Marcin SYPNIEWSKI

Policy topics Marcin SYPNIEWSKI is active on

What Marcin SYPNIEWSKI has said (60)

• 2026-06-15 “Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. On the 1 hand, we've got the EU. On the other hand, The United States. It's difficult to talk about equilibrium because we have gotten rid of all the arguments. The more powerful dictates, their stance to the weaker, and Europe is the weaker partner because The US is now fully controlling global energy interest. And Europe has lost energy sovereignty. We are dependent. We have to import energy, sources, and this crazy situation is going to go on. Look at this. The World Cup in 1994 took place in The US, and then all those who are great, in, football adjusted to Europe. We could watch matches at normal European hours, and now we have to adjust. And the same goes for trade. Europe doesn't matter as much, and we see it during the negotiations. In order to gain respect and have a position of power, you need to act wisely. And today, Europe is just an open air museum. We have to get rid of the green deal, and only then we will be able to negotiate better agreements.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2026-03-05 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question 1. Under Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU [1] , EU action must respect Member States’ responsibilities for organising and delivering health services. The EU is therefore not competent for legislative action aimed at directly reducing hospital deficits. The EU’s economic governance framework supports Member States in strengthening debt sustainability and growth through reforms and investments, including in healthcare, where efforts are needed to improve capacity, quality and resilience. Through the European Semester, the Commission provides policy recommendations and monitors implementation. The EU also supports Member States through funding, technical assistance and knowledge sharing. 2. Directive 2011/7/EU [2] ensures suppliers are paid within a set timeframe. It recognises the specific situation of public hospitals by allowing Member States to extend the 30-day payment period up to 60 days for public entities providing healthcare. The Commission does not envisage exempting public hospitals from its scope, as this would adversely affect suppliers, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises. The directive sets minimum interest rates. Parties can negotiate other rates, if not ‘grossly unfair’. The Commission’s proposed Regulation to replace the directive puts forward a fixed interest rate and eliminates the ‘grossly unfair’ provision. While such Regulation is not approved by Council, the Commission is open to finding a negotiated solution. Meanwhile, the Commission continues to monitor the situation and prioritise enforcement, as late payments by public authorities are a priority for specific enforcement actions and horizontal investigations in the Annual Single Market Enforcement Agenda 2026 [3] . [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=en. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:048:0001:0010:en:PDF. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0046.”
  Public and private sectors role in healthcare services
• 2026-03-02 “E-000856/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council (MiCA Regulation) 1 was drafted based on an impact assessment, which included a dedicated section for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). That impact assessment demonstrated that the MiCA framework would likely increase non-bank sources of funding for SMEs through the development of initial coin offerings and securities token offerings, providing an opportunity for start-ups to raise substantial amounts of funding at an early stage of development. Different provisions of the MiCA Regulation aim at limiting costs for SMEs, exempting for instance, for crypto-assets other than stablecoins, small offerings below a certain threshold and crypto-assets distributed to small circles of users from publishing an information document describing the issuance of tokens (so-called ‘white paper’). The proportionality principle also applies to all minimum prudential requirements, whether quantitative or qualitative, applying to issuers of asset referenced tokens and crypto-asset service providers. It also allows adapting the content of redemption plans to be drawn up by issuers of asset referenced tokens, and the frequency of their reviews, to the size, complexity and nature of the asset-referenced token, and to the issuer’s business model. By 30 June 2027, the Commission is to issue a report on the application of the MiCA Regulation and on the latest developments with respect to crypto-assets. That report will enable the Commission to assess whether there is a risk that crypto-asset activities relocate outside the EU and whether any legislative amendment is required. 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets, and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 and Directives 2013/36/EU and (EU) 2019/1937 (OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 40, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1114/oj.”
  Regulation of crypto · Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2026-02-26 “E-000811/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission In May 2024, the Commission decided to formally close the procedure of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) for Poland, by withdrawing its reasoned proposal that had triggered this procedure in 2017. The decision to close the Article 7 procedure followed a thorough analysis which concluded that ‘a clear risk of a serious breach’ of the rule of law no longer exists 1 . The concerns regarding the situation of the rule of law in Poland between 2015 and 2023 have been clearly set out in the Commission’s reasoned proposal under the Article 7 TEU procedure, in several judgments of the Court of Justice, and in the Commission’s Rule of Law Reports. The Commission continues to monitor rule of law related developments in Poland, including progress made by Poland to implement the Action Plan on the Rule of Law, in the annual Rule of Law Reports 2 . 1 See the Commission press release of 6 May 2024 IP/24/2461, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/lv/ip_24_2461/IP_24_2461_EN.pdf. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/bac7fb6c-b5f2-4593-b62ab9a4b87269e4_en?filename=2025%20Rule%20of%20Law%20Report%20%20Country%20Chapter%20Poland.pdf.”
  Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass) · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2026-02-09 “E-000516/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission Milestone E1L of the Council Implementing Decision (CID) Annex 1 approving the Polish recovery and resilience plan 2 (RRP) requires a legal act setting an obligation to create lowemission zones (LEZ) in cities with more than 100 000 inhabitants where there is an excess of nitrogen dioxide. There is no specific EU law requirement to establish LEZ under this condition. Following a payment request, the Commission assesses whether the relevant milestones as set out in the CID are satisfactorily fulfilled. The scope of assessment for LEZ is determined by milestone E1L, related milestone E2L and the measure description. The Commission would like to draw the Honourable Member’s attention to the Commission’s report 3 from 19.9.2023 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility. According to Article 24(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 4 , the satisfactory fulfilment of milestones and targets requires that previously fulfilled milestones and targets have not been reversed by the Member State concerned. Whether a modification by the Member State fulfils this requirement can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis. In general, a change of a reform that would still meet all requirements of the respective milestone(s) would not be considered problematic. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15795-2025-ADD-1/en/pdf. 2 https://reforms-investments.ec.europa.eu/polands-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en. 3 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility: Moving forward, COM(2023) 545 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=COM:2023:545:FIN. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj/eng.”
  Climate efforts · EU policy on urban development
• 2026-02-04 “E-000454/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra On behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission has no plans to suspend the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The Commission is accelerating its work on the upcoming review of the ETS, notably to set out the emissions cap and decarbonisation trajectory beyond 2030, in line with the 2040 emissions reduction target agreed by the co-legislators. This will provide more emissions space for industry compared to the legislation currently in force. 2. The Commission is taking steps to lower energy and business costs in the context of the Clean Industrial Deal and its Affordable Energy Action Plan. Examples include the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework supporting industries’ energy costs and decarbonisation, and the European Grids Package. By accelerating the expansion and interconnection of EU electricity grids, it will further increase the integration of EU electricity markets, already delivering approximately EUR 34 billion in annual benefits to consumers. To shield consumers from gas-driven price spikes, tools such as Power Purchase Agreements with renewable generators are encouraged under the Electricity Market Design. Furthermore, industry decarbonisation and consequent long-term reduction of energy costs is supported by the substantial revenues generated through the EU ETS. 3. Protection against carbon leakage risk is provided by free allocation and, for a number of sectors, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which is gradually replacing the free allocation of allowances for these sectors. In December 2025, the Commission proposed measures to further strengthen CBAM. The future of carbon leakage protection under EU ETS will be assessed as part of the Impact Assessment accompanying the ETS review.”
  Energy (green transition) · Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme · Carbon leakage support
• 2026-01-13 “Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission 27.3.2026 Written question The Commission set out its assessment of the My Voice My Choice European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) in its communication adopted on 26 February 2026 [1] . The ECI calls on the Commission to ‘submit a proposal for financial support to Member States that would be able to perform safe termination of pregnancies for anyone in Europe who still lacks access to safe and legal abortion’. In its reply to the initiative, the Commission outlines that the ECI’s objective can be met through the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) , i n case Member States wish, voluntarily and in accordance with their national laws, to provide such support, notably by using or reallocating available resources under their national or regional programmes. In order to respect the boundaries of EU competence as set out in Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, any Member State action supported by ESF+ money must remain fully neutral as to where the patient comes from and cannot specifically target women from particular other Member States. [1] Communication from the Commission on the European Citizens' Initiative ‘My Voice, My Choice: For Safe and Accessible Abortion’, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52026XC01383.”
  Abortion policy · EU competences on health
• 2025-11-26 “– Panie Przewodniczący! Obrona nieletnich w sieci jest tematem bardzo ważnym i takim, z którym chyba każdy z nas się zgadza. Natomiast niestety jest to pretekst do naruszenia prywatności i do rozszerzenia wszystkich regulacji, które tak naprawdę nie będą pomagały małoletnim, ale wszystkim szkodziły. Przede wszystkim ta rezolucja wychodzi poza kompetencje Unii Europejskiej. Narusza zasadę subsydiarności. Tworzy też pretekst do kontroli danych użytkowników i ingeruje w prywatność. Duża część propozycji oznacza regulacje modeli biznesowych. Dokument wzmacnia, tak naprawdę, władzę Komisji Europejskiej kosztem państw członkowskich i rodziców. I promuje podejście paternalistyczne, w którym to Unia Europejska ma zastąpić rodziców. To rodzice wychowują dzieci, a nie Unia Europejska. Te przepisy też powielają istniejące przepisy, które są często wystarczające. Ochrona małoletnich jest konieczna i co do tego nikt nie ma wątpliwości. Ale dokument idzie znacznie dalej. Tworzy infrastrukturę potencjalnego nadzoru i cenzury.”
• 2025-11-26 “– Panie Przewodniczący! Głosowałem przeciwko temu projektowi, dlatego że uważam, że jest on politycznie naiwny. Nie zrozumiałem, w jaki sposób Unia Europejska chce rywalizować w terenie Arktyki. To powinna być domena suwerennych państw, które powinny sobie tam poradzić. Natomiast my nie mamy wspólnych europejskich interesów, żeby walczyć na terenie Arktyki i żeby tam ustanawiać jakieś nowe reguły. Dlatego też głosowałem przeciw.”
• 2025-11-13 “E-004543/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission EU company law acquis does not harmonise any aspect of the company liquidation procedure outside of insolvency. Liquidation is entirely under Member State laws for both limited liability companies and commercial partnerships. Therefore, the Commission does not collect data about liquidations from Member States. To tackle abuse and fraud, Directive (EU) 2017/1132, as amended by Directives (EU) 2019/1151 and 2025/25, provides for increased cross-border transparency and accessibility of company information, including about groups of companies, coupled with strengthened national requirements for preventive legality checks during incorporation, making information in business registers more accurate and reliable. By making such information easily and reliably accessible across the EU, these measures empower stakeholders to perform better due diligence and allow national authorities to better assess and detect fraudulent activities. In particular, Article 14 of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 provides that, for the protection of third parties’ interests, basic information about the liquidation procedure should be publicly available in the national business register where each company is registered, and through the Business Register Interconnection System at EU level. As a result, everyone has access to information on the company statutes and their amendments, the winding-up of the company, the appointment of liquidators and any termination of a liquidation.”
  EU restrictions on unfair commercial practices · EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2025-10-22 “E-004171/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission As the Honourable Member might be aware, on 21 October 2025, the Commission presented a proposal 1 to amend the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) 2 , in order to reduce the load on the EUDR Information Technology (IT) system and ease the administrative burden for economic operators, while maintaining the Regulation’s environmental integrity. The proposal introduced targeted simplifications and transition periods to ensure a smooth and effective implementation of the EUDR. Without these changes, the IT system would not be able to function. The co-legislators have agreed in December 2025 on a revised EUDR. The new text builds on the Commission proposal while adding an extra period before the entry into application and introducing some changes on substance. More specifically, the agreed text limits the obligation to submit due diligence statements to the first operator placing the relevant products on the market. It also exempts micro and small primary operators, i.e. small producers who sell their products directly on the EU market, from regular submissions of due diligence statements, replaced by a one-time simplified declaration. This addresses some of the specific concerns the Honourable Member has raised with regard to the wood and furniture companies. In addition, the EUDR will enter into application on 30 December 2026 with regard to all companies except for most micro- or small operators, for which the entry into application is 30 June 2027. For micro- or small operators already covered by the EU Timber Regulation 3 , the entry into application will be 30 December 2026. Finally, and importantly, the agreed text provides predictability and certainty with regard to the regulatory framework, which is key for businesses and competent authorities in order to ensure a successful implementation. 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 as regards certain obligations of operators and traders, COM/2024/452 final. 2 Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010, OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 206–247. 3 Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market, OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, pp. 23– 34.”
  Trade impact on forests · Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2025-10-07 “E-003926/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The Polish Recovery and Resilience Plan includes investments aiming to supply schools in Poland with state-of-the-art multimedia equipment for teachers and students. When it comes to the public procurement process, including the translation of any requirements from the Annex to the Council Implementing Decision 1 in the tenders, this lies within the competence of the Polish authorities. The Commission will verify the fulfilment of the requirements of the related milestones and targets included in the Council Implementing Decision in the preliminary assessment of payment requests, which has not yet taken place for the investment in question. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/71559ea5-b36e-4342-a4c5960257549d0f_en?filename=COM_2025_284_1_EN_annexe_proposition_cp_part1_v3.pdf.”
  EU policy on sustainability criteria in public funding · Conditions to access EU budget
• 2025-06-10 “E-002319/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission understands that while Poland has emerged as a major footwear trade hub in Central Europe, the Polish footwear industry has been facing a combination of market and competition challenges. On information on the country of origin (‘Made in’), footwear labelling rules, as governed by Directive 94/11/EC 1 , foresee already that such additional information may be provided, on a voluntary basis. In any case the voluntary origin labelling should be made in accordance with the relevant non-preferential Rules of Origin 2 applicable to imports into the European Union. Furthermore, misleading the consumer on the geographical origin of a product could fall under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 3 . The Commission has currently no plans to introduce a mandatory indication of the country of origin for footwear sold in the EU. On controls, the Commission is aiming for strengthened market surveillance to ensure that imported products, notably via e-commerce, comply with EU rules (including in relation to chemical substances restricted under the Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals 4 ). The e-commerce Communication 5 announced the launch of Priority Control Areas, focusing specifically on e-commerce imports and products with significant safety hazards and risk of non-compliance. On unfair competition, the Commission proposal for a Customs reform package includes the abolition of the current threshold, whereby goods valued up to EUR 150 are exempt from customs duty, to improve fairness for EU economic operators. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:01994L0011-20130701. 2 See https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/customs/international-affairs/origin-goods/non-preferential-rulesorigin_en and https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/af7b2672-610c-411b-8723ea1f7d46d3fd_en?filename=SectionXII_ch64_67_HS2022.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02005L0029-20220528. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/1907/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=comnat:COM_2025_0037_FIN.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2025-06-10 “E-002318/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission closely monitors the impact of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) 1 on all relevant stakeholders, including on local services, SMEs and consumers. The Commission has received significant positive feedback concerning the DMA’s effect on the EU’s digital markets. The Commission has also opened an investigation to assess Alphabet’s compliance with Article 6(5) DMA. The obligation prevents Alphabet from the practice of favouring its own services (e.g. Google Flights and Google Hotels) in ranking on Google Search over similar third-party services, thus benefitting Alphabet’s competitors (e.g. Skyscanner, Expedia.com, Booking.com) and not the business users of Google Search in general (e.g. direct suppliers including airlines and hotel companies). The Commission has not endorsed any measures implemented by Alphabet in the context of compliance with this obligation and on 19 March 2025, has informed Alphabet of its preliminary view that certain features and functionalities of Google Search may treat Alphabet’s own services more favourably compared to rival ones. In its assessment, the Commission considers the interests of various user groups of Google Search (including SMEs and consumers), in line with the objectives and other provisions of the DMA. This includes Article 6(12) DMA, which mandates Alphabet to apply fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory access conditions to its search engine Google Search. As such, the Commission is in discussions and holding workshops with various impacted stakeholders, including representatives of suppliers of services competing with Google services and many others, to assess how compliance with the DMA can be best ensured. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R2554.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2025-05-26 “E-002109/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. A study providing an analysis of the market structure and dynamics of the EU road transport sector, and the challenges faced by EU road transport operators following the adoption of the Mobility Package was finalised in May 2025 by an external consultant and will be published in 2025. It will be the basis for a Commission report to the European Parliament and Council. 2. Under the Road Transport Agreement with Ukraine 1 (RTA), Ukrainian hauliers are granted limited rights for access to the EU market compared to the rights that hauliers established in the EU Member States, as no cross-trade or cabotage operations are allowed. Modifications to the Agreement made on 20 June 2024 2 have substantially strengthened its enforcement, establishing a legal framework that enables effective controls and the prevention of abuses. In addition, as part of the pre-accession process, the Commission will prioritise the road transport regulatory convergence between Ukraine and the EU. 3. Before making any proposal as regards the continuation of the RTA, and in view of the specific concerns of two Member States bordering Ukraine and the demands of Polish road hauliers, the Commission presented a non-paper with options to Member States on 14 July 2025. This non-paper was discussed at the Council Land Transport Working Parties of 17 and 22 July 2025. 1 Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine on the carriage of freight by road (OJ L 179, 6.7.2022, p. 4). 2 Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine amending the Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine on the Carriage of Freight by Road of 29 June 2022 (OJ L 2024/1878, 2.7.2024).”
  Road transport environmental policy · EU Competition policy
• 2025-05-12 “EN E-001874/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 1 (the ‘Visa Regulation’) the Commission monitors the continuous compliance by visa-free third countries of specific requirements used to assess the appropriateness of granting visa liberalisation. The results are published in Visa Suspension Mechanism Reports. The latest (seventh) report, adopted on 6 December 2024, included several recommendations addressed to Georgia 2 . The eighth report is due for adoption in the fourth quarter of 2025. The Visa Regulation foresees the possibility to suspend the visa exemption of a third country where there is ‘an increased risk or imminent threat to the public policy or internal security of Member States, in particular a substantial increase in serious criminal offences, linked to the nationals of that third country, substantiated by objective, concrete and relevant information and data provided by the competent authorities’. In such circumstances a Member State may notify to the Commission and request the activation of the suspension mechanism. On 27 January 2025 the EU decided to partially suspend the Visa Facilitation Agreement between the EU and Georgia to end the visa exemption for holders of diplomatic and service passports. Subsequently and following guidelines issued by the Commission, 12 Member States have imposed since then a visa requirement for holders of diplomatic and service passports issued by Georgia. In October 2023, the Commission submitted a proposal to revise Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 to modernise and strengthen the visa suspension mechanism to prevent the abuse of visa-free travel. The European Parliament and the Council agreed on the revised text in June 2025. It should enter into force in November 2025. 1 Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (codification); ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1806/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2024%3A571%3AFIN.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · Asylum & border control
• 2025-05-12 “E-001873/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. In accordance with shared management, the conditions for granting the EU support under cohesion policy are defined: - at the EU level, principally in the Common Provisions Regulation 1 (CPR) and the Fundspecific regulations. - in the Partnership Agreement and the relevant programmes, as well as, - in the national rules, pursuant to Article 63(1) CPR. The Partnership Agreement and every Polish programme contain a passage: ‘Where the beneficiary is a local authority (or an entity controlled or dependent on it) that has taken any discriminatory action contrary to the principles referred to in Article 9(3) of Regulation 2021/1060, cohesion policy support cannot be granted’. 2. Regional authorities, fulfilling the role of Managing Authorities, are responsible for ensuring the compliance with the above-mentioned rules also at local level and making sure that there is a widespread understanding on the conditions to receive EU funding. 3. It is the responsibility of Managing Authority and the Polish Ministry of Development Funds and Regional Development, to ensure compliance with all rules and procedures to receive EU funding in all the territory of Poland. It is the role of the Commission to monitor the management and control systems established in Member States. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231 30.6.2021).”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2025-04-09 “E-001479/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission In its assessment of whether a specific case of State aid being provided is or is not compatible with the internal market, the Commission follows Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Commission is not in a position to comment on the compatibility of State aid in general terms. In general, it is for Member States to decide if they wish to support a specific company or sector and to design support measures in line with EU law. Similarly, the Commission is not in a position to comment on a potential merger in general terms. The Commission would only assess the compatibility with the internal market of a potential merger between Polska Grupa Górnicza (PGG), Południowy Koncern Węglowy (PKW) and Węglokoks Kraj (WK) if it fell within the scope of the EU Merger Regulation 1 . As with every merger, the Commission would investigate the merits of such merger based on the facts of the case. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1, ELI: https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/139/oj?eliuri=eli%3Areg%3A2004%3A139%3Aoj&locale=en).”
  Energy transition (state support) · Fossil fuels
• 2025-04-09 “E-001480/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The Commission pays special attention to ensuring that the territories most negatively affected by the costs of the transition towards climate-neutrality receive additional financial support. The Just Transition Fund (JTF) is a key tool aimed at mitigating the socio-economic effects of the transition process, to ensure that no one and no region is left behind. On 1 April 2025, the Commission adopted a proposal 1 to amend the cohesion policy regulatory framework to align investment priorities with the evolving context and introduce greater flexibilities to facilitate the implementation of the programmes, including JTF. The Commission is also preparing the ground for the post-2027 cohesion policy within the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The next MFF will face significant challenges, as outlined in the Commission Communication ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ 2 . The political guidelines of the President of the Commission 3 and the abovementioned Communication have set out the objective of a strengthened cohesion and growth policy with regions at the centre. The proposal for the next MFF will build on a broad consultation, with input at political, institutional and stakeholder level, alongside with active citizens’ involvement and will be presented in July 2025. It is still too early to prejudge the overall architecture of the future MFF, including specific funding instruments and sectorial scope. 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review COM(2025) 123 final. 2 COM(2025) 46 final. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-04-09 “P-001478/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not directly authorize specific business activities for coal companies on the assets of decommissioned mines. However, in general, the Commission would encourage the use of assets in a way that aligns with EU policy goals, to facilitate economic diversification and transformation. Approval relies on plan details and current laws. The Member States must ensure that such activities comply with EU laws, including EU State aid rules and environmental standards. In general, it is for Member States to decide if they wish to support a specific economic activity or a specific objective. Any new mechanism involving State aid would require notification to the Commission under EU State aid rules, unless it is exempted pursuant to regulations such as the General Block Exemption Regulation 1 or the de minimis regulation 2 . It is for the Member States to design measures in line with EU law including State aid rules, and international trade rules. The measure must abide by applicable sector specific State aid rules as well as horizontal State aid provisions. 1 Commission Regulation (EU) 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 (consolidated text) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2023.167.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2023%3A167%3ATO C 2 Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/2831 of 13 December 2023 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2831/oj”
  Energy transition (state support) · Fossil fuels
• 2025-04-09 “E-001481/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission In the preparedness union strategy 1 , one of the key actions is to ‘embed preparedness by design into EU policies and actions’. This means that preparedness and security considerations will be integrated and mainstreamed across EU legislation, policies and programmes. Under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 2 , the Commission provides funds for emergency shelter capacities through rescEU 3 . These reserves consist of high-quality emergency shelter units, including light prefabricated structures, flat-pack containers, and emergency tents. In addition, the Commission co-finances the voluntary commitment of national shelter capacities to the European Civil Protection Pool 4 under the UCPM. Furthermore, under 2021-2027 cohesion policy programmes, investments for civil preparedness including shelters may be eligible subject to the compliance with the specific objectives set out in EU legislation, including in former coal mine sites. On 1 April 2025, the Commission tabled a legislative proposal 5 allowing Member States to adjust their 2021-2027 cohesion policy programmes during their mid-term review, by incorporating new strategic priorities to incentivise defence-related investments, which would also include the construction of shelters. The Commission endorsed a targeted revision of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan for Poland which will allow for financing shelters. The support is in the context of the Security and Defence Fund which will cover four areas: (i) protective buildings and civil protection infrastructure, (ii) dual-use infrastructure, (iii) cybersecurity and (iv) enterprise modernisation including research and development support. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/preparedness_en. 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en. 3 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/resceu_en. 4 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/european-civil-protection-pool_en. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/communication/mid-term-review-2025/communication-mid-termreview-2025_en.pdf.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-03-28 “E-001310/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The EU pledge for planting 3 billion additional trees in the EU by 2030 was launched in 2021 as a non-binding, but meaningful target to further enhance afforestation for climate, biodiversity and the bioeconomy 1 . Its implementation depends on voluntary grass-roots initiatives across the EU. The Commission supports tree planting initiatives by giving them visibility though a web page 2 including a ‘counter’ 3 , launched in April 2022. Although not all planted trees are reported, up to now, 65 organisations 4 in the 27 Member States have participated, as well as numerous citizens, via the dedicated MapMyTree 5 application. Organisations vary from state or region authorities to cities, private companies, foundations, universities and nongovernmental organisations. In order to further promote the pledge, in March 2025 the Commission announced the ‘Tree billion trees Award’ 6 that will be organised starting from 2026 in order to recognise innovative and impactful tree-planting projects. There is no specific budget for implementing this voluntary pledge. However, several possibilities exist to fund afforestation and tree planting projects at local level. The Commission published guidance on such funding 7 opportunities in 2024 and will update it before end of 2025. The Commission does not plan to appoint national coordinators, but it may support local initiatives, in particular through jointly organised events. An expert report on the challenges to implement the pledge will be published in 2025. 1 Commission Staff Working Document The 3 Billion Tree Planting Pledge For 2030 accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - New EU Forest Strategy for 2030, SWD/2021/651 final. 2 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/biodiversity-strategy-2030/3-billion-trees_en 3 https://forest.eea.europa.eu/policy-and-reporting/3-billion-trees 4 https://forest.eea.europa.eu/policy-and-reporting/3-billion-trees/organisations?searchTerm= 5 https://mapmytree.eea.europa.eu/ 6 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/biodiversity-strategy-2030/3-billion-trees/3-billion-trees-award_en 7 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c216e918-d646-11ee-b9d9-01aa75ed71a1/language-en”
  Management of EU forests · Nature protection and restoration in the EU
• 2025-03-06 “E-000970/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission In line with Article 72 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1 , Member States can take measures that could deviate from EU secondary law. However, this must be in exceptional and well-defined cases, under stringent conditions controlled by the Court of Justice of the European Union 2 . Such measures must be temporary, necessary and proportionate, limited to what is strictly necessary. Article 6(3) of the Return Directive 3 allows Member States to take back illegally staying third-country nationals in other Member States under bilateral agreements or arrangements existing on the date of entry into force of the Return Directive (also respecting when applicable the Dublin Regulation 4 ). The Commission’s proposal for a Return Regulation adopted on 11 March 2025 5 includes allowing Member States to conclude new bilateral agreements or arrangements, or to establish bilateral cooperation between Member States to take back illegally staying third-country nationals crossing internal borders without authorisation. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2016/art_72/oj/eng. 2 See inter alia judgment of 2 April 2020, European Commission v Republic of Poland, European Commission v Hungary and European Commission v Czech Republic, Joined Cases C‑715/17, C‑718/17 and C‑719/17 EU:C:2020:257; judgment of 17 December 2020, Commission v Hungary, Case C-808/18, EU:C:2020:1029; judgment of 30 June 2022, M.A. v Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba, C-72/22, EU:C:2022:505. 3 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98–107. 4 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 31–59. 5 COM(2025) 101 final.”
  Asylum & border control · Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
• 2025-03-06 “E-000972/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully committed to ensure the respect in all Member States of the fundamental rights and EU values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 1 . In the EU, the public incitement to violence or hatred against a group or a member of such group by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin is a criminal offence under the Council Framework Decision on combating racism and xenophobia 2 . This includes the penalisation of the condoning, denial or gross trivialisation of the Holocaust and international crimes. Member States are competent to investigate and prosecute such crimes, as well as any crime committed with a racist or xenophobic motivation happening within their jurisdictions. As elaborated in the Commission’s replies to questions E-006476/2020 3 and E-001741/2021 4 , the Commission implements the mechanisms provided in the Financial Regulation 5 for the award of funds. It carries out rigorous selection processes, including different checks on grant beneficiaries based on objective criteria such as the exclusion criteria 6 or the EU restrictive measures 7 . The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 8 is based on the respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms. This means also that Ukraine has committed to promote, enforce and ensure respect for these principles. The EU follows closely the developments in Ukraine, including the legislative steps that may impact on democracy, human rights and the rule of law and is consistently encouraging Ukraine, as well as all its partners, to continue efforts to fight any incidents of violent extremism. 1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391–407. 2 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, p. 55–58. 3 Parliamentary question - E-006476/2020(ASW) - Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the European Commission, 10.3.2021: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html. 4 Parliamentary question - E-001741/2021(ASW) - Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the European Commission, 8.7.2021: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html. 5 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024. 6 Art. 138 on exclusion criteria and decisions on exclusions of the Financial Regulation. 7 Article 215 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 8 Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part , OJ L 161 29.5.2014, p. 3: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/295/2023-12-01.”
  Polish-Ukraine historical conflict · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2025-03-06 “E-000971/2025 Answer given by Mr Micallef on behalf of the European Commission The Commission promotes equality, diversity and inclusion in sport for all, notably through its strong commitment to building a Union of Equality, including for lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) people through the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 1 , as well as through funding programmes such as Erasmus+. As announced in President of the Commission Political Guidelines 2 and in the 2025 Commission Work Programme 3 , the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy will be renewed beyond 2025. Based on the core principle of autonomy of sport, it is for each sport and its governing body to decide on the participation of transgender athletes in sport competitions. The Commission notes the International Olympic Committee’s Framework on Fairness, Inclusion and NonDiscrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity and Sex Variations, that offers a 10-principle approach to help sport organisations to develop criteria applicable to their sport. One of the Erasmus+ horizontal priorities is inclusion, and its inclusion and diversity strategy aims at creating equitable opportunities of access to the programme for everyone. In the sport field, some of the sport-specific priorities include values of non-discrimination, anti-racism and openness and tolerance. The Commission’s commitment to equality and inclusion alongside the evolving policies of sports federations, plays a key role in shaping a fair and inclusive environment for women’s sports. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52020DC0698. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/7617998c-86e6-4a74-b33c249e8a7938cd_en?filename=COM_2025_45_1_annexes_EN.pdf.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2025-02-12 “P-000662/2025 Reply The Honourable Member is informed that the Council has not discussed the issue raised in his questions as the right of initiative for proposals for the next Multiannual Financial Framework and the corresponding legislation falls within the Commission’s sphere of competence. The Honourable Member is therefore invited to put these questions to the Commission.”
  Size of EU budget · Climate efforts
• 2025-01-15 “E-000136/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission All EU Member States are party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 1 since 2013. The EU’s position on the Convention was last comprehensively agreed in the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 2 . The Convention contains provisions on withdrawal but not on suspension 3 . The common security and defence policy is part of the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and thus falls under the responsibility of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The High Representative conducts and develops the CFSP as mandated by the Council. Although security and defence policy is not directly under the Commission’s remit, furthering cooperation in matters related to security and defence is one of the top priorities for the newly established Commission. A Commissioner for Defence and Space has been tasked to ensure that when it comes to defence industry, Europe spends more, spends better and spends European. To this end, the Commissioner for Defence and Space, together with the High Representative, will present the Paper on the future of European defence to frame a new approach to defence and defence industry, and identify investment needs. As such, the AntiPersonnel Mine Ban Convention goes beyond the scope of the prospective White Paper. The rising and complex nature of threats facing Europe, notably the ongoing Russia’s war against Ukraine, have pointed to the need for Europe to take the next step on defence with a view to preparing for the most extreme military contingencies. For this, the EU and its Member States step up work on defence readiness to prepare for the challenges ahead. This includes closing critical capability gaps, ramping up European defence production, and mobilising additional funding for defence. 1 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Oslo, 18 September 1997, https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cpusptam/cpusptam.html 2 Council conclusions on an EU position on strengthening the ban against anti-personnel mines in view of the Fifth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Brussels, 27 May 20204, (9442/24). 3 General rules on suspension of an international treaty are contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.”
  EU competences on defence · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2024-11-15 “E-002556/2024 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission From the outset, the sanctions have been designed and implemented to impose a heavy price on Russia and Belarus, whilst minimising adverse effects on the EU, its citizens and businesses. When developing sanctions packages, the Commission carefully considers their impact on EU operators and on individual Member States. Consultations with Member States and industry are aimed at preventing adverse impacts. Against the backdrop of Russia's war of aggression, Ukraine has benefited from various EU support measures. The Autonomous Measures adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in June 2022 and renewed twice until June 2025 have provided duty and quota-free access for Ukrainian agricultural products to the EU market. The Commission has been monitoring the impact of these measures closely (monitoring reports are shared with the European Parliament's Committee on International Trade) and has not found any adverse impact of liberalisation on the EU market. Concerning the possible establishment of a mechanism to mitigate the impact of sanctions, the Commission would like to recall that the adoption of sanctions takes into account impacts on the EU’s economy and operators and systematically requires the unanimous approval by the Member States.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-Belarus relations
• 2024-11-15 “E-002555/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU disposes of a number of trade defence instruments, such as anti-dumping or antisubsidy duties, in order to protect European production against international trade distortions. Any EU industry may contact the complaints office of Directorate-General for Trade for advice 1 . Increase of the EU customs duties for a product may not be the more appropriate policy tool to address such concerns in the short term, especially since the maximum bound rates authorised for the EU under its commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO) for children’s pushchair correspond to the applied most favored nation rates. Under the General Product Safety Regulation 2 , applicable as of 13 December 2024, manufacturers have to indicate their name and their postal and electronic address on the product that they wish to place on the EU market. Importers and distributors, where it is relevant, need to verify that this labelling obligation has been complied with by the manufacturer before making products available on the EU market. This will allow consumers to identify the origin of the manufacturer and give market surveillance authorities the manufacturer’s contact details in case they have product safety issues or questions. On 17 May 2023, the Commission proposed a comprehensive Customs Reform package 3 to strengthen EU customs’ capacity to monitor goods. This includes the creation of a new EU Customs Authority and an EU Customs Data Hub, which will centralise data to improve targeting of unsafe products. The reform also eliminates customs duty exemptions for goods valued up to EUR 150 and designates platforms and sellers registered for the Import One Stop Shop (IOSS) as ‘deemed importers’, making them responsible for compliance. 1 https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/glossary/single-entry-point 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) that entered into application on 17 February 2024; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/digital-services-act.html 3 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Union Customs Code and the European Union Customs Authority, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013; https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/952/oj/eng”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2024-11-15 “E-002557/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Poland is bound by all the legislative instruments forming part of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which were adopted in line with the EU obligation to develop a common policy on asylum 1 , and in full respect of the principle of shared competence in the area of freedom, security in justice 2 . Under the EU law, there are no legal possibilities to exempt Poland from the implementation of any elements of the Pact. The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation 3 foresees mandatory solidarity and each Member State has full discretion to choose between the various forms of solidarity, namely relocation, financial contributions and alternative measures (in-kind support). The number of persons benefitting from temporary protection in the Member State concerned is among the factors determining whether a Member State is under migratory pressure or facing a significant migratory situation, which allows for full or partial reductions of solidarity contributions. The assessment of which Member State will be under migratory pressure, at risk of migratory pressure or facing a significant migratory situation for the first annual migration management cycle, starting in mid-2026, will be made by the Commission in October 2025. Poland has not yet presented any information to the Commission in the framework of the first cycle. 1 Article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 47–390. 2 Article 4(2)(j) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 47–390. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013; OJ L, 2024/1351, 22.5.2024.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-10-04 “E-001961/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The EU Aviation Security Regulation 1 establishes a general restriction at EU airports, limiting access to boarding areas with liquids, aerosols, and gels (LAGs) over 100 ml, with exceptions for special diets, baby products, and medicines. This restriction is due to the limitations of traditional security equipment, such as X-ray machines, in detecting liquid explosives. To address this, airports have deployed C3 EDSCB 2 systems capable of screening baggage with liquids inside. The Commission confirms that urgent aviation security measures related to LAGs have been introduced, establishing that, as of 1 September 2024, the maximum volume of individual LAG containers in cabin baggage is limited to 100 ml. This applies to all EDSCB C3 equipment configurations that received the EU Stamp before 1 August 2024 3 . This precautionary measure is based on technical information received by the Commission and validated by the European Civil Aviation Conference States and laboratories, showing that the existing configurations of standard C3 EDSCB equipment need to be revised to improve their performance in detecting liquid explosives. Manufacturers must review these configurations and subject them to additional testing. The 100 ml restriction will be lifted once newly configured C3 EDSCB equipment has been tested and approved to meet the required detection standards. The Commission is working with stakeholders to resolve this issue, but no specific date for lifting the restriction can be given until testing is successfully completed. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008R0300 2 EDSCB C3 refers to Explosive Detection Systems for Cabin Baggage with Standard C3, which allows the screening of baggage containing portable computers, other large electronic items, and Liquids, Aerosols and Gels (LAGs). 3 Commission Implementing Regulation 2024/2108 of 29 July 2024, amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1998 regarding urgent aviation security measures related to equipment for the security screening of Liquids, Aerosols, and Gels.”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• 2024-08-23 “E-001545/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has strongly condemned Russia’s espionage, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns. There can be no doubt of the Commission’s position in this regard. The Commission’s annual Rule of Law Report is prepared in continuous dialogue with the 27 Member States and is based on a transparent methodology, developed in consultation with the Member States in full respect of the principles of equal treatment, impartiality and objectivity. It relies on a broad variety of sources, including national authorities, independent bodies, international institutions, and other stakeholders such as civil society. The country chapter for Poland of the 2023 Rule of Law Report 1 , to which the Honourable Member refers, briefly mentions the case of Pablo González under the pillar of media freedom. It factually reports on his arrest by the Polish Security Services and the charge of illegal espionage on behalf of Russia without taking a position. The case of Pablo González, who at the time was believed to be a freelance journalist, had been brought to the attention of the Commission by different organisations expressing concern over his arrest and the length of his pre-trial detention. This was also an alert published on the Council of Europe’s platform 2 and the Commission usually refers to such alerts in its Rule of Law Report in relation to all Member States. The Commission is aware of the outcome of the case and considers it important to pay careful attention to any references to individual cases in the Rule of Law Reports. The Commission is committed to further strengthening the Rule of Law Report, as expressed in the Political Guidelines. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/b576c76e-0755-4690-92667895c4294433_en?filename=48_1_52627_coun_chap_poland_en.pdf 2 https://fom.coe.int/en/alerte/detail/107637244;globalSearch=true”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2024-08-22 “E-001542/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission Freedom of expression and information is a pillar of the EU’s democratic system and is protected under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 1 , which is binding on the EU institutions and on Member States when they implement EU law. The objective of the Digital Services Act (DSA) 2 is to ensure that everyone in the EU can enjoy online platform services safely, in full respect of fundamental rights, including freedom of expression. It does so by defining platforms’ responsibilities, so that very large online platforms and search engines take reasonable, proportionate and effective measures to mitigate the risks they pose to society. It also protects users in the EU against over-removal of lawful content. On 11 August 2024, Mr Musk announced a likely increase of X’s user traffic due to a planned live-streamed event. The DSA requires designated platforms, including X, to have adequate means to deal with a massive traffic increase in order to avoid risks of amplification of any posts by its millions of users containing illegal content, disinformation or which are contrary to the terms and conditions of the platform. In this respect, it is noteworthy that X’s terms of service ban hateful content; they also set rules on the moderation of violent content and to ensure civic integrity. In ensuring compliance with the DSA, the Commission does not require removal of specific pieces of content. The letter sent to X on 12 August 2024 did not raise issues with the live broadcasting of the interview itself. It took no view on the context of the interview nor the political views of the participants in that interview. All acts and decisions adopted by the Commission on the basis of the DSA are taken within the limits of the Commission’s powers and are subject to judicial review. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-08-22 “E-001543/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission’s early warning report (EWR) 1 shows progress towards achieving the 2025 and 2035 targets for municipal and packaging waste laid down in EU legislation, even if the situation is diverse and many Member States are at risk of not attaining the targets within the deadlines 2 . The report concludes that the majority of Member States have recently carried out or are in the process of implementing waste reforms that will result in increased recycling rates in the years leading to 2025 and beyond. As improving recycling is essential for the circular economy transition, as well as for reaching climate neutrality, zero pollution, resilience and security of supply, the Commission does not intend to propose modifications to these targets. 2. The EWR makes country-specific recommendations to improve preparing for re-use and recycling rates in Member States 3 . If implemented swiftly, the suggested measures could significantly accelerate the achievement of the targets. Technical support, compliance promotion and EU funding have been continuously available to Member States. The Commission also adopted recommendations on increasing the return of used and waste mobile phones, tablets and laptops 4 . The Commission will monitor the situation and take enforcement actions as appropriate. Infringement cases were recently launched for failure to achieve the 2020 municipal waste recycling targets and the targets for waste electrical and electronic equipment 5 . 3. The new Waste Shipment Regulation 6 contains provisions to strengthen enforcement of waste shipment rules and better address waste trafficking, including a mandate for the Commission (through the European Anti-Fraud Office) to support Member States in their enforcement efforts. 1 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/waste-early-warning-report_en 2 The 2025 targets for preparing for re-use and recycling of municipal waste and recycling of all packaging waste, and the 2035 target for reducing landfilling of municipal waste in accordance with Article 11(2)(c) of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3–30, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/851 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 109–140. ; Article 6(1)(f) of European Parliament and Council Directive 94/62/EC of 20 December 1994 on packaging and packaging waste, OJ L 365, 31.12.1994, p. 10–23, amended by Directive (EU) 2018/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 141–154. ; Article 5(5) of Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste, OJ L 182, 16.7.1999, p. 1–19, amended by Directive (EU) 2018/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 100–108. 3 Early warning report, p. 5. 4 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2585 of 6 October 2023 on improving the rate of return of used and waste mobile phones, tablets and laptops, C/2023/6618, OJ L, 2023/2585, 20.11.2023. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_24_3228, Directive 2012/19/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), OJ L 197, 24.7.2012, p. 38–71. 6 Regulation (EU) 2024/1157 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on shipments of waste, amending Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) 2020/1056 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, OJ L, 2024/1157, 30.4.2024.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-08-01 “E-001469/2024 Answer given by Mr Gentiloni on behalf of the European Commission The Council already amended the Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 1 (DAC6) provisions concerned in Directive 2011/16/EU in October 2023 2 to address the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union in case C-694/20. In its latest judgement of 29 July 2024, the Court of Justice confirmed the validity of DAC6 (see C-623/22) 3 in light of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination, as well as Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Commission is also evaluating DAC6 as part of the broader evaluation process of Directive 2011/16/EU 4 . The public consultation was open until 31 July 2024. The European Court of Auditors has also started an audit covering DAC6 which should be finalised before 2025. The responses and further analysis on the functioning of the DAC framework will be assessed. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/822/oj 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/2226/oj 3 Judgment of 29 July 2024 in Case C-623/22, Belgian Association of Tax Lawyers and Others: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-623/22 4 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/16/2024-01-01”
  EU competences on taxation · Anti-money laundering regulation
• “Thank you. If we take a look at the European Union competition policy. Well, this is a bureaucratic Frankenstein. Uh, in theory, it's supposed to develop the internal market, but we have a veritable administrative dragon. Bureaucratic dragon that's swallowing at small companies. The idea is to protect against concentration on the markets. What's the effect? We know that rating agencies control over 90% of the market. And there are four accounting companies that have the whole of the European Union in their hands. And and more than the European unions are dead. But the Commission wants a new industrial deal. But then we've got the Green Deal as well. And, uh, there there are a couple of countries that account for 70% of state aid, and Poland is on the reserve Bank. We can't even get on to the playing field to compete. And the idea, we seem to have a market view to them. There are those who apply for subsidies and others who control these forms. We don't need funds. We want we need economic freedom and a return to common sense.”
  EU Competition policy
• “Yeah. Thank you very much. We talk about the victory in the global tech race, but unfortunately, European innovators and businesses, inventors are still on the starting line and hampered by administration bureaucracy, tons of rules. So we're not going to win the race. And anybody who believes in this myth well obviously know that it's the government or things. The government creates innovation, but that's not true. Centralized planning hampers innovation. It does not foster progress. And if we're talking about saying that the commission or the council is involved in inventions because they were part of the process. That's not true. For example, if you take a look at, um, any key inventions, if you Google this in browsers, etc., you'll see that this happened before the kind of process we have now. And very often what we have is we waste a lot of time, and I think the time has come to, um, banish some of these myths and become a true motor of innovation.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Yes. Thank you very much, president. Ladies and gentlemen. I'm listening to this debate, and I have the impression that we are somewhat removed from reality because the presidency is starting off with a major scandal. The agreement that has been signed on is to be signed on Mercosur, against the will of the parliament and the citizens of the European Union. So I don't know why we're accepting this procedure. This is a major scandal, and I think real Europe is outside the building of the European Parliament, where the farmers, once again seeing what they're going to, how they're going to be losing out, losing their jobs, are protesting and demonstrating. And we continue our work as if nothing was happening. And so this is a Europe that is not at the service of its citizens. And I would prefer the European Union to change the direction it's taking. And I think we have to do everything to turn around the situation that we can withdraw, withdraw from this agreement. I do have one request to the Cyprus presidency. Recently, Poland, um, is, uh, it concerns that a vessel flying under the Cyprus flag. And, uh, this is all to do with, uh, registering vessels. And so we do have 1 or 2 issues. But anyway. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “It's too far from the everyday of real people. Let's look at the gate. The FISA gate, which was a real undermining of the EU's credibility. The. The negotiations about that issue is something that citizens are right. Have a right to know about. It was billions that was at stake. There's a conflict of interest here. So this report is really about access to information. We have hundreds of reports, analytics analyzes websites, but we hide behind procedures that are of real public and not make access to documents that are of real public interest. The work that you're doing is a fight with red tape, not in the spotlight, but very valuable. Let's make sure that you do your job and make sure that the institutions do their job. Perhaps something will change for the better because of your work. Thank you.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Thank you. I see potential three problems here. The first would be the actual income tax, which to me is the most detrimental tax of tax of all, because when you work in the EU nowadays, you have to pay more taxes than there is a tax imposed on, for instance, vodka or other spirits. So, uh, the the equation is quite clear. If we want to boost productivity, we should not increase income tax. Also, income tax results in a situation whereby rich people have more monies to actually go around it and invest more money because it's them who have enough money to pay for tax advisers. And last but not least, East. There is no such a thing as a joint tax base in the EU. I think that countries with better tax systems should win over those that have poorer tax systems. And last but not least, I believe that Buffett is an A in a way a way to get more money into the European budget. Thank you. **Nicolae ȘTEFĂNUȚĂ @Chair: Vice president, would you like to conclude this debate?”
  Priorities of taxation policy in the EU
• “Members, every year the European Union spends billions on investment. It spends money from a number of funds. But because there's not enough money, it takes out debt. And we and our children and grandchildren are going to pay off that debt. It weighs on all of us in order to get the economy running. The commission has been suggesting centralisation decisions taken in Brussels and not in the member states. And what's the effect of that? Well, the Draghi report says Europe is not competitive. Europe needs great amount of investment in order to catch up with the rest of the world. We're not innovative in Europe, but we haven't learned any lessons from that. You're still suggesting the same thing. You're suggesting we spend even more money and the result will be different. Well, the result won't be different. Commission can't take better decisions than the business person who knows best what's best for them, how to save money, how to investment. Businesses know better than even the smartest Brussels civil servant. So let's learn from our mistakes. Stop centralizing. Stop creating unions and drafting reports. We need to deregulate. We need to put our money on the countries setting up their own capital markets. Europe doesn't produce. We're going to have to import everything. Let's deal with that problem and stop talking about the next round of Harmonizations.”
  EU political integration
• “Thank you. At the very beginning, I would like to thank the rapporteur for a good and constructive work on the draft report. We believe that this sector can play an enormous role in our economy. I also welcome the approach one more, one less, Which is supposed to simplify the regulatory framework. From our perspective, it is crucial to support startups and SMEs because they are the most innovative economic entities and which have to struggle with the greatest economic and financial obstacles. We also would like to see further decentralization of existing mechanisms, and we also would like to not intensify the centralized research in the EU. So instead of creating new structures like the biotechnology director in the European Commission, we should focus on making effective use of the existing institutions and existing funds, in particular Horizon Europe and the 10th Framework um Research and Innovation programme. We also believe that adopting a directive Effective instead of a regulation would give the member states more flexibility in implementing the regulations. Finally, using biological material, especially of human origin, raises a lot of concerns regarding privacy and respect for dignity. Therefore, we need to have a clear regulations on collecting and storing those materials. We want to protect the rights of individuals. We also must bear in mind the food security and the possible consequences for health that new technologies can bring, including genetic modifications of plants and animals. Thank you.”
  EU policy on ethical standards in biotechnology applications
• “In 1991, third of electricity was produced from nuclear power. And now it's only 15%. Do we have to wait for decades for the European Commission to admit that it was a mistake to just focus on gas and renewable energy sources? I think that it would be too. It's too late because these are changes that you can't backtrack on. I think the policy is inefficient and the Green Deal is pure madness. We see the impact of these policies. We have energy poverty. We have plants that are closing shop and relocating abroad. And this leads to more unemployment. We talked about energy security, what security we have that comes from far flung places and has to go through different seas and oceans. I can see these price fluctuations. So we have so much fossil fuel and we're not tapping into these sources. It's cheap, it's stable. And then we have nuclear power and we need to access our own resources. **Nicolae ȘTEFĂNUȚĂ @Chair: Uh, Thomas Geisel.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “In 1991, third of electricity was produced from nuclear power. And now it's only 15%. Do we have to wait for decades for the European Commission to admit that it was a mistake to just focus on gas and renewable energy sources? I think that it would be too. It's too late because these are changes that you can't backtrack on. I think the policy is inefficient and the Green Deal is pure madness. We see the impact of these policies. We have energy poverty. We have plants that are closing shop and relocating abroad. And this leads to more unemployment. We talked about energy security, what security we have that comes from far flung places and has to go through different seas and oceans. I can see these price fluctuations. So we have so much fossil fuel and we're not tapping into these sources. It's cheap, it's stable. And then we have nuclear power and we need to access our own resources.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Thank you. President. Ladies and gentlemen, Brussels promises deregulation. But this is rather like letting the wolf into the sheep pen. For decades now, the European Commission has been suffocating us with regulations. And now this. They say they're going to simplify everything. This is like an arsonist saying he wants to become a firefighter. This is not a revolution. These are just cosmetic changes. The European Union doesn't want to do away with red tape. It simply wants to better administer red tape. The omnibus proposal is little more than a slight rewriting of the text. It's not an attempt to do away with red tape. If we really want to liberate our businesses, we need to fire up the chainsaw. As president, Millay said, that's what we need a chainsaw rather than a letter opener. So rather than having three documents, you now have to follow one document, but the print will be very small. That's not a solution. The Commission talks about simplification, but at the same time, it continues to roll out the Green Deal and a whole series of other regulations. This is like a rucksack full of stones that won't help us. If we really do say that ccdd will never apply to 80% of companies, that won't mean the remaining 20% will be freed. Let's remove this obligation from all businesses. The problem is not that regulations are too complex, it's simply a problem of volume of regulations. It's what we need is not to simplify rules. It's simply to guarantee that the EU doesn't adopt any new rules. So we've heard a lot about red tape. Large businesses, multinationals can cope with red tape, but small companies can't is simply too much for them. So we have to take we have to be absolutely determined to remove red tape to prevent the adoption of new regulations. And in this way, we really can reduce bureaucracy in the European Union.”
  EU political integration
• “Dear madam, I am from Poland. We have a lot of coal. Our energy system is based on coal, which is why we are doing great and now we still are enjoying our energy sovereignty. We are not dependent on Russian gas. So we you want to have our coal powered plants and you want to force us to use panels and wind farms. Now we want to keep using coal and Nuclear energy. This is the foundation of our energy.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. There are no good and bad taxes. There are only taxes which are less bad, and those less bad. Taxes are the taxes which are neutral. So they interfere with the market and people's choices the least. However, how Ludwig von Mises said it is better for the rulers to have a less neutral taxes because thanks to this, they can shape human behaviors and choices. I doubt if the Commission wants simple taxes because many of their staff and lobbyists would lose their privileges. For example, the EU's VAT. 80. And this is a Paradise for theft. You know about it for 50 years. We experienced it for 20 years. And your advisors who create new rules also advise those huge companies and huge criminals and the small companies which cannot keep up with the pace of changes they are always losing. We should really have a huge lawn mower and cut all the rules as much as possible, because this is the only way to keep Europe competitive.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Ladies and gentlemen, president, we've heard about the crisis affecting agriculture, the steel industry, the automotive industry. We've discussed all those crises. Now, today, we turn our attention to saving the chemicals industry. There are crises galore. It's not about crisis. It's about the EU's mad man policy. We don't need any more policy. We need to take the burden off the shoulders of industry. This is a step in the right direction for the chemicals industry, but it's a very cautious step. There's still too much bureaucracy. This is a system in which industry has to constantly speak to officials and legal experts. The industry isn't reaching out to customers and clients as it should be. Now we've got one substance, one assessment. But this will lead to centralization of the decision making process. We need to have a system where we can go more quickly, more simply. We are killing our competitiveness. We need to have respect for companies and for the member states. We need to have common sense. Without that, we won't go anywhere.”
  Classification, labelling and packaging of chemicals
• “Thank you very much. President Ombudswoman, it's a great shame that even discussion on a report like this, the left is trying to squeeze in its own ideology. Rather than showing that black is black and white is white. They're trying to say that it's green, whereas actually at the end of the day, it's always red. It's a shame that we're not talking about what the ombudsperson has actually done, and that we have to argue about the blindingly obvious. The Ombudsman has been active in Poland, and I see their work when I'm on delegation on missions as well, and they don't get enough praise. Many people complain about the EU. It's not transparent, it's complicated. People aren't listening to the workers, the pensioners or SMEs. People say that the big companies always find an open door at the European Commission, and it's easier for them to lobby for changes to legal provisions. And the report shows that many citizens have seeked help sought help. However, with the Ombudswoman and since there are so many actions, that means that the EU is not subject to the checks and balances its need to.”
  Activities of EU Ombudsman
• “Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. Whenever we debate the Green Deal, you find thousands of people out on the streets demonstrating against this energy transformation. I mean, it's madness. And we pay the price in our wallets. We've got the coal and steel industry. We've got ordinary workers who are demonstrating in Warsaw to defend their way of life, but emissions are not decreasing. They're going up. So your system, quite simply is not effective. You have created a mechanism for speculation on the backs of ordinary people, and you want to go even further. You want to extend this to transport as well as construction. Why should we be paying this tax? Everybody in Asia is making fun of us, laughing at us. We're undermining our companies.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• “Um, the fight with cash is ongoing. It's not about the money printed out. Additionally, by central banks. I'm talking about the actual cash used by millions of of Europeans. Cash means freedom. Digital euro means supervision and control. I know you have beautiful reasons, such as fighting the grey zone, illegal work and terrorism. Let's take Sweden as an example. They are a leader when it comes to cashless payments. And still there are numerous problems when it comes to money transactions. And then we have to understand that the majority of problems that are identified as very often referred to only amounts of €10,000, so there is no direct link to organised crime. If we fight cash, we won't win anything. It's an urban legend. The problem is governments who decide to flood us with empty money and they want to control us. Cash means freedom. Let's protect freedom.”
  Means of payment (cash vs digital)
• “Chair. Minister. Thank you very much for your presentation. I have read the Polish Presidency programme on the economy, and I don't see a great deal of detail in it, particularly regarding energy. And the economy. So I have a few questions. Firstly. I absolutely agree that the figures you've just quoted are very impressive. 13,000 legal acts in the European Union. That's a huge number, isn't it? And I think everyone would agree that this isn't going to help the European economy grow. But my question is how can we reduce this amount and Also, how can we reduce the quantity of obligations imposed on businesses? Because if we don't have a plan, nothing's going to happen. We can talk and talk and talk and nothing will change at the end of the day. So my question is, do you have a clear idea of how we are to reduce the number of regulations? And my second question is on energy prices. We want to reduce energy costs. And if we don't do this we are not going to see an increase in European competitivity. European Union and Poland as a country are undergoing a period where prices are extremely high. And companies are suffering are hurting. And construction and transport sectors. It's very difficult for businesses. What can the Polish presidency do? How will it move forwards through the days and weeks to come with regard to this green pact? How will you reduce energy costs so that companies that are suffering so much at the moment will finally be able to become competitive? Moyer is a mine in Poland and it's been said that it should close, but we could save it, perhaps. Thank you.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Colleagues. I don't know if you seen this. A comedy film with Rowan Atkinson. Uh, the Bee. Um, it's basically a man against, uh, a bee. And today, coming back to reality, it's more of a man that actually disturbs the life of a bee than the other way around. A bee does not have its office in Brussels, does not, uh, get in touch with lobbyists, is not waiting for the New Deal. It just lives and pollinates and supports the nature and provides us with access to healthy food. Whereas we, on the other hand, create new deals, consultation strategies. And the truth is, we forget that the problem with bees is not the existence of, uh, bureaucrats, but or office people, but rather farmers who know that without pesticides they won't have good yield from the field. If you want to do something with this, Um. Let's fight and dishonest competition from outside the EU. Do not penalize your farmers if they want to produce food rather than produce excel sheets. What a be needs is balance in nature and not administrative chaos. They need just forests and meadows and not the Green Deal that would destroy what it should actually create. So let's not copy the script of the film with Rowan Atkinson. Let's try to protect nature with those who actually understand the nature with beekeepers and farmers.”
  Agriculture (green)
• “They refuse to set maximum prices for energy, transport, housing, water and all of this has a massive impact on the quality of life of poor people. If we are to tackle these growing inequalities, it's essential that we define political priorities involving improved distribution of wealth. This can be done via increased pay, tax justice, redistribution of wealth or indeed the cutting of taxes on labour. In parallel, social policy must be promoted so as to ensure that benefits which are needed by the poor help better distribute wealth. All of this must be accompanied by improvements in public services, education, culture, health care. All of these are essential. We need greater investment in affordable housing, including social housing. And great investment in our accommodation infrastructure. Commissioner, all these decisions in the past have led to a situation where 23 million people in the European Union find themselves living under the poverty line. Moreover, the situation is constantly getting worse for our weakest households. The poorest people in society are finding it increasingly difficult to pay their bills and to pay for their families. If we are to help the poorest members of society, we have to change political direction.”
  Priorities of taxation policy in the EU
• “Thank you so much. Finally we are talking about serious issues. And it's true we have to modernize the grids. The problem is it costs a lot of money. And I don't really understand where to take these money from because everything in Europe needs a lot of money. And the second problem is, why are we talking about it now and not when you started to design all your, uh, energy and climate goals. It was the time to think about grids. And now the grids cannot, uh, function with this green energy that is being used that should be designed and thought of earlier and not we shouldn't be thinking about it now because the world wants more and more energy. The demand is growing, and with the development of, for example, artificial intelligence, it will grow even more. So the world is increasing its energy. The US, China, India. But they are not blinded by this green ideology. If we could change the ideology ideology into megawatts, we would have the cheapest electricity ever. But it is not possible because unfortunately, even solar energy is not free. Everything costs and it also costs the grid operators. And with the current energy prices, our industry has no chance. Everybody is leaving us. All the industries are leaving Europe. And of course, grids will cost us billions. But they will not. It will not bring prices down. The prices will go down if we leave ideology and start thinking of prices.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• “Well, ladies and gentlemen, you are saying that the wind farms and solar panels is tantamount to free energy? No, it is not true. You are lying. Look at how much we need to pay to make our grids operational. I hope you're not naive enough to be promoting the most expensive and most unstable source of energy. The report that we are discussing today is not a plan for clean, cheap energy. Now it's a manifesto of the Green Deal, which turns Europe into a testing field of your green ideology. The commission wants to spend more money on our grids, which means that every European will need to pay €1,300 up until 2030, and as much as €5,000 up to 2050. So the more so-called renewable energies, the more risk, the more blackouts, cables, etc.. It's a road to nowhere. We need a good reason, not fanaticism.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you. I will speak polish. The revision of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive was adopted at the end of the previous term of the European Parliament. Um, and it introduces a list of requirements for buildings that have to be fulfilled in the coming years. All buildings, residential or others that are public property, would have to be net zero starting from 2028, and private buildings will have to fulfill this criteria from 2030. It is also assumed that the use of primary energy, so the actual total use of energy from their use will go down by 16% to 2030. This directive also limits the possibility of heating flats because it prohibits the use of fuels based on fossil fuels. And all this in a moment, comes in a moment when all European citizens struggle with finding a place to live, a flat, a house for them and their family. Therefore, the European Parliament should repeal those limitations and introduce in their place solutions that will facilitate building new homes. Thank you.”
  Energy performance of buildings
• “Thank you very much. The EU budget for 2026. It isn't a financial plan. It's an ideological manifesto. Is the expression of a philosophy, unfortunately, an interventionist one. Redistribution and bureaucracy. We see an attempt here to. Um, be, um, to sprinkle money everywhere is. We're not short of resources. That's not the problem. But the have a false diagnosis of the illness where there's too much regulation and fiscal policy is choking all initiatives, more and more taxes, more and more hidden costs for economic activity in this budget. There's nothing which would help the U.S competitiveness against the rest of the world. We have artificial projects being financed and further resources for the central apparatus. That we all need is more freedom. That's the only thing that can help us.”
  Size of EU budget
• “Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. Once upon a time, a European car was a mark of class and quality. I had an uncle in France who always drove a Peugeot. Renault. Citroen. That was a tradition in Poland. We imported thousands of fantastic German cars. Even in the United States. They appreciated European cars because we had the best cars, the best design, and even James Bond had a European car. And then along came some nutters and the the E transformation. This is not a crisis. This is a result of misguided policy. The Audi factory closed in Brussels, and that was the first time a zero emissions factory. So now we don't have jobs, we don't have cars, we don't have anything. Thank you.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen. The change of the name from New Green Deal to Clean Industry Deal does not change anything because it is still the old damaging project based on bureaucracy and ideology. The European Commission did not learn anything. Energy prices are high. The regulations. We have them too many. They admit it. But instead of going away from the ETS and going away from the new Green Deal, we are getting new suggestions for quotas of made in EU and regulations. It will not work because it cannot work. And we hear that energy prices will go down, but we do not hear anything about the ETS system which is bringing them up. How can we promise cheaper energy if we have a system which makes it expensive? And at the same time, USA and China have cheap energy from fossil fuels? We are creating new institutions, but we have old programs and just experimented. We need a real change and we need to leave this policy.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices