Henna Virkkunen

Policy topics Henna Virkkunen is active on

What Henna Virkkunen has said (80)

• 2026-06-16 “Honourable president, honourable members, on the 8th of June, the European Commission adopted a technological sovereignty package. This is a crucial step for Europe. We are positioning ourselves for the future of digital technologies and addressing our strategic dependencies. Europe needs to be in the position to make its own choices, avoiding dependence on single dominant suppliers. Because we live in a world where geopolitics and technology go hand in hand. Those who lead technological innovation will shape the future. We must ensure that Europe plays the leading role. The recent US Export Control Directive on Anthropic's most advanced AI models is a case in point. We are seeing a new generation of highly capable AI models reach the market. These models offer significant benefits, including for cyber defense, but they also raise serious cybersecurity concerns that need to be addressed. And this is not only about single jurisdiction or single company, it is a shared challenge. We believe that contingency measures taken in this light, should not be discriminatory against partners with our tax sovereignty package. We are taking concrete steps to address such challenges. The package has three main objectives to transform our economy by driving the adoption of new technologies and AI in Europe, to reinforce the resilience of our supply chains and to promote the European way for tech sovereignty. And the package is designed to deliver through four key elements. First, the Chips act 2.0 that builds on the success of European Chips act. It includes a set of demand side measures to stimulate the uptake of chips made in Europe, bringing chip manufacturers closer to growth sectors like AI, cloud services and data centers.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-16 “Thank you very much. Thank you, honourable members, for this. I think very encouraging and lively debate, because you have illustrated also very well that why tax sovereignty is so crucial at this time and age. Many of you was very much underlining how important it is to build up our own capacity on AI. And I very much, of course, agree. We have also great strengths here because we have, for example, 30% more AI engineers per capita than the USA. So we have a great talent pool. And also we have 8000 startups which are developing and training AI. But one big obstacle for these companies has been that they have not had access to computing capacity. And that's why it's so important that now we are investing together with our member states to 19 AI factories, and we are able to open up this computing capacity for our startups to train AI models in Europe. And also in a very, very short time. We will now open also the official call for those gigafactories, and then we will be able to have even much more computing power. But AI factories is not only about computing power, it's also bringing together high quality data sets to train AI and also talented people.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-16 “Thank you very much, honorable, chair, honorable members. I I very much agree what many of you said that Europe is really having everything what is needed to be competitive in technologies. So I think it's important that we are building to our own strengths. It's it's good to also underline that we have really world class class science and research in Europe. We have very strong industrial base in Europe. We have also huge potential in our startups. We have 45,000 startups with great ideas, but now we have to pay sure that and make sure that our startups, they are able to scale up their businesses in Europe, and that's why we have to focus very much to our single market really to remove the barriers between member states, really to accelerate our savings and investments union to attract investments, and also to make Europe easy and faster for the businesses by cutting red tape and bureaucracy from our businesses. And in the same time, we have to use much more actively also public procurement to boost our own homegrown technologies in Europe. And, of course, via using open source, we can really do that. And it's important also to underline, like many of you said, that tech sovereignty, that it's not about isolation or protectionism, but we see, certainly, that we have to build up our own capacities in critical fields, like in AI, in semiconductors, also in quantum computing, cybersecurity technologies, in space technologies. So these are very critical technologies where we have to have our own capacity. But in the same time, we wanna work very closely with our trusted partners because nobody can't be competitive alone. So we need always our partners. So this package is very much about resilience and security of European Union because we wanna be sure in the same time, we are when we are open for investments, open for trade, that these very long global supply chains, they can't be weaponized against us, that we have also our own capacity, we have alternatives, and nobody isn't having so called kill switch element to our critical technologies.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty · Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2026-06-16 “And this is a clear market failure to address, especially for large scale ventures and scale ups. Just for the initiatives of this package, the total investments needs are estimated up to €450,000,000,000 in next 10 years. And we know that public funding is very crucial, but it will be in no way sufficient to bridge such a big investment gap. So we need ways to crowd in large amounts of private investments. The reform of the EU's capital markets under the savings and investment union will improve how the EU's financial system channels savings to productive investments. At the same time, the commission is launching now a consultation with our member states and with the European Investment Bank Group and other key stakeholders on the idea of setting up a European equity capacity. In other words, we aim to create a mechanism managing a portfolio of equity investments in advanced technologies and infrastructure that are critical for our economic security, such as digital, but also clean energy and biotechnologies. And this can be a true game changer for Europe, and I count on your support.”
  EU industrial funding (mechanism level: EU-pooled vs nationally-financed)
• 2026-06-16 “Thank you very much, chair. Thank you, honorable members for this, I think, very encouraging and lively debate because you have illustrated also very well that why tech sovereignty is so crucial at this time and and age. Many of you was very much underlining how important it is, to build up our own capacity capacity on on AI, and I very much, of course, agree. We have also great strengths here because we have, for example, 30% more AI engineers per capita than USA, so we have a great talent pool. And, also, we have 8,000 startups which are developing and training AI. But 1 big obstacle for these, companies has been that they haven't had access to computing capacity. And that's why it's so important that now we are investing together with our member states to 19 AI factories, and we are able to open up this computing capacity for our startups to train AI models in Europe. And also in in very, very short time, we will now open also to official call for those gigafactories, and then we will able to have even much more, computing power. But AI factories, it's not only about computing power. It's also bringing together high quality datasets to train AI and also talented people. And here, I also wanna encourage parliament also to proceed with our digital omnibus because we have to also clarify the rules to access to data because this is needed to train and develop AI models. Also encouraging in developments we have seen in the businesses because in last year, our AI uptake among our businesses in Europe, it was increasing already 50% in last year. But still, we have to work, especially with our key industrial sectors and public sector, to support them also to uptake and use AI. So I wanna very much, assure you that the technical technological sovereignty package we have proceed is not only about statement of ambition. It's really concrete action plan, and the work is already ongoing. And then just a small, also, notice about this, very capable AI models, which are now coming to the markets. We are also working with the with the concrete list of actions also that what is needed to address the new cybersecurity threats with these new new capable models. Thank you.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-16 “Firstly, our technological sovereignty package takes its climate and environmental footprint very seriously. Europe's structurally higher energy costs. They are a genuine competitive constraint, particularly for technologies that consume power at scale. And this is precisely why the package also includes the strategic roadmap for digitalisation and AI in energy. And secondly, technological sovereignty also requires investments. Other tech leading countries have invested massively, while Europe continues to suffer from a huge gap in equity and high risk financing to tech. And this is a clear market failure to address, especially for large scale ventures and scale ups. Just for the initiatives of this package, the total investment needs are estimated up to EUR 450 billion in next ten years. And we know that public funding is very crucial, but it will be in no way sufficient to bridge such a big investment gap. So we need ways to crowd in large amounts of private investments. The reform of the EU's capital markets, under the Savings and Investment Union, will improve how the EU's financial system channels savings to productive investments. At the same time, the commission is launching a consultation with our member states and with the European Investment Bank Group and other key stakeholders on the idea of setting up a European equity capacity. In other words, we aim to create a mechanism for managing a portfolio of equity investments in advanced technologies and infrastructure that are critical for our economic security, such as digital, but also clean energy and biotechnologies. And this can be a true game changer for Europe. And I count on your support.”
  EU industrial funding (mechanism level: EU-pooled vs nationally-financed)
• 2026-06-16 “Thank you very much. Honourable Chair, honourable members, I very much agree with what many of you said, that Europe is really having everything, what is needed to be competitive in technologies. So I think it's important that we are building to our own strengths. It's good to also underline that we have really world class science and research in Europe. We have very strong industrial base in Europe. We have also huge potential in our startups. We have 45,000 startups with great ideas, but now we have to be sure that and make sure that our startups, they are able to scale up their businesses in Europe. And that's why we have to focus very much to our single market, really to remove the barriers between member states, really to accelerate our savings and investments union, to attract investments, and also to make Europe easier and faster for the businesses by cutting red tape and bureaucracy from our businesses. And at the same time, we have to use much more actively also public procurement to boost our own homegrown technologies in Europe. And of course, via using open source, we can really do that. And it's important also to underline, like many of you said, that tech sovereignty, that it's not about isolation or protectionism, but we see certainly that we have to build up our own capacities in critical fields like in AI, in semiconductors, also in quantum computing, cybersecurity technologies, in space technologies. So these are very critical technologies where we have to have our own capacity. But at the same time, we want to work very closely with our trusted partners because nobody can't be competitive alone. So we need always our partners. So this package is very much about resilience and security of European Union, because we want to be sure at the same time, when we are open for investments, open for trade, that this very long global supply chains, they can't be weaponized against us, that we have also our own capacity. We have alternatives. And nobody isn't having so-called kill switch element to our critical technologies.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-16 “It also reinforces the European supply side capabilities across the entire value chain, including through strategic projects with strong EU added value focusing on advanced manufacturing, design and packaging, and also following the AI Continent Action plan. The cloud and AI Development Act turns the vision of tripling Europe's data centre capacity within the next 5 to 7 years into reality, and doing so in a sustainable manner. Very importantly, the act also encourages tech sovereignty of our public sector. It established clear criteria for sovereign cloud and also strengthens support for the development of AI services, notably EU frontier models, while using its buying power to boost EU security and resilience. And here, the Commission's own internal Digital Sovereignty Action Plan is paving the way for migrating our core IT systems to EU based cloud infrastructure, to deploying sovereign AI tools in our daily operations. We are proving that strategic autonomy is not just an aspiration, it is a very concrete action. And with the open source strategy, we are making and working to ensure that European companies and public administration are never again locked into a handful of platforms controlled elsewhere. In all of this, I want to underline that technological sovereignty does not mean isolation or it does not mean protectionism. It is about making Europe stronger, more resilient and less exposed to critical dependencies. We will remain open to trade, investment and cooperation with trusted partners. But Europe must also be able to develop, deploy and protect the technologies that our economy, public services and security dependent on. Honourable members. Two more points before I conclude.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty · Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-16 “And here I also want to encourage Parliament also to proceed with our digital omnibus, because we have to also clarify the rules for access to data, because this is needed to train and develop AI models. Also encouraging developments we have seen in the businesses because in the last year, our AI uptake among our businesses in Europe, it was increasing already 50% in last year. But still we have to work, especially with our key industrial sectors and public sector, to support them also to uptake and use AI. So I want to very much assure you that the technological, technological sovereignty package we have to proceed is not only about statement of ambition, it is really concrete action plan, and the work is already Ongoing. And then just a small. Also notice about this very capable AI models which are now coming to the markets. We are also working with with the concrete list of actions. Also that what is needed to address the new cybersecurity threats with this new new capable models. Thank you.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-16 “Honorable president, honorable members, on that of June, the European Commission adopted a technological sovereignty package. This is a crucial step for Europe. We are positioning ourselves for the future of digital technologies and addressing our strategic dependencies. Europe needs to be in the position to make its own choices, avoiding dependence on single dominant suppliers. Because we live in the world where geopolitics and technology go hand in hand. Those who lead technological innovation will shape the future. We must ensure that Europe plays the leading role. The recent US export control directive on Anthropix's most advanced AI models is a case in point. We are seeing a new generation of highly capable AI models reach the market. These models offer significant benefits, including for cyber defense, But they also raise serious cybersecurity concerns that need to be addressed. And this is not only about single jurisdiction or single company. It's a shared challenge. We believe that contingency measures taken in this light should not be discriminatory against partners. With our tech sovereignty package, we are taking concrete steps to address such challenges. The package has 3 main objectives, to transform our economy by driving the adoption of new technologies and AI in Europe, to reinforce the resilience of our supply chains, and to promote the European way for tech sovereignty. And the package is designed to deliver through 4 key elements. 1st, the Chips Act 2 that builds on the success of European Chips Act. It includes a set of demand side measures to stimulate the uptake of chips made in Europe, bringing chip manufacturers closer to growth sectors like AI, cloud services, and data centers. It also reinforces the European supply side side capabilities across the entire value chain, including through strategic projects with strong EU added value focusing on advanced manufacturing, design, and packaging. And also following the AI content and action plan, the cloud and AI development act turns the vision of tripling Europe's data center capacity within the next 5 to 7 years into reality and doing so in a sustainable manner. Very importantly, the act also encourages tech sovereignty of our public sector. It established clear criteria for sovereign cloud and also strengthens support for the development of AI services, notably EU frontier models, while using its buying power to boost EU security and resilience. And here, the commission own internal digital sovereignty action plan is paving the way. From migrating our core IT systems to EU based cloud infrastructure to deploying sovereign AI tools in our daily operations, we are proving that strategic autonomy is not just an aspiration. It's a very concrete action. And with the open source strategy, we are making and working to ensure that European companies and public administration are never again locked into a handful of platforms controlled elsewhere. In all of this, I want to underline that technological sovereignty does not mean isolation or it does not mean protectionism. It's about making Europe stronger, more resilient, and less exposed to critical dependencies. We will remain open to trade, investment, and cooperation with trusted partners. But Europe must also be able to develop, deploy, and protect the technologies that our economy, public services, and security dependent on. Honorable members, 2 more points before I conclude. Firstly, our technological sovereignty package takes its climate and environmental footprint very seriously. Europe's structurally higher energy costs, They are a genuine competitive constraint, for technologies that consume power at scale. And this is precisely why the package also includes the strategic road map for digitalization and AI in energy. And secondly, technological sovereignty also requires investments. Other tech leading countries have invested massively while Europe continues to suffer from a huge gap in equity and high risk financing to tech.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-03 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 3.6.2026 Written question The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act [1] is a landmark legislation, delivering trust in AI through a single legislative framework. The AI Act complements existing product safety rules with horizontal requirements that ensure that high-risk AI systems are safe and trustworthy. The Commission acknowledges that stakeholders have questions on how to apply the new rules in practice, in particular together with existing law. To build clarity regarding the applicable rules and their practical application, the Commission has launched initiatives such as the AI Act Service Desk [2] where businesses, and especially small companies, can obtain clarification concerning any concrete questions they may have. Furthermore, the Commission is preparing guidelines and other support tools. Likewise, the AI Act complements existing EU data protection law. The Commission and the European Data Protection Board are preparing joint guidelines. To further address implementation challenges and simplify compliance with the AI Act, the Commission has proposed the Digital Omnibus on AI [3] on 19 November 2025, which builds on the lessons learned during the progressive roll-out of the AI Act. In particular, the Omnibus allows more time for the AI Act’s rules on high-risk AI systems to come into force since standards and specifications are not yet available. Moreover, targeted amendments aim to further clarify the interplay with other EU law, in particular the Machinery Regulation [4] . The Digital Omnibus on AI was provisionally agreed by the co-legislators on 7 May 2026 and is expected to be adopted by July 2026. [1] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024. [2] https://ai-act-service-desk.ec.europa.eu/. [3] COM(2025) 836 final. [4] Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2023 on machinery and repealing Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 73/361/EEC, OJ L 165, 29.6.2023, pp. 1-102, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1230/oj.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-01 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 1.6.2026 Written question The protection of children in the digital age is a key priority for the Commission. The existing legal framework already includes very high standards. The Digital Services Act (DSA) [1] regulates, inter alia , systemic risks posed by providers of very large online platforms like TikTok, including risks to minors [2] , and on how the selection of advertisements influence such risks [3] . Providers must establish appropriate measures of privacy and safety [4] for minors and ban profiling-based advertisements [5] using their personal data. In addition, the Protection of Minors guidelines [6] cover advertising on online platforms and the DSA requires establishing a functionality to flag commercial communications [7] . The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive [8] ensures strict consumer protection, including shielding children from misleading commercial practices. It applies to influencers, requiring them to be clear about commercial communication. The Audiovisual Media Services Directive [9] sets minimum standards for audiovisual commercial communications (ACC), which must not cause physical, mental or moral harm to minors. Direct exhortations to acquire products or services are prohibited (applicable to influencers who qualify as audiovisual media service providers) and video-sharing platforms must ensure compliance with ACC to different degrees [10] . Minors’ personal data collected for age verification or parental control may not serve commercial purposes [11] . The forthcoming Digital Fairness Act [12] will aim to strengthen consumer protection online. Its priorities will include addressing unfair influencer marketing that capitalises on the relationship between young users and content creators . The Commission is currently assessing potential measures, including a clarification of the requirement for a salient disclosure of commercial content [13] . Such further measures will be informed, inter alia , by the recommendations of the Commission’s Special Panel on Child Safety Online. [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act. [2] Article 34 DSA. [3] Article 34(2) DSA. [4] Article 28 DSA. [5] As defined in Article 4(4) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng. [6] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/commission-publishes-guidelines-protection-minors. [7] Article 26(2) DSA. [8] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2005/29/oj/eng, OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, pp. 22-39. [9] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/13/oj/eng. [10] Article 9(1)(g) of Directive 2010/13/EU. [11] Article 28(b).3 of Directive 2010/13/EU. [12] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/consultations/commission-launches-open-consultation-forthcoming-digital-fairness-act. [13] https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14622-Digital-Fairness-Act/public-consultation_en.”
  Digital advertising · Safety features & content control for child protection online
• 2026-05-27 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 27.5.2026 Written question Secure use of drones and the security of drones placed in the internal market are a priority of the Commission. The action plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security [1] (‘Action Plan’) envisages measures including a Drone Security Package to adapt the regulatory framework to new threats. In this context, the Commission will work also on establishing an EU Trusted Drone Label to further enhance trust in civil drones. The label would rely on independent third-party verification and define additional product-level trust and resilience criteria without duplicating existing EU cybersecurity legislation. The Commission has not been involved in discussion on an import ban against specific drone manufacturers, including DJI. All drones placed in the internal market must comply with the applicable regulatory framework, including Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 [2] and relevant delegated and implementing acts, such as Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 [3] and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 [4] . Based on the Cyber Resilience Act [5] , a large majority of drones placed on the EU market will also be subject to mandatory cybersecurity requirements. Moreover, the proposal for revision of the Cybersecurity Act [6] sets out an objective and risk-based framework to address non-technical cybersecurity risks in information and communications technologies (ICT) supply chains in the EU, which may also occur in relation to drones and counter-drone systems. As part of the action plan, the Commission proposed to initiate work with Member States on a coordinated risk assessment on drones and counter drone capacities. This could be followed by a Drone and Counter-Drone Security Toolbox proposing proportionate security mitigation measures. [1] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security. COM(2026)81 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0081. [2] Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1139/oj/eng. [3] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators of unmanned aircraft systems. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/945/oj/eng. [4] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/947/oj/eng. [5] Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj/eng . [6] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the European cybersecurity certification framework, and ICT supply chain security and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/881. COM(2026)11 final.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · EU-US trade relations · Trade relations with China
• 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The Voices European Festival of Journalism and Media freedom receives co-funding from the Commission, following an open call for proposals with a maximum total contribution of EUR 3 000 000, for the duration of 27 months. This is a preparatory action initiated by the European Parliament, which are typically defined as experimental initiatives designed to test the feasibility of new actions and prepare new programmes. The festival is organised as a project carried out by a consortium of European and local organisations with strong EU-wide networks for media. As such, the choice of speakers is made by a dedicated coordinator designated by each of the organising partners. The Commission has no involvement in this process. It should also be recalled that the concerned call for proposals included strict, transparent and pre-established criteria to select projects and that the Commission does not have a role in implementation decisions taken by the beneficiaries. The Commission is committed to ensuring that projects are properly implemented in accordance with the terms of each agreement in line with the Financial Regulation [1] . [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng.”
  EU research funding · Conditions to access EU budget
• 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The action plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security [1] responds to security needs for the protection of European critical infrastructure and public spaces, covering drones as well as hybrid threats from other unmanned threat vectors such as balloons. In 2025, suspensions of flight operations due to drones, near-miss with an aircraft, violation of airspace by military drones, and the entry of unmanned balloons into national airspace were all observed in Europe. Such incidents attest to the pressing need to take measures to ensure the safe operation of drones in airspace, and to protect against threats arising from drones and other unmanned threat vectors. While incidents like these pose a security threat, attribution of responsibility for individual incidents is not within the Commission’s competence. [1] COM(2026)81 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0081.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The Commission has no specific comment to make on potential plans of the freedom.gov initiative and does not speculate on design or intent. The Commission is thus not planning to issue further comments. By law, the Commission cannot block websites in the EU. Only Member States' authorities may block a website if it is illegal under national or European law. This includes websites promoting child-sexual abuse material, terrorist content or copyright-infringing material. The Commission remains open to engagement with the US. The enforcement of EU law, in digital like in other areas, is the EU’s sovereign right. The Commission has a responsibility to enforce its laws, including the Digital Services Act [1] , effectively, fairly and without discrimination towards all companies operating in the EU. [1] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng.”
  EU-US data transfers · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-05-21 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 21.5.2026 Written question In the context of Pillar 3 of the EU Chips Act [1] , the Commission is monitoring the supply of memory chips, including prices and lead times, via regular expert reports. Early warning indicators may be used to flag shortages and price-shock risks to the Member States authorities represented in the European Semiconductor Board. Under Article 23 of the Chips Act, the activation of the ‘crisis stage’ is a prerogative of the Council. The Commission may, after consulting the European Semiconductor Board, propose to the Council the activation of a crisis. This would require evidence of serious disruptions of the supply chain affecting essential products used by critical sectors as defined in Annex IV, and evidence that the activation of the crisis stage would have a positive impact. At the moment this is not the case. The Commission has not specifically assessed whether long-term supply arrangements may have an influence on shortage of supply or pricing. The Commission welcomes proactive action from industry to manage risks of supply disruptions through commercial practices. Investment decisions under the Chips Act framework lie primarily with companies and Member States, and any public support must comply with EU competition and state aid rules. The Commission already supports, through open, competitive calls, research and innovation in embedded and specialty memories, which can serve important EU end-markets such as automotive, industrial and edge applications. The Commission recognises the strategic importance of strengthening EU capabilities in the memory ecosystem and is considering how to further reinforce this aspect in the context of the forthcoming revision of the Chips Act. [1] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1781/oj.”
  EU industrial funding
• 2026-05-20 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 20.5.2026 Written question Safeguarding the integrity of the information space to support everyone in society to access reliable and trustworthy information and exercise their democratic rights is essential for democracy as outlined in the European Democracy Shield (EDS) Communication [1] . In this vein, the Commission has supported the development of technological tools that enable journalists, fact-checkers, civil society groups and all citizens to detect disinformation and foreign interference (FIMI) campaigns, including through support for consecutive projects under Horizon 2020 [2] and Horizon Europe [3] such as InVID [4] , WeVerify [5] and vera.ai [6] , with around EUR 34 million through EU Horizon Europe Cluster 4 funding. Results developed under vera.ai are being further taken up by some members of the consortium in the ongoing AI-CODE project, which ensures continuity of tools and expertise supported through earlier EU funding. Furthermore, the Commission also supports other relevant projects contributing to information integrity, such as European Narrative Observatory pilots, recurring funding to foster media literacy under Creative Europe, and support to the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) under Digital Europe [7] . As part of the EDS, the Commission has also launched new initiatives, such as a call for proposals for a common research framework [8] that will support technical infrastructure and research on information integrity. This is complemented by support for a European Network of Fact-Checkers. Europe must be better equipped to protect the integrity of its public debate and democratic processes. For that reason, under the new Multiannual Financial Framework, the Commission proposes to continue supporting innovation across the media sector. As part of the proposed new AgoraEU programme [9] , the Commission intends to step up support actions that promote and protect a free, viable and diverse EU information ecosystem. [1] Communication on the European Democracy Shield: https://commission.europa.eu/document/2539eb53-9485-4199-bfdc-97166893ff45_en. [2] https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-2020_en. [3] https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe_en. [4] https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/687786. [5] https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/825297. [6] https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101070093. [7] Latest call: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/DIGITAL-2026-BESTUSE-TECH-EDMO-09-HUBS?keywords=edmo&isExactMatch=true&status=31094501,31094502,31094503&order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=50&sortBy=relevance. [8] https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/DIGITAL-2026-BESTUSE-RSF-10-AWARENESS?order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=50&sortBy=startDate&isExactMatch=true&status=31094501,31094502,31094503&frameworkProgramme=43152860. [9] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the ‘AgoraEU’ programme for the period 2028-2034, and repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/692 and (EU) 2021/818: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0550.”
  EU industrial funding · Disinformation & online freedoms · Promotion of open-source softwares
• 2026-05-19 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) ‘Stop Destroying Video games’ [1] was submitted to the Commission on 26 January 2026. On 23 February 2026, the Commission met with the ECI organisers to allow them to present the objectives of the initiative in detail, clarify its requests and provide further background information. The initiative was subsequently presented to the European Parliament on 16 April, and it is now in examination phase in the Commission. In line with Regulation (EU) 2019/788 on the European Citizens’ Initiative [2] , the Commission will adopt its formal reply, in the form of a communication, no later than 27 July 2026. The communication will set out the Commission’s conclusions on the initiative, as well as the action it intends to take (including a possible envisaged timeline), if any, and its reasons for taking, or not taking, any action. [1] https://citizens-initiative.europa.eu/initiatives/details/2024/000007_en. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019R0788.”
  EU competences on consumer protection and product standards
• 2026-05-19 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The upcoming Audiovisual Media Services Directive [1] review will aim to streamline the regulatory framework for video-sharing platforms to ease complexity as well as compliance burden for businesses. Additionally, the review will consider the emerging role of content creators in the audiovisual media landscape, to ensure that the rules applicable to them are fit for purpose, while protecting audiences and fostering creativity. In addition, the EU supports the audiovisual sector through different programmes, currently mainly via Creative Europe’s MEDIA strand [2] . The Digital Services Act [3] requires providers of online platforms to set out in their terms and conditions the main parameters used in their recommender systems, including the most significant criteria in determining which content is suggested to users. Very large online platforms and very large online search engines are also required to assess and mitigate systemic risks stemming from their services, including those related to recommender systems. In January 2026, the Commission extended its investigation into X's compliance with its recommender systems’ risk management obligations. The Digital Markets Act [4] also applies to YouTube, TikTok and Instagram to ensure that these services are contestable and do not impose unfair conditions on content creators and audiences. EU competition law does not prohibit dominant positions as such. If a company acquires a strong position lawfully, this is authorised. However, once companies become dominant, they have the responsibility to avoid abusing that position. The Commission enforces Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU vigorously in digital markets. It also enforces merger control in the digital sector. The Commission can block such mergers if the parties do not offer suitable commitments. [1] Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1808/oj/eng. [2] https://culture.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/creative-europe-media-strand. [3] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R2065. [4] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (Text with EEA relevance) available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng.”
  Recommender systems · EU rules on digital competition · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-05-19 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The guidelines on the protection of minors [1] under the Digital Services Act (DSA) [2] set out guidance for where age assurance technologies should be deployed. They include minimum specifications to ensure that age assurance measures are accurate, robust, non-intrusive, reliable, and non-discriminatory. The guidelines are aligned with European Data Protection Board guidance [3] , requiring platform providers to only process data that is necessary for age assurance purposes, and to ensure that data processed for this purpose is not stored or used for other purposes. The Commission developed an age verification solution [4] allowing users to prove they are 18+ online. A blueprint is available to Member States for customisation and publication. Designed to meet the highest privacy standards, it uses ‘zero-knowledge proof’ technology to securely prove that the user has a valid age credential without revealing the credential or any other information. The user’s identity is only checked once during the issuance of the proof of age. The proof does not contain any identity data, only disclosing that the user is 18+. The trusted proof provider is not informed about online services for which the proof is used. On 29 April, the Commission adopted a recommendation urging Member States to accelerate the rollout of the age verification app and make it available by the end of 2026 [5] . Under the DSA, online platforms accessible to minors are required to provide them a high level of privacy, safety, and security. The aforementioned guidelines outline steps that platforms can take to do so, including to reduce addictive design. The Commission recently adopted preliminary findings against TikTok [6] where the Commission informed the provider that they must disable features that can contribute to excessive use. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C_202505519. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. [3] https://www.edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/statements/statement-12025-age-assurance_en. [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/factpages/blueprint-age-verification-solution-help-protect-minors-online. [5] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-urges-member-states-rollout-eu-age-verification-app [6] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_312.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse · Electronic identity · Safety features & content control for child protection online
• 2026-05-19 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question Directive (EU) 2022/2555 [1] aims to increase the cybersecurity of entities operating in 18 critical sectors, including public administration. Under this directive, Member States must ensure that certain public administration entities take cybersecurity risk-management measures and report significant incidents. This directive does not apply to public administration entities that carry out their activities in the areas of national security, public security, defence or law enforcement. In the current global threat landscape, cyberattacks disrupt critical infrastructure and economic stability. Robust cybersecurity is paramount and the transposition of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 a strategic imperative. Spain must urgently advance with the full transposition of this directive. An infringement procedure [2] has already been initiated by the Commission in this respect. The urgency of the transposition is not just about the obligation under the law; it is fundamental to reinforce the cyber standards of our critical infrastructure. The Commission remains fully committed to assisting Member States’ efforts and helping them overcome any challenges in the transposition process, while respecting the ongoing infringement processes concerning the Member States that have not yet notified full transposition of Directive (EU) 2022/2555. [1] Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80). [2] INFR(2024)0270 Lack of transposition of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union by Spain, source: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_25_982 (Section 8. Digital economy).”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware · Privacy & law enforcement
• 2026-05-13 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question The Digital Services Act (DSA [1] ) entitles recipients of hosting services to a statement of reasons, and recipients of online platforms to an internal complaint-handling system, if their content is restricted by providers of those services. It also entitles recipients to access out-of-court dispute settlement bodies [2] . On this basis, millions of moderation decisions have been reversed since 2024 [3] . The DSA further mandates providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs [4] ) to identify, analyse and assess systemic risks in the EU stemming from their services, and to mitigate those risks. The Commission Guidelines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes pursuant to Article 35(3) of the DSA [5] point out that collaborating with independent fact-checkers who work on the basis of high ethical and professional standards can be one way for VLOPs to mitigate risks to civic discourse. All content moderation decisions based on fact-checking are subject to the transparency and redress measures mentioned above. The Commission initiated proceedings in relation to Meta for the suspected demotion of political content through Facebook and Instagram’s recommender systems [6] . The Commission is continuously monitoring compliance with the obligations of the DSA. The Commission published the European Democracy Shield [7] , which aims at reinforcing the integrity of the information space in the EU, and where the EU’s commitment to academic freedom is reaffirmed. Pursuant to Article 91(2) of the DSA, the Commission shall evaluate the DSA by 17 November 2027, addressing, among others, its impact on the respect for the right of freedom of expression and information. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. [2] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-out-court-dispute-settlement. [3] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-content-moderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops. [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3014/oj/eng. [6] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373. [7] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2660.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The objective of Article 25 of the European Media Freedom Act [1] , applicable as of 8 August 2025, is to ensure transparency in the allocation and use of public funds for state advertising, thereby supporting undistorted competition between media service providers and online platforms and reducing the risk of covert subsidies and undue political influence on the media. For Article 25 to apply, public funds have to be made available by a ‘public authority or entity’, defined as a national or subnational government, a regulatory authority or body, or an entity controlled, directly or indirectly, by a national or subnational government; the recipient has to be a media service provider or a provider of online platform; and the aim of spending has to be ‘state advertising’, defined as the placement, promotion, publication or dissemination of a promotional or self-promotional message or a public announcement or an information campaign. Therefore, without prejudging what a possible interpretation by the Court of Justice of the EU may find , organisations constituted under private law would be covered where they are controlled, directly or indirectly, by a national or subnational government and make available public funds for state advertising to media service providers or providers of online platforms . Article 25 does not provide for general thresholds limiting its application based on the level of expenditure. The only flexibility explicitly foreseen concerns certain subnational authorities, which may be exempted from publishing specific information (namely, business group data under Article 25(2)(b)), reflecting proportionality considerations. [1] Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj/eng.”
  EU engagement with civil society · Transparency requirements for interest groups
• 2026-05-04 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 4.5.2026 Written question The Commission rejects the report’s unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations. Freedom of expression is a fundamental right enshrined in the Charter [1] . The Digital Services Act (DSA) [2] protects users by entitling them to explanations, appeals and redress when their content is removed or restricted. Since its application, online platforms have reversed almost 50 million decisions [3] , demonstrating how the DSA empowers users and effectively protects them against arbitrary platform moderation. The DSA does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined purely by national law or other EU laws. The Commission cannot order providers of online services to remove or amend specific content from their services . Platforms remove content based on their own policies. The DSA mandates the largest platforms [4] to identify, analyse and assess systemic risks in the EU stemming from their services, and to mitigate those risks. This includes risks to electoral processes. The DSA brings accountability and transparency. For example, it requires providers of online platforms to issue statements of reasons explaining their moderation decisions in a Transparency Database [5] . Here, providers must specify the reason for restricting or removing content. The DSA requires the Commission and national competent authorities to publish all key enforcement decisions. This is done through a dedicated website [6] , with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of providers and to the protection of confidential information concerning other persons involved, in line with established practice amongst all similar regulatory and enforcement frameworks. Moreover, the Commission’s general transparency rules apply to meetings involving Senior Managers. [1] https://fra.europa.eu/en/eu-charter/article/11-freedom-expression-and-information. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. [3] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-content-moderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops. [5] https://transparency.dsa.ec.europa.eu/. [6] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-05-04 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 4.5.2026 Written question The Commission has consulted the data centre industry from the outset when it drafted the Energy Efficiency Directive [1] and subsequent proposal delegated acts on reporting, rating scheme and minimum performance standards on water and energy usage. The introduction of these measures has not affected their investment decisions in the EU but rather the opposite: colocation data centres invested EUR 7,7 billion in 2024, and they plan to invest over EUR 26 billion in 2030 [2] . The upcoming Cloud and AI Development Act will address the urgent and growing data centre capacity gap, aiming to at least triple the EU’s data centre capacity within the next five to seven years. It will do so by harmonising the conditions for investment in data centres across the EU with a focus on sustainable and innovative data centres, ensuring their operators find access to land, water, finance and energy in the EU. Additionally, through the upcoming Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI in the Energy Sector the Commission will facilitate the sustainable integration of data centres into the EU energy system. The Commission has conducted various regulatory impact assessments and cost benefit analyses related to investment barriers in the energy, network, and raw materials sectors, particularly in the context of the Green Deal Industrial Plan [3] , REPowerEU [4] , Critical Raw Materials Act [5] and Net-Zero Industry Act [6] . It will conduct an impact assessment that will accompany any proposal for a regulation on minimum performance standards later this year. [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-efficiency/energy-efficiency-targets-directive-and-rules/energy-efficiency-directive_en. [2] https://www.eudca.org/new-2026-state-of-european-data-centres. [3] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/green-deal-industrial-plan_en. [4] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/energy/repowereu_en. [5] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/green-deal-industrial-plan/european-critical-raw-materials-act_en. [6] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/green-deal-industrial-plan/net-zero-industry-act_en.”
  Climate efforts · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-04-29 “P-001161/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Rapid Response System (RRS) for elections is a cooperation and communication framework among relevant signatories of the Code of Conduct on Disinformation. It allows non-platform signatories, like independent fact-checkers, researchers and civil society to swiftly report time-sensitive content, accounts, or trends that they deem to present threats to the integrity of the electoral process and discuss them with the platforms in light of their respective policies 1 . The flagged content is reviewed against the social media platforms’ policies, and any content moderation decision lies exclusively on the platforms. The signatories decided to apply the RRS to all national elections in the EU and European elections 2 . Thus, it is not the Commission, but the signatories who launched the RRS. As part of the Code's commitments, it is the Code's signatories and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) that have access to the RRS. The participants that are nonplatform signatories differ for each RRS iteration: usually the signatories with specific understanding of the local context and language of the election participate in the iteration, together with the local EDMO hub. In the case of the RRS for the Hungarian elections, the participants were Democracy Reporting International, Alliance4Europe, CEE Digital Democracy Watch, and the Hungarian EDMO hub (HDMO). The signatories of the Code report about their activities in the context of elections taking place in the EU, including where it pertains to the RRS, in their periodic reports, which are publicly available through the Transparency Centre of the Code. 1 European Commission (2025) Code of Conduct on Disinformation, https://disinfocode.eu/the-code/read 2 Transparency Centre of the Code of Conduct on Disinformation, Rapid Response System Q&A, https://disinfocode.eu/elections”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-04-29 “E-000965/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has no specific comment to make on potential plans of the freedom.gov initiative and does not speculate on design or intent. The Commission does not block websites in the EU. Only Member States' authorities may block a website if it is illegal under national or European law. This includes websites promoting child-sexual abuse material, terrorist content or copyright-infringing material. The Commission has a responsibility to enforce its laws, including the Digital Services Act 1 , effectively, fairly and without discrimination towards all companies operating in the EU. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-04-29 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 29.4.2026 Written question The Commission has extensively invested in the EU’s technological sovereignty including in semiconductors and AI Chips. The Chips Act (CA) [1] has resulted in EUR 80 billion in announced investments in semiconductor manufacturing capacity since 2022. Furthermore, through the CA, the EU has invested in over EUR 1.8 billion in pilot lines that are ensuring that the research required to manufacture the most advanced chips is done in Europe. Further investment has been made in setting up semiconductor competence centres across the EU, equity investment in start-ups and the launch of a Design Platform. More investment is expected through the future revision of the CA. Furthermore, via Horizon Europe, the EU and Member States are investing over EUR 239 million in the development of European chip solutions for High-Performance Computing and AI data centres [2] . Cohesion policy supports critical technologies, including semiconductors, through programmes agreed with Member States and regions, which are responsible for project selection and implementation. In 2025, EUR 8.8 billion was allocated by Member States to the specific objective covering semiconductors and other technologies critical to EU technological sovereignty. Over the course of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, EUR 4.8 billion was allocated by Member States to semiconductor-related measures, including through the Important Project of Common European Interest on Microelectronics and Communication Technologies [3] . The last available data by the Commission on the EU’s market share in semiconductors is the 2025 State of the Digital Decade report, which showed a market share for Europe of 10.5% in 2024 that is projected to reach 11.5% by 2030 [4] . From 2022 to 2030, manufacturing capacity should increase by 30% in absolute terms if announced CA investments materialise. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1781/oj/eng. [2] https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101202459. [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3087. [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/state-digital-decade-2025-report.”
  EU industrial funding · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-04-23 “E-000937/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Drawing on the learning from the programmes under the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF 1 foresees simpler and integrated support for stakeholders, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). These include the use of a single work programme for the entire digital leadership window, a single rulebook, a common set of instruments, and a coherent approach to leveraging private investments through the European Innovation Council (EIC) and the European Competitiveness Fund 2 (ECF) InvestEU Instrument. The proposal also foresees dedicated actions to increase SME participation, business support and the establishment of the ‘EU for Business’ Network. The integrated approach between the ECF and the successor of Horizon Europe 3 will ensure a comprehensive support to the entire innovation journey from research to pilots, early industrialisation, manufacturing and deployment, with the EIC playing a key role. It aims to provide key infrastructure support. The ECF will have dedicated support for scaling up, such as the scale up facility under the ECF InvestEU Instrument, and support for advanced skills development needed by SMEs to develop and deploy innovative solutions. The Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 4 will be a policy framework for the ECF and National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPPs). The State of the Digital Decade reports will ensure coordination and track progress towards the digital transformation, issuing semester-like recommendations on areas for reform and investment. 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘A dynamic EU Budget for the priorities of the future – The Multiannual Financial Framework 2028–2034’ (COM(2025) 570 final). 2 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European Competitiveness Fund ('ECF’), including the specific programme for defence research and innovation activities, repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/522, (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/783, repealing provisions of Regulations (EU) 2021/696, (EU) 2023/588, and amending Regulation (EU) [EDIP] (COM/2025/555 final). 3 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Horizon Europe, the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, for the period 2028-2034 laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulation (EU) 2021/695 (COM/2025/543 final). 4 Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 (OJ L 323, 19.12.2022, pp. 4–26, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/2481/oj).”
  Digitalization of public governance & administration · EU industrial funding
• 2026-04-23 “P-000489/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The censorship allegations of the Committee on the Judiciary of the US House of Representatives report are unsubstantiated and unfounded. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 brings unprecedented transparency and accountability for users of platforms 2 in the EU. It protects their freedom of expression by entitling them to explanations, and redress if their content is removed or restricted. The DSA does not prescribe what content is illegal; this is determined by national or other EU laws. The Commission cannot order platforms to remove specific content; such decisions are taken by the providers themselves. The DSA does not regulate electoral processes or political debate. Conducting and organising elections is solely the competence and responsibility of Member States. Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs), independent national authorities that implement the DSA at Member State level, can organise election roundtables 3 to facilitate information sharing and coordination between relevant stakeholders. Upon an explicit request from the national DSC, the Commission can provide support for the organisation of such roundtables. Such activities have been hosted with the support of the Commission in Slovakia and the Netherlands in 2023; Ireland, France and Romania in 2024; and Romania, Netherlands, Ireland in 2025. No such activities were organised for Polish elections in 2023, 2024 and 2025. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/dsa-elections-toolkit-digital-services-coordinators.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-04-20 “E-000528/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission rejects the unsubstantiated and unfounded claims made by the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in its report of 3 February 2026. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 empowers users of online platforms to appeal removals, receive explanations and seek redress where their content is removed or restricted by platforms. This protects users’ freedom of expression. For example, between April 2024 and June 2025, Meta reversed almost one third 2 of 68 million contested content moderation decisions on Facebook and Instagram. Users can also appeal platform decisions through outof-court dispute settlement. In early 2025, they overturned 52% of decisions out of the more than 1 800 complaints 3 submitted. The DSA does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined by national law or other EU laws. The Commission does not have the competence to mandate the removal of lawful content and has no role in individual moderation decisions. These decisions lie with platforms themselves, according to their own terms and conditions. However, the DSA obliges platforms to specify the reasons for restriction or removal of content and mitigate systemic risks. When online platforms fail to meet these transparency and accountability obligations, the Commission acts. In April 2024, the Commission opened an investigation into Meta for suspected demotion of political content through their recommender systems 4 . In October 2025, the Commission preliminarily found Meta failed to provide adequate reporting tools for illegal content or effective appeals mechanisms 5 . The President of the Commission and the Commission are fully focused on keeping Europe independent, secure and competitive, including in technical matters. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-impact-platforms#ecl-inpage-greater-transparency-incontent-moderation-and-more-options-to-appeal. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-contentmoderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373. 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-preliminarily-finds-tiktok-and-meta-breach-theirtransparency-obligations-under-digital.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-04-20 “E-000681/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission firmly rejects the allegations contained in the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee’s report of 3 February 2026 as unsubstantiated and unfounded. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 does not prescribe which content is illegal. The Commission cannot order providers or intermediaries of online services to remove specific content from their services. Decisions on such content are taken by the providers themselves. The DSA obliges the Commission to publish decisions with due regard to protecting confidential information of affected companies. That is why, before publication, the Commission gives companies a chance to redact sensitive business information. This due process and regard for confidential information should be followed by all sides. The publication of unredacted documents including personal data potentially exposes the respective companies to legal liability for personal data breaches under the General Data Protection Regulation 2 . The publication of personal data of EU staff and civil society experts is deeply concerning, and the Commission takes this very seriously. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Staff Regulation 3 , staff can request assistance from the Commission in this kind of situation and affected staff members have already been provided with information on how to obtain support in case of threats, insults, defamation or other attacks to their person or property. Moreover, the Commission already provides needs-based counselling and assistance to staff enforcing the DSA. The enforcement of the EU’s democratically adopted digital regulations is a sovereign matter. The Commission remains committed to enforcing the DSA at full speed. The Commission stands behind its staff. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02016R067920160504&qid=1532348683434. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A01962R0031-20210101.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-04-20 “E-000858/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The European citizens’ initiative is still in examination phase in the Commission. The Commission will adopt by 27 July 2026 at the latest its formal reply in the form of a communication. The communication will then set out the Commission’s legal and political conclusions on the initiative, as well as the action it intends to take (including an envisaged timeline), if any, and its reasons for taking or not taking action. Whether videogames publishers should conclude agreements with other private entities for the exploitation or maintenance of discontinued videogames lies within the exclusive discretion and contractual freedom of those publishers.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2026-04-20 “E-000549/2026 E-000552/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 operates under a high level of transparency. It requires platforms to publish reports on content moderation 2 , risk assessments, mitigation measures and audits. In turn, the Commission publishes information on the platforms it supervises and on its main enforcement actions, including requests for information, the opening of proceedings, preliminary findings and decisions 3 . The Commission’s transparency framework is further governed by the Transparency Register 4 and the rules on public access to documents 5 . Since 1 January 2025 6 , staff holding management functions may meet interest representatives if they are registered in the Transparency Register, and minutes of such meetings are published 7 ; unless exempted from these obligations 8 . Public access to Commission documents can be requested in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Access to documents related to enforcement proceedings is examined on a case-by-case basis. Where necessary, access may be limited in order to protect the legitimate interests of providers, including business secrets and confidential information, as well as the integrity of ongoing investigations, as recognised in the DSA 9 and the Detailed Rules for the application of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 10 . All enforcement-related documents, including exchanges with external parties, are duly filed in dedicated internal case-management systems, ensuring traceability, institutional oversight and access to the file in line with companies’ rights of defence 11 . This balance between transparency, effective enforcement and protection of confidential information reflects established practice in comparable regulatory and enforcement frameworks. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R2065. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/harmonised-transparency-reports-under-dsa-bring-enhancedclarity-content-moderation-practices. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses. 4 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en. 5 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001R1049. 6 Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3081, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3081/oj/eng, and Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3082, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024D3082. 7 https://commission.europa.eu/about/service-standards-and-principles/transparency/transparencyregister_en#meetings-with-interest-representatives. 8 See Article 3 of Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3081 and Article 3 of Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3082. 9 Articles 79(4), 80 and 84 of the Digital Services Act. 10 Article 4(2)(e) of Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3080, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3080/oj, and Article 4(1) to (3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 11 Article 79 of the Digital Services Act.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2026-04-20 “E-000592/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission firmly rejects unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations made by the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in its report of 3 February 2026. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined purely by national law or other EU laws. The Commission cannot order providers of intermediary services to remove specific online content from their services. The DSA does not regulate political speech or debate. It requires providers to assess and mitigate systemic risks stemming from their services to fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, and to electoral processes. Engaging with providers on how their systems and practices operate across jurisdictions is a normal and necessary part of regulatory oversight. Interpreting such exchanges as a means to influence political debate misrepresents the nature of regulatory dialogue. Freedom of expression is at the core of the DSA, which lays down rules ensuring that such freedom as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 2 , is effectively protected. The DSA brings unprecedented transparency on content moderation and DSA compliance by mandating online platforms to make their annual risk assessments and audits public 3 . It also requires the Commission to publish all key enforcement decisions, which is done on a dedicated website 4 . Thanks to the unparalleled standards set by the DSA for user empowerment, fundamental rights safeguards, and accountability of providers, almost 50 million decisions affecting users’ content or accounts have been reversed in just two years 5 . The Commission’s role and powers as an enforcer are laid out in the DSA itself. All enforcement decisions are subject to judicial oversight. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-brings-transparency#ecl-inpage-lsets8qr. 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses. 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-contentmoderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-04-17 “E-000813/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the report and rejects its unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations. The Commission is not planning to issue further explanations. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 aims to create a safe, predictable online environment, protecting fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 2 . The Commission acts when providers of very large online platforms (VLOP) and very large online search engines (VLOSE) fail to meet the transparency and accountability obligations. In April 2024, the Commission opened an investigation into Meta for suspected demotion of political content through their recommender systems 3 . The DSA does not define illegal content, hate speech or disinformation, nor does it contain criteria for determining this. What constitutes illegal content is determined by national law or other EU laws 4 . The Commission cannot issue orders to act against illegal content; only national judicial or administrative authorities can issue orders to providers of intermediary services, on the basis of other EU legislation or national law in compliance with EU law. Providers must inform authorities of any effect given to the order without undue delay, if such orders fulfil the requirements stated in Article 9 of the DSA. Content moderation decisions are taken by providers themselves, while the DSA obliges them to specify the reasons for restricting or removing content and provide effective redress. 30% of appealed moderation decisions 5 have been reversed since the DSA’s application. In relation to elections, the Commission has issued guidelines 6 for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373. 4 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_framw/2008/913/oj/eng. 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-contentmoderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. 6 Communication from the Commission – Commission Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes pursuant to Article 35(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3014/oj/eng.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-04-17 “E-000947/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission published on 31 March 2026 a report 1 on the overall amount of costs incurred for the fulfilment of the tasks under Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, Digital Services Act (DSA) 2 in 2025, in accordance with Article 43(7) of that Regulation. This mandatory annual report covers the entirety of the expenditure, beyond the Commission’s supervisory tasks covered by the supervisory fee pursuant to Article 43(2) DSA 3 . The information requested by the Honourable Members on the number of recruited staff and resulting personnel costs is included in this report in paragraphs 9 and 10. The information on the total personnel costs for the fulfilment of the supervisory tasks under the DSA is publicly available in the staff working document published by the Commission on 27 June 2025 4 . The overall number of full-time equivalents (FTEs) necessary for the fulfilment of the tasks referred to in Article 43(2) DSA is estimated for the year 2026 at 270 FTEs. This figure includes existing staff and further appointments. The associated cost is estimated at EUR 34.82 million. The number of staff working on DSA implementation is set by the authorised staffing levels agreed in the standard budgetary procedure and can evolve subject to budgetary availabilities and anticipated needs, estimated on annual basis, for instance in the case of new designated services. The DSA clarifies that the Commission should be in possession of all the necessary resources, in terms of staffing, expertise and financial means, for the performance of its tasks under the Regulation. 5 None of those tasks involve the moderation of content. 6 The resources allocated to the DSA implementation are annually estimated and subject to the scrutiny of the European Parliament and Council via the above mentioned annual report. 1 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the overall annual costs incurred for the fulfilment of the Commission’s tasks pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 in the period from 1 January 2025 until 31 December 2025 and the total amount of the annual supervisory fees charged pursuant to Article 6(4) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/1127 in 2025: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2026:147:FIN. 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act): https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 3 Article 43(2) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. 4 SWD(2025) 175: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/overview-elements-accounted-estimationamount-external-assigned-revenues-stemming-0. 5 Recital 101 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. 6 That is a matter for specific laws and the courts to determine, same as for offline content. The DSA does not determine which content is illegal and the Commission does not have the power to order providers of intermediary services to remove specific content from their services.”
  Digitalization of public governance & administration
• 2026-04-16 “E-000550/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 requires providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large search engines (VLOSEs) to assess the systemic risks stemming from their services and to mitigate them. This includes risks related to content moderation systems. The Commission assesses the risk assessment reports that providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs are required to compile and transmit to the Commission at least annually. Should the Commission identify shortcomings in those reports, it may send requests for information or open proceedings. In parallel, the Commission engages in regulatory dialogues with providers. To mitigate systemic risks stemming from their services, providers have the freedom to choose from a wide range of measures. One among many options is adhering to a voluntary code of conduct deemed to contribute to the proper application of the DSA. Examples of such codes include the Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online+ 2 . The DSA sets a framework to create a safe online environment in which fundamental rights, including freedom of expression and information, are protected. Requirements to mitigate risks are limited to what is proportionate. To prevent ‘over moderation’, intermediary service providers must apply their terms and conditions in a diligent, objective, and proportionate manner, be transparent about all content moderation decisions, inform users of content moderation decisions affecting them and give them clear and specific statements of reasons, and provide effective appeal mechanisms. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act). 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-04-16 “E-000763/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission fully supports the successful operation of the mObywatel application. Poland is constructively cooperating with the Commission and is efficiently implementing a comprehensive development plan managed by the Ministry of Digital Affairs, positioning itself as one of the frontrunners in the development of European Digital Identity Wallets. Under the European Digital Identity Regulation 1 , Member States are required to provide European Digital Identity Wallets by December 2026. The Commission has been informed that Poland is preparing a new version of mObywatel application, which will comply with the requirements for the European Digital Identity Wallets. According to the information received, the European Digital Identity Wallet will constitute an additional component of the mObywatel application ecosystem. All documents used in mObywatel will stay accessible to the users. Existing national eID solutions and the European Digital Identity Wallets may continue to coexist. Poland is actively participating in the European pilot projects POTENTIAL 2 and APTITUDE 3 supporting the development and testing of digital identity wallets. The experience gained contributes to the design of the Polish implementation of the European Digital Identity Wallet. The Commission cooperates with Member States through these projects and the broader implementation process to ensure that European Digital Identity Wallets meet legal requirements and function across the EU. 1 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0910. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-buildingblocks/sites/spaces/EUDIGITALIDENTITYWALLET/pages/924976339/LSP-POTENTIAL. 3 https://aptitude.digital-identity-wallet.eu/.”
  Electronic identity
• 2026-04-15 “E-000632/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The AI Act 1 applies to AI systems and general-purpose AI models. It prohibits AI systems that employ subliminal or deceptive techniques or exploit vulnerabilities that have the objective or effect of materially distorting behaviour, when this is reasonably likely to lead to significant harm 2 . Discriminatory content produced or amplified by AI systems may be covered by this prohibition. AI systems classified as high-risk 3 need to comply with certain requirements, including on data governance to avoid bias and discriminatory content. For AIgenerated or -manipulated content, such as deepfakes, transparency obligations apply 4 . Providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic risk must identify and address concrete risk scenarios arising from their models, which may include the generation of illegal, violent, hateful, radicalising, or false content, and report the results of this risk management process to the AI Office before placing those models on the market. The rules on enforcement of the AI Act will apply from August 2026. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 5 requires online platforms to put in place a notice and action mechanism through which users can report content that they consider illegal. If providers are made aware of illegal content on their services, they must remove it expeditiously. In addition, the DSA requires providers of very large online platforms and search engines to identify, analyse and assess the systemic risks stemming from their services in the EU and mitigate such risks. This includes the risk of the dissemination of illegal content, such as illegal hate speech, and the risk of negative impacts on users’ mental health and wellbeing. These provisions apply irrespective of whether the content is AI generated. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng. 2 Articles 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) of the AI Act. 3 Article 6 of the AI Act. 4 Article 50 of the AI Act. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32022R2065.”
  Artificial Intelligence · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• 2026-04-15 “E-000461/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission firmly rejects the censorship allegations made in the report of 3 February 2026 by the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, which are unsubstantiated and unfounded. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 protects freedom of expression by empowering users to obtain explanations and redress if their content is removed or restricted. It sets unparalleled standards for user empowerment, fundamental rights safeguards, transparency 2 . It also requires all key enforcement decisions to be published, which is done on a dedicated website 3 . Engaging with providers on how their systems and practices operate is a normal and necessary part of regulatory oversight. Interpreting such exchanges as a means to influence political debate misrepresents the nature of regulatory dialogue. The Code of Conduct on Disinformation 4 is a self-regulatory instrument developed by its signatories, including online platform providers and other relevant players. It promotes a transparent and fair online environment while fully upholding freedom of speech: the Code focuses on providing more context for users to navigate safely in the online environment and counter manipulative practices (e.g. the use of fake accounts or bots), not on removing content. The Commission does not provide financial support to signatories for their participation in the Code 5 . None of the instruments mentioned by the Honourable Member provides grants or financial support to any other organisations. Every year, the Commission reports to the European Parliament and the Council on the costs of the Commission's actions in the scope of the DSA 6 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-contentmoderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses. 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-disinformation. 5 All the information about EU funded projects is available at the EU Funding & Tenders Portal, https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home. 6 Latest report on the overall amount of the costs incurred for the fulfilment of the tasks under DSA; for the year 2024, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/annual-report-costs-incurred-fulfilment-commissions-tasksunder-digital-services-act-dsa-2024.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-04-14 “E-000660/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission attaches great importance to upholding and fostering pluralistic and independent media and condemns any form of interference in the professional activities of journalists and their editorial independence. Article 5 of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) 1 requires Member States to ensure that public service media providers are editorially and functionally independent and that the procedures for the appointment and the dismissal of the head of management or the members of the management board of public service media providers aim to guarantee the independence. It also sets out requirements for transparent, open and objective procedures to appoint the heads and management boards of such providers. The Commission is in close contact with all Member States, including Portugal, to make sure that their laws comply with the EMFA, applicable as of 8 August 2025, and will use its enforcement powers to ensure such compliance as appropriate, focusing on systemic issues. In addition, the Commission is monitoring relevant developments related to media freedom and pluralism in all Member States, including Portugal, under the annual Rule of Law Report. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1083.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
• 2026-04-14 “E-000527/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission firmly rejects the report’s unfounded and unsubstantiated allegations, including those concerning Slovakia’s 2023 elections. Freedom of expression is a cornerstone of the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 . It helps protect this freedom by entitling users to explanations, appeals and redress when their content is removed or restricted by platforms. The DSA does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined purely by national law or other EU laws. The Commission does not have the competence to mandate the removal of specific items of lawful content; moderation decisions lie with platforms themselves. Since its application, 30% of appealed moderation decisions 2 have been reversed, proving users have real recourse mechanisms. No other law matches the DSA’s protections against arbitrary platform moderation or its demand for accountability on how platforms operate. TikTok’s alleged content removals must therefore stem from its own policies. The DSA ensures accountability and transparency through annual transparency reports, where platforms must justify restriction or removal of content (e.g., under legal provisions or terms of service). Compliance is annually checked by an external audit. The DSA also requires very large online platforms to assess systemic risks to civic discourse and elections, while considering the exercise of fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of expression and information 3 . Engaging with platforms to ask how their systems and practices operate across different jurisdictions is a normal and necessary part of regulatory oversight. Interpreting such exchanges as a wish to influence political debate or pressure platforms misrepresents the nature of regulatory dialogue. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-contentmoderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. 3 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng.”
  EU political integration · Disinformation & online freedoms · LGBTIQ+
• 2026-04-13 “E-000560/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with EU law, a measure constitutes State aid if, cumulatively, (i) it is imputable to the State and financed through State resources, (ii) it confers a selective advantage to an undertaking, (iii) it is liable to affect trade between Member States and (iv) it distorts or threatens to distort competition. Financing granted by a State-owned investment bank, therefore, may not automatically constitute State aid. If a Member State intends to grant State aid, it is under an obligation to notify the measure to the Commission and obtain the Commission’s approval before the measure is implemented, unless the measure is covered by block exemptions. The European Media Freedom Act 1 does not prohibit investments or acquisitions in the media sector as such. It provides a framework for assessing media market concentrations that may affect media pluralism and editorial independence. National regulatory authorities and, where relevant, competition authorities remain responsible for the assessment of such transactions, in accordance with EU and national law. The European Media Board or the Commission may issue an opinion where the concentration is likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services. The conduct and the organisation of free and fair elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional and legislative rules, while respecting their international obligations and EU law. National competent authorities and courts have the primary responsibility of ensuring compliance with these rules, including several EU rules applicable in electoral contexts such as the political advertising Regulation 2 or the General Data Protection Regulation 3 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1083. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng. 3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng.”
  EU rules on digital competition · EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
• 2026-04-08 “E-000748/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of Google’s announcement to introduce this verification process, starting from September 2026 in some jurisdictions (not including the EU based on publicly available information). The Commission understands that, as a result of this process, Android will require that all applications (apps) are registered by verified developers in order to be installed on certified Android devices. The Commission is also aware of public campaigns such as ‘Keep Android Open’ which have emerged in reaction to Google’s announcement. Article 6(4) of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) 1 obliges gatekeepers like Alphabet to allow and technically enable the effective distribution of apps on their operating system through third party app stores or the web. At the same time, the DMA also permits Google to introduce strictly necessary and proportionate measures to ensure that third-party software apps or app stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system, provided that such measures are duly justified by Alphabet. The Commission is actively engaged in a regulatory dialogue with Alphabet concerning Article 6(4) of the DMA and is diligently monitoring Alphabet's compliance with the relevant legal framework to ensure that apps, including open-source apps, can be effectively distributed on Android outside Google Play. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng.”
  EU rules on digital competition · Promotion of open-source softwares
• 2026-03-31 “E-000299/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recalled the applicability of the General Data Protection Regulation 1 in its reply to written question E-000182/2025, including requirements to ensure security of processing and conditions for the transfer of personal data to third countries. In addition, the gaining of access to personal and non-personal data in the terminal equipment of a user are governed by Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive 2 . The Network and Information Systems Cooperation Group, the Commission and the European Network and Information Security Agency, conducted a cybersecurity risk assessment on connected and automated vehicles which demonstrated espionage and physical security risks 3 . The report contains mitigation recommendations. In addition, the revised Cybersecurity Act 4 proposed by the Commission sets out a framework to deal with strategic risks and de-risk EU critical infrastructure from high-risk suppliers. The Commission would be able to propose measures to address identified risks in key information and communication technology (ICT) assets, ranging from requiring supplier information in the ICT supply chain and data processing within the EU, to prohibition for EU critical infrastructure to use, install or integrate such ICT components from high-risk suppliers. Connected vehicles are not foreseen as an area for future European cybersecurity certification. For technical risks, vehicle type-approval rules 5 require vehicle manufacturers to identify and assess risks and apply appropriate measures to manage those risks and that vehicle manufacturers obtain a cybersecurity management system certificate to ascertain its implementation. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1-88. 2 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, pp. 37–47. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/toolbox-improve-ict-supply-chain-security. 4 COM(2026) 11 final. 5 Regulation (EU)2018/858, Article 5(1) and Part 1 of Annex II; Regulation (EU) 2019/2144, Article 4(5)(d) and Annex II; UN Regulation No 155.”
  Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations · International data transfers
• 2026-03-31 “E-000458/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The allegations of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee are unsubstantiated and unfounded. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 brings unprecedented transparency in relation to and accountability of online platforms. The DSA does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined by national law or other EU laws. It protects freedom of expression and entitles users to explanations and redress if their content is removed. From July to December 2025, of 3.4+ billion content removals, most breached terms of service, while others involved unsafe products, scams, illegal hate speech, violence, or Internet Protocol violations 2 . The Commission's guidelines and codes of conduct support providers of online platforms with DSA compliance; these are entirely voluntary. Platforms choose mitigation measures; codes are one option among many, designed by platforms themselves. Engaging with platforms on how their systems operate across different jurisdictions is a normal and necessary part of regulatory oversight. Trusted flaggers operate exclusively in specific areas of expertise (e.g., protection of minors’ violations or intellectual property infringements) where they can submit notices related to illegal content. These notices are not legally binding; just like any notice of any other user, they serve solely as alerts to platforms, which must conduct their own independent assessment of the content’s legality before acting. The trusted flagger status is awarded by the independent Digital Services Coordinators of Member States following strict criteria set by the DSA and subject to various safeguards, such as objectivity, quality and transparency requirements, and the revocation of the trusted flagger status in case of misuse. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://transparency.dsa.ec.europa.eu/dashboard.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-03-30 “E-000292/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 1 (UCPD) prohibits traders’ from misleading consumers, including with false information about the product’s main characteristics that deceives average consumers or is likely to lead them to a transactional decision that they would not have taken otherwise 2 . The UCPD applies only to business-to-consumer transactions and therefore does not apply to transactions concluded solely between consumers, which may occur on platforms such as Vinted when the seller acts as a private individual. The UCPD, transposed into national laws of the Member States, which are in charge of its enforcement with respect to individual traders, acts as safety net ensuring consumer protection and complementing the requirements of specific EU legislation, such as the Digital Services Act (DSA). The DSA, applicable to providers of intermediary services like Vinted, establishes a framework for tackling misleading practices and the dissemination of illegal products such as counterfeit goods on online platforms. Under the DSA, providers of online marketplaces must put in place notice and action mechanisms to report illegal products, process it in a timely manner and provide feedback on their decision 3 , establish complaints handling mechanisms for users 4 , take firm measures against repeat offenders 5 and make best efforts to assess if the information obtained from trader is reliable and complete 6 . As Vinted is not designated as very large online platform, the Member state in which its main establishment is located in the EU (i.e. Lithuania) is competent to supervise and enforce the DSA against it. Vinted is also a signatory of the Memorandum of Understanding on counterfeiting, industryled and facilitated by the Commission 7 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2005/29/oj/eng. 2 Article 6 UCPD. 3 Article 16 DSA. 4 Article 20 DSA. 5 Article 23 DSA. 6 Article 30 DSA. 7 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/strategy/intellectual-property/enforcement-intellectualproperty-rights/memorandum-understanding-sale-counterfeit-goods-internet_en.”
  EU restrictions on unfair commercial practices · Liability for online marketplaces
• 2026-03-26 “P-000628/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Telegram is not designated as a very large online platform but must comply with the applicable rules of the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 . These rules include obligations related to notice and action procedures, independent means of redress, and transparency regarding terms of service and content moderation decisions. Telegram has appointed its legal representative in Belgium; the Belgium Digital Services Coordinator (DSC) is therefore competent for the supervision and enforcement of the DSA with respect to Telegram. The Commission is in regular contact with the Belgium DSC, notably to discuss Telegram and the actions foreseen or already taken by them and assist when required. Telegram is a hybrid service consisting of online platform and non-online platform features. According to Telegram’s published information, and in contrast with WhatsApp’s published information, the users of its online platform features are below the designation threshold 2 . In light of Article 24 DSA and the ruling in Case T-348/23 3 , if a provider is able to isolate the online platform features’ users from the total number of users, then it is possible to count only the former for the purposes of the reporting obligation laid down in that provision. The Commission monitors the evolution of user numbers and takes into consideration all relevant sources of information. The Commission under Article 33(3) DSA may adopt a delegated act to supplement the provisions of the DSA by laying down the methodology for calculating the number of average monthly active recipients of online platforms and of search engines in the EU. The Commission continues to monitor the appropriateness of adopting such a delegated act. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1-102. 2 https://telegram.org/tos/eu-dsa; https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/transparencyreports. 3 Judgment of 3 September 2025, Zalando v Commission, T-348/23, EU:T:2025:821.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-03-26 “E-000392/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 requires providers of very large online platforms and very large online search engines to diligently identify and assess and effectively mitigate systemic risks stemming from their services, including any negative effects on civic discourse. Providers are required to analyse whether and how these risks are influenced by a manipulation of their service, such as the use of bots or fake accounts. In addition, these providers must undergo yearly independent external audits to assess their DSA compliance. The DSA obliges providers of hosting services to set up a user-friendly and easy-to-access notice and action mechanism, empowering users to report content considered to be illegal, including fake identities and to publish transparency reports, including the number of notices received and actions taken. The Code of Conduct on Disinformation 2 , which was integrated into the DSA, includes commitments for its signatories to combat the use of bots and fake accounts to artificially amplify content, deceive users and disinform. Enforcing the DSA is a priority and proceedings on systemic risks to civic discourse are ongoing. For example, the Commission’s investigation of Meta’s policies and practices also concern deceptive advertisements and disinformation due to suspicion that it does not comply with DSA obligations to address coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the EU 3 . The Democracy Shield 4 proposes to reinforce the existing framework with operational measures, such as setting up a DSA incident and crisis protocol or improve the detection and labelling of AI-generated and manipulated content on social media services and voluntary user verification tools. All actions should be progressively rolled out by 2027. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1–102: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-disinformation. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/stronger-measures-protect-our-democracy-and-civilsociety-2025-11-12_en.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-03-24 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 24.3.2026 Written question The Commission shares the objective of strengthening Europe’s technological sovereignty. Under the European Chips Act [1] , the Commission and the European Semiconductor Board monitor the semiconductor value chain and may carry out targeted analytical assessments. These can also cover memory, mapping EU demand, capacity and supply-chain risks. While the EU currently has limited capabilities in standard random-access memory (RAM) and data-centre memory components, the Commission supports research and development via open, competitive calls (e.g. under the Chips Joint Undertaking) in embedded and specialty memories, including promising next-generation non-volatile memory developments, for automotive, industrial and edge/Internet of Things (IoT) applications. It has also authorised state aid under Article 107(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2] for semiconductor research and first industrial deployment in the context of two Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) on microelectronics in 2018 and 2023, totalling up to EUR 10 billion. Under the European Chips Act, the Commission aims to increase manufacturing capacity of semiconductor products, including RAM. The type of manufacturing facility to support depends primarily on companies’ and Member States’ decisions. Member States may grant support if it complies with EU State-aid rules and may notify support for projects for first-of-a-kind facilities under Article 107(3) TFEU to undergo Commission approval; to date, up to EUR 13.8 billion has been approved. [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/european-chips-act. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E107.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-03-24 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 24.3.2026 Written question The revision of the Chips Act [1] is ongoing, with the proposal for a Chips Act 2 foreseen in spring 2026. Preparatory work is carried out in an inclusive way, with the possibility for stakeholders to voice their priorities via the call for evidence. Printed circuit boards and electronics manufacturing services are not excluded from the scope of the Chips Act but the Commission is assessing whether the first-of-a-kind definition needs to be clarified to provide legal certainty to actors in the semiconductor value chain planning investments in the EU. The level of customs duty rate applicable depends on the tariff classification of the goods. Levels of bound duty rates, including where it is ‘duty-free’, result from EU commitments under the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The Commission is committed to protecting EU industries from unfair competition where it finds that EU industry is suffering from dumped and/or subsidised imports. Industries can contact the Commission’s trade defence services [2] for such issues. The Commission aims to tackle strategic dependencies as cybersecurity risks. The proposed Cybersecurity Act 2 [3] aims to reduce risks in the EU’s information and communication technology (ICT) supply chain from third-country suppliers with cybersecurity concerns. It sets a trusted ICT supply chain security framework using a harmonised, proportionate and risk-based approach. [1] OJ L 229, 18.9.2023, pp. 1-53, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1781/oj. [2] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/contacts/trade-defence-enquiries_en. [3] COM(2026) 11 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026PC0011.”
  EU industrial funding · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-03-23 “E-000410/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 requires providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) to diligently identify and assess at least once a year, and to put in place effective measures to mitigate the systemic risks stemming from the design, functioning or use made of services, including any actual or foreseeable negative effect to civic discourse and electoral processes. Providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs should also analyse whether and how these risks are influenced by a manipulation of their service, such as the use of bots or fake accounts. The DSA does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined purely by national law or other EU laws. The DSA does not regulate electoral processes or political debate. The DSA empowers citizens and helps protect fundamental rights, including freedom of expression. It requires providers of online platforms to, amongst others, put in place an internal complaint-handling mechanism for users who deem they have faced an undue moderation decision. Since its application, platforms have overturned 30% of appealed moderation decisions 2 proving users have real recourse mechanisms. When applying regulatory responses, Member States and the Commission must respect the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Decisions can be challenged respectively before national courts or the Court of Justice of the EU. It should be noted that the EU has imposed targeted restrictive measures on certain Russian state-controlled outlets, which have played a key role in spreading war propaganda related to Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. These outlets are included in Annex IX to Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP 3 and Annex XV to Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 4 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, pp. 1–102, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-contentmoderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014D0512-20251224. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/2025-05-21/eng.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2026-03-23 “E-000349/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission will present a proposal for a Cloud and AI Development Act. This will facilitate the development and adoption of European cloud and AI technologies, especially in the public sector, thus addressing the risks stemming from the EU’s reliance on third countries. The Act will promote the development of the EU cloud and AI offer by driving investment and simplifying permitting procedures, with the aim of tripling EU data centre capacity by 2030 and bringing it to a level that matches its needs by 2035. The Act will provide a harmonised definition of sovereign cloud and AI computing services and criteria for the public sector to procure secure and sovereign services for the most critical use cases. The intervention rationale is based on the report ‘The future of European competitiveness’, which estimates the European infrastructure investment gap to be around EUR 75 billion until 2030 and around 70% of the European cloud and AI market is dominated by US hyperscalers. These figures illustrate the EU’s reliance on third countries for cloud and AI computing services and the risks to its strategic autonomy and industrial competitiveness. Leading by example, the Commission launched in 2025 a EUR 180 million tender for the provision of sovereign cloud services. There are no global figures on how much the EU institutions, EU programmes or the national public sector pay for US cloud services companies, but in 2025, EU institutions, bodies and agencies spent EUR 87 million on public cloud services.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty · Digitalization of public governance & administration
• 2026-03-19 “P-000551/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission firmly rejects the report’s unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations. Freedom of expression is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter 1 , as well as a cornerstone of our democracy. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 2 , sets unparalleled standards for user empowerment; fundamental rights safeguards; and accountability of platforms as concerns illegal content online, based on what is defined as illegal in EU and national law. The DSA brings unprecedented transparency on content moderation. The DSA shines light on online platforms by requiring them to make publicly available their risk assessment, mitigation and audit reports. The DSA also requires the Commission and national competent authorities to publish all key enforcement decisions, which is done on a dedicated website 3 , with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of the provider, and other concerned person’s confidential information 4 in line with established practice amongst all comparable regulatory and enforcement frameworks. The DSA is a proportionate, democratically enacted regulation, adopted in accordance with the EU legislative procedure and reflecting the EU’s sovereign right to regulate its internal market. The Commission has repeatedly clarified the DSA’s objectives to the US administration, and remains open to dialogue, while continuing its enforcement. The DSA addresses globally recognised societal challenges, including the abuse of AI tools, online scams, addictive design and threats to minors. Governments worldwide have identified and acted on these problems, including the US. We will continue enforcing the DSA in a firm, fair and evidence-based manner while working closely with the US on our shared challenges. 1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2012/C 326/02 https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 3 Supervision of the designated very large online platforms and search engines under DSA https://digitalstrategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses. 4 Article 80(2) and recital 146 of the DSA https://www.eu-digital-servicesact.com/Digital_Services_Act_Article_40.html.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-03-19 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 19.3.2026 Written question The Commission shares the Honourable Member’s view that these are very serious issues that need to be addressed. On 26 January 2026, the Commission launched new proceedings against the provider of X under the Digital Services Act (DSA) [1] , which will determine if the provider properly assessed and mitigated systemic risks associated with the deployment in the EU of Grok’s functionalities on X, including risks related to the dissemination of illegal content, such as manipulated sexually explicit images and content that may amount to child sexual abuse material. Under the DSA, online platforms must have mechanisms and procedures in place for reporting and expediently removing illegal content they have become aware of, including non-consensual intimate images. The DSA does not empower the Commission itself to order the removal of content, but national judicial or administrative authorities may order platforms to act against items considered illegal under national or EU law. The 2024 Directive on combating violence against women [2] criminalises different forms of cyber-violence offences, such as non-consensual sharing of intimate images, and of material created or altered to falsely portray someone engaging in sexually explicit activities where such conduct is likely to cause serious harm to that person. Member States must transpose it by 14 June 2027, thus establishing the illegality of such content under national law which further complements DSA enforcement and ensures that online platforms act against it. As for the AI Act [3] , the Commission is aware that Member States and Members of the European Parliament are proposing to strengthen the current protections and include explicit prohibitions of AI systems producing child sexual abuse material and non-consensual sexually explicit images in the context of the AI Omnibus negotiations. [1] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, pp. 1-102. [2] Directive (EU) 2024/1385 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on combating violence against women and domestic violence, OJ L, 2024/1385, 24.5.2024. [3] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024.”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-03-19 “P-000445/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Strengthening technological sovereignty, ensuring strong data protection and boosting competitiveness are key priorities for the Commission. Therefore, the Commission is investing decisively in European capabilities - in semiconductors, cloud and data infrastructures, artificial intelligence, supercomputing and cybersecurity - while ensuring that Europe’s digital rules protect European values, data and economic interests. The Commission’s ambition is clear: Europe must be able to design, develop and control the critical digital technologies on which its security, competitiveness and future depend. In this context, the Commission will explore future pathways for the EU’s tech environment, as set out in the communication on the European Democracy Shield (EDS) 1 . The initial focus is on future social networking and social media platforms, with a view to supporting EU digital sovereignty. The Commission will also support the development of pan-European platforms making real-time news, and information from professional media outlets, available to wider audiences across the EU in multiple languages. The challenges that digital technologies bring for democracies, economies and societies have to be addressed in a comprehensive manner. In addition to work on the EDS, which seeks to protect EU democracies by strengthening information integrity and societal resilience, the Commission will continue to enforce both the Digital Services Act 2 , which aims to ensure a safe, predictable and trusted online environment that protects fundamental rights, including the principle of consumer protection, and the Digital Markets Act 3 , which creates a level playing field in digital markets, promoting fairness and innovation. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/2539eb53-9485-4199-bfdc-97166893ff45_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/digital-services-act.html. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-03-18 “E-000256/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The AI Act 1 prohibits AI systems that employ subliminal or deceptive techniques or exploit vulnerabilities that distort behaviour, when this is likely to lead to significant harm 2 . It also establishes transparency obligations for AI systems directly interacting with people 3 . As AI chatbots are being built on general-purpose AI (GPAI) models, the provider of GPAI models with systemic risks may also bear responsibilities. Harmful manipulation, which may include undue influence in highly sensitive contexts such as suicide detection, is explicitly identified as a systemic risk in the General-Purpose AI Code of Practice 4 . The rules on enforcement of the AI Act will start to apply in August 2026. Therefore, enforcement of Article 5 or other rules cannot be initiated earlier neither on national nor on EU level. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 5 applies to AI systems integrated in online platforms and includes the obligation to ensure a high level of privacy, security and safety for minors on their service. Providers of very large online platforms and very large online search engines must also assess and mitigate systemic risks stemming from their services, including risks to physical and mental well-being, dissemination of illegal content and protection of minors 6 . The Guidelines on protection of minors recommend safeguards for AI features such as chatbots integrated in online platforms 7 . The Commission has also launched an Action Plan Against Cyberbullying 8 and is working towards an EU-harmonised approach to age verification 9 . The European Data Protection Board has outlined principles to design General Data Protection Regulation-compliant age assurance 10 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng. 2 Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of the AI Act. 3 Article 50 of the AI Act. 4 The Safety and Security Chapter of the General-Purpose AI Code of Practice: https://digitalstrategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/contents-code-gpai. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 6 Article 34 DSA. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C_202505519. 8 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/cyberbullying. 9 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-age-verification. 10 https://www.edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2025-04/edpb_statement_20250211ageassurance_v1-2_en.pdf.”
  Artificial Intelligence · Safety features & content control for child protection online
• 2026-03-18 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 18.3.2026 Written question The Commission shares the view that these are very serious issues that need to be addressed in an effective way. On 26 January 2026, the Commission initiated proceedings against the provider of X for that provider’s suspected infringement of the Digital Services Act (DSA). The Commission will investigate if the provider of X diligently assessed and effectively mitigated systemic risks associated with the deployment in the EU of Grok’s functionalities into X, including risks related to the dissemination of illegal content, such as manipulated sexually explicit images and content that may amount to child sexual abuse material, and the actual or foreseeable negative effects in relation to gender-based violence and to the person’s physical and mental well-being [1] . Should the Commission conclude that the provider of X breaches the DSA, it may impose a fine of up to 6% of that provider’s total worldwide annual turnover. The 2024 Directive on combating violence against women criminalises different forms of cyber-violence offences, such as non-consensual sharing of intimate images and of material created or altered to falsely portray someone engaging in sexually explicit activities. Member States must transpose it by 14 June 2027 and ensure its enforcement [2] . The gender-based cyber-violence dimension is also addressed in the newly adopted action plan against cyberbullying [3] . The Commission is aware that Member States and Members of the European Parliament are proposing to strengthen the AI Act [4] to include explicit prohibitions of AI systems producing child sexual abuse material and non-consensual sexually explicit images in the context of the AI Omnibus negotiations. [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-investigates-grok-and-xs-recommender-systems-under-digital-services-act. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1385/oj/eng. [3] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/action-plan-against-cyberbullying. [4] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content · Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2026-03-17 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 17.3.2026 Written question The Commission carefully assessed all relevant evidence and considered the arguments put forward by the provider of X within the framework of the proceedings under the Digital Services Act (DSA) [1] referred to by the Honourable Members. The Commission also ensured that provider was given the opportunity to respond to the Commission’s preliminary findings, and that that response was considered fully before reaching a final decision. The provider of X also has the right to challenge the Commission’s non-compliance decision before the Court of Justice of the European Union. Notwithstanding the arguments put forward by the provider of X, the Commission concluded that the ‘blue checkmarks’ feature for ‘verified accounts’, which forms part of the X service in the EU deceived users because any recipient could pay to obtain the ‘verified account’ status without the provider of X meaningfully verifying who was behind the account. The Commission also concluded that X’s advertisement repository failed to meet the transparency and accessibility requirements of the DSA, as it incorporated design features and access barriers, such as excessive delays in processing results. This prevents recipients of the service, including independent researchers, from identifying and studying emerging risks tied to the distribution of online advertising, such as scams. Lastly, the Commission concluded that the provider of X unduly restricted eligible researchers from accessing public data, effectively hindering studies into several systemic risks within the EU. The announcement by the provider of X that it will make its recommendation algorithm open source was made after the Commission issued its non-compliance decision and after the period under investigation, which concluded on 5 December 2025. [1] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (Text with EEA relevance).”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Recommender systems
• 2026-03-16 “E-000357/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Beyond the obligation for Member States to ensure that audiovisual media services provided under their jurisdiction respect and protect human dignity pursuant to Article 6 of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) 1 , Article 6a(1) of that Directive requires Member States to take appropriate measures to ensure that audiovisual media services which may impair the physical, mental or moral development of minors are only made available in such a way as to ensure that minors will not normally hear or see them, including selecting the time of the broadcast, age verification tools or other technical measures. Similarly, pursuant to Article 28b of the AVMSD, Member States also need to ensure that video-sharing platform providers adopt measures to protect minors against harmful content. Under the Digital Services Act (DSA) 2 , providers of designated very large online platforms must, at least annually, conduct risk assessment to effectively identify, assess and mitigate systemic risks stemming from their services. This can include the risk of the dissemination of illegal content and risks to the mental health and wellbeing of their users as well as their human dignity. Moreover, the DSA makes it easier for users to report illegal content. In order to ensure that minors do not have access to harmful content, the Commission is carefully assessing whether more needs to be done in the area of protection of minors in the context of the ongoing evaluation and review of the AVMSD 3 . 1 Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services in view of changing market realities. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32022R2065. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/15752-Audiovisual-media-servicesevaluation-and-update-of-EU-rules/public-consultation_en.”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-03-12 “E-000153/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission monitors and reports on market trends affecting the competitiveness of the audiovisual sector. The latest findings were published in the European Media Industry Outlook 2025 1 , including specifically on concentration. Under EU merger rules 2 , the Commission takes into account market concentration when assessing specific mergers. Pursuant to the Creative Europe regulation 3 , actions under the MEDIA strand aim to foster a level playing field among Member States. For example, a dedicated action 4 for independent production companies in countries with a low audiovisual capacity contributes to fostering their competitiveness and cultural relevance. The Commission recently reported to the European Parliament 5 on the evaluation of Creative Europe, which shows significant progress in improving the level playing field (collaborations between low and high-capacity countries increased to around 30% under the current programme, from less than 5% under the previous one). At the same time, it points to the need to further broaden the participation in MEDIA. Horizon Europe also funds projects addressing the competitiveness of the film industry in smaller EU markets 6 . Looking ahead, the Commission’s proposal for AgoraEU aims to strengthen collaborations among entities from Member States with different audiovisual capacities 7 . It should however be noted that MEDIA funding accounts for less than 1% of total national funding to the audiovisual sector in the EU. EU State aid rules 8 make national funding to the audiovisual sector possible while preventing undue distortion to competition, thus helping to ensure competitiveness and balanced development across Member States, in line with both cultural policy and internal market rules. 1 European Media Industry Outlook, SWD(2025)261, 5.9.2025. 2 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the ‘Merger Regulation’) (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1). 3 See Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2021/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 establishing the Creative Europe Programme (2021 to 2027). 4 This is an annual call entitled ‘European Mini Slate Development’. 5 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions a Decade of Creative Europe, COM/2025/768, 17.12.2025. 6 See the ‘CresCine’ project in particular and also the ‘REBOOT’ project - Eastern European partners are an integral part of both projects’ consortia. 7 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 'AgoraEU' programme for the period 2028-2034, COM(2025) 550,16.7.2025. 8 See in particular the Communication from the Commission on State aid for films and other audiovisual works (2013/C 332/01; 15.11.2013) and the relevant provisions of the General Block Exemption Regulation.”
  EU and national cultural identities
• 2026-03-09 “E-000086/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is investigating whether Meta’s mitigation of systemic risks and transparency obligations under the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 are met. In 2024, the Commission opened proceedings under the DSA against Meta, on suspicion that the recommender systems of Facebook and Instagram demote political content 2 . The Commission is monitoring Meta’s compliance with the DSA and has sent requests for information, including on recommender systems 3 . Findings related to ongoing investigations are confidential until publicly communicated. On 24 October 2025, the Commission preliminarily found Meta in breach of its obligation to grant vetted researchers adequate access to public data under Article 40 DSA 4 . This essential transparency obligation contributes to the detection, identification and understanding of systemic risks in the EU stemming from very large online platforms (VLOPs), such as Meta’s Facebook and Instagram, including any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse or electoral processes. The EU has put in place a strong co-regulatory framework to counter disinformation 5 , which encompasses the DSA, including the Commission Guidelines on electoral processes 6 , the Code of Conduct on Disinformation including its Rapid Response System 7 , and the DSA Elections Toolkit 8 . Building on this framework, the Commission adopted the European Democracy Shield 9 , which sets out a strategic framework to safeguard, strengthen and promote democratic resilience. Digital Service Coordinators designated pursuant to the DSA can organise election roundtables to facilitate information sharing and coordination between stakeholders. Upon request, the Commission can provide support in this exercise 10 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/digital-services-act.html. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses#ecl-inpage-metaplatforms. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2503. 5 Beyond the DSA, this notably includes the Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R0900&qid=1771413840504) and the 2023 Commission’s Recommendation on inclusive and resilient elections (https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2829/oj/eng). 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024XC03014&qid=1714466886277. 7 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-disinformation. 8 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-presents-new-best-practice-election-toolkit-digitalservices-act; https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/dsa-elections-toolkit-digital-services-coordinators. 9 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/democracy-digital. 10 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/dsa-election-readiness-roundtable-platforms-search-engines-anddigital-service-coordinators.”
  Recommender systems · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-03-09 “E-000023/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The AI Act 1 aims to promote the uptake of human-centric and trustworthy AI, while ensuring a high level of protection of health, safety, and fundamental rights. The Apply AI Strategy 2 proposes actions deeply rooted in the needs and challenges of each sector and its workers, including in the cultural and creative sectors and industries (CCSI). Moreover, one of the objectives of the Culture Compass is to harness digital tech and AI in the CCSI, for which a new AI Strategy for the CCSI will be developed. This strategy will aim to foster an ethical use of AI that supports human creativity. Translations which consist of AI generated text are not eligible for protection under the EU copyright law. Post-editing corrections of AI generated texts by natural persons i.e. human translators, may in certain circumstances fulfil the requirements to be considered a work of authorship and will benefit from copyright protection and also be subject to the exceptions and limitations provided for in EU law. As authors of such works, human translators may reserve their rights, thereby excluding the exception or limitation of text and data mining 3 . The Commission is currently reviewing the DSM Directive 4 and will consider further adjustments to the EU copyright framework to address the challenges faced by creators, in particular to facilitate licensing for the use of copyright-protected content by AI providers. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/apply-ai. 3 Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market. 4 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market.”
  EU support for cultural and creative sector · Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-03-09 “E-000202/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission shares the view that these are very serious issues that need to be addressed in an effective way. Under the AI Act 1 , deepfakes are subject to labelling requirements that can address some concerns related to their misleading nature. Moreover, providers of generalpurpose AI models with systemic risk must assess and mitigate risks associated with their models, including those arising from illegal or discriminatory content 2 . The enforcement of these rules will only start from 2 August 2026. The Commission examined whether the current prohibitions in Article 5 of the AI Act 3 cover AI systems that generate child sexual abuse material or sexually explicit deepfake nudes, and concluded that they would not. The Commission is aware that Member States and Members of the European Parliament are proposing to strengthen the current protection and include such AI systems in the context of the AI Omnibus negotiations. On 26 January 2026, the Commission launched new proceedings against the provider of X under the Digital Services Act (DSA) 4 , which will determine if the company properly assessed and mitigated systemic risks associated with the deployment in the EU of Grok’s functionalities into X, including risks related to the dissemination of illegal content, such as manipulated sexually explicit images and content that may amount to child sexual abuse material. Should the Commission conclude that the provider of X has infringed its obligations under the DSA, it may adopt a fine of up to 6% of the provider’s total worldwide annual turnover. On 10 October 2025, the Commission sent a request for information to the providers of Apple App Store and Google Play under the DSA, to seek information on how they manage the risk of users, including minors, being able to download illegal or otherwise harmful applications (apps), including tools to create non-consensual sexualised content, the so-called ‘nudify apps’. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024. 2 The creation and dissemination of AI generated child sexual abuse material is criminalised under Directive 2011/93/EU and the producing and subsequently sharing of non-consensual deep fake images depicting a person engaging in sexually explicit activities is criminalised under Directive 2024/1385. 3 Article 5 AI Act. 4 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• 2026-03-09 “E-000117/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The proposal for a Digital Omnibus 1 is a first step in the simplification agenda for the digital rulebook, expected to cut at least EUR 5 billion of administrative costs for enterprises. The proposed amendments seek to give legal predictability and make it more cost-effective to address policy objectives – in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and small mid-caps (SMCs). The proposal focuses on the areas most strategic to Europe’s digital competitiveness: data and artificial intelligence. It clarifies data rules, bringing four legal frameworks into one coherent Data Act. It simplifies and gives legal certainty that the rules on personal data are applied in a coherent way across the entire Single Market, clarifying for instance the application for pseudonymised data, based on recent Court of Justice rulings. It also simplifies how companies report cybersecurity incidents, and reflects lessons learnt from the early implementation of the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) 2 - notably through a proposed revision of the timeline for high-risk rules, streamlined procedures and reduced governance fragmentation. The Commission is actively supporting the enforcement of the AI Act, for instance through the AI Act Service Desk 3 . The Commission proposed further simplification measures through the Digital Networks Act 4 and the revision of the Cybersecurity Act 5 . The Tech Sovereignty Package will be an additional means to enhance Europe’s digital competitiveness. A Digital Fitness Check 6 was launched on 19 November 2025 to stress test the EU digital acquis and the cumulative impact of current rules. 1 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/digital-omnibus-regulation-proposal. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai. 3 https://ai-act-service-desk.ec.europa.eu/en. 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-networks-act. 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/proposal-regulation-eu-cybersecurity-act. 6 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/15554-Digital-fitness-check-testingthe-cumulative-impact-of-the-EUs-digital-rules_en.”
  Artificial Intelligence · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-03-09 “E-000099/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission On 26 January 2026, the Commission launched new proceedings against the provider of X under the Digital Service Act (DSA) 1 , which will determine if the company properly assessed and mitigated systemic risks associated with the deployment in the EU of Grok’s functionalities on X, including risks related to the dissemination of illegal content, such as manipulated sexually explicit images and content that may amount to child sexual abuse material. Should the Commission conclude that the provider of X breaches the DSA, it can decide to adopt a fine of up to 6% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the provider and order it to take measures to address the breach. Under the DSA, online platforms must have mechanisms and procedures in place for reporting and expediently removing illegal content they have become aware of, including non-consensual intimate images. The DSA does not empower the Commission itself to order the removal of content, but national judicial or administrative authorities may order platforms to act against items considered illegal under national or EU law. The 2024 Directive on combating violence against women 2 criminalises different forms of cyber-violence offences, such as non-consensual sharing of intimate images, as well as material created or altered to falsely portray someone engaging in sexually explicit activities where such conduct is likely to cause serious harm to that person. Member States must transpose it by 14 June 2027, thereby establishing the illegality of such content under national law. This further complements DSA enforcement and ensures that online platform providers act against it. As for the AI Act 3 , the rules on enforcement of the AI Act will only apply as of 2 August 2026. Thus, investigations cannot be started before that date. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022. 2 Directive (EU) 2024/1385 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on combating violence against women and domestic violence, OJ L, 2024/1385, 24.5.2024. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024.”
  Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content · Safety features & content control for child protection online · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-03-09 “E-000165/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission On 17 February 2026, the Commission opened a formal investigation into Shein under the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 regarding the risk of illegal products, including content which could constitute child sexual abuse material, being disseminated on its platform, its addictive design and the transparency of its recommender system and is actively monitoring all other designated very large online marketplaces. If the Commission identifies a breach of the DSA, it could issue a fine of up to 6% of the provider's global turnover. The Commission has proactively invested in artificial intelligence solutions to enhance the efficacy of product recalls with tools such as e-Surveillance 2 and Proactive Webcrawler 3 in order to detect unsafe or non-compliant products online. As announced in the e-commerce Communication 4 , the Commission organised a time limited Priority Control Area, coordinating customs and market surveillance authorities to concentrate controls on imports from major online platforms, gathering data for tools like the DSA, supporting the Market Surveillance Regulation (MSR) revision, and enhancing customs cooperation. The Customs Reform, in final stage of negotiation, will structurally reinforce the capabilities of enforcement authorities to control the flow of goods at the EU-border, throughout the EU Customs Data Hub which will enhance exchange of data. The MSR revision, part of the upcoming European Product Act, aims to close enforcement loopholes in EU product compliance, strengthening accountability for authorised representatives of foreign manufacturers, clarifying compliance requirements across the supply chain, and using tools like the Digital Product Passport to improve checks across Member States. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/digital-services-act.html. 2 https://esurveillance.ec.europa.eu/product_safety/home. 3 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/single-market/goods/building-blocks/market-surveillance_en. 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/e-commerce-communication-comprehensive-eu-toolbox-safeand-sustainable-e-commerce.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse · Safety features & content control for child protection online
• 2026-03-05 “E-000174/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission shares the view that these are very serious issues that need to be addressed. Under the Digital Services Act 1 , online platforms must have mechanisms and procedures in place for reporting and expediently removing illegal content they have become aware of, including non-consensual intimate images. Providers of very large online platforms and very large search online engines are required to assess and mitigate systemic risks related to the design and functioning of their service, including the dissemination of illegal content, such as image-based abuse 2 . On 10 October 2025, the Commission sent a request for information to the providers of Apple App Store and Google Play, to seek information on how they manage the risk of users, including minors, being able to download illegal or otherwise harmful applications (apps), including tools to create non-consensual sexualised content, so-called ‘nudify apps’. On 26 January 2026, the Commission launched new proceedings against the provider of X, which will determine if the company properly assessed and mitigated systemic risks associated with the deployment in the EU of Grok’s functionalities into X, including risks related to the dissemination of illegal content, such as manipulated sexually explicit images and content that may amount to child sexual abuse material. As for the AI Act 3 , the rules on enforcement of the AI Act will only apply as of 2 August 2026. Therefore, investigations cannot be started before that date. The Commission is aware that Member States and Members of the European Parliament are proposing to strengthen the current protections and include explicit prohibitions of AI systems producing child sexual abuse material and non-consensual sexually explicit images in the context of the AI Omnibus negotiations. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022. 2 The creation and dissemination of AI generated child sexual abuse material is criminalised under Directive 2011/93/EU and the producing and subsequently sharing of non-consensual deep fake images depicting a person engaging in sexually explicit activities is criminalised under Directive 2024/1385. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024.”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content · Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• 2026-03-05 “E-004013/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The 2025 Budapest Pride was held on 28 June despite the ban, and between 100 000 and 200 000 people were present. The Ministry of Interior 1 stated that facial recognition systems 2 will not be used to punish attendees 3 . The AI Act prohibits use of real-time remote biometric identification for law enforcement purposes (Article 5.1.h, Article 5(2) – (7) AI Act). The Commission is currently assessing the reply provided by the Hungarian authorities in order to determine the compliance with EU law, in particular with the AI Act, and to decide on any appropriate next steps. According to Article 113 AI Act, the enforcement of the prohibitions by national authorities shall start from 2 August 2026. 1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_Interior_(Hungary). 2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facial_recognition_systems. 3 Hungarian Pride parade ban - Wikipedia FN 180 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarian_Pride_parade_ban#cite_note-184.”
  Artificial Intelligence · Privacy & law enforcement
• 2026-03-03 “P-000463/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act 1 (DSA) sets specific obligations for providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOPSEs), whose average monthly active recipients in the EU are equal to or higher than 45 million. This is because VLOPs and VLOSEs may cause societal risks different in scope and impact from those caused by smaller platforms. Providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs are notably required to assess and mitigate systemic risks stemming from the design, functioning and use of their services, such as risks associated with the dissemination of illegal content through their services. Non-consensual sexually explicit deepfakes of women and minors enabled by Grok on the VLOP X, as corroborated by independent public reports, are unacceptable and are far beyond comparison with what was enabled by software that are several decades old. On 26 January 2026, the Commission initiated new proceedings concerning X, which will determine whether the provider of X properly assessed and mitigated risks associated with the deployment of Grok’s functionalities into the X service in the EU. This includes assessing and mitigating risks related to the dissemination of illegal content in the EU, such as manipulated sexually explicit images, including content that may amount to child sexual abuse material. The Commission is committed to enforcing the DSA fairly and proportionately to ensure a safe and open online environment for all citizens in the EU. The Commission applies the DSA’s criteria objectively and uniformly to all designated VLOPs and VLOSEs, regardless of their origin. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act).”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• 2026-02-26 “E-000017/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission and Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs) actively monitor the implementation of the Digital Service Act (DSA) 1 , including compliance with Articles 16 and 20 by very large online platforms (VLOPs) and other providers of hosting services. Both the Commission and DSCs have various supervisory powers at their disposal, including the power to compel information from the providers. The Commission also continuously improves the DSA transparency database to help inform this effort. In October 2025, the Commission in addition adopted preliminary findings in relation to Meta, concerning Facebook and Instagram, and a suspected breach of Articles 16(1) and 25(1) DSA, as it appears to impose several unnecessary steps and additional demands on users and to use deceptive interface designs. In December 2023, the Commission initiated proceedings against the provider of X as it appears to fail to process notices on illegal content, to take decisions in a diligent, non-arbitrary and objective manner and to notify individuals or entities of the action taken in relation to notices. Both proceedings are still ongoing. The Commission is closely monitoring the implementation of Article 21 of the DSA on outof-court dispute settlement (ODS) bodies. Under the DSA, ODS bodies must report on an annual basis to the DSC that certified them. DSCs draw up a report on the functioning of the ODS bodies they certified every two years. The Commission has commissioned a study to identify and address the main issues faced by actors involved in the ODS process. This will allow the Commission to have an accurate overview of the implementation of Article 21 and assess whether additional guidance is needed. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-02-26 “E-000170/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Citizens rely increasingly on online platforms and influencers to access information and form their opinions on a wide range of issues. The increased use of those services has resulted in risks and challenges for citizens, free media and the society as a whole. The EU has a robust legal framework to address these challenges. The Digital Services Act 1 (DSA) - the EU’s flagship legislation on the responsibilities of online platforms - inter alia requires very large online platforms to assess and mitigate risks stemming from their service, for example related to influencer programmes. The protection of minors Guidelines 2 recommends measures to online platforms concerning influencers. In addition, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) 3 also covers influencers when they qualify as audiovisual media services. The Political Advertising Regulation 4 also contains obligations for influencers if political messages are published by them in exchange for monetary benefits or benefits in kind 5 . Moreover, with the EU Influencer Legal Hub the Commission provides material to facilitate compliance with EU consumer law by influencers. The role of influencers will be considered in the AVMSD review and in the Digital Fairness Act to complement existing EU rules. The Commission will support the setting up of a voluntary network of influencers to raise awareness about relevant EU rules. It will encourage ethical standards and voluntary commitments, including regarding information integrity, and support work by influencers to promote digital literacy. Additionally, the Commission will provide updated Guidelines for teachers and educators on tackling disinformation and promoting digital literacy which will cover the role of influencers. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, pp. 1–102. 2 Guidelines on measures to ensure a high level of privacy, safety and security for minors online, pursuant to Article 28(4) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, C/2025/5519. 3 Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities, OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, pp. 69–92. 4 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024. 5 Guidelines to support the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, C(2025) 6829 final.”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-02-26 “E-000142/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission On 26 January 2026, the Commission launched a new formal investigation against X under the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 , which will assess whether the provider of X properly assessed and mitigated risks associated with the deployment in the EU of Grok’s functionalities into X. This includes risks related to the dissemination of illegal content, such as manipulated sexually explicit images and content that may amount to child sexual abuse material. The Commission has been looking into the deployment of Grok functionalities in the X service already before the recent events. On 19 September 2025, the Commission sent X a request for information related to Grok, including the ‘Ask @Grok’ feature. This included questions on risks and risk mitigations linked to the various integrations of Grok in the X service. X submitted its first replies at the end of 2025. On 19 December 2025, the Commission also extended the retention order sent to X in January 2025 to preserve all internal documents and data relating to changes to its recommender systems, including the deployment of Grok in X’s recommender systems, until the end of 2026. The Commission will now carry out its investigation related to the deployment in the EU of Grok functionalities into the X service as a matter of priority, including by assessing the changes implemented by the provider of X in response to the recent incidents. Should the Commission conclude that the provider of X breaches the DSA, it can decide to adopt a fine of up to 6% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the provider and to order the provider to take measures to address the breach. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, pp. 1–102.”
  Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content · Safety features & content control for child protection online · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-02-26 “E-000047/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission welcomes stakeholders’ engagement, including through the open letter of 12 November 2025 mentioned in the Honourable Member’s question. The call for evidence (CfE) published on 6 January 2026 for the initiative ‘Towards European open digital ecosystems’ 1 is designed to gather evidence on barriers and on concrete EU actions to strengthen Europe’s open-source ecosystem, including in Artificial Intelligence (AI). In this context, the CfE refers to the issues raised in the abovementioned letter, namely the limited access of the open-source ecosystem to public procurement and asks what measures could encourage public administrations and other large users to adopt and contribute to open source. Moreover, in line with the Apply AI Strategy 2 ; the CfE also notes constraints in growth capital and support and invites stakeholders to propose funding and policy measures. Furthermore, the CfE points to the limited access of the ecosystem to hosting and infrastructure and it was prepared alongside the forthcoming Cloud and AI Development Act 3 , which will aim to expand EU cloud and data-centre capacity and promote secure and sovereign cloud and AI services along with other initiatives, such as the AI Gigafactories. Finally, the CfE invites evidence on governance and upscaling frameworks, where contributors may also address conditions for re-use of public sector data, in full respect of privacy and other rights. All feedback received through the Call for Evidence will be assessed and will inform the Commission communication on a European Open Digital Ecosystems Strategy, which will expand on the current open-source actions under the Apply AI Strategy. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/16213-European-Open-DigitalEcosystems_en. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/apply-ai. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14628-AI-Continent-new-cloud-andAI-development-act_en.”
  Artificial Intelligence · Promotion of open-source softwares
• 2026-02-23 “E-000024/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission welcomes the declaration initiated by the Danish Presidency on the necessity of culture and media as a safeguard for our European democracies 1 . The Commission is fully committed to ensuring the independence of the media. In the Communication on the European Democracy Shield 2 , the Commission stresses the crucial role of free, independent and plural media in upholding democratic values and outlines actions to defend and promote media freedom and independent journalism. The Commission supports the news media sector with full respect for editorial independence. All EU co-financed news media projects operate with full editorial independence from any authority, as per the provisions of the calls for proposals and the ensuing grant agreements. When applying for EU media funding, news media organisations sign a declaration confirming that they abide by the relevant professional standards. Furthermore, the Commission supports news media projects with full regard for the principle of subsidiarity, focusing on areas of intervention that are more effective at EU level, such as EU wide journalistic projects and cross-border collaborations. The vast majority of public support for news media in EU is provided by the Member States 3 . Rules on the implementation of the EU budget are enshrined in the EU Treaties, notably in Articles 317 to 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Treaties contain provisions guaranteeing democratic control of the EU budget. 1 https://danish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/new-declaration-makes-culture-and-trustworthy-mediacornerstones-in-defending-european-democracy/. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/2539eb53-9485-4199-bfdc-97166893ff45_en. 3 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/4a26df80-bbff-11ee-b164-01aa75ed71a1/.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
• 2026-02-23 “E-000055/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the dissemination of AI-generated content on TikTok advocating for Poland to leave the EU and has, in the framework of the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 , engaged in exchanges with the provider of TikTok and third parties regarding the concerned account(s). The DSA requires providers of very large online platforms (‘VLOPs’), such as TikTok, to assess the risks stemming from their services and to put in place measures to mitigate those risks, including the risks of any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse and electoral process. On 17 December 2024, the Commission initiated formal proceedings against TikTok for a suspected breach of the DSA in relation to the obligation to diligently identify, analyse, assess and mitigate systemic risks linked to election integrity, notably in the context of the Romanian Presidential elections on 24 November 2024 2 . These proceedings focus on the risks linked to the provider’s recommender systems, notably the intentional manipulation or automated exploitation of the service, as well as the provider’s policies on political advertisements and paid-for political content. The investigations in these proceedings are ongoing, and the Commission continues to gather and analyse evidence and assess any changes made by TikTok to its related systems and processes. Moreover, the Commission recalls that it has adopted guidelines for VLOPs and very large online search engines (‘VLOSEs’) on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes 3 , recommending the implementation of efficient and easily recognisable labels on AI-generated content, along with the adoption of robust content moderation processes and algorithmic systems to detect such content. 4 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:4625430. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6487. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202403014. 4 This will be further reinforced by obligation imposed by Article 50 AI Act, when it enters into application, on providers and deployers of AI systems that generate or manipulate image, audio or video content to label content constituting a deep fake: Regulation - EU - 2024/1689 - EN - EUR-Lex: https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng#cpt_IV.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• 2026-02-23 “E-000043/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Media Board has not, at this stage, been consulted or informed by the French authorities under Article 22 of European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) 1 concerning the envisaged acquisition of the magazine ‘Challenges’. It is for Member States to enable an appropriate national assessment of media market concentrations falling within the scope of Article 22. The Commission remains in close contact with the French authorities regarding the designation of the competent national authority foreseen by the EMFA. In the absence of an assessment by the national regulatory authority or body concerned or a consultation of the Media Board under Article 22, the Media Board shall draw up, on its own initiative or at the request of the Commission, an opinion on the impact of a media concentration on media pluralism and editorial independence, where the concentration is likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services. Currently, the Commission has not requested the Media Board to draw up an opinion on this acquisition. The Commission continues to closely monitor the application of the EMFA in France and in all Member States and will follow up as appropriate. The EMFA is without prejudice to the application of EU competition law, including Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on merger control, which applies in parallel. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj/eng.”
  EU rules on digital competition · EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
• 2026-02-20 “E-004683/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is working at full speed on Digital Services Act (DSA) investigations (e.g. Temu, AliExpress, Shein) to reach swift yet legally sound conclusions on the cases. If the investigations confirm the existence of systemic risks on the platform, the Commission could adopt non-compliance decisions and ultimately impose fines or accept binding commitments. The Commission also coordinates ongoing enforcement actions by the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Network against Temu and SHEIN 1 in response to identified consumer law infringements. To make the current consumer enforcement framework more effective and more deterrent, the Commission plans to propose a revision of the CPC Regulation during the 4 th quarter of 2026 2 . The Commission continues the implementation of the eCommerce Communication with results of the first product safety sweep and the Priority Control Area expected to contribute to a more robust enforcement framework, as will the use of EU IT tools, targeted enforcement via joint actions, and new EU testing facilities. The upcoming EU Customs Reform, in final stage of negotiation, is expected to be adopted in 2026 to structurally reinforce the capabilities of EU customs and other enforcement authorities on e-commerce imports directly shipped to consumers. The EU Market Surveillance Regulation is planned to be revised as part of the European Product Act legislative package, aiming to ensure level-playing field for businesses and safety for consumers. The Commission will continue providing the Parliament with regular updates during the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection meetings to discuss the relevant Commission's services’ progress on online marketplaces regulation. 1 Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004, OJ L 345, 27 December 2017, pp. 1–26. 2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - 2030 Consumer Agenda and action plan for consumers in the single market 'A new impulse for consumer protection, competitiveness and sustainable growth', COM/2025/848 final.”
  Liability for online marketplaces · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports