trade between Member States to an extent contrary to the common interest [1] . The urgent rescue loan approved in the decision will be exclusively used to meet operating costs, such as contractual wages and supplies, for some months. Moreover, the rescue loan is without prejudice to the obligation of Italy to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance in the shortest possible timeframe with the Industrial Emissions Directive [2] , as interpreted in the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union [3] . The additional letter of formal notice sent to Italy in the context of infringement procedure INFR(2013)2177 [4] takes account of the Court’s findings. The rescue loan merely bridges the liquidity gap with a view to transferring operations to a private investor that will be selected in the ongoing selection process and which may eventually be liable to repay the rescue aid. In this regard, the Commission takes note of the announcement of the Italian Government that the new operator will also be obliged to decarbonise the Taranto plant. Given its legal basis (Article 107 TFEU), therefore, the ‘do no significant harm’ principle is not applicable to the Commission decision of 9 February 2026. [1] OJ C1662 of 17.03.2026, p.1. [2] OJ L 334, 12.12.2010, pp. 17-119. [3] ECLI:EU:C:2024:542. [4] https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/search-infringement-decisions/?langCode=EN&version=v1&typeOfSearch=byDecision&refId=INFR(2013)2177&page=1&size=10&order=desc&sortColumns=decisionDate”
  EU policy on sustainability criteria in public funding · State Aid
• 2026-04-27 “E-000818/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The European Steel and Metals Action Plan 1 , adopted on 19 March 2025, outlines a roadmap to help secure the industry’s competitiveness and support its decarbonisation. To this end, policy instruments and initiatives available or forthcoming include: - Trade defence instruments on unfair pricing, subsidies for the steel sector, and tariffrate quotas on EU steel imports. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism keeping carbon costs of imported steel comparable to those of EU producers; - Funding for low-carbon steel technologies under the European Green Deal; - The Industrial Accelerator Act 2 to help boost manufacturing, grow businesses, and create jobs; - Amendments to the European Social Fund Plus and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, as well as the Pact for Skills 3 support workers, companies affected by structural change, and large-scale partnerships of energy-intensive industries; - The Emissions Trading System State aid Guidelines 4 , the Clean Industrial Deal State aid Framework 5 , and the Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy 6 support decarbonisation plant development. The General Block Exemption Regulation 7 helps retain skilled staff during plant transformation. Besides, Romania listed the Liberty Galati plant under the Romanian Just Transition Programme. Its funding contributes to the steel industry’s transition towards clean and efficient technologies, including training and re-skilling of staff. These measures show the Commission's commitment to support the steel industry. Without prejudice to other EU law obligations, they can be tailored to specific strategic industrial needs. The Commission is also ready to discuss any planned measures by Romania under EU competition rules. 1 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/european-steel-and-metals-action-plan_en. 2 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/industrial-accelerator-act_en. 3 https://pact-for-skills.ec.europa.eu/about/industrial-ecosystems-and-partnerships_en. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2020_317_R_0004. 5 https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/contribution-clean-just-and-competitive-transition/cleanindustrial-deal-state-aid-framework-cisaf_en. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52022XC0218%2803%29. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/general-block-exemption-regulation.html.”
  Ownership of strategic assets · Sourcing of critical raw materials · EU industrial funding
• 2026-04-22 “E-000940/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has been in contact with the German authorities regarding the ‘Solar Package I’ amendments to the German Renewable Energy Law (EEG 2023). One of the criteria for authorising State aid is to limit aid to what is necessary to address an identified market failure and thus avoid overcompensating beneficiaries. This principle is reflected in the Climate, Energy and Environmental Aid Guidelines 1 , which govern the Commission’s assessment of aid. Long-term commitments to disburse aid (contract duration of up to 20 years) create considerable uncertainty about market developments and whether financial projections are being implemented in practice, and thus the possibility of undue windfall profits. For this reason, in the Commission decision of December 2022 in Case SA.102084 2 approving the EEG 2023, Germany committed to introduce a claw-back clause (or similar mechanism) to limit any windfall profits. This obligation is a condition for the authorisation of the German State aid scheme. It is the responsibility of Member States to notify aid in line with the applicable legal requirements and to ensure the timeliness and quality of the information provided. Once a Member State notifies to the Commission a proposal for an aid scheme or its amendment, the Commission assesses whether the proposed scheme or amendment is in line with the State aid Guidelines and sectoral legislation. By ensuring compliance with these rules, the Commission ensures the compatibility of the proposed scheme or amendment with the internal market and its legitimacy vis-à-vis other Member States. The Commission has two months from the receipt of a complete notification to issue a decision. Given the confidential nature of discussions between the Commission and the Member States, the Commission cannot comment on the details of any particular notification. 1 OJ C 80, 18.2.2022, pp. 1–89, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52022XC0218%2803%29. 2 OJEU C/2023/061 of 17.02.2023, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202302/SA_102084_80CC9685-0100-C1F9-86A8933503F73C2D_58_1.pdf.”
  Energy transition (state support)
• 2026-04-22 “E-000370/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 1. Food price inflation since 2022 resulted from a confluence of factors, including supply chain disruptions due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine and energy price inflation, which also significantly increased fertiliser costs, severe weather events, and plant and animal diseases (e.g. avian influenza). These affected Member States differently, leading to transitory divergences in inflation rates. Competition authorities have actively investigated whether anticompetitive practices fuelled inflation. Since 2022, national competition authorities carried out inquiries for instance in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary and Slovakia. They did not find systematic margin increases, but initiated a few follow-up investigations, e.g. in Bulgaria. The Commission vigorously enforces competition rules against practices that keep consumer prices high. For example, it sanctioned practices in the confectionery 1 and beer 2 markets that led to the partitioning of the internal market along national borders. It also sanctioned a food delivery services cartel 3 . Current investigations target an energy drinks supplier 4 that may have limited consumer choice and excluded lower-priced alternatives; possible collusion by salmon producers 5 on prices, volumes and other factors; and possible market partitioning and trade restrictions by drinks and personal care producers 6 . 2. The Commission’s single market strategy 7 aims to develop tools to address unjustified territorial supply constraints when they fall outside competition law. A 2020 study 8 found removing such practices could lead to significant consumer savings. An impact assessment and consultations are ongoing. A call for evidence 9 to gather stakeholders’ views was published on 5 March 2026. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2727. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_2488. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1356. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2671. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_405. 6 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/mt/ip_25_737. 7 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/single-market/strategy_en. 8 https://op.europa.eu/pl/publication-detail/-/publication/831c7de4-2a1e-11eb-9d7e-01aa75ed71a1. 9 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/15252-Single-market-tacklingunjustified-territorial-supply-constraints_en.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2026-04-20 “E-000814/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) are a State aid tool enabling Member States to grant national funding to bring together knowledge, expertise and economic actors throughout the EU and create positive spillover effects to the whole EU. The disbursement of State aid after the Commission approval decision is the sole responsibility of the respective Member State and creates neither a right nor a legally enforceable act for a beneficiary to receive the aid approved, even if named in the approval decision. The Commission is aware that, in some approved IPCEIs, some Member States have delayed or even abandoned their initial plans to grant aid notified to and approved by the Commission, which were also identified by the European Court of Auditors 1 . Aiming to prevent such potential delays, the Joint European Forum for IPCEI (JEF-IPCEI), which involves all Member States, European Economic Area countries and the Commission, agreed on and published a collection of national best practices including hands-on guidance for all national authorities when to start and how to prepare for the implementation phase of an IPCEI after the adoption of the Commission decision in an efficient manner to ensure a timely disbursal of approved aid 2 . The Commission follows the implementation procedures of IPCEIs, for instance, by being ready to respond to requests from Member States and by participating in exchanges within the respective IPCEI governance body meetings. Member States involved in IPCEIs need to submit annual reports, which were standardised and streamlined in 2025 to improve efficiency. Based, on these reports the JEF-IPCEI is developing a dashboard to monitor the implementation of IPCEIs 3 . For more information on aid granted by Member States, please see the State Aid Transparency website 4 . 1 See European Court of Auditors’ Special Report on ‘The EU’s industrial policy on renewable hydrogen’, recital 76, https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2024-11/SR-2024-11_EN.pdf. 2 See i.e. Collection of national best practices https://competitionpolicy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bec8fa3-ff8b-4248-8522-b0534de6f46a_en?filename=JEFIPCEI_National%20Best%20Practices%20Collection%20KPs%201%20to%208.pdf on national budgeting process available at the dedicated IPCEI website https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/ipcei_en. 3 IPCEI website https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/ipcei_en. 4 State Aid Transparency website https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/competition/transparency/public/search/home?lang=en.”
  State Aid · EU industrial funding
• 2026-04-17 “E-000401/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 1. The legal basis for the Commission’s control in State aid 1 , as interpreted by the case law of the EU courts, does not allow to make the compatibility of an aid measure with the internal market dependent on conditions that are not laid down in that legal basis. The Commission’s powers seek to ensure that State aid does not unduly distort competition in, and not outside of, the internal market. However, Member States granting State aid may decide to impose additional conditionalities on the aid recipient. In such a case, it is for the Member State concerned to ensure compliance with the chosen conditionalities. 2. The Commission’s proposal for a measure addressing the negative trade-related effects of global overcapacity on the EU’s steel market 2 is critical to ensure the long-term viability of the EU’s steel sector amidst the significant challenges posed by increasing global overcapacity and growing protectionist measures in third countries. Like any other third country (with the exception of the European Economic Area) India will be subject to that measure’s scope and will be treated in line with its objectives. Therefore, the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with India does not pose a risk to the effectiveness of that proposed measure. 3. The Commission is not empowered to make its approval of State aid conditional upon compliance with conditions that are not laid down in Article 107(2) or Article 107(3) TFEU. As regards FTAs, reflecting the proposed conditionalities may limit the effectiveness of these agreements as they may result in potential trade barriers, which are normally what FTAs aim at removing. 1 Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). 2 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)726&lang=en.”
  State Aid
• 2026-04-17 “E-000427/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 1. Undertakings in difficulty within the meaning of the General Block Exemption Regulation (‘GBER’) 1 or the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines (‘R&R Guidelines’) 2 are not simply in a situation of weakened solvency, but are instead either manifestly insolvent 3 or in a situation of severe distress nearing bankruptcy 4 . An undertaking in difficulty has structural difficulties irrespective of the economic sector or whether it is an energy-intensive user. The State aid rules include crisis indicators which, when they are met for a given company, are generally considered by creditors as high-risk and triggering restrictions on financing. Such companies are not excluded from State aid altogether: they can benefit from rescue and restructuring aid, as well as targeted categories of aid under the GBER (e.g. natural disasters and start-ups) 5 . Public support to failing companies – which would otherwise exit the market – is severely distortive of competition and is in any event ill-suited to achieve other public policy objectives. 2. The Commission is currently revising the GBER, with the main objective of simplifying it and reducing administrative burden for Member States and beneficiaries, with an emphasis on small and medium-sized enterprises. The GBER already enables Member States to provide support to energy-intensive users, for example through aid for decarbonisation or tax reductions under the Energy Taxation Directive. In addition, the existing State aid rules 6 have recently been amended to expand the possibilities for energy-intensive users to receive various types of public support, including compensation for indirect emission costs and temporary electricity price support. 1 Article 2(18) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187 26.6.2014, p. 1). 2 Point 20 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty (OJ C 249, 31.7.2014, p. 1). 3 See Article 2(18)(c) GBER and point 20(c) of the R&R Guidelines. 4 See Article 2(18)(a), (b), (d) and (e) GBER and point 20(a), (b), (d) and (e) of the R&R Guidelines. 5 Article 1(4)(c) GBER. 6 Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy 2022 (OJ C 80, 18.2.2022, p. 1), Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post-2021 (OJ C 317, 25.9.2020, p. 4), and Framework for State Aid measures to support the Clean Industrial Deal (OJ C, C/2025/3602, 4.7.2025).”
  EU policy on sustainability criteria in public funding · EU industrial funding
• 2026-04-15 “E-000971/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of Google’s announcement to introduce this verification process starting from September 2026 in some jurisdictions (not including the EU based on publicly available information). The Commission understands that, as a result of this process, Android will require that all applications (apps) are registered by verified developers in order to be installed on certified Android devices. The Commission is also aware of public campaigns such as ‘Keep Android Open’ which have emerged in reaction to Google’s announcement. Article 6(4) of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) 1 obliges gatekeepers like Alphabet to allow and technically enable the effective distribution of apps on their operating system through third party app stores or the web. At the same time, the DMA also permits Google to introduce strictly necessary and proportionate measures to ensure that third-party software apps or app stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system, provided that such measures are duly justified by Alphabet. The Commission is actively engaged in a regulatory dialogue with Alphabet concerning Article 6(4) DMA and is diligently monitoring Alphabet's compliance with the relevant legal framework to ensure that apps, including open-source apps, can be effectively distributed on Android outside Google Play. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng.”
  Promotion of open-source softwares · EU rules on digital competition · Interoperability requirements for digital platforms
• 2026-04-01 “E-000612/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of Google’s announcement to introduce this verification process starting from September 2026 in some jurisdictions (not including the EU based on publicly available information). The Commission understands that, as a result of this process, Android will require that all apps are registered by verified developers in order to be installed on certified Android devices. The Commission is also aware of public campaigns such as ‘Keep Android Open’ which have emerged in reaction to Google’s announcement. Determining whether a commercial practice is in breach of Article 102 TFEU requires an indepth analysis of all relevant circumstances of the case. It is therefore not possible for the Commission to take a view on this question at this point in time. Article 6(4) of the Digital Markets Act (‘DMA’) obliges gatekeepers like Alphabet to allow and technically enable the effective distribution of apps on their operating system through third party app stores or the web. At the same time, the DMA also permits Google to introduce strictly necessary and proportionate measures to ensure that third-party software apps or app stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system, provided that such measures are duly justified by Alphabet. The Commission is actively engaged in a regulatory dialogue with Alphabet concerning Article 6(4) and is diligently monitoring Alphabet's compliance with the relevant legal framework to ensure that apps, including open-source apps, can be effectively distributed on Android outside Google Play.”
  EU rules on digital competition · Interoperability requirements for digital platforms
• 2026-03-31 “Answer given by the Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 31.3.2026 Written question U nder the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, [1] the Commission can tackle distortions of the internal market caused by subsidies from third countries. When such distortions are established following an in-depth investigation, the Commission can impose redressive measures on, or accept commitments from, undertakings receiving such subsidies. The Commission remains at all times committed to ensuring an efficient functioning of the internal market and monitors actively sectors for which it considers that there is a high risk of distortions caused by foreign subsidies. The Commission also analyses market information provided by Member States as well as market participants. This could include information about activities of UZ Cargo Polska . [1] Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2560/oj.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · State Aid
• 2026-03-30 “E-004282/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission As the Commission has previously indicated, salt is an important industrial input. While the Commission does not collect data on recent price developments for high-purity vacuum salt, it examines supply concentration in its assessment of the criticality of raw materials 1 . If the thresholds established in the Critical Raw Materials Act 2 are met, the Commission will consider the material critical and can take measures aiming at supply diversification. In case of high supply concentration within the EU, competition policy may be relevant. Competition rules, in particular Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), apply to the sector of high-purity vacuum salt. As regards any abuse of dominance, the Commission would apply its standard criteria under Article 102 TFEU 3 . It would first define the relevant market. Next, it would evaluate whether a firm holds a dominant position. If dominance is found, the Commission examines whether the dominant company’s conduct constitutes an abuse of dominance. If a violation is found, the Commission may order the concerned company to cease the conduct and may levy fines or require remedies. If they suspect that a specific practice restricts competition, citizens and companies can lodge a formal complaint to the Commission 4 . If relevant, this could include information about developments related to high-purity vacuum salt. In addition to public enforcement (under Regulation 1/2003 5 ), private damages actions remain available in national courts. 1 The Commission plans to update the list of critical raw materials by 24 May 2027 in line with Article 4 of the Critical Raw Materials Act. See for background also the latest https://single-marketeconomy.ec.europa.eu/publications/study-critical-raw-materials-eu-2023-final-report_en. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020, OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024. 3 See for further information on the Commission’s assessment under Article 102 of the Treaty the draft guidelines on the application of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (‘the draft Article 102 Guidelines’), https://competitionpolicy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-and-cartels/legislation/application-article-102-tfeu_en. 4 See for further information: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-andcartels/procedures/complaints_en. 5 Council Regulation (EU) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, pp. 1–25.”
  Sourcing of critical raw materials · EU Competition policy
• 2026-03-25 “P-000532/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Regarding the standstill obligation under Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 1 , it is settled case-law of the Union Courts that aid implemented after the Commission’s positive decision is presumed lawful until the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decides to annul that decision. The annulment of a Commission decision, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 264 of the TFEU renders that decision void. Pursuant to Article 108(3) TFEU, State aid granted without valid Commission approval should be considered, in line with Article 1(f) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589, as being unlawful. Nevertheless, it remains within the Commission’s purview to re-assess the aid’s compatibility with the internal market in the light of the Court judgment. The Commission cannot, at this stage, prejudge the outcome of that assessment. 1 Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union stipulates: ‘The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. If it considers that any such plan is not compatible with the internal market having regard to Article 107, it shall without delay initiate the procedure provided for in paragraph 2. The Member State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision’.”
  Energy transition (state support)
• 2026-03-24 “E-004680/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission As the Commission explained in its reply to written question E-000413/2025, commercial cards fall under Regulation (EU) 2015/751 1 on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions (IFR) but the caps on interchange fees are limited to consumer cards. Commercial cards can only be issued to undertakings, public sector entities or self-employed natural persons, used for business expenses, and charged directly to the account of the undertaking, public sector entity or self-employed natural person (Article 2(6) of IFR). In the EU, the share of commercial cards is still small compared with consumer cards. As statistics focus on aggregate data, across card categories, there is no detailed recent public data on the relative growth rates of commercial cards. The Commission is available to further discuss substantiated evidence that stakeholders may have. Under Article 11 of IFR, merchants can steer cardholders to use another payment instrument through rebates, surcharges when allowed at national level. This is enabled via Article 10(5) of IFR, under which issuers must ensure that commercial cards are electronically and visibly identifiable, so that both payees and payers can unequivocally identify a commercial card. National authorities are competent to address implementation issues faced by stakeholders. The UK judgement of 27 June 2025 2 concerns the mandatory multilateral interchange fees imposed by Visa and Mastercard on card transactions in the UK, including those for commercial cards, and ruled that they constitute an infringement of competition law ‘by object’ under EU/UK competition law. These proceedings are specific to the U K market. 1 OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, pp. 1-15. 2 https://www.catribunal.org.uk/sites/cat/files/202506/151711722%20%28UM%29%20Merchant%20Interchange%20Fee%20Umbrella%20Proceedings%20%20Judgment%20%2027%20Jun%202025.pdf.”
  Financial regulation · EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2026-03-12 “E-000132/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Having access to the full Commission decision of 5 September 2025 in the AdTech case is not necessary to reply to the Commission’s requests for information on Google’s compliance plan. The Commission’s questions are about Google’s compliance plan, a copy of which was attached to the questionnaire in the requests for information. Still, on 15 January 2026, the Commission published the non-confidential version of the full decision in the AdTech case 1 . Proxistore did not file any complaint with the Commission. Proxistore has been consulted on Google’s compliance plan and has received the same questions as other market participants. The AdTech decision imposes two obligations on Google. First, Google must cease certain ongoing practices. Second, Google must eliminate its conflicts of interest within the AdTech supply chain. Whilst the Commission, in its statement of objections sent to Google, maintained the preliminary view that a structural remedy is likely to be the only way to comply with the second obligation, it has not reached a final conclusion on that matter. To reach a final conclusion, the Commission needs first to examine Google’s compliance plan, and to check whether it addresses the conflicts of interest. This is what the Commission is currently seeking input on, including from Proxistore. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases1/20263/AT_40670_18812.pdf.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2026-03-04 “P-000514/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission closely follow developments in the audiovisual industry, including in subscription video-on-demand services 1 . From the perspective of competition policy specifically, the Commission may intervene where undertakings abuse their dominant position within the internal market (Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), as well as where concentrations would significantly impede effective competition. In the context of the merger control review of the potential Netflix/Warner Bros deal, the Commission will investigate the potential harmful impact on effective competition resulting from the concentration, such as risks of higher prices but also a wide range of non-price effects, such as lower quality of service, content foreclosure, reduced innovation and decreased diversity in content production. The views of various market participants that may be affected by the concentration (such as competitors, content suppliers and cinemas) will be thoroughly considered in order to determine whether the deal would raise competition concerns. Undertakings are responsible for assessing the compatibility of their practices with the EU competition rules, including information exchanges during the due diligence procedure of a potential acquisition. Potential anticompetitive exchanges of sensitive information between may be the subject of a separate investigation and eventual penalties under Article 101 TFEU and/or to the prohibition of gun-jumping under the merger control rules. 1 See for example: European Media Industry Outlook, SWD(2025)261, 5.9.2025.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2026-02-27 “P-293/26 Answer given by Ms Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Since the submission of the complaint in April 2025, the Commission has been carefully examining allegations contained in it, following up with the Hungarian authorities and the complainant. The timing of the Commission’s assessment depends on various elements, such as the type of the allegations and the completeness of the information submitted to the Commission. The Commission assesses State aid complaints based on objective criteria, as enshrined in the EU Treaties, State aid-related legislation as well as the case-law of the EU courts. The Commission will inform the Hungarian authorities and the complainant of the developments of the case in due course, in compliance with the applicable procedural and substantive rules. In relation to state advertising rules more generally, the Commission’s 2025 Rule of Law Report 1 reiterated a recommendation addressed to Hungary calling on it to ‘adopt measures to ensure fair and transparent distribution of advertising expenditure by the state and stateowned companies’. Furthermore, on 11 December 2025 the Commission opened an infringement procedure against Hungary for failure to comply with several provisions under the European Media Freedom Act 2 , including provisions relating to the allocation of public funds for state advertising and supply or service contracts. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rulelaw/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle/2025-rule-law-report_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj/eng ; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1808/oj/eng.”
  Rule of law in Hungary · EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
• 2026-02-27 “E-000134/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Article 7 of the Digital Markets Act (‘DMA’) 1 requires gatekeepers to ensure interoperability of their messaging service with the messaging services of other providers upon the request of the latter. As of today, Meta is the only provider of messaging service that has been designated as a gatekeeper for two of its messaging services - WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger - for which it is required to comply with Article 7 DMA. For those services, Meta published reference offers for interoperability in March 2024 and November 2024, respectively. The Commission is in constant contact with Meta and interested third parties to ensure effective compliance with Article 7 DMA. In November 2025, two new messaging services (BirdyChat and Haiket) announced that they managed to interoperate with WhatsApp. However, those two new services are only gradually rolling out to the public or in beta test version. It is therefore too early to assess the take up for interoperability in the context of those services at this stage. The Commission will continue to closely monitor the situation in the coming months. These recent launches confirm that there is potential demand for interoperability, and that Article 7 DMA can contribute to market contestability with regards to the provision of messaging services. Regarding encryption, Article 7 DMA provides that the level of security, including end-to-end encryption, should be preserved across the interoperable services. In line with this requirement, the interoperability solution provided by Meta for WhatsApp and Messenger preserves end-to-end encryption. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, pp. 1–66.”
  Interoperability requirements for digital platforms
• 2026-02-16 “E-004598/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) 1 aims to ensure fair and open markets in the EU, while respecting the highest standard of privacy, safety and security, in accordance with existing regulatory frameworks such as the the General Data Protection Regulation 2 , Digital Services Act 3 and Cyber Resilience Act 4 . And while gatekeepers are taking actions to support their own compliance with these acts, these actions should not undermine the DMA’s goals of ensuring fairness and contestability. The DMA clearly states that gatekeepers can apply measures to protect integrity when providing interoperability, if they are strictly necessary and proportionate. Gatekeepers need to show that such measures are justified. Such measures should not be a pretext to hinder developers’ right to effective interoperability with operating system features that gatekeepers already make available to their own products. 2. The Commission engages in a continuous and comprehensive regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers on their interoperability obligation under Article 6(7) of DMA as well as with interested developers to ensure gatekeeper’s effective compliance. This includes understanding possible difficulties in ensuring interoperability. As part of this process, the Commission duly considers privacy, safety and security. Strong protections for integrity, security, and privacy, on the condition of non-discrimination, necessity and proportionality, equally benefit the gatekeeper’s and third parties’ products. Interoperability improves developers’ opportunities to offer better and more innovative services, with improved privacy and security, to the benefit of users. 1 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/index_en. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection_en. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act. 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/cyber-resilience-act.”
  EU rules on digital competition · Interoperability requirements for digital platforms
• 2026-02-10 “P-000066/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the Commission 1. Article 4(5) of Directive (EU) 1/2019 recognises that national competition authorities have the power to set priorities in applying Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The decision to investigate a practice lies within the discretion of each national competition authority, that exercises it case by case taking account of all relevant circumstances. These include the specific characteristics of the conduct, the dynamics of particular markets and available resources. These considerations may lead to different conducts or types of conduct being investigated and prosecuted by different national competition authorities. 2. To ensure the consistent application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in specific cases, Article 11(4) of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 provides that national competition authorities shall consult the Commission before adopting a decision, inter alia, requiring that an infringement be brought to an end, and make appropriate efforts to ensure the consistent application of Union law. This mechanism applies to all decisions finding an infringement of Article 101 and/or 102 TFEU. 3. The current system ensures the uniform interpretation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU through the mechanism envisaged in Article 11(4) of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, as well as through that envisaged in Article 11(3) of that regulation, pursuant to which national competition authorities shall inform the Commission of their first investigative measure in a timely manner. In addition, in light of its responsibility to safeguard the consistent application of EU competition law, the Commission regularly engages with national competition authorities through bilateral and multilateral meetings to ensure coordination of their respective enforcement actions.”
  EU Competition policy
• 2026-02-02 “E-004318/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission On 23 December 2025, the Commission amended the State aid guidelines governing the indirect cost compensation 1 , setting out how Member States can compensate a share of electricity-related carbon costs for electro-intensive industries at risk of carbon leakage. In line with the European chemicals industry action plan 2 , the amendment addresses the increased risk of carbon leakage for certain energy-intensive industries compared to the situation in 2020, due to the sustained rise of emission costs under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) in the last years. The Commission has also decided to update the technical parameters in line with point 67 of the guidelines with recent data and to keep the methodology constant. Different CO 2 emission factors reflect the fact that the carbon price is passed on to different degrees in the electricity price in geographic areas in the EU. The amendment will contribute to the competitiveness of EU industry while incentivising their decarbonisation. Member States are not obliged to use ETS auction revenues for such schemes. The Commission will apply the guidelines until 31 December 2030; new guidelines would be accompanied by an impact assessment. 1 Communication from the Commission Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post-2021 (OJ C 317, 25.9.2020, p. 5), as supplemented by Communication from the Commission supplementing the Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post-2021 (OJ C 528, 30.12.2021, p. 1) and amended by Communication from the Commission amending the Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post-2021 (OJ C, C/2026/196, 5.1.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/196/oj). 2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - A European Chemicals Industry Action Plan (COM/2025/530 final).”
  Carbon leakage support · Energy (green transition)
• 2026-01-27 “E-004469/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission While the Commission cannot prejudge the outcome of any potential future merger proceedings, it remains committed to prevent a significant impediment to effective competition which generally results from the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. As to a potential acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery by Amazon, the Commission notes though that according to public reports, Amazon did not submit an offer for Warner Bros. Discovery within a deadline for initial bids and that Warner Bros. Discovery has entered into an agreement with Netflix instead while Paramount made a competing offer. As to the market position of Amazon, the Commission had preliminarily found Amazon in the context of a previous antitrust case to be dominant on markets for the provision of online marketplace services to third-party sellers. Furthermore, in case M.10349 – Amazon/MGM, the Commission considered whether the acquisition of MGM would strengthen Amazon’s potentially dominant position in the market for the provision of marketplace services, even though it ultimately concluded that the merged entity would not have the ability to leverage Amazon’s position in the market for the retail supply of audiovisual content into the market for the provision of marketplace services. As already indicated in the current Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1 , the Commission can assess competitive harm linked to the access of commercially sensitive information acquired through a merger. For example, the access to commercially sensitive information could lead to higher prices (see paragraph 78 of the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines). The Commission assessed the question of access to commercially sensitive information for example in Case M.9660 – Google/Fitbit. 1 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ C 265, 18.10.2008, p. 7).”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2026-01-16 “E-004344/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 1. Support that fulfils the conditions of the Fisheries de minimis regulation 1 is deemed not to entail State aid and no prior notification and approval by the Commission is needed. It is therefore up to the Member State to activate the use of the de minimis support. 2. The Commission has enforcement powers to ensure that the State aid rules are respected. However, it is for the Member States to design the State aid policy and decide which situations require State aid support and when to grant this support, provided that the relevant provisions and general principles of EU law are respected 2 . 3. The Greek European Maritime Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) programme provides key support for the resilience and competitiveness of the fisheries sector and coastal communities. This includes a wide range of activities, such as diversifying activities to support income, fishing tourism, modernising fleets, mitigating impacts from climate change, invasive species, enhancing fishers' skills and income possibilities through training. Moreover, under the EMFAF legal framework projects related to small-scale fishing may be supported at an aid intensity of up to 100%. The Commission works with Greece to ensure its EMFAF programme meets sector-specific needs, with the Greek Managing Authority being responsible for providing EMFAF support for projects aligning with the national priorities. Aid to make good damage caused by exceptional occurrences or for temporary cessation of fishing activities can also be granted under the Guidelines for State aid in the fishery and aquaculture sector 3 . If it were to be concluded that the extensive pollution incident was due to a natural disaster, aid can also be granted under the Fisheries Block Exemption Regulation 4 . 1 Commission Regulation (EU) No 717/2014 of 27 June 2014 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the fishery and aquaculture sector, as amended (OJ L 190 28.6.2014, p. 45). 2 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 23 January 2019, Fallimento Traghetti del Mediterraneo, C-387/17, EU:C:2019:51, paragraph 66. 3 Communication from the Commission Guidelines for State aid in the fishery and aquaculture sector 2023/C 107/01 (OJ C 107, 23.3.2023, p. 1). 4 Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/2473 of 14 December 2022 declaring certain categories of aid to undertakings active in the production, processing and marketing of fishery and aquaculture products compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ L 327, 21.12.2022, p. 82).”
  Environmental regulation of fisheries · Funding for fisheries and aquaculture
• 2026-01-14 “E-004092/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission In the evening of Friday 5 September 2025, the Commission adopted a decision fining Google for breaching EU antitrust rules. Given the adoption of the decision on a Friday evening, the Commission chose to publish a written statement by the Executive Vice-President for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition 1 and provide a technical briefing to journalists that same evening. This approach ensured that key information was communicated promptly, without unnecessary delay. This arrangement was collectively agreed upon internally and consistently explained by the Commission’s spokesperson during the technical briefing on 5 September 2025, the midday briefing on 8 September 2025, and in written responses to media. It was also confirmed by the Executive Vice-President and the Cabinet in follow-up interactions with journalists. The Commission as an institution upholds high standards of transparency, particularly in cases of significant public interest, such as this high-profile antitrust decision. While press conferences are a valuable tool for direct engagement, the Commission must also balance the need for timely, accurate, and comprehensive communication, especially when decisions are announced at unconventional times. The Commission will continue to assess the most effective way to communicate major decisions, ensuring that citizens and stakeholders receive clear explanations while maintaining timely communication. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/statement_25_2034.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2026-01-13 “E-003852/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission In 2016, the Commission approved a measure for the closure of lignite-fired power plants in case SA.42536. Plants in the scope of this measure were mothballed for four years, before they were planned to shut down permanently. Payments under this measure were scheduled annually to compensate for forgone profits due to the mothballing. In 2022, following the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, Germany decided to transfer some of these mothballed plants to a temporary reserve with the view to temporarily allow those plants to return to the market, to be on stand-by and ready to be activated to the extent needed in the event of natural gas shortages. The Commission approved this latter measure in case SA.103662 pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to remedy a serious disturbance in the German economy. This measure was limited until 31 March 2024 and the Commission assessed specifically in that decision that there is no overlap in compensation with the measure for the closure of lignite-fired power plants, given that the eligible costs are different. Furthermore, the Commission approved several German measures concerning the early closure of lignite power plants. These plants were or will be closed permanently at the agreed date.”
  Energy transition (state support) · Fossil fuels
• 2026-01-13 “E-004068/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission On 23 December 2025, the Commission adopted a targeted amendment of the Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post-2021 (ETS State aid Guidelines) 1 . In line with the methodology underpinning the ETS State aid Guidelines, the list of eligible sectors was expanded to take into account that the risk of carbon leakage has genuinely increased for certain sectors. The criteria for sectors to be eligible were a trade intensity above 20% and an indirect emission intensity above 0.32 kg CO2/EUR, resulting in an indirect carbon leakage indicator above 0.064. These sectors include manufacturing of glass fibres, flat glass and hollow glass. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_3141.”
  Energy (green transition) · Carbon leakage support
• 2026-01-09 “P-004500/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Public funding can be used to steer investment towards specific policy objectives, such as the greening of transport, emission reductions, etc. The rationale for granting investment aid is not the same for infrastructure as for superstructure. The former is so costly, that investment costs mostly cannot be recouped over its lifetime and so relying on private funding would mean that vital elements of the European transport network are not built. Port superstructures are mainly productive assets of logistics and transport companies, which can be amortised with revenue from their exploitation. Having said that, various possibilities for supporting specific superstructures in ports exist. Decarbonisation aid can be granted under Article 36 of the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) EU No 651/2014 1 and the acquisition or up-grading of clean vehicles, including vessels, is eligible for support under Article 36b GBER respectively under the Commission’s Guidelines on State aid for Climate, Environmental Protection and Energy 2 (CEEAG). Moreover, proposals for supporting certain elements of inter-modality are included in the draft Land and Multimodal Transport Guidelines and Transport Block Exemption Regulation 3 . Shore-side electricity infrastructure as well as recharging and refuelling infrastructures are covered by the definition of port infrastructure of Article 2(157) of the GBER and are as such eligible for support under Articles 56b and 56c GBER. State aid rules are regularly reviewed and brought, where necessary, into line with developments. Citizens and stakeholders can contribute to this process through the various consultation activities accompanying the reviews. 1 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1. 2 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy 2022, C/2022/481, OJ C 80, 18.2.2022, p. 1. 3 https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/public-consultations/2024-lmtg-and-tber_en.”
  Energy (green transition) · State Aid
• 2026-01-06 “P-004449/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 1. It is the ultimate responsibility of Romania to ensure compliance of the measures referred to by the Honourable Member with State aid rules. The Commission services received some information from the Member State regarding acquisition of assets of CFR Marfă by Carpatica Feroviar and, without prejudice to any future assessment by the Commission, have not currently expressed any concerns. 2. The Commission has closely monitored Romania’s approach to the operationalisation of Carpatica and the phasing-out of CFR Marfă in the context of the Commission decision declaring the aid to CFR Marfă incompatible with the internal market and ordering its recovery. The Commission will continue to monitor developments, to ensure compliance with State aid rules. 3. The Commission will continue to monitor Romania’s implementation of the recovery decision, particularly the liquidation of CFR Marfă and the auction of its remaining assets under national insolvency law. The registration and recovery of the remaining State-aid claims through the insolvency process remains a key element in ensuring a level playing field.”
  State Aid · EU Competition policy
• 2025-12-23 “E-003668/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission decided on 31 July 2020 not to raise objections to the aid scheme of the Solvency Support Fund for strategic enterprises notified by the Kingdom of Spain and financed from resources of the State budget 1 . The scheme was considered compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3) (b) of the Treaty of the Functioning of European Union, which allows aid to remedy a serious disturbance of the economy of a Member State. The 2020 Commission Decision also underwent judicial review of its legality, which the General Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed 2 . The 2020 Commission Decision approved the scheme, within which Spain could grant individual aid. It also required individual notification to the Commission in certain cases, notably if the amount of the relevant solvency instruments exceeded EUR 250 million to individual beneficiaries, irrespective of whether solvency instruments were combined with senior loans. Since the amount of the participation loan (préstamo participativo) granted to Air Europa was lower than EUR 250 million, Spain needed not to individually notify the recapitalisation of Air Europa to the Commission. The relevant provisions in section 3.11 of the Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak, which provided legal basis under State aid rules for recapitalisation support of the kind at issue expired on 30 June 2022. 1 Commission Decision SA.57659(2020/N)-Spain-COVID 19 - Recapitalisation fund (OJ C269, 14.8.2020, p. 8). 2 Case T-628/20, EU:T:2021:285, case C-441/21 P, EU:C:2024:477.”
  EU Competition policy · State Aid
• 2025-12-19 “E-003816/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission If the Commission receives information that indicates the existence of an infringement of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position, it can take action to put an end to such an abuse in accordance with its standard procedures. The Commission does not possess information pointing to practices to that effect in relation to the technical inspection sector. As a general matter, the Commission sees the Single Market as critical for competitiveness and vital to deliver on the actions in the Competitiveness Compass. In this context, removing remaining barriers and expanding the Single Market enhances market access, not least for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), such as of small technical inspection companies. In this respect, on 21 May 2025, the Commission adopted the Single Market Strategy, for making the Single Market simple, seamless and strong 1 . Further, State aid rules provide many possibilities to support SMEs, in particular when they envisage cross-border expansion. On the basis of the State aid General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER), Member States can implement aid schemes without prior notification and approval by the Commission. Under the GBER, aid can be awarded to SMEs for instance to support their training actions, the use of consultancy or innovation services and their participation in fairs 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1274.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · EU Competition policy · State Aid
• 2025-12-17 “E-004484/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission To the Commission’s knowledge, Portugal and the Autonomous Region of Madeira intend to implement any future State aid fiscal scheme applicable in the Free Trade Zone of Madeira (ZFM) under the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER). Under the GBER, granting authorities in Member States can implement directly the schemes they adopt, provided these comply with the conditions set in the Regulation, without prior notification to the Commission. Furthermore, Member States have to comply with transparency and reporting obligations. These have been fulfilled by the Portuguese and Madeiran authorities in relation to the current ZFM regime and annual reports on the implementation of the current regime have been sent to the Commission’s services.”
  Funding for OCTs and outermost regions
• 2025-12-15 “E-004026/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission remains at all times committed to assuring an efficient functioning of the Single Market through enforcement of competition rules. Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union applies to agreements or concerted practices between operators. The situation referred to by the Honourable Members seems to be explained by individual decisions of market operators and the Commission is not aware of elements indicating coordination leading to price-fixing arrangements. Hence, the situation does not warrant a competition investigation into a possible breach of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Of course, the Commission remains open to receive any other relevant elements on the matter. Regarding the checks to prevent origin fraud, all olive oils marketed in the EU must comply with a strict set of marketing standards 1 , independently of their origin. Member States must carry out a number of conformity checks on olive oil in relation to its production and internal composition, and carry out these controls based on risk analysis that relies on various factors, including its price, storage facilities and country of origin. Besides, EU imports of olive oil from Tunisia and Türkiye under a preferential tariff regime are subject to preferential rules of origin. Member States’ customs authorities are competent as regards doubt as to the authenticity of the declared origin and may request a verification to confirm the origin of the products concerned. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R2104.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU · EU policy on country of origin food labelling
• 2025-12-10 “E-003788/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission In EU competition law, Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits agreements having either the object or the effect of preventing, restricting, distorting competition within the internal market which may affect trade between Member States. Restrictions by object are types of coordination between undertakings which are, by their very nature, harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition. Such is the case of cartels, whereby competitors aim at coordinating their competitive behaviour on the market or influencing the relevant parameters of competition, for instance fixing prices or rigging bids. For this category of restrictions, while it is necessary to examine the legal and economic context of the agreement, the Court of Justice of the European Union has consistently held that it is not necessary to examine or prove effects on the market. As regards the category of restrictions by effect, it is in general sufficient to show potential effects. Once a competition authority establishes a restriction of competition (by object or by effect) under Article 101(1) TFEU, the undertakings concerned bear the burden of invoking and proving that the agreement produces efficiencies that meet the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU. There is no basis to require the harmonisation of Swiss law with EU competition law, as Switzerland is a third country. In any event, as noted in recital 3 of the Competition Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Switzerland 1 , ‘the competition enforcement systems of the EU and of Switzerland are based on the same principles and provide for similar rules’. EU companies operating in Switzerland must ensure that their agreements as far as they affect competition in Switzerland comply with Swiss competition law, just as Swiss companies whose activities affect competition in the internal market must comply with EU competition law. The Gaba judgment 2 was delivered in 2016; the Commission is not aware of any significant evolution in the application of Swiss competition law such as to call into question the basis of the EU-Switzerland Cooperation Agreement. 1 Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws, OJ L 347, 3.12.2014, pp. 3–9. 2 https://search.bger.ch/ext/eurospider/live/de/php/clir/http/index.php?lang=de&type=highlight_simple_query&pa ge=1&from_date=&to_date=&from_year=2016&to_year=2016&sort=relevance&insertion_date=&from_date_ push=&top_subcollection_clir=bge&query_words=Gaba&part=all&de_fr=&de_it=&fr_de=&fr_it=&it_de=&it _fr=&orig=&translation=&rank=1&highlight_docid=atf%3A%2F%2F143-II297%3Ade&number_of_ranks=1&azaclir=clir.”
  EU Competition policy
• 2025-12-09 “E-003775/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has initiated three ex-officio preliminary investigations under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation 1 (FSR), in the wind, security equipment, and nuclear sectors: Wind: The Commission sent information requests regarding certain wind parks in several Member States to investigate market information about alleged foreign subsidies. The information requests were addressed to several Chinese wind turbines manufacturers and to certain European companies. Security equipment: The Commission carried out unannounced inspections in the premises of Nuctech. Nuctech filed applications for annulment of the inspection decision and for interim measures with the European Courts. The interim measures application was rejected by the General Court and the Court of Justice on appeal. Proceedings regarding the appeal against the inspection decision are ongoing. Nuclear: The Commission sent information requests in the context of the construction of new reactors units at Dukovany and Temelín nuclear power plants in Czech Republic. The information requests seek information on alleged foreign subsidies granted to a Korean company and its subcontractors. In each case, the Commission is assessing information collected. In case of sufficient indications regarding distortive foreign subsidies, it will open in-depth investigations. The Commission closely follows developments in the internal market, assesses market information and stands ready to initiate ex-officio investigations, where elements point to distortive foreign subsidies both in concentrations and public procurement procedures. The FSR provides an effective legal basis to assess distortive foreign subsidies granted to undertakings active in the internal market while complying with its international obligations under Article 44(9) FSR. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (OJ L 330, 23.12.2022, p. 1, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2560/oj).”
  Trade relations with China · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market
• 2025-11-27 “E-004231/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The formal investigation concerning the planned Polish measures supporting the nuclear power plant project is ongoing. The Commission cannot prejudge the outcome of these investigations. In its analysis, the Commission will thoroughly and timely consider the applicable legal framework, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union and its interpretative guidance, aiming to ensure a legally sound and consistent decision.”
  "Buy European" provisions · EU policy on sustainability criteria in public funding
• 2025-11-26 “E-003328/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission In the European Steel and Metals Action Plan 1 presented in March 2025, the Commission identified the challenges of the steel sector and other metals sectors and proposed concrete solutions to address them. These challenges include high energy costs, exposure to an unlevel playing field in international competition, decarbonisation investment needs and regulatory burden. Under the Framework for State aid measures to support the Clean Industrial Deal 2 , sectors that are particularly exposed to international trade and heavily dependent on electricity may receive aid in form of temporary price relief. Moreover, aid for decarbonisation is also possible. In addition, the Commission has initiated the process of the revision of the 2014 Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty (R&R Guidelines) 3 and, on 22 August 2025, it launched a call for evidence and a public consultation to seek input on the scope and content of the revision. The consultation concerns in particular the potential inclusion of the steel sector into the scope of the R&R Guidelines. While State aid to the steel sector is and has been possible in general, overcapacities that existed back in 2014 justified the exclusion of steel producers in difficulty from the benefit of rescue and restructuring aid. While there is no longer structural overcapacity in steel in the EU itself, global overcapacities still exist. Therefore, the Commission contemplates a modification of the R&R Guidelines which would address a potential unequal treatment of companies in sectors that have similarities (e.g. aluminium). The Commission welcomes the views from stakeholders and other interested parties in response to its consultation. 1 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/european-steel-and-metals-action-plan_en. 2 OJ C 3602, 4.9.2025, p.1. 3 JO L 246, 24.9.2015, p. 9.”
  Climate efforts · EU industrial funding
• 2025-11-21 “E-004147/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission could investigate this matter if there are concrete indications of a potential infringement of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), which prohibits abuses of a dominant position. However, as the situations reported by the Honourable Member seem to be local and primarily affecting only Cyprus, the national competition authority of Cyprus (the Commission for the Protection of Competition) would seem to be better placed to investigate this matter. The Commission notes, however, that Article 102 TFEU, and the equivalent national rules, apply only to abuses by dominant companies and that – based on the information provided in the question – it is not evident that these conditions are fulfilled. Whether applying the conditions mentioned by the Honourable Member for the award of public construction projects are legitimate depends on the specific circumstances of each case and cannot be answered in general. Likewise, the Commission has insufficient information at its disposal to speculate how competition in this area could be improved.”
  "Buy European" provisions · EU Competition policy
• 2025-11-18 “E-003802/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Markets Act (DMA) regulates only a very limited number of designated gatekeepers - large platforms with significant influence on the EU internal market and its users. The DMA does not prevent any gatekeeper from releasing new product features. The EU is an attractive market of 450 million potential users, and it is up to the gatekeepers to evaluate their business cases. Some gatekeepers may strategically delay interoperability with features in their operating systems to limit competition and choice, and collaterally affect the availability of some services for EU users. Interoperability is essential for European companies and startups to compete fairly and bring innovation to consumers. The DMA seeks to ensure that gatekeepers do not misuse their position by withholding interoperability from innovative companies. Many of these innovators are small and medium sized companies, who need effective interoperability with the hardware and software features of the gatekeepers’ operating systems to bring their innovations to the market. The Commission adopted in March 2025 two decisions specifying how Apple should allow interoperability between its iPhones and connected devices of third parties and how it should structure the process for third party developers to request interoperability 1 . Apple has now decided to launch the Live Translation on AirPods in the EU, just two months after their initial decision to withhold the product. This follows additional engineering work to give access to third parties to building blocks to develop similar innovative features based on their own technology that also work in the same way with iPhones. Although Apple decided not to do this at the same time as they did in the rest of the world, it was worth the wait, as this move opens competition, letting other earbud makers offer their own translation service to iPhone users. The Commission will review the final details of the interoperability solution to ensure full compliance with the DMA, but it is a positive development. The Commission continues to engage with Apple and many third parties to ensure that the DMA is implemented to benefit end users and businesses. 1 Commission Decisions C(2025) 3000 final and C(2025) 3001 final.”
  EU rules on digital competition · Interoperability requirements for digital platforms
• 2025-11-17 “E-003763/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Under existing EU law, Member States must ensure transparency in the granting of State aid, including measures co-financed by EU funds. This includes the publication, on a comprehensive State aid transparency website, of detailed information on individual aid awards exceeding the relevant thresholds established in the applicable Guidelines and Regulations. The Commission has reinforced these requirements through the Transparency Award Module, which provides Member States with a common platform for uploading aid award data. As from 2026, the transparency obligation will extend to de minimis aid pursuant to Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/2831, and the Commission’s new e-Aid Register will provide Member States with a shared platform to record the aid granted. Transparency of EU funds is ensured through the Financial Transparency System, established under Article 38 of the Financial Regulation. This platform publishes information on beneficiaries of EU funds managed directly by the Commission or indirectly through other entities, including the amounts awarded and their purpose. Where public support qualifies as State aid, the Treaty sets out conditions for its compatibility with the internal market. Those conditions are further specified in the relevant secondary legislation and Commission guidelines to make sure that the relevant objective is achieved without undue distortion of competition and intra-EU trade. These conditions may involve also creation and maintenance of jobs (e.g. for regional aid or investment aid under the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework 1 ). Even when the State aid rules do not involve any such requirements, the Member States may make their granting of aid subject to additional conditions. 1 OJ C, C/2025/3602, 4.7.2025.”
  EU policy on forced redundancies · EU policy on social criteria in public funding
• 2025-11-07 “E-003821/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission As part of State aid procedures, the Commission contacts the authorities of the Member State concerned by the procedure. Any information exchanged between the Commission and the Member State in the context of State aid procedures is primarily channelled through the Permanent Representation of the respective Member State.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2025-10-30 “P-003652/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Following the judgment of the Court of Justice of 12 September 2025, the Commission decision of 6 March 2017 declaring the State aid compatible has been annulled. In its judgment, the Court of Justice considered that the public procurement procedures for the construction of nuclear power plants were ‘inextricably linked’ to the State support and needed to be examined more thoroughly in the Commission’s decision. The judgment of the Court of Justice is final and cannot be appealed. Following the annulment of the final decision, the State aid control procedure is again with the Commission, back at the stage after adoption of the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Commission will assess the impact of the ruling on the investigation and decide on the next steps. The Commission cannot, at this stage, prejudge the outcome of that investigation. It is first and foremost an obligation for the Member State to ensure compliance with all applicable legislation.”
  Nuclear energy · Energy transition (state support)
• 2025-10-27 “E-003261/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission EU State aid rules prohibit Member States from granting tax advantages to multinationals, if these advantages, among other conditions, are not also available to other undertakings in a similar situation in the same country. The Commission is committed to keep enforcing the EU State aid rules against such practices and will examine any information brought to its attention regarding alleged unlawful aid. At this stage, the Commission does not have any formal investigation opened in respect of the alleged misapplication of the tax rules in relation to the Meta Group. In addition, the fight against tax evasion and avoidance continues to be one of the key policy priorities of the Commission. The Commission strongly supports the G20/Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) initiative to reform international taxation. This includes the so-called ‘Pillar 1’ that, once finalised, will re-allocate taxing rights of the largest multinationals to the jurisdictions where their end consumers are situated. It also includes ‘Pillar 2’, which is a coordinated system of minimum taxation (15%) on the profits of large multinationals in the jurisdictions where they operate. The latter was already implemented in the EU through a Directive. Finally, the Commission is currently evaluating the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 1 (ATAD) and the Directive on Administrative Cooperation 2 (DAC) with a view to assessing if they are still fit for purposes. Based on the outcome of these evaluations the Commission will, if appropriate, present proposals to improve their functioning. 1 Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market. 2 Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and subsequent amendments.”
  Tax Havens · EU competences on taxation
• 2025-10-24 “E-003408/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 1. Aid measures that fulfil the conditions of the Commission regulation (EU) 1408/2013 (‘Agricultural de minimis regulation’) 1 are deemed not to meet all the criteria in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and are therefore exempt from notification to the Commission. Therefore, the Commission would not have received information in relation to a joint ministerial decision adopted to grant de minimis aid to farmers whose crops were affected by debris. 2. Funding that fulfils the requirements of the Agricultural de minimis regulation (see Article 3(2) and (3) of that regulation) is within the discretion of the Member States. 3. Farmers who suffered officially recorded damage and have restored and re-cultivated their flooded fields at their own expense, are not excluded from receiving aid. These farmers can receive support under the Agricultural de minimis regulation, under conditions to be determined by national authorities, provided they respect the relevant provisions and general principles of EU law. There is also a possibility, at the discretion of the Member State, to grant aid to farmers who suffered officially recorded damage under Regulation (EU) 2022/2472 (Article 37) 2 or the Guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas 3 . 1 Commission regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the agriculture sector, as amended (OJ L 352, 24.12.2013, p. 9). 2 Commission regulation (EU) 2022/2472 of 14 December 2022 declaring certain categories of aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ L 327 21.12.2022, p. 1). 3 Communication from the Commission Guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas 2022/C 485/01, C/2022/9120, OJ C 485, 21.12.2022, p. 1–90, as amended by Communication from the Commission correcting the Guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas, C/2024/1902, OJ C 1902, 5.3.2024.”
  Agricultural funding
• 2025-10-16 “E-003301/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Merger control aims to prevent concentrations that would significantly impede effective competition in the internal market including by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. The acquisition of Ceconomy by JD.com was notified for merger control to the national competition authorities of some Member States, including the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK), and not to the Commission as the thresholds of the EU Merger Regulation ((EC) 139/2004) were not met. If the relevant criteria are fulfilled, the parties will have to notify the transaction to the Commission (under the Foreign Subsidies, Regulation, (EU) 2022/2560). If so, the Commission will assess whether there could be foreign subsidies that distort the internal market. The General Data Protection Regulation ((EU) 2016/679) prevents personal data of EU consumers from being transferred to entities in third countries without adequate safeguards, and its provisions would apply in this instance. Moreover, access to or control of sensitive information, including personal data, is assessed in the screening mandated under the Foreign Direct Investment Regulation ((EU) 2019/452). The risk of increasing economic dependence in strategic sectors was acknowledged in the Commission’s Economic Security Strategy, which aims to protect the EU from economic security risks by better deploying instruments available in the EU toolbox, including trade defence instruments, foreign subsidies screening, foreign direct investment screening and export controls. The Commission is continuing to implement and refine these instruments while developing a new economic security doctrine, that will set out the strategic use of the EU’s economic security tools.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Trade relations with China · International data transfers
• 2025-10-03 “E-003332/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission On 5 September 2025, the Commission fined Google 2.95 billion EUR for an abusive practice under EU competition law in the advertising technology (‘adtech’) sector that is global in scope 1 . Antitrust issues that can be addressed both at EU and national levels are coordinated between the Commission and the national competition authorities. The European Competition Network (‘ECN’) offers a unique and successful forum where such close cooperation takes place. To avoid duplication of cases and ensure effective enforcement against abusive practices, the network facilitates case allocation discussions at the early stages of investigations. Such an allocation depends on several factors such as the territory where the effects on competition materialise, the ability to gather evidence and the capability to bring the infringement to an end. The initiation of Commission proceedings relieves national competition authorities of their competence to act against the same abusive practices. In case of parallel investigations at national levels, the competition authorities concerned coordinate in the ECN, and there are mechanisms in place (in particular the notification of envisaged decisions) to ensure the consistent application of EU competition law across the EU. While details on coordination in specific cases are confidential, the Commission applies the same cooperation and coordination mechanisms in cases concerning the adtech sector to ensure the most efficient deployment of resources and the most effective enforcement. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1992.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2025-10-03 “E-003324/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Poland notified the planned aid for the investment into the capacity expansion of conventional truck production as regional investment aid under the Guidelines on Regional State aid 1 (RAG). The objective of regional aid is to ensure regional development and cohesion. Accordingly, the Commission’s assessment focuses on this objective, while also assessing the overall impact of the aid on the internal market. The RAG and Council Regulation 2015/1589 2 respectively provide a framework for assessment and a procedure that the Commission applies uniformly to all Member States, ensuring equal treatment and non-discrimination. The RAG analysis verifies whether the aid fulfils its purpose, i.e. has a positive impact on regional development and cohesion. More generally, State aid control aims at ensuring that such aid does not adversely affect the level playing field on the market and trade between Member States. Thus, the Commission considers the overall impact of the aid on the internal market by also assessing criteria, such as the existence of the incentive effect or the proportionality of the aid. Industrial resilience and defence capabilities are not explicit criteria of the analysis, but the Commission may consider them in the ‘balancing test’ of the aid’s positive and negative effects. 1 OJ C 153, 29.4.2021, p. 1. 2 OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, p. 9.”
  State Aid · EU Competition policy
• 2025-10-02 “E-002986/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission State aid rules prohibit Member States from granting tax advantages to multinationals, if these advantages, among other conditions, are not also available to other undertakings in a similar situation in the same country. The Court of Justice has clarified the application of the State aid rules regarding aggressive tax planning by multinationals. A judgment of 10 September 2024 in the Apple case 1 confirmed that the grant of a tax ruling cannot reduce the tax amount normally payable by the recipient of the ruling if subject to the ‘normal’ tax rules. The Commission is committed to keep enforcing the State aid rules against such practices. Aside from State aid rules, the EU is strongly committed to tackling tax avoidance schemes, including by multinationals, to make sure there are no tax advantages when compared to smaller operators, including small and medium-sized enterprises. To this end, the EU has introduced targeted measures, such as the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, the Directive on Administrative Cooperation 1 to 9 and most recently the so-called Pillar 2 Directive 2 . Moreover, the Commission endorses efforts within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Group of 20 (G20) to develop a new approach for taxing the digital economy. This includes discussions on a framework called Pillar 1, which ultimately should allow re-allocating the taxing rights of excess profits of the largest multinationals to the jurisdictions where their end consumers live. 1 https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=289923&doclang=EN. 2 OJ L 193, 19.7.2016, p. 1; OJ L 64, 11.3.2011, p. 1; OJ L 328, 22.12.2022, p. 1.”
  EU competences on taxation · EU taxation policy (political compass) · Tax Havens
• 2025-09-29 “E-003368/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Regarding the Honourable Member’s question about State aid, the Commission has adopted a decision in case SA.104638 on 12 September 2025. In its decision, the Commission has reached the conclusion that the payments made by the German Federal Government to FIEGE Logistik Stiftung & Co. KG do not constitute aid under EU State aid rules. The decision will be published as soon as a non-confidential version is available. Regarding the alleged contradiction mentioned in the question, the Commission would like to point out that the assessment under EU State aid law is a separate matter from contacts in relation to national audits, which were the contacts referred to in the written reply by Commissioner Hadja Lahbib to question P-002657/2025.”
  Financial regulation
• 2025-09-26 “E-3257/25 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has been in contact with the German authorities with regard to the Biomass Package amendments to the German Renewable Energy Law, EEG 2023. In December 2022, the Commission declared the EEG 2023 compatible with the internal market in line with the Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy. It falls within the responsibility of Member States to ensure compliance with State aid rules and to notify new aid in line with the applicable legal requirements, and to ensure the timeliness and quality of information provided. Once a Member State notifies to the Commission a proposal for an aid scheme or its amendment, the Commission assesses whether the notification is in line with the State aid Guidelines and sectoral legislation. By ensuring compliance with these rules, the Commission ensures the legality of the act with the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and its legitimacy vis-à-vis other Member States. The Commission has two months to issue a decision since the lodging of a complete notification. Given the confidential nature of discussions between the Commission and the Member States, the Commission cannot comment on the details of any particular notification, nor predict the outcome or timing.”
  Biofuels (RED II) · Energy transition (state support)
• 2025-09-23 “E-003115/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission may launch investigations on suspected breaches of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union either upon receipt of a complaint or on its own initiative, for example based on information it received from the market. When deciding whether to launch an investigation, the Commission can set priorities to make more effective use of its limited resources and focus its efforts on deterring the most harmful practices. National competition authorities (NCAs) are very often well placed to investigate suspected infringements limited to one country or area. 2. The Commission cooperates with NCAs of EU Member States, including the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC), through the European Competition Network (ECN). The ECN ensures an efficient division of work between NCAs and the Commission, and an effective and consistent application of EU competition rules. Each NCA, member of the ECN, determines its areas of activity and its enforcement priorities independently and autonomously. NCAs have discretion to decide whether to open or close an investigation in a specific sector and the Commission does not interfere with such decision of NCAs. Having said that, the Commission is aware of recent actions by the HCC in the banking sector. In December 2023, the HCC fined Greek banks for anticompetitive practices on various payment and transaction services 1 and, in July 2024, the HCC launched a, still ongoing, sector inquiry on deposit interest rates 2 . 3. The Commission and NCAs, when enforcing EU competition rules, aim to safeguard the competitive process in any sector of the economy, including the provision of banking services. Competitive markets result in lower prices, better quality of services and more choice to the benefit of consumers. 1 https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/2902-decision-838-2023.html. 2 https://www.epant.gr/en/information/sector-inquiries/bank-deposits.html.”
  EU policy on banks profits · Financial regulation
• 2025-09-08 “E-002318/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission closely monitors the impact of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) 1 on all relevant stakeholders, including on local services, SMEs and consumers. The Commission has received significant positive feedback concerning the DMA’s effect on the EU’s digital markets. The Commission has also opened an investigation to assess Alphabet’s compliance with Article 6(5) DMA. The obligation prevents Alphabet from the practice of favouring its own services (e.g. Google Flights and Google Hotels) in ranking on Google Search over similar third-party services, thus benefitting Alphabet’s competitors (e.g. Skyscanner, Expedia.com, Booking.com) and not the business users of Google Search in general (e.g. direct suppliers including airlines and hotel companies). The Commission has not endorsed any measures implemented by Alphabet in the context of compliance with this obligation and on 19 March 2025, has informed Alphabet of its preliminary view that certain features and functionalities of Google Search may treat Alphabet’s own services more favourably compared to rival ones. In its assessment, the Commission considers the interests of various user groups of Google Search (including SMEs and consumers), in line with the objectives and other provisions of the DMA. This includes Article 6(12) DMA, which mandates Alphabet to apply fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory access conditions to its search engine Google Search. As such, the Commission is in discussions and holding workshops with various impacted stakeholders, including representatives of suppliers of services competing with Google services and many others, to assess how compliance with the DMA can be best ensured. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R2554.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2025-09-02 “E-002741/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/2831 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid was adopted in 2023, entered into force on 1 January 2024 and will apply until 31 December 2030. It is based on a thorough evaluation conducted in 2020 and wide stakeholders’ consultation prior to the adoption. De minimis aid may be cumulated with State aid granted under another legal basis (most notably the General Block Exemption Regulation - Commission Regulation (EU) 651/2014) but the beneficiary company cannot receive State aid for the same costs twice. When complying with these cumulation rules, Member States are allowed to grant State aid to address regional disparities in line with the General Block Exemption Regulation. Before its expiry in 2030, the Commission will assess whether and how the Regulation should be revised, in line with the Better Regulation rules. Solid data allowing this review will be available when all Member States have a register of de minimis support. A central register will become mandatory as of 1 January 2026 allowing for reliable data to be available by the time of the next review. As it was the case in 2023, the Commission will assess whether the threshold or other conditions should be reviewed and, to that end consult the relevant stakeholders, including Member States, regions, companies and wider public.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-09-02 “E-002993/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission For the justification of closing a case without final decision in light of Judgment C‑40/23 P, the honourable Member is invited to refer to Article 24(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 1 . Based on the information the Commission received from a concerned citizen on the HHLA-MSC case, it concluded that the person does not meet the conditions of an interested party under Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589, which is a prerequisite for submitting an admissible formal complaint under Article 24(2) of the same Regulation. In line with usual practice, the citizen was informed accordingly. Consequently, the case file was closed without a formal decision. 1 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, pp. 9, available at: https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/1589/oj/eng.”
  Financial regulation
• 2025-08-28 “P-003150/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission In compliance with Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the TFEU, the Commission will publish the full text of the decision adopted on 29 July 2025 in case SA.51501 (2021/C), once a non-confidential version is agreed with the Czech Republic. Furthermore, as regards the recovery of unlawful aid, the Commission publishes regularly the statistics 1 on recovery of unlawful aid including the names of the companies that are subject to recovery. The current State aid procedural rules provide for several instruments that aim to prevent the misuse of aid. This includes monitoring of existing aid schemes, the power of the Commission to initiate a formal investigation procedure and the right of interested third parties (such as competitors) to submit a complaint to the Commission. The Commission keeps its State aid rules under regular assessment, in order to ensure their efficient performance. 1 https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/procedures/recovery-unlawful-aid_en.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2025-08-27 “E-002992/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has closed the case regarding allegations on the sale price of shares in Hamburger Hafen und Logistik Aktiengesellschaft (HHLA) to the shipping company MSC without a formal decision pursuant to Article 24(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 1 , as no interested party within the meaning of Article 1(h) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 submitted an admissible formal complaint. The Commission could reopen the case if it were to receive an admissible formal complaint that fully complies with Article 24(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 containing factual elements substantiating the existence of unlawful aid to MSC. 1 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, pp. 9, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/1589/oj/eng.”
  State Aid · EU Competition policy
• 2025-08-18 “E-002485/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 1. In the period 2022 to 2024, the main State aid Guidelines allowing for support to energyintensive industry were (i) Section 2.4 of the Temporary Crisis Framework (TCF) and Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF), 1 (ii) Section 4.11 Climate Environmental Protection and Energy Guidelines (CEEAG) 2 , (iii) Emission Trading System State aid Guidelines (ETS) 3 . In that period, the Commission approved 21 schemes under Section 2.4 TCF, 10 schemes under Section 2.4 TCTF, four schemes under Section 4.11 CEEAG and 17 schemes under the ETS Guidelines 4 . 2. The notion of aid is an objective notion explained in the Notice on the notion of State aid 5 . Member States are only required to notify measures if these constitute State aid or if these do not meet the requirements under the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) 6 or the de minimis Regulation 7 . 3. Wholesale energy prices differ across Member States and even within in different bidding zones due to market fundamentals, including, but not limited to, interconnection and grid capacity and regional balance of energy supply and demand 8 . Divergence of wholesale energy prices across Europe does not per se constitute a distortion of competition in the Single Market. Furthermore, the Commission has approved Greek schemes to support energy intensive industries for the ETS allowance prices embedded in electricity prices (SA.103180), for compensation under Section 2.4 TCTF (SA.107915), and reduction on levies raised for renewable sources and high-efficiency cogeneration (SA.52413, adopted on 18 December 2018). Finally, the new Clean Industrial State aid Framework (CISAF) 9 , in its Section 4.5, provides for additional avenues to support certain categories of energy intensive industries. 1 OJ C 101 17.3.2023, p. 3. Initially already included in the Temporary Crisis Framework for State Aid measures to support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia, OJ C 131I, 24.3.2022, p. 1. 2 Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy 2022, OJ C 80, 18.2.2022. 3 Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post-2021, OJ C 317, 25.9.2020. 4 These statistics count new or reintroduced schemes (schemes that expired and were renotified). Amendments and prolongations were not counted. The most recent State aid scoreboard contains further analysis of aid measures, available at: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/scoreboard_en. 5 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 262, 19.7.2016. 6 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 187, 26.6.2014. 7 Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/2831 of 13 December 2023 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, OJ L, 2023/2831, 15.12.2023. 8 The Affordable Energy Action Plan (COM/2025/79) of 26 February 2025 presents several actions to foster the integration of the EU energy markets.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices · Energy transition (state support)
• 2025-08-11 “E-002624/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 1.The financing of childcare providers organised within the national educational system falls outside the scope of EU State aid rules when the national educational system is financed entirely or mainly by public funds and not by pupils or their parents, so that public education may be considered a non-economic activity. In such cases, the Commission has no competence to investigate a potential distortion of competition with private providers offering comparable childcare services. 2. Private childcare providers can be financed by Member States if they are entrusted with the provision of a service of general economic interest (‘SGEI’). Article 2(1)(c) of the SGEI Decision 1 provides that it is possible to compensate childcare providers regardless of the amount. In such case, the compensation is exempted from notification. 3. A childcare service is non-economic when it is organised within the national educational system, which is financed entirely or mainly by public funds and not by pupils or their parents. The non-economic nature of public education is in principle not affected by the fact that pupils or their parents sometimes have to pay tuition or enrolment fees which contribute to the operating expenses of the system, if this fee only covers a fraction of the true costs of the service 2 . 1 Commission Decision 2012/21/EU of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest, OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, p. 3. 2 Commission Notice C/2016/2946 on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 262, 19.7.2016, p. 1, paragraph 29.”
  State Aid · EU Competition policy
• 2025-07-30 “E-002067/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Within the Italian Resilience and Recovery Plan 1 , 5G connectivity is supported under Measure Mission 1 Component 2 Investment 3: Fast Internet Connections (Ultra Broadband and 5G). This includes investment in 5G networks to ensure adequate coverage across the Italian territory. On 25 April 2022, the Commission adopted State aid decision SA.100557 2 – Italian 5G Plan – declaring compatible with the internal market a measure to support, among others, the deployment of 5G networks providing speeds of at least 150 Megabit/second download speeds under usual peak times conditions. According to the Commission decision, the aid can only be granted for the deployment of such performant 5G networks in areas where existing or planned mobile networks, including 5G networks, do not provide, or were not expected to provide by 2026, at least 30 Megabit/second download speeds under usual peak times conditions. The Italian authorities carried out a comprehensive mapping exercise and a public consultation to determine the target areas for the measure. The mapping was conducted between 10 June and 31 August 2021, followed by a public consultation from 15 November to 15 December 2021. Stakeholders were invited to comment on the results of the mapping, including the list of intervention areas. The Commission decision approving the measure was not appealed, and the State aid covered by that measure is considered as existing aid. The Commission, together with the Member States, keeps existing aid systems under constant review. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resiliencefacility/country-pages/italys-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en. 2 https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/SA.100557.”
  5G · EU industrial funding
• 2025-07-30 “E-001864/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission In its current review of the 2014 guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines (Aviation Guidelines), the Commission has carried out stakeholder consultations 1 and launched an external support study to be finalised in 2025. The Commission aims to adopt the new rules before the expiry of the 2014 guidelines. Stakeholders will have the chance to comment on the draft Aviation Guidelines before that date. The Commission will ensure that the revision considers all relevant EU objectives such as territorial and social cohesion, regional development as well as others (as contained, e.g., in the Clean Industrial Deal). In that regard, while the Commission acknowledges that regional airports generally may contribute to connectivity, it notes that operating aid is generally one of the most distortive forms of public support, which is why the Aviation Guidelines currently foresee the phase-out of operating aid to regional airports by 3 April 2027. In the context of the greening of aviation, the Commission will assess, among other things, the potential need for the Aviation Guidelines to include specific measures for the decarbonisation of aviation and reduction of aviation related emissions in addition to the possibilities already offered by the 2022 Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy and by the Framework for State Aid measures to support the Clean Industrial Deal. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6264.”
  EU Competition policy · Decarbonisation of aviation sector · EU funding for transportation
• 2025-07-29 “E-001956/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission decided on 31 July 2020 not to raise objections to the aid scheme of the Solvency Support Fund for strategic enterprises notified by the Kingdom of Spain 1 . The scheme was considered compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3) (b) of the Treaty of the Functioning of European Union, which allows aid to remedy a serious disturbance of the economy of a Member State. The 2020 Commission Decision required individual notification of solvency support that exceeded EUR 250 million to individual beneficiaries. That Decision also provides that solvency support could be cumulated with liquidity support in the form of ordinary debt. The Commission is committed to ensure that exceptional State aid granted owing to the pandemic is in strict compliance with EU law. The 2020 Commission Decision underwent judicial review of its legality, which the General Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed 2 . 1 Commission Decision SA.57659(2020/N)-Spain-COVID 19 - Recapitalisation fund (OJ C269, 14.8.2020, p. 8). 2 Case T-628/20, EU:T:2021:285, case C-441/21 P, EU:C:2024:477.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets · Financial regulation
• 2025-07-29 “E-002358/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission confirms that it has been in contact with Sweden concerning the framework law for new nuclear power plants in Sweden and the envisaged support for the financing of future individual nuclear projects. As these contacts are ongoing the Commission cannot, at this stage, comment on any potential next steps or predict their outcome.”
  Energy transition (state support) · Nuclear energy
• 2025-07-29 “P-002647/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission can confirm that it is fully committed to ensuring the effective implementation and enforcement of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). The Commission has clarified 1 , and more recently in the debate in the European Parliament plenary on 9 July 2025 on transatlantic trade, that the EU’s legislation and regulatory framework remain non-negotiable, and that the Commission will continue to protect the EU’s regulatory autonomy. The Commission is very much committed to implementing the DMA in a robust and evidence-based manner as swiftly as possible. The Commission has already adopted two non-compliance decisions 2 , two specification decisions 3 and issued various preliminary findings 4 . The Commission also continues to engage in constructive and all-inclusive regulatory dialogue with all designated gatekeepers and interested third parties to ensure that the DMA delivers on its objectives. Concrete changes on the market are already observable (for instance, the introduction of choice screens or the availability of alternative app stores on iPhones). The Commission is determined to maintain open and transparent communication channels with the European Parliament, including through the Working Group on the Implementation of the DMA. The Commission values the Working Group’s monitoring and feedback, which it believes is essential for shaping and supporting the work of the DMA team. In line with Article 35 of the DMA, the Commission also regularly reports to the European Parliament via its annual report on the implementation of the DMA 5 . The Commission ensures transparency throughout the DMA implementation process also by regularly updating the public on all key milestones via the Commission’s dedicated DMA website 6 . 1 https://thecapitolforum.com/eu-competition-chief-bloc-wont-compromise-sovereignty/; https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-tech-tariffs-us-brussels-trade-commissioner-maros-sefovic/. 2 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-finds-apple-and-meta-breach-digital-markets-act-2025-0423_en. 3 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-provides-guidance-under-digital-markets-act-facilitatedevelopment-innovative-products-2025-03-19_en. 4 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-sends-preliminary-findings-alphabet-under-digitalmarkets-act-2025-03-19_en; https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-closes-investigation-applesuser-choice-obligations-and-issues-preliminary-findings-rules-2025-04-23_en. 5 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-publishes-annual-report-dma-implementation-2024-202504-25_en. 6 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/latest-news_en.”
  US-EU tech coordination · EU rules on digital competition
• 2025-07-28 “E-002339/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission As announced on 25 March 2024, the Commission has been taking investigative steps to assess Amazon’s compliance with Article 6(5) of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). 1 The Commission is still actively looking into potential self-preferencing practices by Amazon on the Amazon Marketplace. The Commission is in regular discussions with Amazon and has sent the company various requests for information. The Commission is additionally collecting evidence from relevant stakeholders to conduct its assessment. This will inform the next steps. Relatedly, Amazon explained on Monday 23 June 2025 during the DMA compliance workshops organised by the Commission the main evolution and effects of the compliance measures it has taken to comply with the provisions of the DMA. Amazon’s intervention has given the Commission the possibility to obtain market feedback to the Article 6(5) DMA compliance solution proposed by Amazon. Amazon also explained how it has been integrating and rolling-out Artificial Intelligence (AI) solutions on its platforms. The DMA contains obligations that guarantee that the use of AI on gatekeepers’ core platform services doesn’t hamper the development of fair and constable digital markets. In addition, the Commission has taken important steps to monitor and accompany the development of trustworthy AI. The AI Act 2 has introduced disclosure obligations on AI-generated and manipulated content and transparency requirements for General Purpose AI Models. In the future, the Commission will continue to examine opportunities and challenges related to the use of AI. At this stage, there are no interim findings available and no further publicly available information on the status of the Commission’s preliminary investigation. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R1925. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202401689.”
  Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content · EU rules on digital competition
• 2025-07-25 “E-002398/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is in close and constructive contacts with the Polish authorities concerning this State aid case. The Commission is fully conscious of the significance this project has for Poland and treats this case with a high priority. On 18 December 2024, the Commission adopted a decision initiating the formal investigation procedure concerning the aid package supporting the first nuclear power plant, as notified by Poland. This decision was published in the Official Journal on 4 March 2025 1 , inviting interested parties to submit comments within one month of that date. These comments were forwarded to Poland to provide its replies to the submitted comments. Poland submitted its replies to the Commission. In view of the ongoing procedure, the Commission is neither in a position to comment further on the content of the contacts with the Polish authorities, nor can it predict the timing or outcome. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1389/oj/eng.”
  Nuclear energy · Energy transition (state support)
• 2025-07-24 “E-002330/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission In 2018, the Commission approved the acquisition of Ilva by ArcelorMittal. This approval was conditional on the sale of several steel plants in Europe to preserve effective competition. ArcelorMittal suggested Liberty House Group as a suitable purchaser of the said steel plants. The Commission thoroughly assessed the suitability of Liberty House Group as a purchaser in 2019. As a general matter, the Commission thoroughly assesses all foreseeable effects of all reportable acquisitions, including in the steel sector, in its merger control approvals. At the time of the Commission’s merger control approval, it was not possible to foresee the issues that would arise in the following years. Most notably, in 2021, Greensill Capital, a financial backer of Liberty House Group, filed for insolvency. As a result, Liberty House Group started to face material financial difficulties. Beyond the merger control aspects, the Commission has carefully assessed the EU interest in several reviews of measures related to steel imports, most recently the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/612 of 24 March 2025 1 , and is confident that a fair balance of interests has been achieved. During the latest review of this measure, the Commission carried out a detailed analysis of all submissions to bring short-term relief to the EU industry in categories facing significant import pressure, while not unnecessarily restricting sourcing opportunities for EU user industries and other stakeholders in categories where import pressure is not present. More generally, building on the Clean Industrial Deal, the Commission adopted the Steel and Metals Action Plan 2 that aims to strengthen the sector’s competitiveness and safeguard the industry’s future. 1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/612 of 24 March 2025 amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing a definitive safeguard measure on imports of certain steel products, OJ L, 2025/612, 25.3.2025. 2 COM(2025) 125 final.”
  EU Competition policy · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2025-07-22 “P-002225/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is not aware of these alleged practices by vertically integrated pharmaceutical wholesalers in Czechia. The Commission recalls that, pursuant to Article 81 of Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use 1 , wholesalers have a general duty to ensure appropriate and continued supply pharmaceutical products to pharmacies so that the needs of patients in the Member State in question are covered. The described conduct could theoretically violate Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits abuses of a dominant position. A refusal, by a vertically integrated pharmaceutical wholesaler, to supply independent pharmacies competing with its own pharmacy chain could, subject to the conditions of the Treaty and the applicable case law, constitute an exclusionary abuse of a dominant position. Such conduct could also theoretically infringe Article 101 TFEU if it involves anticompetitive agreements or concerted practices between several undertakings not to supply independent pharmacies. The Commission shares its powers to enforce EU competition law with national competition authorities, such as the Czech Office for the Protection of Competition. These authorities can be particularly well placed to investigate conduct limited to a single Member State, as may be the case here. Where, following an in-depth investigation, the Commission finds that an undertaking infringed Article 101 and/or 102 TFEU, it may, by decision, require the undertaking to bring such infringement to an end (Article 7 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003) and impose a fine (Article 23 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003). 1 Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ L 311, 28.11.2001, p. 67, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/83/oj).”
  Pharmaceuticals regulation in EU · Public and private sectors role in healthcare services
• 2025-07-15 “E-002348/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Regarding the Honourable Members’ first question on Amazon’s 2022 antitrust commitments, the Monitoring Trustee appointed in accordance with the Commitments Decision 1 has been evaluating Amazon’s compliance and provides bi-annual reports to the Commission. The Commission has been carefully assessing both the Monitoring Trustee’s reports and Amazon’s compliance and is continuously engaging with both to ensure Amazon’s effective compliance with the commitments. In parallel, and as announced on 25 March 2024, the Commission has been taking steps to assess Amazon’s compliance with Article 6(5) of Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 (Digital Markets Act – DMA) 2 and continues to look into potential self-preferencing practices by Amazon on the Amazon Marketplace. Regarding the Honourable Members’ second question on Amazon’s automated pricing systems, the Commission is aware of the Federal Trade Commission’s and Bundeskartellamt’s investigations into Amazon’s pricing behaviour. The Commission is assessing Amazon’s compliance with Article 5(3) DMA and is closely coordinating with the Bundeskartellamt on the investigation into Amazon’s pricing practices. Regarding the Honourable Members’ third question on Amazon’s compliance report, the Commission shares the view that transparent and complete compliance reports are fundamental to ensuring that all relevant stakeholders can scrutinise DMA compliance. The Commission is engaging with Amazon to make sure that these reports are as informative and detailed as possible. 1 Commission Decision of 20 December 2022 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, Cases AT.40462 – Amazon Marketplace and AT.40703 – Amazon Buy Box, C(2022) 9442 final. 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1–66.”
  Liability for online marketplaces · EU rules on digital competition
• 2025-07-15 “E-002350/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission As regards individual access of farmers to State aid provided by Member states under Articles 21 and 22 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2472 1 , prior registration of the beneficiaries (agricultural holdings/farmers) is not a condition for receiving State aid contained in the EU State aid legislation in force. According to these articles, the aid shall be accessible to all eligible undertakings in the area concerned, based on objectively defined conditions. Moreover, where the provision of the relevant activities is undertaken by producer groups and organisations, membership of such groups or organisations shall not be a condition for access to those activities. Nevertheless, Member States shall ensure that actions supported under these articles are consistent with the description of the agricultural knowledge and innovation systems provided in the Member State common agricultural policy strategic plan. The choice of the modalities of implementation of additional requirements unrelated with EU legislation, for instance a prior registration of agricultural holdings/farmers mentioned in the question, is not excluded. It remains at the discretion of the Member States. However, caution is needed to avoid unnecessary administrative burden limiting access to consultancy services. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2022:327:TOC.”
  Agricultural funding
• 2025-07-14 “E-001615/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission This transaction has not been formally notified to the Commission. It is up to the companies to notify transactions for merger control clearance, if they constitute a concentration with an EU dimension under the Merger Regulation 1 . The processing of personal data requires a legal basis under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2 . The acquisition of the shares in a company that is a controller of personal data does not provide a legal basis for the processing of personal data by the acquiring company. The transmission of personal data by X to xAI and any further processing of individuals’ personal data by xAI would therefore require a legal basis in the GDPR. Without prejudice to the competences of the Commission as guardian of the Treaties, the enforcement of the GDPR in individual cases lies primarily with the competent national supervisory authorities and courts. For instance, in April 2025, the Irish Data Protection Commission announced the commencement of an investigation into the processing of personal data comprised in posts on the X social media platform for the purposes of training generative artificial intelligence models, in particular the Grok Large Language Models (LLMs), developed by xAI. In 2024, the EU adopted the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) 3 . The AI Act in Article 53 sets out specific transparency requirements regarding training data for general-purpose AI (GPAI) models. In addition, Article 55 imposes an obligation on providers of GPAI models with systemic risks to identify and mitigate those risks arising from the development and use of such models. The AI Act’s enforcement mechanism is key to ensuring that AI models placed in the EU market are not threatening consumers’ rights and the democratic values of the EU. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1. 2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence, OJ L, 12.7.2024, 2024/1689.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2025-07-01 “E-001676/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 1. In general, State aid should not encourage or facilitate the relocation of services or production from one Member State to another. EU State aid rules contain safeguards in this sense. The Hungarian aid to Apollo Tyres was granted in the context of State aid schemes approved by Commission decisions in cases SA.56926 and SA.57375 1 . The schemes were adopted to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and to partially compensate companies for losses suffered because of the lockdown measures introduced by the Hungarian Government, in line with the State aid rules applicable to this type of situations. 2. Regarding the alleged closure and relocation of the Enschede factory, the Commission cannot interfere in specific company decisions regarding restructuring plans. 3. The Commission decisions in cases SA.56926 and SA.57375 do not depart from the standard interpretation of the applicable State aid rules. Furthermore, the Commission does not have any indication that the Hungarian schemes at issue were not implemented in line with those decisions. 1 Commission decision of 8 April 2020 in case SA.56926 (2020/N) – Hungary COVID-19: Aid measures for increasing competitiveness of undertakings in relation with the COVID-19 outbreak, OJ C 144 of 30.4.2020; Commission decision of 23 June 2020 in case SA.57375 (2020/N) – Hungary COVID-19: Compensation scheme related to the recovery of the Hungarian economy, OJ C 302 of 11.9.2020.”
  State Aid · EU Competition policy