Mathilde ANDROUËT

Policy topics Mathilde ANDROUËT is active on

What Mathilde ANDROUËT has said (79)

• 2026-03-23 “answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written questions E-10-2026-001200_EN E-10-2026-001201_EN The Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) [1] establishes benchmarks for 2030 that give clear indications towards reducing and avoiding excessive dependencies. The ResourceEU Action Plan [2] aims to accelerate the implementation of the CRMA, especially for strategic projects. Most strategic projects will deliver supply by 2030, significantly strengthening the EU’s medium- and long-term resilience [3] . The Commission regularly collects data on global production, trade and usage of raw materials. This forms the basis of the EU’s list of critical raw materials, enables the Commission to analyse the EU’s dependencies and promote risk mitigation strategies. In the CRMA, this is further enhanced by stress-testing of strategic raw materials value chains. To address current bottlenecks in the project development, the CRMA put in place single points of contact for permitting of critical raw materials projects and fast-tracked permitting timelines for strategic projects. Other enabling conditions for strategic projects include facilitation of access to finance and the support in finding off-takers. The REsourceEU Action Plan also announced the mobilisation of EUR 3 billion of EU funds within 12 months to support the raw materials value chain, of which EUR 300 million is dedicated under the Battery Booster [4] . The subsidiarity principle is ensured by coordination of actions at EU level through the Critical Raw Materials Board established by the CRMA. The Board consists of the Commission, Member States representatives and the European Parliament as an observer. The funding instruments in question are not designed to secure volumes of raw materials. Their role is, for example, to develop new technological solutions and support decarbonisation measures. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02024R1252-20240503#tocId90. [2] https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/01c448d6-dc93-40d7-9afe-4c2af448d00c_en. [3] https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/strategic-projects-under-crma/selected-projects_en. [4] https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/c1e2c753-e327-4d9f-b060-56ab4af2a754/download.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · State Aid
• 2026-03-23 “Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 28.5.2026 Written question The Commission’s proposals for the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF) [1] reaffirm the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as a cornerstone of EU policy, providing a cohesive and robust framework to support farmers, consumers, and the environment. Flexibility rules are designed to complement — not compromise — the Policy’s common principles. Stringent EU-wide safeguards, including common definitions and common EU rules, including farm stewardship obligations and performance monitoring continue to apply. The Commission will also issue CAP national recommendations, steering Member States’ CAP interventions to support common EU priorities while being tailored to Member States’ specific needs and challenges. These measures ensure that Member States’ tailored solutions remain aligned with common EU economic, social and environmental objectives and support a level-playing field in the EU. The Commission also advocates a collaborative approach to developing the National and Regional Partnership (NRP) Plans, incorporating early dialogues with Member State to ensure that national and local needs align with overarching EU priorities. The Commission will rigorously assess Member States’ draft NRP Plans before submitting a proposal for approval by the Council to see if the common policy objectives are met. Crucially, the budget for farmers’ income support remains secure guaranteeing predictability. The new MFF [2] introduces a new method (‘deflator’) to handle inflation challenges. It keeps the annual price adjustment at 2% if EU inflation is between 1% and 3%. If inflation falls below 1% or rises above 3%, the adjustment matches the actual forecast rate. [1] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/eu-budget-2028-2034_en. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0571&qid=1753801194712.”
  Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1) · Agricultural funding
• 2026-02-26 “Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission 29.5.2026 Written question The Commission promotes and protects fundamental rights by ensuring that all legislative, policy and administrative measures falling under EU competence comply with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The gender equality provisions of Horizon Europe are anchored in the legal basis of the programme, which commits to ensuring the effective promotion of equal opportunities for all and the implementation of gender mainstreaming, including the integration of the gender dimension in research and innovation content [1] , [2] . The Gender Equality Plan eligibility criterion is set out in the General Annexes to the Work Programmes of Horizon Europe [3] , established through governance and programme design mechanisms that balance EU-level coordination with national and regional autonomy, ensuring the upholding of the principle of subsidiarity. The gender equality plans are expected to be adapted to the unique institutional contexts of organisations. The mandatory provisions are designed to accommodate the internal governance structures of diverse institutions. By enabling organisations to tailor these plans, they support inclusivity without compromising organisational autonomy. Integrating the gender dimension in research refers to the systematic incorporation of sex and/or gender differentiated analysis into the design, methodology and implementation of a research project [4] . This practice ensures outcomes that benefit the society as a whole, enhancing the relevance and excellence of research. This requirement aims to enrich scientific inquiry without imposing constraints on intellectual creativity and expression, thereby fully respecting and enhancing academic freedom and integrity of scientific inquiry. [1] Article 7(6) of Regulation (EU) 2021/695 establishing Horizon Europe, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/695/oj/eng. [2] They are direct applications of the Treaty-based principle of equality mainstreaming, Article 10 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states: In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2016:202:FULL. [3] https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe/horizon-europe-work-programmes_en. [4] These principles are also reiterated and strengthened in the Roadmap for Women’s Rights, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0097 and the EU Gender Equality Strategy, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/1f5fa936-9fba-4435-93f5-32fa220bac82_en?filename=gender-equality-strategy-2026-2030.pdf.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion · Governance of academic priorities within the EU
• 2026-02-26 “Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission 1.6.2026 Written question The respect for fundamental rights is a founding principle set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. The EU safeguards fundamental rights in research inter alia through the ethics review process that operates within the framework of Horizon Europe (HE) [1] . All projects undergo a rigorous ethics review process, ensuring compliance with ethical standards and respect for human rights. The gender equality provisions of HE are anchored in the legal basis of the programme, which commits to ensuring the effective promotion of equal opportunities for all and the implementation of gender mainstreaming, including the integration of the gender dimension in research and innovation content [2] . The project AEQUITAS [3] has been funded under the topic ‘Tackling gender, race and other biases in AI’ of a HE Cluster 4 call in the 2021-2022 Work Programme [4] . Work programmes and most notably the HE calls are shaped through inclusive consultation with Member States, stakeholders, and experts, and are aligned with the HE general and specific objectives in the basic act and the operational objectives in the Council Decision on the Specific Programme [5] , including gender equality promotion. [1] See Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2021/695, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02021R0695-20251224. [2] Article 7(6) Of Regulation (EU) 2021/695. [3] Assessment and engineering of equitable, unbiased, impartial and trustworthy AI systems, https://doi.org/10.3030/101070363. [4] A human-centred and ethical development of digital and industrial technologies 2021 (HORIZON-CL4-2021-HUMAN-01), https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/HORIZON-CL4-2021-HUMAN-01-24. [5] Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 of 10 May 2021, OJ L 167I, 12.5.2021, pp. 1-80, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2021/764/oj/eng.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2026-02-04 “E-000457/2026 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission In 2024, the Union adopted 146 files under the ordinary legislative procedure (82 basic acts and 64 amendments). It is usual for a higher number of adoptions by the European Parliament and the Council to take place in the last year of the legislative term. The Commission is pursuing an ambitious simplification agenda. This agenda has so far delivered in 2025 EUR 15 billion reduction of administrative costs through ten omnibus proposals and other simplification initiatives, which will reinject annual savings into the real economy. In 2026, half of Commission work programme legislative initiatives have a simplification dimension. This represents concrete progress towards the target to reduce administrative burdens by at least 25% and 35% for small and medium sized enterprises. Moreover, the Commission has deprioritised around 30% of the delegated and implementing acts initially planned for 2026. The Commission will present ideas on how to further improve regulatory simplicity in its upcoming Communication on Better Regulation. The choice of the legal instruments follows from the nature and scope of the intended policy objectives and the assessment of the proposed measures in the light of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, while also considering the widely-shared goal of facilitating implementation and reducing the barriers to the Single Market for businesses and citizens. The Union acts within the limits of the competences conferred by the Treaties (principle of conferral) and only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States (principle of subsidiarity).”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU political integration
• 2026-02-04 “E-000456/2026 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission works hand in hand with the Member States, based on the principles of subsidiarity and the conferral of competences. The Commission as guardian of the Treaties must monitor the compliance with EU law, including notably to ensure the integrity of the Single Market to the benefit of European citizens and companies across all Member States. At the same time, the Commission is pursuing an ambitious regulatory simplification agenda. 2. The use of digital tools, including artificial intelligence, could support this mission by enhancing the efficiency and objectivity of compliance monitoring. The use of such tools will assist, not replace the substantial assessment of each individual case to be performed by the Commission services under the authority of the College of Commissioners. 3. Under Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, the EU operates within the limits of competences conferred upon it, while other competences remain with Member States, thus they retain full responsibility for the implementation of EU law. The Commission’s role is to support Member States in fulfilling their obligations and, where necessary, to initiate enforcement action to address non-compliance. The Commission is committed to upholding the subsidiarity principle when proposing draft laws to the co-legislators; a thorough subsidiarity assessment is part of its Better Regulation agenda.”
  Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass) · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• 2026-01-27 “E-000316/2026 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU Treaties have conferred to the Commission the role of guardian of the Treaties. Decisions on the opening and pursuing of infringement cases are the Commission’s prerogative and are taken by the College, based on the principle of collegiality, after detailed analysis of the facts and laws at stake. 2. The Commission attaches great importance to ensuring transparency of its enforcement policy and decisions 1 . Its 2016 and 2022 Communications on enforcement 2 set out the criteria that underpin the Commission’s strategic approach to enforcement and the various tools used for this purpose. This Commission has reinforced its reporting to co-legislators on the enforcement of EU law. Every Commissioner has published an Annual Progress Report on Simplification, Implementation and Enforcement, transmitted to the relevant Committees of the European Parliament and configurations of the Council 3 . The individual reports have been complemented by an Overview Report adopted by the Commission on 21 October 2025 4 . 3. The Commission’s enforcement actions are guided by the Commission’s strategic approach referred to in reply to the second question of the Honourable Member. 1 A public register of infringement cases and press releases (https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/searchinfringement-decisions/?lang_code=en&langCode=EN) informs about the progress of individual cases while an Europa website (https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/home/en) on infringement cases, pre-infringement dialogues and transposition of directive provides easily accessible statistical data with customisable graphs. 2 ‘EU law: Better results through better application’ of 19 January 2017 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2017_018_R_0002) and ‘Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers’ of 11 October 2022 (https://commission.europa.eu/document/b75864f0-8516-4ff0-9e2a-c3e8a557bbfb_en). 3 The Annual Progress Reports are available on a dedicated website on Europa (https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/better-regulation/simplification-andimplementation/2025-annual-progress-reports-simplification-implementation-and-enforcement_en). 4 The Overview Report (https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2025-overview-report-simplificationimplementation-and-enforcement_en) was presented to the Committee on Legal Affairs by Commissioner Dombrovskis on 4 December 2025.”
  Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass) · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2026-01-26 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The recast Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) [1] includes criteria to make energy performance certificates (EPCs) clearer, more reliable and visible, and more comparable across the Union while respecting the specificities of the building stock and climate of each Member State. It does not propose harmonising them. These criteria will benefit building owners, buyers and tenants and governments. Urban planning remains a competency of Member States, however, the European Affordable Housing Plan (EAHP) encourages Member States to simplify their national, regional and local planning and permitting rules to increase housing supply. The EPBD does not impose renovating individual residential buildings but provides a framework to encourage cost-effective energy renovations, which can substantially decrease households’ energy bills. The directive offers Member States the flexibility to adopt tailored rules and exemptions while designing social safeguards to avoid ‘renovictions’ such as caps on rent increases or rent support. The Commission supports Member States in implementing these requirements. The Emissions trading system for buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2) supports complementary measures and investments in clean heating and road transport. The Social Climate Fund (SCF) will mobilise EUR 86.7 billion between 2026-2032 and is designed with double solidarity: supporting a socially fair transition for vulnerable households and microenterprises, with lower-income Member States benefitting most. Member States must also target all national ETS2 revenues at measures and investments to support low- and middle-income citizens in the transition. [1] Directive (EU) 2024/1275 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the energy performance of buildings (recast), OJ L, 2024/1275, 8.5.2024. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1275/oj/eng.”
  EU housing policy · EU competences on social policies · Energy performance of buildings
• 2026-01-26 “E-000282/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU takes robust action to protect its industries from unfairly traded imports and at present has over 230 measures in place. Where measures in place are considered to be no longer sufficient to counteract the impact of injurious dumping, there is a possibility to have the issue examined by way of an interim review. Such a review can be initiated on request by an interested party who must show that there have been significant changes of a lasting nature in the circumstances relating to the dumping and/or injury. Interim review investigations can result in an amendment of the measures in place, if justified. The complaints office of the Trade Defence Services can be contacted to discuss the procedure 1 . As regards safeguards, in November 2025, safeguard measures were imposed on four ferro alloys. However, silicon is not covered by those measures, as the criteria to include the product were not met, namely, there was no increase of imports. Nevertheless, market conditions can change rapidly in the current volatile trading environment, and the Commission is ready to engage with industry to explore all possible options available under the trade defence instruments. The ferro alloys safeguard investigation showed that the sector, like many others, is facing challenges other than harmful trade practices, such as high energy costs. It is therefore necessary to explore also other policy options to help EU silicon producers operate on a sustainable basis. 1 trade-defence-complaints@ec.europa.eu.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · Trade relations with China
• 2026-01-13 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 23.3.2026 Written question The recast Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) [1] does not ban the renting of worst-performing buildings, nor does it impose obligations to renovate individual residential buildings. In line with the Better Regulation principles, the recast EPBD was preceded by an impact assessment. This showed that the worst-performing residential buildings are often occupied by vulnerable households and that the proposed measures will help reduce their energy bills. Energy costs represent a major share of households’ overall living costs. Renovating dwellings that are in poor condition, including those with poor energy performance, will improve access to decent, sustainable and affordable housing, particularly for low-income households, as highlighted in the European Affordable Housing Plan published by the Commission in December 2025 [2] . Rather than imposing uniform rules, the recast EPBD gives Member States significant flexibility to address social and territorial specificities and challenges, including through tailored national measures and financial incentives. Member States can also rely on EU funding instruments, such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility [3] , the Social Climate Fund [4] and the Cohesion policy Funds [5] , to support building renovations. As announced in the Affordable Housing Plan, the Commission will put forward a housing simplification package to facilitate the supply of affordable and sustainable housing. [1] Directive EU/2024/1275. [2] COM(2025) 1025 final. [3] https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en. [4] https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-and-activities/funding/social-climate-fund_en. [5] https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/cohesion-fund_en.”
  Energy performance of buildings · EU housing policy
• 2025-10-30 “E-004272/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The study referred to was commissioned by the European Parliament’s Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield. The European Democracy Shield, published by the Commission on 12 November 2025, provides a strategic approach to safeguard, strengthen and promote democracy in the EU. The Commission organised wide consultations in the preparation of the Democracy Shield, seeking the views of the Member States, of the European Parliament, of other EU institutions and bodies, as well as a wide range of stakeholders. A public consultation and a Eurobarometer were also conducted. The Democracy Shield builds on the various input received during these consultations. The European Democracy Shield does not restrict pluralism of opinions or freedom of expression. Quite the opposite: strengthening the integrity of the information space is key to supporting rights such as freedom of expression. Citizens must be able to access and partake in a reliable and trustworthy information space - free from interference. This is key to exercising democratic rights and engaging meaningfully with institutions and communities.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU political integration
• 2025-10-30 “E-004274/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The study referred to was commissioned by the European Parliament and reflects solely the views of its authors. It does not represent the position of the Commission. The European Democracy Shield, presented by the Commission on 12 November 2025, sets out a strategic and long-term approach to reinforcing democratic resilience across the EU. Its purpose is to ensure that citizens, democratic institutions and free and independent media can operate freely and securely in a trusted information environment. The European Democracy Shield does not alter the institutional balance or confer new supervisory powers on the Commission. The European Democracy Shield was prepared through wide consultations with Member States, the European Parliament, EU bodies, independent authorities, media stakeholders, civil society, academia and the wider public, including a public consultation and a Eurobarometer survey. It reflects broad input and is grounded in EU values and the rights guaranteed by the Charter. The European Democracy Shield does not restrict political pluralism; on the contrary, its objective is to strengthen the conditions enabling citizens and political actors to form and express their views freely and participate in democratic life. Participation of universities in EU programmes such as Horizon Europe 1 , Erasmus+ 2 including its Jean Monnet actions, 3 follow competitive grant award procedures based on an independent expert evaluation of the proposals. 1 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en 2 https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/ 3 https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/programme-guide/part-b/jean-monnet-actions”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-10-24 “E-004196/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission While fossil fuels still represent the majority of primary as well as final energy consumption globally and in the EU, the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in the EU’s energy mix has doubled since 2009 1 , reaching 20% of primary consumption in 2023 2 . Globally, renewable energy capacity additions amounted to 582 GW against 57 GW for non-RES in 2023 3 . Replacing fossil fuels with home-grown RES, including wind, is a prerequisite for enhancing the EU’s strategic autonomy by reducing existing dependencies on fossil fuel imports and reducing energy prices for a competitive EU economy. It also helps reaching the EU’s energy and climate targets. According to the International Renewable Energy Agency IRENA, wind energy is the cheapest source of renewable electricity worldwide and 91% of all newly commissioned utility-scale RES projects delivered electricity at a lower cost than the cheapest new fossil fuel-fired alternative in 2024 4 5 . Up until now, the European wind supply industry is dominating the EU market 6 and the EU remains a net-exporter of wind turbines and generators, as well as equipment and components 7 . To address the challenges faced by the European wind industry, including increased competition from third countries, the Commission presented the European Wind Power Action Plan 8 in October 2023. It has been largely implemented, including with the creation by the European Investment Bank of a dedicated package of counter-guarantees to improve access to finance for the wind sector 9 . In addition, the Net-Zero Industry Act 10 adopted in June 2024 aims 1 Year of adoption of the first Renewable Energy Directive (RED). Note that the targets in the RED are expressed as shares of final energy consumption. 2 It should also be noted that renewable energy sources like solar and wind directly produce electricity, thus bypassing the conversion losses associated with fossil fuels, which need to be converted into electricity or heat. This makes the primary energy figure higher for fossil fuels and thus lowers the share of renewables in primary energy statistics. Going forward, electrification of end uses would systematically reduce primary energy consumption, leading to a rise in the share of renewable energy. 3 Renewable Energy Highlights 2025, IRENA, 2025, available at https://www.irena.org//media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2025/Jul/IRENA_DAT_Renewable_energy_highlights_2025.pdf. 4 Renewable power generation costs in 2024, International Renewable Energy Agency, 2025, https://www.irena.org/Publications/2025/Jun/Renewable-Power-Generation-Costs-in-2024. 5 Renewable Energy Directive, Environmental Impact Assessment Directive, Birds Directive and Habitats Directive, amongst others. 6 European OEMs dominate the domestic onshore market with an 88% share and monopolize the offshore market entirely. Source: Clean Energy Technology Observatory: Wind Energy in the European Union - 2024 Status Report on Technology Development, Trends, Value Chains and Markets, European Commission, 2024, available at https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/0882709. 7 European suppliers account for 83% of the supplier payments made by the European wind industry. The rest goes to suppliers outside of Europe, including overseas affiliates of European companies. Source: European Wind Energy Competitiveness Report, ETIP Wind, June 2025, available at https://etipwind.eu/wpcontent/uploads/files/publications/ETIPWind-competitiveness-report-2025.pdf. 8 COM(2023) 669 final. 9 https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2023-510-eib-commits-eur5-billion-to-support-europe-s-wind-manufacturersand-approves-over-eur20-billion-in-financing-for-new-projects. 10 Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724, OJ L, 2024/1735, 28.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1735/oj.”
  Off-shore renewables · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2025-09-29 “E-003781/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The bilateral safeguard clause in the EU-Mercosur Agreement is an effective tool to protect any EU sector in case of serious injury due to increased imports. The Commission proposal for a Regulation implementing the bilateral safeguard clause for agricultural products 1 of 8 October 2025 translates into EU law the political commitments set out on 3 September 2025. The Regulation will enable the Commission to act swiftly and effectively to counteract potential negative effects, with specific provisions on the monitoring and launch of investigations for sensitive products. Any food product placed on the EU market, being domestically produced or imported from Mercosur countries, must comply with EU’s sanitary requirements. These requirements are not negotiable. Official controls at EU borders performed by competent authorities of Member States are intended to verify whether EU food safety rules are respected. The Commission carries out audits in third countries to ensure that control systems provide enough guarantees. In the framework of the Communication on a vision for agriculture and food 2 , the Commission announced a dedicated task force to further strengthen the control on imports. The Communication foresees a stronger alignment of production standards applied to imported products, notably for pesticides and animal welfare, in line with international rules. The Commission has already started the impact assessment process for the modernisation of farm animal welfare rules, and the start of the process for pesticides residues is foreseen for end 2025. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0639. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0075.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur · Import of agri-food products in the EU · Pesticides & trade
• 2025-09-09 “E-003481/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission In line with the precautionary principle set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and applicable EU legislation 1 , it is essential to carry out an assessment of the likely effects of certain projects, including offshore renewable energy projects, on the environment before an authorisation or permit is granted. This is important in order to ensure that any likely significant impacts on the environment are avoided, prevented or reduced. The Offshore Renewable Energy Strategy 2 aims to ensure that environmental considerations are taken into account when developing and executing offshore renewable energy projects. Authorising renewable energy projects is the responsibility of Member States which must ensure that relevant EU and national legislation is complied with during the construction and operation of such projects. The Commission supports research and monitoring to better understand and minimise the environmental impacts of offshore renewable energy projects 3 . This includes studies on the long-term effects of heavy metals and microplastics in marine environments 4 , as well as the impacts of construction activities on marine habitats 5 . 1 Such as Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1–21, Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50, Directive 2009/147/EC on the conservation of wild birds, OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7–25, Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32–35. 2 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable-energy/offshore-renewable-energy_en. 3 HORIZON-CL5-2026-02-D3-08 - Understand and minimise the environmental impacts of offshore wind energy - https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topicdetails/HORIZON-CL5-2026-02-D308?isExactMatch=true&status=31094501,31094502,31094503&frameworkProgramme=43108390&callIdentifie r=HORIZON-CL5-2026-02&order=ASC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=50&sortBy=identifier. 4 Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Publications Office of the European Union and CORDIS, CORDIS results pack on ocean plastic pollution, 2024: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/2ad04024-d20e-11ee-b9d9-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. 5 Such as the North Sea Interreg project dedicated to risk of chemical release in the offshore wind industry, https://www.interregnorthsea.eu/anemoi.”
  Water pollution · EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects · Off-shore renewables
• 2025-08-17 “E-003249/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Communications companies are the main actors capable of detecting explicit videos or videos that are child sexual abuse material. Currently they are encouraged to do this voluntarily – a practice that has existed for over a decade and proved essential for child protection. Many major investigations in recent years have been made thanks to this approach. The Commission proposal for a Regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse 1 seeks to make this approach mandatory. The proposal is clearly defined, the terms are closely monitored by data protection authorities and provide guarantees. A similar approach is already being widely used to detect malware and spam. The proposal includes provisions on detection orders, which are measures of last resort when prevention measures are insufficient. They target only high-risk services, or, where possible, specific users or groups. Such orders are issued by a judicial or independent administrative authority balancing all the rights at stake and after a thorough assessment of their necessity and proportionality. The proposal is technology neutral, while acknowledging encryption as an important tool to guarantee the security and confidentiality of the communications of users. When executing a detection order, providers are required to put in place the requisite safeguards to ensure the security and confidentiality of the communications of users. The impact assessment 2 analysed and assessed the risk of false positives, which for some technologies is estimated at no more than 1 in 50 billion 3 . Nonetheless, the proposal includes safeguards to address such risks, including requiring providers to deploy technologies that are the least privacy-intrusive in accordance with the state of the art in the industry, and that limit the error rate to the maximum extent possible, as well as judicial redress if needed. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52022PC0209. 2 Ibid. 3 https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110075/witnesses/HHRG-116-IF16-Wstate-FaridH20191016.pdf.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• 2025-08-17 “E-003248/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission Enforcing the ban under Article 118 requires the adaptation of multiple legal acts under the Regulation on Veterinary Medicinal Products 1 and amending the Official Controls Regulation 2 . This took time. It ensures that the EU’s robust official control system applies to imported goods subject to restrictions on the use of antimicrobials too. In respect of its international obligations, the EU has set a deadline of September 2026 to give its trade partners sufficient time to meet the EU requirements. This timeframe allows operators and official authorities in third countries to put in place the necessary measures to adjust to the new import requirements. Animal, plants and food products placed on the EU market, domestically produced or imported from any third country, must comply with EU’s sanitary and phytosanitary requirements. These are not negotiable and apply regardless of agreements concluded with third countries, such as the one reached with Ukraine. Moreover, as outlined in the Commission’s Communication ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ 3 the Union will strive towards a fairer global level playing field for agriculture. The Commission will pursue, in line with international rules, a stronger alignment of production standards applied to imported products. In this Communication, the Commission also announced a dedicated task force to further strengthen controls on imports. 1 Regulation (EU) 2019/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on veterinary medicinal products, (OJ L 4, 7.1.2019, pp. 43), ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/6/oj. 2 . Regulation (EU) 2021/1756 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2021 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/625 as regards official controls on animals and products of animal origin exported from third countries to the Union in order to ensure compliance with the prohibition of certain uses of antimicrobials and Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 as regards the direct supply of meat from poultry and lagomorphs,(OJ L 357, 8.10.2021, pp. 27), ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1756/oj. 3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A Vision for Agriculture and Food Shaping together an attractive farming and agri-food sector for future generations COM/2025/75 final https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0075.”
  Antimicrobial resistance
• 2025-07-17 “E-002989/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission In 2024, Ukrainian imports into the EU took place under the Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs) for Ukraine 1 . Article 4(7) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1392 (the ATM Regulation) provided for an emergency brake for several products, including poultry, that could be automatically triggered if import volumes reached the average yearly imports between 1 July 2021 and 31 December 2023. For poultry, this volume amounted to 137 042,80 tonnes. In 2024, EU imports of poultry from Ukraine amounted to 136 825 tonnes, thus remaining below the threshold 2 . The cited figure of 373 800 tonnes relates to Ukraine’s global poultry exports. Imports of agricultural products from any third country into the EU are subject to the Union’s rules on sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS). The referenced Directives do not include equivalency for imports, meaning that imported poultry products are not bound by animal welfare standards relating to the conditions under which poultry are kept on farms. Article 44 of Regulation (EU) 2017/625 3 stipulates that the competent national authorities are responsible for carrying out official controls on goods introduced into the EU. As part of the review of the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) 4 , Ukraine has committed to align its legislation to a number of EU agri-food standards by 31 December 2028. These encompass, among others, relevant EU legal acts on animal welfare, including Directives 2007/43/EC 5 and 98/58/EC 6 . If the EU assesses the alignment as unsatisfactory, it may suspend all or some of the preferences granted in this review. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1392 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on temporary trade-liberalisation measures supplementing trade concessions applicable to Ukrainian products under the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, OJ L, 2024/1392. 2 Eurostat. 3 Regulation (EU) 2017/625 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on official controls and other official activities performed to ensure the application of food and feed law, rules on animal health and welfare, plant health and plant protection products, OJ L 95, 7.4.2017. 4 Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union in the Association Committee in Trade Configuration established by the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, as regards reduction and elimination of customs duties. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0450&qid=1753807047060. 5 Council Directive 2007/43/EC of 28 June 2007 laying down minimum rules for the protection of chickens kept for meat production, OJ L 182, 12.7.2007. 6 Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes, OJ L 221, 8.8.1998.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU · Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• 2025-07-17 “E-002990/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. On 30 June 2025, an agreement in principle was reached 1 between the EU and Ukraine on the review of the tariff liberalisation under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. In view of Ukraine’s accession perspective, the additional market access granted under this review is conditional on Ukraine’s alignment to the EU agricultural production standards by 2028, including on animal welfare, environmental protection, use of pesticides and veterinary medicines. The agreement also includes a robust safeguard mechanism enabling the adoption of appropriate measures in case of adverse effects including on one or several Member States markets. 2. Animal, plants and food products placed on the EU market, including those imported, must comply with the EU sanitary and phytosanitary requirements. These requirements are not negotiable and apply regardless of agreements concluded with third countries, including with Ukraine. Moreover, as outlined in the European Commission’s Communication ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ 2 , the EU also strives toward fairer global level playing field for agriculture. The Commission will pursue, in line with international rules, a stronger alignment of production standards applied to imported products. In addition, many EU autonomous measures targeted at enhancing the sustainability of products placed on the EU market also apply to EU imports. These include, for instance, the EU Deforestation Regulation 3 , the Forced Labour Regulation 4 , the prohibition of the use of antibiotics as growth promoters 5 and lowering the maximum residues level for two neonicotinoids known to contribute to the decline of pollinators 6 . 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1672. 2 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/overview-vision-agriculture-food/vision-agriculture-and-food_en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023R1115&qid=1687867231461. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3015/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2003/1831/oj/eng. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/334/oj/eng.”
  Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports · Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2025-06-16 “E-002412/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is already working on the formal evaluation and review of the Chips Act, gathering evidence on different aspects pointed out by the European Court of Auditors, such as the needs of the EU’s most relevant vertical markets or on how to measure the investment gap for the 20% Digital Decade Policy Programme target. The Commission considered that the objectives of the Chips Act could not be achieved by Member States acting alone, as the problems are of a cross-border nature, and not limited to individual Member States or to a subset of Member States. It therefore focused on areas where there is a demonstrable added-value in acting at EU level due to the scale, speed and scope of the efforts needed. The Commission considers that action at EU level can clearly best drive European actors towards a common vision and implementation strategy. This approach still allows Member States to have control over their tools or financing, and to support national strategies.”
  EU industrial funding · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2025-06-11 “E-002362/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission As the Commission pointed out in its reply to written question E-001866/2025, ‘the Commission’s digital transformation is guided by its cloud strategy 1 , prioritising a secure hybrid multi-cloud approach. The hybrid aspect is delivered through private cloud infrastructure under full Commission control, as the key part of its digital autonomy. […] Contracts have been awarded to a variety of providers, all of which are EU-based entities. The Commission has included European providers without corporate ties to the United States and makes extensive use of open-source software. Currently, in line with the objective to avoid dependency, 85% of workloads run in the Commission’s private cloud. The remaining 15%, managing non-confidential data, are equally distributed among Amazon Web Services EMEA SARL (AWS) and Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited, and – to a lesser extent – OVHcloud. […] Since 2014, successive cloud and software framework contracts 2 have incorporated award criteria reflecting European digital sovereignty initiatives such as references to SecNumCloud that resulted in a contract awarded to OVHcloud. Looking ahead, the Commission remains committed to leveraging forthcoming legislative and procurement instruments to strengthen EU digital sovereignty and foster innovative EU services. The upcoming Cloud and Artificial Intelligence Development Act 3 will ensure secure EU-based capacity for critical needs, backed by a single EU-wide cloud policy for the public sector.’ The ServiceNow’s service used by the Commission is operated from an infrastructure exclusively dedicated to the Commission, which is located in the EU, and is not related to any Microsoft cloud. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/european-commission-cloud-strategy_en. 2 For example, Cloud III or SIDE III. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14628-AI-Continent-new-cloud-andAI-development-act_en.”
  Digitalization of public governance & administration · Ownership of strategic assets
• 2025-06-11 “E-002359/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Defence Readiness Omnibus 1 adopted by the Commission on 17 June 2025 includes a Commission proposal to amend, amongst others, Directive 2009/43/EC as regards the simplification of intra-EU transfers of defence-related products 2 . This proposal aims to improve the functioning of the intra-EU transfer mechanisms by ensuring their more uniform application by Member States. Neither this proposal, nor any other proposal under the Defence Readiness Omnibus includes any provision impacting the control of exports of military technology and equipment to third countries as referred to in the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 3 . Therefore, the Commission proposal does not increase the risk of ‘unwanted transfers of sensitive know-how’ related to the export of military technology and equipment to third countries. 2. The proposed changes to Directive 2009/43/EC do not influence the existing balance of responsibilities as regards exports of military technology and equipment to third countries as referred to in the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. They also do not modify the Member States’ obligations related to the assessment of export control licences in relation to exports to third countries established by the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_10604_2025_INIT. 2 COM(2025) 823 final. 3 Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, p. 99, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/2008/944/oj).”
  Arms export from the EU · EU competences on defence
• 2025-03-25 “E-001235/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission respects the freedom and sole responsibility of professional organisations to choose as their representatives the individuals they consider fit for this purpose. The Commission notes that RTX Corporation is registered in the Transparency Register and declares in its registration Mr. Priem as their person in charge of EU relations 1 . In their relations with external stakeholders, Commission Members and staff members are bound by stringent rules and internal control standards, included in particular in the treaties, the Staff Regulations 2 and the Conditions of employment of other servants of the EU, as well as the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour 3 . These rules aim at ensuring the independence, impartiality, objectivity and loyalty of Commission Members and staff members in the exercise of their duties. In March 2025, responding to the start deterioration of the EU’s security context, the Commission proposed the European Readiness 2030 Plan 4 which includes the Security Action for Europe 5 (SAFE) instrument to enable urgent and major public investments in the European defence industry, to rapidly increase its production capacity, improve the timely availability of defence products, and speed-up its adjustment to structural changes. The SAFE regulation includes strict eligibility rules aimed at ensuring security of supply and strategic autonomy of the European defence industry. 1 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/searchregister-or-update/organisation-detail_en?id=87564644126-75. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1962/31(1)/2021-01-01/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3083/oj/eng. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_793. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on defence · "Buy European" provisions · EU-US relations
• 2025-03-14 “E-001098/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Human rights and democracy, including the right to freedom of religion or belief, are a key element of EU-Algeria relations, enshrined in Article 2 of the EU-Algeria Association Agreement 1 . On this basis, the EU closely monitors the situation of human rights in the country including in relation to individual cases such as the one referred to in the Honourable Member’s question. Promotion and protection of freedom of religion and belief, which includes the right for everyone to have and adopt freely their religion or belief of their choice, continues to feature among the priorities of the external agenda of the EU on human rights, as highlighted in the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2 . The EU regularly addresses human rights issues, including the fulfilment of international human rights obligations, in the framework of the EU-Algeria Association Agreement and through regular contacts with government officials at all levels. In this regard, the EU prioritises frank and constructive dialogue, which it considers the most effective course of action. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A22005A1010%2801%29# 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_action_plan_on_human_rights_and_democracy_20202024.pdf”
  EU-Algeria relations · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2025-03-14 “P-001099/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The EU strictly adheres to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, as outlined in the EU Treaties and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid 1 . The EU provides humanitarian aid to all people in need in Syria, without discrimination and irrespective of ethnicity, faith or other considerations other than need. This includes the Alawite community and Christian populations. The EU’s humanitarian assistance is delivered through certified humanitarian partners in all parts of Syria, regardless of the area of control. EU-funded humanitarian operations are based on people’s needs, humanitarian principles, and accountability to affected populations. The resilience/non-humanitarian assistance provided in Syria by the EU also follows strict parameters of implementation. It aims to foster social cohesion by bringing together Syrians and countering any form of community or ethnical fragmentation. The EU was gravely alarmed by the horrific sectarian violence in Syria’s coastal region targeting minorities. On 11 March 2025, the High Representative/Vice-President issued a statement on behalf of the EU, strongly condemning the attacks 2 . This was also supported by the Joint Press Statement issued on 18 March 2025 by the Commissioner for Equality; Preparedness and Crisis Management, Commissioner for the Mediterranean, High Representative/Vice-President, and the Foreign Minister of the Syrian transitional government, His Excellency Asaad Hasan Al-Shaibani 3 . The EU welcomed the transitional authorities’ commitments to establish an independent investigative committee and called on them to allow the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to investigate. 1 Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, OJ C 25, 30.1.2008, p. 1–12, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A42008X0130%2801%29 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/ 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/18/brussels-ix-conference-on-standing-withsyria-meeting-the-needs-for-a-successful-transition-joint-press-statement/”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · EU-Syria relations
• 2025-02-20 “P-000796/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has a four-year Financial Framework Partnership Agreements 1 with three consortia of media-development organisations, which implement the Commission’s global programme to support independent media for the duration of this partnership. One of these consortia is led by Internews Europe, which is fully funded by European donors and constitutes a separate entity from Internews. The consortium includes four other organisations, none of which is either based or affiliated with the United States. The consortium is currently implementing the AGILE project 2 , which seeks to reinforce the resilience of independent media across Global South countries, working closely with local actors. The objective of EU projects is to safeguard the editorial independence of media around the world by increasing their financial autonomy, consolidating their skills, and building up their resilience to censorship and other forms of pressure. 1 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/news-and-events/events/infopoint-conference-supportingindependent-media-through-global-partnerships-2024-12-05_en 2 https://internews.org/internews-europe-launches-e10-5m-eu-grant-funded-independent-journalism-project/”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-02-13 “E-000693/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission published on 12 February 2025 the Communication ‘The Road to the next Multiannual Financial Framework' 1 (MFF), outlining the key policy and budgetary challenges and launching reflections on how to adapt the next EU's long-term budget, as the current MFF is laid down for the years 2021 to 2027. Together with the Communication, the Commission launched a Europe-wide consultation campaign with a range of stakeholders, including Member States governments, regional entities, and citizens, inviting stakeholders and citizens to have their say on the future EU budget and the policies it should support. This wide consultation includes a citizens' panel to debate and make concrete recommendations for the next EU budget. It will be accompanied by an online platform offering everyone the opportunity to participate in the debate 2 . The Commission welcomes the involvement in the reflections on the future EU budget by all EU institutions and bodies as well as the partners who implement the EU budget. The Commission intends to present its proposal for the next MFF in July 2025 in order to provide ample time for the deliberations of the European Parliament and the Council ahead of the start of the next MFF in January 2028. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_486 2 https://citizens.ec.europa.eu/new-europeanbudget_en?utm_source=cu&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=45323”
  EU political integration · Size of EU budget
• 2025-02-13 “E-000692/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission adopted on 11 February 2025 the Communication ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ 1 (MFF), outlining the key policy and budgetary challenges that will shape the next long-term budget of the EU and setting a clear direction: a more focused, simpler and more impactful budget. For the next MFF, Europe needs to square the circle: there cannot be an EU budget fit for the Union’s ambitions, the reimbursement of NextGenerationEU debt, and, at the same time, stable national contributions without new own resources. Choices need to be made. As regards the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), building on the Vision for Agriculture and Food 2 , a CAP that is fit for purpose must provide targeted support to farmers who need it most, promote positive environmental and social outcomes through rewards and incentives for ecosystem services, support the right enabling conditions for thriving rural areas, find the right balance between incentives, investments and regulations, and ensure that farmers have a fair and sufficient income. The Commission launched a public consultation inviting stakeholders and citizens to have their say on the future EU budget and the policies it should support 3 . The Commission invites for a broad dialogue to help prepare the proposal for the next MFF, which will be presented in July 2025. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/6d47acb4-9206-4d0f-8f9b3b10cad7b1ed_en?filename=Communication%20on%20the%20road%20to%20the%20next%20MFF_en.pdf 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0075 3 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/cap-overview/main-initiatives-strategic-dialoguefuture-eu-agriculture_en”
  Size of EU budget · Agricultural funding
• 2025-02-13 “E-000691/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission As stated in the Communication on ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework 1 ’, the EU budget must continue to play a central role in promoting the EU’s prosperity, competitiveness, sovereignty, security, resilience, preparedness and global influence, while upholding the highest standards on rule of law and democratic values. In light of the policy and budgetary challenges the EU is facing for the EU budget to achieve these objectives, the status quo is not an option. Among others, the global political and economic landscape poses challenges of unprecedented magnitude. The scale of the challenges ahead calls for an ambitious budget, both in size and design. The next long-term budget will have to address the complexities, weaknesses and rigidities that are currently present and maximise the impact of every euro it spends, focusing on EU priorities and objectives where the EU action is mostly needed. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0046”
  Size of EU budget · Own EU resources
• 2025-02-07 “E-000582/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has received several complaints regarding the allegedly wrong application of EU environmental law regarding offshore wind farms, including those being developed in France. Upon examination and for the moment, the Commission has not identified any problem that would justify further investigation. The Commission also notes that complainants in France have sometimes referred such matters to administrative courts to challenge development permits, including environmental authorisations. For the reasons outlined above, the Commission has not requested any information from the French authorities about possible environmental damage to wild flora and fauna caused by offshore wind farms in French marine waters. The EU is supporting research to further understand and mitigate the environmental impacts of offshore wind farms, notably through its recent Horizon Europe call for proposals for ‘Minimisation of environmental, and optimisation of socio-economic impacts in the deployment, operation and decommissioning of offshore wind farms’ 1 . It is expected that the findings of this research will further enhance knowledge on the impacts of offshore wind farms on biodiversity and help minimise those, among other environmental impacts. 1 https://projects.research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/en/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmesand-open-calls/horizon-europe/eu-missions-horizon-europe/restore-our-ocean-and-waters/minimisationenvironmental-and-optimisation-socio-economic-impacts-deployment-operation-and”
  Off-shore renewables
• 2025-02-07 “E-000581/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Renewable energy sources are necessary to achieve our decarbonisation targets and reach climate neutrality by 2050. The EU legislative framework in place fosters their deployment. While the Renewable Energy Directive 1 sets an overall EU target of 42.5% renewable energy by 2030, as well as several sectoral targets, it does not set technology-specific targets. The EU legislative framework leaves discretion to Member States on technologies and what contribution they put forward, provided that the overall ambition is aligned with the achievement of the EU target. The infringement procedure that the Commission opened in September 2024 (INFR(2024)0227) 2 is related to incomplete transposition of the permitting provisions of the Directive 2023/2413 3 by the transposition deadline (1 July 2024). The correct transposition and implementation of EU law is crucial for achieving the policy goals of the Commission. To that end, the Commission services are in contact with the French authorities regarding this ongoing infringement procedure. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02018L2001-20240716 2 https://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringementsproceedings/infringement_decisions/?lang_code=en&langCode=EN&version=v1&typeOfSearch=byDecision&d ecisionDateFrom=01%2F08%2F2024&decisionDateTo=02%2F10%2F2024&dg=ENER&memberState=FR&pa ge=1&size=10&order=desc&sortColumns=decisionDate&title=permitting&refId=INFR(2024)0227 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/2413/oj/eng”
  EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects · Energy (green transition)
• 2025-01-23 “E-000311/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recently presented a Competitiveness Compass 1 with a joint roadmap for decarbonisation and competitiveness. The energy transition is central to meet this objective, as well as to ensure the competitiveness of the industry. Under the framing of the Competitiveness Compass, the Commission has adopted the Clean Industrial Deal (CID) 2 . It includes measures to make EU an attractive location for manufacturing, including for energy intensive industries, and for clean tech. The CID is accompanied by an Action Plan for Affordable Energy (AEAP) responding to the call of the Draghi report to address energy prices for households and industries. The EU’s persistent reliance on fossil fuel imports is one of the major causes of the volatility and high level of energy prices. The deployment of energy efficiency and clean energy production will help provide homegrown, reliable, cheaper energy. The AEAP presents a set of actions that, taken together, can help frontload the benefits of the clean transition. The investment figures from Bruegel 3 are based on the Commission’s Climate Target 2040 Impact Assessment 4 . They encompass all sectors, including the transport sector, which accounts for circa 60% of overall investment needs, although not all of the investment required is due to the energy transition. Decarbonisation is key for the competitiveness of the European economy and requires massive investment. This is why the Commission will scaleup and prioritise investment in clean energy infrastructure and technologies as set in the political guidelines. The Commission will propose a dedicated clean energy investment strategy for Europe, which will include de-risking initiatives to unlock private capital. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/10017eb1-4722-4333-add2-e0ed18105a34_en 2 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en 3 https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/2024-12/PB%2031%202024_0.pdf (page 3). 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024SC0063 (page 159).”
  Energy (green transition) · EU approach to electricity market and prices · EU industrial funding
• 2025-01-23 “E-000310/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The Commission notes that the Treaties do not confer competencies in ‘pro-birth policies’ to the EU level. The Commission confirms that having children is a matter of individual choice and that it supports Member States in creating favourable social and economic conditions. The Commission also confirms that its response to demographic change includes policies integrating family support, labour market reforms, education and skills development, and healthy ageing, alongside measures on talent attraction. At all times, our efforts should also promote gender equality, non-discrimination, respect of fundamental rights and intergenerational fairness. As stated in the Demography Toolbox 1 , better reconciling family aspirations with paid work is one of the four pillars for adjusting policies. A comprehensive approach is needed to adapt social and economic policies in order to manage demographic change. The quality of life, availability of care and housing, as well as work opportunities and adequate income may shape choices. This can also help to mitigate the impacts of demographic change by inter alia enabling a higher labour force participation of women and supporting child development. Based on Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 2 on European demographic statistics and the Implementing Regulation (EU) No 205/2014 3 , Eurostat collects annually from EU countries the number of live births by country of citizenship of the mother (broken down by national citizenship, citizenship of other EU countries, and citizenship of non-EU countries). Data is available on Eurostat’s online database 4 . No information is available on the second parent, only referring to the mother. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/whats-new/newsroom/27-10-2023-harnessing-talent-in-europecommission-launches-the-demography-toolbox_en 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1414166546868&uri=CELEX:32013R1260 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1414166596621&uri=CELEX:32014R0205 4 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/demo_faczc__custom_15467911/bookmark/table?lang=en&book markId=9283caa2-b30b-4895-8566-fdfe3067a199”
  Support for families · EU strategy on population growth · EU competences on demographic policy
• 2024-11-19 “E-002577/2024 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission welcomes the European Court of Auditors’ (ECA) acknowledgement in Special Report 14/2024 that the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) contributes to the EU’s green transition by, amongst other things, prompting Member States to include substantial climate measures (both reforms and investments) in their recovery plans. As noted in the Commission’s replies to the special report 1 , ECA’s findings on the calculation of the RRF’s climate contribution are the mathematical consequence of ECA using more conservative climate coefficients than those provided for in the RRF Regulation 2 . The Commission notes that it is obliged to apply the methodology agreed by the two co-legislators and the specific coefficients set by the Regulation. The Commission reiterates that the RRF is one of the key EU instruments to support the green transition, with an expected unprecedented EUR 276 billion contributing to climate objectives. 2. The design of the RRF ensures that Member States receive significant financial support in return for the successful implementation of their reform and investment agenda, in line with EU priorities. The RRF has channelled significant resources to help Member States design and implement reforms and investments to increase the share of renewables in Member States’ energy mix, improve energy efficiency, cut pollution, boost the economy through green technologies, support sustainable transport, enhance climate resilience, and promote green skills. The Commission has been working closely with Member States to ensure the successful and timely implementation of the Facility. 1 https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECAReplies/COM-Replies-SR-2024-14/COM-Replies-SR-2024-14_EN.pdf 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R0241”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-08 “E-001983/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission China remains a vital trading partner: the third largest after the United States and the United Kingdom, trading EUR 740 billion in goods in 2023, and EUR 100 billion in services. However, EU-China relations have become increasingly complex. Russia’s war against Ukraine is an existential threat to Europe and China’s support to Russia negatively impacts EU-China relations. Since 2019, the EU has maintained its ‘multifaceted approach’ to China. However, its trajectory over the last years, and in particular its support to Russia and economic imbalances, have shifted the balance towards competition and rivalry. China’s support to Russia – both economic and diplomatic – impacts EU security and, thus, has its bearing on the overall EU relationship with China. The EU has repeatedly raised its concerns about China’s relation with Russia, including with China directly, and will continue to do so. Unfortunately, the EU has not seen any changes in China’s approach towards Russia. The EU seeks constructive engagement with China and wants to address and mitigate risks in a complex political environment. This includes Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, but also addressing EU’s critically unbalanced trade relationship, as well as China’s industrial overcapacity. This has led the President to develop the de-risking concept – aiming at addressing, in a targeted way, those areas where Chinese practices put EU’s competitiveness, economy, technological autonomy or security of supply at risk.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-China relations
• 2024-10-08 “E-001982/2024 Answer given by Ms Urpilainen on behalf of the European Commission The EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) was created at the height of the migration crisis of 2015 as an innovative instrument with a high political significance to coordinate the EU response and constructive dialogues with partner countries on migration related topics. It has addressed a wide range of actions along the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus 1 , addressing urgent needs and more structural developments ones. Since 1 January 2022, the EUTF for Africa is not financing any new programmes. The ongoing programmes will continue being implemented up to 31 December 2025. The European Court of Auditors confirmed that the EUTF has developed new approaches for collecting information about the root causes of instability, irregular migration, and displacements, concluding that projects responded to the needs and delivered many of the planned outputs. Some of the projects have been implemented in contexts of extreme fragility and instability, and their sustainability depends on multiple external factors. The Commission will continue analysing issues of sustainability of EUTF actions through ongoing impact evaluations, studies, and a final evaluation. As per the Constitutive Agreement, the EUTF undergoes an independent external audit every year 2 . An annual report on the activities financed by the EUTF, including the results of controls, on the efficiency and effectiveness of the internal control system is also drawn up 3 . Information on the overall resources and results achieved is annually approved by the Operational Committee and presented to the Board members of the EUTF. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24010/nexus-st09383en17.pdf, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5413-2018-INIT/en/pdf 2 Article 11.2 of the Constitutive Agreement, https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/document/download/4cb965d7-8ad5-4da9-9f6d3843f4bf0e82_en?filename=Constitutive%20Agreement%20 3 In accordance with Article 7.2 of the Constitutive Agreement of the EUTF. The reports can be found in the library section of the EUTF website, https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/library_en”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2024-09-19 “E-001766/2024 Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission The risks of trafficking in human beings were considered very high from the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which increased opportunities for traffickers to exploit the vulnerable situation of Ukrainian nationals, mainly women and children. To address these risks and support potential victims, the EU Anti-trafficking Coordinator developed and coordinated the implementation of an anti-trafficking plan to protect people fleeing the Russian military aggression, in close cooperation with the national rapporteurs and coordinators, the EU Agencies, civil society organisations and the Ukrainian authorities. The plan set out concrete actions at EU level and recommendations for the Member States to prevent the crime, increase law enforcement and judicial cooperation and protect potential victims. All the actions of the plan have either been completed or are ongoing. The Commission also launched a dedicated webpage including a section with practical advice to refugees on how to avoid falling into the hands of traffickers 1 . EMPACT 2 operational actions set up to tackle trafficking in human beings in relation to Ukraine are taking place 3 4 . The immediate actions taken at the EU and national level as well as the protection provided through the activation of the temporary protection Directive 5 contributed to the rather limited number of confirmed cases among Ukrainians fleeing the Russian military aggression. The Commission will remain vigilant and continue the implementation of the anti-trafficking plan. The amended Anti-trafficking Directive 6 will further strengthen the judicial and law enforcement response and reinforce the assistance to the victims of trafficking. 1 https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/select-language?destination=/node/30 2 European Multi-disciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) 3 Human traffickers luring Ukrainian refugees on the web targeted in EU-wide hackathon | Europol (europa.eu). 4 The detailed measures are included in the Fourth report on progress fight against trafficking human beings – https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/fourth-report-progress-fight-against-trafficking-human-beings_en 5 Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC and having the effect of introducing temporary protection (OJ L 71, 4.3.2022, p. 1). 6 Directive (EU) 2024/1712 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims (OJ L, 2024/1712, 24.6.2024).”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · Asylum & border control
• 2024-09-17 “E-001728/2024 Answer given by Mr Schmit on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s response to demographic change includes policies integrating family support, labour market reforms, education and skills development, and healthy ageing, alongside a legal migration strategy. The European Care Strategy 1 , for instance, fosters supportive environments for families, balancing family and career obligations. The Commission’s Action plan to tackle labour and skills shortages 2 aims to harness talents by activation of underrepresented groups in the labour market, reskilling and upskilling the workforce, improving working conditions and facilitating intra-EU mobility. It also sets measures to attract talent from outside the EU in certain occupations (EU Talent Pool) and supports the full implementation of the EU Blue Card Directive 3 . The Action plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027 4 aims to improve integration of migrants into the labour market. Having children is a matter of individual choice; the Commission supports Member States in creating favourable social and economic conditions. Examples of EU instruments (e.g. directive on work-life balance, the European Child Guarantee, support for investments in childcare) are listed in the Demography Toolbox 5 which will continue to be implemented. 1 COM/2022/440 final - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022DC0440 2 COM(2024) 131 final - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024DC0131 3 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/legal-migration-and-integration/work/eu-bluecard_en 4 COM (2020) 758 final - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/AUTO/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0758. 5 COM(2023) 577 final - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A577%3AFIN”
  EU strategy on population growth · EU competences on demographic policy · Support for families
• 2024-09-17 “E-001729/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission Fostering innovation and adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) in the EU is a strategic priority of the Commission. The Commission has launched several initiatives to support research, innovation and deployment of trustworthy AI in the EU through funding programs such as Horizon Europe 1 and the Digital Europe Programme (DEP) 2 . Early 2024, the Commission published the AI innovation package 3 , focussing on measures in support of generative AI. The President of the Commission announced 4 the roll-out of the AI Factories initiative in the first 100 days of the new Commission and an Apply AI Strategy to boost new industrial uses. An important building block to enable the uptake and innovation of AI is the AI Act 5 . It aims at creating an internal market for AI and increased trust, fostering uptake by citizens and businesses and stimulating innovation. It follows a risk-based approach and focuses on highrisk contexts. The Commission is working to ensure an efficient and predictable implementation of the AI Act. As regards AI innovation, it should be noted that research activities are not in the scope of the AI Act. The AI Act is innovation-friendly and takes into account the needs of European companies. Since it applies to any AI systems in the EU regardless of its origin, it creates a regulatory level playing field with developers from outside the EU. The AI Act provides for measures to support compliance of European innovators, for example AI regulatory sandboxes 6 . The Commission is providing additional support for compliance for small and medium sized enterprises (e.g. the EU AI Innovation Accelerator action under the DEP 7 ). The statement to which the Honourable Member refers represents only personal views and does not reflect the Commission’s position. 1 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/activities/digital-programme 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_383 4 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf 5 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), OJ L, 2024/1689. 6 Article 57 of the AI Act. 7 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/digital-2024-aiact-06-innov”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2024-09-17 “E-001732/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission EU legislation aims to ensure a balanced contribution of all economic sectors to emission reductions, including aviation. At the same time, the aviation sector continues to experience strong emissions growth. The EU does not regulate airfares, as it is the airlines that ultimately determine ticket prices. The Commission analyses airfares when assessing policy impacts 1 . Since 2012, the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) applies to aviation. The 2021 ETS Impact Assessment found very limited impacts of this policy on prices. For a flight from Paris to Rome estimated ETS costs assuming full auctioning would be around EUR 7.5 2 . As of autumn 2024, there have been no major changes to warrant a price increase 3 . From 2025, ReFuelEU Aviation will increase the share of sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) used on flights taking off from EU airports. The EU ETS supports the uptake of SAF with allowances worth around EUR 1.5 billion 4 available for flights covered by the EU ETS for any aircraft operator. Moreover, aviation is eligible for Innovation Fund support, and support derived from Member States’ ETS auction revenues. On energy taxation, the Commission proposed to end the tax exemption for aviation and set a minimum rate for the fuel used for intra-EU passenger flights to level the playing field for different modes of transport. Discussions in Council are ongoing and the European Parliament will be consulted. The Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) aims to offset emissions above a certain baseline, which should help level the playing field globally. In 2026, the Commission will carry out an assessment of CORSIA, which might result in further legislative proposals. 1 The impact assessment for the latest revision of the European Union Emissions Trading System took into account air fare developments: SWD(2021)603, accessible at : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0603 The study underlying this impact assessment also analysed air fare developments: Accessible here: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/471ca3b9-7cca-11ec-8c40-01aa75ed71a1/language-en 2 Assuming 102 kg CO2 emissions for one passenger, and an ETS price of EUR 75/tCO2. 3 The ETS continues to apply to flights within the European Economic Area and departing flights to Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 4 A total of 20 million allowances have been set aside to support eligible aviation fuels on routes with an ETS surrender obligation. At an allowance price of EUR 75, this is around EUR 1.5 billion.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-09-10 “E-001669/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The 2025 CO 2 emission reduction targets for cars and vans were agreed by co-legislators and set in legislation in 2019 1 , and they remained unchanged during the 2023 revision, providing manufacturers with sufficient time to develop compliance strategies. The CO 2 standards are designed to drive a gradual transition towards zero-emission mobility, and the 2025 milestone does not require full electrification. More affordable electric vehicles, which have been announced by several manufacturers for 2025, can support a faster uptake of the technology. Other technologies can also contribute to reaching the targets, such as hybrids, plug-in hybrids or improvements in conventional vehicles. In addition, deploying smaller and more efficient vehicles can also contribute to reaching the CO 2 targets. The CO 2 standards allow for stepwise improvements of the fleet average CO 2 emissions. The previous standards were characterised by stagnating performances, followed by a significant reduction of CO 2 emissions in 2020, as soon as the more stringent targets started to apply. Some manufacturers argue that it would create competitive distortion to change the rules after they have invested to comply with them. With the rise in global market demand for electric vehicles 2 , it is necessary to continue driving investments in technologies, infrastructure, skills and development of new value chains, in order to strengthen the competitive position of EU industry in the global transition towards zero-emission mobility. In this context, it appears premature to draw conclusions on companies’ 2025 compliance situation at this stage. 1 (Regulation (EU) 2019/631). 2 Executive summary – Global EV (electric vehicle) outlook 2024: https://www.iea.org/reports/global-evoutlook-2024/executive-summary”
  Flexibility for 2030 CO2 Targets for Cars
• 2024-09-06 “E-001644/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission will consider how to best support water reuse in the next long-term EU budget post-2027, but financing possibilities already exist under the current Multiannual Financial Framework 1 and NextGenerationEU 2 ; water reuse infrastructure for irrigation is eligible under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 3 ; funds can also be mobilised under the European Regional Development Fund 4 , the Cohesion Fund 5 , the EU programme for the environment and climate action 6 , Horizon Europe 7 and the Recovery and Resilience Facility 8 . Public and private investments can also be mobilised via the InvestEU programme 9 . The Commission is keen to foster the wastewater reuse. It has worked to facilitate the implementation of the Water Reuse Regulation (WRR) 10 with the publication of guidelines on the application of WRR 11 and a Delegated Regulation on risk management 12 . It organises and participates in workshops and other events to exchange best practices, widely shared in publications 13,14 and online 15 . This responds to commitments included in the 2020 Circular Economy Action Plan 16 , the revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive 17 and the revised Industrial Emissions Directive 18 . Moreover, the Commission supports Member States through 1 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/2021-2027_en 2 https://next-generation-eu.europa.eu/index_en 3 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/european-agriculturalfund-rural-development-eafrd_en 4 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/erdf/ 5 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/cohesion-fund/, under a specific objective on water, which covers investment primarily in water supply, wastewater management and water efficiency. 6 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/life_en 7 Research and innovation framework programme https://ec.europa.eu/info/research-andinnovation/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe_en 8 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en 9 https://investeu.europa.eu/index_en 10 Regulation (EU) 2020/741 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 2020 on minimum requirements for water reuse, OJ L 177, 5.6.2020, p. 32–55. 11 Commission Notice - Guidelines to support the application of Regulation 2020/741 on minimum requirements for water reuse 2022/C 298/01, OJ C 298, 5.8.2022, p. 1–55. 12 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1765 of 11 March 2024 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2020/741 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to technical specifications of the key elements of risk management, OJ L, 2024/1765, 20.6.2024. 13 European Commission: Joint Research Centre, Gawlik B. et al, The gateway to the future of the Mediterranean Water, energy, food and the environment Publications Office of the European Union, 2022, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/38718 14 European Commission: Joint Research Centre, Maffettone, R. and Gawlik, B., Technical guidance water reuse risk management for agricultural irrigation schemes in Europe, Publications Office of the European Union, 2022, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/590804 15 https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/index_en 16 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy-action-plan_en 17 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning urban wastewater treatment (recast): https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7108-2024-INIT/en/pdf 18 Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 amending Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste, OJ L, 2024/1785, 15.7.2024.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-09-05 “E-001636/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission 1. Sphera Network gathers ten partners across Europe. It has been selected for funding under the European Parliament pilot project and preparatory action ‘A European public sphere: a new online media offer for young Europeans’ that aims to bring the EU closer to young people by increasing the availability of online information that affects young people 1 . Under the current grant, Sphera Network receives EUR 1.94 million. Since the project’s inception in 2021, the total EU co-financing amounts to EUR 3.9 million. The coordinator of Sphera Network, Cafébabel, received a yearly grant of EUR 200 000 between 2014 and 2021 under the Europe for Citizens programme 2 . 2. EU grants are subject to the principles of transparency and equal treatment as set out in the Financial Regulation 3 . Calls for proposals are open to all eligible entities. All proposals are evaluated against the same criteria listed in the calls, which include the relevance of the project to the objectives of the call, the effectiveness and rationale of the methodology and organisation, the experience of the team, the outreach plan and expected audience figures, as well as cost-effectiveness of the action. Calls require applicants to abide by professional journalistic standards by signing a Declaration on standards and independence, guaranteeing that all beneficiaries act in full editorial independence. Moreover, projects are monitored during implementation to make sure that the commitments are respected. 3. The Commission supports a diverse public debate. All beneficiaries must commit to journalistic standards and to respect general principles such as transparency, nondiscrimination, accuracy, pluralism and independence. 1 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/eu-supports-four-media-consortia-enrich-pan-european-debateamong-young-europeans 2 https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/departments-and-executive-agencies/justice-andconsumers/justice-and-consumers-funding-tenders/funding-programmes/previous-programmes-20142020/europe-citizens-efc_en 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202402509”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU engagement with youth
• 2024-07-31 “E-001462/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission Despite a stagnation in the uptake of new battery electric vehicles (BEV) in certain Member States, BEVs have a market share of 12.5% in the EU 1 . The EU has a robust policy framework in place for the transition to zero-emission mobility by setting binding and predictable carbon dioxide targets for vehicle manufacturers, in Regulation (EU) 2019/631 2 , complemented by other measures aimed to ensure a sustainable and fair transition 3 . By the end of 2025, the Commission will submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the progress towards zero-emission road mobility and will on this basis review the Regulation in 2026. The EU also provides substantial financial support for the battery manufacturing and transformation of the industry to BEV along the whole value chain 4 . In 2023, to speed up investment decisions, the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework 5 introduced the possibility for Member States to support with aid investments for batteries manufacturing. The EU has 30 battery gigafactory projects with a total manufacturing capacity of 167 Gigawatt hours installed and is preparing further action to cope with the new challenges ahead 6 , such as de-risking investment under the Innovation Fund 7 and accelerating the permitting under the Net-Zero Industry Act 8 . The Commission is in regular exchange with Member States and stakeholders to ensure all enabling factors are in place for accelerating the uptake of BEVs in the coming years, including the rollout of charging infrastructure 9 as well as improving the affordability of 1 https://alternative-fuels-observatory.ec.europa.eu/transport-mode/road/european-union-eu27/vehicles-and-fleet 2 Regulation (EU) 2019/631 for passenger cars and vans, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32019R0631 and Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 for heavy-duty vehicles, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32019R1242 3 Among others, the Critical Raw Materials Act (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401252), the Net-Zero Industry Act (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023PC0161), the Chips Act (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2023.229.01.0001.01.ENG) to address supply chain issues and the Automotive Skills Alliance (https://automotive-skills-alliance.eu/) to support the reskilling and upskilling of the automotive workforce. 4 For example, funding from the Recovery and Resilience Facility to support for instance the conversion of automotive plants and national schemes to incentivise fleet renewal (e.g. https://www.mintur.gob.es/enus/recuperacion-transformacion-resiliencia/paginas/perte.aspx; https://commission.europa.eu/business-economyeuro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/germanys-recovery-and-resilience-plan/germanysrecovery-and-resilience-supported-projects-nation-wide-investment-scheme_en) and funding from the Connecting Europe Facility to support the deployment of charging infrastructure (https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/commission-makes-eu1bn-available-recharging-and-refuellingpoints-under-connecting-europe-facility-2024-02-29_en). 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023XC0317(01) 6 Eighth high-level meeting of the European Battery Alliance on 24 May 2024, https://www.eba250.com/8thhigh-level-meeting-of-the-european-battery-alliance-shaping-a-new-action-plan-amid-geopolitical-shifts/ 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02019R0856-20210811 8 See footnote 3. 9 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023R1804”
  "Buy European" provisions
• 2024-07-31 “E-001461/2024 Answer given by Ms Ferreira on behalf of the European Commission The Commission provides reasonable assurance in its annual activity reports that for Cohesion policy, the level of error is lower than the materiality threshold of 2% for most programmes, and slightly above 2% for the overall expenditure, taking into account potential additional risks. Where the level of error is material, the Commission performs multiannual controls and requests corrections to bring the error rate below 2% by the time of programme closure, based on the regulatory requirements for the application of financial corrections. Thus, the final error rate reported for all cohesion programmes is, according to the Commission’s calculations, approximately 1.3%. In parallel, the Commission will continue all its administrative capacity building actions for programme authorities. It will also continue the use of its preventive and corrective tools and mechanisms in safeguarding the EU budget such as retention on interim payments, interruptions and suspensions of payments, and financial corrections. The report 1 mentioned by the Honourable Member was produced by a group of independent high-level specialists. Among other topics, the report describes some of the drivers of Euroscepticism, based on academic literature. 1 High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy, Forging a sustainable future together – Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe, Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/how/future-cohesion-policy_en”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• “For example, 50% of peatlands should be restored. 50,000km of rivers by 2050 is difficult. There aren't. Except if you don't have many rivers or peatlands. The consequences are serious for farmers or for rural trades. The regulation on nature restoration is not just about big obligations, but. Costs which are difficult to foresee. And these obligations amount to tens of billions of euros which will be needed. It will be over many years. But with the stock markets going down, Who knows what the levels of expenditure will be involved by this regulation. Also, the war will have major effects on the economy. The budget of the EU will be difficult for the member states, and there will be additional debts and higher deficits and taxes. The impact studies can't be precise, so it's difficult to have any text. This draft regulation on nature regulation does not respect the fundamental rights in the European Union. It goes against the spirit of the treaty, the Tfeu, especially uh, articles 39 and 191, which which means that environmental restrictions should be reconciled with food security and competitiveness. We should avoid that these measures, um, weaken our farms and fragile areas for some years. France and other countries want to have farming independence, and it's a question of competitiveness. I'm not just talking about. Ukrainian products, which we can tolerate. Also free trade agreements, for example, for example, for example, Mercosur, which will have a big impact on farming. And we talk about not affecting competitiveness. We're actually doing the opposite here. And we don't place demands on third countries, no mirror clauses. Other countries will protect our rural areas. But this is not being done here and that's deplorable. Colleagues. I'm sure you'll remember the nature restoration regulation was rejected in various commissions, in Parliament's committees in Parliament, and it was reintroduced in Plenary. The. Parliamentary principal was replaced. And and that's actually a shocking procedure given the lack of flexibility in national plans, given the higher spending and the obligations, the lack of respect for competitiveness in current policies, given the lack of democratic legitimacy legitimacy in this text, I vote, I implore you to vote in favour of this objection to timetabling today.”
  Nature protection and restoration in the EU
• “Beyond the protection of forests. This regulation is an instrument of economic and geopolitical policy by demanding high standards. Member states are more free to protect their agriculture and forestry sectors, enhance their production and achieve much needed strategic autonomy. It is also not a question of becoming complicit through our consumption, in the destruction of tropical forests and violations in the rights of local populations. Finally, this objection aim to speed up the assessment of countries in the event of serious deficiencies in third countries by avoiding waiting five years when a third country with which the European Union trades engages in massive deforestation. Ladies and gentlemen, this objection on deforestation is a unique opportunity to defend our natural heritage, to ensure the quality and sustainability of products on our market, and to assert the responsibility and sovereignty of the Member States within the framework of the European Union. Limiting imports from the Mercosur countries or Indonesia will strengthen our sovereignty and reassure the agricultural sector, which continues to manifest its anger right now. This objection defends the positions of many member states on imported deforestation, and is much in line with the concerns of European farmers. I therefore invite you to vote in favour of this objection. Thank you. And I particularly like to thank the Secretariat, the lawyers, the interpreters who work towards completing this objection.”
  Trade impact on forests
• “Ladies and gentlemen, MEPs. My objection today concerns deforestation linked to the import of certain products into the European Union. As you know, the challenge is related to the deforestation regulation. I'd like to have a significant impact on the European agricultural sector. This competition from countries in South America and Asia can be significant. For months, our farmers have been expressing their discontent. There's dissatisfaction with the free trade agreement with Mercosur countries in various ways. What is stated in that implemented regulation? What countries in South America or Southeast Asia are not among the countries that are engaged in deforestation to expand their agriculture? Although it is clear that the environmental policies of these countries are largely insufficient. The list issued by the Commission could be an essential lever for reducing the European Union's impact on global deforestation by imposing on operators enhanced environmental obligations for the products concerned like livestock, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber, soy and wood, and their derivatives. Massive deforestation, particularly in South America and Southeast Asia, poses a serious threat to biodiversity, accelerates environmental disasters and destroys vital ecosystems, as illustrated by the dramatic losses of primary forests in Brazil, Indonesia or Cote d'Ivoire. By protecting our forests and and demanding products from agriculture that respect the environment and the quality of forests. Member states affirm their environmental responsibility.”
  Trade impact on forests
• “30, which is going to be held near the Amazon in Brazil. It's already likely to be hypocrisy. Thousands of politicians and NGOs and so on will be going by private jets to tell people that they have to change the way they act. China continues to build coal fired power plants, and Europe enacts legislation, which is important, is impossible to comply with. So we keep having these cops to finance green bureaucracy, but we never do anything about the real reasons for climate change. We all keep talking about delocalizing our industry, importing more. Um, the climate change can't be solved in the hotels in Brazil. We should be working with our farmers and our industry. We shouldn't be looking at economic ruin among the worldwide global approaches. Thank you very much.”
  Climate efforts
• “The protection of kids against cyber bullying is a duty. It's a just cause. We can't make it a pretext to change the digital freedom of Europeans. The commission is preparing an action plan against cyberbullying. Fine. At the same time it is. There are age verification. Measures being planned to protect kids. We end up having the identification and tracking of everybody. We there's a digital problem which leads to more control, more limits without tackling the roots of the problem. You need to. It's possible to get around this. It'll be the life of everybody. It'll be fragilized. And. But there will be control mechanisms left in place. There are technical controls, but the the victims need rapid responses. The platforms must be responsible and the sanctions must be made to apply. That's where we should be making our efforts heard. Prevention, education, rapid responses, effective sanctions and control regulation of platforms. And we need to do that to protect children. But we need we're bringing in mass surveillance. That shouldn't mean that we end up infringing the freedom of all.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• “Thank you very much, colleagues. This objection is on national plans under the regulation on nature restoration. This is important for farmers, but not just them. Forestry irrigation Organization will pay for this ideology. This regulation is rigid with in terms of the implementing acts, and I'm challenging the legitimacy of it given the lack of flexibility in the restoration of nature. The risk of destroying rural areas without achieving the goals of the regulation is high in the current taxes. We want to have more competitiveness following the Ukraine war and the protectionist measures of the US administration. It's important to look at this aspect. We should not forget that farmers farms have to plant 3 billion trees or free up rivers. For example, 50% of peatlands should be freed up.”
  Nature protection and restoration in the EU
• “To have decent housing. Affordable housing is what we wanted to do. But the committee didn't rise to the challenge because it looked at what isn't within its remit. Let us let let us let member States deal with their own housing policy. In France, housing accounts for 30% of household expenditure and the real estate bubble has led to prices skyrocketing. In a country where there's more and more unemployment and more poverty, having a roof over your head isn't a right, but a luxury. And obviously, if you pay more for housing, then you can consume less. There are more and more environmental constraints making it more difficult to build. There are 2 million dwellings, but because of the administrative burden means that we can't turn offices into into dwellings. And then all sorts of other problems. However, the solution is very simple. Give us some air, give us oxygen. Let the peoples decide what kind of roof is going to be over the head of their families. Thank you.”
  EU housing policy
• “Is false support and additional inconsistency from the Commission. The objection, therefore proposes that the Ukraine be placed in the so-called standard category until peace is restored, and that the Ukraine be temporarily removed from the list of low risk countries so that its timber reserves are spared. The damage is obviously temporary and does not result from legislation that is allowing deforestation. Therefore, our support for the Ukrainian people cannot be achieved by providing an economic pledge that could pose an environmental threat to Ukraine. My objection also proposes the creation of a new category for countries with insignificant risks of deforestation, in particular European member states, where forest areas increased in recent decades. This differentiation will alleviate an unnecessary administrative burden for our farmers and operators, while concentrating efforts where the risk is real. This provision was defended by Luxembourg and Austria, supported by many European countries such as Italy, Bulgaria, Finland and Portugal. Like the document on the simplification of the Deforestation Regulation, the objection proposes to draw up an official list of countries at negligible risk, exempted from certain obligations as with systematic geolocation or the establishment of compensation mechanism based on reforestation. This approach will focus controls on areas of real risk, reduce administrative costs, and foster a sustainable economy while ensuring the traceability of imported products.”
  Trade impact on forests
• “(16:11:32 – 16:13:57): Chairman, with this, review of the energy Trans European energy structures, we are, dealing with an essential issue, energy sovereignty for our countries, the prices paid by our household, and the sovereignty of our industry. Yes. We need modern infrastructure, more solid infrastructure networks, more storage, and useful interconnections, but this infrastructure should not become a pretext to impose, uniform energy policy on member states. The European texts are clear on this. Each member state reserves the right to choose their own energy range. This principle must be fully respected without any sort of technocratic hiding. We want efficiency, not ideology. European projects must be assessed based on their real usefulness, security of supply, drop of prices, stability of the network, industrial competitiveness, not on whether they conform to a single view of energy transition. We must admit to all decarbon, energy, nuclear, hydroelectric is dams, pump stations, geothermal, low carbon hydrogen. These technologies are not obstacles to transition. They are the pillars to building a reliable, affordable, and sovereign energy. We refuse that interconnections become a, an automatic solidarity mechanism where consumers in 1 country would pay for the energy, choices risky energy choices in another. Cross border cooperation must be voluntary, balanced, based on real benefits and, fair compensation. Finally, energy infrastructure must not be done against the land. We need to protect agricultural, lands, tourism, local communities. Priority should be on modernizing existing networks to avoid the already artificial infrastructures. Our priority in the Patriots is decarbon decarbon energy that is affordable to the service of the people, company, and member states, not to the service of an energy European energy centralization, which is ever more expensive.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration
• “The democracy shield is neither a shield nor democratic. It's a tool for the EU to engage in mass surveillance. It's not external threats, but freedom of opinion funded NGOs, subverting democratic processes, opaque algorithms without any neutral and objective checks. It's not about a public discussion, but. Discrediting opponents and dissidents and bringing in ideology into everything. What Brussels is scared of is opinions which are not under their control, and freedom of expression has to be submitted to the powers that be. They want to decide what Europeans can hear, say or think, and we will battle to the end to defend these values which are so dear to our civilization.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “(16:41:41 – 16:42:54): It's not A case of being against NGOs but being pro transparency and pro concrete results for the environment. The 7.4 billion euros paid to the NGOs, actually the total of that could be much higher. The concentration is concerning. Around the 4,000 NGOs financed, a small number of them took up a large part of the funding with and their identity wasn't communicated to us. Apparently certain contracts were reviewed but in the most cases the contracts had already finished and the NGOs didn't actually respond. Too often this control relies on self declarations. So we demand that traceability is improved and that lobbying financing lobbying is prohibited.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe
• “Chairman, Europe and France are examples when it comes to dealing with plastic waste. We've banned single-use plastics and we have more strict rules on the waste management. Citizens follow these rules but otherwise nothing or almost nothing.”
  Own resources (plastics)
• “Thank you, Chair. Thank you, dear shadows, members of the committee. The Common Agricultural Policy is more than just a budgetary tool. It's the concrete embodiment of the UN's principles, which recognize agriculture as a key point in strengthening the rural environment. Here we have three simple and noble objectives. Ensure proper income for farmers, ensure food security for Europeans, and maintain a living social fabric in our rural areas throughout the EU. These promises have been at least partially not kept. After 2027, there will be a reform, but it's not just a technical reform that our farmers need. It's a very political reform. We need to send out a strong message. We need to break with the principles of the past. This year, thousands of farmers have demonstrated across the EU – France, Spain, the Netherlands, the Basque Country, Germany – they're not asking for any privileges. They just want to be able to make a living. And if we're honest, they're also speaking out against the stumbling blocks that the Green Deal has come up against. Politic people in the Commission are increasing the legislation, but farmers are stuck. They have been asked to reduce their emissions and so forth. And on the other hand, they are facing increasingly ferocious competition for products that would be produced under conditions that we would not accept here. 95% of our food is directly dependent on European farmers. They are key to our food change, at the same time facing up to a global biodiversity loss and climate change. So why are we producing less, more expensively in Europe, if we're going to import it from elsewhere? It's not environmentally, strategically or economically logical. The farm-to-fork strategy has come and gone. We've seen the other programmes. The Speaker is reading very quickly, I'm afraid. We need to see a coherent policy that's founded in reality, and we need to ensure that we meet our environmental and sanitary objectives. We have to ensure that the Common Agricultural Policy becomes a positive lever, that we have a balance, a CAP that is faithful to its roost, which will ensure the vitality of rural areas. We want to ensure we have short circuits and have proper income for producers, as well as carbon-neutral transport, reduce transport emissions, focus on added value, encourage young farmers to set up through simplified, stable provisions, help them to adapt to climate change, helping them to modernise. And finally, we have integrated new technologies and research. Another key point is ensuring that young people can become farmers. This is a key challenge. In 2011, only less than 20 per cent of farmers were under the age of 40. In France, one in two farmers earns less than minimum wage. This is all made worse by the complexity of support and complex administrative provisions. We want to see simplification and adaptation of environmental legislation and targeted assistance. Forty-four per cent of EU land is subject to seasonal hydric water stress. Instead of blaming farmers, what we're doing through our amendments is trying to provide better support for infrastructure, ensure that we have a precision irrigation. The EU imports 138 million tonnes of agricultural products every year. So why are we doing this? We have to mobilise all arable land available to ensure our autonomy. We have defended the role of farmers without stigmatising them. We know that they have a key role to play in biodiversity and protecting our countryside. We want to make it clear that farmers are not enemies of the environment. They are the first guarantors of the environment. But they have to be supported, listened to, respected and not blamed. That's where we see political problems. On the one hand, the far left wants to see agriculture as a problem that has to be corrected, a sector that needs to be dismantled. On the other hand, we want to work with agricultural farmers to ensure that agriculture can be sustainable, productive and rooted in Europe. We don't want to see punitive measures. We want to encourage research, best practices and fair competition. We believe in subsidiarity and flexibility in adapting rules to local specificities. That's why I would hold my hand out to you, members of this hammer cycle, colleagues, to ensure that you share this balanced vision with us. Together we can get a stable majority to defend a stable, protective CAP that will help our agricultural sector. We also have to look at the role of outermost regions. This is often forgotten, but they are part of EU agricultural biodiversity. The post-2027 CAP can't leave them out. Farmers are going to read this text. Farmers' unions will look at it, cooperatives too. Farmers will see who is in favour of a positive vision of farming and will see who is in favour of ideology and degrowth. Before I end, I want to thank ComAgri members and Carmen Crespo for her excellent work. We see eye to eye with her on many areas and I think that we can make progress together. Dear colleagues, I hope that we can come up with useful and solid compromises that our farmers are looking for. I'm here for any questions or doubts. I'd also like to thank the interpreters and the Secretariat for being there for us. Thank you.”
  Agriculture (green)
• “To have decent housing. Affordable housing is what we wanted to do. But the committee didn't rise to the challenge because it looked at what isn't within its remit. Let us let let us let member States deal with their own housing policy. In France, housing accounts for 30% of household expenditure and the real estate bubble has led to prices skyrocketing. In a country where there's more and more unemployment and more poverty, having a roof over your head isn't a right, but a luxury. And obviously, if you pay more for housing, then you can consume less. There are more and more environmental constraints making it more difficult to build. There are 2 million dwellings, but because of the administrative burden means that we can't turn offices into into dwellings. And then all sorts of other problems. However, the solution is very simple. Give us some air, give us oxygen. Let the peoples decide what kind of roof is going to be over the head of their families. Thank you.”
  EU policy on urban development
• “Well, as rapporteur for the N.V. opinion on the future of the Cap. I am a bit worried about this alliance between the Commission and the environmental activists. The farmers have an important job and they have to have their position strengthened for dealing with the world competition and our tough requirements. The Commission has decided to push through the Mercosur agreement, which threatens the competitiveness of our farmers and threatens their very existence. We need, at the very least, mirror clauses. We need simply to enforce our farmers first, rather than trying to compete against South American farmers who reduce prices to the floor and Mean farmers will lose their jobs. So we need to strengthen the cap. There's no credible cap without strong borders. And there's no real cap without putting a young farmers at the centre. The commission is trying to push through the Mercosur agreement, but it should stop doing this and support measures to support our farmers.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Well thank you chairman. Thank you. Rapporteur for the European Commission is going to impose a goal of reducing CO2 emissions by 90% by 2040. That's unrealistic. It's an ideological goal. It's not scientific, and it's going to destroy our economies. The European Union only represents of 7% of global CO2 emissions. France just 1%. China and the United States, however, continue to increase the CO2 emissions. So we're sacrificing our farmers and our industry and our jobs. And what's the point of doing that if the rest of the world just carries on emitting? So our factories, our jobs and our know how will disappear. Every month, more and more jobs are lost. More and more businesses close down and towns and cities lose their community spirit as a result. That's the reality of these kinds of goals. What's more shocking is to see some members of the right from the EPP, like Mr. Retailleau, who's from the Republicans who are ready to vote with the left and the far left in favour of these goals. I mean, essentially, they're betraying our industry. We don't want to see European committing economic suicide. Just for goals that are completely out of touch. Rapporteur. You can count on our support against those who want to see European growth disappear. Thank you.”
  Climate efforts
• “Once again, the European Commission is playing the firefighter arsonist. And they say they're defending freedom of the press in the European Union. And this is somewhat ironical if when it comes to looking at the digital sector, they've imposed a record sum of 2.9 billion on Google for dominant market position. And but at the same time, the commission itself is giving data to Microsoft, for example, for the European, uh, health space. And then they roll out the red carpet. But I think the worst thing are the methodical attacks against freedom of expression through DSA. The Digital Services Act. The European Union is allowing a platform to censor, without any kind of control, and allowing the private messages of 450 million citizens to be opened. But and here I'm not talking about public messages, but personal private messages and videos shared between individuals. So does this not bother the commission? And, uh, the real urgency here is not to impose a fine on a search engine to correct a facade, but we see that the citizens are not able to express their opinion freely without fear, and that is what's under threat. Thank you.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “It's not about justice for some. No problem is justice applies. Should apply to protect victims. The. The only response we have is to observe everybody which serves no purpose. We we can't control our borders or control bullies. Why? We look at them. Why do we look at the messages and the social networks of 450 million Europeans for that purpose? If there's a follow up question.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• “Vice president, we are here dealing with the main text for your mandates, and you need to look at what the views of industrial experts are there. I guess that are made in Europe. There's 80 countries you're talking about here, Vietnam, Northern African countries, and Microsoft countries that's essentially being brought into a mechanism which does not protect European industry. My first question is, why do we have such a broader definition of made in Europe? Secondly, why are we framing FDI above €100,000,000, which is a considerable amount of money? Underneath this threshold, you got a whole network of SMEs, which are the backbone of European economy. They're going to be under additional checks, and they're not gonna get anything for that. So we don't understand that. Third, why are you making it facultative, certain criteria without adding any European added value for investment in Europe, such as European jobs, not having a technical transfer or ensuring that there's a European player in the governance? If these criteria are really necessary for our sovereignty, and I think that they are, then why are we letting a foreign investor only adhere to a part of these criteria? And then, fourthly, why are we derogating from European requirements when you have a cost of more than 25%? Does this mean that a Chinese dump truck car can get a preference over a European product because it's less expensive? And then your text looks at aluminum or automotive. But what about other very important sectors such as the digital sector? We need to understand that they're made in Europe. Would there essentially be an exception there, commissioner? Essentially, you can water this down to European preference. Simultaneously, you've got very laudable objectives defending European industry, but essentially, you're providing people with the ways to get around the measures that we need to protect European industry. So you can't be globalist and protectionist at the same time. It just won't work. Thank you.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market
• “Given the environmental changes, we need to decide and act. But we really need to act. In fact, not by, um, sacrificing our farmers and industry for abstract for the sake of abstract environmentalism. We've mentioned in major climate environmental conferences the how unbridled globalism is, what's causing these problems. We have seen, according to the energy, uh, organisation, that over 1 billion tonnes of CO2 per year is causing this problem. Transport represents over 9009 million tonnes of CO2, and the EU is also importing industrial products from places like Baku, where they don't respect environmental or social standards. This is what we need to be questioning and questioning right away. These empty agreements won't solve the problem. We need to use our common sense re localize, uh, production, use more local sources of production and, uh, shorter supply chains. We also need to focus on local agriculture and, uh, species that are under threat support, uh, nuclear energy and, uh, provide decarbonized and sustainable energy can reconsider or consider agreements like Mercosur, focus on, um, different farming strategies. But the cop in the in Berlin Cop 30 will not uh or needs to offer a sustainable future for our children.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “I'm very happy to see that we've really got the centre of the debate here with these NAACP's. Uh. I see when we see the figures that we've been very alarmed, but the member states are actually doing their homework and doing their planning. However, we are being asked for more effort. I heard the word effort being used by the representative of the commission. But what kind of effort? How are we going to manage to attain these objectives? From the technological point of view? Or should we be putting to the heart of the debate the nuclear issue, or should we perhaps be? Focusing on rather costly renewables? Are we going to be making the European taxpayer pay much more for all this in our economies? When you talk about effort, should we have an effort in terms of, uh, employment and so on and encouraging growth? Because otherwise this is a machine to create unemployment. And I give you an example. Uh, the thermal automobile issue and the fact that we've got a date for this. It's going to delocalized pollution to. Offshore pollution to Asia. And it's going to create unemployment in Europe. So when you talk about effort I want to know. Are you going to invite the member states to find some smart solutions which are smart economically, or are you going to ask them once again to just create unemployment? Because that is the real challenge that we have. We don't want environment to be a machine to create unemployment.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Will speak French commissioner in this committee. Some weeks ago we called into question life, which is considered a. Beacon for the shift. A number of the some organisations have received money from the Commission in order to lobby the Parliament on the Green Pact. You will know how Important it is to get the favour of these NGOs who have the status, but who are also the high priests of the growth. 4.7 billion was spent to a number of NGOs through the Life programme, without any follow up. They use either by the Commission or by the Member States. The European Union has lost sight of these public monies and that's a scandal. And during this time, SMEs, our SMEs and our farmers are trying to survive a lot of bands, a lot of rules and regulations. Life has become a money distribution machine where you can get money without any checks, and you could even exert some policy. It's time to shift this money to people who live in the territory, who produce here. So how are you intending to deal with this nontransparent situation and how? Can you make sure that this money goes to other sectors such as industry?”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe
• “Madame director. Thank you very much for joining us today. And thanks for this opportunity to hold this exchange of views on this subject, which is key to the future of Europe. The climate measure is necessary, should not justify some of the directions the Commission is taking by imposing ineffective and sometimes dangerous measures on citizens. We are still facing a weakened energy sovereignty. We are dependent on outside sources, and that's expensive for our citizens and bad for our industry, and indeed for the environment as well. And then if you look at the current agricultural policy, um, the European Commission is working on, as well as the Green Deal, well, this just serves to sacrifice our farmers and the purchasing power of Europeans without guaranteeing real environmental effectiveness, as shown on some parts of your graph. If you look at the restrictions on pesticides and fertilizers, well, that's pushing our farmers to the brink. How can we remain competitive in the face of unfair foreign competition, not subject to the same drastic imperatives? Are you letting the European Commission know how inconsistent it's being by multiplying its free trade agreements, such as Mercosur? This is a type of treaty that opens the EU up to products produced on the other side of the planet, not subject to the same rules around standards. We need to ensure that everyone becomes aware of the gaps in the Green Deal. What impact does the change of the Commission have on your agency? Is the commission asking you? The commission is asking you to look for new ways forward, founded on innovation and on protecting our jobs. This is a change of strategy that's been called on by public opinion in the EU. Does your agency intend to move forward with the kind of measures citizens are requesting? Are you going to be holding the Commission to account on its measures? Thank you.”
  Agriculture (green)
• “Kopp, 30, in Berlin, was an umpteenth disappointment, umpteenth proof that this isn't the right tool to solve the world's climate problems. Too costly to polluting, too mired in ideology, and therefore, the problems that stem from globalization can never be solved by more globalization. When it comes to the environment, we have to survive what is around us and not to use ETS. On the other side of the world, while developing countries have to guard their forests while the rest of the world pollutes at the same time. This is green neocolonialism. No more, no less. And that's not going to help anyone. And definitely not our climate. There are countries that for a long time have been used to this. Every country has to be sovereign and come up with their own approach on the basis of pragmatism. The EU is trying to teach everyone lessons, but I don't think that's acceptable. We have exorbitant energy costs. We're the only ones to have reduced emissions. But look where that has led to. Our plants are closing, our factories are closing, and now there's more pollution in Asia. You want to set delirious targets? Cop 30 didn't lead to much. Uh. So much ado about nothing. And it cost €900 million to organise. Berlin. This is hypocrisy and we have to put an end to this. The only palpable reality is the EU diplomatic approach in this international stage.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• “And also protect environmental producers who meet higher standards than anywhere else in the world. This is a matter of sovereignty. We cannot allow our market to be flooded with products from the illegal or sustainable destruction of forests, to the detriment of our farmers and our economy. With this list of deforestation countries, we can protect our farmers much better. My objection to imported deforestation is based on the publication by the European Commission of a list clearly distinguishing high risk countries like Russia, Belarus, North Korea or Burma. Let's be honest, these countries fall into this category not because of the deforestation policy, but because of their ideology, which distorts the original regulation voted on by the European Parliament. The list, which for a long time was only available by appointment without. Says a lot about the lack of transparency in the Commission's methods and the lack of credit. The lack of credibility of this classification. We can refuse to import timber products from these countries for political reasons. It can be agreed and debated, but in this case, it's not being debated here in the committee, but in the parliamentary Committee on International Trade or Inter. If we want a strong environmental criterion to protect forests, why are Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Paraguay, Vietnam and Malaysia, where deforestation is a particular concern? Not included at all in this high risk category. Moreover, the classification of Ukraine as a country with a low risk of deforestation, even though the terrible conflict there has caused a loss of thousands of hectares of forest.”
  Trade impact on forests
• “Chairman. Thank you. And thank you to our minister colleagues. I'm very appreciative of having you here. Lazard recently said that a carbon neutral union would be stronger and more secure. This is a phrase which shows what a disconnect there is between these speeches and the reality which industry and our workers Curse experience. It's just a banner. A mantra which veils the reality of industry closing its doors. In Europe, many jobs over 300,000 have been lost already in the last month. Energy is hemorrhaging money because of high input costs and high energy costs. It's strangulating our productive networks. We've lost 330 industrial sites already in the last few months, according to employer reports. This means loss of jobs, families affected, people losing their very income, and cheap imports from China and India and also from America. Is this a Europe which is supposedly more competitive and more safe? More shows, more security? We talk about needing to protect the environment, but are fit for 55 and carbon neutrality. And I suppose it 90% reduction in emissions by 2040 simply fail to take into account the economic reality and the ability of our industries to adapt. You've set targets which are absolutely fabricated. They're totally unrealistic. And yet our employees continue to pay the price for this. So can you tell us what the Danish presidency intends to do? How will it prioritise the industrial recovery of the continent? Your targets are simply leading to greater deindustrialisation. Will you finally have a rethink and have a genuine debate on the competitive future of Europe? Without industry, there won't be any transition, no security, no future for our people. Thank you.”
  Climate efforts
• “Madam Commissioner, European taxonomy defines the investments that are judged to be ecologically virtuous. It's part of the Green Deal for Europe and since its launch, we've noticed it's overshooting restrictions that will have a heavy burden on our companies. We've already warned about the commission's desire to please environmental warriors. We've seen that this policy could put farmers out of business, or bring them onto the streets and to weaken our industry. Neither the Parliament or the commission listened to our warnings. They needed to listen to us. Studies and assessments for the Commission to admit that the restrictions were strangling our companies today. We are singing a different tune. You're talking about streamlining and we can only welcome this step in the right direction. However, it's not enough. The commission is. Well, we'd like to know if you're looking at more simplifications and which ones. Even though the agricultural sector is not targeted by this new these new delegated acts, financial areas are which could affect agriculture. This will be higher costs for farms and cooperatives if they don't fulfil these criterias. Exactly. Access to financing is essential for farming development, especially investing in innovation and transition. Can the Commission guarantee that the simplification that these delegated acts bring in won't have an indirect or direct effect of restricting European farmers access to finance? Furthermore, from an energy point of view, nuclear has been included in the taxonomy since 2022, as you recognize, but only temporarily. So, as you know, the industry needs certainty. Can we hope that the Commission will fully get behind nuclear in a non temporary way when it comes to the green investments of taxonomy? Thank you.”
  Green Taxonomy
• “So there's hypocrisy. The French, the Europeans are responsible for the evil to the planet. So we do more than most other regions in the world. Industry is adapting itself and all other actors are respecting the standards but pollution continues. These international treaties are becoming overcomplicated, all these contradictory rules, explosion of standards, and it's their companies, our families, our local or regions which are paying the bill. We need to have a global agreement but it should be, we should be turning towards the real polluters. We should protect our industries and our small operators and we should simplify the life for Europeans and not smother them in regulations. We shouldn't shoot ourselves in the foot again and we should demand that Asia, China, the biggest polluters finally do their bit. Otherwise this treaty will be nothing more than a new masquerade. **Tiemo Wölken @Chair (Germany, S&D): Thank you very much. Next up would be ECR. We do not have any indications. Does anyone from the ECR here want to take the floor spontaneously? That's not the case. So then for the Renew group, Karin Kalzpro please.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Under Queen von der Leyen, the cap means ever heavier conditionality, reducing the agricultural budget. This is a major danger. Now we have a Mercosur agreement and duty free imports from Ukraine. Our environmental standards. Our social standards are not respected by those producing these products which are now flooding in. And this is a danger for our food sovereignty too. We're accused of. Rhetoric about. Wanting to undermine the agreement. But it's we then see the Jordan bardella a motion of no confidence, and we see a double standards from those who are saying that we still need to stand by the commission. I say to the French Republican Party, if you continue supporting, uh, von der Leyen, you'll see us everywhere in every constituency. Farmers will stand up. They will know. They will know who defended Mercosur and who stood up against it.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Online sexual exploitation are crimes are fake. Video can even cause a young person to commit suicide. It is so destructive of their lives. And this is something which has got to be regulated. The platforms can't hide behind the facade of neutrality. They have the means to act and they must do so. They need to do detection. They need to flag up problematic content. They need to take the requisite measures and they need to deal with illegal content. Politics and justice has also got to think in terms of real deterrence. We've got 20,000 prostitutes who are minors, who are exposed to the internet and social media. And when pedophiles get embroiled in these networks, everybody knows who they are, but they're never brought to account. They're never stopped. And all too often, it's victims who are children, who bear the brunt of this, who suffer the most, and they simply end up being ruthlessly exploited in far too many different ways. We need to have enforcement. We don't need new rules. We need enforcement of the rules that we have. We have rules which should be able to protect minors without muzzling free expression. Technology must not become a weapon against Europeans, but rather a support for the most vulnerable. Thank you.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• “Commissioner, this European Oceans Pact is like the Green Deal. We have an unrealistic European ideology. There are new competitors going to the Commission which having sacrificed European fisheries which has collapsed, they will now impose sea based wind turbines. We don't citizens don't want to have them on land but now they're being deployed at sea. We have more than two hundred chemical substances emanating from these sea based wind turbines and bureaucracy is being pumped up and new laws, more reports, promises of simplification, you know, given to the technocratic reflexes and there's a whole lack of involvement of the Member States. We have the second largest marine environmental zone in France and their views are ignored as if we were the proper property of Brussels. The oceans is a confiscation of marine sovereignty, that's what's going on. And like the Green Deal, the Blue Deal will fail. The citizens will refuse to give up their sovereignty on the altar of your ideology.”
  Off-shore renewables
• “Thank you very much. I don't think we can deny it. And statistics prove this, that wildfire risk has increased over the past few years throughout the EU and also in France. But if we just said it's at the climate, I think that's too simple an explanation. We have to look at the causes that we've been looking at for quite a while. The abandonment of land, the accumulation of combustible biomass, amongst others. But also, I think we need to highlight the fact that human behaviour sometimes is criminal and irresponsible. We have to talk about farmers here, foresters, local municipalities. They're all at the heart of the solutions, the environmentalists. They are also a real threat. So we need to draw the right conclusions. Preventing wildfires. That's not going to happen here with guides in Brussels with extra indicators. We need to active the forests there on the ground. We need to look at more grassland. We need to have more people in rural areas to make sure that there's more civil security in those areas. To save a forest, sometimes you just need to let farmers prosper. This communication, we don't want it to become a pretext to legitimize a new way of centralizing things. Um, June last year, the Court of Auditors, they said that the commission, uh, its vision was incomplete when it came to budget for wildfires and that the most useful actions weren't always financed. It's not just about green budget. We're talking about, uh, uh, mutualisation. But the new tools from EU won't come in until 2028. Basically, it's up to sovereign member states and people on the ground to be the front line. And that means for France. Well, we excel in managing and conserving our forest areas. Thank you.”
  Management of EU forests
• “In Europe, this should freeze in our veins. We've seen that 50,000 migrant children have disappeared over the last three years. Many of these were put into the hands of a paedophile. Gangs and various affairs, such as the casino affair have shown that our children are in danger and these children were sold or humiliated online. So we have this horror. So we must, uh, crack down on these butchers. We must take down these, uh, we must take down this content. We must increase, uh, what we're doing, we must be severe. But let's be clear about what our target is. We must not have a Trojan horse, uh, approach where we introduce mass mass surveillance. We mustn't attack privacy. We want to dismantle all paedophile networks, and we want to have protection of our borders, physical and digital protection of our borders. In Europe, it's about protecting our civilisations. But first of all, our children.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• “Thank you. I'll now give the floor back to the reporter, Madame Androuet, for conclusions. Thank you. By way of introduction, I would just like to dispel a couple of myths. I would just remind you that often families and farmers themselves come to the Rassemblement National when they hear about the type of things that you're talking about. So saying that we're not listening makes me laugh. Yes, we need to listen to them. The fact that there were thousands of farmers in the streets is because of the administrative chaos, and that is the Green Deal. The Green Deal has had many unintended consequences. Your words made me laugh in order not to cry, because people are suffering because of this administrative red tape. We're not saying deregulation, but we do need to improve the situation. It doesn't make me happy to know that tons and tons of Ukrainian grains are coming onto the European market, the same for Ukrainian poultry, where they don't respect any of the conditions that are imposed on our own farmers. So we're against this unbridled competition, and that's why we want to see mirror clauses. We're in favour of mirror clauses. We are not in favour of deregulation. We want protection. So please don't put words in my mouth. For example, 50% of local products as an objective for our canteens. There are some European countries that ask public institutions to, when carrying out public tender, they're actually not favourable to local products, and that means not favouring the environment either. So we have to reflect on the impact that we're going to have, and also to focus on regenerative agriculture. Also, think about how we can manage pesticides in a reasonable manner through new technical developments. I think innovation is a healthy way to look at agriculture. So we have to work smartly in the service of farmers and European consumers. But I think that some groups, when you look at the text, you're thinking about, you know, please forget about ideology and think about how we can best protect our farmers and consumers.”
  Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports