Markus BUCHHEIT

Policy topics Markus BUCHHEIT is active on

What Markus BUCHHEIT has said (38)

• 2026-06-17 “(14:50:40 – 14:51:58): you, president. Ladies and gentlemen, here, we have visitors, from Germany in the gallery, and they're thinking, finally, somebody has understood the situation. The electrification action plan, it we're talking here about my electricity bill and lowering my expenses. Unfortunately, that is not the case. We talk and talk about fixing the supply side, but we need to fix the demand side. Now ladies and gentlemen, you promised jobs. You're going to create jobs. But in China, most of, our jobs are being produced in China. We don't really have our own production. Now you promise growth, but we don't have grids that will allow us to even deal with the demand that we're talking about. We don't have the battery storage capacity. You're talking about some future plan that may possibly implement it at some point, but we hear these promises of, freedom through new regulations, but it's just simply introducing a new planned economy. Progress means freedom, and this plan does not produce freedom. It is the opposite of that, and it certainly will not give you cheaper electricity. Thank you. We finish with the round of interventions coming from the political groups, and we go back to the commission. Commissioner McGrath, you have the floor.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-03-30 “P-001313/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is not aware of any judicial proceedings currently under way in Uruguay where EU institutions and/or EU-funded non-governmental organisations are involved. The Commission does not intervene in foreign proceedings where it is not a defendant or plaintiff, or where no EU institution is involved. The EU’s funding is based on the Articles 2, 3 and 21 of the Treaty on European Union 1 and aims to promote human rights, rule of law and international law. EU funding for external action is provided mainly through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe and includes, inter alia, support to civil society organisations, in line with the Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union 2 . In Uruguay, civil society funding covers the areas of human rights, social inclusion, advocacy and participation in public policy debates. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 2 please see footnote 1.”
  EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2026-03-18 “Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission 21.5.2026 Written question Eurostat publishes data on total annual financial assets and liabilities of the total economy, as well as on non-financial assets by detailed asset type, for all Member States, starting from 1995. The data are also available by institutional sector. All the necessary elements are therefore available for users to combine the data and compile a complete balance sheet for the economy. The data follow the conceptual requirements of the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010) [1] , which are followed by the Deutsche Bundesbank . Eurostat publishes data on total annual financial assets and liabilities of the total economy [2] , as well as on non-financial assets by detailed asset type [3] , for all Member States, starting from 1995. The data are also available by institutional sector. [1] Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the European system of national and regional accounts in the European Union (OJ L 174, 26.6.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/549/oj). [2] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/8333a515-e77d-4728-9b4e-b256cc7ad86b?lang=en&createdAt=2026-03-27T09:23:52Z. [3] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/f0a4b7d5-abb5-4582-80bc-6b00aa0a8ae7?lang=en&createdAt=2026-03-27T14:07:45Z.”
  Wealth taxation
• 2026-03-18 “Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question 1. Eurostat publishes data on total annual financial assets and liabilities of the total economy [1] , as well as on non-financial assets by detailed asset type [2] , for all Member States, starting from 1995. The data are also available by institutional sector. 2. The stocks of non-financial and financial assets for Germany for the reference year 2023 in EUR million are as follows: Non-financial assets — excluding IPPs (tangible assets) 21,651,552; Intellectual Property Products (IPPs) (intangible assets) EUR 719,718; Financial net worth 3,180,374. The same data for other Member States can be obtained following the links in footnotes 1 and 2. 3. National accounts and annual financial accounts data, transmitted to Eurostat by Member States and published on the website of Eurostat, follow the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010) [3] . [1] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/8333a515-e77d-4728-9b4e-b256cc7ad86b?lang=en&createdAt=2026-03-27T09:23:52Z. [2] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/f0a4b7d5-abb5-4582-80bc-6b00aa0a8ae7?lang=en&createdAt=2026-03-27T14:07:45Z. [3] Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the European system of national and regional accounts in the European Union (OJ L 174, 26.6.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/549/oj).”
  Wealth taxation
• 2026-03-18 “Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question Eurostat publishes data on total annual financial assets and liabilities of the total economy [1] , as well as on non-financial assets by detailed asset type [2] , for all Member States, starting from 1995. The data are also available by institutional sector. Annual financial accounts data are transmitted to Eurostat by all Member States , including data for Germany compiled by the Deutsche Bundesbank following the European System of National and Regional Accounts [3] ( ESA 2010), and are used to compile Euro Area and EU aggregates by institutional sector. National accounts and annual financial accounts data transmitted to Eurostat by EU countries follow ESA 2010, the EU’s internationally compatible accounting framework. Eurostat issues manuals and methodological guidance to support harmonised implementation by all Member States and applies a robust quality assurance framework to the transmitted data. Since 2018, and every five years thereafter, Eurostat reports to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of ESA 2010, assessing the data quality, the effectiveness of the regulation and its monitoring process, as well as progress on contingent liabilities and data availability (the latest report was released in 2023 [4] ). [1] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/8333a515-e77d-4728-9b4e-b256cc7ad86b?lang=en&createdAt=2026-03-27T09:23:52Z. [2] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/f0a4b7d5-abb5-4582-80bc-6b00aa0a8ae7?lang=en&createdAt=2026-03-27T14:07:45Z. [3] Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the European system of national and regional accounts in the European Union (OJ L 174, 26.6.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/549/oj). [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A308%3AFIN.”
  Wealth taxation · EU regulation on financial data access
• 2026-02-24 “Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission 10.6.2026 Written question Members of the College are subject to strict obligations arising directly under the Treaties as well as to the ethical obligations emanating from the Code of Conduct for the Members of the Commission [1] . The Commission is aware of the allegations against Peter Mandelson, who was Member of the Commission between November 2004 and October 2008. It takes these allegations very seriously and has referred the matter for appropriate follow-up to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), within the latter’s independent investigative function. OLAF has confirmed it has opened a case but is not in a position to share details on individual cases or probes beyond the information and data already made public. This is in order to protect the confidentiality of investigations and of possible ensuing judicial proceedings, as well as to ensure respect for personal data and procedural rights. OLAF fully respects the presumption of innocence and the rights of defence of the persons/entities concerned. Global Counsel was removed from the Transparency Register [2] on 20 March 2026 following the cessation of its activities. Public information regarding its participation in meetings, previously available in the Transparency Register, remains accessible on the Commission’s transparency webpages concerning meetings with Members of the Commission, members of their cabinets and Commission staff holding management functions . The Commission requires registration of interest representatives in the Transparency Register prior to such meetings and publication of information and minutes for each meeting thereafter. The EEAS should be addressed for questions about members of its staff. [1] Commission Decision of 31 January 2018 on a Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission, C(2018) 700 final. [2] https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Transparency requirements for interest groups
• 2026-02-06 “Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question The former Commissioner for Trade became a Member of the Commission in November 2004, and his office ended in October 2008. Members of the College are subject to strict obligations arising directly under the Treaties as well as to the ethical obligations emanating from the Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission [1] . In accordance with the applicable rules, including Articles 245 and 339 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, former Members of the Commission are bound by certain life-long obligations even after their mandate. Especially, they must continue to behave with integrity and discretion and are also required to observe the obligation of professional secrecy. The Commission takes the allegations regarding the former Commissioner for Trade very seriously and has referred the matter to the European Anti-Fraud Office (‘OLAF’) for appropriate follow-up, within its independent investigative function. OLAF has confirmed it has opened a case but is not in a position to share details on individual cases or probes beyond the information and data already made public. This is in order to protect the confidentiality of investigations and of possible ensuing judicial proceedings, as well as to ensure respect for personal data and procedural rights. OLAF fully respects the presumption of innocence and the rights of defence of the persons/entities concerned. OLAF’s mission is to detect, investigate and stop wrongdoings related to EU funds. However, OLAF reports without undue delay suspected criminal conduct to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which has full competency to investigate and prosecute such offences. The investigation of other criminal offences remains the competence of national authorities. [1] Commission Decision of 31 January 2018 on a Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission, C(2018) 700 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32018D0221(02). In 2008, the version Code of Conduct of 24 November 2004 was applicable, available at the following link: https://www.cvce.eu/obj/code_of_conduct_for_commissioners_24_november_2004-en-eb3c996a-b728-496e-b06c-49ef61f70d16.html.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-07-09 “E-002791/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is bound by the EU Treaties, which enshrine values of equality and nondiscrimination. The Commission implements EU interventions and funding activities accordingly. The Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027 1 sets expenditure targets for climate and biodiversity, and tracks expenditure supporting gender equality. It also requires strengthening the assessment of gender equality. Currently, sectoral regulations include objectives related to climate action and gender equality. For the next MFF, Article 33 of the Financial Regulation 2 requires that programmes and activities be implemented in line with the principle of gender equality, and that gender-disaggregated data be collected, where appropriate. Under the Financial Regulation, the award of EU funds is subject to respecting the legal requirements of equal treatment, transparency and non-discrimination 3 . There is no requirement that a recipient of EU funding endorses any ideology. Under Article 138 of the Financial Regulation, applicants are excluded from participating in award procedures or from implementing EU funds if they are found guilty of grave professional misconduct, which includes having engaged in incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence against a group of persons or a member of a group or activities that are contrary to the values under Article 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 4 . Specific award criteria are set to assess the quality of the proposals in line with the objectives and priorities of the relevant EU programmes. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020Q1222(01). 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402509. 3 See Article 163 of the Financial Regulation for procurement and Article 191 of the Financial Regulation for grants. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_2&format=PDF.”
  EU policy on sustainability criteria in public funding · Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2025-07-09 “E-002792/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The General-Purpose AI (GPAI) Code of Practice sets out how signatories intend to ensure compliance with the rules applicable to providers of general-purpose AI models, laid down in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act, 1 whose purpose is to ensure the safety of large AI models placed on the EU market. Adherence to the GPAI Code is voluntary. Since the AI Act applies to all providers placing their GPAI models on the EU market, irrespective of where they are based, the Code will apply to signatories based both inside and outside the EU. It therefore cannot be said to disadvantage or place excessive compliance burdens on EU-based companies. The GPAI Code was drawn up by independent experts in a multi-stakeholder process, with input from over 1,000 stakeholders, and facilitated by the Commission’s AI Office. The Commission will regularly monitor and evaluate whether the GPAI Code is fit for purpose. In the EU, AI training can be carried out on the basis of the text and data mining (TDM) exceptions to copyright established in the Digital Single Market (DSM) Directive, as implemented in the national laws of the Member States 2 . At the same time, the DSM Directive allows rightsholders to reserve their rights for TDM purposes. The AI Act supports the effective application of the TDM exception. Notably, the Commission has recently published a template that, as provided for by the AI Act, GPAI providers must use to summarise the content used to train their GPAI model, thus providing meaningful transparency. The template was designed in a way that respects the providers’ trade secrets. In parallel, as set out in the AI Continent Action Plan, the Commission is stepping up efforts to ensure access to high-quality to data for AI innovators, e.g. through data labs within AI factories. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024. 2 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC (Text with EEA relevance.), OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, pp. 92–125.”
  Artificial Intelligence · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• 2025-06-30 “E-002639/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission While European industry has shown resilience to recent crises and has many strengths, its competitiveness is under pressure due to several factors, including high energy prices, international competition amidst rising geopolitical tensions, and overcapacities in third countries 1 . The Commission presented its Competitiveness Compass 2 to address these challenges and boost Europe’s competitiveness by closing the innovation gap, decarbonising the economy and reducing dependencies. Decarbonisation is a global challenge that can also be an economic opportunity 3 . The Clean Industrial Deal 4 presented a set of actions to strengthen the business case for production and decarbonisation in Europe. It aims to improve access to affordable energy, lead markets, materials and circularity, funding and skills. The Commission is also simplifying EU rules and their implementation to reduce burdens for businesses 5 . Moreover, the Affordable Energy Action Plan 6 aims at lowering energy bills while promoting decarbonisation. To accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy, the upcoming Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act will speed up permitting for industry and increase demand for EU-made clean products. Under the Critical Raw Materials Act 7 , mining and processing in the EU are also encouraged. The Commission has announced a review of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 8 to reduce the risk of carbon leakage, notably for exports, and prepare a proposal extending it to downstream goods and introducing anti-circumvention measures. To address unfair competition from outside the EU, the Commission will continue to assess distortive effects of foreign subsidies 9 and make fast and efficient use of trade defence instruments. 1 2025 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report: https://single-marketeconomy.ec.europa.eu/publications/2025-annual-single-market-and-competitiveness-report_en. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/competitiveness-compass_en; https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/competitiveness-compass_en. 3 As flagged in the Draghi Report: https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en of 26 February 2025. 5 E.g. Sustainability Omnibus to reduce complexity related to sustainability reporting: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/commission-simplifies-rules-sustainability-and-eu-investmentsdelivering-over-eu6-billion_en. 6 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/affordable-energy_en, also of 26 February 2025. 7 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-rawmaterials/critical-raw-materials-act_en. 8 https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en. 9 Such as the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/foreign-subsidiesregulation_en) and Investment screening (https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/enforcement-andprotection/investment-screening_en).”
  Energy (green transition) · Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · EU industrial funding
• 2025-06-30 “E-002643/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The revised Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) aims to lower energy bills for citizens, improve living comfort and reduce dependence on fossil fuels. It does not impose mandatory renovation obligations for residential buildings. Instead, Member States shall adopt a national trajectory to reduce the average primary energy use of the residential building stock by at least 16% by 2030 and 20 to 22% by 2035. They have flexibility to choose how to achieve these targets and to adapt their renovation strategy to national circumstances. At the same time, their financial incentives have to support vulnerable households as a priority 1 . The Commission thoroughly assessed 2 the expected socio-economic impacts ahead of its proposal for revising the EPBD, in particular as regards energy poverty reduction and affordability, and found that building renovation leads to reduced energy bills for building owners and tenants, especially for those living in homes in the lowest energy performance classes. The EU has significantly increased funding to support building renovation, with more than EUR 100 billion estimated to be available under the current Multiannual Financial Framework, the bulk of it from the Recovery and Resilience Facility and Cohesion Policy Funds. From 2026 until 2032 the Social Climate Fund will mobilise EUR 86.7 billion, to support the most affected vulnerable groups, notably households in energy poverty, making sure they are not left behind in the transition to a cleaner economy. This includes support for building renovation and installing clean heating and cooling systems. 1 Article 17(18) of Directive (EU) 2025/1275. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0453.”
  EU housing policy · Energy performance of buildings
• 2025-06-30 “E-002638/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Member States are solely responsible for maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security. The Commission does not comment on individual cases of alleged corruption. The Commission’s annual Rule of Law Report reports on developments in the Member States in four areas of systemic importance, including judicial independence and the effectiveness of the fight against corruption. The sixth edition of the EU Rule of Law Report was adopted on 8 July 2025. It provides concrete recommendations to tackle systemic weaknesses in all Member States, including Spain. The Commission remains committed to taking any necessary measures to ensure compliance with EU law and upholding the rule of law in all Member States. It will continue to monitor developments in the areas covered in the 2025 Rule of Law Report and continue to work with the Spanish authorities and relevant stakeholders on the findings and recommendations in the 2025 report, as part of the Rule of Law cycle.”
  Rule of law in Spain · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2025-06-30 “E-002633/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act 1 (DSA) does not regulate speech. The DSA is content-agnostic, and the Commission and Member States as regulators have no power to moderate content or to impose any specific approach to moderation. The substantive rules on unlawful speech or other illegal content are established in other pieces of national or EU legislation. The DSA aims to contribute to a safe, predictable and trusted online environment that facilitates innovation, and in which fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including the freedom of expression, are effectively protected. The DSA regulates processes and responsibilities for the providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) and requires they assess – and if needed mitigate – the possible systemic risks that could stem from their services. The DSA explicitly protects freedom of expression and protects users in the EU against overremoval of lawful content. The DSA created a set of redress mechanisms for users: when platforms take decisions affecting online content: when platforms remove or demote content, they must inform the user that posted the content, explain why they took the decision, and offer the opportunity to challenge it. The Commission is continuously monitoring the compliance of all VLOPs and VLOSEs with the DSA. The Commission has opened an investigation against Meta (the provider of Facebook and Instagram) in April 2024 because of its suspicion that Meta does not offer the required transparency and redress obligations when it comes to its ‘political content approach’, as well as Meta’s obligations to assess and mitigate risks to civic discourse and electoral processes. 2 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 Commission opens formal proceedings under DSA https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-06-30 “E-002634/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission On 22 May 2025, the Romanian’s Constitutional Court formally validated the outcome of the 2025 Romanian Presidential elections. The Commission does not intervene in the organisation and conduct of elections. These are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional rules and legislation, as well as their international obligations and EU law. National authorities and courts are primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with the applicable rules. The Commission fosters cooperation and information sharing between EU institutions and Member States to promote a whole-of-society approach to increasing awareness of foreign interference and information manipulation and to support coordinated prevention and response. The Commission does not intervene in determining if particular activity is foreign interference. The Commission supports Member States on electoral matters, mainly through the framework of the European cooperation network on elections 1 . This brings together national authorities with relevant competence and facilitates the exchanges of information and best practices. The Commission is also working with Member States to support the application of EU law provisions relevant in national electoral contexts, such as those in the Digital Services Act 2 and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising 3 . According to Article 30 of the Regulation, it applies fully from 10 October 2025. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/democracy-eucitizenship-anti-corruption/democracy-and-electoral-rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065. In 2024, the Commission issued Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024XC03014&qid=1714466886277. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-06-30 “E-002635/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission does not intend to propose legislation harmonising the rules on taxis and Private Hire Vehicles with driver (PHV). 2. As stated above, there is no such initiative. In its activities, the Commission is committed to respect of the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5 (3) of the Treaty on European Union 1 ) and the need to avoid undue administrative burden and to simplify legislation 2 . 3. In the field of local passenger transport-on-demand, the Commission focusses on ensuring that the fundamental freedoms as guaranteed by the Treaties, notably the freedom of establishment enshrined in Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 3 , are respected. To that end, in 2022, the Commission published a Notice on wellfunctioning and sustainable local passenger transport-on-demand (taxis and PHV) 4 , which clarifies the limits established by EU law on how Member States may regulate the sector. The Commission does not exclude to update this Notice and/or to take another initiative, the details of which have still to be defined. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008M005:EN:HTML. 2 A simpler and faster Europe: Communication on implementation and simplification (COM(2025) 47 final). 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2008/art_49/oj/eng. 4 OJ C 62, 4.2.2022, p. 1.”
  EU Competition policy · EU transport infrastructure integration
• 2025-06-30 “E-002637/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission welcomes the publication of the European Parliament’s own-initiative report ‘Electricity Grids: the backbone of the EU energy system’ 1 , which reflects similar findings to the Commission’s Action Plan for Affordable Energy 2 , regarding the need to accelerate the expansion, modernisation and digitalisation of grids to promote a competitive and secure energy supply. This is a long-standing view of the Commission, as evidenced by the goals of the Trans-European Networks for Energy Regulation 3 but also the EU Action Plan for Grids 4 . As highlighted in the Draghi Report 5 and stressed in the Action Plan for Affordable Energy, more integrated energy markets bring immense economic benefits, amounting to some EUR 34 billion yearly today, with potential to further save up to EUR 43 billion annually by 2030. Integrated networks themselves bring net savings of up to EUR 8 billion annually by 2040, as well as potential to create some 4.1 million extra jobs 6 A more integrated network also increases the resilience of our energy system, limiting the risks of blackout and accelerating recovery following an incident. All Commission proposals respect Member States’ rights under the Treaties, and legislative initiatives related to grids are no exception, as they are adopted by the Council, representing the Member States, and the Parliament. This encompasses the principles stated under the Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, inter alia on Member State's right to determine their energy mix. In doing so, EU-wide energy infrastructure approaches make it possible to build on the diversity of energy sources and on the strength of each Member State to create an efficient, resilient and decarbonised energy system. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0136_EN.html. 2 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/affordable-energy_en. 3 Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A757%3AFIN&qid=1701167355682. 5 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en. 6 2024 Ten-Years Network Development Plan of the ENTSO-E, https://eepublicdownloads.blob.core.windows.net/public-cdn-container/tyndpdocuments/TYNDP2024/foropinion/Infrastructure_Gaps_Report.pdf.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices · EU energy infrastructure integration
• 2025-06-30 “E-002632/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The energy transition and energy security are two sides of the same coin. A shift from traditional dependency on imported fossil fuels to the deployment of domestic and homegrown clean energy strengthens our strategic autonomy in the field of energy and ultimately contributes to deliver secure and affordable energy to European citizens and industries. In this transition, energy security is and will remain one of the key dimensions of the Energy Union, with particular attention to the flexibility and the stability of the whole EU energy system and the imperative of energy affordability. As announced in the Affordable Energy Action Plan, the Commission will put forward a revision of the current EU energy security regulatory framework to increase the resilience of the EU’s energy system and contribute to price stability. Following the very first European Climate Risk Assessment 1 of 2024, the Commission’s review of the EU energy security framework will also pay close attention to emerging risks, notably climate change impacts. The Commission will present this proposal in 2026. In addition, in line with Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Member States have the right to decide their own energy choices, notably on their energy sources to ensure security of supply. 1 COM(2024) 91 final.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Energy (green transition) · EU energy infrastructure integration
• 2025-06-30 “E-002646/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The EU and its partner countries have jointly committed to international frameworks such as the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Within this context, EU support helps translate shared commitments into practical improvements in people’s daily lives. Information on organisations in Latin America that received EU funding over the past five years, including amounts, is available on the Commission’s website 1 . Given the breadth of the portfolio, the Commission cannot provide a full overview of outcomes within the space of this reply. However, projects are accompanied by reporting, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and related documentation is publicly available 2 . EU funding is governed by the Financial Regulation 3 . Grants to non-governmental organisations must support an EU policy objective or the functioning of a body aligned with it. Funded actions must reflect EU values, including human rights, rule of law, gender equality, and sustainable development, and are subject to monitoring and audit. Entities found in breach of EU values or legal obligations may be excluded through the Early Detection and Exclusion System. Organisations listed under EU Restrictive measures are not eligible to receive EU funds. Cooperation is based on partnership and mutual respect. Programmes are developed jointly with partner governments and stakeholders and reflect shared priorities and international commitments. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html. 2 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/eu-financial-regulation_en.”
  EU development policy (gender conditionality) · Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2025-06-30 “E-002636/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU is taking several steps to safeguard its competitiveness in Latin America. By lowering tariffs for EU products, EU trade agreements with countries of the region help EU exporters, including from Germany, better compete with exports from China. Latin American countries with trade agreements with China 1 also have agreements with the EU, so EU companies don’t face a competitive disadvantage when they do business in these countries. By concluding the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement 2 , EU companies would have preferential market access and greater legal certainty in all Latin American countries except for Bolivia and Venezuela. EU companies also require competitive financing and a level playing field to help them compete with Chinese companies in Latin America. The recent modernisation of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development rules on government export credits enables EU export credit agencies to offer more advantageous financing. Through the Global Gateway strategy, the EU, together with Member States, is promoting de-risking and better coordinated financing between export credit agencies, development and financial institutions as well as policy frameworks aligned with EU standards and criteria. This would increase the competitiveness of the EU and its Member States’ private sector in Latin American partner countries and enhance the socio-economic development of the region through mutually beneficial strategic investments. 1 Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Peru. 2 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eumercosur-agreement_en.”
  Trade relations with China · Trade relations with Mercosur
• 2025-06-30 “E-002631/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Upholding human rights is inscribed in the Algerian Constitution and constitutes a key element of EU-Algeria relations, as enshrined in the Association Agreement 1 and reinforced in the Partnership Priorities 2 . On this basis, the EU monitors and follows developments closely and continues to have regular exchanges on human rights and rule of law with representatives of the Algerian government. Freedom of religion or belief has constantly been raised with the Algerian authorities. In particular, the closure of certain Christian places of worship was specifically discussed at the last meeting of the EU-Algeria Political, Security and Human Rights Sub-Committee, and the European External Action Service plans to raise this issue again at the next meeting. The EU consistently promotes upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion or belief, in line with international conventions. 1 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part, OJ L 265, 10 October 2005. 2 Shared Partnership Priorities of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and the European Union under the revised European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), UE-AL 3101/17 ADD 1, Brussels 7 March 2017.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU-Algeria relations
• 2025-02-05 “E-000534/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Dublin III Regulation 1 does not foresee sanctions in case of suspension of the taking charge and taking back of applicants for international protection by the Member State designated as responsible. The Commission takes note of the judgement of the European Court of Justice in joined cases C-185/24 and C-189/24 2 . The proper functioning of the Dublin system is essential for achieving the common European objectives on migration and asylum. The Commission is working closely with Member States on the good functioning of Dublin transfers, and to ensure a successful transition to the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation 3 . 1 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) – OJ L180/31 of 29/06/2013. 2 Judgment of 19 December 2024, Tudmur, Joined Cases C-185/24, C-189/24, paragraph 42, EU:C:2024:1036. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 – OJ L2024/1351 of 22/05/2024.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-01-27 “P-000351/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The EU programme for the environment and climate action (LIFE Programme 1 ) provides, amongst others, financial support for the functioning of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), supporting civil society’s participation in policy making, in line with the LIFE Regulation 2 and the EU Financial Regulation 3 . Operating grants awarded under the LIFE Programme do not mandate NGOs to influence the legislative process and decision-making towards a specific direction or targeting specific Members of the European Parliament. These grants are awarded following a competitive procedure. Applicants submit proposals that include their work programme of activities in areas indicated in the LIFE Regulation. This work programme is annexed to the grant agreement. The Commission agrees that work programmes involving specifically detailed activities directed at EU institutions and some of their representatives, even if they do not breach the legal framework and contractual provisions, may entail a reputational risk for the Union. To mitigate this risk, the Commission issued guidance 4 for both existing grant agreements and future calls, addressed to all Commission services and applicable to all spending programmes. The guidance clarifies which activities should not be mandated as a requirement or condition for Union financing. The Commission adheres to its transparency obligations. The NGOs benefiting from LIFE support and the amount received are published annually in the Commission’s Financial Transparency System 5 and on the LIFE website 6 . The Commission proactively shares the objectives and outcomes of EU-funded projects on the Funding & Tenders Portal 7 . The Commission has no indication that ongoing LIFE operating grant agreements breach the provisions of the LIFE Regulation or the Financial Regulation. It therefore has no legal grounds to terminate any ongoing operating grant agreements. Amendments could only be done if mutually agreed with beneficiaries. Nearly all LIFE operating grants containing detailed work programmes expired by end 2024, and the Commission is taking action to ensure the application of the guidance for future calls and agreements. 1 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life_en 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/783 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing a Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE), and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1293/2013. 3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/guidance-fundingdev-impl-monit-enforce-of-eu-law_en.pdf 5 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html 6 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life/life-operating-grants_en 7 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home”
  EU engagement with civil society · Transparency requirements for interest groups
• 2025-01-21 “E-000254/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen On behalf of the European Commission As the Commission noted in its reply to written question E-000108/2025, no Commission official was instructed to follow the conversation live.”
  Budget for EU politicians
• 2024-07-18 “P-001375/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission Free speech is a pillar of democracy and at the core of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 1 and the European Convention on Human Rights 2 , which are legally binding on all EU institutions and Member States. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 3 does not regulate content 4 . Its objective is to ensure that EU users can enjoy online platform services safely while respecting fundamental rights. It defines the platforms’ responsibilities and mitigates risks, preventing algorithmic amplification of illegal content and over-removal of lawful content, especially for very large online platforms and search engines (VLOPSEs) 5 . The Commission supervises DSA compliance by the VLOPSEs. To this effect, the colegislator entrusted the Commission with investigative and enforcement powers. These powers and related procedures are laid out in the DSA 6 , and include the possibility of accepting commitments, i.e. remedial actions offered by platforms to solve the Commission’s concerns without being subject to fines for non-compliance. To assist companies in deciding whether to offer commitments, in line with the principles of good administration, the Commission stands ready to explain to them its concerns. The Commission adopted the first DSA commitment decision on 5 August 2024, making binding TikTok's commitments to permanently withdraw TikTok Lite Rewards programme from the EU 7 . In ensuring compliance with the DSA, the Commission does not require removal of specific pieces of content. All acts and decisions adopted by the Commission on the basis of the DSA are taken within the limits of the Commission’s powers and are subject to judicial review. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A12012P%2FTXT 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/european-convention-on-human-rights-echr.html 3 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act). 4 As in the offline world, that is a matter for specific laws and the courts to determine. 5 VLOPSEs are designated online platforms with more than 45 million users in the EU (10% of the EU population). 6 DSA, section 4. 7 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_24_4161”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• “Thank you president. The EU regulation on end of life vehicles jeopardizes our competitiveness. Using recycled materials and new type approval, which deviate from global standards put a burden on our manufacturers. We are not looking at equitable and binding quotas, but we have the Inflation Reduction Act and the requirements within them, which relates to recycling. But the provisions are less stringent and don't impose such a burden on our producers. What we are seeing is that Chinese and US companies are being able to produce more and cheaper vehicles. We've seen already that a couple of thousand jobs have been lost, and this is jeopardizing our industry and our competitiveness. This regulation threatens our Europe here. Well, are we going to now rejoice about this regulation and say that it could have been worse? But our industry wishes that we didn't have such bureaucracy and that we didn't have such a proposal across the board. **Nicolae ȘTEFĂNUȚĂ @Co-Chair: Thank you. Next up, Mr. Arias Echeverria.”
  Circular economy
• “Thank you, Madam President. Colleagues. The EU ETS has failed and it has neither saved the environment or saved a European energy. It has simply resulted in a higher energy costs and has brought European industry to its knees. We are talking today about a revision, but you don't revise a system which is a structural failure. You do away with it. While China and the U.S. continue to produce and grow, European business and workers are suffering, this is not a way of saving the environment. The answer to our competitiveness crisis here isn't just reforms and more rules. It is doing away with the ETS completely today.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• “Thank you. President. The European Commission tries now with its new energy policy and the clean industrial deal, to really pull the wool over our eyes. It's telling us this as a way to give everyone affordable energy. But really, the hard truth is that it's simply making the very problems that are driving prices up. Um, further differences between the gas and energy electricity price are going to be balanced with more rules, more bureaucracy. That's not free market policy. That's a planned economy from Brussels. And it's, uh, not in favor of the taxpayer. The Green Deal is being set in stone instead of stopping it once and for all. We've got energy intensive businesses for chemistry, chemicals, and, uh, other areas that are being moved out to China and elsewhere. And highly paid jobs are getting lost. The European Commission admits that Europe's energy prices are too high and are a threat to its industrial base. Even Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the German chancellor concluded that the phasing out of nuclear was a strategic error. Factory has been closed, jobs being lost, less prosperity, less tax revenue. All of that is bad for our country. So we say no to this package. We say yes to a pragmatic and open solution that really includes everyone without the unnecessary bureaucracy. Thank you.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• “Thank you. Thank you very much. It's Kafkaesque. What's going on here? Absolutely crazy in In 2019. We sat here and were looking at studies. My colleagues from the EPP, S&D and other groups said they wanted to save the sector, but it's already finished. It's already collapsing. In 2019, we already knew that 200,000 to 400,000 jobs were at risk. Here we are. And give me German. I'm giving you German figures. 60,000 jobs have been lost this year, 240,000 since the introduction of the Green Deal. And we're thinking about what we can do now. There are people out there, ladies and gentlemen, who are tearing their hair out at what a crazy position the European Parliament is adopting. We need Just stop and take a look at ourselves. Um, Hajek got a Nobel Peace, a Nobel Prize for saying that politicians don't know better than business leaders. But here we are in 2025, still continuing upon our same senseless path. It is the entrepreneurs, the businesses that carry the risk for their decisions. Now we have big mouths here. We have a lot of words. Um, but we do not have responsibility for what is happening yet. We think we can make the decisions. It is the business people outside who know what's best. So there's no doubt in my mind that we need to give businesses to need to give the businesses the room to breathe so that they can survive in the world market. Look at, uh, how far China has come in the last few years. They're dominating the market. Uh, so all of the ideologies that we've tried to impose, we have to do away with if we want to save our industry and give these people the room to breathe and work.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you very much. Yes. Ladies and gentlemen, 2019. As the Green Deal achieved those particular heights right now, um, there are a number of different studies that indicate that from 200,000 to 400,000 jobs in Germany alone will be lost if we come up with if this band becomes reality and the question is asked. But things we things are going so badly. But why are things going so bad? Um, it's it's because of the situation. Because we have an industrial policy which is undermining industry above all. And indeed, uh, you want some sort of planned economy, five year plans, something of that particular nature. And it cannot be. Ladies and gentlemen, it doesn't work, uh, with, for example, iPhones. Nokia. Uh, when we went from iPhones, from Nokia to iPhones, when we went from, um, horse drawn carriages to cars, this is a development that takes place. And all of this was thought up in an, in an atmosphere of freedom, and it was implemented in an atmosphere of freedom as well. We need freedom for our undertakings and for our citizens as well. So let's get rid of these bands, and let's get rid of these particular sanctions on those who try to flout any bands that are out there. Thank you.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you very much, president. Yeah. One has to say something. What what what a deceptive discussion and what a deceptive title as well. You know exactly where the problems of competitiveness exist. The green New Green Deal, this green left ideology, which has been which has poisoned the situation altogether. There are other issues which have to be taken into consideration as well. It's also that firewall in Germany. It's time for a firewall in Brussels right now. Uh, this. So hasn't anything been learned on the green side as well? What's the point of all of these particular firewalls? And what is the meaning behind there? Is there isn't. The issue isn't keeping things out. The issue is bringing things in and really looking at the problems that exist. Uh, you are to save lives. Your wall ought to be one which saves, not one which destroys industry, undermines Minds competitiveness and in the end, kills children.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you chairman. Thank you Commissioner, for coming today. Thank you, Commissioner, for finding the time. There are some fans of subsidies, but I'm not one of them. I think they always distort the market, both when you're a provider and when you're, um, demand on the demand side. Arcelor Mittal, we saw it there. We saw it with Northvolt in Germany. We've seen, uh, Intel's promises, etc. the money that's paid out, you could have just, uh. Lit the notes and, and it would have gone up in smoke. I think many of the problems that we have when it comes to competitiveness today and thinking about Cbam, uh, steel industry, you've said, has to be protected and it needs to be and will be protected more strongly in the hours ahead than it has ever been before. And we need that if we're going to get the Green Deal in this form. I mean, that's what's happened. But you cannot, uh, have, uh, one off payments to solve the world's problems. We've seen this happen, but we haven't seen solutions. So therefore my question is this. Quite apart from the competitiveness Fund or this. The €35 billion, what flanking measures have you put in place to ensure that companies can maintain a competitive edge? Quite apart from the fund that's been set up to do it?”
  State Aid
• “Thank you. President. Well, ladies and gentlemen, absurd and bizarre. I mean, it's a paradox. When you see the Greens and the left who've spent decades fighting for free, markets and industry, now want to come up with the concepts that we need to save industry. I mean, it's utterly absurd to see them as the saviors of industry. Ladies and gentlemen, we wouldn't be in this situation if we hadn't gone for the Green Deal. If we didn't have this terrible environmental hubris, we wouldn't need cbam. We wouldn't need to go for all these measures. I mean, we're talking about energy prices. We'd have cheap energy if we didn't have to have carbon certificates. Our industries also are heavy. Industries can only survive and thrive if they're free. I mean, we're seeing the dumping of products from China. Yes, they're having an effect. But the biggest problem here is the Green Deal and it has to be ended.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• “Thank you president. Well, when my green colleagues think that a proposal is good. Well, industry and citizens are going to think the opposite. I mean, this is basically the next terrible project, the next effort at centralization. The next step in our decline. I mean, what's the situation here? We're talking about spending billions and billions here on massive projects. But have we learned nothing from what happened in Spain? Don't we realize how important it is to have a good energy mix? I mean, thank you for what you said, Mrs. Paulus, but we can't continue to make the mistaken take the mistaken decisions under the Green Deal, which make life so difficult for our citizens and citizens. We can't continue to bed that in. We need to have a wide energy mix. We need to have cheap energy prices. And the proposal we have on the table goes in exactly the wrong direction.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you. President. Many today referred to what happened six years ago, so I'll do the same. It was interesting to see because here in Strasbourg, the EPP were fighting over getting on this photo with Greta Thunberg. I don't know if the pictures are still about, but this has left its mark. Looking at what happened with our heavy industry. This is just one example. If you look at what happened with our suppliers, the AhrC has been sounding the alarm. Expect an extra 1.2 million jobs to be jeopardised by 2032. They expect losses of up to €50 billion. I wonder. Greta to somebody who started this. We had a climate stickers. Even here in Parliament, we need to say we have had enough of this. We need competitiveness. It shouldn't be about a reform. It should be about doing away with these climate targets the same as they've done in the US. The key issue is competitiveness.”
  Climate efforts
• “Thank you, Madam President. Ladies and gentlemen, it's a bit better late than never, but even in 2019, it was clear that we had a problem. The end of the internal combustion engine was going to be a problem. The other aspects of the Green Deal were going to we're going to be a problem in terms of the cost of thousands of jobs, just in the Federal Republic of Germany. So then it was the Green Deal. Now the commission is waking up, and now we're hearing about the global market being difficult. And it's true. But why at a difficult time for the market, do you take away from the manufacturers the niche in which they have become leaders? We have to go back to pragmatism. We need to go back to entrepreneurial freedom. And if the Greens were interested in the future, they would be interested in the freedom for entrepreneurs, for business. We don't need restrictions. Thank you, Mr. Bloss. I'm glad you agree with me. And if the EPP and the Commission want to ditch central planning and in favour of entrepreneurial freedom, then they need to go with us and not with the Greens.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Well, I mean, I know what the situation is in Spain, and I believe that if we had a good energy mix, nuclear, coal, etc., it wouldn't have happened. And, uh, you know that it is the increased load from solar power that actually caused the problem.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• “Thank you, Madam President. Ladies and gentlemen. When we are going to get all emotional all over again in this house, it's not a sign that it's Christmas. It's a sign if you're following at home that people don't have strong arguments. You've said time and again that this is going to be a definitive phase out, a definitive end to the import of gas from Russia. Have you have you really thought this through? Uh. Um, you're saying it's wonderful that Parliament has gone even further than the commission and the council wanted to. That they've been even more energetic and aggressive against Russia. Um, what is happening today, ladies and gentlemen, is not action against Putin and Putin's war machine. This is an explicit declaration of war against Russia itself, against the Russian people. If you just think that there would be a regime change in Russia, what would you do then? What we are deciding now is permanent. You're breaking all the bridges that we might want to keep with Russia in future. You're militating against peace. I can understand if you don't want peace with Putin, but you're actually saying that you don't want peace with Russia forever more. And I think that is a scandalous.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Thank you very much. President. Commissioner. I'm going to go easy on you. Don't worry. You know, I'm trying to come up with a logical conclusions here. It's getting pretty, pretty wild. So you can see that there's a ban on various herreras coming from from China. And, you know, here in Brussels where, you know, are just, you know, acting as normal, you know, the de facto monopoly here. But, you know, maybe we need to look at the more at home because with the Green Deal, as I'm sure you know, you know, plenty of the greens are at fault for what we're doing here. Not necessarily on the on the demand side, but on the supply side. You know, look at Sweden, Portugal, Germany, which have been left to their own devices. So, Commissioner, what we need to do is we need to step it up a gear. You know, we need to make progress. We need to get away from the green swamp that's been keeping us back. So with, um, um, we know, um, what's what's happening with with the war, we know that, um, you know, China is building new power stations, and we know what the what the price for that is. We know that how they can produce an export about 80% of the processing possibilities for retro has been given to, uh. Um, uh, to Beijing. So what we can we what conclusion can we draw from that? We need to make progress here in Europe. We need a mass, uh, state, um, investment in, to our own minds, our own resources. But we also need to look to the future. You know, we need we need to look at progress. We've basically just been looking at our competitors for for too long. You know, just looking at what they've been doing with their production sites. And, you know, we've ended up with with laws that we can't implement. So that's what we need to do. Thank you.”
  Sourcing of critical raw materials