Charlie WEIMERS

Policy topics Charlie WEIMERS is active on

What Charlie WEIMERS has said (51)

• 2026-02-19 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 4.6.2026 Written question EU funds are not used to support activities of mosques, Islamic centres or other places of worship. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) supports the restoration and valorisation of cultural heritage, recognising its contribution to socioeconomic and territorial cohesion and its role in addressing identified local needs in the Member States. Across the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 programming periods, only a limited number of EU-supported projects focused on the preservation of historic mosque buildings, most of them former or repurposed structures, to preserve and safeguard architectural heritage. For example, based on the Kohesio database, three former mosques were renovated in Greece and one active mosque in Poland that also serves as a Tatar cultural centre. In accordance with Article 3(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1149 [1] , the Internal Security Fund (ISF) is to contribute to the specific objective of supporting the strengthening of Member States’ capabilities to prevent and combat crime, terrorism and radicalisation, as well as to manage security-related incidents. In that regard, the ISF supports the implementation of the ProtectEU: Agenda to prevent and counter terrorism [2] , including through enhancing the protection of places of worship of all faiths. In the context of shared management, Member States shall ensure that ERDF and ISF support is in line with the EU fundamental rights, equality, and non-discrimination as per Article 9 of the common provisions Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 [3] . [1] Regulation (EU) 2021/1149 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Internal Security Fund , OJ L 251, 15.7.2021, pp. 94 , ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1149/oj. [2] COM(2026) 101 final: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/eu-agenda-preventing-and-countering-terrorism-and-violent-extremism_en. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj/eng.”
  EU policy on Islam · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2026-02-19 “E-000715/2026 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Pursuant to Article 17 of the Habitats Directive 1 , Member States are requested to report the population of species protected under the Directive every 6 years. Following the receipt of the data, the Commission has asked follow-up questions to a number of Member States as regards the alignment with the Habitats Directive, including Sweden. The reported value of 170 wolves as the favourable reference population (FRP) raises questions regarding its scientific underpinning. In the 2025 report of the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) 2 , the value of 170 individual wolves reflects a minimum viable population (MVP) estimate 3 . A scientifically sound FRP is, by definition, higher than the MVP to ensure long-term population viability 4 . In the previous report in 2019, the FRP value for the Swedish wolf population had been set at 300 individual wolves. The Commission proposed, in March 2025, an amendment to modify the protection status of the wolf under the Habitats Directive from ‘strictly protected’ to ‘protected’. This gives additional flexibility to Member States in managing their local wolf populations, including by taking measures that are well adapted to regional circumstances, including in areas with specific challenges linked to population density and human activity. This amendment entered into force in July 2025 5 . Even after a change in status, it follows from Article 14 of the Habitats Directive, that Member States should take measures to ensure that the species concerned are maintained at a favourable conservation status, with sufficient flexibility to ensure effective and balanced management in practice. 1 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50. 2 As stated in the SEPA report of 13 March 2025: ’the minimum viable population (MVP) for the Swedish part of the Scandinavian wolf population is approximately 170 individuals’ and the FRP ‘needs to be greater than 170’. https://www.naturvardsverket.se/49421e/globalassets/om-oss/slutredovisaderegeringsuppdrag/slutredovisning-ru-forvaltningsatgarder-for-varg-li202402201.pdf. 3 The MVP is the minimum population level required to minimise the extinction risk over a defined time frame. By contrast, the FRP is the population level ensuring that the species fulfils its ecological role in its natural habitat and range and is viable in the long term, considering uncertainties. To account for these uncertainties and for the precautionary principle, standard scientific practice is to calculate FRP by applying a multiplier to the MVP. Sweden previously applied a multiplier of 2, or 2 to 3. 4 Guidelines on concepts and definitions, Article 17 of Directive 92/43/EEC, Reporting period 2019-2024, page 25, https://cdr.eionet.europa.eu/help/habitats_art17/Reporting2025/Final%20Guidelines%20Art.%2017_20192024.pdf/ . 5 Directive (EU) 2025/1237 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2025 amending Council Directive 92/43/EEC as regards the protection status of the wolf (Canis lupus), OJ L, 2025/1237, 24.6.2025.”
  Large Carnivores
• 2026-02-13 “E-000644/2026 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Financial Regulation 1 sets out detailed rules for the selection and award of funds to entities, based on objective criteria. In the case of humanitarian support, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) need to undergo an assessment of their systems, rules and procedures identified in the Humanitarian Aid Regulation 2 , the Financial Regulation and international best practices 3 , before becoming certified under the EU Humanitarian Partnership 2021-2027 and being able to apply for EU humanitarian funding. Islamic Relief Worldwide did not undergo the ex-ante assessment and hence cannot apply for EU humanitarian funding. Further, Islamic Relief Sverige (Swedish NGO) and Islamic Relief Humanitäre Organisation in Deutschland e.V. (German NGO) met the criteria and were certified under the EU Humanitarian Partnership 2021-2027. Since their certification, neither organisation has received EU humanitarian funding. As a matter of principle, the Commission does neither discriminate on grounds of religion or beliefs nor classify partner organisations based on religious affiliation. The Commission takes a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to any misconduct by partner organisations receiving EU funds and will act should it become aware of any proven evidence in this respect. The safeguarding of the proper use of EU funds is further ensured by various mechanisms (for example, regular monitoring of NGOs to ensure their continued compliance with the standards mentioned above, suspension of contract or payments and contract termination) framed by the Financial Regulation and relevant agreements concluded with recipients of EU funds. 1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast) (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.09.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj). 2 Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid (OJ L 163, 2.7.1996, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/1257/oj). 3 In particular, for what relates to internal control systems, ethical standards, antifraud, anti-corruption and safeguarding policies. See more here: https://www.dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/ngo/humanitarian-partnership2021-2027/how-to-become-a-partner.”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · Support for international humanitarian organisations
• 2026-02-10 “E-000561/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The legal prerequisite to add new individuals, groups or entities to the list of those subject to restrictive measures under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP 1 (CP931), was indeed a competent authority decision, for example, a court decision or a proscription order by an administrative authority 2 . Moreover, such a decision had to concern the involvement of the individual, group or entity in question in a terrorist act as defined by Article 1(3) of CP931. Such a decision is used by the Council to underpin the statement of reasons for the listing of an individual, group or entity under CP931. A recent national decision meeting the requirements of CP931 was used by the Council to list the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. However, the statements of reasons for this particular sanctions regime are in a Council document, which is not public. 1 Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP) (OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/2001/931/oj). 2 On 26 February 2026, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2026/455 on restrictive measures to combat terrorism (ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/455/oj ). That decision repealed the CFSP part of CP931, but reproduces the substance of CP931, which will continue to be applied in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2026-02-10 “E-000563/2026 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Resettlement and humanitarian admission are safe and controlled pathways for people who are in need of protection. The first Plan 1 under the Union Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission Framework Regulation 2 covers Member States’ efforts on resettlement and humanitarian admission for 2026-2027. The contributions to resettlement and humanitarian admissions are not determined by the Commission but by the Member States on a voluntary basis. The voluntary contributions for the period 2026-2027 amount to 10 430 admissions. As underlined in the Asylum and Migration Management Strategy 3 , resettlement and humanitarian admission is a tool for an effective migration management. It helps responding to the global resettlement and humanitarian admission needs and strengthen partnerships with third countries, including to support the fight against migrant smuggling networks and cooperation on returns. Before admission in a Member State from a country outside of the EU, Member States need to assess, among other things, whether candidates to resettlement and humanitarian admission committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, represent a danger to the community, public policy, security or public health or have committed a serious crime. In such cases, admission will be refused. 1 Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/2628 of 18 December 2025 on the Union Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission Plan (2026-2027). 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1350 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a Union Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission Framework, and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1147. 3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy, COM/2026/45 final.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2026-02-10 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The statement by the High Representative/Vice-President on behalf of the EU of 9 January set the tone for a strong EU response [1] . On 29 January 2026 [2] and 16 March 2026 [3] the Council adopted restrictive measures against perpetrators of serious human rights violations and abuses. Furthermore, following the political agreement reached by the Foreign Affairs Council on 29 January 2026, on 19 February 2026 the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2026/421 [4] which added the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to the list of groups and entities subject to Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (CP931) [5] on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism. Following that listing, the IRGC also became subject to the restrictive measures in Articles 2 and 3 of CP931, namely the freezing of its funds and other financial assets or economic resources, as well as the prohibition for EU operators to make funds and economic resources available to that group [6] . Those restrictive measures are temporary and do not entail a confiscation of assets. The Council may maintain those sanctions in force for as long as there is an ongoing risk of the IRGC being involved in terrorist activities. The IRGC had already been subject to those restrictive measures following its listing under the Iran weapons of mass destruction sanctions regime, on 25 October 2010 [7] . Through its different sanction regimes, the EU has also the possibility to impose travel bans on IRGC members: several have already been sanctioned in the past years, including recently after the violent crackdown on protesters. [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/01/09/iran-statement-by-the-hr-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-situation-in-the-country/. [2] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/01/29/iran-council-adopts-new-sanctions-over-serious-human-rights-violations-and-iran-s-continued-support-to-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine/. [3] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/16/iran-council-sanctions-an-additional-16-persons-and-three-entities-over-serious-human-rights-violations/. [4] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/421/oj. [5] OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/2001/931/oj. [6] On 26 February 2026, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2026/455 on restrictive measures to combat terrorism: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/455/oj. That Decision repealed the CFSP part of CP931, but reproduces the substance of CP931, which will continue to be applied in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU. At the same time, that Decision also repealed Decision (CFSP) 2026/421, but maintained all previous listings under CP931, including that of the IRGC. [7] Council Decision (CFSP) 2010/644 of 25 October 2010 amending Decision (CFSP) 2010/413 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ L 281, 27.10.2010, p. 81, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/644/oj).”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2026-01-29 “E-000376/2026 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the EU and India on a Comprehensive Framework of Cooperation on Mobility that was signed at the 16 th EU-India Summit on 27 January 2026 1 is a non-legally binding instrument which does not create new commitments or obligations. The MoU recalls that, in accordance with the Treaties, Member States retain the competence to determine volumes of admission of third-country nationals for work purposes. The implementation of the MoU will be carried out within the scope of the applicable national and EU laws. Member States participation in activities carried out under the MoU will be voluntary. The European Legal Gateway Office pilot aims at providing information on, and support for, the mobility of workers, researchers and students from India to the EU in the information and communication technology sector. Its overall duration is currently foreseen to be 26 months. The MoU also reaffirms the intention of both India and the EU to fully cooperate on return and readmission. The Commission continuously monitors and reports on migratory flows from India using information from a variety of sources including Frontex. Readmission cooperation with India is assessed annually in the framework of the mechanism of Article 25a of the Visa Code 2 . 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_26_225. 2 Article 25a, Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), pp. 23-25, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02009R0810-20240628.”
  Legal migration · Asylum & border control
• 2026-01-29 “E-000373/2026 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The European Legal Gateway Office in India will cover high-skilled jobs, starting with the information and communication technology sector. Furthermore, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the EU and India on a Comprehensive Framework of Cooperation on Mobility that was signed at the 16 th EU-India Summit on 27 January 2026 contains provisions on supporting skills development and vocational education and training, as well as on facilitating the comparison of skills and qualifications frameworks. These provisions are intended to ensure that prospective migrants are appropriately qualified for positions in the EU. The implementation of the MoU will be carried out within the scope of applicable domestic and EU laws. By offering reliable and trustworthy information and advisory services, the European Legal Gateway Office aims to reduce the risks of misinformation and fraud that can lure aspiring migrants into precarious or even irregular situations. Furthermore, in accordance with the Family Reunification Directive 1 , Member States have the possibility, for a period of 12 months, to perform a labour market test before granting access to employed or self-employed activities to newly arrived family members, limiting any negative impact on their labour market. In compliance with the applicable EU and national law, Member States are free to introduce additional safeguards and their participation in either initiative is voluntary. Readmission cooperation in particular is assessed annually in the framework of the mechanism under Article 25(a) of the Visa Code 2 . 1 Article 14(2), Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251, 3.10.2003, pp. 12: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/86/oj/eng. 2 Article 25(a), Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), pp. 23: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/810/oj/eng.”
  Legal migration · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2026-01-29 “E-000374/2026 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The European Legal Gateway Office pilot will be a one-stop hub to provide information and support the legal and controlled admission to the EU of Indian workers, students and researchers in the Information and Communication Technology sector. There is no specific target number of Indian candidates to be admitted to the EU. In accordance with the Treaties, Member States retain the right to determine the volume of admission of third-country nationals coming to their territory in order to seek work. The estimated cost of the European Legal Gateway Office pilot will be approximately EUR 3 900 000 over the course of 26 months. The Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and India on a Comprehensive Framework of Cooperation on Mobility affirms the commitment of India and the EU to fully cooperate on return and readmission. Furthermore, readmission cooperation with India is assessed annually in the framework of the mechanism of Article 25(a) of the Visa Code 1 . 1 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), pp. 23-25 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02009R0810-20240628.”
  Legal migration
• 2025-11-04 “E-004317/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Pact for the Mediterranean (‘Pact’) sets out a framework of practical cooperation between the EU, its Member States and the southern Mediterranean partners in areas of mutual interest, including migration. It is built on the principles of co-ownership, co-creation, joint responsibility and flexibility. The latter principle allows for variable participation of Member States and Mediterranean partners in its initiatives and will ultimately determine the reach and the scope of the various initiatives under the Pact. In light of its multi-faceted nature and complex causes, the Pact addresses the migration phenomenon across its initiatives, aiming to address root causes of migration by promoting stability, enhancing preparedness and resilience of partners, supporting economic growth and creating jobs through investments. In addition, under its first and third pillar, the Pact promotes a comprehensive, whole-of-route and rights-based approach, with a view to prevent irregular migration and break smugglers’ business with enhanced border control, improve the protection of migrants in vulnerable situations, asylum seekers and refugees, pursue an effective return and readmission policy including safe and dignified returns and sustainable reintegration, as well as promote legal pathways in line with EU and national competences. This approach is complementary and in full coherence with the efforts and priorities of EU external migration policy carried out at bilateral level, including in the framework of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnerships, which have already achieved substantial results. Between January and September 2025, around 116 000 irregular arrivals to the EU were recorded along the three Mediterranean routes (Central Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean and Western Mediterranean) and the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands. This represents a 17% decrease compared to the same period in 2024 and a 42% decrease compared to the same period in 2023.”
  Asylum & border control · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2025-11-04 “E-004310/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Pact for the Mediterranean 1 (Pact) sets out an ambitious strategy to strengthen EU relations with its southern Mediterranean partners. It is built on the principles of coownership, co-creation, joint responsibility and flexibility. The latter principle allows for variable participation of Member States and Mediterranean partners in its initiatives and will ultimately determine the reach and the scope of the various initiatives under the Pact. By investing people’s choices for learning, growth and mobility, the Pact aims to reinforce the cultural, academic, social and economic ties that will make Europe stronger and more resilient. It is not possible at this stage to determine the exact number of mobilities expected by country. The possibility for short term learning exchanges from any region in the world, including the Southern Mediterranean, towards the EU already exists under the international strand of the Erasmus+ programme. Notably, Erasmus+ provides short term mobility opportunities for higher education students (up to one year) as part of their studies in their home country, and for academic staff (5-60 days). Participants return to their home countries after their mobility period, bringing back new skills, perspectives, and networks. Studies show concrete benefits of such mobilities for the EU, including by promoting the EU values. Overall, Erasmus+ promotes brain circulation, exchange and knowledge mobility, share of skills, and circulation of talent across borders, not migration. In line with the EU external migration policy, the Commission wants to support efforts in preventing illegal departures and ensure effective return and readmission within the framework of the Pact, contributing to broader cooperation on migration management. Cooperation to prevent illegal departures paves the way for legal and orderly pathways according to EU and national competences for international labour mobility and skills development. 1 https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-pact-mediterranean_en.”
  Legal migration · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2025-10-08 “P-003944/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission Nicotine is a toxic and highly addictive substance. Using nicotine containing products can be a gateway to nicotine addiction and tobacco consumption which accounts for 25% of all cancer deaths globally and is the primary cause of lung cancer according to the World Health Organization (WHO) data from 2025 1 . The WHO has noted that nicotine containing products, in particular e-cigarettes and nicotine pouches, generate substances known to cause cancer and expose users to carcinogens. For this reason, these products are associated with an increased cancer risk. The consumption of nicotine has many other negative effects, for example, in children and adolescents it has deleterious long-term impacts on brain development, potentially leading to learning and anxiety disorder. According to the WHO, more than 14 million adolescents aged 13–15 years are currently using e-cigarettes globally and in countries with data, adolescents are on average nine times more likely than adults to vape 2 . The ongoing evaluation of the Tobacco Products Directive 2014/40/EU 3 and the Tobacco Advertising Directive 2003/33/EC 4 involves considering a wide array of scientific, market, and regulatory developments, including the emergence of new tobacco and nicotine products. The evaluation follows a structured and evidence-based approach in line with the Better Regulation requirements. The findings from this evaluation will inform the next steps concerning the two Directives. 1 https://www.who.int/europe/news-room/fact-sheets/item/effects-of-tobacco-on-health. 2 https://iris.who.int/server/api/core/bitstreams/2eca3aea-b772-4272-a2ae-6fa26f3f9cd5/content. 3 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/40/oj. 4 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/33/oj.”
  Regulation on New Oral Nicotine Products · Smoking regulation · EU measures on lifestyle-related behaviours (smoking, drinking, eating, etc.)
• 2025-09-30 “E-003802/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Markets Act (DMA) regulates only a very limited number of designated gatekeepers - large platforms with significant influence on the EU internal market and its users. The DMA does not prevent any gatekeeper from releasing new product features. The EU is an attractive market of 450 million potential users, and it is up to the gatekeepers to evaluate their business cases. Some gatekeepers may strategically delay interoperability with features in their operating systems to limit competition and choice, and collaterally affect the availability of some services for EU users. Interoperability is essential for European companies and startups to compete fairly and bring innovation to consumers. The DMA seeks to ensure that gatekeepers do not misuse their position by withholding interoperability from innovative companies. Many of these innovators are small and medium sized companies, who need effective interoperability with the hardware and software features of the gatekeepers’ operating systems to bring their innovations to the market. The Commission adopted in March 2025 two decisions specifying how Apple should allow interoperability between its iPhones and connected devices of third parties and how it should structure the process for third party developers to request interoperability 1 . Apple has now decided to launch the Live Translation on AirPods in the EU, just two months after their initial decision to withhold the product. This follows additional engineering work to give access to third parties to building blocks to develop similar innovative features based on their own technology that also work in the same way with iPhones. Although Apple decided not to do this at the same time as they did in the rest of the world, it was worth the wait, as this move opens competition, letting other earbud makers offer their own translation service to iPhone users. The Commission will review the final details of the interoperability solution to ensure full compliance with the DMA, but it is a positive development. The Commission continues to engage with Apple and many third parties to ensure that the DMA is implemented to benefit end users and businesses. 1 Commission Decisions C(2025) 3000 final and C(2025) 3001 final.”
  EU rules on digital competition · Interoperability requirements for digital platforms
• 2025-09-26 “E-003746/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The proposal 1 for the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) 2 was based on an Impact Assessment 3 which included a review of scientific literature and in particular of primary sources estimating the impact of EU consumption of specific commodities on global deforestation. The Impact Assessment estimated that the costs of compliance for companies were significantly lower than the expected benefits. The proposal to amend the EUDR aims to reduce the load on the EUDR Information System and ease the administrative burden for economic operators, while maintaining the Regulation’s environmental integrity. On 4 December 2025, the co-legislators agreed on the revised EUDR 4 . The new date of entry into application will be 30 December 2026 for all companies except for most micro- or small operators, for which it will be 30 June 2027. For micro- or small operators already covered by the EU Timber Regulation 5 , the entry into application will be 30 December 2026. The amendments to the EUDR also limit the obligation to submit due diligence statements to the first operator placing the relevant products on the market. Downstream operators, such as retreading industry or craft businesses, will no longer need to submit due diligence statements, nor to pass on the reference numbers further in the supply chain. The proposal does not include country-based exemptions, but it streamlines the obligations for small and micro primary producers. 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 as regards certain obligations of operators and traders, COM/2024/452 final. 2 Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010, OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 206–247. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021SC0326&qid=1727163336725. 4 Regulation (EU) 2025/2650 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2025 amending Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 as regards certain obligations of operators and traders, OJ L, 2025/2650, 23.12.2025. 5 Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market, OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, pp. 23– 34.”
  Trade impact on forests · Management of EU forests
• 2025-09-26 “E-003747/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Commission presented a proposal to amend the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) 1 in order to reduce the load on the EUDR Information System and ease the administrative burden for economic operators, while maintaining the Regulation’s environmental integrity. In December 2025, the co-legislators agreed on the revised EUDR 2 and the revised text has now entered into force. The new date of entry into application will be 30 December 2026 for all companies except for most micro- or small operators, for which it will be 30 June 2027. For micro- or small operators already covered by the EU Timber Regulation 3 , the entry into application will be 30 December 2026. The amendments to the EUDR also limit the obligation to submit due diligence statements to the first operator placing the relevant products on the market. Downstream operators, such as retreading industry or craft businesses, will no longer need to submit due diligence statements, nor to pass on the reference numbers further in the supply chain. The agreed text also includes a differentiated approach for low-risk countries. It notably exempts from the obligation to submit a due diligence statement ‘micro and small primary operators’ form a low-risk country that sell their goods directly on the EU market. A large majority of farmers, cattle ranchers and foresters within the EU will be captured by this definition and hence benefit from the simplifications. 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010, OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 206–247. 2 Regulation (EU) 2025/2650 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2025 amending Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 as regards certain obligations of operators and traders, OJ L, 2025/2650, 23.12.2025. 3 Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market, OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, pp. 23– 34.”
  Trade impact on forests · Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights)
• 2025-09-05 “E-003456/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has provided EUR 6.1 billion in military support through the European Peace Facility (EPF) since the start of the full scale Russian military aggression in 2022. This is on top of Member State bilateral contributions. Support through the EPF is closely coordinated with likeminded partners, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Ukraine Defence Contact Group. A further EUR 3.4 billion from extraordinary revenues generated from immobilised Russian assets have been channelled through the EPF, of which EUR 1.5 billion has been directed to the Ukrainian defence industry. This makes the EU its foremost single international investor. In early 2025, High Representative/Vice-President also announced an initiative to provide 2 million rounds of large calibre artillery ammunition to Ukraine. At the same time, EUR 6.6 billion remain blocked under the EPF, including EUR 5 billion under the Ukraine Assistance Fund, due to the position of one Member State. This blockage must be lifted as a matter of urgency. Ukraine needs further European military support immediately. High Representative/Vice-President is fully engaged in exploring possible ways forward with all Member States.”
  EU competences on defence · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · Defence spending
• 2025-09-05 “E-003455/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Nuclear energy, as other clean energy technologies like renewables, will play a strategic role in supporting Europe’s artificial intelligence (AI) competitiveness and energy resilience, allowing to meet growing energy demand of data centres. This also includes Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), as a low-carbon and baseload energy source 1 . In this context, the Commission plans to adopt a strategy for the development and deployment of SMRs in Europe. The strategy will seek to create a supportive framework and identify policy and industry actions needed for the acceleration of the development and deployment of SMRs in Europe in the early 2030s 2 . The Commission is also preparing a Strategic Roadmap for digitalisation and AI in the energy sector due for publication in early 2026 3 . To support this, the Commission has launched an open public consultation and a call for evidence 4 . The Strategic Roadmap will consider the increasingly heavy energy consumption of data centres and look at how they can be more sustainably integrated into the energy system. In parallel, the Commission holds targeted consultations through dedicated workshops with stakeholders from the digital and energy fields. In the AI Continent Action Plan 5 and in the Apply AI Strategy, the Commission laid out actions to boost innovation, accelerate productivity growth, and reinforce its competitiveness and technology sovereignty. In this plan, the Commission committed to a clear and simple implementation of the AI Act 6 . The AI Act approach is risk-based and innovation-friendly. It applies in the single market, avoiding fragmentated state-based legislation that affect other parts of the world. 1 Data centres and Artificial Intelligence may drive the SMRs’ roll out in: ‘COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission Nuclear Illustrative Programme presented under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty for the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee’, p. 72. 2 As set out in the 2025 Commission work programme and the Action Plan for Affordable Energy. 3 The Commission also announced an upcoming Cloud and AI Development Act, which is expected to address strategies to ensure there is energy resources to develop AI, for instance by improving energy efficiency in data centres. 4 Both the public consultation and the call for evidence will close on 5 November 2025. Link: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14742-Artificial-intelligence-anddigitalisation-for-energy-a-roadmap_en. 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/ai-continent-action-plan. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng. For example, the service desk was launched on 7 October 2025, enabling stakeholders to submit queries about the AI Act and receive tailored feedback.”
  Nuclear energy · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2025-07-25 “E-003104/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The own resource based on e-waste is not a tax, but a national contribution based on statistical data. As such there is no direct cost for the Swedish taxpayer. Member States are however free to put in place measures or initiatives to increase the collection of e-waste. The Commission has not conducted a formal impact assessment on the administrative costs for Member States. However, it believes that the administrative burden is limited as Member States already have the obligation to provide data necessary to calculate the own resource to Eurostat in the context of the Directive on waste electrical and electronic equipment 1 . The choice to propose an e-waste own resource is linked to its possible positive impact on the EU’s competitiveness and environmental policy. A new own resource based on the amount of non-collected e-waste would help protect the environment and support the Union’s strategic autonomy in critical raw materials. E-waste represents one of the fastest growing waste streams. Critical raw materials such as copper, platinum, and rare earth elements can be recycled when waste is managed effectively. At the same time, e-waste contains hazardous materials such as heavy metals and chemical substances, which pose severe environmental and health risks, if not properly collected and treated. Despite progress in recycling, the collection rate remains significantly below the policy targets set out in the Directive on waste electrical and electronic equipment. In relation to plastic bags (e.g. shopping bags), they are already covered by the own resource on the existing plastic packaging waste generated in each Member State that is not recycled (EUR 0,80 per kilogram). 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012L0019.”
  Climate efforts · Own EU resources
• 2025-07-25 “E-003103/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission As reported by Deutsche Presse-Agentur on 20 July 2025 and published in several news sources, the Commission clarified that no decision has yet been taken on the proposal on decarbonising corporate fleets. An impact assessment is being prepared by the Commission services, and it will be published together with the legislative proposal, in accordance with the relevant procedures. The impact assessment will evaluate and compare different policy options and will not be limited to a ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ as falsely claimed in some news reports. The Commission will decide on the contents of the legislative proposal based on the outcome of the impact assessment.”
  Corporate fleet electrification: binding zero-emission quotas vs. voluntary approach · EV charging infrastructure
• 2025-07-25 “E-003099/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. The statement by the Commissioner for health and animal welfare was made in the context of the proposal for the revision of the Tobacco Taxation Directive (Council Directive 2011/64/EU) published on 16 July 2025 1 . The full text of the statement reads: ‘For the first time ever, we acknowledge that new #tobacco and nicotine products pose health risks comparable to traditional ones. With new market developments and the need to protect future generations, rates should be further assessed’. In this context, ‘new tobacco and nicotine products’ referred to those products that have not yet been specifically regulated under the Directive, such as heated tobacco, e-cigarettes and nicotine pouches. 2. There are no safe levels of tobacco or nicotine consumption, and new products have increasing popularity, especially among young people. The Scientific Committee on Health, Environmental and Emerging Risks, for example, underlined the negative health effects associated with e-cigarettes 2 . Besides the intrinsic public health risk these products represent, they also have the potential of opening the ways towards conventional smoking. Harmonising tax rules across the EU and introducing minimum rates for such products will allow for better controls, while giving flexibility to Member States to adapt their taxation rules in line with market developments in their country. The increased tax will also help to reduce their attractiveness as tobacco substitutes. 3. It is the official position of the Commission. 1 https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/taxation/excise-taxes/excise-duties-tobacco/revision-tobacco-taxationdirective-proposal_en. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/default/files/scientific_committees/scheer/docs/scheer_o_017.pdf.”
  Electronic cigarettes · Smoking regulation · Heated tobacco products
• 2025-07-25 “E-003102/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission remains firmly committed to ensuring the EU’s continued financial support to Ukraine for as long as it takes. As a matter of fact, the proposal for the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 1 is designed to enable the EU to cater for Ukraine's exceptional and unpredictable needs in the context of Russia's war of aggression, while ensuring that Ukraine is adequately supported towards its EU accession path. In line with its responsibilities under the Treaties, the Commission will assess all possible scenarios concerning the timeline of the MFF negotiations with a view to ensuring continuity of financial assistance. The timely agreement on the MFF has always proven essential to ensure predictability and continuity in the EU’s priorities, and support to Ukraine is a clear case in point. In this context, the Commission counts on the close cooperation of the European Parliament and the Council to reach an agreement on the 2028–2034 MFF package, thereby ensuring that the necessary resources can be mobilised without interruption. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/eu-budget-2028-2034_en.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · Size of EU budget
• 2025-07-22 “E-003036/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The proposed Tobacco Excise Duty Own Resource (TEDOR) is not a tax but a revenue source for the EU budget that builds on the Tobacco Taxation Directive 1 . The own resource does not define the scope of tobacco taxation. It solely specifies that a certain share or revenues from tobacco taxes will go to the EU budget. Therefore, the proposal 2 for a Tobacco Excise Duty Own Resource concerns manufactured tobacco and tobacco related products released for consumption as defined in the provisons of the proposed in the Tobaco Taxation Directive. The revised Directive will not harmonise taxation rules on tobacco for oral use, known as snus. However, nicotine pouches fall within the scope of the Directive and will be accounted for in the calculation of the base for the Tobacco Excise Duty Own Resource. For a matter of equal treatment of Member States aiming at a fair collection of the Tobacco Excise Duty Own Resource, without pre-empting the result of the ongoing negotiations, the Commission has no intention to propose any exemption to Member States for the application of the Directive and the collection of the related own resource. 1 Council Directive 2011/64/EU of 21 June 2011 on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco, OJ L 176, 5.7.2011, p. 24–36. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=COM:2025:574:FIN.”
  Regulation on New Oral Nicotine Products · Smoking regulation
• 2025-07-22 “E-003037/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The proposed Tobacco Excise Duty Own Resource (TEDOR) 1 is not a tax but a revenue source for the EU budget that builds on the Tobacco Taxation Directive 2 . The own resource does not define the scope of tobacco taxation. It solely specifies that a certain share of revenues from tobacco taxes will go to the EU budget. The Commission adopted at the same time a proposal 3 to revise the Tobacco Taxation Directive. There are no safe levels of tobacco or nicotine consumption, including of smoke-free tobacco and nicotine products 4 . Therefore, the Commission proposes to extend the scope of the Tobacco Taxation Directive to include such products. Article 17 of the Tobacco Products Directive 5 prohibits the placing on the market of snus within the EU. Only Sweden is exempted from this provision by means of Article 151 of the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden 6 . Article 1(2) of the proposal therefore makes clear that the revised Directive will not harmonise taxation rules on tobacco for oral use, known as snus. 1 Proposal for a Council Decision on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053, Brussels, 16.7.2025, COM(2025) 574 final, 2025/0574(CNS). 2 Council Directive 2011/64/EU of 21 June 2011 on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco, OJ L 176, 5.7.2011, p. 24–36. 3 Proposal for a Council Directive on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to tobacco and tobacco related products (recast), COM (2025) 580 final. 4 World Health Organization, Factsheet, Tobacco https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/tobacco. 5 Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products. 6 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, Contents, OJ C 241, 29.8.1994, pp. 9–404.”
  Regulation on New Oral Nicotine Products · Smoking regulation
• 2025-07-02 “E-002704/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s calls for proposals for media are open to all types of news media organisations and excludes direct awards. Applicants are free to propose activities to be implemented in response to the objectives and expected deliverables set out in the Commission’s open calls for proposals. Beneficiaries operate in full editorial independence from the Commission and any other authority, as per the provisions of the calls for proposals and the ensuing grant agreements. Funding is modest, considering the overall size of the media market in the EU, and does not unduly affect competition within that market. The Commission monitors the implementation of the funded media projects from a technical and financial perspective. Aggregated information on the Commission’s funding for the news media sector is regularly updated and made publicly available on the Commission's dedicated website 1 . Information on EU budget funding awarded to specific recipients, such as European media outlets, is also publicly available through the Commission’s centralised Financial Transparency System web page 2 . This tool provides information at individual project level (e.g. short description, amount granted, project start and end date, funding instrument, responsible DirectorateGeneral) and allows to generate breakdowns per year and to draw information according to different criteria (e.g. name of the organisation, beneficiary country). 1 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/funding-news-media-sector. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/analysis.html.”
  EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
• 2025-06-26 “E-002594/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission Directive 2003/88/EC 1 lays down minimum safety and health requirements for the organisation of working time. It sets out the workers’ right to minimum 11 consecutive hours of daily rest and offers flexibilities for Member States and social partners to establish derogations. Derogations are allowed for specific activities, such as those involving the need for continuity of service or production, such as care services. Where a derogation applies, the workers concerned must be granted equivalent periods of compensatory rest or, exceptionally, appropriate protection. On these conditions the Directive opens the possibility for shifts to last 24 hours. In accordance with Article 153 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2 , the Directive sets minimum requirements and does not harmonise the laws or regulations of Member States. Member States and social partners, where Member States have delegated its implementation to them, are therefore free to set working time rules that are more protective of workers. The Commission fully respects the autonomy of the Member States and their national or regional social partners to regulate working time within the framework of EU law and does not intend to propose a revision of the Directive. In accordance with, and within the limits of the powers conferred by the EU Treaties, the EU adopts the necessary measures for the inclusion of persons with disabilities in society and for the full recognition of their rights. Through a series of concrete actions put forward in the Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 3 , the Commission aims at improving the lives of persons with disabilities in the EU and beyond. 1 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ L 299, 18.11.2003, p. 9‐19 - https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/88/oj/eng. 2 OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 1-388. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0101.”
  EU policy on disability inclusion & accessibility · EU rules on hazardous working conditions
• 2025-06-04 “E-002256/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The European External Action Service (EEAS) does not monitor nor comment on communications, which concern the internal affairs of a specific Member State. With regards to any questions on this matter, the EEAS suggests the Honourable Member to contact the relevant authorities of the concerned Member State. Margot Wallström is no longer a member of the College of Commissioners. Her comments are her own. It is Commission policy not to comment on statements by politicians.”
  Foreign interference in Europe · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-11-15 “E-002549/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In 2013, the Council designated the military wing of Hezbollah under the EU sanctions regime to combat terrorism 1 . The EU position has not changed since then. Designations under this regime require a decision by the Council acting unanimously 2 . The EU welcomes the ceasefire agreement between Lebanon and Israel, the election of Mr Aoun as President, and supports the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as sole security actor. The restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty requires the deployment of LAF in the south, where they must become the only military force present. The EU is supporting the LAF through the European Peace Facility with a new assistance measure worth EUR 60 million for 2025, in addition to the previous EUR 22 million. The EU also insists on the full respect and implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 3 , including the call for disarmament of all armed groups. The international community has the duty to contribute to bringing back peace in Lebanon that will ensure a long-term stability, for the sake of the Lebanese people and the whole region. The EU ensures that its funding is channelled through partners that meet the highest standards of accountability and transparency and are subject to rigorous pre-assessment procedures. Partners receiving EU funding are expected to uphold strict ethical and professional standards. They are required to establish effective and efficient internal control systems and robust riskmanagement mechanisms. These measures ensure that EU resources are utilized for their intended purposes and in compliance with EU regulations. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013R0714 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02001R2580-20190709 3 http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1701”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · EU-Lebanon relations
• 2024-10-31 “P-002375/2024 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The rules adopted under Mobility Package I 1 are designed to ensure a balance between improved working conditions for drivers and the freedom to provide cross-border services for operators. They aim at guaranteeing a level playing field between all operators providing road transport services in the EU. The provision on the return of the vehicle 2 , which was declared void by the Court of Justice of the European Union on 4 October 2024 3 , was not part of the Commission’s proposal nor of its impact assessment. At the time of adoption, the Commission made a declaration 4 noting that the obligation of return of the truck would lead to inefficiencies in the transport system and an increase in unnecessary emissions, pollution and congestion. These potential inefficiencies were confirmed by a February 2021 study assessing the expected impacts of this obligation 5 . A number of other provisions under Mobility Package I, such as the strengthened rules on effective and stable establishment and the new rules on posting, are effective in preventing unfair practices. The Court also upheld the provisions directly improving working and social conditions, among them the right of the driver to return ‘home’ within each period of 3 or 4 consecutive weeks (depending on whether the driver had two consecutive reduced weekly rests). The Commission thus does not see any need to revise such rules. At the same time, the Commission will continue working on a full and effective implementation of Mobility Package I. In this regard, the Commission will remain attentive as to any negative impact that the annulment of the provision on the return of the vehicle might have, especially on working conditions. The Commission has no comment on the details of the Court’s judgement. 1 Regulation (EU) 2020/1054 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020 amending Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 as regards minimum requirements on maximum daily and weekly driving times, minimum breaks and daily and weekly rest periods and Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 as regards positioning by means of tachographs (OJ L 249, 31.7.2020, p.1), Regulation (EU) 2020/1055 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020 amending Regulations (EC) No 1071/2009, (EC) No 1072/2009 and (EU) No 1024/2012 with a view to adapting them to developments in the road transport sector (OJ L 249, 31.7.2020, p. 17), Directive (EU) 2020/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020 laying down specific rules with respect to Directive 96/71/EC and Directive 2014/67/EU for posting drivers in the road transport sector and amending Directive 2006/22/EC as regards enforcement requirements and Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 (OJ L 249, 31.7.2020, p. 49). 2 Article 1(3) of Regulation (EU) 2020/1055 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020 amending Regulations (EC) No 1071/2009, (EC) No 1072/2009 and (EU) No 1024/2012 with a view to adapting them to developments in the road transport sector (OJ L 249, 31.7.2020, p. 17), amending Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing common rules concerning the conditions to be complied with to pursue the occupation of road transport operator and repealing Council Directive 96/26/EC (OJ L 300, 14.11.2009, p. 51). 3 Joint cases C-541/20 to C-555/20. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32020C0731(01) 5 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/b35587b8-72a1-11eb-9ac9-01aa75ed71a1”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2024-08-19 “P-001520/2024 Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission Border management is a shared competence between the Member States and the EU. In this context, the Commission supports Member States and Schengen Associated Countries to bolster their border management capacity and to create EU-added value by a better equipped border management at EU level with the use of EU funds. The Commission has been consistent in its view that any items and measures funded by the EU must comply with the EU acquis and ensure the respect of human rights and international obligations. The Commission considers that EU funds are best used to support an integrated approach to border management. Accordingly, the Commission has been actively supporting efficient border management solutions, such as border surveillance, in compliance with EU law, values and fundamental rights. This approach has focused on fostering integrated solutions consisting of a complex toolkit including cameras, electronic surveillance, patrols, personnel equipment, watchtowers, vehicles and so on.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you. Chair. Dear colleagues, Socialist members of this House. You requested this useless waste of time debate about a dead on arrival, woke progressive anti-discrimination directive. Okay, so let's talk discrimination. Let's talk about how hundreds of elderly Swedes are being raped and abused by migrants in their own home. Just today, a migrant was convicted for raping a 100 year old. And because of legislation that you endorse, he is allowed to stay in my country. Let's talk about how our daughters are sexually harassed and abused by migrant males. When they go to the mall, take the bus, or walk home from school. Let's talk about generation prey. Swedish youngsters being humiliated and robbed by predators that you imported. You don't want to talk about this, I hear that. But you sure want to. Virtue signal about anti-discrimination. Go home already. You did enough damage. Let us in the right. Clean up the mess now.”
  EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• “(15:18:11 – 15:20:01): Thank you very much, chairman. The migration pack will enter into force in less than 2 weeks now. There will be a new screening system. So we're gonna quickly check people who arrive at the external border. We're going to have to send them to an asylum examination or send them back if they don't have grounds for asylum. Well, the problem is what you said, commissioner, and that is that we have large structural problems. We don't have capacity at the external border. Pilot tests have shown that there are serious difficulties because people quite often manage to go underground. Tens of thousands, of migrants arrive at the external border every year. A large number of them disappear before, after, or during screening. And in that case, we're going to have problems. They can travel further inside Schengen to countries like Sweden. That will put pressure on our reception system, on our communities, and our safety. So this will enter force in less than 2 weeks now. How will the commission and council ensure that there are strong functioning measures to stop people absconding? How can we provide support, financing? Will there be controls? What's going to be implemented to ensure that this system will work, that border countries can deal with large numbers of of arrivals without people going underground, that countries like Sweden and others will be prevented from well, be protected from, problems when the system fail doesn't function correctly.”
  Asylum & border control
• “So I gather that it's the great weather in Sweden that made so many migrants go to my country instead of staying in the very dark and cold Italy. Right. Just a coincidence, wasn't it? I mean, wake up. Welcome to reality. They picked this nation countries because of our welfare systems. Why are not Somalis going to the stable and democratic Somaliland, for example, instead of going to Germany? Ask yourself that question. And you know, the answer is quite easy to understand. Really. Thanks.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you very much. Madam president, the ETS, the emissions trading system, was supposed to reduce emissions, but actually it risks destroying Europe's industry. We see that companies are facing higher costs. We see investment leaving the EU. But the EU continues on this path and makes energy more expensive. We see that actually emissions aren't dropping. It's just being outsourced to China. We cannot become a fossil emissions free by becoming industry free. We don't need these policies that make us poorer and more dependent on other powers. What we need is a real overhaul of this system. And we really need to, uh, support Europe's industry as well. Thank you.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• “Thank you, Mr. Vice President. Commissioner, colleagues, we are witnessing the largest oil supply shock in history. Energy prices are soaring, driving up fertilizer costs and threatening food security for European families and farmers. Jet fuel stocks are critically low. Commissioner Johnson urged Europeans to work from home where possible, and president von der Leyen stated we should reduce demand. The builder, the baker, the bus driver. They cannot telework. But the EU Parliament can. My colleague Eriksson and members across groups wrote to President Metsola urging we stop the monthly travelling circus between Brussels and Strasbourg for as long as this crisis requires. We stopped it during Covid. We can't stop it now. Colleagues, or is the EU above the demands it requires from ordinary citizens. Think about that.”
  EP seat in Strasbourg
• “Thank you, Madam chair, um, we all agree that new and enhanced readmission agreements and arrangements are essential if the EU is to deliver an effective and relevant migration policy that truly serves our citizens. Um, and, uh, Deputy Secretary General Luna, um, you mentioned that we have concluded 18 formal readmission agreements, uh, and several non-binding arrangements, uh, but that cooperation remains uneven. And return rates, um, well, disappointingly low. Um, we know that only about 20% of non EU nationals ordered to leave the EU are actually returned. And if we look at non-European countries, uh, it often falls below 20%. So it's quite clear that the mere existence of an agreement clearly does not guarantee high return rates. Um, the approach with Egypt and Tunisia has been different from many other countries, with broader deals that could be branded as strategic partnerships, covering not only readmission but also border tech upgrades and anti-smuggling efforts. Um, Deputy Director General, uh, would you say that, uh, these types of deals are more effective than strict, uh, readmission agreements? Um, could you compare the concepts? Um, do you see a difference in the measurable impact they've had on actual returns and curbing illegal migration? Um, I also would like to, uh, mention the fact that several member states have demanded stronger leverage to hold third countries accountable. Uh, and I would like to ask whether the commission is preparing to make readmission agreements and arrangements mandatory in future economic, trade or diplomatic EU partnerships with third countries. Thank you.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you. President. How can we put a title on all of this? When the European Parliament meets to debate on how the EU should win the global tech race? Well, it's not enough to just talk about innovation. It's not enough to just talk time and time again and repeat time and time again. The word competitiveness. No, what we need to do is really home in on what exists. A pile of rules 13,000 in just the last five years and from session to session. Um, we talk about sustainability, all of these different points. And you would like to represent this as if it's a simplification of the rules, but it's much worse than what we would even believe. And then there's the issue, of course, of bureaucracy. We don't need an increased number of studies, more money that is spent on projects that you like. We need quicker decision making processes so that businesses can invest and develop a product. That's the way that we'll be able to have good start ups and keep Europe and make sure that production is here and doesn't go to the US.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Well, obviously there are lots of historical examples that you could use, but the situation today is quite clear that migrants have been going passing through safe countries on their way to destination countries in Northern Europe, primarily like Germany, like Sweden. Asylum shopping. And we're starting to deal with that problem now by designating safe third countries, by stopping this asylum shopping. Are you in favor of asylum shopping, Mr. Sieper.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. Commissioner, uh, I would like to express my gratitude to the Danish presidency for its tough and serious approach on migration. The new majority in Europe will make sure Parliament works with the Council, not against it, to regain control. Illegal migrants must understand one thing very clearly. There is no way they will make Europe their home. The EU budget must reflect that reality. Fund wall construction at the external border. Make EU return hubs real. Build them. And for every migrant a foreign country refuses to take back, €10,000 is automatically cut from EU aid. No bargaining, no exceptions. That is firm and it is fair. Thank you.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you. Chair. Commissioner. The 2035 ban on combustion engines was never about the climate. It was about Brussels. It was about you. You politicians know better than engineers, better than workers, better than the market itself. Tell you what factories are closing. Not because of Beijing, but because of Brussels. The EPP now admits the ban was a mistake. The EPP leads the way. Really? To what? To where? Ah, but the chair, Manfred Weber, promised Europeans the end of the combustion engine phaseout when we have a center right majority. Why are you so afraid to use it? Forget about the extensions, the reviews and revision and the 2035 combustion engine ban. Let's go.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. Firstly I would like to congratulate the rapporteur, Madam Bartoszek, for an excellent work. Um, and good cooperation. Um, now the EU Ecuador Agreement on Europol. Cooperation represents a pragmatic step towards combating transnational crime, including the drug trafficking that plagues our member states, with Ecuador as a key transit hub for cocaine. This pact could enhance operational efforts, as evidenced by the 80 tonnes of narcotics seized through prior collaborations. From a conservative perspective, we view this favourably. Although we do have some reservations or points we would like to make. We must ensure this cooperation remains focused on preventing criminal activities within the EU, thus rejecting the ideas from some on the left side to extend technical assistance to Ecuador's police amid their ongoing instability. Particular caution is needed regarding embedded Ecuadorean officials in Europol structures unrestricted access to sensitive data risks fraud, leaks or misuse, undermining our citizens privacy. To address these robust safeguards are essential. Independent audits. Swift suspension mechanisms if standards falter and, um, verifiable outcomes, uh, should be in focus, such as reduced drug inflows and disrupted terror networks. Uh, this will be a key to success in the forthcoming years. So the ECR group supports this file while emphasizing Europe's security and borders. Thank you.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Commissioner, Europe is lagging behind and we've not yet felt the full impact of the Green Deal legislation pushed through in the last term. Sustainability reporting and due diligence directives. The combustion engine ban, ban, cbam the taxonomy and ETS too will all increase costs and hurt our competitiveness. The regulatory burden will grow. More economic activity and jobs will move abroad. And what does the Commission propose for the next five years? You talk about addressing Europe's cost of living and competitiveness crisis, and repairing some of the damage caused while spellbound by the green agenda. But this work programme makes it clear that you plan to unleash a new tsunami of legislation and double down on green policies, and that's no surprise. You yourself, commissioner, said when commenting on the massive bureaucracy. Simplification doesn't mean deregulation, and instead the Commission is pushing for an expanded EU budget and new EU taxes. That's how you manage decline rather than making the EU a beacon of prosperity and innovation.”
  Climate efforts
• “Thank you chair. I note that the social democrat protest against the usage of the phrase illegal migration in this Parliament. We say irregular migration, you say—I would say that as long as the EU institutions use Orwellian language and refuse to call a spade a spade, the general public's trust in the sincerity with respect to stopping mass uncontrolled migration of the EU institutions will just not be there. So it is illegal migration period. Now commissioner, you want to switch the migration pact on but the system that makes the whole thing work, Eurodac 2.0, is not ready. It is a much enlarged ID system meant to hold more data, more categories, facial images, travel history and return information but it is not up and running and it is not fully connected in every member state. And if legal migrants are not registered properly, if we do not know who they are or where they go, then the rest of the pact cannot work. How can we control our borders or carry out deportations when the system that tells you who is who is still under construction? So let me ask you if Eurodac is not ready, isn't switching on the pack the same as running Europe's borders blind? No reliable identification, no history, no tracking, no follow-up, just chaos. So I wonder whether you will now promise that the forced migrant relocation system, the so-called solidarity pool, will not start until Eurodac is fully built and working in every member state. Thank you.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Mr. chair. Um, Commissioner. Minister, the centre right majority is ready to work with you on combating illegal migration. You had our support on the visa suspension mechanism. Now we expect results on the return regulation. So why are you opening the door to migration from Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt with so-called talent, partnership and student visas? Who abuses our welfare systems? Who commits crime? Who become the terrorists? Is it the Europeans, or could it be migrants from North Africa and the Middle East? And when they are ordered home, their governments refuse to take them back. 20 years of negotiations with Morocco. Still no readmission deal. When will you understand? We don't want more migration. Not illegal, and certainly not from North Africa and the Middle East. Legal or not? Thank you.”
  Legal migration
• “Thank you. Well, I think that the European Commission should do like we did in Sweden. We replaced the word renewables with the word fossil free because we knew That, uh, industry competitiveness demands a baseload energy production, meaning nuclear. The commission has yet not understood that. But they will unleash new goals for renewables, new targets, making us even more uncompetitive. So this must be done as soon as possible, and I hope that the EPP will push for that. We stand ready to work with you to make policies sane again.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Madam president, Commissioner, the ongoing mass migration to Europe is unsustainable. Member States realise this. They want the prevention and countering of illegal migration, more returns of migrants who should not be in Europe, and the designation of safe third countries to enable the return of more individuals. They want to secure the border. All of these demands are reasonable and could find a majority in this House. If you look at the election manifestos of the groups. But friends, we are facing a litmus test. Quite soon as the European Parliament takes a position on return policy, we must address the fact that eight out of ten with deportation orders remain in Europe. If we agree on the deliverance of this policy, we can actually get a forceful return regulation together with the Council. But for that to happen, Christian Democrats need to work with us conservatives.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you, madam chair. Child soldiers in Sweden. Sweden, not Africa. Criminal gangs recruit hitmen as young as 12 years old, lured with promises of watches or designer clothes. Dystopian fiction? Our reality. The direct results of decades of social democratic failure, mass uncontrolled migration, failed integration, and weak punishments. And Europe, you're not immune. Sweden is the cannery in the coal mine. Follow the same policies, get the same result. Children murdering children. But now the Sweden Democrats and our partners are restoring law and order. Gang crimes, double sentences, violent young offenders, tougher penalties. A child assassin is still an assassin. And why does the left want killers on our streets?”
  EU policy on criminal justice
• “Thank you, Madam Speaker. President von der Leyen, it's great to see you here. Last year you fled the chamber after half an hour. Much like, uh, public trust in your leadership has fled. Uh, now, 6 in 10 Europeans want you to resign. And who can blame them? You buried Europe under a mountain of regulations and danced to the tune of the Green Left choir. While industry crumbled and taxpayers bled. You came in promising unity and delivered debt and division. You claim to defend democracy, but sidelined it with centralisation. You spoke of competitiveness while pushing businesses out of Europe. And don't take my word, my word for it. Uh, von der Leyen. Ask your own party members revolting against your unrealistic 2040 climate target. They know it would destroy our industry colleagues. You you saw a president of the European Commission taking a victory lap on a track she helped burn down. Europe deserves better, it's time to resign.”
  Von der Leyen
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. Today, Sweden woke up to yet another Iranian assassination plot on European soil. The regime has ordered the murder of Swedish-iranian expert and Reza Pahlavi supporter Arvin Khoshnood, through its terrorist proxies in the Foxtrot criminal network. Right on our own soil. This is something that the Sweden Democrats warned about for years. When you open the door to mass uncontrolled migration and failed integration. Islamist regimes exploit our street gangs to spread terror, attack our citizens and threaten our national security. Enough is enough. The EU has to wake up. We need to expel Iranian diplomats from Europe. We need to close regime funded mosques such as the Imam Ali Islamic Centre outside Stockholm. We need to follow Australia's strong example with crushing sanctions. The time when Islamists treat Europe as their own playground must be over once and for all. Thank you.”
  EU-Iran relations
• “Mr. president, colleagues, the freezing of the US EU trade deal is not just a response to President Trump's tariff threats over Greenland. It's a wake up call for many of us in Europe, especially those of us who have always been pro American. This latest episode with Greenland has crossed a line. It is painful. For years there have always been voices in Europe resentful of America. But now even those of us who deeply value the transatlantic alliance are losing trust. Sweden, for example, is making massive investments in our military, taking our NATO commitments seriously. We recognize that it is wrong to freeride on the American taxpayer. Yet today we find ourselves punished simply because we stand by Danish sovereignty over Greenland. I would like as a conservative to call upon Republicans in Congress. Let's find a way forward that respect each other's sovereignty and build us a future of mutual respect, not division. Thank you.”
  EU-US relations
• “(16:38:36 – 16:41:06): Thank you very much, chairman. I'll be speaking in Swedish. Well, Magnus Randstorp from Sweden, you mentioned that we need to defend the liberal democracy without becoming illiberal. Well, that makes me think of Karl Popper and his book on the open society and its enemies. He talks about the tolerant paradox of tolerance, I could cite. So in the name of tolerance, we have to have the right not tolerant, the intolerant. That's the end of his quote. So I was thinking about a debate that took place in my home country about independent schools. There are Islamic confessional independent schools that turned out to be run by the Muslim Brotherhood. They have ended up being closed now. Some parties were saying we should ban all, confessional independent schools without drawing any distinctions, and that was in the, name of justice and fairness. Well, what about when it comes to mosques, there are Iraqi, Saudi, and other financing sources. But they were saying that to try and prevent that from happening, the Americans in Minnesota couldn't send money to evangelical churches back home. So is that an illiberal form of discrimination, or is it actually proportionate? I don't know. So the question is, how should we respond to a survey from the Swedish Doku Foundation? They looked into Islamism. They said 95% of the believers in the major mosques in Sweden felt that Islam and Mohammed sorry, discriticizing Mohammed or Islam should be criminalized. So there's a kind of ideological conflict where our basic freedoms are being questioned or endangered. I was wondering what the panelists think about this kind of distinction, saying it's not just a question of religion. It's a question of ideology. Sometimes we need to draw distinctions between religions. Thank you.”
  EU policy on Islam
• “Don't do drugs. Then you might end up in a fairy land where your own disastrous failures are projected on others. A fantasy world in which those who have been right so far are being called far right. No matter how much copium or wokamon the socialist green left snorts, injects, and inhales, you will never escape from your economically illiterate, innovation. Choking, death addicted, productivity killing, competitiveness crushing, green utopia. No pain, no gain. The green steel is all pain. Delusional gain. Evs, costly cars. We cannot all simultaneously charge industry exodus. Solar panels, EVs, batteries all dominated by China. And you think China will keep their promises on emissions? Quit taking delusional champagne. Socialists and the famous political centre have controlled the EU for 30 years. The result? Germany and France are the sick man of Europe, and Europe is the sick man of the world.”
  Energy (green transition)