Jean-Paul GARRAUD

Policy topics Jean-Paul GARRAUD is active on

What Jean-Paul GARRAUD has said (62)

• 2026-03-24 “Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission 21.5.2026 Written question In July 2025 the Commission put forward a new basket of own resources, including a proposal for a Corporate Resource for Europe (CORE) [1] . The CORE annual lump-sum contribution would be established as an own resource for the EU based on Article 311(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2] . This provision empowers the Council to establish new categories of own resources. Article 311(3) TFEU is a self-standing legal basis enabling the direct establishment of new own resources in the Own Resources Decision [3] . The Commission shared its revenue estimates per own resource and per Member State, inclusive of the underlying assumptions, with the Council and the European Parliament in the context of the ongoing interinstitutional decision-making process in relation to the EU’s future multiannual financial framework . CORE would be applicable to large companies and permanent establishments with a taxable presence in the EU with an annual net turnover above EUR 100 million. Therefore, CORE would not apply to small and medium-sized enterprises, which represent 99% of businesses in the EU. The CORE annual lump-sum contribution to be paid by large companies in scope would represent a very small fraction of their ‘net turnover’ — a maximum of 0.1%. The rather modest CORE contribution is a charge that recognises the benefits that companies operating and selling in the EU enjoy from the single market. [1] https://commission.europa.eu/publications/system-own-resources_en. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2008/art_311/oj/eng. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020D2053.”
  Own EU resources · EU industrial funding
• 2026-03-24 “Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission 4.5.2026 Written question The Commission presented its revenue estimates per own resource and per Member State, inclusive of the underlying assumptions, in fiches (working documents). The fiches were shared with the Council and the European Parliament in September 2025. These fiches have been produced by the Commission in the context of the ongoing interinstitutional decision-making process in relation to the EU’s future multiannual financial framework and are, as such, not public documents at this stage.”
  Size of EU budget · Own EU resources
• 2026-03-24 “E-001221/2026 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission proposed five new own resources and adjustments to the current own resources. This package is expected to generate EUR 65.6 billion (current prices) per year in average over the period 2028-2034 1 . The Commission presented the breakdown per own resource in the staff working document 2 accompanying the Communication ‘A dynamic EU budget for the priorities of the future: the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034 3 ’ as well as in the factsheet on ‘New own resources 4 ’. In application of the principle of universality, the total revenue shall cover the total expenditure, thus there is no earmarking of the revenue generated by the own resources. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/system-own-resources_en, COM (2025)574. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025SC0570R(01), SWD (2025)570. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0570R(01), COM (2025) 570. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/eu-budget-20282034_en#factsheets.”
  Size of EU budget · Own EU resources
• 2026-03-03 “Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question The Commission takes its duty to communicate about EU policies and programmes seriously. It therefore agreed a partnership with the Confederation of African Football as a means to appeal to a young adult audience that is hard to reach. The Africa Cup of Nations is watched by nearly two billion viewers worldwide, making it an impactful visibility opportunity. With increasing reach on digital platforms, the tournaments are a key platform to communicate about the EU’s investments in Africa and support for young people across the continent, including through the Global Gateway strategy [1] . The contract followed the standard checks and safeguards for these kinds of agreements, in line with the EU Financial Regulation [2] . As with all conditions for contracts for external actions financed by the EU, the agreement has robust verifications, checks, audits and reporting requirements. For this service contract, the Commission relies on a combination of (i) contractual audit and inspection clauses in the General Conditions for service contracts, (ii) record-keeping and access obligations for contractors and contracting authorities, (iii) management checks, expenditure verifications and ex post audits, and (iv) specific anti-fraud and irregularity mechanisms [3] (suspension of implementation and payments, and recovery of unduly paid amounts) designed to prevent, detect and remedy irregularities and misuse of EU funds. [1] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/global-gateway-overview_en. [2] Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast); ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj. [3] Including European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), European Court of Auditors (ECA) access.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2026-02-23 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 4.6.2026 Written question To deliver affordable, secure energy and achieve climate goals [1] , the EU needs to — amongst several initiatives — significantly scale up renewable electricity generation [2] . In 2024, Member States updated their offshore renewable goals [3] . The North Sea Summit declarations align with this approach. Offshore wind is a stable source of electricity, with the capacity factor of new installations reaching 50%. This contributes to reduce greenhouse gas emissions [4] and pollution [5] . In line with the precautionary principle and EU environmental laws [6] projects likely to have significant effects on the environment, including projects for offshore renewable energy, are subject to an environmental impact assessment. Effective participation for the public in the decision-making process is a fundamental requirement. Europe has a solid position in the wind power value chain [7] and aims at maintaining this strategic autonomy [8] . The financial support at EU level is subject to project application, and independent scrutiny based on objective criteria in EU law [9] . Indeed, all net-zero and low carbon technologies need to contribute to reach the climate goals. Offshore renewables, just like nuclear, are an indispensable part of the net-zero energy mix. Member States have the right to decide which sources to include in their energy mix. For several Member States, nuclear energy is not only a decarbonisation tool, but also an asset to strengthen their energy autonomy and reduce external dependencies. The Commission recently adopted the eighth Nuclear Illustrative Programme [10] outlining the investment needs in nuclear by 2050. The Commission also adopted a Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) Strategy to accelerate the development and deployment of SMRs in Europe by early 2030s. [1] Regulation (EU) 2021/1119/EU. [2] Eurostat. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Electricity_and_heat_statistics. [3] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable-energy/offshore-renewable-energy_en. [4] https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/climate-strategies-targets/progress-climate-action_en. [5] Port electricity commercial model (project pilot) https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/60f97fad-70b5-11ef-a8ba-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. [6] Such as Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32011L0092, Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds. See also Regulation 2022/869/EU on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R0869 (see Article 9 and Annex VI). [7] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/draghi-report_en#paragraph_47059 . European original equipment manufacturers dominate the domestic market, with a 96% (100% in 2023) share for offshore installations. ‘ Wind Energy in the European Union — 2025 Status Report on Technology Development, Trends, Value Chains and Markets ’ JRC, 2025. [8] See i.a. https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-modes/maritime/eu-ports-and-industrial-maritime-strategies_en. [9] See i.a. Regulations on Horizon Europe, Connecting Europe Facility and Innovation Fund. https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe_en, https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/connecting-europe-facility_en, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02019R0856-20231121. [10] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1488.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Nuclear energy · Off-shore renewables
• 2026-02-23 “E-000740/2026 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Infringement Case INFR(2018)2208 1 concerns failure to guarantee appropriate access to justice for environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as regards forest management plans (FMPs) in Poland. These are considered to be plans likely to have a significant effect on Natura 2000 sites and thus fall under the scope of Article 6 of the Habitats Directive 23 . Under Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention 4 , environmental NGOs must be able to challenge substantive and procedural legality of environmental decisions. The Convention is an integral part of the EU legal order and binding on Member States under Article 216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 5 . The Court of Justice of the EU, which under Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 258 of the TFEU is competent to rule on Member States’ compliance with their obligations under the Treaties, confirmed that FMPs fall under Article 9(2) of the Convention 6 . On 2 March 2023, the Court found Poland in breach of its obligations to ensure appropriate access to justice for FMPs 7 . Under Article 260 of the TFEU, the Commission is competent to ensure that rulings of the Court are complied with. The Commission is monitoring the state of the implementation of this ruling by Poland. It is within Poland’s discretion to design the modalities for appropriate access to justice and judicial review of FMPs within the Polish legal system, but this must be in line with the objective of ‘wide access to justice’ to the public concerned 8 . 1 https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/search-infringementdecisions/?langCode=EN&version=v1&typeOfSearch=byDecision&page=1&size=10&order=desc&sortColumn s=decisionDate&refId=INFR(2018)2208. 2 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50. 3 Judgment of 17 April 2018 in Case C-441/17, Białowieża, ECLI:EU:C:2018:255, para. 124. 4 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/law-and-governance/aarhus_en. 5 Judgment of 8 November 2016 in Case C‑243/15, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, EU:EU:C:2016:838, para. 45. 6 Judgment of 2 March 2023 in Case C-432/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:139. 7 Ibidem, paras. 171-173. 8 Ibidem para. 174.”
  Management of EU forests · Environmental crimes and justice
• 2026-01-05 “E-000014/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission As enshrined in Articles 2 and 10 of the Treaty on European Union, democracy is a founding value on which the EU is built. The Commission, together with all other EU institutions and the Member States, is responsible under the Treaties for promoting the founding values of the EU, including democracy. Free and fair elections are at the core of democracy. The conduct and organisation of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their constitutional and legislative rules, subject to EU law and their international obligations. For elections to the European Parliament, certain common principles are set out in the European Electoral Act 1 , in line with Article 223(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Political Advertising Regulation 2 and the Digital Services Act 3 have been adopted on the basis of Article 114 and Article 16 TFEU, and Article 114 TFEU respectively, in full respect of the allocation of competences between the EU and Member States. They do not regulate elections. Instead, they establish common standards within the internal market for ensuring the transparency of political advertising and, respectively, for ensuring that online platforms and search engines put in place measures to mitigate risks related to negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes. The Commission is fully committed and actively engaged to help Member States in their efforts to ensure the fairness and integrity of elections, including by supporting the application of this legislation. The Council 4 also stressed the importance of maximising the use of EU tools, including the Political Advertising Regulation and the Digital Services Act, to safeguard free and fair elections in the EU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A41976X1008%2801%29&qid=1746537901793. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 4 Council conclusions on democratic resilience: safeguarding electoral processes from foreign interference approved on 21 May 2024 (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10119-2024-INIT/en/pdf).”
  EU political integration · Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
• 2026-01-05 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 18.3.2026 Written question There are no comparable EU-level statistics available on the number of age assessment procedures carried out in the Member States and their outcomes. Regulation (EU) 862/2007 on statistics on migration and international protection [1] , as amended in June 2020 [2] , does not require Member States to report such data. Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 [3] provides that, where there are doubts as to whether or not an applicant is a minor, the determining authority may undertake a multi-disciplinary assessment, including a psychosocial assessment, which should be carried out by qualified professionals and should not be based solely on the applicant’s physical appearance or behaviour. The multi-disciplinary assessment should be carried out in a manner that gives primary consideration to the best interests of the child. When inconclusive, it may be followed with a medical examination, to be carried out with full respect for the individual’s dignity. The results from the medical examination and the multi-disciplinary assessment should be analysed together. Where the result of the age assessment is not conclusive or includes an age-range starting from below 18 years, Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 requires Member States to assume that the applicant is a minor. The Asylum and Migration Management Strategy [4] emphasises the importance of deploying and using new technologies, including AI tools, to provide Member States with modern, secure and efficient tools to improve the quality, consistency and timeliness of decision making. In line with the existing regulatory requirements, the Commission plans to set up a Forum for AI on Migration to identify the possible uses of AI. [1] Regulation (EC) 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers ( OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, pp. 23-29 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32007R0862). [2] Consolidated text: Regulation (EC) 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2007/862/2021-07-01/eng. [3] Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive (EU) 2013/32 (OJ L, 2024/1348, 22.5.2024. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1767349209985&uri=CELEX%3A32024R1348). [4] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/european-asylum-and-migration-management-strategy_en.”
  Asylum & border control · Privacy & law enforcement
• 2026-01-05 “Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission 27.3.2026 Written question EU funding is awarded based on clear eligibility, exclusion, selection and award criteria. The award of EU funds is conditional on the absence of any exclusion grounds laid down in Article 138 of the Financial Regulation [1] , including where an applicant for a grant has engaged in activities contrary to the EU founding values [2] , fraud, criminal organisation, terrorist offences and related activities, etc. Before award and during the implementation of a grant, as well as before disbursing payments, participants and recipients of EU funds and their affiliates are systematically checked against the Early Detection and Exclusion System database of the Commission which contains a list of all excluded persons and entities. Moreover, Article 14 of the Commission’s horizontal model grant agreement [3] requires beneficiaries to respect EU values. The Commission will act immediately on evidence of non-compliance by implementing appropriate measures against unreliable entities, such as the suspension of contract or payments, contract termination, recovery or exclusion from EU financing. All entities receiving or implementing EU funds are verified to ensure that they are not subject to the EU sanctions [4] . Any entity sanctioned by such measures is prohibited from receiving or implementing EU funds. For participation in sensitive actions (e.g. defence, space, cybersecurity), entities, including non-governmental organisations, are furthermore subject to the full set of measures in place to protect security or public order of the EU and its Member States. Under Article 136 of the Financial Regulation, or other security restrictions under sectoral basic acts (e.g. Article 22(5) Horizon Europe Framework Programme [5] ), entities may be subject to ownership/control assessments, facility restrictions, security clearances and other appropriate measures. [1] Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26 September 2024, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng. [2] These values are enshrined in Article 2 Treaty on the European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF). [3] For the Multiannual financial framework 2021-2027, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.LI.2020.433.01.0011.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2020%3A433I%3ATOC. [4] Article 215 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0695.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Regulation of NGOs in Europe
• 2025-10-01 “E-003836/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission First of all, it should be recalled that the European Investment Bank (EIB) is the EU multilateral development bank which is owned by the 27 Member States who are its shareholders. The EIB thus has its own governing structures in place and it is governed by its own statute and internal rules, including Code of Conduct. Secondly, when entrusting EU funding under indirect management, the Commission relies on EIB systems, rules and procedures which have been pillar assessed pursuant to Article 157 of the Financial Regulation. The assessment includes the respect of integrity and ethical values (i.e. code of conduct and procedures to deal with possible conflicts of interest at management level) as part of an effective and efficient internal control system. The members of the management committee of the EIB, referred to in the question by the Honourable Member, are subject to a Code of Conduct 1 of the EIB. It provides, inter alia¸ rules for different kinds of conflict of interest situations, including a cooling-off period of 24 months after the employment at the EIB (see in particular Article 6.2 of the Code of Conduct). According to this Code of Conduct, former members of the management committee are entitled to perform profitable occupational activities with any other entity unless these would raise conflicts of interest and reputational risks for the EIB, which could not be duly mitigated. The Code of Conduct also contains detailed rules on procedure to be followed by former members of the management committee regarding employment during the cooling-off period. Against this background, a prior approval by the Ethics and Compliance Committee is required, unless the future employment falls under certain specific categories defined in the Code of Conduct. Even in the latter case, information to the Chair of the Ethics and Compliance Committee is required. 1 Code of Conduct of the Management Committee https://www.eib.org/files/publications/code_of_conduct_mc_en.pdf.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-09-29 “E-003783/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The energy cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan significantly contributes to achieving the EU's objective, as outlined in the REPowerEU plan, to eliminate dependency on Russian fossil fuel imports, including natural gas. Since 2021, gas supplies from Azerbaijan to the EU through the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) have increased by over 40%. Importantly, the SGC is exclusively connected to Azerbaijani gas fields and not integrated with the broader Azerbaijani national gas system. Consequently, it does not facilitate the transportation of Russian gas to the EU. Furthermore, Azerbaijan imported less than 1 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Russia for domestic consumption in 2023. These imports decreased sharply in 2024 and 2025. In contrast, Azerbaijan's total natural gas exports exceeded 25 billion cubic meters in 2024, with approximately half destined for the EU market. The difference in these volumes highlights the distinct magnitudes involved. The EU continues to actively support lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is crucial that both countries continue to make progress on their path towards full-fledged normalisation of relations. In this context, the EU strongly commends both sides for the initialling of their bilateral peace treaty on 8 August 2025 in Washington, DC, marking a significant breakthrough to end decades of conflict. The EU stands ready to help implementing the Washington agreements 1 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/08/armeniaazerbaijan-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-initialling-of-the-armenia-azerbaijan-peace-treaty/.”
  Natural gas · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2025-09-24 “E-003720/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. Any amendment to the EU Treaties needs to follow the procedures laid down in those same Treaties. Modifications of the EU Treaties would have to follow the various steps in the ordinary or simplified revision procedure laid down in Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), both of which require ratification by all Member States, in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Under Article 48(6) TEU, the simplified procedure is limited to ‘all or part of the provisions of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union relating to internal policies and actions of the Union’. The simplified revision procedure may not increase the competences conferred by the Treaties on the Union. 2. The Commission is committed to the subsidiarity principle and has made a subsidiarity assessment part of its Better Regulation agenda. The Commission supports national Parliaments in executing their role within the ‘Early Warning Mechanism’. It discounts the recess periods in August and at the end of the year in the calculation of the eight-week period for national Parliaments to submit reasoned opinions. It has revamped its portal on the opinions of national Parliaments and Commission’s replies to them. Moreover, it has committed to enhance the visibility of national Parliaments’ views by providing an aggregated response where a significant number of national Parliaments have raised similar concerns even where the threshold for a ‘yellow card’ is not attained 1 . The Commission will continue to engage with national Parliaments, facilitating their involvement in shaping EU policies. 1 As set out in the Communication ‘The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality: Strengthening their role in the EU’s policy making’, COM(2018) 703.”
  EU competences on health · EU competences on taxation · EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2025-09-24 “E-003699/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission Medicine shortages is a growing issue that poses a serious threat to patients and public health. Strengthening the availability of medicines has been high on the EU’s political agenda for years. The Commission has undertaken a number of actions to better understand the reasons for medicines shortages to be able to propose solutions. In April 2023, the Commission adopted the proposed reform of the pharmaceutical legislation 1 . This reform introduces several regulatory measures to prevent and mitigate critical shortages through EU coordinated actions, and to strengthen the security of supply of critical medicines in the EU. The proposal for a Critical Medicines Act 2 , adopted in March 2025, provides a complementary toolbox to address underlying supply chain vulnerabilities, reduce EU dependencies and support the diversification of supply chains. Both proposals aim to address many of the remaining challenges highlighted in the special report 3 . As these proposals are currently under consideration by the co-legislators, their potential impacts have not yet materialised and could thus not be assessed by the European Court of Auditors. At the same time, Member States remain responsible for the supervision of the supply of medicines on their territory. To the extent that EU-level action is needed to ensure an effective response to cross-border challenges and to avoid uncoordinated Member States efforts that may undermine the functioning of the internal market, the EU has proposed the mentioned tools to bring more structural support to the security of supply of critical medicines at EU level. 1 COM/2023/193 final and COM/2023/192 final. 2 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL laying a framework for strengthening the availability and security of supply of critical medicinal products as well as the availability of, and accessibility of, medicinal products of common interest and amending Regulation (EU) 2024/795. 3 https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2025-19/SR-2025-19_EN.pdf.”
  Pharmaceuticals regulation in EU · EU competences on health · Government stockpiling of critical medicines
• 2025-09-23 “E-003690/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission Proposal for a Regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse 1 (the Proposal) relies on a thorough and publicly available impact assessment 2 . The provisions on detection orders included in the Proposal are targeted and are issued by a judicial or independent administrative authority balancing all the rights at stake and after a thorough assessment of their necessity and proportionality. The Proposal includes safeguards that ensure a fair balance in the protection of all fundamental rights impacted. The Commission will continue supporting the Council of the EU and the European Parliament in the interinstitutional negotiations to ensure that the final set of safeguards enables a fair balance in the protection of all fundamental rights impacted. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52022PC0209. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022SC0209.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse · Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2025-09-22 “E-003657/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission supports artificial intelligence (AI) innovation in Europe and has adopted several initiatives to support the development and scaling of AI startups in Europe. In April 2025, the AI Continent Action Plan 1 was adopted. It links different AI initiatives relating to data, skills and infrastructure such as the financial support of the AI Factories 2 and upcoming AI Gigafactories 3 , which are accessible to European AI startups. At the same time, the Commission organised a high-level round table on AI innovation where representatives of several AI startups, including Mistral AI, participated. Furthermore, the European Innovation Council and the GenAI4EU 4 initiative provide various funding programs; and under the InvestEU programme 5 , the EU is de-risking investments and financing operations by Financial Institutions and National Promotional Banks into European AI start-ups 6 . In May 2025, the Commission adopted the EU Startup and Scaleup Strategy 7 which further supports European AI startups and scaleups, including by facilitating access to venture capital and growth funding 8 . The strategy includes the Scaleup Europe Fund, which will mobilise significant private funds and make direct equity investments in strategic sectors. In this regard, Member States have full autonomy. The Commission welcomes similar national initiatives to fund critical technologies, infrastructures and research that contribute to Europe’s technological sovereignty respecting the EU rules and a level playing field. 1 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/ai-continent-action-plan. 2 https://eurohpc-ju.europa.eu/ai-factories_en. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-factories. 4 The GenAI4EU initiative supports bringing transformative AI-driven solutions to the market and under the Digital Europe Programme, the Commission called for proposals to fund scalable generative AI pilot projects for public administrations based on European AI models. https://eic.ec.europa.eu/eic-funding-opportunities/eicaccelerator/eic-accelerator-challenges-2025/genai4eu-creating-european-champions-generative-ai_en. 5 https://investeu.europa.eu/investeu-programme_en. 6 https://investeu.europa.eu/investeu-and-europe-fit-digital-age_en. 7 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/strategy-research-and-innovation/jobs-and-economy/eustartup-and-scaleup-strategy_en. 8 The key actions in this area include the deployment of the Scaleup Europe Fund, the expansion and simplification of the European Innovation Council (EIC), and the development of the European Innovation Investment Pact.”
  Artificial Intelligence · EU digital & tech sovereignty · EU industrial funding
• 2025-09-17 “P-003602/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission refers the Honourable Member to its reply to question E-000584/2025 1 . As explained in its reply, the Commission is taking determined steps to respond to the unacceptable acts of violence against Christian believers as well as places of worship. The Commission is committed to pursue its action to address the safety of places of worship and to monitor hatred based on religion, including against Christians. As regards the situation of Christians outside the EU, the Commission is in the process of appointing a new Special Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU who will be tasked with addressing violations of freedom of religion or belief and religious persecution, with a particular focus on religious minorities, including Christians. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-000584_EN.html.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU-Congo (DRC) relations
• 2025-08-26 “E-003293/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The European Citizens’ initiative (ECI) is a unique participatory democracy tool. Since its launch in 2012, the ECIs have allowed citizens to become more engaged in the EU policy-making process, influencing the agenda-setting of the European institutions. ECIs triggered laws such as the recast Drinking Water Directive 1 or the Regulation on food chain transparency 2 . In other cases, the Commission proposed non-legislative measures, such as improved implementation of existing legislative acts (for instance in the case of the ECI ‘Minority Safepack’) or preparatory work before a final decision on legislative follow-up is made (related impact assessment for the ECI ‘Stop Finning – Stop the Trade’ or a scientific opinion on the welfare of animals farmed for fur in case of ‘Fur Free Europe’ ECI). Citizens continue to successfully campaign for their initiatives, with four ECIs collecting over 1 million signatures in 2025. In line with its obligations under the ECI Regulation 3 , the Commission thoroughly assesses each valid ECI and explains added value of legislative intervention. The reasons for taking or not taking legislative action are clearly specified in this communication. Since 2018, the Commission has been running a multilingual communication campaign, online and offline, with local promotions in the Member States. The campaign focuses on young people – for example, offering an educational toolkit for schools 4 . The Commission will continue its awareness-raising efforts, working with the other EU institutions and bodies, and institutions and organisations at national level. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2020/2184/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1381/oj/eng. 3 Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/788/oj/eng. 4 https://citizens-initiative.europa.eu/schools/eci-educational-toolkit_en.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU engagement with citizens
• 2025-08-26 “E-003292/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission does not agree as trilateral legislative negotiations (‘trilogues’) are already covered by a framework of binding rules and established practices, such as the Joint declaration on practical arrangements for the codecision procedure 1 , the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making 2 and the European Parliament’s own Rules of Procedure 3 , which together make for a transparent and efficient legislative process. 2. Arrangements for the legislative process are primarily a matter for the co-legislators, the European Parliament and the Council. The Commission’s negotiating mandate is its proposal, which is a public document. The European Parliament’s negotiating mandate is public and subject to approval by the plenary session. The Council’s negotiating mandate is also generally made public. During the course of trilogues, there is regular public reporting on the progress of negotiations in the relevant parliamentary committee. Provisional agreements are always made public ahead of the public vote in the European Parliament. The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission have recently set up the EU Law Tracker 4 , which gathers in one place all the publicly available information on ongoing legislative files, making it easier for the general public to follow developments. The Commission would not object if the European Parliament and the Council decided to publish additional information, such as indicative timetables for trilogues or, after a trilogue, summary agendas showing the topics discussed. 3. The Commission therefore sees no need for new laws to further codify the rules relating to legislative negotiations. 1 OJ C 145, 30.6.2007, pp. 5–9. 2 OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, pp. 1–14. 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RULES-10-2024-07-16-TOC_EN.html. 4 https://law-tracker.europa.eu/homepage?lang=en.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-08-08 “E-003219/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. Under the principle of conferral, set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the EU shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it in the Treaties, while competences not conferred on the EU remain with the Member States. Since its formalisation in the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission is not aware of any case in which the Court of Justice of the European Union has found the principle of conferral to be breached by EU institutions. 2. The Commission is committed to the application of the subsidiarity principle and has made a subsidiarity check part of its Better Regulation agenda. The Commission also reinforced its public consultations and political dialogue with national Parliaments to facilitate their input to the Commission’s initiatives allowing for better alignment with national priorities and concerns. The Commission improved its portal publishing the opinions of national Parliaments and the Commission’s replies equipping it with better search possibilities as acknowledged in the relevant European Parliament draft report 1 . 3. The Commission recalls that the European Parliament adopted a resolution on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties on 22 November 2023, triggering the treaty revision process in Article 48 TEU. The Commission stands ready to play its institutional role in the procedure set out in Article 48 TEU, and in particular to give its opinion if and when consulted by the European Council. 1 Draft report on the application of the Treaty provisions related to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/en/procedure-file?reference=2025/2042(INI).”
  EU political integration
• 2025-08-08 “E-003218/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. Article 12 of the Treaty on European Union and Protocols 1 and 2 attached to the Treaties clearly define national Parliaments' competence in the European governance. 2.The Commission believes that national Parliaments’ subsidiarity checks of legislative proposals are crucial for EU decision-making and considers that their effectiveness is not just measured by the number of reasoned opinions or yellow or orange cards. Beyond reasoned opinions, numerous opinions under the political dialogue with the Commission covered proposals subject to the subsidiarity control mechanism and concluded that the legislative proposals complied with the principle of subsidiarity. Today, many national Parliaments engage earlier and more strategically on EU policies, as reflected in the intensifying feedback on the Commission Work Programme or other strategic policy documents. 3.The Commission is committed to the application of the subsidiarity principle and has made a subsidiarity assessment part of its Better Regulation agenda. A subsidiarity grid accompanies legislative proposals with impact assessment. The Commission also reinforced its public consultations and political dialogue with national Parliaments to facilitate their input to the Commission’s initiatives allowing for better alignment with national priorities and concerns. The Commission improved its portal publishing the opinions of national Parliaments and the Commission’s replies, equipping it with better search possibilities as acknowledged in the relevant European Parliament draft report 1 . The Commission will continue to engage with national Parliaments, facilitating their involvement in shaping EU policies. 1 Draft report on the application of the Treaty provisions related to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/en/procedure-file?reference=2025/2042(INI).”
  EU political integration
• 2025-07-29 “E-003131/2025 Reply The listing of a person, group or entity under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (CP 931) has to satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 1(2) to (4) thereof. These paragraphs set out a definition of persons, groups and entities ‘involved in terrorist acts’ and a definition of ‘terrorist acts’ for this purpose, and specify the requirements related to the adoption of a decision by a national competent authority in respect of the persons, groups and entities concerned. The Muslim Brotherhood is not included in the list of persons, groups and entities covered by the measures in Articles 2 and 3 of CP 931. The Council has not discussed the matter raised by the Honourable Member.”
  EU policy on Islam
• 2025-07-04 “P-002740/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 1. Under the EU-Algeria multiannual indicative programme 1 (MIP) 2021–2027, the EU allocated EUR 172 million between 2021 and 2024 to support mutually agreed priorities. For the period 2025–2027, an indicative amount of EUR 45 million per year has been planned, in line with the allocations of the previous period. 2. Upholding human rights is enshrined in the EU-Algeria Association Agreement 2 and thus represents a key element of EU-Algeria relations. On this basis, the EU has consistently raised the cases of Mr Boualem Sansal and Mr Christophe Gleizes with the Algerian authorities. The High Representative/Vice-President personally addressed both matters with her counterpart. The EU remains firmly committed to pursuing all efforts aimed at securing the prompt release of Mr Sansal and Mr Gleizes. 3. EU financial cooperation with Algeria does not involve direct transfers of funds to the Algerian public authorities. It supports projects of common interest that are implemented by international organisations, European public agencies, development actors, private operators and civil society organisations. These projects aim to accompany Algeria’s economic and social development in line with shared values and the broader objective of a stable and prosperous neighbourhood. The Commission continuously monitors its cooperation to ensure it is consistent with EU principles and interests. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/18c0dcae-9074-40e0-a8ca-765abb44b281_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2005/690/oj/eng.”
  EU-Algeria relations
• 2025-06-02 “E-002197/2025 Answer given by Mr Micallef on behalf of the European Commission According to Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU shall contribute to the promotion of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and promoting the common cultural heritage. The EU’s action aims to encourage cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, support and supplement their actions. Through initiatives such as the Creative Europe programme, the European Capitals of Culture, the European Heritage Label, as well as several EU Cultural Prizes, the Commission aims to nurture cultural diversity and allow for exchange, cooperation, and scalability. Erasmus+ 1 and Creative Europe 2 have been funding numerous projects that promote linguistic diversity, including regional and minority languages 3 . Policy cooperation on culture at EU level aims not to replace national cultural policies but to support and enhance them by addressing common and/or cross-border challenges in full respect of the subsidiarity principle. Cultural policy cooperation is based on common priorities and actions identified by EU Member States in the multiannual EU Work Plans for Culture. 1 https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/https:/erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/. 2 https://culture.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/creative-europe-culture-strand. 3 Some examples can be found in the publication ‘Linguistic diversity in the European Union’: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d325c589-011a-11ef-a251-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.”
  EU political integration · Role of education (social change vs. tradition)
• 2025-06-02 “E-002198/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Interinstitutional agreements are an important tool for ensuring efficient and constructive cooperation between the EU institutions. The Commission would like to clarify that the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making 1 , which the Honourable Member refers to, dates back to 2016 and provides a general framework for all EU law-making. Principles outlined therein applies to all new legislative and non-legislative initiatives adopted by the Commission. Interinstitutional agreements do not weaken the role of national Parliaments, including when it comes to the shaping of European policies. In areas of shared competence, the Treaties grant national Parliaments the power to scrutinise legislative proposals tabled by the Commission in order to assess whether they are in line with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. In light of input received from national Parliaments under this control mechanism, the Commission may be required to review its proposal. Moreover, the Commission has established a political dialogue with national Parliaments to facilitate their participation in EU policy-making and raise awareness about their views on Commission initiatives. This includes written replies, visits and meetings. For example, since the beginning of the current mandate, Members of the Commission have had 84 meetings (81 of them inperson) with national parliaments. The Commission ensures that all its initiatives, including those related to the European Green Deal, are subject to the regular democratic scrutiny and consultation processes. The European Parliament, as a co-legislator, plays a crucial role in shaping EU policies, and national Parliaments are involved in the policy-making process through the subsidiarity control and political dialogue with the Commission. The Commission will continue to engage with national Parliaments, ensuring their effective involvement in shaping European policies. 1 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making, OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1.”
  EU political integration · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-06-02 “E-002200/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The revised enlargement methodology provides for an even stronger focus on fundamental reforms in negotiations on accession to the EU. Credible and irreversible reforms in the policy areas belonging to the ‘fundamentals cluster’ (cluster 1 of the EU acquis communautaire), including democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, determine the progress made on the accession path. Negotiations start and end with these fundamental values. In the context of enlargement negotiations, the Commission proposes and the Council sets benchmarks in these areas for each country. The Commission assesses the state of play and progress on reforms, including in the fundamentals cluster, in its annual Enlargement Package. The package contains detailed analysis of developments in these areas as well as tailor-made recommendations to the countries. In addition, the sixth edition of the Rule of Law report was adopted on 8 July 2025 1 that along all Member States include also country chapters on four enlargement countries, namely Albania, Montenegro, North-Macedonia, and Serbia. Their inclusion will support these countries’ reforms efforts and progress on democracy and rule of law ahead of the accession, and to guarantee that high standards will continue after the accession. In case of serious or prolonged stagnation or backsliding in reform implementation in the fundamentals cluster, or in a situation where progress under the fundamentals cluster lags progress in other areas, the Commission stands ready to take appropriate action. The decision to suspend accession negotiations ultimately rests in the hands of the Member States. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2025-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Ukraine relations · EU enlargement
• 2025-06-02 “E-002195/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission According to Article 48(6) Treaty on European Union (TEU) any decisions taken by the European Council to amend the Treaties under the simplified revision procedure are taken by unanimity and can only enter into force if and when approved by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The EU does not have any competence to launch public consultations via referenda in the Member States. It is for the Member States to decide when to hold a referendum on any given topic, in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Any amendment to the EU Treaties needs to follow the procedures laid down in those same Treaties. In that regard, modifications of the EU Treaties would have to follow the various steps in the ordinary or simplified revision procedure laid down in Article 48 TEU, both of which require ratification by all Member States, in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.”
  EU engagement with citizens · EU political integration
• 2025-06-02 “E-002196/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission As the Commission indicated in its Communication on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews of March 2024 1 , the precise financial impact of enlargement will primarily depend on its timing and scope, on the result of the accession negotiations, which remain merit-based, and on the applicable EU acquis at the moment of accession. Since the 2022 Conference on the Future of Europe, there have been reflections ongoing on EU institutional reform. With the prospect of enlargement, this debate has gained prominence. The Political Guidelines 2024-2029 2 acknowledge the need to ensure that the EU as well as future Member States should be ready at the time of accession, and that work to prepare both should run in parallel. While the Commission has indicated its support to Treaty change if and where it is needed, it believes that the EU’s governance can be swiftly improved by fully harnessing the potential of the current Treaties. Decisions to reform EU institutions lie with the Member States. As laid down in Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, the decision to admit a new Member State requires the unanimous agreement of Member States’ representatives in the Council and an agreement between the Member States and the new Member State that needs to be ratified by all the contracting states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 1 COM(2024) 146 final. 2 European Commission: Directorate-General for Communication and Leyen, U. v. d., Europe’s choice – Political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024−2029, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2775/260104.”
  EU enlargement · EU-Ukraine relations · EU-Moldova relations
• 2025-05-28 “E-002149/2025 Reply The EU lifted its economic sanctions on Syria to support its inclusive political transition, as well as its swift economic recovery, reconstruction, and stabilisation, in line with a gradual and reversible approach. The EU maintained sanctions related to the Assad regime in line with its call for accountability as well as sanctions based on security grounds, including arms and technology that might be used for internal repression. The Council has assessed that, despite the fall of the al-Assad regime and the establishment of the transitional authorities, the situation in Syria remains unstable and al-Assad’s network, spread inside and outside Syria, has not yet been held accountable and cannot be considered dissolved. Since listed individuals and entities linked to the al-Assad regime continue to hold powerful influential roles and pose a risk of supporting, through financing or other means, further armed conflict, and may play a part in attempts to reverse the transition and, they may continue to be sanctioned. The EU has also introduced additional sanctions against human rights violators and those fuelling instability in Syria. The Council will continue monitoring developments on the ground, including progress on accountability with regard to recent violence outbreaks, and the Council will remain seized on the matter of restrictive measures and sanctions in the context of Syria 1 . The Council approved on 23 June 2025 conclusions on Syria 2 , reaffirming the EU’s commitment to standing with the Syrian people, regardless of their ethnic or religious background and to supporting a peaceful and inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned transition. All Syrians should have the chance to finally reunify, stabilise and rebuild their country, restore justice and ensure accountability. The European Union also welcomed the commitment by Interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa and the transitional government to build a new Syria based on national reconciliation, rule of law, separation of powers, as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms for all Syrians without distinction, fully safeguarding the diversity of the country. 1 Council statement of 20 May 2025 on the lifting of EU economic sanctions on Syria; https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9176-2025-INIT/en/pdf. 2 Council conclusions of 23 June 2025 on Syria; https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10688-2025-INIT/en/pdf.”
  EU-Syria relations
• 2025-05-21 “P-002053/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The organisation and conduct of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional rules and legislation, as well as their international obligations and applicable EU law. National authorities and courts are primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with the applicable rules. On 22 May 2025, the Romanian’s Constitutional Court formally validated the outcome of the 2025 Romanian Presidential elections. The Commission does not intervene in the organisation and conduct of elections. The Commission supports Member States on electoral matters, mainly through the framework of the European cooperation network on elections 1 , which hosts exchanges among competent authorities, for instance on good practices to support turnout. The Commission is also working with Member States to support the application of EU law provisions relevant in national electoral contexts, such as those in the Digital Services Act 2 , the Regulation 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising 3 (which will apply in full from October 2025), the General Data Protection Regulation 4 and the Artificial Intelligence Act 5 . These measures help ensure fundamental rights, including data protection, freedom of expression and information. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/democracy-eucitizenship-anti-corruption/democracy-and-electoral-rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065. In 2024, the Commission issued Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024XC03014&qid=1714466886277. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-04-23 “E-001634/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission refers to its replies to the European Court of Auditor’s (ECA) Special Report 11/2025 1 , mentioning that ‘carrying out an economic activity is compatible with the nature of a non-governmental organisation (NGO), for as long as any profits it generates from its activities are not distributed to its members’. The Commission will explore how to take into consideration the NGO status when an entity is pursuing its members’ commercial interests. This aspect is not part of the NGO definition agreed by the Council and the European Parliament in the Financial Regulation (FR) 2 . The need to indicate in direct- management- grant applications whether the entity is an NGO came into effect with the FR recast. To receive EU funding, NGOs must fulfil the same eligibility requirements as other applicants. Being an NGO is no eligibility criterion in itself, aside from a few, very specific cases. The Commission discloses information on recipients of funds financed from the budget in direct management through the Financial Transparency System (FTS) 3 These publications are aligned with the EU's consolidated annual accounts, which are audited by ECA. The Commission refers to point 2, section III of its replies to the ECA observations. Article 38 of the FR indicates the requirements for publishing information about recipients and does not require the disclosure of advocacy activities funded through grant agreements. The Commission also shares objectives and outcomes of funded projects on the EU Funding & Tenders Portal 4 . Interest representatives that register in the Transparency Register 5 as not representing commercial interests, which would typically include NGOs, must report their lobbying activities and declare their main sources of funding as well as the amount of each contribution above EUR 10,000 exceeding 10% of their total budget and the name of the contributor. The Commission notes ECA's recognition that, based on their sample, interest representatives were correctly registered in the Transparency Register 6 . 1 https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECAReplies/COM-Replies-SR-2025-11/COM-Replies-SR-2025-11_EN.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html. The annual publications are based on Article 38 of the Financial Regulation (OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1–239), and in accordance with the third paragraph of the article, information on recipients is not disclosed in specific cases outlined therein. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home. 5 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en. 6 See paragraph 50 of the ECA report (see footnote 1).”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-04-16 “P-001563/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission The European Research Council (ERC) has funded since 2007 more than 17 000 projects and over 10 000 researchers, across physical sciences and engineering, life sciences, social sciences and humanities 1 . This led to over 2 200 patents and other Intellectual Property Rights applications. More than 200 000 articles were published in scientific journals and the ERC grantees have been awarded with 14 Nobel Prizes, 7 Fields Medals, 11 Wolf Prizes and dozens of important prizes. This project is a ERC grant funded through Horizon 2020, the EU's research and innovation funding programme from 2014-2020. The project was selected through a rigorous peer review process involving top researchers from around the world. ERC grants support pioneering research that push the frontiers of knowledge and have the potential to make significant scientific breakthroughs. The sole criterion for funding is the scientific excellence of the proposal 2 . The project explores the complex historical interactions between Europe and the Islamic world by studying how the Qur'an has been translated, interpreted and used in Europe from the 12 th to the 19 th centuries. It wanted to understand the continent's broader intellectual, religious and cultural history, foundational to European values 3 . Grant proposals are evaluated by independent top scientists. Any proposal that provides a ground-breaking internationally competitive approach can be funded if it meets the ERC’s criterion for scientific excellence. All projects funded by the ERC can be found in the ERC database 4 or CORDIS 5 . 1 Within the social sciences and humanities projects which represent around a fourth of ERC grants, topics span an extensive range of disciplines, including economics and finance, law and political science, sociology, psychology and linguistics, literature and philosophy, history and archaeology, geography and environmental studies, anthropology, arts and cultural and religious studies – the category in which falls the mentioned project. 2 For more details on the applicable evaluation procedure and criteria, please consult the ERC work programme 2018-2020, Commission C(2017) 5307 of 2 August 2017: https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2018_2020/erc/h2020-wp18-erc_en.pdf. 3 For an overview of the project’s results, please consult https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/810141/results. 4 https://erc.europa.eu/projects-statistics. 5 https://cordis.europa.eu/.”
  EU policy on Islam · EU research funding
• 2025-03-27 “E-001300/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU continues to call for an end of violence across Syria and urges all parties to protect all Syrians from all backgrounds without discrimination. The EU, gravely alarmed by the violence in Syria’s coastal region, issued a statement strongly condemning the horrific crimes committed against civilians 1 . It also called for a swift, transparent and impartial investigation to ensure perpetrators are brought to justice and to prevent any such crimes from happening again and welcomed the commitments made by the transitional authorities, particularly the establishment of an investigative committee. The EU remains attentive to the actions of the new authorities in ensuring the protection of all Syrians without any kind of discrimination and consistently supports an inclusive, peaceful, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political transition grounded in the respect for international law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, pluralism and tolerance among all components of society. It continues to be a staunch supporter of accountability mechanisms working on Syria. The EU’s current approach, in terms of non-humanitarian assistance, is gradual and conditional to the steps taken by the transition government. Such EU assistance provided follows strict implementation parameters and is subjected to extensive monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, including third party monitoring and risk assessments. The EU delivers humanitarian assistance through pre-certified partners in all parts of Syria without discrimination, based on people’s needs, humanitarian principles, accountability to affected populations, transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/pdf/.”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · EU-Syria relations
• 2025-03-12 “E-001057/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission In line with the Article 194 of the European Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, Union policy ensure the functioning of the energy market. On this basis, the Electricity Regulation 1 and Directive 2 lay down the principles for the European electricity market. The Internal Energy Market and the integration of European electricity markets already benefit consumers by around EUR 34 billion every year 3 . It enables Member States to rely on neighbouring Member States to meet demand and ensure security of supply. The design of short-term markets through market coupling also ensures that the cheapest and cleanest technologies are used first, that interconnections are used in the most optimal way, and that all Member States can rely on imports in times of scarcity. The internal energy market is a protection against country-specific shocks, as the recent crisis has demonstrated. Withdrawal of a Member State from only the European electricity market would be incompatible with current internal market rules and the EU treaties. The EU agreed on a reform 4 of the European electricity market design to stabilise the prices of electricity supply, lower the impact of gas prices and ensure the reaping of the benefits from decarbonised electricity. As part of the Clean Industrial Deal, the Commission adopted an Action Plan for affordable Energy 5 , which outlines the importance of further unlocking the value of our Energy Union by taking steps towards a fully integrated energy market supported by an interconnected and digitalised network. Further integration of the European internal energy market could increase the benefits to up to EUR 40-43 billion per year by 2030. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/943/oj/eng 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/944/oj/eng 3 ACER’s final assessment of the EU wholesale electricity market design, April 2022 (https://www.acer.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Publications/Final_Assessment_EU_Wholesale_Electr icity_Market_Design.pdf) 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401747 and https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401711 5 Action Plan for Affordable Energy, COM(2025)79 final.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration · EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2025-02-13 “P-000688/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The European Platform on Combatting Homelessness provides support to Member States to design and implement effective national homelessness strategies 1 . In December 2024, a Policy Toolkit to Combat Homelessness prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with the financial support of the Commission was launched. Since the launch of the Platform in 2021, around half of the Member States have designed or revised national homelessness strategies, in line with the guidelines and knowledge developed by the Platform. The monitoring and evaluation of these strategies will be the focus of the future EU work on homelessness 2 . Various EU programmes and instruments are already available for Member States to support social and affordable housing, though no assessment regarding their impact along citizenship status of beneficiaries is available 3 . To assist Member States in harnessing the available EU funding opportunities, the Commission also published a toolkit 4 . The Commission also co-chairs with the Council of Europe Development Bank a working group on access to finance. The aim is to map available funding options, to build capacity and enhance the expertise of project promoters and to support the development of projects to combat homelessness, including social/affordable housing and social support services. The Commission will put forward a European Affordable Housing Plan to address structural drivers of the housing crisis. The policies to combat homelessness will be a component of this Plan and the first-ever EU Anti-Poverty Strategy. In the context of these initiatives, the 1 See for example the EU-funded policy toolkit developed by the OECD in support of the Platform (https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-toolkit-to-combat-homelessness_0fec780e-en.html). 2 A second EU-funded project with the OECD that started on 1 February 2025 will focus on the ‘Implementation of homelessness and housing exclusion strategies: monitoring and evaluation’. 3 Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRP) include measures worth at least an estimated EUR 21.3 billion that contribute to social housing and other social infrastructure for social inclusion purposes alone. In addition, the RRPs also cover measures promoting affordable housing. (Estimated expenditure is based on the pillar tagging methodology for the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard and corresponds to the measures allocated to the policy area ’Social housing and other social infrastructures’ as primary or secondary policy area.). The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) focuses on the provision and improvement of physical housing infrastructure, including through energy efficiency measures. EUR 10.4 billion in total investment is planned, involving an EU budget contribution of EUR 7.5 billion (from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), Cohesion Fund (CF) and Just Transition Fund (JTF)). This support primarily focusses on energy efficiency measures to reduce energy costs. The InvestEU programme is mobilising public and private investments in affordable social housing. EUR 2.8 billion is earmarked for the Social Investments and skills window (including other priorities such as microfinance, social finance and social impact) and EUR 9.9 billion for the sustainable infrastructure window. The European Social Fund+ (ESF+) can support Member States in facilitating access to housing and promoting integrated services, in line with the European Pillar of Social Rights. An exact amount indicating the amount of the ESF+ funds allocated only to housing-related actions cannot be determined. Nevertheless, EUR 16.8 billion is programmed for access to services which can include housing, and more are still available from an envelope of EUR 45.6 billion envisaged for social inclusion. 4 Social Housing and beyond. https://european-social-fund-plus.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-launchestoolkit-support-social-housing-member-states”
  EU competences on social policies · EU housing policy
• 2025-02-12 “E-000658/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission Equalis received EUR 4 million in European funding from the European Social Fund (ESF) 1 between 2015 and 2022 (through the 2014-2020 French national programme) and EUR 1.14 million between 2022 and 2024 (through the FSE+ 2021-2027 French national programme). Equalis does not receive funding from the FSE+ regional programme of Île-deFrance. La Commission carried out a compliance audit on the FSE+ French national programme in 2021 with a view to providing reasonable assurance that the management and control systems of this programme were working effectively to prevent, detect and correct errors and irregularities, thereby guaranteeing the lawfulness and regularity of expenditure declared to the Commission. The audit conclusions were positive. However, it should be noted that the sample selected by the Commission auditors did not include any operations of which Equalis was the beneficiary. It is the Member States which are primarily responsible for the management and control of the structural funds. In the event of irregularities, the authorities must deduct the expenses in question from the amounts declared to the Commission (in the annual accounts). The Member State is responsible for recovering these amounts from the beneficiary. The Commission checks the control systems put in place by the Member States. In the event of significant weaknesses, the Commission can interrupt payments and request corrective measures such as financial corrections and measures aimed at improving the functioning of the management and control systems. 1 https://fse.be/”
  EU expenditure on social policy · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-02-12 “E-000657/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Delivering on the EU’s net greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 and the climate neutrality target by 2050 1 calls for ambitious action to ensure a swift decrease in emissions from all sectors, including transport. The revised CO 2 standards Regulation 2 sets targets which get more stringent over time, up to a 100% emission reduction for new cars and vans registered in the EU as of 2035. This gradual transition towards zero-emission mobility gives industry enough lead-time to develop an adequate compliance strategy. The 2025 target requiring a 15% reduction of emissions from the 2021 baseline was agreed by the co-legislators in 2019 and confirmed in 2023. Manufacturers may rely on various technologies to achieve this target, such as zero-emission and hybrid vehicles, or improvements of conventional vehicles. For manufacturers that may not be in a position to achieve target compliance on their own, the Regulation provides the option to pool with other manufacturers. Pooling is not mandatory, but is one option as part of manufacturers’ compliance strategy. As announced in the Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector 3 , on 1 April 2025 the Commission proposed a targeted amendment of the CO 2 emission standards, whereby the compliance would be assessed over the years of 2025, 2026 and 2027 instead of annually 4 . This will contribute to safeguarding industry’s capacity to invest, keeping the overall ambition of the 2025 targets. The Commission will also accelerate work on the preparation of the review of the Regulation. 1 Enshrined in the European Climate Law – http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/851/oj/eng 3 COM(2025) 95 final. 4 COM(2025) 136 final, 1.04.2025.”
  Climate efforts · EU Competition policy · Road transport environmental policy
• 2025-02-08 “E-000584/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to ensure that there is no place for hate based on religion in the EU. Through its policy instruments to address hate speech and hate crime, the Commission is addressing and monitoring closely the situation on hate based on religion within the EU, including against Christians. The Commission cooperates with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in the context of the Commission’s High Level Group 1 . The ODIHR provides regular data on hate crimes targeting Christians 2 . Places of worship have been targeted by acts of vandalism and terrorism in the EU, including Christian churches. Such acts are unacceptable and need to be prosecuted as hate crime by national authorities, who are solely responsible for investigations in the Member States. The Commission supports strengthening the protection of places of worship 3 4 . A quick guide to support the protection of places of worship has been published in 2021 5 to help assess the risks they face and implement measures that increase their protection, in particular against terrorism. Moreover, under the 2023 PROTECT call 6 of the Internal Security Fund 7 , the Commission will provide EUR 30 million of funding to support transnational and inter-religious projects conducting, among others, vulnerability assessments in places of worship and providing training to faith leaders and communities 8 . 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combattingdiscrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/combating-hate-speech-and-hate-crime_en#the-high-level-group-oncombating-hate-speech-and-hate-crime 2 see https://hatecrime.osce.org/ 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52023JC0051 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0612 5 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/whats-new/publications/eu-quick-guide-support-protection-placesworship_en#:~:text=This%20guide%20aims%20at%20helping%20smaller%20and%20mediumsized,altering%20the%20nature%20and%20purpose%20of%20the%20space 6 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/isf/wp-call/2023-2025/call-fiche_isf2024-tf2-ag-protect_en.pdf 7 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/internal-security-fund_en 8 https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/13598/36”
  EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination · EU policy on criminal justice
• 2025-02-04 “E-000479/2025 Reply The Council has not discussed the issue raised by the Honourable Member.”
  EU political integration
• 2025-01-23 “E-000289/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s relationship with Algeria is multifaceted. The EU remains Algeria’s largest trade partner. Algeria is the EU’s third-largest gas supplier, and its vast renewable energy potential makes it a key partner in the green transition. Both also share a strategic interest in stabilising the Sahel. Algeria is a country of origin, transit and destination for migration. While many Algerians migrate legally to Europe, Algeria has also become a hub for sub-Saharan migrants – some settling, others transiting. It seeks closer cooperation with the EU on the voluntary return of sub-Saharan migrants, facilitated through the International Organisation for Migration. EU efforts to engage Algeria on the readmission of its nationals illegally staying in the EU remain challenging for several Member States. EU financial support is primarily channelled through international partners rather than the Algerian government. No financing instruments used for Algeria directly link funding to specific policy measures. As a result, political dialogue remains the primary tool for advancing cooperation on migration and security. EU development cooperation supports Algeria’s economic diversification, critical given its high hydrocarbon dependency and youth unemployment. Funds are allocated through pillarassessed partners (e.g. United Nations agencies, Member State development agencies) to ensure effective implementation.”
  EU-Algeria relations · EU development aid (migration conditionality) · Asylum & border control
• 2025-01-23 “E-000288/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission In 2025, the EU’s contribution to Frontex’s budget amounts to approximately EUR 1 billion. This provides Frontex with sufficient resources to fulfil its role in combatting cross-border crime, in line with its mandate. Return and readmission are important components of cooperation of the EU and its Member States with partner countries. Under international customary law, all States are obliged to readmit their own nationals. To implement this obligation, the Commission continually engages with partner countries of origin and transit both to improve returns and to prevent irregular arrivals. This cooperation can take the form of readmission agreements or arrangements, or dedicated provisions in broader agreements such as the Samoa Agreement 1 ; Anti-Smuggling Operational Partnerships, like the one concluded with Morocco 2 ; EU support for the voluntary return of sub-Saharan migrants from several transit countries; or comprehensive migration partnerships, like the one concluded with Mauritania in March 2024 3 . These initiatives complement the ones caried out on a bilateral basis by Member States. 1 Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part. OJ L 2023/2862, 28.12.2023, p. 1172. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-and-morocco-launch-renewed-partnershipmigration-and-tackling-human-smuggling-2022-07-08_en 3 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/eu-mauritania-joint-declaration_en”
  Asylum & border control · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2025-01-21 “E-000256/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The organisation and conduct of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional rules and legislation, as well as their international obligations and applicable EU law. National authorities and courts are primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with the applicable rules. The Commission has no competence to intervene in the organisation and conduct of elections. The Commission supports Member States on electoral matters, mainly through the framework of the European cooperation network on elections 1 . This brings together national authorities with relevant competence and facilitates the exchanges of information and best practices. The Commission is also working with Member States to support the application of EU law provisions relevant in national electoral contexts, such as those in the Digital Services Act 2 , the Regulation 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising 3 (which will apply in full from October 2025), the General Data Protection Regulation 4 and the Artificial Intelligence Act 5 . In 2023, the Commission issued the Recommendation on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the EU 6 aiming to promote high democratic standards for elections in the EU, supporting high turnout, inclusive participation, easy and equal exercise of electoral rights and resilient electoral processes. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/democracy-eucitizenship-anti-corruption/democracy-and-electoral-rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065. In 2024, the Commission issued Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024XC03014&qid=1714466886277 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2829/oj/eng”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · EU political integration
• 2024-12-20 “E-003072/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission While national security is a competence of the Member States 1 , the Commission has supported the Member States to counter terrorism as regards the protection of public spaces 2 and countering threats posed by non-cooperative drones 3 . Considering the high and fast evolving security threat in the EU, the Commission has adopted a new Internal Security Strategy 4 and is preparing a new Agenda on Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism 5 .The Commission will also propose to strengthen the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), whose mandate was already reinforced in 2022 6 . The Pact on Migration and Asylum 7 entered into force in June 2024 and will enter into application in June 2026. This will ensure that the EU has strong and secure external borders, that people's rights are guaranteed, and that no EU country is left alone under pressure. The status of churches and religious associations is defined by the national laws of Member States 8 thus matters concerning the foreign funding of religious associations fall within their competence. The Commission is supporting Member States to develop and implement policies and strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism at national level through the EU Knowledge Hub on Prevention of Radicalisation 9 with particular attention paid to youth. Furthermore, the EU Internet Forum 10 brings together technology companies, Member States, and other relevant actors to develop concrete actions to address violent extremist and terrorist content online. The Regulation on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online 11 requires Member States to issue removal orders of terrorist content to online service providers offering services in the EU. 1 Article 4(2) of the Treaty of the European Union. 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation/protection_en 3 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on countering potential threats posed by drones, COM(2023) 659 final. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_920 5 Announced in the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029), https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf 6 Regulation (EU) 2022/991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2022 amending Regulation (EU) 2016/794, as regards Europol’s cooperation with private parties, the processing of personal data by Europol in support of criminal investigations, and Europol’s role in research and innovation. 7 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM(2020) 609 final. 8 Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 9 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/eu-knowledge-hub-prevention-radicalisation_en 10 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-union-internet-forum_en 11 Regulation (EU) 2021/784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online.”
  Asylum & border control · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · EU policy on Islam
• 2024-12-20 “E-003074/2024 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission Evaluations of decentralised agencies are conducted as required by the agencies’ establishment acts adopted by the co-legislators. Agencies’ activities are evaluated in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and EU added value. The scope for synergies between decentralised agencies is also assessed. The evaluations are conducted by independent evaluators consulting all relevant stakeholders, including the main beneficiaries/users (often Member States and national authorities), the agencies’ Management Board representatives, external experts, international counterparts, and the Commission. Decentralised agencies’ governance is set out in the 2012 Common Approach 1 . They are autonomous EU bodies managed by an Executive Director and a Management Board which is composed of Member States’ representatives, the Commission and in some cases stakeholder representatives. The Commission only has a limited number of votes in the Management Board (usually one – two votes) and has no veto right. Ten decentralised agencies also have small Executive Boards, which oversee the application of audit results and support the administrative and budgetary management. The Commission systematically proposes to the co-legislators to introduce such Executive Boards for all new decentralised agencies. The Commission monitors each decentralised agency’s budgetary implementation as well as financial and human resource needs and proposes resource adjustments to the budgetary authority in the annual budget procedure, whenever justified and possible. Moreover, the discharge of the decentralised agencies’ annual budget is granted by the European Parliament, upon recommendation by the Council. To achieve synergies, the Commission proposes, when appropriate, to merge agencies or to harbour new tasks in an existing agency instead of creating a standalone agency or to link a new small agency to a big one to rely on the support departments of the latter. The Commission proposes the creation of a new standalone agency only when the new activities are too large or different for one of the above options to be viable. The Commission also presents in detail to the co-legislators the budgetary and staffing needs related to a proposal to create – or expand the mandate of – an agency 2 . 1 Joint statement of the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission on decentralised agencies including the annexed Common Approach of 19 July 2012 (https://europeanunion.europa.eu/document/download/d4199ff4-1e3d-45e6-af7e90cf1a7b10bc_en?filename=joint_statement_on_decentralised_agencies_en.pdf). 2 In line with the requirement of Article 35 of the Financial Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 (https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509) and Article 27 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020Q1222(01)).”
  Discharge of EU institutions and agencies · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2024-12-10 “E-002842/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to protecting freedom of expression as a fundamental right be it offline or online. Freedom of expression is essential to the EU’s democratic system and is protected under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter), 1 which is binding on the EU institutions but also Member States when they are implementing EU law 2 . In this case, it is for the Member State, including its judicial authorities, to ensure that fundamental rights are effectively respected and protected in accordance with national law and international human rights obligations. The Commission has not been contacted by the Federal Government of Germany regarding possible plans to introduce rules such as those claimed by the Honourable Members and has not assessed their compatibility with EU law following such notification. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 3 aims to ensure a safe, predictable and trusted online environment that facilitates innovation and protects the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter, such as the freedom of expression. The DSA sets out rules and responsibilities for online intermediaries to tackle illegal content (as defined in national and EU law), while safeguarding freedom of expression and information. It also contains a prohibition on general monitoring and conditional liability exemptions for online intermediaries, which aim to prevent over-removal of legitimate content online. Users can seek review of content moderation decisions through internal complaint-handling systems and out-of-court dispute settlement bodies. Moreover, the DSA obliges online platforms and search engines with more than 45 million average monthly users in the EU to assess and mitigate the systemic risks to which their services give rise. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj 2 Article 51(1) of the Charter. 3 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1 – 102.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-11-05 “E-002422/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is not aware of the data published by the United Kingdom (UK) Health Security Agency. The UK is no longer a member of the European Union, and matters related to public health in the UK fall under the responsibility of the UK government. The Commission does not have evidence to suggest that the rise in human immunodeficiency viruses (HIV) diagnoses in the UK is directly linked to migration or the EU's migration policies. The Commission supports partner countries in strengthening different aspects of their health systems, including activities that support the prevention and treatment of HIV in countries outside the EU. Specific needs are identified together with the concerned countries. The Commission also supports the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The Global Fund works in more than 100 countries, contributing to the prevention and control of the three diseases. Since its creation in 2002, it has contributed to saving 65 million lives. In 2023 alone, the Global Fund contributed to keeping 25 million people on antiretroviral therapy for HIV. This not only keeps people affected by the disease alive; it also helps reduce transmission of HIV.”
  Asylum & border control · Legal migration
• 2024-10-18 “E-002171/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The revised CO 2 emission standards for new cars and vans 1 provide a clear framework for the transition to zero-emission vehicles, which is essential to deliver on the European Union’s objective of becoming climate neutral by 2050. The agreed 2035 targets create certainty for manufacturers and investors on the road ahead, with sufficient lead time to plan for a fair transition. They support the EU industry’s competitiveness, in a global vehicle electrification context. The impacts of the revised CO 2 standards on employment and consumers have been analysed in the Commission’s impact assessment 2 . A small overall increase in employment was projected. Both first- and second-hand car users would benefit from a lower total cost of ownership over the vehicles' lifetime. This will be increasingly the case as more affordable zero-emission vehicles become available. The Commission has set up a Social Climate Fund and will work with Member States on their Social Climate Plans to ensure that resources are spent to support the most affected vulnerable groups, such as households in energy or transport poverty. The forthcoming Clean Industrial Deal Communication and an Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act will support companies by simplifying, investing and ensuring access to cheap, sustainable and secure energy supplies and raw materials. In 2025, the Commission will prepare a progress report on the transition 3 . In 2026, the Commission will review the Regulation 4 , which will be an opportunity to assess how to best ensure a fair transition, also considering changing global circumstances. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/851/oj 2 Impact assessment accompanying Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards strengthening the CO 2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in line with the Union’s increased climate ambition. 3 Article 14a of Regulation (EU) 2019/631. 4 Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2019/631.”
  2035 CO2 Emission Target for Cars
• 2024-10-18 “E-002170/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Schengen area is based on the principle of absence of border controls at internal borders. Based on Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code 1 , Member States have the possibility to temporarily re-introduce or prolong checks at their internal borders. However, this possibility should only be used as a last resort, for a limited period of time and in exceptional circumstances. The instrument for financial support for Border Management and Visa Policy 2 (BMVI), which is part of the Integrated Border Management Fund, supports actions to facilitate legitimate external border crossings, to prevent and detect illegal immigration and cross-border crime and to effectively manage migratory flows, under its specific objective for an effective EU’s external borders management. Pursuant to Article 5(4) of the BMVI Regulation, actions related to temporary reintroduction of border controls at the internal borders are not eligible. The Pact on Migration and Asylum 3 provides additional solutions for managing the EU external borders and to effectively respond to illegal immigration including through the Screening Regulation 4 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/399. 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/1148. 3 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-andasylum_en#:~:text=The%20Pact%20on%20Migration%20and%20Asylum%20is%20a%2cresults%20while%20 remaining%20grounded%20in%20our%20European%20values 4 Regulation (EU) 2024/1356.”
  Asylum & border control · Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2024-10-18 “E-002172/2024 Answer given by Vice-President Jourová on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware that the Spanish Government has presented an action plan 1 that includes several measures, including on transparency of media ownership and state advertising. Article 6(2) of the European Media Freedom Act 2 (EMFA) requires Member States to entrust national regulators or competent authorities to develop media ownership databases with updated information on media service providers, including their legal name and contact details, the name of their direct, indirect, and beneficial owner, and the total annual amount of public funds for state advertising and of advertising revenues received from third-country public authorities or entities. Such information is necessary so that the recipients of media services can understand and are able to enquire about potential conflicts of interest as a pre-condition for their ability to assess the reliability of the information they receive. These databases would work as a one-stop shop for recipients of media services to check the relevant information related to a given media service provider. Under Article 6(2) of the EMFA, it is for Member States to decide which authority or body will be in charge of setting up and managing such media ownership databases. The Commission will continue assessing all relevant developments related to media freedom and pluralism in all Member States, including Spain, under the annual Rule of Law Report 3 . 1 https://www.mpr.gob.es/prencom/notas/Documents/2024/2024-3002_Plan_de_accion.pdf 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1083 3 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rulelaw/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle_en#rule-of-law-report”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Rule of law in Spain
• 2024-10-17 “E-002132/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Integration is both a right and a duty and ensuring integration is a fundamental component of building cohesive and resilient societies. Gaps persist between legal migrants and EU nationals in many areas. The migrant employment rate gradually increases over time 1 , despite the employment rate of migrants being proportionally more impacted by economic recessions 2 . Integration policies can have a positive impact on labour market outcomes 3 : migrants contribute to economic growth and workers born outside the EU are overrepresented in occupations facing persistent labour shortages 4 . Return of third-country nationals with no right to stay in the EU is an essential part of a functioning system for migration management and remains a priority. To complement the reforms introduced by the Pact on Migration and Asylum 5 , on 11 March 2025, the Commission adopted a legislative proposal for a Regulation establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the EU 6 . In addition, alongside operational assistance provided through the European Border and Coast Guard Agency the Commission provides financial support to Member States through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund in implementing voluntary and forced returns, as well as national return procedures. The Commission is also working on a proposal on the digitalisation of the return process. 1 International Migration Outlook 2024, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/international-migration-outlook2024_50b0353e-en.html 2 Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE) 2023: ESDE Review 2023, https://op.europa.eu/webpub/empl/esde-2023/chapters/chapter-2-6.html 3 Bahar, D., Brough, R. J. and Peri, G. Forced migration and refugees: Policies for successful economic and social integration, Working Paper 32266, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2024, https://www.nber.org/papers/w32266; European Parliament study: New approaches to labor market integration of migrants and refugees, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2024/754232/IPOL_STU(2024)754232_EN.pdf 4 ESDE Review 2023, https://op.europa.eu/webpub/empl/esde-2023/executive-summary.html 5 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en 6 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC COM(2025) 101 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0101”
  Asylum & border control · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2024-10-16 “E-002121/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not comment on individual cases. The European Court of Human Rights is not an EU institution, but a court established by the Council of Europe to ensure the observance of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1 . The Commission does not have any power in respect of the procedures of the European Court of Human Rights. Free movement rights of EU nationals and their family members in the UK are safeguarded by Part Two of EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement 2 . Such rights are not unconditional and may be limited on grounds of public policy or public security. 1 http://www.echr.coe.int/ 2 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ L 29, 31.01.2020, p. 7.”
  Asylum & border control · Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
• 2024-10-16 “E-002120/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission Following allegations of breaches to EU values related to the mentioned project, the Commission assessed the beneficiary’s compliance against its obligations under the grant agreement signed with the Erasmus+ national agency in Türkiye. It concluded that the beneficiary had committed grave professional misconduct and requested the Turkish national agency to terminate the grant agreement and proceed with the recovery of the funds. The Commission confirms these have been returned by the national agency in October 2023. The Commission had also registered the beneficiary with an early detection information in the early detection and exclusion system database in accordance with the provisions of Article 144 of the Financial Regulation 1 . The Commission acknowledges and appreciates the value of information provided by EU institutions, including the European Parliament, in the context of taking measures against unreliable entities. While such contributions are crucial, the Commission is committed to ensuring that all relevant factors, including legal and procedural safeguards, are taken into account when determining appropriate actions. The Commission is committed to ensuring that persons and entities considered unreliable because of involvement in criminal, unethical practices, or activities incompatible with EU values do not receive EU financial support. Beneficiaries of Erasmus+ must uphold legal provisions protecting EU values. Mechanisms framed by the Financial Regulation and relevant agreements concluded with recipients of EU funds have been put in place to safeguard and monitor the proper use of these funds. Moreover, in line with the rules for indirect management and the Erasmus+ Regulation 2 , the Commission deploys a set of monitoring and supervision activities to ensure efficient and effective programme implementation. 1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024. 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/817 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 establishing Erasmus+: the Union Programme for education and training, youth and sport and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013, OJ L 189, 28/05/2021, p. 1–33.”
  EU engagement with civil society · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2024-10-16 “E-002115/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code 1 allows Member States to temporarily reintroduce border control at its internal borders in case of a serious threat to public policy or internal security. Such a decision must be necessary and proportionate and is based on an overall assessment of circumstances. Occurrences, such as the knife attack in Solingen, may form part of this overall assessment. It is for the Member States’ authorities to assess the importance and gravity of specific incidents. The effective management of the external borders is essential for the proper functioning of the Schengen area. The Schengen Borders Code obliges Member States to deploy appropriate staff and resources to ensure an efficient, high and uniform level of border control. Member States can also count on the support of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). More than 2 000 standing corps have already been deployed at the external borders of the EU and their number will grow to 10 000 in 2027. In August 2024, Frontex reported that unauthorised border crossings at the external borders have fallen by nearly 40 percent over the previous year. Frontex’s budget is substantial. Under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), the EU contribution to Frontex’s budget has increased from approximately EUR 499.6 million in 2021 to EUR 858.8 million in 2024. It is programmed to reach EUR 1 173 million in 2027. The Commission is considering how to best strengthen the operational capabilities of Frontex, including to ensure adequate funding to increase the operational support it provides to Member States under the next MFF. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1.”
  Asylum & border control · Enlargement of Schengen area
• 2024-10-08 “E-001990/2024 Answer given by Ms Urpilainen on behalf of the European Commission The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) was established to foster stability and improved migration management, including by addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement. It was an implementing tool with flexible objectives to respond to challenges stemming from complex crises in the three regions it covered. The overall conclusion 1 of the recent European Court of Auditors (ECA) audit states that the EUTF delivered on many planned outputs. The EUTF put in place a detailed and transparent monitoring and reporting system on the performance and achievements of its actions. Evaluations and lessons learned from the EUTF are integrated in the robust monitoring and results mechanisms for migration related actions under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe 2 .The ECA recommendations will contribute to strengthening future migration related actions. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum 3 calls for strong EU cooperation with third countries of origin and transit, some of them hosting large numbers of migrants and refugees, in order to promote tailor-made and mutually beneficial partnerships. NDICI-Global Europe applies a ‘flexible incitative approach’ to encourage cooperation with third countries, opening the possibility to adjust allocations of funding related to migration, in line with the programming principles of this regulation. It means that additional funds can be mobilised for partners when these can further strengthen cooperation on migration management (‘more for more’), including on returns, or encourage a partner to implement policies that will improve the management of migrant and refugee situations. 1 https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications?ref=SR-2024-17 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/947, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0947 3 COM(2020) 609 final, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-andasylum_en”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality)
• 2024-09-26 “E-001829/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 1. Decisions and policies to regularise illegally staying third-country nationals, including the granting of residence permits, fall under the responsibility of Member States. The Commission has no competence on this matter. That said, Member States need to ensure that these decisions do not put at risk the integrity of the EU common area without internal border controls and to duly consider potential migratory and security implications. More generally, the EU is supporting Member States in reducing irregular migration, by strengthening cooperation with third countries concerned and preventing irregular arrivals, by stepping up counter-smuggling efforts and by enhancing returns of those who have no right to stay. 2. The freedom to travel freely within the Schengen area for up to three months in any sixmonth period extends both to EU citizens and third-country nationals who hold valid residence permits or long-stay visa. The absence of internal frontiers is expressly prescribed by Article 3(2) of the Treaty on the EU, as is the absence of internal border controls in Article 67(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Article 22 of the Schengen Borders Code 1 implements those principles by providing that internal borders may be crossed at any point without a border check on persons, irrespective of their nationality, being carried out. Article 6 of this Code provides the conditions for entry into the Schengen area and rules on border checks and surveillance to ensure that these rules are complied with. The right to free movement under Article 20(2) TFEU, which encompasses the right to enter and reside freely within the territories of the Member States subject to the conditions laid down in the Treaty and secondary legislation giving effect to that right 2 , applies only to the citizens of the EU. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1. 2 Most importantly, Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77.”
  Asylum & border control · Legal migration
• 2024-09-09 “P-001656/2024 Answer given by Ms Ivanova on behalf of the European Commission In June 2024, the European Council reiterated its strongest condemnation of the brutal terrorist attacks conducted by Hamas and other terrorist groups on 7 October 2023 1 . Hamas is listed under the EU terrorist list 2 . The EU established restrictive measures against those who support, facilitate or enable violent actions by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in January 2024 3 . The organisation ‘Şark Forum Derneği 4 ’ is currently not receiving any funding. In the past, it received funding (to be shared with partners) as coordinator of four projects from Erasmus+ programme for already finalised projects: EUR 85 173 in 2021 and EUR 18 755 in 2020 5 . The Commission is politically committed and legally bound to ensure that organisations and projects involved in criminal, unethical practices or those incompatible with EU values do not receive EU financial support. The Commission will immediately take action should it become aware of any proven evidence in this respect by excluding from EU funding entities guilty of terrorism financing or terrorism offences under the Early Detection and Exclusion System 6 . The safeguarding of the proper use of EU funds is further ensured by various mechanisms (e.g. suspension of contract or payments and contract termination) framed by the Financial Regulation 7 and relevant agreements concluded with recipients of EU funds. Entities implementing EU funds are also subject to EU restrictive measures 8 . Furthermore, the recently adopted Financial Regulation (recast) introduced specific provisions reinforcing the protection of EU values including a specific exclusion ground under the Early Detection and Exclusion System for entities that engage in activities that are contrary to the EU values. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/qa3lblga/euco-conclusions-27062024-en.pdf 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02001E0931-20240221 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02024D0385-20240119 4 https://www.sharqforum.org/ 5 These figures are those granted by the national agency to the entire consortium managing each project after finalisation. 6 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/how-it-works/annuallifecycle/implementation/anti-fraud-measures/edes_en 7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast). 8 Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”
  EU policy on Islam · Regulation of NGOs in Europe
• “Thank you, Madam President. Donald Trump has just announced that he's going to increase tariffs by 25% on European goods. It's an unfortunate decision, but not really a surprising one. Why? Well, because the US know that the EU ends up in giving in. They don't defend their the interests of their members. The EU is happy to be a technocratic arrangement removed from industrial reality in a in unable to protect its workers, its factories, a facade that prefers posturing to actual, real action as if submission is a guideline. This recent announcement from Washington is one in many, and what's clear is that our manufacturers, our car sectors, our workers are the ones who are going to be paying the short price in the short term, are going to be paying the price for the problems with selling their their goods, but then in the longer term are the closure of their factories and we will all pay and loss of sovereignty. This isn't something that's come from clear blue sky. This is also the result of our own inability to assert ourselves, strategies that have been going on for years, for far too long. The European Union has been trying to apply all sorts of procedures with their territory, without any rationale, but with dogma.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Thank you. President. It's been 100 days since the new commission was set up, and sadly, we just see continuity with the previous commission, which has been largely defeated by Europeans in the last elections. Despite the message sent out at the ballot box, the commission is still trying to oppose the will of the people when it comes to migration with the Asylum and migration pact and environmentalism. When it comes to the Green Deal, agriculture with the Mercosur agreement and the prospect of new free trade agreements that will sacrifice. Our farmers on the author of global on the Altar of Globalization. The Commission is interventionist in areas that are not part of its remit, such as defence. The Commission once again is trying to profit from international crises, to try to take sovereignty from countries where it's interfering in democratic processes in certain countries, and yet it's doing nothing to protect our external borders, nothing against the threat of Islamic terrorism. And recently France, Germany, Austria have all been affected by this terrorism. You've done nothing to protect our industry or do anything about poverty that's worsening throughout Europe. So it's very clear, the Draghi report that the commission itself asked for says that the technological and economic progress of Europe is lagging. Your policies have failed. You are threatened by the Europe of nations that we want to see. We don't want to see this anti-democratic superstate. Europeans have had enough of it. They want to see sovereignty, a Europe of nations that will work in the interests of our people. And it's coming. Thank you.”
  EU political integration
• “President von der Leyen has smilingly signed a death warrant for European agriculture after 25 years of negotiations, and it shows how much resistance there was to this treaty. There are people that still want to preserve the agricultural world, part of our history and traditions. We have a centralized, globalized Europe that wants to lead everything, that wants to rule everything to the detriment of the member states. Are you going to let the Commission take away all your prerogatives without saying anything? Are you going to participate in this? There are people that want Mercosur, that want, uh, this crazy globalization. I would like to speak out against the hypocrisy. Uh, President Macron didn't do anything against Mercosur in his eight years of, uh, mandate, did nothing with his blocking minority, and is now protesting, even though he knows it will have no effect. He's simply trying to do that to calm the wave of criticism that could wipe out his government. Mrs. von der Leyen has, uh, cut out, uh, Parliament's divided this agreement into two so that no member state could veto it. She has ensured that, um, the treaty will only be ratified by Parliament after it has been signed. This is an extremely anti-democratic way of working. You members here represent 450 million citizens. We, uh, will see in the vote who wants, uh, to save agriculture and who wants to condemn it? Go beyond ideological divides and listen to your conscience. On Thursday, if you vote for the motion of censure, you'll be showing support for our farmers. If you press the red button, you'll be making the opposite choice and history will judge you for it.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Thank you, Madam President. We can still stop this. It's still time for the European Commission to stop this free trade agreement between the EU and the Mercosur agreement. Farmers have been protesting against this for months. But you don't want to do this, Commissioner. This, uh, agreement is out of date. It undermines our food sovereignty when every other power around the world is trying to ensure, uh, the food sovereignty. It goes against environmental protection. It increases trade with commodities from elsewhere in the world which don't respect environmental standards. This is a mistake. This agreement is a mistake. There's an obscure, um, dispute, uh, mechanism, and it allows other countries to undermine decisions taken by member states. So undermining their sovereignty, uh, that we have we are promising a compensation fund for farmers. You recognize implicitly that this agreement is going to lead to problems in the agricultural sector. Our farmers don't want more subsidies for their decline or for their disappearance. They want to be they want to live freely from from their work with this noble mission of feeding Europe. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Thank you. President. We've seen the ban of combustion cars from 2035. And this is one of the most absurd piece of legislation from the EU. This is an environmental dogma. So Brussels is offering up the European automobile sector to the Chinese and American manufacturers. Now some are protecting their industries, but we are sacrificing ours. The Asian giants, um, produce electric vehicles at a low price, which also received subsidies. And we're not even looking at the environmental impact. We're seeing factories closing in Europe and patients are being stolen. And now the European dream is becoming an industrial nightmare. The association of manufacturers in Europe, including Renault and people, these people are raising the alarm. The German chancellor spoke on Monday about reversing this ban. They understood the major, uh, stakes for the automobile industry. And what about drivers themselves, those who live in, um, uh, the suburbs or in the, um, in the countryside. A lot of people can't afford an electric vehicle. They need these, um, these, uh, combustion cars. People will be left by the wayside. They won't be able to drive around because of European policies being, um, dictated by technocrats who had no idea of reality. We want to see a freedom of choice for technology, and we want to protect our industry. We want to fight this, uh, environmental dogma. It shouldn't be a pretext for destroying our industry.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “This Green Deal is basically sacrificing our competitiveness and we are giving up our lead in these technologies to China. China who protects, who encourages and supports its industry as the US does. And during this time, the European construct is failing. We're seeing a lack of coordination, a lack of will, a lack of vision. Worse than that, we see that the commission is actually financing extremist NGOs. They are undermining industry. They're allowing the industry, the NGOs, to impose their ideology. So it seems that's replaced strategy, the European project. Today is a continent without factories, without energy, without jobs. There's no compass. The lack of realism in the people who are trying to lead and bureaucratic illusion to Europe, which is really sabotaging what is left of its industry. It's high time to say stop to this. To defend our industrial independence, to protect our jobs, our expertise, our competitiveness, of keeping our feet on the ground. Because if the if Europe is going to continue with this form of suicide, there'd be nothing tomorrow. We can only shed tears for what we've lost without fighting. Thank you.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you. The Denmark is taking on the presidency of the European Council. And, madam Prime Minister, your government continues to be characterised by its left wing policies, but you have at least moved slightly in the right direction. But we have to be just to those who have prepared this change. It's our Um. Colleagues in the Danish People's Party, who have recognised the devastating effects of massive immigration and help to move things along. You recognise what people have been saying for years in Europe without properly managing migration. There's no social justice or security and the impact of mass migration is considerable for the rest of society. You've said you want to encourage this type of stance at European scale. People want to see action. We want need to reduce immigration, limit asylum and bring back sovereignty. People want to be responsible for their own destiny and that will start through migration policy. You've done it in Denmark. We have to now do that in Europe. Thank you.”
  Asylum & border control