Arkadiusz MULARCZYK

Policy topics Arkadiusz MULARCZYK is active on

What Arkadiusz MULARCZYK has said (50)

• 2026-06-17 “(16:21:41 – 16:22:55): Europe has been, stating that we need to electrify our economy. We need to build new, photovoltaic farms. We need to have more charging stations and production. And this is coming closer and closer to the individual citizens and where they live. I have received complaints from, inhabitants of a small village that are going to see a large, energy storage warehouse close to their homes, and we are not monitoring this. We are not imposing any distance between these facilities and housing. So this is a gap in our legislation. We this is a free for all. Large EU funds are going to be channeled towards large photovoltaic farms and, storage facilities which are located close to people's homes. The inhabitants of those homes are protesting. We need to look at security 1st and then develop, energy. Thank you. That was the last speaker that we're able to accept. This was is the next last speaker. Sorry. Mister Grangelist.”
  EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects
• 2026-06-16 “(11:17:42 – 11:18:51): Thank you. In the face of escalation of the Middle East crisis, what is necessary is effective international diplomacy, especially the EU's diplomacy. Several days ago in the UN, on the June 3, there was a vote where the Germans dramatically lost their race to be a permanent member of the security council. They lost with Austria and Portugal. I would like to congratulate the, MAPs from Austria and Portugal because they will represent the EU in the Security Council UN Security Council. So this dramatic result, this defeat of Germany, 104 votes, Austria got 130. Isn't it a sign of a lack of trust in the dominating country of the EU, Germany, which has, for many years, been negatively influencing our foreign policy of the EU? What's your opinion on this policy?”
  EU foreign policy approach
• 2026-02-05 “E-000467/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the revelations referenced in the written question through press coverage and publicly available information. The Commission acknowledges the importance of addressing the rights and claims of EU citizens who may have historical entitlements tied to any bank accounts. The EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) 1 and the Terezín Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues 2 , signed by all Member States in 2009 3 , outline several measures towards restorative justice for the victims of Nazi persecution and their descendants. The United States of America and Switzerland are signatories to this Declaration, which includes compensation mechanisms. The responsibility to enforce applicable requirements of EU law and, where relevant, national law transposing the latter, lies with the relevant EU and national authorities. In particular, EU banking supervisors are competent in matters relating to the provision of banking services by the UBS group entities in the EU and cooperate with the Swiss supervisory authority in this context. However, for activities that were or are performed in Switzerland, the relevant Swiss supervisory or judicial authorities are in charge. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=COM:2021:615:FIN&pk_campaign=doc&pk_source=EURLex&pk_medium=tw&pk_keyword=No2Antisemitism . 2 https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/terezin_declaration/index.html. 3 See also: https://www.lootedart.com/web_images/pdf2018/1.1.3%20Joint_Declaration_EU_CZ_final.pdf .”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism · EU policy on victims' compensation rights
• 2025-11-24 “E-004678/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The respect of the rights of persons belonging to minorities is one of the founding values of the EU explicitly mentioned in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. Moreover, any discrimination on the basis of membership of a national minority is explicitly prohibited under Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Racial Equality Directive 1 offers protection against discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin with regard to certain specific areas. It neither affects the rights of national minorities as such nor requires the recognition of such a status. The EU does not have the competence to mandate changes in the political, administrative and institutional framework existing in the Member States regarding the status of national minorities. In fact, it is for Member States to legislate as regards national minorities, in particular over issues relating to the recognition of the status of such minorities, their selfdetermination and autonomy or the regime governing the use of regional or minority languages. In its reply 2 to the European Citizens' Initiative ‘Minority SafePack’, the Commission noted that the full implementation of legislation and policies in place provides a powerful set of measures to protect persons belonging to national and linguistic minorities and to strengthen cultural and linguistic diversity in the Union. 1 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 22–26. 2 Communication from the Commission on the European Citizens' Initiative 'Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe', C/2021/0171 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=PI_COM:C(2021)171”
  EU competences on human rights · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2025-11-12 “E-004489/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) is aware of this case and wishes to recall that the EU consistently calls on Iran to respect due process rights for the accused, to ensure that those in detention or imprisonment are not subjected to mistreatment and to pursue a consistent policy towards the abolition of capital punishment. The HR/VP will continue to voice the EU’s long-standing opposition to the death penalty at all times and under all circumstances and support the Iranian people’s fundamental aspiration for a future where their universal rights and freedoms are fully respected and upheld.”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2025-11-12 “E-004492/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission As already indicated in the reply to parliamentary question E-001695/2024 and E002766/2024, which also related to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, the European arrest warrant is an entirely judicial procedure between the judicial authorities in the Member States based on the particular circumstances of each individual case where surrender is requested. Neither the Commission nor the Member States’ governments can interfere with or influence the decisions taken by judicial authorities. As the Honourable Members know, on 3 December 2025 the Council presidency and the European Parliament’s representatives reached a provisional agreement on the Commission’s proposal for a regulation to phase out imports of Russian natural gas. The regulation constitutes a central element of the EU's REPowerEU roadmap to end dependency on Russian energy following Russia's weaponisation of gas supplies with significant effects on the European energy market.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2025-11-12 “E-004490/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission With regard to the application of the Victims’ Rights Directive 1 and the EU funding opportunities in the area of victims’ rights, the Commission wishes to refer the Honourable Member to the response it had provided to parliamentary question E-003059/2025 2 . There is currently no additional update. Furthermore, the EU Policy Framework on Transitional Justice was designed to guide EU support to third countries emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule, and it does not operate as an internal legal instrument within the EU. Nonetheless, the same victim-centred principles that underlie the Policy Framework – such as truth, justice and reparation – also inform the EU’s approach to victims’ rights inside the EU, notably through, the Victims’ Rights Directive, interpreted in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as through the EU Strategy on Victims’ Rights (2020 – 2025). 1 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57. 2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html.”
  EU policy on victims' compensation rights · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-08-27 “E-003301/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Merger control aims to prevent concentrations that would significantly impede effective competition in the internal market including by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. The acquisition of Ceconomy by JD.com was notified for merger control to the national competition authorities of some Member States, including the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK), and not to the Commission as the thresholds of the EU Merger Regulation ((EC) 139/2004) were not met. If the relevant criteria are fulfilled, the parties will have to notify the transaction to the Commission (under the Foreign Subsidies, Regulation, (EU) 2022/2560). If so, the Commission will assess whether there could be foreign subsidies that distort the internal market. The General Data Protection Regulation ((EU) 2016/679) prevents personal data of EU consumers from being transferred to entities in third countries without adequate safeguards, and its provisions would apply in this instance. Moreover, access to or control of sensitive information, including personal data, is assessed in the screening mandated under the Foreign Direct Investment Regulation ((EU) 2019/452). The risk of increasing economic dependence in strategic sectors was acknowledged in the Commission’s Economic Security Strategy, which aims to protect the EU from economic security risks by better deploying instruments available in the EU toolbox, including trade defence instruments, foreign subsidies screening, foreign direct investment screening and export controls. The Commission is continuing to implement and refine these instruments while developing a new economic security doctrine, that will set out the strategic use of the EU’s economic security tools.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · International data transfers · Trade relations with China
• 2025-08-27 “E-003302/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission With regard to the situation of the employees situated in Poland and other EU Member States, Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses 1 , protects employees’ rights in the event of a change of employer. As stated in Article 1(2) of the forementioned Directive, the Directive applies ‘where and in so far as the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be transferred is situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty’, also in cases where the transferee’s headquarters are established outside the EU. Where the Directive applies, ‘the transferor’s rights and obligations arising from a contract of employment or from an employment relationship existing on the date of a transfer shall, by reason of such transfer, be transferred to the transferee’ (Article 3(1)) and that the transfer ‘shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by the transferor or the transferee’ (Article 4(1)). This means that the transfer cannot in itself justify the dismissal of workers in the transferred business or change in working conditions. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/23/oj.”
  EU policy on social & environmental impact of foreign investments · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2025-08-04 “P-003177/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis On behalf of the European Commission 1. The Italian recovery and resilience plan does not contain any measure for the compensation of Second World War victims in Italy. The media reports quoted by the Honourable Member appear to refer to the ‘Fondo per il ristoro dei danni subiti dalle vittime di crimini di guerra e contro l’umanità’, a fund established by Italian national legislation through Decree-Law n. 36, of 30 April 2022, converted with modifications by Law n. 79 of 29 June 2022. This fund aims to provide reparations for damages sustained by victims of Second World War crimes and crimes against humanity committed on Italian territory or suffered by Italian citizens. While this Law indeed mainly contains provisions related to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the fund falls under Chapter VII on Justice Measures and is explicitly not part of measures under the RRF. The financial resources allocated to this fund derive from two national sources specified in the law, with no involvement of the RRF. 2. Similarly, no agreement was made between the Commission and the German and Italian authorities regarding the use of RRF funds for such a compensation. The RRF focuses on making European economies more sustainable and better prepared for the green and digital transitions. Consequently, compensation related to historical events falls outside the scope of the RRF. All Member States’ plans are publicly available via the Commission website 1 . 3. Since no RRF funds are allocated for this purpose, the question regarding the legal basis does not arise. 1 Country pages – Commission: https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economicrecovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/country-pages_en.”
  Conditions to access EU budget
• 2025-07-23 “E-003058/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The respect of the rights of persons belonging to minorities is one of the founding values of the EU explicitly mentioned in Article 2 of the Treaty on the EU. However, the EU lacks the competence to mandate changes in the political, administrative and institutional framework existing in the Member States regarding the status of national minorities. In fact, it has no general power to legislate as regards national minorities as such, in particular over issues relating to the recognition of the status of such minorities, their selfdetermination and autonomy or the regime governing the use of regional or minority languages. It is primarily a Member State’s responsibility to deal with the sensitive and complex issue of addressing the horrors and crimes committed in the past by totalitarian regimes. Within its competence, the Commission can facilitate the process of remembrance by encouraging discussion and sharing of experiences, as well as promoting best practices.”
  EU and national cultural identities · EU competences on human rights
• 2025-07-23 “E-003059/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission wishes to refer the Honourable Member to its responses provided to parliamentary questions P-002838/2024 1 , P-000819/2025 2 and E-002079/2025 3 and to recall that it is a Member State’s responsibility to deal with the sensitive and complex issue of addressing the horrors and crimes committed in the past by totalitarian regimes. When it comes to the issue of seeking redress in the case raised by the Honourable Member, the Commission would like to clarify that where criminal proceedings take place in a Member State, Article 16 of the Victims’ Rights Directive 4 applies. It provides for a right to a decision on compensation from the offender in the course of criminal proceedings, except where national law provides for such a decision to be made in other legal proceedings. The Commission highlights that it provides funding opportunities, including under the Justice programme 5 , the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme 6 and the Technical Support Instrument 7 to protect and support victims of crime in the EU and strengthen their rights. None of these instruments, however, is directly related to the funding of transitional justice activities. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2024-002838-ASW_EN.html. 2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000819-ASW_EN.html. 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html. 4 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57. 5 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/justice-programme_en. 6 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/citizens-equality-rightsand-values-programme/citizens-equality-rights-and-values-programme-overview_en. 7 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/technical-supportinstrument/technical-support-instrument-tsi_en.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · EU policy on victims' compensation rights
• 2025-07-09 “E-002808/2025 Answer given by Mr Micallef on behalf of the European Commission The Directive 2014/60/EU 1 establishes a harmonised system of cooperation between Member States to facilitate the return of cultural objects, defined by a Member State as being among national treasures 2 , which have been unlawfully removed from the territory of that Member State. The Directive also establishes return actions before national courts with harmonised limitation periods and institutes a system of national authorities to facilitate administrative cooperation and information exchange. The Directive applies solely to those cultural objects that left the territory of a Member State on, or after, 1 January 1993. Nevertheless, pursuant to Article 15 of the Directive, Member States may voluntarily choose to extend the system to cultural objects other than national treasures and to cultural objects unlawfully removed before this date. In the absence of the application of Article 15, Member States can refer to other frameworks (1954 Hague Convention 3 , Washington Principles 4 , Council of Europe’s resolutions, EU primary law) and specific national legislation and bilateral agreements where they exist. 1 Directive 2014/60/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 (recast), OJ L 159/1, 28.5.2014; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/60/oj/eng. 2 These cultural objects are defined by a Member State as being among the ‘national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value’ under national legislation or administrative procedures within the meaning of Article 36 TFEU. 3 https://www.unesco.org/en/legal-affairs/convention-protection-cultural-property-event-armed-conflictregulations-execution-convention. 4 https://www.state.gov/washington-conference-principles-on-nazi-confiscated-art.”
  EU and national cultural identities
• 2025-07-08 “P-002767/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recognises the challenges posed by security threats and unauthorised secondary migration and is committed to addressing their root causes. As concerns refusals of entries at the internal border, the Commission is in close contact with the German authorities and with the authorities of all Member States concerned to obtain the necessary information on measures taken and their practical implementation. Given the recent notification of a prolongation of internal border controls by Germany, the Commission, under Article 27a (3) of the Schengen Borders Code, has initiated a consultation process with Germany and its neighbouring countries. In this context, the Commission continues to stress the importance of both mitigating and alternative measures 1 . At this point, the Commission considers that the above-mentioned consultation process is the most appropriate approach to encourage Member States to take alternative measures and phase out internal border controls. 1 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/268 of 23 November 2023 on cooperation between the Member States with regard to serious threats to internal security and public policy in the area without internal border controls. C(2023) 8139 final.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-06-25 “P-002571/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not intervene in the elections of Member States, nor in the activities of Members of the European Parliament. The conduct and organisation of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their constitutional and legislative rules, subject to EU law and their international obligations. National competent authorities and courts have the primary responsibility of ensuring compliance with these rules, as well as of protecting the fairness and integrity of the electoral processes.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2025-06-18 “E-002462/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not have general powers to intervene in elections of the Member States. The conduct and organisation of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their constitutional and legislative rules, subject to EU law and their international obligations. The Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, which will enter into full application on 10 October 2025 provides for common transparency and accountability standards in the context of the provision of political advertising services in the internal market. National authorities are competent to monitor and enforce the application of the new rules. The Commission supports the exchange of best practice and information between Member States to strengthen the fairness and integrity of electoral processes, including through the European Cooperation Network on Elections which brings together representatives of Member States’ authorities with competence in electoral matters. Furthermore, the Commission is currently preparing the European Democracy Shield, which will provide a strategic approach to safeguard and strengthen democracy in the EU. In this context the Commission will also continue to support the fairness and integrity of electoral and other democratic processes. The Commission is also preparing a civil society strategy, to propose a framework for action at EU and Member State level with the aim to strengthen meaningful engagement with and protection of civil society actors active across a broad set of EU policies.”
  Transparency requirements for interest groups · EU engagement with civil society
• 2025-06-05 “E-002282/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission EU humanitarian action aims at preserving human life, preventing and alleviating human suffering and helping people to maintain dignity in face of natural hazards and humaninduced disasters. It abides by the humanitarian principles 1 – humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence – and the international humanitarian law 2 . The provision of aid is based on independently assessed needs and not channelled via governments. Under no circumstances is such assistance intended to support governments’ political agendas. As the Commission noted in its reply to written question E-002542/2024 3 , the assistance provided to Cuba in 2024 included in-kind assistance and EUR 4.4 million for emergency response, and the long-term support to strengthen development and resilience. Regarding the modalities for administering this aid, the Honourable Member is referred to the 2021 Commission’s Communication on the EU’s humanitarian action 4 , confirming the humanitarian aid framework within which Member States and institutions have agreed to work. EU cooperation with Cuba is anchored in the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) 5 and aims at improving the living conditions of the Cuban population. EU funding is directly transmitted to the implementing agencies in charge of the various EU projects, be it United Nations agencies, agencies of Member States or European nongovernmental organisations. In the framework of the PDCA, the EU is following the reform processes in Cuba and pushing for advancements through constructive engagement, guided by the EU’s founding principles, such as the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which the EU seeks to advance worldwide 6 . 1 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/who/humanitarian-principles_en. 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/humanitarian-aid/international-humanitarianlaw_en. 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/hacommunication2021.pdf. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2016:337I:FULL&from=en. 6 Article 21(1) of the Treaty on EU, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12016M/TXT&from=EN.”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · EU-Cuba relations
• 2025-06-05 “E-002281/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The EU has adopted several legislative measures that address the threat from criminal organisations, including the ones involved in drug trafficking that are targeted by the executive order referenced by the Honourable Member. These measures include the Directive criminalising money laundering 1 , the Directive on asset recovery and confiscation 2 and a package of new anti-money-laundering rules 3 . Half of the EU’s most dangerous criminal networks are involved in drug trafficking. Although the EU has recently increased its preparedness in relation to drug-related threats 4 , notably by expanding the mandate of the EU Drugs Agency, further actions are necessary, as the threat of organised crime continues to grow, fuelled by geopolitical tension and technological advancements 5 . The Commission will work in close cooperation with the Member States to propose a new EU drugs strategy and will present an EU action plan against drug trafficking. Moreover, the EU’s new Internal Security Strategy 6 - ProtectEU - announces a wide range of actions, including a legislative proposal for modernised rules on organised crime in 2026 and work to explore the feasibility of a new EU-wide system to track organised crime profits and terrorist financing. Moreover, ProtectEU includes the option of exploring additional restrictive measures targeting criminal networks, in line with Common Foreign Security Policy objectives, and enhanced partnerships with key regions, such as Latin America where several of the designated cartels and organisations are based. 1 Directive (EU) 2018/1673. 2 Directive (EU) 2024/1260. 3 Directive (EU) 2024/1640, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 and Regulation (EU) 2024/1620. 4 COM(2023) 641 final. 5 Annual report by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) - the EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (2025), https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/mainreports/socta-report. 6 COM(2025) 148 final.”
  Anti-money laundering regulation · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-05-22 “E-002079/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The funding initiatives referred to are provided under external action instruments. In the EU’s external action, the majority of the transitional justice-related programmes are supported under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. Notably, transitional justice is supported as part of the ongoing programming phase under NDICI Global Europe, often as part of broader programmes in the field of justice and rule of law. However, such external action instruments are not applicable inside the EU. Otherwise, the Commission wishes to refer the honourable member to its responses provided to parliamentary questions P-002838/2024 1 and P-000819/2025 2 . There is currently no further update. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2024-002838-ASW_EN.html. 2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000819-ASW_EN.html.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · EU policy on victims' compensation rights
• 2025-03-12 “E-001060/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission Conflicts of interests involving Members of the Commission are dealt within the framework of the Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission 1 , which details the ethical rules applicable to Members of the Commission enshrined in the relevant articles on the Treaties, namely Article 17(3) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. However, the participation of a Commissioner in a political debate is not covered by the definition of conflict of interest in Article 2(6) of the Code of Conduct, which reads: ‘A conflict of interest arises where a personal interest may influence the independent performance of their duties. Personal interests include, but are not limited to, any potential benefit or advantage to Members themselves, their spouses, partners or direct family members. A conflict of interest does not exist where a Member is only concerned as a member of the general public or of a broad class of persons.’ The Commission publishes information on meetings held by Members of the College with, among others, representatives of public authorities or political parties of the Member States on their online public calendars or through other channels of communication. Additionally, the Commission publishes information on all meetings as well as the minutes of the meetings held by Members of the College and their Cabinets with interest representatives in accordance with Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3081 2 . Meetings with representatives of public authorities or political parties as well as meetings of a purely private or social character are excluded from this Decision. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2018.065.01.0007.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AC%3A2018%3A065%3ATO C. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3081/oj/eng.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-02-23 “P-000819/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission reiterates its reply to parliamentary question P-002838/2024 1 , which underlines that it is a Member State’s responsibility to deal with the sensitive and complex issue of addressing the horrors and crimes committed in the past by totalitarian regimes. The Commission cannot intervene in matters outside the scope of the Treaties on which the EU is founded. As regards specifically the access to reparation of Polish World War II victims and their families for harm caused during the war, there are no applicable EU rules on this matter. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2024-002838-ASW_EN.html”
  Remembrance of communism/Soviet Union
• 2025-02-13 “E-000685/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission In its Communication from 11 June 2025 1 , the Commission presented a state of play of the progress made at EU and national level in the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum 2 , and provided an overview of the state of implementation in relation to each of the ten building blocks set out in the Common Implementation Plan 3 . All Member States have established planning and coordination mechanisms to deliver at the operational level, and have appointed contact points at senior and technical level that work in close contact with the Commission. Regarding the national implementation plans, 25 Member States have submitted their plans to the Commission to date. In their plans, Member States have addressed the administrative, operational and legal measures needed for the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, and the work on the necessary legislative and operational changes has started across Member States. The Commission maintains a continuous dialogue with all Member States to provide direct assistance and tailor-made support, to monitor the progress in the implementation, and to address possible delays. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0319. 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2024%3A251%3AFIN.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-12-19 “E-003063/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission EU macro-regional strategies were not set up with a specific focus on fostering economic convergence between Member States that joined the EU before and after 2004. Rather, the strategies address shared regional challenges within a single macro-region, such as environmental issues, transport and energy security, that cannot be effectively addressed by individual countries alone. The 4 macro-regional strategies have been operating for over a decade and have added value in guiding cross-border cooperation, enhancing policy alignment between countries, mobilising funding, and engaging stakeholders. These are complemented by 4 sea-basin strategies, with a maritime and blue economy dimension. Although the impact of these strategies on macro-economic parameters is difficult to quantify, they contribute to policy development, indirectly promoting the socio-economic development of the EU and its regions. Macro-regional cooperation has been instrumental in improving the navigability of the Danube River and in cutting red tape for inland navigation operators. The objectives of macro-regional and sea-basin strategies are complementary to those of the Three Seas Initiative, which is a country-led initiative that aims to promote economic growth, energy security, and infrastructure development in the wider region. Together, these initiatives can facilitate regional dialogue and close infrastructure gaps through coordinated transnational actions, for example by advancing key corridors in the framework of the transEuropean transport network.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2024-12-10 “P-002838/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission It is primarily a Member State’s responsibility to deal with the sensitive and complex issue of addressing the horrors and crimes committed in the past by totalitarian regimes. Within its competence, the Commission can facilitate the process of remembrance by encouraging discussion and sharing of experiences, as well as promoting best practices. Keeping the memory of totalitarian regimes alive is a collective duty as a tribute to and respect for the victims. Preserving this memory nourishes not only the commitment of the European Union to democracy and the respect of fundamental rights, but also to the fight against modern manifestations of intolerance, extremism and historical revisionism. The EU is currently funding many initiatives worldwide, aimed at providing reparations and redress to victims in the framework of its transitional justice activities. None of such programmes is dedicated to the process of transitional justice in relation to crimes committed during the World War II either in Poland or in any other Member States.”
  EU policy on victims' compensation rights · Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
• 2024-11-28 “P-002696/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is closely monitoring the situation regarding the import of fertilisers into the EU from Russia and Belarus. While reflecting on possible new measures, upholding food security remains among EU’s primary consideration. Any measure should contribute to preserve a competitive EU fertilisers industry, reduce dependencies while also ensuring that EU farmers have access to ample and diverse sources of fertilisers. It is worth mentioning that some fertilisers types, albeit not urea or nitrogen fertilisers, are also subject to restrictions under EU sanctions, i.e. a quota on imports of potash fertilisers from Russia 1 and a ban on Belarus 2 . Where there is unfair competition stemming from imports, the EU uses trade defence instruments to restore fair competition. There are anti-dumping measures in place on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate from, inter alia, Russia 3 which are currently subject to an expiry review. There are also measures in place on ammonium nitrate from Russia. Where measures are no longer effective, they may be reviewed. The trade defence process is normally driven by complaints or requests from industry giving evidence of unfairly dumped or subsidised imports of products or showing that there are changes of a lasting nature which require a change to existing measures. EU industry should contact the complaints office of Directorate-General for Trade for advice. 1 Article 3i of Council Regulation 833/2014; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0833-20241217 2 Article 1i of Council Regulation 765/2006; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02006R0765-20241216 3 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1688 of 8 October 2019; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019R1688”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2024-10-10 “P-002018/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The EU emerged from the horrors of World War II. The scale of the crimes, mass murders and genocides committed under the Nazi regime were unseen in human history. The memories of Europe’s tragic past must be kept alive. Remembering the victims of World War II, researching and teaching about this darkest page of Europe’s history, is essential for the unity of Europe and its citizens. This is the EU’s joint responsibility. This is the basis for understanding the values that underpin the EU today: respect of human dignity, fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law. The Commission has supported the Member States to maintain memorial sites of former Nazi concentration and death camps through EU funds. It will continue to do so. For instance, the EU Cohesion policy has funded different projects over the years in Poland, including the ones that provide support for the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum 1 . The Commission is also supporting initiatives coming from civil society organisations and public authorities, to engage on European remembrance, including the crimes committed by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, the Holocaust, through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and Erasmus+. In addition, the Commission is committed to ensuring Holocaust education, research and remembrance as part of its EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) 2 . 1 e.g. https://mapadotacji.gov.pl/projekty/781748/, https://mapadotacji.gov.pl/projekty/746970/, https://mapadotacji.gov.pl/projekty/717528/, https://mapadotacji.gov.pl/projekty/722350/ 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=COM:2021:615:FIN&pk_campaign=doc&pk_source=EURLex&pk_medium=tw&pk_keyword=No2Antisemitism”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism
• 2024-10-03 “E-001938/2024 Answer given by Ms Kyriakides on behalf of the European Commission Member State authorities are responsible for the control and enforcement of the maximum residue levels (MRLs) of pesticides. Where they identify an exceedance of a MRLs, they perform a consumer exposure assessment and take enforcement actions as needed. These actions may include, for example, prohibiting the placing of products on the market or recalling products from the market. Moreover, if pesticide residues are found at a level of concern for consumers, through the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), they can notify the non-compliance and inform on the measures taken to protect consumers. None of the existing RASFF notifications related to propargite involve honey or honey-related products. Beeswax, not being foodstuff, is not covered by specific MRLs established by Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council 1 which applies to food and feed only. However, there are specific MRLs established for honey for all non-approved substances, including propargite, which are controlled by the Member States. Should there be cross-contamination from beeswax to honey (e.g. within the hives or later in the production chain), this would be identified by detectable residues levels in honey and be followed up by Member States’ enforcement authorities. Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/832 of 5 June 2018 2 set the MRLs for propargite in honey at the specific limit of determination, which means technical zero. The value for this limit of determination (0.05 mg/kg in this case) is based on the information provided by the European Union Reference Laboratories. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2005/396/oj 2 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/832/oj”
  GMOs
• “And my colleagues after. Yes. Thank you. I would like to thank you for your presentation. It was very interesting for us and especially I would like to ask you about the human rights for victims in Ukraine and in the in the broader context for victims of the conflict, especially to after the World War two. And I would like to ask you about the mechanism that actually gives European Union victims a chance today to the case, to the court, take their case to the court, because now we talking about the situation in Ukraine or about the different contexts, how we can stop this conflict. But we should think about the victims, Ukrainian victims and not only Ukrainian victims, but from other countries. And we still have a lot of victims who have suffered after the Second World War, and they don't have a chance to take Germany to the court because there is there is the state immunity. And I see this is a big problem, especially for many poles, Greek and Italian and other people, citizens, European Union. Thank you.”
  EU competences on human rights
• “Thank you. Thank you. Commissioner. Colleagues, we expect the new budget post 2027 to be based on integrity, transparency and equal treatment. However, if we look back over the years, what we've witnessed is actually using various financing instruments as political weapons. My country, Poland, for the past two years have received has received no funds because of the alleged problems with the rule of law. Ursula von der Leyen was defining milestones for the Polish government at some stage that had to be achieved to block the fund's colleagues after elections where Donald Tusk won his nominee. Ehm present here, Commissioner Serafin. Then the whole situation changed and suddenly the funds started to flow despite not having met the milestones. Rule of law is suddenly a reality and funds flow. So my question to commissioner colleagues.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “Thank you very much. I'll speak Polish. Let me stress that both the ECR Group and Poland. We welcome the position of the European Commission, which decisively is willing to use a Russian sovereign assets to finance military support for Ukraine. I'm known in Poland for preparing a report on German damages to Poland during World War II, and for 18 months we've been trying to raise interest in reparations unpaid to Poland and Greece for World War II. But we have not found any understanding there so far. And I am surprised, because the issue of reparations and human rights, those are fundamental issues in the European Union. It's something that we try to promoting elsewhere in Asia, in Africa. But apparently the same rules are not applied to Greece or Poland, which are member states of the EU. The current Polish prime minister visited Germany yesterday. He met with Chancellor Mertz, who said once again that the issue of reparations was closed, although there is no agreement in place between Poland and Germany concluded after World War II. The Polish prime Minister said something that was, uh, uh, quite polarizing for the Polish public debate. He said that the Polish government would pay reparations or compensation for victims of World War two who are still alive. So the Polish prime minister, in fact, wants the Polish people to pay the second time round for German damages in Poland. Similarly, we know that in Greece the damages are paid by the Greek government. So my question to you is why are you turning a blind eye on this issue? Why are you willing to help Ukraine and you are unwilling to help Italy, Greece or Poland? Why are you failing to address this issue? Thank you.”
  Polish-Ukraine historical conflict
• “Thank you, Mister Chairman. I welcome the rapporteur's realistic approach to international security. Cooperation with the United States remains essential for Europe's defense and global stability, but this partnership must go hand in hand with great responsibility on our side. The EU and its member states need to increase defense spending, strengthen capabilities, and coordinate the security policies more effectively. Only then will we be ready to face current threats and protect the values on which Europe is built. At the same time, we will table amendments to further strengthen the report to call for higher defense spending, stronger capabilities, and better coordination of security policy among the European Union member states. Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “I will be speaking on behalf of ECR Group. Uh, first of all I would like to thank you all of these who have spoken today. Uh, there is a lot of on the, on this plenary hall. There's a lot of new member of European Parliament. So, so this is a very important reason for us because we never heard about the political and human rights situation in Bangladesh. Uh, as we get the material before the commission. We see a lot of very important things about the political situation political repression, cyber security act, refugee crisis, crisis and forced disappearance and torture problem with the freedom of speech and labour rights. Women's and girls rights, disability rights and international response. So we are delighted that and to hear that the EU resolution has had an effect in this, in this issue. And I think we will be, uh, we, uh, this issue will be closed for us and we will be observing the situation in the future. So thank you once again.”
  EU-Myanmar relations
• “Thank you. I'll speak Polish. Madam High Representative, regarding the war in Ukraine, you and other European leaders. Are showing a degree of skepticism in light of the efforts undertaken by American diplomacy. Personally, I am a great fan of. I'm not the greatest fan of rapprochement of the Russian border towards my country, Poland. But when it comes to the war in Ukraine. European policy has been quite hesitant and cautious. 102. Leopard. Leopard tanks have been transferred to Ukraine and before the war, Russia. Rather, Germany did not allow anti-drone systems to be transferred or indeed other kinds of equipment. Today, France and Belgium continue to refuse to cooperate when it comes to use of frozen Russian assets. All this brings me to this question. Do you think pressure should be exerted on these member States who are refusing to cooperate? Today? You have an opportunity to speak about the attitudes of some member states, for instance, Germany when it comes to the war in Ukraine. Furthermore, when we think about Bangladesh. We have a tragic situation, a real disaster on our hands. And it's the European Union that is funding the operations of the camps. So what can be done to make sure that Arab countries contribute to the funding of these refugee camps? I'm coming to a conclusion. Let me come to Latin America now. Venezuela. Do you share the attitude of the United States?”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “Thank you very much, chair. I just want to say that our debate is somewhat one sided, and we're not looking at the broader context in which Donald Trump's administration sits. Now, in Mexico, there's virtually a civil war going on and under pressure from the. And basically, there's all this pressure from the narcotics cartels. And for decades they have been putting pressure on American. On America. They terrorize their own citizens. And they also export terrorism and violence linked to drugs. Now, in the first instance, what Trump's administration wants to do, wants to do is to arrest these people who are connected to the cartels and to deport them. And. Um, however, obviously this is politically inspired as well. You've got these protests which have been well organized, um, by sureties open society. And uh, there are also, there's also propaganda which is flowing from other political parties, which tries to undermine anything that the Trump administration does. And I'd like to, uh, refer to another thing concerning ice. The Democratic governor of Minnesota called Ice today's Gestapo. Now, are we in Poland? Knew what the Gestapo was when it murdered millions of people in my country and elsewhere in Europe. And no one talks about, um, uh, the Gestapo, any relics of the Gestapo being in the European Parliament. And we also heard from the mayor that Ice is terrorizing its citizens now. We're not children. We shouldn't be naive. And we ought to also be aware that some of these issues are form part of political campaigns, and let's not be used as part of that campaign. Thank you.”
  EU-US relations
• “Thank you, I will speak Polish. India imports India imports thirty-five to forty percent of oil from Russia entirely. This reinforces Kremlin's budget and finances war on Ukraine. What kinds of measures does the European Commission take to limit it and not to allow the re-exports of such products to the EU market? The Droit Committee has been recently to Bangladesh and we saw a Rohingya refugee camp from Myanmar, from Burma, where one million three hundred thousand people live in dire conditions, really drastic conditions. Some of Rohingya refugees are sent from India to Burma and they need to live on twelve dollars per month, whole families. India is a country that might help to resolve this problem in relations with Bangladesh or with Burma. What kind of position has the European Commission taken on that head? I think that this should be really addressed strongly in the EU-India agenda. Thank you.”
  EU-India relations
• “The EU single market is, of course, a source of great opportunity for 450 million citizens, but also a considerable challenge because the European Commission is currently introducing rules which will counter a. Competitiveness. It's important for. For the red tape here to be reduced. We need some freedom to do a business. If you look at the Polish 75% of our businesses do exploit the EU single market, but they complain that they have been held back by red tape and they're unable to develop to their full potential. That's why it is so important to go back to basics and allow European businesses to act on a level playing field, together with third country businesses. Otherwise, we are going to end up losing out in our fight against these businesses.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “(11:55:06 – 11:56:22): The EU single market is, of course, a source of great opportunity for 450,000,000 citizens, but also a considerable challenge because the European Commission is currently introducing rules which will counter route to competitiveness. It's important for red tape here to be reduced. We need some freedom to do a business. If you look at to the Polish economy, 75% of our businesses do exploit the EU single market, but they complain that they're being held back by red tape and they're unable to develop to their full potential. That's why it is so important to go back to basics and allow European businesses to act on a level playing field together with the third country businesses. Otherwise, we are going to end up losing out in fight against these businesses. Thank you Very much. Everybody coming to the room, please take your seats quietly because we wish to proceed with a debate. Oyanna Aragotte Martinez.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you. Well. In Poland, the Mercosur agreement is considered by the majority of the population and mostly the farmers, as damaging and dangerous. Uh. It would lead to the import of cheap food from South America. It would lead to a lack of competition with European farmers, who are bound by higher standards when producing food, which would then lead to a dangerous situation for many European farmers, including Polish farmers. Agricultural production will just not be profitable anymore. So what I would like to underline, and I participated in the mission of our Committee to Latin America. It was underlined that many producers in Mercosur are actually Chinese companies. I don't know if you knew that. So my question is, from a geopolitical point of view, is it reasonable to make Europe, those countries that sustain themselves by agricultural production, so central Europe, but also Ireland, France, Austria? Do we want to be dependent on food produced by partners? At the other end of the world, transport takes weeks and could be easily paralyzed in crisis situations, for example when supply chains are interrupted, as we saw it with Covid. So do you see any threat like this that if another pandemic hits in two or 3 or 5 years, Europe would be a continent without food? That is not able to sustain itself. I think it is a huge threat and an easy way to manipulate food safety for Europe. And for Europeans. So do you see such threats? Thank you very much.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “I would like to ask two questions question about the human rights and about the situation in Poland especially. I would like to speak in Polish, so please. Cadenze and the previous term, the previous government was heavily criticized by non-governmental organizations, including the Parliament, for alleged violations of democracy. So Poland had a European funds suspended, given a violation of article seven. After the the government was changed, nothing had changed in terms of, um, um, milestones, but, uh, the funds were released and since then, regularly, um, human rights are being violated. In Poland, for example, um, a Council of Europe parliamentarian was arrested right now for, uh, a Euro parliamentarians are subject of an immunity waiver and one, uh, Catholic priest was arrested, allegedly because he had committed some, uh, frauds. And Prime Minister Poland says that we have fighting democracy in Poland, fighting the opposition. But the European Parliament, the euro, the European Union is silent because we have a EPP as the government. So will you be still interested in the situation of Poland, a respected, irrespective of the government in place?”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “Thank you. On the 16th of September, 2024, Germany introduced unilateral border controls within the Schengen zone. At that time in Poland, but also in many other countries like in the Netherlands, a movement arose to defend borders. So citizens recorded proof that the German police is smuggling illegal migrants into Poland and posted them on social media on the 7th of July this year. The Polish government has taken the decision to introduce border controls at the border with Germany and with Lithuania are regarding this border as a critical infrastructure. I'd like to ask about the Danish experiences with these border controls, and will you use your experiences during your presidency? Because I think it is unheard of that our neighbour illegally smuggles illegal migrants from Germany into Poland, solving their problems at our cost. So I wanted to ask you about the Danish experiences about that, and what are you going to do about it during your presidency? Thank you very much.”
  Asylum & border control
• “I'm Polish. I come from a country that has the fight for democracy in its DNA, and it has a fight for independence and sovereignty in its DNA. Poland is now free. But before we were occupied by Soviet Russia. Before then, we were occupied by Germany. We've experienced occupation, war crimes and all that. So we're very sensitive. Especially to double standards. In your report. You've identified some authoritarian threats expressed in different types of policies around the world. Unfortunately, we're seeing the same trends in the European Commission's policies. They are also using a double standard. When a country seems to act in the along the same lines as the European Commission side, it's considered a good country, a good government. When a government does not fall into line, then they're accused of having problems with the democracy in their country. When my party was in power in Poland, your report, uh, I identified several obstacles to democracy, media freedom and so on. And two years after the government, uh, changed, you no longer see those threats. You no longer say that the public media is, uh, legally, uh, under the control of the government. You no longer say that the decisions of the Constitutional Court are no longer considered you. Close your eyes to the trials of people close to the government. And you didn't close your eyes to that when it happened before, so it's just not credible. It lacks credibility because the narrative is just following the policy of the hypocritical European Commission. Why in the Parliament do we have a cordon sanitaire? And the members of the Patriots can't take up important roles in the committees and the bureaus? Do you think this is a Democratic standard, or do you think it's authoritarian? Thank you.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “Thank you. And for the third group, thank you very much. I'll be speaking Polish. And thank you very much for your presentations. I also wanted to point to one of the problems, which is due to the fact that our asylum system, which is based on foundations, which used to be groundbreaking, but now which seems to be out of date and don't take into account the current realities. And of course, we hark back to the to Geneva 1952. But there is a huge migratory pressure and people Abuse some of the procedures and what we urgently need is revision of asylum law in order to make our laws efficient and in order to ensure that we can protect those people who need it. There is this, of course, people have talked about refoulement, and you can't just apply this for two people on the grounds of their ethnicity or their religious, um, or their religious beliefs. And, but of course, you've got the convention against torture, and we've got to heed those provisions and we've got to realise that even if we're talking about dangerous criminals, we've still got to be aware of the fact that in many cases, many cases, migrants are getting rid of their documents and lying about who they are and where they come from. And so we've got to put in place other safeguards, and we've obviously got to be able to have cooperation amongst our states, but we are not able to ascertain who people are when they come in. And so we don't know whether we can even send them back to. So obviously, we've got to renew our asylum procedures, and it's only in this way we can protect our own citizens. The the rights of our own citizens have got to take priority. Thank you.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you very much. This is a very nuanced situation in the Middle East, and we can hardly expect long lasting peace. Trump's policy of might or force has dismantled our previous beliefs. We need to understand that the countries of the Middle East are subject to different rules, different rules from Western democracies. For the ayatollahs of Iran. Peace for them is a show of weakness, not of strength. And what shows that is the nuclear agreement which was concluded during the Obama administration. If we look ahead, the hope or the idea that one of the most authoritarian regimes in the world might have a weapon, I mean, that was very close. Thanks to the actions of von der Leyen. But now that has not proven to be the case. Thank you very much.”
  EU-Iran relations
• “Dear colleagues, dear friends. Venezuela has become a central corridor for cocaine flows into Europe with corrupt security structures such as the so-called cartel de silos, enabling transatlantic roads that now feed violence, addiction and corruption inside our own union. This is not just a security issue. It is a profound human rights crisis for Venezuelans, for transit communities in Latin America and West Africa, and for the vulnerable people trapped in criminal economics in our own cities. For decades, the root causes of instability, poverty and crime across much of Latin America have been an unholy alliance between socialism and narco trafficking. Turning parts of the state into enforces and finances of criminal power. We see clearly in Venezuela how a regime that the European Parliament itself has deemed legitimate has fused with organized crime structures. While Cuban intelligence and security operatives help keep Nicolas Maduro coup proof and deepen repression against civil society and democratic actors, there is another path, and recent success stories show it from the dramatic improvements in public security in El Salvador to reformist, pro-market and anti-corruption agendas in countries like Argentina and Ecuador. The combination of dismantling cartel power and rejecting failed socialist economic models is starting to give citizens back their streets and their future. In this context, Donald Trump's decisive policy line toward Latin America aimed at confronting both drug cartels and the regimes that protect them, offers an opportunity for Atlantic coordination that puts human dignity, rule of law and democratic change first, including through sustained pressure on Maduro, whom even the EU does not recognize as a legitimate president. Finally, colleagues, this human rights subcommittee should send a clear message Europe will not tolerate a criminalized state apparatus in Venezuela that exports cocaine and repression while its people sink deeper into poverty. All members are therefore invited to co-sign my letter condemning the cartel, the lost souls, the Cuban support for the Maduro dictatorship, and calling for robust, coordinated transatlantic sanctions investigation and asset seizures. Thank you.”
  EU-Venezuela relations
• “After 20 years since the enlargement of the EU, we are dealing with systematic inequality between the old and the new member states. The direct payments for farmers in Western Europe are higher than those for farmers in Poland, for example. That is unfair and. We would also like to fight back against the fact that we are signing agreements like Mercosur, which is very unfair to Polish farmers. Through this agreement, many food products will enter Europe at a low price but of poor quality without controls. And this is going to be bad for Poland, bad for Ukraine. This is going to destroy agriculture in the EU. If if you let this happen, we will see this as a conscious decision made by the EU.”
  Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1) · Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Thank you very much, Commissioner. Ladies and gentlemen, I want to refer to a historical matter. In 1940, by decree of Hermann Goering. The Association of Poles in Germany was made illegally, was dissolved, their property was taken over by Nazi Germany and 80 years after Germany. Still refuses to give back that property. They do not want to rehabilitate the activists of the Association of Poles in Germany. Now, as many as 2 million poles live in Germany, and Germany still refuses to recognize them as Polish minority. So no money is given for learning the Polish language, and in German official instances there is no information available in the Polish language. So, Commissioner, I hope you address the German Chancellor and ask what is happening with the Association of Poles in Germany and why the Germans don't want to give back the property they stole during the war.”
  Polish-Ukraine historical conflict
• “Of the speakers here today. And for your presentation. During World War II, German Nazis used Polish child labor to help their war efforts. 200 Polish children were taken from their families and raise as a German child. Polish children were harmed, mutilated and forever scared. German children were forced to fight. In summary, eight years ago, terrible things happened. But ultimately for these children, Nothing was done then and nothing can be done now. This still alive cannot make claims for the harm they suffered. This is a clear breach of human rights. But today the exact parallels can be seen in Ukraine and in other conflict areas around the world. The question I have to ask is what have we done? What legal teeth do we have to help child victims? We have treaties that we can enforce against perpetrators, but we have no enforceable legislative act to help child victims. My question to the panel is simply what concrete efforts can be made to give child victims of conflict redress? Thank you.”
  EU competences on human rights
• “Thank you. I'd like to start with the positive content that I find in this report. I'm happy that the EU, US relations are still perceived as the foundation of Europe's security. Uh, we know that the rapporteurs political family is rather negatively inclined towards the new administration. So that's good. But also we need to promote nuclear energy as one of the clean sources of energy. For me personally, this is the only the only source of energy that is independent from the weather. I also like the provision on NATO and on increasing the armament for all the spending on, on arms, for and defense for, for all members. What I'm missing here are provisions or on the threats, uh, from resulting from uncontrolled, unlimited migration into Europe. Uh, President Trump has been very efficient in this area, and EU member states should learn their lessons from what the Americans do and take measures to protect. Our societies are less positive for me is item 15 and non accession of the EU to the Global Tax Agreement. These solutions could lead to a drainage of capital to tax havens, which would be negative for both the US and Europe. Except for those details, the draft report looks good and is a good base for further work. Thank you very much.”
  Asylum & border control · EU-US relations · Defence spending
• “Madam. You represent a country. That supports the agreement with Mercosur. You represent a country that. Is in favour of a free trade agreement with Ukraine. Europe wants to import cheap food from Ukraine and Mercosur that would flood the European market. Your country's policy is going to destroy the Common Agricultural Policy.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Thank you. Thank you to all the speakers here today and for for your presentations. We must use the momentum of having World Children's Day on 20th November and the 35th anniversary of the convention, to push forward the agenda concerning protecting children in today's world. However, in an attempt to improve children's rights, which of course, everyone must must support. How can we how can we measure the effectiveness of the current programmes? For example, in the joint statement by the European Commission and the High Representative on the occasion of World Children's Day, over ten strategies and programmes were referenced. How successful are these programmes? Do they coordinate their actions? What is the effect of the work? Are the EU benchmarks being applied in the EU's external policy? If yes, how effective are they in general? How effective is the EU strategy on the rights of the child and the European Child Guarantee on influencing your work in the in non-EU countries? Also, if we observe the EU states, we can see that they are taking direct legislative actions. The new US administration will probably legislate to stop children being mutilated because of gender identity ideology. In Australia, they will ban social media for under 16 years old. Does the panel think that there is a case for following the example set by some non-EU states and have focused, simplified way of dealing with protecting children's rights and taking a more direct approach through Member States legislation. Thank you.”
  Support for families