Beatrice TIMGREN

Policy topics Beatrice TIMGREN is active on

What Beatrice TIMGREN has said (67)

• 2026-06-17 “(15:48:09 – 15:49:16): You. We have seen it time and time again that members stand here. They talk about green goals and electrification. Well, I think 1 thing is clear. We're not going to be able to achieve our goals if electricity continues to be this expensive. And perfectly normal families and companies are continue to have to pay incredibly high costs for European bureaucracy. I think we need to be honest about that. AI and industry cannot be over won over by wind and sun. We need reliable energy, nuclear energy, for example. We need to know exactly how this works. We don't need to talk about how it should work. We need to know how it actually works. Lots of people are saying cheap electricity is what we need. Well, yes. Absolutely. But this is only going to be possible, apparently, if the sun is shining or the it's windy. Please, mister Lovin.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-04-28 “– Fru talman! Den här omröstningen handlar inte om kvinnors trygghet. Vänstersidan vill plocka politiska poäng genom plakatpolitik och godhetssignalering. Om vänstersidan verkligen hade brytt sig om att stoppa sexualbrott hade de för länge sedan tillsammans med oss drivit igenom högre straff och att utvisa utländska våldtäktsmän. Men vänstersidan röstar ständigt emot högre straff och driver på för fortsatt massinvandring från kulturellt avlägsna länder, där samtycke inte ens finns på kartan. Nu försöker de framstå som kvinnokämpar genom att undergräva nationellt självbestämmande och rättssäkerhet. Det är hyckleri. Idén om samtycke kan tyckas självklar i teorin, men desto svårare i verklig juridisk prövning. Principen måste vara att du är oskyldig tills motsatsen är bevisad. Vi ska inte införa rättsosäkra system på EU-nivå där staten tvingar individer att bevisa sin egen oskuld. Det hör inte hemma i en rättsstat. Därför röstar vi nej.”
• 2026-03-20 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The proposal in the Grids Package builds on Regulation (EU) 2019/943 [1] , which governs the use of congestion income . The objective is to provide stronger investment signals for cross-border energy infrastructure projects. This should also improve consistency and transparency, contributing to greater predictability for investors. Furthermore, using congestion income for network investments that reduce structural congestion will provide long-term benefits for consumers and industries. First, it should be clarified that only after priority objectives a) [2] and c) [3] have been fulfilled, would 25% of the remaining congestion income be reserved for investments in Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMIs). Second, the Commission’s proposal foresees no centralisation or EU-level pooling of congestion income. Congestion income remains nationally managed and retained within the Member State where it is generated, for PCI and PMI investments located within that same Member State, including internal infrastructure with PCI status, unless national authorities decide otherwise. Furthermore, the Commission supports the establishment of internal bidding zones where appropriate and acknowledges the specific circumstances of Member States that have implemented such systems. The Commission has already engaged with Member States to address these specificities where necessary and remains ready to continue doing so. The proposal is currently under discussion by the European Parliament and the Council. The Commission stands ready to support co-legislators in their discussions. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019R0943&qid=1775155216966. [2] Guaranteeing the actual availability of allocated capacity. [3] Compensation to offshore renewable electricity generation plant operators.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration · EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-02-13 “E-000643/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The RESourceEU Action Plan 1 confirms the Commission’s intention to accelerate the EU’s diversification efforts to reduce critical raw materials (CRM) dependencies and to build on multilateral initiatives to secure diversified supply. The Commission assessed the United States proposal to launch the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) and proposed to the Council to join FORGE, on behalf of the EU. FORGE’s intention to cooperate on both policies and projects identification and support has the potential to foster the development of projects along the value chain that need enhanced support from different players. The EU will join FORGE once the internal procedures in the Council have been completed. Engagement in FORGE is complementary to the EU’s participation in other global fora, such as the Group of Seven (G7) and the Group of 20 (G20), its bilateral relations through its 15 partnerships on raw materials, the G7 Critical Minerals Production Alliance, contributing to the policy objectives set by the Critical Raw Materials Act 2 and RESourceEU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0945. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02024R1252-20240503.”
  EU-US trade relations · Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights)
• 2026-01-12 “E-000068/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission remains fully committed to ensuring a high level of protection of human health while maintaining a proportionate and workable regulatory framework for cosmetics. These principles underpin the Commission’s Omnibus VI proposal 1 , which enhances legal certainty, improves predictability of regulatory outcomes, and facilitates timely risk assessment and management for cosmetic products. In particular, the proposal establishes a three-month window for industry to submit derogation dossiers following the entry into force of the Delegated Regulation classifying carcinogenic, mutagenic and reprotoxic (CMR) substances. The Commission also proposes standardised periods of 12 months for placing products on the market and 24 months for the sell-through of existing stocks. This provides lead time needed for reformulation and inventory management, mitigating economic impacts, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. Lastly, the proposal clarifies that a CMR constituent within natural complex substances (e.g., essential oils) does not automatically trigger a ban on the entire extract if its overall safety is confirmed. This is especially relevant for fragrances. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0531.”
  Pharmaceuticals regulation in EU
• 2025-11-13 “– Fru talman! EU:s jämställdhetspolitik, den är inte modig. Den är feg och den är naiv. Man sitter fast i genusworkshop. Man fokuserar på ordval, blanketter och normkritik. Samtidigt blundar man för det riktiga problemet: islamisering, hedersvåld, otrygghet, parallellsamhällen där kvinnors frihet faktiskt offras. Och vad gör EU? Man skriver rapporter, man håller panelsamtal, man jagar pronomen. Problemet, det är inte män. Problemet, det är män som anser sig äga kvinnor som sin egendom och så kallade feminister som ursäktar, försvarar, tystar ner. Jämställdhet, det handlar inte om PowerPoint. Det är rätten att känna sig trygg, att kunna röra sig fritt i samhället utan att kontrolleras, hotas eller tystas. Så sluta spela modig i konferensrum. Stå upp när det faktiskt kostar någonting. Bekämpa islamisterna utan undanflykter. Därför så röstade jag nej idag.”
• 2025-11-13 “– Fru talman! Europa står för 6 % av de globala utsläppen. Ändå förbereder vi ett nytt strikt klimatmål för 2040 som om vi ensamma kunde styra planetens temperatur. Men den obekväma sanningen är denna: klimatet år 2050 avgörs inte i Bryssel, utan i Peking, Washington och New Delhi. Om vi sätter mål som vår industri inte kan uppnå, då räddar vi inte klimatet, vi flyttar bara våra utsläpp och vi skadar våra fabriker, jobb och vårt välstånd. Utsläppen, de följer med. Verkligt klimatledarskap handlar om teknik, innovation, konkurrenskraft. Det handlar om kärnkraft, prisvärd energi, inte symboliska mål som inget annat land följer. Därför röstade jag mot det nya klimatmålet för 2040.”
• 2025-10-10 “E-003983/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has accelerated the review of the CO 2 standards for light-duty vehicles. The review will be based on a fact-based analysis, taking into account all relevant technological developments, including as regards plug-in hybrid technologies, sustainable and renewable fuels and the importance of an economically viable and socially fair transition towards zeroemission mobility. The review will also carefully consider the competitiveness and innovation capacity of the EU automotive industry, in line with the Union’s broader climate and industrial objectives. An inclusive public consultation on the revision of the CO 2 standards for light-duty vehicles has been completed 1 . It gathered input from a broad range of stakeholders, including national administrations, industry, non-governmental organisations, consumers, and academia, to strengthen the evidence base for the review. The feedback is now being analysed and will inform the ongoing work. However, the Commission cannot prejudge the outcome of the review. 1 Link to the public consultation: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14765Revision-of-the-CO2-emission-standards-for-cars-and-vans/feedback_en?p_id=19981.”
  Road transport environmental policy · Climate efforts
• 2025-10-08 “E-003966/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The EU taxonomy 1 aims to provide transparency on activities that promote energy and ecological transition and ensure that greenwashing is prevented. While the EU taxonomy aims to act as a catalyst for investments into the most environmentally sustainable companies and for the transition of other companies towards environmental sustainability, it does not prevent investment in activities that are not covered by its framework. In 2024, capital investments into Taxonomy-aligned activities have reached EUR 273 billion. This brings the total to EUR 742 billion over the financial years 2022, 2023 and 2024. This demonstrates that companies are using the Taxonomy to guide and showcase their capital investments in key sectors contributing to the green transition and more sustainable economic growth, in particular energy. However, and notwithstanding the use of the EU Taxonomy by stakeholders, the Commission is committed to enhance its usability as part of increased focus on EU competitiveness. The Omnibus package adopted on 26 February 2025 2 represents an unprecedented simplification effort, through the reduction of reporting obligations. In addition, the Commission is currently conducting a comprehensive review of the Taxonomy criteria to simplify and enhance their usability. Particular attention is paid to simplifying the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) criteria. The review will be evidence-based and will respect the principle of technological neutrality. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/tools-and-standards/eu-taxonomy-sustainable-activities_en . 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/omnibus-package-2025-04-01_en .”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU · Green Taxonomy
• 2025-09-08 “E-003472/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission Given that wrestling is a culturally significant and widely followed sport in Gambia, it was used as a channel for engaging local communities on climate adaptation and environmental awareness. The three wrestling arenas built in the localities of Ndemban, Farafenni and Boiram, also served as venues for training, education and community events focused on resilience to climate risks – such as flooding and deforestation – which directly affect local livelihoods. The implementation of this project was properly monitored through various mechanisms and a final report is currently under assessment. The above-mentioned project funded cultural engagement through sporting activities that also benefitted climate adaptation and resilience, therefore climate being targeted. Overall, the Commission ensures that all projects align with EU development and climate objectives, with sustainability systematically considered and follow-up evaluations conducted where relevant.”
  EU climate aid for global South · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-09-08 “E-003473/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Since the ratification of the Paris Agreement on climate change, commitments by countries around the world have contributed to reducing projected global warming from 3.7 - 4.8°C to 2.4 - 2.6°C 1 . This shows the importance of ambitious leadership and concrete climate action, such as that of the EU and its Member States, to avoid uncontrolled global warming and the damages it brings for economies, ecosystems, well-being, ultimately contributing to political instability 2 . The European Climate Law (ECL) and its climate targets ensure that the EU remains a global climate leader. Investments are necessary regardless of the EU decarbonisation pathway, to replace ageing assets and infrastructure and to respond to growing energy needs. Delivering on the targets under the ECL provides certainty and boosts such investments in a modern EU energy system, independence, strategic autonomy and enhanced security, while limiting the costs of climate inaction which far outweigh investments needed 3,4,5 . The Clean Industrial Deal and Net-Zero Industry Act 6 outline concrete actions to turn decarbonisation into a driver of growth for European 7 industries. Limiting global average temperature is a collective effort, all countries must act to reduce emissions. Climate targets reflect global cost-effective Greenhouse gas pathways aligned with the Paris Agreement temperature goals. EU climate policy gives credibility to the EU’s calls on others to act and accelerate decarbonisation 8 . The EU, with almost 6% of global population 9 , is a showcase for successful climate action. Total Net Greenhouse Gas Emissions have been reduced by 37% compared to 1990, with our economy growing by 71% over the same period 10 . 1 Projected global warming by the end of the century. See: https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/climate-issues/degrees-matter. 2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) AR6 WGII. Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FullReport.pdf. 3 The report shows that by reducing the risks of climate-induced events, climate action could prevent significant economic losses and raise global Gross Domestic Product by up to 13% by the year 2100. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2025). Investing in Climate for Growth and Development: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/investing-in-climate-for-growth-and-development_16b7cbc7-en.html. 4 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (2024). Climate damage projections beyond annual temperature. The study shows a global Gross Domestic Product loss of 10% if the planet warms by more than 3ºC: https://iiasa.ac.at/news/apr-2024/what-are-economic-costs-of-climate-inaction. 5 European Central Bank (2025). Climate risks: no longer the tragedy of the horizon. It states that climate events could cause euro area Gross Domestic Product to fall by up to 5% by 2030 – a downturn similar in magnitude to the economic impact of the Global Financial Crisis. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/date/2025/html/ecb.blog20250709~aed804c955.en.html 6 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en. 7 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/sustainability/net-zero-industry-act_en. 8 The joint EU-China press statement on climate change shows the importance of EU’s role in building the trust needed for others to commit and engage in climate action: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2025/07/24/joint-eu-china-press-statement-on-climate/. 9 https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/facts-and-figures-european-union_en. 10 Climate Action Progress Report 2025: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/abb61407-e976-482cb309-2c36625df8c1_en?filename=capr2025_report_en.pdf.”
  Energy (green transition) · Climate efforts
• 2025-07-15 “E-002884/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The legislative proposal for a Regulation establishing the conditions for the implementation of the Union support to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the period 2028–2034, adopted by the Commission on 16 July 2025 1 , recognises animal welfare as a key element of the EU’s broader sustainability and agricultural goals. It is explicitly identified as one of the priority areas that Member States are required to support through incentives, placing it on equal footing with other priorities such as climate adaptation, soil health, and biodiversity. The Commission considers that to avoid placing an unfair burden on farmers when Member States apply national laws that go beyond EU minimum standards, especially in areas like the environment, climate, animal welfare, and antimicrobial resistance, Member States should be able to offer financial support to help farmers meet these higher standards that go beyond the EU baseline, whether these standards are newly introduced or already in force. If the Commission proposal is supported by the co-legislators, and where the Member States decide to apply this measure, farmers would be eligible for EU agricultural aid to promote better animal welfare practises for grazing cows. This possibility is proposed for the period 20282034 and has also been proposed in the CAP simplification package for the current programming period, adopted by the Commission on 14 May 2025 2 , which is currently being negotiated by co-legislators. 1 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/media/news/next-chapter-cap-2025-07-17_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0236&qid=1753874272972.”
  EU requirements on animal welfare for farmers · Agricultural funding
• 2025-07-10 “E-002817/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The rules concerning the carriage of dangerous goods do include some specific provisions on the transport of batteries. In general terms, the rules on the carriage of dangerous goods are established at the level of international organisations namely United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail, and set out in the Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road 1 , in the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways 2 and the Regulation concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail (RID) 3 . Except in the case of RID, the EU is not itself a contracting party to these agreements, although EU Member States are. In any case, these international instruments are incorporated into EU law as annexes to Directive 2008/68/EC 4 on the inland transport of dangerous goods, with the result that these rules are mandatory for national transport operations within the Union as well as transport operations between EU Member States. They also apply to international carriage in a much wider geographical area. The Commission nevertheless remains open to dialogue with EU manufacturers to further explore this topic. 1 https://unece.org/adr-2025-files. 2 https://unece.org/transport/dangerous-goods/adn-2025. 3 https://otif.org/en/?page_id=1105. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02008L006820250213&qid=1754552606495, OJ L 260, 30.9.2008, p. 13.”
  Sustainability of batteries regulation · EU competences on consumer protection and product standards · EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2025-06-04 “E-002254/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission thanks the Honourable Member for her questions on the recently adopted delegated act on standards 1 under the Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation 2 . The Commission is aware of the concerns expressed by some stakeholders regarding the potential impact of mandating the standard EN ISO 15118-20, particularly on smaller charging equipment manufacturers. These concerns were raised during the public consultation 3 on the draft act and have been duly considered. The Commission provided sufficient time for implementation, considering the publication dates of the relevant standards by the standardisation organisations. Notably, EN ISO 15118-2 was published in 2016, while EN ISO 15118-20 was published in 2022. Thus, the Commission considers the timeline in the act proportionate to support market uptake. Implementing these standards is essential to ensure interoperability and avoid inconsistent deployment of advanced functionalities such as ‘plug and charge’ and ‘vehicle-to-grid’ across Member States and industry. The Commission remains committed to implementing the delegated act proportionately and in a technology-neutral manner, as shown by the adoption of international standards and the regular dialogue held with Member State experts and industry, including via the Sustainable Transport Forum and the Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Committee. 1 OJ L, 2025/656, 18.6.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2025/656/oj. 2 OJ L 234, 22.9.2023, p. 1., ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1804/oj. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14346-Alternative-fuels-infrastructurestandards-wireless-recharging-electric-roads-vehicle-grid-communication-hydrogen_en.”
  EV charging infrastructure
• 2025-06-03 “E-002217/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The obligation for Member States to set up separate collection for textiles by 1 January 2025 was introduced in the 2018 revision of the Waste Framework Directive (WFD) 1 . The WFD does not include specific requirements on the types of textiles to be collected or on the collection methods; Member States have the flexibility to design systems targeting their specificities and needs. To make the textile waste management more sustainable, the Commission adopted a targeted revision of the WFD in July 2023, which introduces amongst other measures national extended producer responsibility (EPR) schemes. The adoption of the amending Directive is planned in October 2025. The Commission is aware of the challenges the textile second-hand sector is facing mainly because of the growing volume of used textiles and textile waste resulting from ultra- and fast fashion practices. Once the EPR schemes for textiles are established in Member States, producer responsibility organisations will be responsible for, and financially contribute to the collection and management of end-of-life textiles. This will benefit reuse operators and social economy entities, which should have access to the collected EPR fees. In its information note 2 presented to the Council (Environment) on 17 June 2025, the Commission provided an update on the current state of the recycling sector, including the textiles second-hand sector. The note highlights envisaged measures at EU-level to support the recycling sector and invites Member States to complement these efforts with national measures. 1 Directive (EU) 2018/851 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive 2008/98/EC on waste, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 109–140. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9967-2025-INIT/en/pdf.”
  Sustainable fashion · Circular economy
• 2025-06-03 “E-002220/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission thanks the Honourable Members of the European Parliament for the additional questions. During the Consultation Forum which took place on 25 June 2025, participants discussed on the test cycle and on possible emission values, including a possible modification of the CO limit. Exchange of views with industry and other stakeholders will continue after the Consultation Forum. Overall, regarding the concern of the Honourable Members, it is important to state that automatic combustion control and manual operation are not incompatible features. They have been implemented in a number of stoves already being sold. With any upcoming future Regulation, the Commission will work towards an approach, which ensures that all stoves can be manually operated in case of electric power failure, for all models placed on the market. In this context, there is no reason for manufacturers to scale back the functionality of the stoves, since the appliances will be operative under all possible conditions as they are today, including possible blackouts.”
  Ecodesign & durability
• 2025-06-03 “PE774.970v01-00 EN E-002219/2025 Answer given by Ms Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the findings mentioned and is planning to conduct a risk assessment for solar energy infrastructure, including inverters, as announced at the SolarPower Summit last March 1 . The information and communications technology (ICT) supply chain security remains high on the EU agenda. In the recently adopted ProtectEU Strategy 2 , the Commission highlights the need to avoid critical dependencies and de-risk EU ICT supply chains from high-risk suppliers. Union-level risk assessments on the cybersecurity of digital infrastructures and supply chains are conducted by the Network and Information Systems Cooperation Group, supported by the Commission and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), pursuant to Article 22 of the NIS2 Directive 3 . Solar energy infrastructure is one of the technologies identified by the Commission and the Member States for one of these Unionlevel risk assessments. The Commission will thoroughly evaluate the findings of the planned risk assessment for solar energy infrastructure. Policy choices regarding cybersecurity standardisation and certification, informed by this risk assessment, cannot be anticipated at the current stage of the process. In addition, within the revision of the Cybersecurity Act, the Commission will also look at the ICT supply chain security and will consider how to address critical dependencies and how to de-risk EU ICT supply chains and ensure their security. 1 https://www.solarpowereurope.org/news/shining-moments-from-the-solar-power-summit-day-2. 2 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy. 3 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive).”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2025-05-05 “P-001804/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The requirement of tethered caps and lids stems from Article 6(1) of the Single-Use Plastics Directive (SUPD) 1 , a Directive which aims to lessen environmental and health impacts caused by unsustainable plastic use. In line with the Better Regulation rules 2 , a comprehensive assessment was done before adopting 3 the SUPD, based on a study conducted by external experts 4 . SUP beverage container caps and lids were among the most littered items on EU beaches, found more than twice as often as the containers. By combining the tethering requirement with mandatory separate collection targets for SUP beverage bottles, as per Article 9, littering is expected to decrease significantly. Member States provide data on beach litter via the Marine Strategic Framework Directive 5 , which the Joint Research Centre (JRC) analyses for trends. A recent JRC report 6 shows that marine SUP litter on EU beaches decreased by 40% 7 . As the tethering requirement entered into force less than a year ago, since 3 July 2024, continuous monitoring is needed first, before scientifically sound assessment of its impact can be conducted. A single study covering a specific region cannot be generalised to conclude that the measure is ineffective at EU scale. In the study in question 8 , it seems that the figures include caps from packaging other than beverage bottles. It also reports a surge of littered balloons, for which the reasons cannot be directly explained. The Commission will evaluate the SUPD by 3 July 2027, based on available data and evidence to determine if its objectives and measures have been effectively met and implemented across Member States. 1 Directive (EU) 2019/904 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the reduction of the impact of certain plastic products on the environment, OJ L 155, 12.6.2019, p. 1–19. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/better-regulation_en. 3 Summary of SUPD Impact Assessment: https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/6e9b7f79-da96-4a53-956fe8f62c9d7fed/library/466e246b-cfa3-4b3e-a3c7-fe78bb53ee0a/details?download=true. 4 Supporting study - Assessment of measures to reduce marine litter from single use plastics: https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/6e9b7f79-da96-4a53-956f-e8f62c9d7fed/library/10fe4f5e-45cb-4604-8e8a247d8d76f1f5/details?download=true. 5 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/research-area/environment/oceans-and-seas/eu-marine-strategyframework-directive_en. 6 https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/jrc-news-and-updates/marine-litter-eu-coastline-down-almost-onethird-2025-02-04_en. 7 The amount of marine single-use plastic litter in the EU coastline has dropped by 40 % between the baseline period (2015-2016) and the assessment period (2020-2021). 8 https://hsr.se/sites/default/files/2025-04/Skraprapporten-2025-digital-uppslag-webb_0.pdf.”
  EU policy towards plastics · Sustainable packaging
• 2025-04-24 “E-001663/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission As referred to in the response to PQ 853/2025, the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 requires designated providers of very large online platforms and very large search engines to put in place reasonable, proportionate and effective mitigation measures tailored to systemic risks stemming from the functioning, design and use of their services. The choice of the mitigation measures is with the providers, as long as the measures are reasonable, proportionate, effective and tailored to the specific risks identified. This standard applies to centralised factchecking and decentralised initiatives such as community notes. When implementing such measures, providers are required to consider their actual or foreseeable effects on freedom of expression. In the EU’s multi-faceted approach to countering threats related to civic discourse and electoral integrity relies on a broad range of independent stakeholders and fully upholds the freedom of expression. In this approach, fact-checking is only one of many elements, next to regulatory and co-regulatory measures, support for media literacy, strategic communication, and research. In support for stringent standards of integrity and accountability for fact-checking entities, the EU has supported the creation of a code of standards 2 , which amongst other objectives aim to ensure non-partisanship, impartiality and financial transparency. The call for proposal referred to by the Honourable Members requires the participation of a fact-checking organisation certified as independent by such standards as part of the successful consortium and the call’s activities will contribute to promoting and upholding the highest standards for transparency and independence throughout all Member States. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act). 2 See https://efcsn.com/code-of-standards/. The project that led to the creation of the Code of Standards was funded in the course of the Integrity of Social Media call for proposals, https://digitalstrategy.ec.europa.eu/en/funding/call-proposals-integrity-social-media.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU public communication strategy
• 2025-04-24 “E-001664/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The target for reducing reporting obligations’ burden has been set at 25% in March 2023, in the ‘Long term competitiveness’ Communication 1 . As indicated in the Communication ‘A Simpler and Faster Europe’ 2 , this target has been expanded to cover all administrative burden, and up to 35% for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). This represents a target of EUR 37.5 billion of savings over the mandate. The President of the Commission has made the reduction of red tape a priority for the new mandate of the Commission as explained in answer to E-1084/2025. The roadmap has been set in the ‘Competitiveness compass’ and the Communication ‘A Simpler and Faster Europe’ and simplification omnibuses have been adopted on 26 February, 14 May, 21 May and 17 June 2025. However, while aiming at achieving significant simplification, the Commission proposals nevertheless preserve the EU policy goals. The Better Regulation tools have been reinforced (e.g. through the SME and Competitiveness checks, and the scrutiny of delegated and implementing acts) to ensure that EU legislation is designed with implementation and simplification in mind right from the outset. The Communication also underscores the important role of the co-legislators for this process: ‘The European Parliament and the Council have a central role to play in creating simple and effective rules at the lowest administrative cost for people and companies. In 2016, both institutions committed to the principle of assessing the impacts of their substantial amendments when appropriate’. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-03/Communication_Long-term-competitiveness.pdf. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/8556fc33-48a3-4a96-94e88ecacef1ea18_en?filename=250201_Simplification_Communication_en.pdf.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2025-04-24 “E-001665/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of this study 1 , which shows that in the absence of complementary measures, the annual increase in heating costs for households in the lowest six deciles in Belgium could range from EUR 154 to EUR 261 or 0,8% to 0,6% of total expenditure, and from EUR 53 to EUR 158 or 0,6% to 0,5% for transport costs. These estimations are coherent with the Commission’s impact assessment 2 for the review of the Emissions Trading System (ETS) Directive 3 . Europe’s reliance on imported fossil fuels causes energy price volatility and higher supply costs. The Commission and Member States are working towards the timely implementation of the new Emission Trading System for buildings and road transport (ETS2) in combination with complementary measures to decouple people’s energy bills from fossil fuel cost volatility. The Social Climate Fund (SCF) 4 is designed to address the impact of ETS2 on vulnerable households. For those not eligible under the SCF, Member States also must target the national ETS2 revenues 5 at measures to anticipate and address its effects. The Affordable Energy Action Plan 6 aims at lowering energy costs by improving energy efficiency and energy savings and by addressing other aspects of the energy market that influence energy prices. The upcoming Citizens Energy Package 7 will focus on activating citizens to produce, sell and use their own energy and on tackling energy poverty. As part of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 8 , Member States are also developing targets, policies and measures and related financing for building renovations that reduce exposure to fossil fuels and alleviate energy poverty. A range of policies are also available for Member States to incentivise electrification and clean technologies. 1 https://energyville.be/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/ETS2-paper_final-15042025.pdf. 2 SWD(2021) 601 final. 3 Directive 2003/87/EC. 4 The SCF amounts to EUR 86.7 billion for the period 2026-2032. 5 National ETS2 revenues are estimated to amount to EUR 270 billion for the period 2027-2030. 6 COM/2025/79. 7 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/citizens-energy-package-commission-starts-consultation-process-2025-0619_en. 8 Directive (EU) 2024/1275.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme · Energy (green transition)
• 2025-03-12 “E-001074/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission As the Honourable Members correctly point out, in line with the applicable legal framework approved by the co-legislators, budgetary guarantees such as those underpinning the European Fund for Strategic Investments 1 and the InvestEU Fund 2 are granted for investments based on their alignment with EU policy priorities and their additionality. Where such guarantees are implemented in indirect management, implementing partners are fully responsible to enforce contract terms, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, including during legal insolvency proceedings. This includes measures to minimise losses for the relevant partner and the EU guarantee. The Commission provides annual reports on guarantee calls in the aggregate at the end of each financial year in accordance with Articles 250 and 217 of the Financial Regulation 3 , and any loss from the relevant guarantees will be reported in that context, with due account to the necessary protection of commercially sensitive information. The Commission carries out annual evaluations of the adequacy of the provisioning for budgetary guarantees given expected losses. If the Commission has evidence that such provisioning is inadequate, it is prepared to take remedial action in line with Article 217 of the Financial Regulation. However, over the last decade no remedial action has been necessary and, looking ahead, no such action appears likely since losses experienced remain in line with expectations. In general, the Commission gives top priority to a viable battery ecosystem in the EU. The recently announced ‘Battery Booster’ will support that ecosystem notably through dedicated financing and demand-side measures, favouring EU production and diversification of supplies. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32015R1017. 2 https://investeu.europa.eu/investeu-programme/investeu-fund_en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402509.”
  EU industrial funding · EU policy on sustainability criteria in public funding
• 2025-03-11 “E-001045/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Ecodesign Directive 1 requires the Commission to carry out a review of the existing measures for solid fuel local space heaters. The Commission has not adopted ecodesign requirements yet. The Commission tabled a working document to steer the discussion with stakeholders at a Consultation Forum. Initially, the meeting was scheduled on 12 February 2025, but it has been postponed. The Commission will continue discussing the topic with industry and other stakeholders including Member State representatives, with whom the Commission has engaged in an open dialogue. In this process, the Commission will ensure that new measures will not have any negative effects, including on civil defence. In this respect, the Commission will ensure that the fitting of any technology, including automatic airflow control, is compatible with the manual operation of the appliance. Possible effects on competitiveness are being assessed by the Commission, so that any measures proposed take competitiveness aspects fully into account. Potential affordability impacts due to product prices will also be carefully considered. The Commission intends to reconvene the Consultation Forum to discuss the current requirements and options for revising them. A proposal will be published for feedback on the Have Your Say portal and later, after favourable opinion by the Member State regulatory committee, sent for scrutiny to the European Parliament and Council in accordance with the applicable procedure. 1 Directive 2009/125/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing a framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for energy-related products (recast) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 285, 31.10.2009, p. 10–35.”
  Energy efficiency · Ecodesign & durability
• 2025-01-17 “E-000192/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission shares the importance of ensuring a level playing field and providing consumers with accurate information to make informed choices and to allow the comparison of emissions between different modes of transport. In this context, the Commission has adopted in 2023 a proposal for CountEmissions EU 1 , which is currently being discussed by co-legislators in the legislative procedure. The Flight Emissions Label (FEL) 2 was established under the ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation 3 as part of the political agreement reached by co-legislators, and it entered into force on 1 January 2025. FEL was developed in such a way that its methodology is coherent and consistent with the one proposed under the CountEmissions EU proposal. Airlines operating flights within the EU or departing from the EU will be able to voluntarily join this label which will be fully operational as of July 2025. The Commission will report to the co-legislators on the implementation of FEL by July 2027, drawing on the preparatory action 'Environmental Label for Aviation' delegated to the European Union Aviation Safety Agency 4 . 1 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the accounting of greenhouse gas emissions of transport services, COM(2023) 441 final. 2 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3170 of 18 December 2024 laying down detailed provisions concerning the voluntary environmental labelling scheme for the estimation of the environmental performance of flights, established pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2023/2405 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Flight Emissions Label). 3 Regulation (EU) 2023/2405 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on ensuring a level playing field for sustainable air transport (ReFuelEU Aviation). 4 COMMISSION DECISION of 5.4.2024 on the financing of pilot projects and preparatory actions in the field of transport and the adoption of the work programme for 2024.”
  Decarbonisation of aviation sector · Decarbonisation of maritime transport
• 2025-01-16 “E-000177/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission During the confirmatory hearing in the European Parliament on 5 November 2024, the Commissioner for Energy and Housing set out his commitment to work on a renewable energy target for 2040. Setting such a target for 2040 would build on the findings of the impact assessment accompanying the recommendation for a 2040 climate target (COM/2024/63 final; SWD/2024/63 final) and establishing that a greater share of renewables is necessary for the EU to meet its climate goals in the more cost-effective manner, while also enhancing energy independence, energy affordability, promoting jobs and supporting economic growth. The Commission Communication on the 2040 climate target from February 2024 state that ‘all zero and low carbon energy solutions (including renewables, nuclear, energy efficiency, storage, CCS, CCU, carbon removals, geothermal and hydro-energy, and all other current and future net-zero energy technologies) are necessary to decarbonise the energy system by 2040’ 1 . The 2040 Impact Assessment confirms this. The Commission respects the Member States’ right to choose their energy mix in line with the Treaties. Member States are free to decide which renewable energy technologies to develop further and the composition of the non-renewable share of their energy consumption. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2024%3A63%3AFIN”
  Energy (green transition) · Energy transition (state support)
• 2024-12-18 “E-003025/2024 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Following the adoption of the EU proposal 1 to change the protection status of the wolf under the Bern Convention 2 , after its entry into force, the Commission will present a targeted legislative proposal to implement this change in EU law and to modify accordingly the protection regime of the wolf under the Habitats Directive 3 . The change of protection status of the wolf under EU law, once agreed and transposed into national law, would increase management flexibility for Member States. However, they would remain obliged to maintain or restore a favourable conservation status of the wolf populations on their national territory, in accordance with the Directive’s requirements, with the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union 4 and with the international commitments under the Bern Convention. The legal protection status of species is differentiated, in the Habitats Directive, through their listing under the different Annexes 5 . However, the requirement to achieve and maintain a favourable conservation status is the overall objective set by the Directive, and it applies to all species (and habitat types) covered by it. Monitoring, assessment and reporting on the conservation status of species and habitats covered by the Habitats Directive is carried out by national authorities. The related guidelines establishing common formats and criteria 6 have been elaborated and are regularly updated in the competent expert group, in close cooperation with representatives from all Member States, stakeholders and the European Environment Agency 7 . 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6202 2 https://www.coe.int/en/web/bern-convention 3 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50. 4 E.g. Case C-436/22 on wolf hunting in Spain: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/202407/cp240118en.pdf and Case C-601/22 on derogations to kill wolves in Austria: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2024-07/cp240111en.pdf 5 In particular, species listed in Annex IV are subject to a strict protection regime, while species in Annex V are only subject to a protection regime (allowing more management flexibility). 6 https://cdr.eionet.europa.eu/help/habitats_art17/Reporting2025/Final%20Guidelines%20Art.%2017_20192024.pdf/ https://cdr.eionet.europa.eu/help/habitats_art17/Reporting2025/Explanatory%20notes%20Art%2017%20final_u pdate%20Nov%202023.pdf/ 7 https://www.eea.europa.eu/en”
  Large Carnivores
• 2024-11-26 “E-002656/2024 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The implementation framework of budgetary guarantees, for instance under the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), requires that partner institutions implementing them (for EFSI, the European Investment Bank) manage and share concomitant risk exposures as part of their own. Hence, the Commission is in close contact with the banks to ensure that the guarantees concerned are managed as such and in accordance with established terms and risk management frameworks, as well as market practice. However, it is recognised that the principal expenditure for programmes deploying budgetary guarantees is meant to cover potential losses on some of the supported investments, which without such support would not be financed by the market at reasonable terms while they make an important contribution to EU policy priorities. That is why budgetary guarantees are provisioned from the outset so that occasional losses do not impinge on the relevant programmes and their capacity to provide substantial leverage in supporting EU policy priorities. For instance, the InvestEU Programme 1 is on track to mobilise more than EUR 370 billion of investments, comparing with ex ante provisioning of EUR 10.46 billion. Moreover, the Commission notes, that in the specific case of interest to the Honourable Members, insolvency proceedings have not yet concluded. 1 https://investeu.europa.eu/index_en”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · EU industrial funding
• 2024-11-21 “E-002617/2024 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The Commission applies strict rules for the management of all projects, according to the rules and procedures applicable to external instruments as set in the Financial Regulation 1 . These provisions help to ensure full transparency and appropriate use of public funds. Working in a Team Europe 2 approach the EU ensures strong coordination and tangible impact on the ground. A key Team Europe Initiative on sustainable energy under the EU Global Gateway strategy 3 is the Africa-EU Green Energy Initiative 4 (AEGEI). The campaign showcases AEGEI investments jointly identified by the African partners and the EU. Ownership, transparency and accountability are at the core of the EU and African partners cooperation. Improving access to affordable and reliable energy is a cornerstone of the EU's partnership with African countries. AEGEI aims to establish 50GW of additional renewable energy generation capacity, including with solar and wind power. In addition, it strives to bring electricity access to at least 100 million people by 2030. The objective of the campaign is to leverage further commitments in renewable energy access, renewable power generation, grids and storage. Increasing access to affordable and reliable energy and green hydrogen industrialization are complementary goals. Both can create sustainable prosperity, jobs, and services for people. The Commission thoroughly reviews the macroeconomic outlook of partner countries to safeguard EU taxpayers against inflationary and financial risks. The Commission supports capacity building investments that contribute to creating a self-sustaining economy. Local communities are actively engaged in the projects to ensure that investments meet their needs and lead to sustainable development. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/eu-financial-regulation_en 2 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/team-europe-initiatives_en 3 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway_en 4 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/africa-europe-green-energy_en”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · EU climate aid for global South
• 2024-11-07 “E-002458/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) 1 applies, with some exceptions such as for telecom providers or domain name system (DNS) service providers, in principle to medium-sized or larger entities in 18 sectors, which are critical for the EU economy and society. It follows a risk-based approach requiring entities to take appropriate and proportionate cybersecurity risk management measures depending on the risks they face. In addition to the recently adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 2 , which specifies the requirements for cybersecurity measures and defines the thresholds for a significant incident for various categories of digital services and providers, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) is now consulting stakeholders 3 on a guidance document further explaining these requirements. Both will help small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as they offer additional guidance on the implementation of NIS2 and advance harmonisation across the EU. Moreover, the EU is funding SMEs by Horizon Europe 4 (cluster 3) and Digital Europe Programme (DEP) 5 . DEP has been explicitly supporting the uptake of EU cyber legislations by SMEs and promoting their competitiveness since 2022. It gave EUR 70 million from 2022 to 2024, and in addition it will devote around EUR 30 million up to 2027. Furthermore, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 6 (Cyber Resilience Act, CRA) includes provisions on dedicated support measures for microenterprises and SMEs. In 2024, the EU allocated EUR 30 million to develop guidance and compliance tools (including automatic compliance tools) for SMEs. This will help them to comply with the CRA, which in itself would support them in meeting the NIS2 supply chain security requirements. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj 2 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2690/oj 3 https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/ENISA_Guide_Feedback_Form 4 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe/cluster-3-civil-security-society_en 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/activities/work-programmes-digital 6 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj”
  Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
• 2024-10-21 “E-002192/2024 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The transition to the EU regulatory framework for medical devices has proved to be challenging. The recent extension of the transitional periods has given manufacturers and notified bodies more time to carry out the conformity assessment to reduce the risk of acute shortages of devices. In addition, the number of notified bodies has significantly increased since the Regulations have become applicable. As part of the actions financed under the EU4Health Programme 1 to support the implementation of the Regulations on medical devices, the Commission funds a project to increase the capacity of notified bodies and the preparedness of manufacturers, and to facilitate access to notified bodies, especially for small and mediumsized enterprises 2 . Moreover, the Commission has launched a targeted evaluation of the medical devices legislation in 2024 that will assess its performance, to optimise its implementation and pave the way for identifying options to address persisting shortcomings. Having regard to the importance and urgency of the matter, President of the Commission has included in the Mission letter to the Commissioner-designate for Health and Animal Welfare 3 the need to ensure the availability and competitiveness of medical devices, including by stepping up the implementation of the current framework and evaluating the need for potential legislative changes. In this regard, the Commission will prioritise the ongoing targeted evaluation of the medical device Regulations to take informed decisions about the way forward, including about potential legislative changes. 1 European Health Union – helping the transition to the new rules on medical devices and in vitro diagnostics: https://health.ec.europa.eu/document/download/1b817e65-89c8-4235-ab74-c147aeff34db_en?filename=mdr_invitro-factsheet_1.pdf 2 NoBoCap: https://nobocap.eu/about/ 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/b628b5a2-ac1e-4b9c-bbdd35b82da0ac6b_en?filename=mission-letter-varhelyi.pdf”
  GMOs
• 2024-10-21 “E-002193/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission proposal for a Regulation on a Monitoring Framework on Resilient European Forests 1 is designed to use a combination of Earth observation (EO) information and ground monitoring. This approach ensures timely, cost-effective and accurate information about European forests, avoiding unnecessary administrative burden. It builds on the technological potential of EO, while allowing for calibration and ground-truthing of satellitederived data. It will support Member States in fulfilling the obligations under the land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF) Regulation 2 , Nature Restoration Regulation 3 , and Habitats Directive 4 , as well as assist land managers in engaging in certification schemes under the new the Carbon Removal and Carbon Farming Certification Framework 5 . The information from EO will be collected by the Commission through the Copernicus Programme that is already well established. These datasets ensure the temporal consistency and are accompanied by comprehensive documentation on the operation of algorithms, including quality standards. Their accuracy and consistency with regional statistics will be further ensured by the calibration of these products with ground data collected by the Member States, including, where relevant, in the framework of their national forest inventories. To that end, the proposal builds on forest data collection systems already in place in the Member States. Article 346(1)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security. The proposal provides for the necessary safeguards to ensure data confidentiality, including on land ownership and on the location of monitoring sites. 1 COM (2023) 728 of 22 November 2023. 2 Regulation (EU) 2018/841 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2023/839. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1991. 4 Council Directive 92/43/EEC. 5 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TC1-COD-2022-0394_EN.pdf”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-09-26 “E-001825/2024 Answer given by Ms McGuinness on behalf of the European Commission When developing the EU Taxonomy 1 , the Commission prioritised economic activities which have the greatest potential to make a substantial contribution to one or more EU environmental objectives without causing significant harm to the others. The EU Taxonomy covers therefore nuclear activities which can play an important role in moving towards a carbon-neutral economy, including research, development, demonstration and deployment of advanced nuclear technologies with minimal waste from the fuel cycle, construction and operation of new nuclear power plants using best-available technologies and upgrading of existing nuclear installations for the purposes of lifetime extension. The EU Taxonomy is a living document and will continue to evolve over time, with more activities being added to its scope by means of amendments. Stakeholders are able to address suggestions and questions on new activities to be included in the EU Taxonomy or on possible amendments relating to existing activities. For this purpose, the Commission established a stakeholder request mechanism 2 and, with input from the Platform on Sustainable Finance 3 , it assesses suggestions received. When developing the Taxonomy, the Commission paid particular attention to ensuring that all economic activities within a sector are treated equally when they contribute equally towards the environmental objective. Consequently, the activities in the energy sector include activities relating to all major energy sources, including nuclear energy. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/tools-and-standards/eu-taxonomy-sustainable-activities_en 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/overview-sustainable-finance/platform-sustainablefinance/stakeholder-request-mechanism_en 3 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/overview-sustainable-finance/platform-sustainable-finance_en”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-09-26 “P-001827/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has proposed 1 a 12-month phasing-in period for the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) 2 to allow companies more time to prepare. If this extension is approved by the European Parliament and the Council, the obligations laid down therein will apply from 30 December 2025 for medium and large companies, and from 30 June 2026 for micro and small enterprises. The extra time aims to ensure that industry sectors and global partners are fully prepared for the Regulation's entry into application. The third edition of the Frequently Asked Questions 3 and the Guidance document 4 provide pragmatic solutions, developed in close cooperation with the Member States to raise the capacity of the private stakeholders. A call 5 under the EU programme for the Environment and Climate Action is under evaluation that will award EUR 1 million for capacity building of private stakeholders. The development of the Information System is well on track and will be ready in December 2024. The Commission developed several solutions to reduce the need for manual data entry and facilitate the work of stakeholders. Several demonstrations took place in 2024 in the Multi-Stakeholder Platform 6 to facilitate familiarisation with the system. User instructions have been published and virtual trainings have started. The process to develop the benchmarking methodology to classify countries or parts thereof is well advanced. The Commission has published a Strategic Framework for International Cooperation Engagement in the context of the EUDR 7 to promote deforestation-free supply chains globally. The Annex of this framework outlines the principles of the methodology for the classification system, which are firmly grounded in fairness, objectivity and transparency. 1 https://green-business.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-regulation-amending-deforestation-regulationregards-date-application_en 2 Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010, OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 206–247. 3 https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/34861680-e799-4d7c-bbad-da83c45da458/library/e126f816-844b-41a989ef-cb2a33b6aa56/details?download=true 4 https://green-business.ec.europa.eu/publications/guidance-eu-deforestation-regulation_en 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/life/wp-call/2021-2024/call-fiche_life2024-plp_en.pdf 6 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expertgroups/consult?lang=en&do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3282 7 https://green-business.ec.europa.eu/publications/communication-commission-strategic-frameworkinternational-cooperation-engagement-deforestation_en”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-09-17 “E-001730/2024 Answer given by Ms Simson on behalf of the European Commission The REPowerEU plan 1 set an aspirational target of 10 million tonnes of domestic renewable hydrogen production and 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen imports by 2030 to lower the imports of Russian fossil fuels, proposing to increase the mandatory targets for renewable hydrogen consumption in industry and the transport sector. Whilst the co-legislators in the Renewable Energy Directive 2 decided to reduce both binding targets, and as a result, renewable hydrogen demand is expected to be lower than the aspirational targets in the REPowerEU plan for 2030, the mandatory targets will still spur future demand for renewable hydrogen, allowing the hydrogen industry to kickstart supply chains. Furthermore, the colegislators also agreed on additional mandatory targets for renewable hydrogen consumption in industry in 2035 and laid out pathways in the aviation 3 and maritime 4 sector to promote the uptake of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen up to 2050. EU financing for renewable and low-carbon hydrogen projects will go through the same due diligence process as any other EU financing, including robust financial oversight mechanisms, risk assessment procedures and milestones for the delivery of expected returns. Through the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) Innovation Fund, the Commission has developed guidelines on how to calculate and compare the avoided greenhouse gas emissions for its supported projects, including for renewable and low-carbon hydrogen projects 5 . The European Investment Bank uses a transparent methodology to calculate and report on the impacts of their investments on climate mitigation 6 . A carbon footprint of products methodology, as developed under the Battery regulation 7 , will also be able to compare the climate benefits of products. 1 SWD(2022) 230 final. 2 Directive (EU) 2023/2413. 3 Regulation (EU) 2023/2405. 4 Regulation (EU) 2023/1805. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/innovfund/guidance/ghg-emissionavoidance-methodology_innovfund_en.pdf#:~:text=The%20Innovation%20Fund%20(InnovFund) 6 https://www.eib.org/en/publications/20220215-eib-project-carbon-footprint-methodologies 7 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13877-Batteries-for-electric-vehiclescarbon-footprint-methodology_en”
  Energy (green transition)
• “(09:54:06 – 09:55:18): Thank you. I will speak in Swedish. When this was launched, the Commission's President said this was a growth strategy that's going to help with jobs, it's going to help the climate. However, that just seems to be an empty wish as studies have shown that reducing the chemical industry has started to really increase since twenty-twenty, and there have been twenty thousand jobs disappearing in the chemical sector, twenty thousand jobs. And of course, this is a fundamental question: does ETS actually work? Because if production simply moves outside of Europe, so does the emissions. They move outside of Europe as well. And if you've been, we had the auction of the emission rights, and then we see the prices going up. So my question to the Commission is quite simple: how does the Commission evaluate the risk that the current development of the ETS and the higher price of the auction rights, how is this going to impact all of the industries and the jobs in Europe?”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• “First of all, I'd like to say that it's good that you've tried to improve a lot of the bad parts of this deforestation regulation, but the rules have to work in practice. And at the moment, we've got the same message from the member states from the forestry industry, forest owners, cooperatives and small companies. The regulation is not ready yet. The system is too complicated. The IT platform isn't ready and the timetable is unrealistic. Now, the irony in all this is that countries who have the most sustainable, growing forests, such as Finland and Sweden, are now being forced to do more bureaucracy and entails higher costs for them for no use to the environment whatsoever. And that's completely unreasonable. Jessica, I know you understand this and you want to improve things, but your changes are not improving things. Why didn't you go even further? And more importantly, how can we in Parliament help find better solutions? Thank you.”
  Management of EU forests
• “Uh, thank you. I will speak in Swedish. Thank you very much. What I'd like to do is start by saying that the, uh, it's been shown in the audit report that we have to spend taxpayers money more efficiently. We've got these inefficient climate, um, measures instead of increasing competitiveness. And our group says that any attempt to change the RF into a permanently financed project is going to be unsustainable. Arrangement, which is going to result in ever more centralisation and an ever increasing amount of power flowing to Brussels. Thank you. Mr..”
  Climate efforts
• “Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Yeah, there is no doubt. That chemicals like PFAS, which are difficult to break down, constitute a risk to the environment, but above all, to human health. There are also applications where we should be restricting the use, where we're seeing widespread evidence in drinking water, for example. And we know that the thresholds for PFAS seems to be quite low. We're using them in toys, in food packaging, in paper straws. A study from Belgium shows that 90% of all paper straws contain PFAS. Or in cosmetics. Above all, we should replace PFAS where there are alternatives available. But having said that, we have to make sure that the rules are based in reality. We can't be driven by ideology. Otherwise, we risk serious negative consequences for society as a whole. We shouldn't be using PFAS because it's fun to use them. It's because they have important functions to fulfill. And that's why we need to look at the risks of the EU are running by going beyond what's absolutely necessary, by bringing in widespread banning of PFAS in critical applications, where in today's world, there aren't any alternatives available. It may be problematic for some areas of industry. It can slow down innovation and development. And therefore it's very important within medicine, for example, that we can continue to use PFAS because they're absolutely essential. They're used in equipment like endoscopies and things that enable sterility in medical environments. And that cannot be compromised. So we have to be able to continue using PFAS there. There are no realistic substitutes. The commission's work needs to be informed by rational common sense. I hope you'll be doing that. We need a risk based, proportionate approach which deals with the real dangers of PFAS, rather than a general ban. That is going to be a one measure fits all. So how does the Commission intend to ensure that regulation of PFAS in the future will be proportionate? Where is the line to be drawn between where we actually endangering ourselves?”
  PFAs
• “President. That all sounds promising. One substance, one assessment. It sounds as though there's going to be a simple system for chemicals evaluation and assessment. But this is just a chief example of Brussels over administration in capital two. We see in chapter two we see the new requirements. They're listed. And it means that there are more and more requirements flooding SMEs. We are shifting powers to EQA and we have less insight. The Commission wants to have 55% less reporting. But now we're actually heading in the opposite direction. So I say yes to less bureaucracy and to a strengthening of our industry. Thank you.”
  Conditions to access EU budget
• “Thank you Chair. I will speak in Swedish. I have a very simple question which I think is still very important because I think a lot of citizens would like to actually ask this question. In Europe, we have very high energy prices and we have very high fuel prices, much higher than in the US or Asia. Developing ETS and broadening its scope to the construction and transport sectors will create higher costs for households, will it not? Would it not be wiser then to look at technical innovations and the work that can be done rather than overburdening our citizens with price increases which are seemingly spiraling out of all control? Prices are going to increase, there's going to be stagnation, and this could cause conflicts. We have a war in our neighborhood, let's not forget that.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• “Thank you. Chair. Sir. I will speak in Swedish. Thank you very much, Commissioner Roosevelt, for being here to day. You and the French Commissioner have both said that the that reach needs to be simplified, need less red tape and less complicated rules. This is really a huge problem for SMEs. But what happened last week in our national body was a bit of a cold shower. According to the media, this was not about simplification, it was actually leading to more complicated rules. So I wonder whether you should be focusing on more important issues such as competitiveness. Since the Green Deal was launched, the EU's lost competitiveness. We are implying rules which are not in line with reality. What do you think about this? You said that you want to simplify. Do you believe that this will take place within the reach reform? Should we perhaps look at what the consequences are of reach? You need to look at what we can do to ensure the survival of industry. Thank you.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “What it means it means that carbon leakage risk could differ depending on the member states. So this is why we have put this opt in window. Next and last slide please. Conditions. We have the two conditions because conditions for decarbonisation. So the first possibility and this is an option for operators. They can choose to go to energy audit recommendations and these this energy audit recommendation is part of the Energy Efficiency Directive. So it's not a new burden for operators or measures leading to equivalent greenhouse gas emission reduction. The second door is what we call this the the climate neutrality plans currently only existing as a condition on ETS. For those. Those and put there by the previous Parliament in the ETS review is now existing for those operators that there are the worst performance. What we offer here in the Temporary Decarbonisation Fund is one option. So operators can choose all the energy audit recommendation path or the demonstration of a legal commitment through a climate neutrality plan. So all in all, conditions for decarbonization. And second is key administrative burden at the minimum. And that's that's all from my side. Many thanks.”
  Carbon leakage support
• “Thank you very much, chairman and Mr. Vandenberg. I'd like to take up an overreaching question on Cop. 30 years after year after year, we see the focus being shifted to redistribution of money rather than reducing emission. We're talking about financing countries which are still being classified of developing countries. Some of them are rich oil states like Qatar, or they're major emitters like China. Against this backdrop, how does the Commission look at the issue of the real advantage to the climate? If we keep redistributing, it's not going to reduce the emissions. I think the Commission feels that the EU can take on this great challenge when there's nothing happening in the US, and China is continuing to build a coal powered power plants, would it not be better to have innovation and article six instruments. We should. If we reduce emissions, we have immediate effect for each euro rather than trying to harvest a political advantage. Thank you.”
  Climate efforts
• “(09:54:06 – 09:55:18): Thank you. I will speak in Swedish. When this was launched, the Commission's President said this was a growth strategy that's going to help with jobs, it's going to help the climate. However, that just seems to be an empty wish as studies have shown that reducing the chemical industry has started to really increase since twenty-twenty, and there have been twenty thousand jobs disappearing in the chemical sector, twenty thousand jobs. And of course, this is a fundamental question: does ETS actually work? Because if production simply moves outside of Europe, so does the emissions. They move outside of Europe as well. And if you've been, we had the auction of the emission rights, and then we see the prices going up. So my question to the Commission is quite simple: how does the Commission evaluate the risk that the current development of the ETS and the higher price of the auction rights, how is this going to impact all of the industries and the jobs in Europe?”
  Carbon leakage support
• “Thank you very much. Madam president. The European Platform and Chemical Products is a platform which will bring more transparency, which should also ensure better access to data. Nevertheless, looking at what's been done so far with the EPP and Greens and others, we have the impression that we are going to experience an administrative nightmare. We'll need to highlight all of the studies that have been carried out. There are a huge number of reports that are needed for security reasons. Apparently this will be a burden for companies. It will be a burden for innovation as well and will also hinder job opportunities. The EU says they want to reduce the administrative burden, but it's the opposite of what is being done here. It seems to be that more red tape is seen as improving things. No, no, this will actually be worse for our workers.”
  Chemicals regulation
• “Thank you. Chair. Uh, I will speak in Swedish. As we fight disinformation, we must ensure there's no criticism of this fight. There must be no. Apologies for those on the other side, and some NGOs and other stakeholders are part of this, and they have a very specific agenda. Looking at the EU's programs, we've got hundreds and thousands of euros being spent not to provide information as such because they are being misused. So we're thinking about, for instance, the way fossil fuels are being used. And all this is to create a way of Brussels paying for certain campaigns and all this not based on proper facts. €17 million have been spent on mines over the last few years, and many contracts are agreed in secret. So we want transparency. So my question is how the commission can ensure that we have ideological neutrality. To make sure that true information about the climate is published. And shouldn't the commission lead by example by publishing a list of the organisations that don't harm the climate that are being financed? And if the Commission wants to tackle this. This means all relevant information should be published and this is in the interest of taxpayers. Thank you.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Thank you very much, Madam President. Well, if AI pictures being used abusively, that's absolutely unacceptable. But to ban the whole technology or the whole platform is the wrong route to take. We see this as a chance to ban platforms we don't like. And we talk about protection. No, it's not about that. It's about power and control over free discourse. Uncomfortable opinions are always called a threat to democracy, but the real threat is censorship. Freedom of expression is the basic pillar of democracy. But platforms actually give citizens a voice, a chance to debate and to generate things. Well, let's be clear. We should be limiting crime. We should be protecting women and children, but we should not be sacrificing the internet as a whole. That doesn't defend democracy. It weakens it because and.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Thank you chair. Thank you Minister. I will speak in Swedish. The presidency wants to see better legislation and simplification in the context of the environmental omnibus. But simplification must be real and they must be detectable. We need less requirements for reporting. We need less overlapping and we need lower costs for compliance, particularly for SMEs, but also at local levels such as local authorities and regions. More and more people are realising that we really need simplification and that's really what the EU needs. We've become the world leaders in overregulation and this affects our ability to compete and growth in Europe. So it is very serious. Germany in Italy has have pushed forward measures to simplify and speed up legislative procedures and authorisations. Can you say what you will be promoting in in Council and how can we stop undermining simplification? How can we stop imposing Additional requirements which make life difficult for SMEs. Thank you.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you very much. There's been a lot said about competitiveness during your speech, but I want to touch on the issue of forests and forestry and their importance there, particularly important for a country such as Sweden. You know that 500,000 people's livelihoods depend on forests for for their for their work. And then forests are also a potential carbon sink. And we have major forest and timber resources, which vary from one part of the country to the next. And we see that the EU has had a major impact on the forestry sector through the Lulucf regulation, and it's affecting some 80% of forested land. Some 80% of farms can't necessarily deal with this lulucf regulation. So can I ask, what is your approach for the forestry sector And then if we are looking at forest management, who should be responsible? Should it be the member states. And this is particularly important for operators. And in terms of biodiversity. Thank you .”
  Management of EU forests
• “Thank you. President. The steel industry is the backbone of our competitiveness in Europe, particularly in industry. But instead of creating the right conditions, what we do is focusing more on more on climate regulations, high energy prices, more and more bureaucracy. We've lost our vision. We need a vision which will allow us to move forward. We need to focus on these critical materials. Otherwise, the risk is that we'll be wiped out by our competitors, including China, that We see that they have low energy prices, but also more reasonable climate legislation. Our industry. Needs an alternative, and we need to be focusing on products that can be competitive. We've seen a number of different political projects and plans. We've spent a great deal of taxpayer money, and now we've seen that it's not working. We have to focus on technological neutrality rather than more legislation. That's the only way we can be competitive again.”
  Sourcing of critical raw materials
• “Thank you. President. Energy prices that are too high. Depends on electricity that has been mismanaged. Electricity is important, but the system becomes unstable. If you have to transport stuff and it's. It lacks consistency. We need to have core supply all around the all around the clock. Not just when the sun shines, the wind blows, but instead the EU is subsidizing reliance on this sort of energy. That's intermittent. And your average person on the street is not getting that energy. So ideology is something we need to drop when looking at energy. And this opposition to nuclear power is still there since the 1980s. We need to go back to technological neutrality. Let's back what works, including nuclear power. Let's have lower prices that won't come from more regulation. It will come from more electricity, more competition and reliable production. Thank you.”
  Nuclear energy
• “Thank you. I will speak in Swedish. Well the commission often mentions analysis and they might be good, but it's not enough for the European companies. We need these for, uh, ETS, for example. So we need to see how and when policies are so expensive and ineffective that they need to be changed. Our economies are stagnating and the policies of the Commission have not contributed to growth. It has made it more difficult for the European economies, and the result is that investments move outside of Europe. We have just exported our climate problems. So I would like to hear from you a concrete indicator of investments in companies and carbon leakage, for example, that will lead to you redrawing your proposal.”
  Carbon leakage support
• “Thank you chair. Thank you Commissioner. I will speak in Swedish. I will be very short. The competitiveness in Europe will not be decided by more legislation, but by more creativity and possibility to plan ahead. Simplification. Well, that sounds very good on paper, but often you just move the rules to another place. So my concrete question is what would disappear with this initiative? What would companies not have to do anymore in this new initiative that they're doing today? Thank you.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you very much. The commission presented a proposal on a centralised forestry surveillance system. This is based on satellite data, and it seems that we want to say that you want to say that the national systems don't work well. But there are national systems in the member states, and these have been being used for decades or even hundreds of years. They are. Is there any proof? Is there any proof that satellite data takes into account other things, for example, the the forestry structure or biodiversity or biomass that these are? Um. In Sweden, we have cost effective evaluation systems that give qualitative and high quality data. So why is a decent. Why is the centralised system better. Because with this type of system the danger is that we have an overwhelming level of bureaucratic, bureaucratic burdens. And so my question is, what is the reason for the Commission wanting to take over this surveillance, where member states like Sweden already have exceptional performances as regards forestry surveillance? Is this really an attempt to make an improvement, or is it rather to try to centralise power over forests? This is an area where national responsibility continues to work, and that should remain the case in my opinion. Thank you.”
  Management of EU forests
• “Thank you, Chair. I will speak in Swedish. EU Pro, the EU often talks about strategic autonomy. However, reality is different. It's almost impossible to start a new mine in the EU. We are almost entirely dependent on China and metals that we can't do without with regards to the technology that we use almost every day. And at the same time, in Sweden, we have large resources. But even if mines in Sweden can live up to very harsh demands, these granting permit processes take up to fifteen years. And when Japan was put under pressure from China in 2010, then they acted. They did something. They made sure to decrease their dependence on China from ninety down to sixty percent. But in the EU, we've done the contrary. And the Green Deal within this, we see that the demand for these critical raw materials have increased and our dependence on China as well. These new regulations within the EU make it almost impossible to actually extract metals within the EU. We start extracting then within China instead, where demands are so much lower and emissions obviously much, much higher.”
  Sourcing of critical raw materials
• “Thank you. I will speak in Swedish. EU wants to be a trailblazer in energy policy. But as Tony Blair said recently, that climate policy, the EU has become unrealistic and there is a risk of losing the support of the people. Although we have more and more renewables, we have an increased emissions, particularly from China and other countries, and at the same time we have a lot of bureaucracy and bans in the EU. We need to fix less objectives and focus more on solutions and technologies. How can we step take a step towards a climate policy which has global support and the backing of the people, rather than coming up with something here, whereas the rest of the world is doing something entirely different.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Many thanks and very fast. If I could have the next slide, please. Next one, next one. Voila. Here we are. So eligibility. What is we are talking about temporary decarbonisation fund. Do it together with our colleagues of Taxoid. So operators of ETS installation and important is that the serum goods identifying as being as remaining risk of carbon leakage. This is still a carbon leakage, a risk to go to all that other jurisdictions that they don't have in place a carbon pricing are the ones producing. So full production of those goods will receive support. That's important. So not only parts of the not only the part of the production that is exported, this is a view you want is a more generous approach. It needs to fulfill decarbonization conditions. That's an I will I will present in a in a minute. That general approach for identification of goods of risk is derived from the carbon leakage assessment. We have 20 years experience of carbon leakage Its assessment in its system, and then the eligibility will be based on objective indicators. Emission intensity based with the previous carbon leakage list. So a threshold, a threshold of 30% of export goods compared to European produced goods has been set up for targeted support. We are talking about an estimated quantity of 190 million to so of support, and there are additional opt ins.”
  Carbon leakage support
• “(09:54:06 – 09:55:18): Thank you. I will speak in Swedish. When this was launched, the Commission's President said this was a growth strategy that's going to help with jobs, it's going to help the climate. However, that just seems to be an empty wish as studies have shown that reducing the chemical industry has started to really increase since twenty-twenty, and there have been twenty thousand jobs disappearing in the chemical sector, twenty thousand jobs. And of course, this is a fundamental question: does ETS actually work? Because if production simply moves outside of Europe, so does the emissions. They move outside of Europe as well. And if you've been, we had the auction of the emission rights, and then we see the prices going up. So my question to the Commission is quite simple: how does the Commission evaluate the risk that the current development of the ETS and the higher price of the auction rights, how is this going to impact all of the industries and the jobs in Europe?”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• “Thank you. President. The electricity grid is the backbone of the EU energy system. That's what the Commissioner said. But what can you do with a backbone if it's cut off from the rest of your body? We need to ensure that we have the right resources of electricity that we need access to, rather than pouring millions of euros into favouring certain interests, certain green interests. It's all happening behind closed doors and. No mobile phones. We're paying the price of the energy mix of choices made by others. For instance, Germans. We're paying that price, not having access to nuclear. Taxpayers money is being spent on this. We're not getting the cheaper, cleaner energy that we could have had as manipulation of public opinion.”
  Nuclear energy
• “Thank you EU. Most of. The European Union should reduce the amount of regulation it adopts. For years and years we've been tackling problems the pandemic, climate crisis, and again and again we put forward the same solutions more and more rules. Simplification is something we should finally be talking about in this house. Up until now, it's been an empty term. So what do European businesses think about the current situation? They think they're suffocating. They have to provide more and more reports. They're subject to more and more red tape and bureaucracy. While their competitors in Asia and the USA find themselves in the opposite situation, less and less regulation, more and more competitive. This means that we're faced with an unlevel playing field. So we have a proposal for a single data platform for chemicals. That's not an exception. That's another example of just how much bureaucracy is growing. This is unsustainable. We've been told. We've been promised there'll be better access to data. However, more and more reports are reporting is necessary, which makes life extremely hard for EU business in article 22. Businesses are forced to ensure that all studies, including those which have been subject to reports, be made available. This creates even more red tape and tape and not safety. The EU loves talking about better law making, but what they really want is just more laws, more rules, more regulations. Can we really do anything to enhance competitiveness? If we are to succeed, we have to ensure that we tear down these administrative barriers rather than creating new ones. We have to set off on a new path based on less regulation. We shouldn't just try.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you very much. Cop 30 is the outskirts of the Amazon rainforest. Thousands of people are being flown in from all over Europe and are going to be living in hotels who cost about 2000 per night. It's not so much about climate, it's more about who's going to pay. The UN talks about financing gap of 11 trillion Swedish crowns per year, which is supposed to be sent to developing country, which is more than the EU's annual budget. The USA is leaving there the biggest emitter. The Gulf states don't pay either, so it ends up with us, Sweden and Europe having to. Pay the bill. But Sweden is not a country that's going to pay for the whole of the world. We need the money at home to look after our old people and our health and security. If we want to save the climate, we need to invest in innovation, not corruption.”
  EU climate aid for global South
• “Thank you, Madam President. Have you heard have you heard people talk about urea? A lot of Europeans have. It's a very important ingredient in fertilizer. And now Europe is facing a crisis. We have problems with the provision because of the problems in the Strait of Hormuz. And this means it's more expensive for our farmers. But this is dependency on an unsure provision from abroad. And that's something we could have foreseen. But what is Europe doing? We've got permitting procedures that take a long time. We've got bureaucracy, and the ecological measures mean that we continue to be dependent. We are still exporting our emissions and importing vulnerability instead of strengthening our strategic autonomy. We should make sure that fertilizers are excluded from cbam. We. This was on the table originally, but was cut out in the action plan. And that means it's going to make it more expensive for our farmers and for our food. Thank you.”
  Use of fertilisers
• “So here we are faced with a serious situation. Jobs are being lost as deindustrialization. At the same time, we have an increasing dependency on China, a dictatorship, and now we're being told we need to to deal with these procedures. But in fact, we're generating more and more rules, more and more inspections every year. That's what the commission is doing. So yes, faster permitting. Okay. But is it really possible to do this without giving the national authorities a whole new rule book that's even longer and more complicated than at present? We need shorter timescales, but if there are more and more rules to deal with, then we'll just end up with a situation where projects will fall through the cracks and won't end up happening at all. So real simplification would mean actually doing away with the superfluous rule.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you chair. Thank you Commissioner. I will speak in Swedish. If we look at second hand vehicles. If we have a leasing fleet, a corporate vehicle fleet that can be Interconnected with second hand vehicles, as can people's everyday cars too. If all of this goes completely electric and we move away from petrol and diesel vehicles, there will be significant constraints upon what people can do. And ultimately, the upshot is that we have fewer cars. And on the second hand markets, cars are way more expensive. Electric vehicles are already very expensive. We can already see this trend that people can't afford a new car, a new European car, so there's no real alternative available to them. So we're inundated with Chinese vehicles. So have you thought about European competitiveness in the context of the second hand vehicle market, aren't we going to become even more dependent on Chinese vehicles?”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “Thank you. Chair. After that Danish introduction, let me carry on in Swedish. We've heard a lot. We've heard about, uh, companies competitiveness, for instance, about jobs, about more and more climate laws. But we also heard that the cost of industrialization will increase due to this. And the energy side is somewhat being ignored. And now thinking about the 2040 goals, this is no longer possible. So what specific steps has the Danish presidency got in mind to make sure that the climate, the impacts of the climate, not just thinking about emissions, thinking about cost of living. How is this going to be managed? We need to keep this in mind. We need to think about society as a whole. And I think these goals are not realistic. Thank you.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you chair. I will speak in Swedish. I also want to ask about nuclear energy, because I don't think my colleague got a very clear answer. Uh, Ursula von der Leyen had previously spoken out 15 years ago against nuclear energy. And that talks about a strategic mistake. Um, now we have to talk of Sustainable financing and state support. But at the same time, we're dealing with issues such as high energy prices, energy security. And we have to consider that for some member states, nuclear energy is important. So will the commission really have a technology neutral approach and help us remove some of these conditions that other fossil free energies enjoy? Thank you.”
  Energy transition (state support)
• “Thank you very much, Madam President. In uncertain times, when families and family economies and businesses are suffering, the last thing we should do is hamper growth. And that's exactly what was happening in the previous term of office forming, forcing companies to pay through the nose to fulfil all the red tape money that could have been used to adopt new technology, things that actually improves competitiveness. It sounds all well and good when the EPP says they want to reduce the reporting requirements by 25%. At the same time, they've increased the paperwork by 1000 documents. So if the EU is to be competitive again, Then we have to do the same thing as Argentina. Get the motor saw out, start soaring up the planned economy, the bureaucracy and release business from unnecessary EU red tape. Thank you very much, Mr. Keller. Keller.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU