Paolo BORCHIA

Policy topics Paolo BORCHIA is active on

What Paolo BORCHIA has said (64)

• 2026-06-17 “(14:43:18 – 14:45:03): Well, commissioner, it's been, a long time now that we've been talking about electrification. The same things have been said. We're now at 23%. Well, we're meant to be at 32 by 2030. So we have to ask ourselves how we're going to be able to achieve that. How are we going to hit 32% by 2030? Well, if you look at the percentages, you can see that this is a, strategy which doesn't have much of a basis. I think if a solution is really convincing, then the market is there. The consumers are there, and it will happen more or less by itself. Costs will drop. Families will choose the cheapest option, and it will happen naturally. So if we need a plan, then, we need to look at the current conditions because the current conditions at the moment make it look like electrification isn't convincing enough, at least economically, not a convincing enough solution. And so I don't think this is a problem for ambition either. I think there's plenty of ambition around here. I think the issue is more the distance between the costs, that, Brussels is talking about and the costs that families are facing on a daily basis. And so our question here is how we can bridge that gap. Is Brussels going to continue to try to, sell a conviction for this when actually it's just not there yet? From the ECR group, colleague Elena Donathan. Thank you, president. Commissioner,”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2026-06-17 “(10:17:32 – 10:18:51): Well, good luck to the heads of state and government. They are called upon to find solutions at the upcoming European Council. Best of luck because at the moment, apart from slogans and buzzwords, we don't have really heard about real solutions. We've got the socialists and the EPP sparring. I didn't expect the socialists doing this. It's true that we've got the World Cup at the moment, the football cup, but I didn't think that they would be athletes and that they would be supporting the pope and talking about human lives. If that's the situation here in the parliament, then best of luck. Now the returns regulation, I know you don't like it, but I think you've gotta come to terms with it because at the end of the day, even if it's not a perfect text, it is a first step to help us move from a quantitative approach migration to a qualitative one. People are in a real bind, and we need a parliament that works hard and comes up with specific solutions. Thank you.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2026-01-28 “E-000338/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief is one of the key priorities of the EU’s international human rights agenda. The EU addresses violations of this human right through presenting resolutions at the United Nations’ human rights fora; condemning any discrimination, persecution, hatred or violence against any person based on religion or belief; reaching out to partner countries and international organisations, including through bilateral human rights dialogues; and funding projects outside the EU to improve the respect, protection and fulfilment of this human right. Human rights clauses are an essential element of the EU’s cooperation and trade agreements with partner countries. Based on standard clauses in all EU contracts, where human rights violations occur, funding can be suspended or terminated. The European External Action Service and the Commission follow closely the human rights situation in third countries, not least through the extensive network of EU Delegations across the world, and work for improving the protection of human rights of all people worldwide. When violations of human rights occur, including attacks against persons belonging to religious minorities, the EU uses all available diplomatic tools, including private and public and quiet diplomacy, instruments established in the international agreements and autonomous restrictive measures, as appropriate.”
  EU foreign policy approach · EU competences on human rights · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2026-01-28 “E-000332/2026 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Short-term rentals (STR) offer many benefits: greater choice, additional amenities for consumers, extra income for hosts, an incentive to invest in renovation, and a boost to tourism, incomes and jobs. However, in some cities and tourist hotspots, limited housing supply growth combined with the rapid expansion of STR (which can in certain places represent as much as 20% of the dwelling stock) as well as speculative investment practices may be intensifying competition for limited housing stock. While the shortage of affordable housing is mainly attributed to other structural factors, increases in STR activity have been associated with higher rental and sale prices in some European cities 1 . As announced in the European Affordable Housing Plan 2 the Commission will propose a new legislative initiative on short-term rentals, as a central component of an Affordable Housing Act. This will enable public authorities to take a set of justified and proportionate measures, particularly in areas of housing stress, and tackle remaining issues such as consumer protection and distinguishing between professional and non-professional hosts. In drawing up the proposal, the Commission will fully respect the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, working on the basis of its legal competences in accordance with the treaties. 1 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the European Affordable Housing Plan ‘Understanding the Housing Crisis’. 2 https://housing.ec.europa.eu/european-affordable-housing-plan_en.”
  EU housing policy · EU regulation of short-term rentals
• 2026-01-14 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 16.3.2026 Written question Before awarding EU funding, the Commission carries out a rigorous selection process on grant beneficiaries based on objective criteria, such as the exclusion criteria or the EU restrictive measures. The revised Financial Regulation [1] introduced an explicit ground for excluding entities from receiving EU funds if they have engaged in incitement to hatred or violence. EU funded projects are then closely monitored to ensure that they are implemented according to the grant agreement which requires that beneficiaries must respect EU values also during the implementation. Measures such as the termination of the grant can be taken in cases of fraud, irregularities, substantial errors or serious breach of contractual obligations, including the violation of EU values. Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law [2] , referred to by the Honourable Member, defines the criminal offence of public incitement to violence or hatred against a group or a member of such group defined by reference to a number of criteria, including religion. It also requires Member States to ensure that the racist and xenophobic motive of crimes, including those based on religion, is considered an aggravating circumstance or is otherwise taken into account when determining the penalty. It remains however a national competence to investigate or prosecute cases of alleged hate offences, including those targeting Christians and those arising in the context of cultural or digital publications. [1] Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024. [2] Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, pp. 55-58.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-01-12 “P-000066/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the Commission 1. Article 4(5) of Directive (EU) 1/2019 recognises that national competition authorities have the power to set priorities in applying Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The decision to investigate a practice lies within the discretion of each national competition authority, that exercises it case by case taking account of all relevant circumstances. These include the specific characteristics of the conduct, the dynamics of particular markets and available resources. These considerations may lead to different conducts or types of conduct being investigated and prosecuted by different national competition authorities. 2. To ensure the consistent application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in specific cases, Article 11(4) of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 provides that national competition authorities shall consult the Commission before adopting a decision, inter alia, requiring that an infringement be brought to an end, and make appropriate efforts to ensure the consistent application of Union law. This mechanism applies to all decisions finding an infringement of Article 101 and/or 102 TFEU. 3. The current system ensures the uniform interpretation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU through the mechanism envisaged in Article 11(4) of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, as well as through that envisaged in Article 11(3) of that regulation, pursuant to which national competition authorities shall inform the Commission of their first investigative measure in a timely manner. In addition, in light of its responsibility to safeguard the consistent application of EU competition law, the Commission regularly engages with national competition authorities through bilateral and multilateral meetings to ensure coordination of their respective enforcement actions.”
  EU Competition policy
• 2025-11-12 “E-004494/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission For now, the Commission does not plan to propose EU legislation setting specific distances from landfills or to carry out an assessment on the impact of asbestos fibres from landfills. EU legislation on landfills provides specific and adequate protection from threats arising from the management of waste containing asbestos. The Landfill Directive 1 ensures that waste, including asbestos, may only be accepted in landfills if properly treated and safely disposed of. This includes requirements to prevent pollution of air, soil, ground and surface waters and minimum control and monitoring procedures to be carried out periodically on site. Council Decision 2003/33/EC establishing criteria and procedures for the acceptance of waste at landfills 2 provides detailed requirements for the safe disposal of asbestos in landfill sites, such as coverage of the zones of deposit to avoid dispersion of fibres. 1 Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste, OJ L 182, 16.7.1999, p. 1–19, amended by Directive (EU) 2018/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 100–108. 2 Council Decision of 19 December 2002 establishing criteria and procedures for the acceptance of waste at landfills pursuant to Article 16 of and Annex II to Directive 1999/31/EC, notably Section 2.3.3.”
  Industrial emissions directive (IED) · Air quality policy · Water pollution
• 2025-10-01 “E-003814/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission In order to prevent the introduction into the EU of animal diseases, such as the highly pathogenic avian influenza, efficient rules on the entry into the Union of animals and products of animal origin that may transmit such diseases 1 , and on official controls at the border 2 , have been developed based on science, international standards, and in close cooperation with Member States, and have been in place for many years in the EU. All animals, plants and food products placed on the EU market must comply with the EU’s sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, whether they are produced domestically or imported from outside the EU. These requirements are not negotiable and apply regardless of any agreements with non-EU countries, such as the EU-Mercosur agreement. Official controls at border control posts are mandatory for this type of commodities. They ensure that consignments that are found as non-compliant are refused entry into the territory of the Union. The Commission confirms that non-EU countries which are listed for the exports of animals and animal products into the Union are also regularly audited by the Commission. This is also the case for Mercosur countries. Moreover, as outlined in the Commission’s Communication ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ 3 , the Union will strive toward fairer global level playing field for agriculture. The Commission will pursue, in line with international rules, a stronger alignment of production standards applied to imported products. In this Communication, the Commission also announced a dedicated task force to further strengthen controls on imports. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02016R0429-20210421. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02017R0625-20250105. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0075.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU · Animal diseases prevention and management in the EU
• 2025-09-24 “E-003693/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The proposal to revise the Tobacco Taxation Directive 1 complies with the principle of proportionality as set out in Article 5(4) the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 2 . The proposed amendments do not go beyond what could be helpful to ensure that the internal market functions properly, while ensuring a high level of human health protection. Increasing minimum EU excise duty rates for tobacco products will contribute to achieving the goals of Europe's Beating Cancer Plan. Higher tobacco taxes and prices have been demonstrated to be the single most effective measure to reduce overall tobacco use, particularly by young people and produce additional public health benefits. It is in the interest of uniform and fair taxation that tobacco related products be subject to a harmonised excise duty framework within the EU. This would also reduce regulatory fragmentation across Member States. While reduced tobacco demand may impact EU tobacco growers, the effect could be mitigated by switching to other crops, a common practice in agriculture. The common agricultural policy 3 support instruments also remain available to them. Employment in tobacco manufacturing has been declining due to automation and mechanisation. To address potential negative effects, Member States could implement retraining programs for tobacco sector workers. Excise taxes apply when the goods are released for consumption in the EU thus at the level of importers or manufacturers, whereas exports are not subjected to excise duty. Foreign and domestic operators are therefore equally impacted by the increase of EU minima. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32011L0064. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2016/art_5/oj/eng. 3 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy_en.”
  Priorities of taxation policy in the EU · EU competences on taxation
• 2025-09-24 “E-003694/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. There is robust Union legal framework provided for by Regulation (EU) 2016/429 1 and subsequent acts addressing bluetongue virus (BTV). BTV is a category C disease; subject to optional eradication. In addition, the Union legal framework includes measures applicable to the movement of animals within the EU 2 . Movements of animals to other Member States must be safe and the animals must either come from free zones or comply with applicable risk mitigation measures (vaccination and others) and certification providing for safe movement. Implementation of the legal framework is the responsibility of the competent authorities of the Member States. The situation is closely monitored by the Commission, Member States and regularly discussed at several fora, including at the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed 3 and with stakeholders. Also, preventive measures can be supported through Common Agricultural Policy Strategic Plans (CSP), including risk management and on-farm investments. CSP can also support economic mitigation efforts through the restoration of agricultural potential on infected farms. 2. The Commission is reviewing the BTV legal framework, considering a new categorisation of BTV, potentially as a category D disease 4 . In that case, BTV would no longer be subject to optional eradication, but other appropriate, more tailored, fine-tuned, risk-mitigating measures would then apply to movements of animals between Member States. 3. As regards financial resources, EU funding for BTV has not been planned for the 2025– 2027 period for eradication programmes in accordance with EU rules 5 , nor for emergency measures. Financial resources are allocated to the eradication of other major priority animal diseases. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj. 2 https://food.ec.europa.eu/animals/animal-diseases/surveillance-eradication-programmes-and-disease-freestatus/bluetongue_en. 3 https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal-topics/committees/paff-committees_en. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14718-Animal-diseases-newcategorisation-of-infection-with-bluetongue-virus_en. 5 Regulation (EU) 2021/690 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing a programme for the internal market, competitiveness of enterprises, including small and medium-sized enterprises, the area of plants, animals, food and feed, and European statistics (Single Market Programme) and the work programmes (adopted as Commission Implementing Decision C(2024) 2098 of 2.8.2024 for 20252027).”
  Animal diseases prevention and management in the EU
• 2025-09-04 “E-003427/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission Food products from third countries, regardless of their origin, must comply with EU food safety standards laid down in EU legislation. According to Regulation (EU) 2017/625 1 , Member States must carry out official controls and enforcement activities at all stages of distribution, including for imports. So as to ensure compliance with maximum residue levels of pesticides, all Member States have to sample rice, every three years according to the coordinated multiannual control programme of the EU, that is a rolling programme (currently Commission Implementing Regulation 2024/989 2 ). Where food of non-animal origin from third countries, such as rice, poses a risk, the Commission adopts measures through Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1793 3 , including increased frequency and special conditions governing their entry into the EU. Member States are to impose penalties applicable to the infringement of the EU agri-food chain legislation. These penalties shall be effective, proportionate, dissuasive. Furthermore, the Member States’ competent authorities are responsible for the removal of non-compliant goods from the EU market. The Commission performs audits in Member States and in third countries to ensure that their official control systems guarantee that goods intended for export to the EU comply with the applicable EU rules. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/625/oj. 2 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/989/oj. 3 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/1793/oj.”
  Maximum residue levels · Pesticides & trade · Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2025-08-14 “E-003244/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission In 2023, the Commission adopted a regulation prescribing measures to prevent the establishment and spread within the Union territory of Popillia japonica 1 . It should be noted that this regulation prescribes several eradication measures, including chemical treatment but also other measures that are considered equally efficient against the different life stages of the beetle (larvae or adult). The competent authorities can select those that are best suited for their situation. Some examples include a mass trapping system with lures or an attract-and-kill strategy for adults of Popillia japonica, and the prohibition of irrigation of grassland or the use of mechanical milling to destroy larvae in the soil. Recently the Horizon 2020 project, IPM-Popillia 2 , developed an IPM-Toolbox with a range of sustainable control options for larvae and adults, suitable for sites with low and high pest abundance. Moreover, recent scientific literature 3 shows that there are multiple active substances currently approved in the European Union on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 that show effectiveness against this pest. In addition, Article 53 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 provides for derogations from the regular authorisation procedure for plant protection products (PPPs): Member States may grant temporary emergency authorisations in case of serious threat to plant health which cannot be contained by any other reasonable means. Such authorisations can be extended to PPPs based on active substances that are not (yet) approved in the Union. Therefore, through the application of Article 53, the Member States have the possibility to authorise efficacious PPPs to fight quarantine pests like Popillia japonica if this proves necessary. 1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1584 of 1 August 2023 on measures to prevent the establishment and spread of Popillia japonica Newman and on measures for the eradication and containment of that pest within certain demarcated areas of the Union territory, OJ L 194, 2.8.2023, pp. 17–38. 2 Horizon 2020 IPM-Popillia project (Integrated Pest Management of the invasive Japanese Beetle, Popillia japonica) https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/861852. 3 https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/insect-science/articles/10.3389/finsc.2023.1175138/full#h11.”
  EU policy on pesticides · Reduction targets for pesticides
• 2025-07-23 “E-003050/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to previous replies to written questions on the subject of the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood 1 . The Commission is aware of the report of the French Ministry of Interior and closely follows the evolving risk linked to organisations trying to unduly influence the European institutions, including radical and extremist non-state actors, as well as interference from third countries. The Commission values information provided by the Member States and takes note of the recent French report. It is the responsibility of the Member States to take the necessary measures, including by addressing the national courts, in case of substantiated breaches of the law by an association registered under their jurisdiction taking into account the need to respect freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of religion and belief as well as the need to preserve an enabling framework for civil society and human rights defenders. 1 For instance P-002185/2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-002185ASW_EN.html or E-001052/2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/ASW_EN.html.”
  Foreign interference in Europe · EU policy on Islam
• 2025-07-18 “E-003000/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Commission refers the Honourable Members to its answer to Written Question E002861/2025 1 .The Commission is committed to fighting racism, xenophobia and all forms of intolerance, combating any form of discrimination and protecting and promoting the rights and values as enshrined in the Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 2 . The Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme (CERV) 3 is established by Regulation (EU) 2021/692 and implemented through work programmes adopted after consultation with the CERV Programme Committee, whose members are representatives of EU Member States and associated countries participating in the programme. The 2025 work programme was adopted on 18 July 2024. Subsequently, the call for proposals ‘EQUAL’ to promote equality and to fight against racism, xenophobia and all other forms of discrimination was launched, aligning with the objectives of the programme’s Regulation and the priorities outlined in the 2025 work programme. With its six priorities, this call has a wide scope and coverage which accounts for the diversity of the European society. The Commission is determined to engage all relevant actors to work towards the common goal of achieving an open, inclusive and respectful European society, where no one feels excluded, threatened, discriminated or unsafe. In this respect, a dialogue with religious and non-confessional organisations based on Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union has been developed and includes representatives of the main Christian Churches and organisations present in Europe, which are regularly consulted on the major political and policy developments at EU level. 1 Answer for question E-002861/25 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/ASW_EN.pdf. 2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp 391-407). 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme (OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1).”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2025-03-20 “E-000804/2025 E-000724/2025 E-000839/2025 P-001042/2025 E-001183/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission did not run corporate communication campaigns in 2024 before the European elections. The communication efforts around the European elections were led by the European Parliament. In general, when running corporate communication campaigns about common European projects, such as REPowerEU or NextGenerationEU, the Commission may procure communication services, such as advertising space, through contracts and framework contracts awarded to agencies in line with the Financial Regulation 1 . Such procurement of services is always done in full respect of the Financial Regulation and of applicable national rules for advertising. 1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Conditions to access EU budget
• 2025-03-04 “E-000904/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission emphasises the need for large financial institutions to disclose alignment with Taxonomy criteria. The Commission intends to address issues with the methodology of the Green Asset Ratio as part of the planned review of the Taxonomy Disclosures Delegated Act 1 . A draft amending Delegated Regulation was published for consultation between 26 February and 26 March 2025 2 . Financial institutions are also expected to benefit from the possibility to disclose economic activities meeting only certain criteria, like climate change mitigation. This is reflected in the proposed amendment to the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive to revise reporting rules and better reflect the transition efforts introducing disclosures of partial alignment with the Taxonomy. In view of meeting the environment and climate objectives, the 8th Environment Action Programme Mid-Term Review 3 calls for collaborative efforts to render laws effective and promote clean solutions. Simplification, modernisation, digitalisation and funding are pivotal. Successful implementation hinges on overcoming challenges to ensure stakeholder buy-in, showcasing the benefits of the green transition. The Commission commits to ongoing dialogue with Member States, fostering understanding of climate risks and opportunities and building support for effective policies. This approach precedes legislative revisions, adhering to evidence-based policy-making aligned with Better Regulation guidelines. In addition, inclusive dialogues with stakeholders ensure that policies enshrined in the European Green Deal contribute to a just and competitive transition. Notably, the Clean Industrial Deal 4 that facilitates achievement of EU climate goals by incentivising industry decarbonisation, was supported by stakeholder initiatives like the Antwerp Declaration for a European Industrial Deal 5 and Clean Transition Dialogues 6 , tailored to sectors such as automotive, steel, metals and chemicals. 1 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2178 of 6 July 2021 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council by specifying the content and presentation of information to be disclosed by undertakings subject to Articles 19a or 29a of Directive 2013/34/EU concerning environmentally sustainable economic activities, and specifying the methodology to comply with that disclosure obligation OJ L 443, 10.12.2021, p. 9–67. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14546-Taxonomy-Delegated-Actsamendments-to-make-reporting-simpler-and-more-cost-effective-for-companies_en. 3 COM(2024)123 final. 4 COM(2025) 85. 5 https://antwerp-declaration.eu/. 6 COM (2024)163 final.”
  Green Taxonomy · EU approach to sustainability criteria in private investments
• 2025-03-04 “P-000912/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the issues raised in the question, and shares the importance of the uniform classification of goods in the Common Customs Tariff, the cornerstone of the Customs Union. Therefore, as there still are (despite the existing Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2080) divergent views on the classification of the products at issue (salted and dried tomatoes), the Commission opened a case of divergent classification. The issue was examined at the meeting of the Customs Code committee (25 to 26 March 2025). The Customs Code Committee that previously voted unanimously on the above Regulation agreed that salting is not a permitted preparation mentioned in the wording of heading 07.12 (‘Dried vegetables, whole, cut, sliced, broken or in powder, but not further prepared’) The heading covers only dried vegetables, and the drying process does not require the addition of the salt. According to the Explanatory Notes to Chapter 7: ‘Vegetables not presented in a state covered by any heading of this Chapter are classified in […] Section IV. For example, […] vegetables prepared or preserved by any process not provided for in this Chapter fall in Chapter 20’. The Commission ensured an appropriate re-examination of the case by the Customs Code Committee, taking into consideration all relevant arguments presented by the industry. The Customs Code Committee confirmed during its meeting, that the products at issue are to be classified in heading 2002 – in line with the above Regulation.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2025-02-27 “E-000877/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Ensuring the level playing both inside the single market and vis-à-vis third countries is one of the core tasks of Commission. The approach contained in Article 116 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation) 1 is in line with this objective, by granting the same prudential treatment to banks exposures that present equivalent risks. To achieve this objective, the Commission cannot disregard the competences – recognised by the Treaties – of Member States in setting-up and delivering their national health systems. These differ significantly in terms of governance and funding arrangements and, accordingly, credit risk profile. Given their knowledge of their domestic healthcare bodies and other public sector entities (PSE), national competent authorities are better suited to assess the risks which each PSE poses. As such, they are tasked by the Capital Requirements Regulation with assessing whether exposures to PSEs can be considered as bearing the same risks of exposures to the central government, regional government, or local authority of their respective Member States. As noted in the answer to written question E-002729/2024 2 from the Honourable Member, the merits of this approach have been confirmed recently by co-legislators when endorsing Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 3 , which – to increase transparency of the single-market – tasks the European Banking Authority to establish and update a publicly accessible database of PSEs within the EU which are treated as the central, regional or local government of the Member State in which they are established for the purposes of prudential capital requirements. 1 OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1–337. 2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards requirements for credit risk, credit valuation adjustment risk, operational risk, market risk and the output floor, OJ L, 2024/1623, 19.6.2024.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-02-27 “E-000878/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the need for new active substances to be used in plant protection products (PPPs) to secure the long-term resilience of farming, nature and health protection. Research and innovation actions funded under Horizon Europe support sustainable crop protection 1 by exploring alternatives to chemical pesticides, advancing innovative pest control methods, and providing knowledge to farmers and advisors 2 . The Commission has already simplified the requirements for the approval of microorganisms as biological active substances and, as announced in the Vision for Agriculture and Food 3 , intends to propose further measures that accelerate the access of biopesticides to the EU market. The availability of PPPs to farmers also depends on Member States who, according to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 4 are responsible for authorising PPPs containing approved active substance on their market and can apply mutual recognition and extend authorisations to minor uses. It is also possible for Member States in exceptional cases and for a limited period in time to grant emergency authorisations to address serious dangers to plant health that cannot be contained by other means. Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 5 on Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) on pesticides in or on food and feed has the main objective to protect consumers’ health. MRLs are set at the levels that reflect the authorised uses of plant protection products, i.e. the Good Agricultural Practices. MRLs must be safe for consumers. In case Member States grant emergency authorisations for products containing active substances for which no MRLs are set, the MRL Regulation provides for an option of setting temporary national MRLs under specific conditions. 1 More information available at the AgriResearch factsheet on plant health: https://research-andinnovation.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e8a5772e-9fca-4583-a81b-649729068f1e_en 2 See Horizon Europe AdvisoryNetPEST project: https://advisorynetpest.eu/ 3 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/overview-vision-agriculture-food/vision-agriculture-and-food_en 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/1107/oj/eng 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2005/396/oj/eng”
  EU policy on pesticides · Maximum residue levels
• 2025-02-05 “E-000500/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The EU programme for the environment and climate action (LIFE 1 ) provides financial support for the functioning of a broad range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), supporting civil society’s participation to policy making in the areas of environment and climate action 2 , in line with the LIFE Regulation and the EU Financial Regulation 3 . LIFE operating grants are awarded following a competitive procedure. NGOs applying submit proposals outlining their work programme of activities in policy areas indicated in the LIFE Regulation. This work programme is annexed to their grant agreement. The Commission does not prescribe the specific activities to be carried out by the NGOs in their work programme, neither instructs them to support specific positions. According to the grant agreements, any opinions expressed, and activities carried out remain the sole responsibility of NGOs. In line with the EU Financial Regulation, the Commission publishes information about all recipients of EU funding in direct management on the Commission’s Financial Transparency System website 4 , including funding by recipients qualifying as NGOs, such as T&E. Transport & Environment (T&E) is registered as a non-governmental organisation in the Transparency Register 5 under registration number 58744833263-19. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/783 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing a Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE), and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1293/2013. 2 Recital 23 of Regulation (EU) 2021/783 states that “It is, therefore, appropriate that the LIFE Programme support a broad range of NGOs as well as networks of non-profit-making entities that pursue an aim which is of general Union interest, and that are primarily active in the area of the environment or climate action, by awarding, in a competitive and transparent manner, operating grants, in order to help such NGOs, networks and entities, to make effective contributions to Union policy, and to build and strengthen their capacity to become more efficient partners”. 3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj 4 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/ 5 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Transparency requirements for interest groups
• 2025-01-30 “E-000416/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Communication on the 2040 climate target 1 and its Impact Assessment confirm that all zero and low carbon solutions, including renewables and nuclear, are necessary to decarbonise the energy system by 2040. A greater share of renewables in 2040 is thus necessary to meet our climate goals in the most cost-effective way, while enhancing energy independence and affordability. During his hearing on 5 November 2024, the Commissioner for Energy and Housing set out his intention to propose a renewable energy target for 2040, which has been reflected in his Mission Letter 2 . The Commission will then work on this proposal with all the energy stakeholders and in close cooperation with all Member States, in view of supporting investor predictability, innovation and market growth for clean technologies. As reaffirmed by the Commissioner for Energy and Housing 3 , it is also important to ensure technology-neutrality when decarbonising our economy, in line with the Treaty. As announced in the Affordable Energy Action Plan 4 , the Commission will assess investment needs in an updated Nuclear Illustrative Programme and the possibility of streamlining permitting and licensing practices for the deployment of new nuclear technologies such as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). The European Industrial Alliance on SMRs was launched to facilitate the deployment of the first SMRs in the EU by early 2030s. The Commission will continue to support the work of the Alliance. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024DC0063. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/1c203799-0137-482e-bd184f6813535986_en?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20JORGENSEN.pdf. 3 https://hearings.elections.europa.eu/documents/jorgensen/jorgensen_verbatimreporthearing-original.pdf. 4 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/action-plan-affordable-energy-unlocking-true-value-our-energy-unionsecure-affordable-efficient-and_en.”
  Nuclear energy · Energy (green transition)
• 2024-12-19 “E-003068/2024 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The REPowerEU Plan 1 suggested an aspirational target of 10 million tonnes of EU renewable hydrogen production and 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen imports by 2030 to lower the imports of Russian fossil fuels, proposing to increase the mandatory targets for renewable hydrogen consumption in industry and the transport sector. The co-legislators decided on a lower level of binding 2030 targets under the Renewable Energy Directive 2 . In addition, the co-legislators also agreed on mandatory targets for renewable hydrogen consumption in industry in 2035 and laid out pathways in the aviation 3 and maritime 4 sector to promote the uptake of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen up to 2050. There is no hydrogen production target for 2040 set out in the European legislation. The Commission's internal estimate for renewable hydrogen uptake by 2030 based on the above mandatory targets is three to six million tons. The Commission is focusing on the work with Member States, including through an assessment of their National Energy and Climate Plans, to ensure the timely transposition of the mandatory demand volumes and other recent hydrogen legislation. This will contribute to provide the sector with the necessary visibility to carry out its investments. 1 COM(2022) 230 final. 2 Directive (EU) 2023/2413. 3 Regulation (EU) 2023/2405. 4 Regulation (EU) 2023/1805.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-12-03 “E-002729/2024 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation) 1 assigns under Art. 116 a 100% risk weight to exposures of credit institutions to Public Sector Entities (PSEs) without an external rating; unless it has an original maturity of three months or less, in which case a 20% risk weight is applied. However, the same provision specifies that, under exceptional circumstances, competent authorities of each Member State might decide to treat exposures to PSEs as exposures to the central government, regional government, or local authority in whose jurisdiction they are established, if they are covered by an appropriate guarantee by the central government, regional government or local authority. When proposing the Banking Package 2 , the Commission recognised that different approaches to PSE funding structures exist among Member States, including in their health systems. And that standardising these funding structures through banking regulation was not appropriate, leaving the consideration of such specific cases to the above-mentioned competent authorities. The co-legislators agreed with this approach when endorsing Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 3 , which entered into force on 1 January 2025. To enhance transparency on the prudential treatment of lending to PSEs, co-legislators have tasked the European Banking Authority with creating and maintaining a publicly accessible database of PSEs within the EU which are treated as the central, regional, or local government of the Member State in which they are established for the purposes of prudential capital requirements. This initiative will provide a comprehensive overview of the approaches of the abovementioned competent authorities, thereby promoting transparency across Member States. 1 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1–337. 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/latest-updates-banking-package-2023-12-14_en 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards requirements for credit risk, credit valuation adjustment risk, operational risk, market risk and the output floor (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L, 2024/1623, 19.6.2024.”
  European Banking Union · Financial regulation
• 2024-10-30 “E-002351/2024 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission In the State of the Union address to the European Parliament on 13 September 2023, the President announced the launch of a strategic dialogue on the future of agriculture in the EU. Considering the complexity of the task, the Commission decided to entrust it to an external independent person. Special Advisers are engaged to assist Members of the College based on the level of their professional experience and expertise. The choice of the chair of the strategic dialogue was based on his knowledge of the subject and professional experience, especially when it comes to his ability to navigate as a trusted arbitrator in complex negotiation processes with highlevel stakeholders and to the proven capacity for consensus-building around complex issues. As chairperson of the ‘Future Commission Agriculture’ (ZKL) of the German Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (2021-2024), the professor delivered a report on the future of agriculture. He led the ‘agricultural summit’ discussion with 40 associations and organisations. He was also the president of the German Research Foundation from 2013 to 2019, i.e. with an interdisciplinary and academic management profile, and not a profile limited to medieval history. Paid special advisers receive a fee for every day worked that is consistent with the level and the quality of the services expected from the special adviser and that is in accordance with the Rules on Special Advisers to the Commission. Thanks to the chair’s engagement, the strategic dialogue brought together a highly diverse range of stakeholders specialized in farming issues, creating trust and presenting consensual solutions.”
  Agricultural funding
• 2024-08-09 “E-001506/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission acknowledges that the situation created by the landslide near La Praz and the ensuing closure of the Fréjus railway line in August 2023 is serious. Renovation works on the line will take some time due to their challenging nature. At this stage, the Commission has no evidence that not all is done to reopen the line as soon as possible. 2. Coordination of trans-Alpine transport is already addressed by existing coordination structures, in particular the Zurich Process 1 and the EU strategy for the Alpine region (EUSALP) 2 . These structures should be used to the largest extent possible in situations such as the current interruption of the Fréjus rail line following the landslide in August 2023 to ensure that traffic can continue on the most efficient routes and that excessive detours are avoided. 3. The EU does not have the financial programmes or resources to provide subsidies to operators in such cases. Funding from the Connecting Europe Facility is only available for financing of trans-European transport (TEN-T) infrastructure and cannot be used to provide a short-term relief to users of infrastructure that has suffered the damage. Concerning potential support from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the agreement in place with the French authorities specifically exclude support to this kind of infrastructure and cannot be used to provide disaster-related damage. Where Member States concerned consider financial compensations from national resources, such financing would have to be in line with the applicable EU State aid rules. 1 https://acrossthealps.org/ 2 https://alpine-region.eu/”
  EU support of rail transport · EU funding for transportation · EU transport infrastructure integration
• “Thank you. Thank you. Welcome back. Director Jorgensen. Well, a few days ago, Commissioner Jorgensen underlined the importance of reducing reliance on fossil fuels to enhance the union's resilience. And this stance is agreeable. Yet it demands a concrete implementation. To this end, it is essential to strengthen domestic energy production and develop cross-border infrastructures promptly ensuring an integrated market that supports competitive prices. And these elements are critical for a transition that does not place excessive burdens on households and industries. And this is my question. Furthermore, clarification is needed by the Commission's proposed strategy Reducing external dependencies must be supported by precise measures to address potential energy shortfalls, with targeted investments and effective coordination among member states to prevent unilateral decisions that could create imbalances. The work programme for this year, published on February, sets a target of a 90% emission reduction by 2040. However, industrial energy costs are already 40% higher than those of global competitors in 2024, could rise by 15% by 2030 without sufficient domestic production capacity. Additionally, the estimated investment needed for energy infrastructure totals 600 billion by 2030, with only 30% currently covered by public funds. A lot of figures, but an approach to balancing technological flexibility and competitiveness is necessary to ensure the transition does not impose unsustainable costs on key economic sectors. And the Commission, in my opinion, must safeguard industrial resilience. Thank you for your attention and for your reply. Thank you.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you. Mr. 50,000 people. Uh, people were subjected to this blackout. It was the first time that we've had one in the Green Deal. Above and beyond that. And I've heard people playing with words like how we should shed light on responsibilities, pun intended. We can see that there are some things that are clear substituting gas with renewables, that has brought a off balance in the energy system, volatility in terms of prices first and foremost. And then Sanchez and Greenpeace haven't understood why we need nuclear plants, that they would be there to have a continuous energy production and not oscillations in the system. I've also heard criticism of private producers read in Spain is controlled by the state. And there was a there is someone who is connected to the Socialist Party in charge and how much production in renewables, and that was not pumped into the grid. Now we can see that the myth of Spain has collapsed, that it would be able to keep prices low with a huge portion of renewables. This is far too weak, specifically when it comes to energy security, renewables, when they are increased in an uncontrolled way via incentivization. But you don't uphold the security system. You are moving towards the failure of energy policy and the Sanchez government cannot hide from this fact.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• “No, I don't understand why president von der Leyen didn't stay here. She could have followed the debate. We have questions that we would like to put and there are many of them. I heard from the president herself that the when the ETS was introduced. There was a 27% increase in GDP. Well, I'm not sure, but in Italy we might feel like we are not benefiting from that despite the ETS we're managing, not because of it. I think we need to come back to reality and rethink what's going on. We shouldn't speed up what's going on at the moment in this chamber. We're hearing what people are saying here. We're hearing people politicking for their electoral campaigns. But president von der Leyen, if you had stayed in the chamber, you would have noticed you were talking about decarbonisation and competitiveness. But if we continue, we want it's going to have to be either competitiveness or decarbonisation.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• “Thank you. Well I List, listened carefully to president von der Leyen's statements on Mercosur specifically, and I was surprised when she talked about farmers that had been listened to, that had been heard. So my question is, if they have been heard, then why have they been demonstrating for two days now? How come they are losing jobs? Why are they sleeping? Outside of the parliament in temperatures that are below zero? This is a question of legalized unfair competition. We're talking about one of the sectors that is most under pressure by competition, and also by standards that have been adopted by this Parliament. Now, I realize that we cannot make everyone happy. Not every sector happy. But what I want to know is why do we always ask farmers to be massacred everywhere and every time? And then President You referred, sir, to the 90 billion loan for Ukraine. I. I would, if you allow, ask you for more realism. If we think we're going to get this money back without an international legal basis, freezing Russian assets and forgetting that there are European assets frozen in Russia. I think we are being disingenuous here. I beg your pardon, sir, but I'm glad that you're not at the head of a bank. Because if you were in a head of a bank, I'd be. I'd be very afraid to have my savings there.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “All right. Thank you, thank you. Well, we are reaching a breaking point from which there will be no return with a crisis that is no longer a cyclical phenomenon, but a structural one compared to 2019, Europe is producing nearly 2 million fewer vehicles. Um, the message coming from the market is therefore unequivocal. The market is contradicting policy. Once again, the market is contradicting policy. And the reason for this gap are now well known. Uh, an electric vehicle costs on average 30 to 40% more than a combustion model. And the public charging network still falls far short of the estimated need for over 3 million by 2030. Meanwhile, uh, manufacturers from China have reached about 7.4% of the overall European market, and in some summer months have exceeded 10% of the electric segment. Uh, it is therefore not surprising that even president von der Leyen, in her letter to the heads of state on October 20th, acknowledged the need to review the 2019 emission regulation by the end of the year in relation to this forthcoming review. I would like to know the intention of the European Commission. I would like to ask whether. Introducing an explicit mechanism allowing the use of synthetic fuels to achieve the 2030, 20, 35 targets as envisaged in its own reply of September 23rd, and access the regulatory recognition of the contribution of the advanced biofuels and high efficiency hybrids which are currently not accountable under the tailpipe only method.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “Thank you. President von der Leyen. If you'd remained here in the hemicycle. I would have told you that I would be going home tomorrow. Like all colleagues to meet up with farmers, students, mayors with the real country, with people who will ask me how the session, the plenary session went in a context where purchasing power is is causing concern. Students want to flee the country and go abroad where they get more money. Mayors are finding it more and more difficult to provide services to their citizens. What? What will I be able to tell all these people that the president of the European Commission came to speak about the excellent results obtained in terms of wind power and other sources of energy, that the southern part of the world is having difficulty in finding clean energy. This is a continent which simply can't come up with, uh, an answer. It seems to be full of angst when it comes to defence and other matters. It's never really listened to people who think differently. This is the harsh reality. This is what's happening. Um. We're destroying producers. The automotive sector in Italy is being diminished and we will never be accomplices to this.”
  Von der Leyen
• “The automotive sector in Europe is sick. It's in a parlous state. And what is the solution which is proposed? Kind of tepid attempt to do something with ten years away from eliminating the internal combustion engine. But we're currently looking at around 2% for alternatives. But what are we seriously trying to do here? We need to look at supply. We need to look at what consumers actually want, and we need to look at the amount of electricity that would be necessary to power an entire flight of European vehicles. We need to look at what the big car companies are doing and how SMEs might be able to do things better for citizens, but we've just got this shift to E-vehicles, which is destined to fail. We need to look at all the missed opportunities to do something better.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “Yes. Thank you. Thank you very much. I will have the floor in in Italian. Well, looking at figures and prices. Yesterday the average price on the markets was under €29 per megawatt hour. I'm talking about the cost of electricity and. Whereas in Italy the cost is between 130 and 150. These aren't, um, these chances are not at random. They reflect different mixes. Um, today we're talking about nuclear safety and decommissioning, But this, I believe, also links directly to the future of energy and industry in the EU. The EU is competing in a market where we see two speeds. There's a clear split when it comes to costs of energy, and there are some member states who are at a competitive disadvantage compared with others. So the most important thing, I think, is to create synergy between decommissioning on one hand and new nuclear capacity on the other. The know how that we're paying for cannot just be cannot just lead to closing down plants. We have to have, um, uh, keep our know how and ensure that we're looking at the whole life cycle of plants up until they are decommissioned. Member states who are planning new plants and meet the necessary safety provisions will have, um, uh, a more advanced knowledge and technology and will be setting up small modular reactors. So I think that nuclear has to be, um, uh, a part of the mix. Um, and, uh, this tool has to be cross-cutting. Um, we have to ensure reliable, predictable supply for member states. And if member states want to, uh, want to use, um, nuclear, then they have to be ensured that they have, um, competitive conditions within the market. Thank you.”
  Nuclear energy
• “Yes, thank you very much. Well, I take note of this marketing exercise or this camouflage exercise, if you like. We are trying to mask this fear of rearming. Um, that worries people. But we have this program which I think is seeking to achieve the same ends. But let's have a look at people here calling for an increase in wages and pensions. But they're not there when we need latest generation drones and when we need modern arms. So yes, you need some flexibility on the budget, of course, but that has to apply to defence spending as well as elsewhere. I mean, I'm very sorry, but if that is not the case, then we're going to lose any shred of credibility that remains. So we have to acknowledge, um, we have to take urgent action. We have to adhere to the council's conclusions, and we have to act swiftly. But we have a people that is worried. And we have then to look at the decisions that are being taken now. We in the league will never be a party of, um, arms. Otherwise we will simply have to change names.”
  Defence spending
• “Thank you. Thank you, chair. Good morning. Very, very straight. Well, I'll make you, I think, that we need to be straight because the Commission's proposal is generally hard to defend. Any product coming from a third country with a trade agreement in force will essentially be treated as equivalent to a European one. Turkey, South Korea, Vietnam, all established, made EU, and we should have the hard seats to admit that this is not about building a European brand. It is about turning Europe into a toll-free waterway for the global economy. All the while, as strategic autonomy is involved in speeches, the Commission is claiming an increasingly intrusive role over foreign investment, so can defense competencies away from member states that already have affected the national tools such as, as Italy, Golden Power, for instance. It's not coincidence that the proposal received a negative opinion from the regulatory scrutiny board itself. And that this Parliament's research service confirmed that the effects on SMEs were not ever remotely considered. So I have a question. Isn't totally legitimate? Why did the proposal move forward anyway? Thank you very much.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• “Thank you. Thank you, chair. Welcome back, Madam Commissioner. I just have a couple of questions about the research field. Well, first of all, considering the crucial role that nuclear energy can play in ensuring security, decarbonisation and technological competitiveness for the EU, uh, what are the prospects for increased funding for the Euratom programme and nuclear research more generally, including innovative technologies such as small modular reactors and fusion? And what concrete actions will the Commission take to support this strategic area in the upcoming FP ten? And the second question, I would also like to know whether and how you intend to strengthen the prima partnership, thanks to which the EU has achieved the goals in terms of scientific diplomacy in the Mediterranean area. Uh, in light of the need to reinforce international cooperation in research and innovation, the goal of scaling up innovation and the broad portfolio of innovative solutions financed by prima. Moreover, if and in what way they are intended to strengthen the participation of SMEs. Thank you.”
  Nuclear energy
• “Thank you. Above and beyond the topic of overcapacity, which is certainly central, I would like to propose a five point package. Which will be something the commission could look at. Firstly. I think. We look at need to look at the apparatus to deal with carbon leakage. We're seeing that through production outside the EU. Then you've got an issue with the ETS until 2035. I think this is going to force the steel industry. If not to close, then to shrink Rink, then you've got energy related costs for heavy industry. Often we say we need a plan to guarantee secure supplies at competitive prices. This must also involve investments in nuclear and a look at the energy market. Then we need to reform state aid rules so that these measures can be more flexible to protect strategic industry. And the last point on which I'll conclude, I think we need to look at raw materials. Europe needs to invest in a secure supply system. So we don't depend on third countries which engage in unfair commercial practices.”
  State Aid
• “Thank you and welcome back. Vice president. Well, the the union launched the chipset with 43 billion to strengthen our strategic autonomy. But the new report from the Court of Auditors is crystal clear. The current framework is highly insufficient. Technology wise, the union continues to invest in material chips, those above ten nanometers. But global competition is determined by chips below ten nanometers. And in this, we remain almost entirely dependent on East Asia, which accounts for over 90% of global supply, and on the operational side, the authorization timelines exceed 24 months, more than double doses in the United States. And the question is no longer whether to refer to the Chips act, but how to reform it. Could you please clarify which measures the Commission intends to introduce in order to firstly ensure guaranteed and sufficient funding? Certainly. And secondly, establish an authorisation fast track that reduces reduces timelines to levels comparable to those in the United States. Thank you.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• “Well, what a pathetic debate. I mean, there are moments of theater here, but also a lot of memory loss. People appear to be struggling to recall how they had people on the board of Gazprom and so on, within their political group. At any rate, now we're recognizing that the EU got it wrong, got its priorities wrong, that its climate extremism was wrong, and put us in this difficult position in the international context. We're talking about European interests here. If you want energy independence from Moscow, that's fine by me. But how about bringing down prices, increasing domestic production of gas, because otherwise there's no hope of achieving a reasonable situation for European citizens. It's not only about the Ukraine peace process. We need to be able to defend our own interests, starting with energy. Thank you very much.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Yes. Thank you, thank you. Chair. Good morning everyone. Allow me to have the floor in an Italian. The EU has set a very ambitious target 20 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen, half produced internally in the EU and half imported. That target is an extremely ambitious challenge that's going to require a lot of investment and it's going to require a stable supply chain. Nonetheless, the Court of Auditors has indicated that in order to achieve that target for renewable hydrogen, it's basically an impossible task, an impossible ask. Looking at what is actually available in terms of low carbon fuels, looking at the delegated act published in July and analysing the methodology. We have a set of rules that would indicate that looking at the reduction threshold, there would be a calculation that should be carried out in the same way, regardless of the source, regardless of where the fuel had been produced. Nonetheless, if you look at the hydrogen bank and the first round there, it was exclusively limited to renewable hydrogen. That means their special treatment. That means that depending on which instrument you're using, people are treating different fuels in different ways. And that creates a climate of uncertainty for investors. It means that people are not keen to get on board to help develop this sector. So it is our view that we need a radical change of approach and otherwise that 20 million tonnes will be a pipe dream. What are your thoughts? I hope I'm not too much of a doom monger here, but I think there is a bit of food for thought there.”
  Low-carbon hydrogen
• “Comissario Commissioner. We used to have these massive Christmas dinners, didn't we? Now we just have to have thin gruel, because electric vehicles are being imposed in a way which is causing irreparable damage to the car industry and related sectors and people can't afford them. Too quick. The stagnation of sales. But people are supposed to be switching, but only 16% switch rather than 25% so far. There are 3 million vehicles. Less than before Covid, 90,000 jobs. Less than before Covid. We're seeing vehicles coming in from China, so not much to celebrate this Christmas. And giving the automotive sector thin gruel is not going to save it.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “Thank you. Thank you chair. Good morning colleagues. Well, I think we are not, uh, just discussing our research program. We are dealing with a structural question. Does Europe still want to produce still or is it resigning itself to becoming a consumption market dependence on on others? The council had put forward a text that modernises the funds, and the rapporteur rightly highlights the strategic importance of this instrument. But today it is not enough to manage the fund more efficiently. We need to be clear about what it's for. Today. Our plans are operating at around 65% of capacity, and the sector has lost around 100,000 jobs since 2008. Um, in general, if we look at the transition, very concrete limits emerge, even on so-called green steel. Globally, around 28 million tonnes of capacity have been announced, but only about one third is actually under construction in Europe. This amounts to around 18 million tonnes, compared to a demand of over 130 million. On top of this, there is a key constraint green hydrogen is not available at industrial scale and still costs between 2 and 5 times more than conventional alternatives. In conclusion, without competitiveness, there can be no fair transition and you will not lead any transition if it stops producing steel. Thank you. Thank you very much.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Yes. Thank you. Thank you sir. Thank you and welcome, sir. Yes. Uh, well, very, very briefly, I have a question on the Iberian Peninsula blackout and its consequences because, well, at the time of the event, Spain's energy mix consisted of approximately 70% renewable sources, 30% gas and nuclear. Uh, after many weeks, uh, I think that we can say that the system collapsed due to a transition that heavily favored the, uh, renewables without investing with equal determination in, uh, reliable and, uh, stable sources. Um, so my question is, uh, In the absence of a balanced energy mix. Can we truly speak of preventing prices, abuses, and speculation? If the market context is so unstable that it can't even generate reliable price signals to the grid? The emergency is caused by the unpredictable nature of renewables, and aren't we at risk that instruments like remits will be forced to intervene only after the damage is done, losing their capacity to prevent and protect consumers and businesses who by then have already had to pay very high energy bills and cut production capacity. Thank you very much.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• “Lo sport la musica. La la cultura sono stati veicoli strumenti di dialogo tra I popoli per commissario. Io. Io dico da rappresentante della regione del Veneto al Parlamento europeo io considera gravi la sua parole che questa una fase nella quale serve a prior non chiudere in part, ha tradito lo spirito olimpico perché esiste un aumento sacro in cui la armi devono fermare e Popolo in guerra devono dialogar tra loro io credo che un lato inquietante che vedo in questo titulo, IL pericolo di normalizer, ma la normalisation e propedeutica a Farsi che IL dialogo popoli riprendere che I conflitti terribili conflitti si. Abbiamo tutti chiaro IL campo per questo titolo, io credo che questa Europa abbia sempre bisogno di un amico per un significato.”
  EU and national cultural identities
• “Thank you. Thank you very much, Commissioner. Good luck. It looks like this particular commission has a not a very cohesive, uh, united backing now, in now using the plenary to conduct electoral campaigns, but, uh, sorry, but, uh, we're not on television. This isn't we're not on television here to do that particular purpose. Uh, when that support for the left that was out there, uh, and when the Green Deal and the Greens, uh, with their new Green Deal essentially undermining, undermining the possibilities for development of industry. Well, Industry will unfortunately think about the fact that European voters, uh, have been exposed to this particular type of discussion here, this where we're, uh, presenting, uh, extremists as, uh, as elements which are being which are there to destroy Europe. But quite the opposite. We see certain elements from the right which are supporting democracy and doing whatever possible out there to support European and help Europeans.”
  Climate efforts
• “Thank you, thank you. Chair. I'm afraid that there is a still marginal role given to carbon capture, utilisation and storage technologies. Despite their strategic potential being acknowledged by the Commission itself through the Industrial Carbon Management Strategy, the funding allocated for CCS in the Innovation Fund has been set only at 2.4 billion, an amount even lower than the previous allocations, clearly indicating a discrepancy between statements and actions, a discrepancy that is even more serious when considering the centrality of these technologies for hard to abate sectors. To sum up, without a concrete operational plan and without a significant increase in action to reduce energy costs in the short term, the clean industrial deal risks merely turning into reality. The warning already issued by key sectors such as glass and steel. After the release of the of this communication last February that in absence of structural reforms, the future of European production is destined for delocalization. I would like to to have a comment or a or to know what is your approach on the US technology development and the relative financing? Thank you very much.”
  Carbon capture storage and utilisation
• “Thank you, thank you sir. Welcome, Minister. Allow me to have the floor. In. In Italian. The Cypriot presidency set out the issue of autonomy through competitiveness as one of its priorities. But this will be measured by ETS two, which, um. It's a very difficult for road transport and small scale industry. So it's basically a new tax on carbon, which is going to go straight to people's electricity bills or people's, uh, extra costs for small businesses. It could be up to €600 per year, more for a family to heat their house or 800 for, uh, Driving. So it's a huge leap in the price of energy, and it's going to impact those with lowest incomes the most, as well as those who live in rural areas. So Europe can't say it wants to enhance digital research and so forth, but at the same time increase the price of energy. 19 EU governments have asked for stricter controls on ETS two checks to ensure that that prices don't go up so much. Research suggests that it could lead to tens of billions of additional costs for fuel and heating. So the question is clear, and this is for Minister Damianos. Does the Cypriot presidency intend to push a political review of ETS two before its full entry into force. In order to prevent this from becoming a huge fiscal burden on Europe. Thank you.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• “Dear colleagues, how often are we going to have to bang our heads against the wall? We've got a crisis increase in the price of fossil fuels and energy. So it's time we moved away from these sources of energy. And what I would say to our colleague, Mr. Bardella, who seems not to have understood and, you know, it's not got through to him, actually, he's left the chamber. What a surprise. But we have to try and map a course to move away from fossil fuels and protect the front runners who are already out there in Europe being innovative. And I think that although our economies are threatened by the crisis. We have to invest massively in renewable energies in our electricity and water grids, grids, if we are to bring down prices in the long term. So I'd like to thank Mr. Procaccini, who launched the debate and surprisingly, has left the chamber as well. Yeah. Okay. We wouldn't have a problem if governments actually did something to do something about their budget. So we really need to pull together and move this debate forward.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Europe can no longer be the playground where everybody comes and does business without respecting the rules. The essentially, we're sacrificing our own values on the altar of importing countries. You know, we shouldn't just be the place where China's overcapacity gets dumped. We are a group of seven states with businesses and workers. We have an industrial past to defend. And then if we look at our trade policy, it shouldn't be measured in a number of treaties that are signed. The rhetoric of a fair play when the opponents are not playing fairly well, essentially fair play should fall by the wayside. So let's move out of humiliating dependency. What we need is we need to be courageous. We need a reciprocity. We need rigorous checks, and we need massive investments in our industry. For decades, the mantra that we've had from Brussels. Has been an opening up with unconditionally, you know, with a trade we can develop, as, you know, a peaceful round table and Brussels, piece by piece, has essentially ceded ground in terms of a production, you know, steel, electronics. And now we're selling our future down the river in terms of batteries and other things. So what we need to do is we need to look at the the strategic pathways and how we can improve things at home. Otherwise this essentially is the final nail in Europe's coffin. Thank you.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · Trade relations with China
• “Thank you. Thank you chair. Good morning. Welcome back Mr.. Uh, well, it's, uh, it's good news that, uh, the commission is moving, but, let's be clear about what we are talking about. I'm the automotive omnibus. We hear figures of around 700 million a year in estimated savings. But these 700 million won't flow into factories. We are talking about costs avoided. The result of cutting back EU level compliance obligations and requirements. In other words, what is being reduced is a larger burden companies have had to carry simply to avoid being deemed non-compliant under EU rules. And this reduction is is welcome. But it is a correction, not an industrial plan. And crucially, too much still hinges on legal uncertainty because key definitions such as made in new and low emission steel, are deferred to delegated acts, leaving investments decisions in limbo. So my question is what share of the 700 million will actually reach firms across the value chain, meaning SMEs, company makers and subcontractors? On what timeline and measured against which verification indicators? More specifically, which obligations and procedures will be eased with effects already in 2026? And what binding deadlines will you set for the delegated acts for honour made in EU and low emission steel? Thank you very much.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “I'm. Not quite sure what is going on here. It seems like a chronicle of a death foretold. We're talking about a European industry and how competitive it is. And we talk about jobs. But look at the competition from Asia. We've also been hearing all this frantic Communication in recent times about rearming. And now we have a clean industrial deal that is putting forward a program which is linked to compatibility with environmental, uh, measures and survival of European industry as a whole. And now the same people who voted for the Green Deal are criticizing it. There are 30 regulations and directives that compose it. And somehow they got voted through all by themselves. Did they? Without any help from anyone? Uh, Commissioner, when we look at our competitors in third countries, our own competitiveness is undermined by such measures, our ability to attract investment and. To combat outsourcing. We need modern, digitalized electricity grids that can cope with the fluctuating nature of supply from renewables. If we don't want Europe to turn into the go slow zone of the world, we're going to have to stop talking about so-called ambitions for something which is nothing but a dangerous pipedream.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Well, more than a year has passed since the Draghi report. For some people, it's the Bible. Other people read through it. They reread it again and again, but they haven't really understood what it's about. We are now in the middle of a crisis and more than we were a year ago. China and the USA compete against us. But we're not even making much of an effort. Europe has become the world champion in self sabotage. Workers could be as desperate as they want, but that's the situation we find ourselves in. So many of the legislative texts that are being contested now have been voted for. Some of the people in this room have been pressing the green button for it. I mean, many of these legislative texts have got guilty parties still in the room with us. Things do need to be done And in some cases are being done at the level of the European Commission. Some people are talking about the United States of Europe, though it's not a question of just doing things. We have to do the right things. And then you have the whole issue of the cost of living, which is spiking. It seems that in Brussels no one is interested in supporting the European economy. It seems that basically we're here managing decline.”
  EU political integration
• “Thank you. Thank you sir. Well I'm sorry, I will take the floor in Italian. Quanto quanto. Well, what happened wasn't just a procedural glitch. It was an abuse of procedure. Because, um, three, uh, groups decided on assignments behind closed doors are outside of the ordinary ordinary procedure, outside the rules, not respecting the rules, and then just presented it as a fait accompli to the other five groups. And, uh, will take into account the rules of procedure of this group, and the written procedure is only done in cases of urgency with proper justification. In this case, there was no justification. There was just a desire to steamroller ahead with a decision without consulting others. And so, from a personal point of view, as well as from the point of view of the numerical majority not allowing this, I would say that, um, uh, really, we're flouting the rules here. And, um, the we're talking about a system of private clubs. Thank you.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “As ever. Often we see an analysis of a problem. But even more often, you don't manage to come up with answers in what you propose, because we heard so much optimism when it came to the figures. Multiplying by ten, multiplying by five. But when we conclude this debate, what we'll see is reality being a long way from this debate. The commission was focusing on prices, prices, which are an aspect which concern people mainly, but the solutions at the moment we haven't heard anything about those small modular reactors were mentioned, but how long will this take? How many debates will have to take place to convince Europe that without Europe, we're not without nuclear power, we're not going to get anywhere. What's we're short of is the will to implement what is going on the Green Deal, contrarily, has made us dependent rather than giving us autonomy. The United States have become independent when it comes to energy and geopolitically, they can assume risks on that basis. I think we're going to have to start again, go back to the drawing board with the Green Deal. The you said the ETS is not going to be changed, but I think we need to look at the plans. Might be good plans, but obviously we haven't realized that the situation in reality is terrible if we don't leave the Green Deal.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you. Thank you sir. Well I'm sorry, I will take the floor in Italian. Quanto quanto. Well, what happened wasn't just a procedural glitch. It was an abuse of procedure. Because, um, three, uh, groups decided on assignments behind closed doors are outside of the ordinary ordinary procedure, outside the rules, not respecting the rules, and then just presented it as a fait accompli to the other five groups. And, uh, will take into account the rules of procedure of this group, and the written procedure is only done in cases of urgency with proper justification. In this case, there was no justification. There was just a desire to steamroller ahead with a decision without consulting others. And so, from a personal point of view, as well as from the point of view of the numerical majority not allowing this, I would say that, um, uh, really, we're flouting the rules here. And, um, the we're talking about a system of private clubs. Thank you.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Thank you. Thank you. Chair. Welcome back. Commissioner. Um, I will have a question on housing issue, but allow me to take the floor in Italian. So there are quite important costs in linked to housing. And in Italy we call it the green House directive. We're talking about €270 billion a year. In response, the commission is preparing a delegated act which is meant to come out the start of next year to. Try and sort this out. So my first question is on that. Maybe you could give me some more details just on bringing up to date the figures. In 2020, the development fund had €14 billion for energy efficiency and then additional 5 billion of national co-financing. And that. Really means €2 billion a year, which of course is a long way from that 275 billion which is deemed necessary. Now, obviously, there's a disparity between the economic needs in that directive, the Greenhouse directive and what is realistically available. If we take as a supposition that there is that imbalance, and if we look at the fact that the construction sector in various countries is suffering, then a lot of public money is going into what has then become a bubble. And so, Commissioner, I think we can be quite clear and simple in my question. Who is paying for all this?”
  Energy performance of buildings
• “Yes. Thank you. Let's go back to concrete issues. Today we face a critical task securing the EU's Use energy supply with a pragmatic, forward looking approach. Energy security is the bedrock of our industrial competitiveness, the affordability of energy bills for citizens and our strategic autonomy in a turbulent world. The draft report provides a robust foundation, but it must evolve to meet the real world needs and diverse realities of member states. And let me outline a cohesive vision to guide our amendments, weaving together technological flexibility, domestic production and regional cooperation anchored in the Mediterranean. Emerging role as an energy hub. The vision begins with a technological neutrality ensuring decarbonisation reinforces rather than undermines our energy system. Natural gas consumption has risen Raising even in early 2025, and will remain Vsel for the next 30 years. In fact, we cannot ignore this reality. Supports me push for blue hydrogen plus via steam methane reforming with CCS capturing 9,095% of CO2. And it's a practical bridge harnessing existing infrastructure to deliver secure, lower emission energy with we build broader solutions. And central to this strategy is a nuclear power. A cornerstone for stability in our energy transition. Small modular reactors offer a reliable complement to renewables, and their smaller footprint and modular design allow faster deployment, ensuring grid reliability. As a fossil capacity fades. By prioritizing SMEs, we can balance the intermittent sources with steady baseload power. Safeguarding energy security with while advancing decarbonization. A dual win that position nuclear as a lynchpin in our energy mix. I don't want to abuse the chair of your patience, but let me let me have some remarks on the importance of biomethane and geothermal energy. But you will read it in our amendments. Thank you very much.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Now, if the future of Europe is what we had this morning, then really we should be worried. Really? We should be seriously worried because we've got a president of the European Council who only really talked about weapons and armaments. Now, of course, we live in times in which we have a pacifist European left. And then, of course, president von der Leyen talked about how people are struggling to pay their bills. And perhaps we need to be cutting red tape. I mean, it's the European Union, the European Commission, after all, which has created this system, and you need to explain how you're going to resolve it now. Now, of course, all of this stems from the pandemic and the problem of climate change. And then we've got this alleged Russian Invasion of Europe. Now these really are a lot of is a lot of scaremongering to scare European people. Now President Costa, we've got a Europe which seems to be able to find money and flexibility when it comes to rearming. Now that, however, is a Europe which is betraying its own principles. It seems to have forgotten about retirement pensions and wages, and has forgotten about all the people that are suffering and only seems to care about a Europe of armaments.”
  Defence spending
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner. I am curious to hear many of the things that have been said here this morning, and about how the European Union is simply on the margins of the global community. Now, this is quite a strange thing to hear because during the election campaign, we heard that the Green Deal would enhance competitiveness of our companies. But now it seems to be a bit of a change of heart. Colleagues, what is happening here? What? This a similar thing is happening about the defence of our borders. Although I'm glad to hear you're a bit more serious minded about that because there is a serious need for it. I've heard people talking about not putting together majorities that are not acceptable to the Parliament. Well, frankly, we need to respect the majorities of the citizens of Europe who voted for us. Look at what has happened to the farmers. They have been accused of being polluters, rather than those who produce our food, of many other things, and of not being productive enough. I would like to hark back, please, to what Garcia said this morning about the title of the debate. She talked for four long minutes about the Patriot's Summit in Madrid. Well, let's learn from our strategy. We can talk about other people, and we can pin the blame on their door rather than recognize our own failings.”
  Climate efforts
• “Thank you very much. Well, this is a debate where I think we're hearing too much about Russia and too little about Europe. There are massive problems with industrial competitiveness in Europe. We have energy poverty that is on the up. And the only answer I've heard is in the direction of very expensive solutions versus what we have at the moment with the Commission and the majority of this Parliament giving the impression that you're just taking a knee jerk reaction. Somebody attacks you, you want to defend yourself behind what you have here. But it's very simplistic. It's a bit illusory that this is the answer of Europe in trying to find solutions where member states might have different resources to find solutions. So you might not have access to the sea, for example. And then looking at the way south east Europe's been ostracized. It's not just a question of opinions, it's a question of reality. 16 packages of sanctions have not brought an end to this war.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Yes. Thank you, thank you chair. Good morning. Well, in the USA the IRA offers tax credits to that mitigate this cost for industry. While in China subsidies reduce economic pressure on companies. If Europe does not adapt its target, for example by postponing or adjusting deadlines to 2026 instead of 2025, it risks losing market share, with companies potentially relocating to where costs are lower. Weakening industrial competitiveness and effectively undermining the efforts made with the adoption of the Net Zero Industry Act. Well, the goal of achieving 40% domestic production by 2030 requires substantial investments and the net zero industry values, required infrastructure and technical training to be effective in less industrialised areas. So I ask the Commission how the resilience criteria will balance the need for diversification with the cost and timelines of project implementation. Thank you very much.”
  Carbon leakage support
• “Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. The first thing that springs to mind. In order to sum up, the Cop 30 is long jump. Take a normal athlete who wants to do this, but that there might be another athlete that wakes up and thinks they can set or break a new record. I think this is the perfect metaphor. To sum up cop 30. We didn't really look at the crucial issues at Cop 30. There was a useless statement. Instead of looking honestly at the figures, let me explain and give you an example. Let's take fossil fuels for 40 years. The figure is stuck at 80%, and all you need is the World Energy Outlook by the International Energy Agency to see what we're talking about. And that is why this long jump athlete metaphor springs to mind once again. And now, Commissioner. There are constraints, especially when it comes to work methodology. There was a lethal mix of bureaucracy and diplomacy. I think if you don't take an honest approach and an honest look at the figures, this is what happens. Years go by. We have lofty goals and lofty statements, but that's all that we have. **Nicolae ȘTEFĂNUȚĂ @Co-Chair: Anna Zalewski.”
  Fossil fuels
• “Well, I think a crucial point concerns the methods of financing the new European budget. In addition to the traditional contribution based on the gross national income of member states, the Commission proposes introducing new own resources aimed at reducing pressure on national budgets and financing new priorities. Among these, the corporate resource for Europe stands out, and I have a strong political and economic concern about the impact of that and other fiscal instruments on the competitiveness of European companies. Commissioner. So my question is, how do the Commission intend to ensure that the planned increase in allocations for the MFF and the ECF is fiscally sustainable? And what alternative scenarios have been assessed in the event that the new own resources fail to deliver the estimated revenue volumes or face legislative and political hurdles, so as to avoid having to resort to cuts in other programs or a further increase in national contributions. Thank you very much.”
  Own EU resources
• “Thank you. Thank you sir. Well I'm sorry, I will take the floor in Italian. Quanto quanto. Well, what happened wasn't just a procedural glitch. It was an abuse of procedure. Because, um, three, uh, groups decided on assignments behind closed doors are outside of the ordinary ordinary procedure, outside the rules, not respecting the rules, and then just presented it as a fait accompli to the other five groups. And, uh, will take into account the rules of procedure of this group, and the written procedure is only done in cases of urgency with proper justification. In this case, there was no justification. There was just a desire to steamroller ahead with a decision without consulting others. And so, from a personal point of view, as well as from the point of view of the numerical majority not allowing this, I would say that, um, uh, really, we're flouting the rules here. And, um, the we're talking about a system of private clubs. Thank you.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions