Henna Virkkunen

Policy topics Henna Virkkunen is active on

What Henna Virkkunen has said (80)

• 2026-07-07 “Advanced AI models create many possibilities. They can help us to prepare and protect but they can also be used against us. Advanced AI can create cyber exploits in just minutes or hours, for a fraction of the cost of human experts. While a major vulnerability can cost over 1 million EUR on the grey market, AI only needs data center compute power. Once weaponised, these flaws can endanger our infrastructure and society, which is built upon digital systems. The Commission's response has been immediate. We engaged with the entire AI and cybersecurity ecosystem: with Member States, with AI providers, with industry, and with our international partners. We are not starting from scratch. The EU already has robust legal and policy foundations to address these challenges. We are now turning them into action, capability, and resilience, along three priorities. First, AI models with high cyber capabilities must be safe. And Europeans must have access to use them. Through the AI Act, the EU has the world's strongest framework to protect us from the potential risks of advanced AI. The Commission's AI Office is already working with AI companies to implement these rules. Under the AI Act, advanced AI models must be evaluated, and mitigation measures carefully assessed, before the models are placed on the EU market. In less than a month, the AI Office will have enforcement powers. Testing models before they are released is key to reducing risk. To build expertise, the EU will launch a call to boost its AI evaluation capacity—especially in cybersecurity—aiming to be operational by 2027. The EU Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, will play an important role in operationalising this Action Plan, as well as some Member States. Together with ENISA, we will develop a European Blueprint for structured access to advanced AI models, with focus on cybersecurity. The Blueprint will support both AI providers and European organisations, including companies, on how to identify those who get access and on which terms. It will also serve as a basis for cooperation and alignment with international partners. But access is not enough. We must also strengthen our know-how on how to deploy these technologies for our cybersecurity, by testing their cyber capabilities. This is why the Commission will set up a secure platform to test AI for cybersecurity already by the end of 2026. The platform will allow us to assess how models can be used safely for cybersecurity operations in critical sectors such as finance, energy, health, transport or public administration. Second, we must also be able to protect ourselves against malicious attacks stemming from the misuse of such models. Our immediate priority is clear: identify and fix the most critical vulnerabilities faster. The first step is the full and effective implementation of our cybersecurity legislation: the NIS2 Directive, DORA, and the Cyber Resilience Act. This applies to all member states – I want to take the opportunity to highlight the urgency of implementing especially the NIS2 directive. But we also need targeted action where exposure is the highest for our critical infrastructure. We will therefore launch a Critical Open Source Resilience Campaign, to support maintainers in fixing the most critical vulnerabilities in key open-source projects. AI is not only a risk: it is also a strategic enabler of cyber resilience. Existing AI tools can already help with vulnerability management, threat detection, and incident response. We must support their safe and secure uptake across critical sectors, SMEs and public authorities. And we must do so fast. Third, we must build Europe's own AI-powered cyber capabilities. We cannot rely only on non-European solutions for capabilities that are critical for our security. Building up our own AI frontier models is costly, but in today's world, the cost of not building them will be even higher. Frontier AI requires very large-scale investment, far beyond what public funding alone can provide. We need to mobilise private capital, and especially equity. The new European tech equity capacity announced in the Tech Sovereignty Package can be a game changer here. Europe has what it takes to compete. We have the talent. We have a solid cybersecurity and AI ecosystem. We have AI Factories and, in the future, AI Gigafactories that can be part of a sovereign European infrastructure for AI and cybersecurity.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-07-01 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 1.7.2026 Written question The AI Act [1] includes transparency obligations to support distinguishing AI-generated content from human content. The AI Office facilitated the development of a Code of Practice [2] as a voluntary tool to support compliance with those obligations; the final version of the Code was published on 10 June 2026. The AI Office will also issue guidelines on those obligations, which it intends to adopt by August 2026. Furthermore, providers placing General Purpose AI (GPAI) models on the EU market must put in place a policy to comply with EU copyright law and disclose detailed summaries of training data. To support the implementation of these provisions, a template for a public summary of training content has been developed [3] , together with a Code of Practice for GPAI models [4] , to assist providers in complying with those obligations, including identifying and respecting reservations of rights expressed by rightsholders in a machine-readable format and mitigating the risk of copyright-infringing outputs. The Commission is facilitating a process to identify technical solutions for machine readable rights reservation (beyond robot.txt). Under the Apply AI Strategy [5] , the commission will also launch a study on legal challenges and technological safeguards against copyright-infringing AI outputs. The Commission monitors market and technological developments affecting the cultural and creative sectors and will, if necessary, use its powers, including under EU competition law, to ensure a level playing field. Furthermore, the Commission recently published a study on the discoverability of diverse European content online [6] and will present a dedicated AI strategy for the cultural and creative sectors. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1689. [2] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-ai-generated-content#ecl-inpage-transparency-of-ai-generated-content . [3] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/explanatory-notice-and-template-public-summary-training-content-general-purpose-ai-models. [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/contents-code-gpai. [5] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Apply AI Strategy, COM(2025) 723 final. [6] https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/34da2669-32b4-11f1-be39-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.”
  Artificial Intelligence · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• 2026-06-24 “Thank you very much. I very much agree with the analysis of Member Bertram that we have to really focus now to to build up our own capacities in all critical fields of technologies, and especially when it comes to AI. We have also huge potential in the European Union because we have around 8000 start ups who are developing and training AI. But one big obstacle for them has been that we haven't had enough computing capacity to train the models, and now we are also we are going to be in a better position after that when this AI 19 AI factories, what we are now establishing together with member States when they are up and running. And very soon we will also launch the official call for Gigafactories. And then we are also able to train very, very capable frontier models with that. And at the same time, it's also important to to make sure that our very promising startups, that they are able to scale up their businesses in Europe. But then when it comes to, especially to cybersecurity and AI, we are now working with the action plan really to look at what kind of new actions are needed because of this very capable AI models, because we know that they are able to identify the vulnerabilities in our ICT systems in, in a few hours.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-24 “To only apply measures to specific, specific assets where we see that security risks are very high and we need higher protection. We have also seen during the last months that the rise in frontier AI presents a strategic challenge now in cybersecurity. The policy point is very clear here. Ai must become part of Europe's defensive capability agenda. And this is why I announced on 19th May an action plan on AI and cyber security. And the commission will adopt that very soon. The most advanced AI models are viewed as a strategic capabilities with implications for national security and also for cyber resilience, which was confirmed by the US government imposing export controls to suspend access to Anthropic's most advanced AI models by any foreign national. While following the developments across the Atlantic. We remain cooperative with the industry and also with our U.S. partners. As the deployment of these advanced AI models, they are an area of common concern. At the same time, we remain vigilant on how they might affect our security, and these developments also underline how important it is to maintain our own sovereignty and especially develop our own capabilities in AI. One of our common priorities for European Parliament and for commission during this mandate has been protection of minors online. And it's a it's really at the heart of our efforts. And of course, here we have as a crucial pillar, our flagship regulation, the Digital Services Act and its guidelines on the protection of minors.”
  Artificial Intelligence for military purposes
• 2026-06-24 “And it has meant that anthropic has now blocked access for from everybody to this model from inside in their company as well, because it's for them a different difficult to identify who is USA nationality and who is not. But I think it clearly also tells that it's important also to have rules in place that you are also able as, as a policymaker really to cooperate with, with the industry and also that you are able to also address the risks beforehand because this is capable of AI models. They are also posing the risks. And when it comes to child sexual abuse material, the commission has proposed a legislation four years ago, and now it's under negotiations. And I hope that Parliament and Council will reach an agreement very soon. I think the rapporteur is sitting next to me here, And also, of course, we should act as soon as possible because this is very horrible crime. Now we are speaking and now we have gaps in our legislation because the interim regulation has expired as well. And yes, we are investing in education and skills. Of course, it's a crucial pillar of our digital agenda because we really need well-trained, uh, citizens.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• 2026-06-24 “Mrs. Verbunden yes, thank you very much. And I think, um, member Schenk, when we speak about the social media and miners, it has been so high priority now in many political areas that different member states, they have been also carrying out now their own assessments. And today exactly. In Germany, for example, the the recommendations or the outcome of the expert panel in Germany was published also on this topic. And many member states are also working together now with us on this topic and really looking at what is the right approach here. And I think it's also important to to address also the role of parents. But now when we have been investigating the big online platforms, I have to say that many of them, they have some kind of or they have parental tools there, but they are not very effective. And it seems that only few percent of the parents are really using this. So of course, it should be something very, very different to be effective on this side. But I think that everybody has to do really more here. So the online platforms, of course, they have their responsibility, but of course, parents are also playing a role. And then we have to really look at what kind of stronger rules are needed also, for example, to have access to certain services. Of course, when we speak about very high risk services, when we speak about selling alcohol or about gambling or porn platforms, there, of course, we have to have very strict and we have legislation, but now we have to be sure that we are able to also enforce the legislation there, but also with the with the other services.”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online
• 2026-06-24 “Yes. Thank you very much. Uh, when it comes to to online dimension and its impacts to, to minors well-being, we have currently our expert panel working on this topic. And there is experts from many fields, and we have been gathering a lot of information and research and science information also with this group. And really seeing that, Uh, uh, what is the, what kind of, uh, risks there is for minors when they are using online services. And of course, there are two main topics like how much you are using time online, but then also what kind of content, uh, you are seeing there and what kind of activities you are doing online. So we will have a very, very broad, um, report now published in July by the expert panel. And after that, we will also decide that what kind of actions are now needed on the European level. But I want to really underline that we have already many tools in place. And of course, the most important is our Digital Services Act. And there we have a very clear obligation for online service providers that they have to all the time assess and mitigate the systematic risks that they are posing, for example, for people's well-being, and especially when minors are using online services, very high level of security and safety and privacy has to be ensured for miners. So we have already strong rules in place. We have also our Avms directive, which is currently now under review. And it's it's about content and about video, video platforms. And then we have also our Safer Internet Kids network who is helping on the ground. Our, our kids also in online dimension. And when it comes to migration pact, our priority is now really to support our member states to implement this pact. And we know that different member states, they have a little bit different challenges here, but the Commission's priority is now really to support our member states that everybody could implement the pact now in a very effective manner.”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online
• 2026-06-24 “Thank you very much. And when we look, the Pegasus Committee's report, of course, after that the most important legislative actions has been the Media Freedom Act. And there we have very strong safeguards for journalists against spyware. So it's a part of our legislative tools, what we have in place. Of course, earlier we had already GDPR and also law enforcement directive and also Cyber Resilience Act was adopted a few years ago. And also we have our dual use regulation. So we have already a lot of legislation in place. But of course, we are also following the developments in different member states. And like I said, now, in a few weeks time, we will also publish our annual Rule of Law report. And this is also the place to really report the issue of spyware, and especially from the perspective of the checks and balances and the protection of journalists as well.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2026-06-24 “We have to look that. And especially when it comes to this, our dependencies and building up our own tech sovereignty. I fully agree that we have to really work now hard in this critical fields, because we see that also these critical technologies, they are really strategic assets for, for countries and those countries and those who are who are controlling these critical technologies, they are not only dominating the economy, they are also ruling the world in the future. So it's geopolitical power also. And that's why we have to build our own own capacity here. Maybe a few words about because we just carried out also a public consultation about the digital fitness check. You know that we are we are planning after this when these omnibuses. When we conclude this and adopt these omnibuses, we are continuing our work with the digital fitness check. And the data was something that many, many stakeholders, they were still mentioning there that difficulties and complex, um, complicated framework when it comes to data. So it's of course very important that we have to be able to really create that kind of high quality data sets for AI training and for innovations.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-24 “Thank you very much, chair, and all the members. So thank you very much for all these questions. It was a great pleasure to be here today with you. And really, that was an important day for us because we were today adopting two important regulations about your trust and Europol. So Commissioner Brunner will come tomorrow to this committee and represent these regulations more in detail. And when you have had also a little bit more time to to look them because they were just published today. But the main reason is now really that our security landscape, of course, it has changed very much. And as we were today, in most of the cases we were speaking, they were talking about technologies. We know that how strong the linkage is between technologies and our security, and especially also our Europol and Eurojust regulations. It's very much about this that we see that also the criminal activities, they are nowadays much more international, so cross-border dimension, but they are also very digitalized. So that's why we have to also make sure, for example, that at Europol. It can serve as an innovation hub technology hub for our member states, but also operational hub really to support also our member states and especially when it comes to different technological tools.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2026-06-24 “Thank you very much, member Sippel. I very much agree that we have a lot of very innovative companies in Europe. And when we speak about technologies, we have many European alternatives. Often they are smaller and they are not so visible in the markets. So we have to really also make them more visible and also support more European alternatives. And we can do it with our public procurement. And that's why public procurement is very much key pillar of our tech sovereignty package. For example, with the cloud services where we were now defining four different levels of sovereignty in cloud services, this will create more demand for the European cloud services, and it will also create more demand for European data centers. And this will create more demand for European chips as well. So public procurement is playing a very important role here. And we can really give a great boost for those companies by choosing European alternatives. And when it comes to this digital omnibus, we were touching and addressing these parts. But you were underlining in our digital omnibus the cookies part and the e-privacy here. And then also our GDPR rules. And of course, now the discussion is here in the Parliament that what kind of decision Parliament is taking on that? But what we wanted to achieve with the cookies part was really that we wanted to make it easier for for the users and simplify the things with our proposal. And also, when it comes to GDPR, we wanted to simplify and clarify the rules because we know that this is something that many stakeholders are always addressing, that this is one big obstacle in the European markets, that our rules are not clear enough. And also different member states, they have different interpretation when it comes to GDPR, that, for example, what is personal data and what is not personal data. And that's why we wanted to provide European approach and more more simple rules also for our companies.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-24 “Thank you very much. And this is certainly a very important priority for the Commission and also for me personally, because I, I want that when we are now building up our own technological capacity, we are doing it in a sustainable way that our citizens can really also trust to these developments. And we have estimated that we have to really triple our data centre capacity in the coming years, because, of course, when we are now producing more and more data, it has to be stored and processed also. And that's why data centres are needed. But we want to have more European data centres and more sustainable data centres. So it's very important now that we are really supporting that kind of data centres, which are using the most energy efficient technologies and which are saving natural resources as much as possible. We know also that our member states are in a very different position now, because some member states, they have big difficulties to have access to clean, affordable energy. And in some member states, it's easier also to build the data centers. But in the same time, all our member states, they need more of that kind of data center capacity. And that's why in our tech sovereignty package, we were also proposing that each member states they should identify also that kind of data center accelerator zones, that which are the identical, like ideal, ideal places to set up data centers with access to clean energy and where they can do it in very energy efficient manner. So it should be planned more a more coherent manner in the member state level. Also that what is the right place for data center and where they can, for example, use the waste heat, for example, for heating the buildings and do it in a very energy efficient manner. So this is certainly very important priority for us. And we are working together with the energy Commissioner on this topic, and they are now working also with the labeling, with the label of data centers, because of course, it's crucial that we have also transparency on that, that how energy efficient our data centers are.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-24 “Thank you very much. And it's very true. What what you said that we have many very critical dependencies, and we know that European countries and European Union, we have been always very open for global businesses. And, uh, our, our industry has also very long global supply chains. But now we can see that that kind of dependencies, they can be also weaponized against us. And that's why it's very important that now we are identifying all the critical sectors where it's very important that we are able to control the technology always ourselves, and especially with our cloud and AI Development Act, we were now making a we were making a proposal that all the governments they should do now risk assessment when they are using a public cloud services that. What kind of level of sovereignty is needed, and especially higher level of sovereignty is needed. When we speak about areas like health care, about law enforcement, internal and external security, defense, that kind of very critical fields. It's important that the cloud is controlled by Europeans and also that the data is localized in Europe. So we have to really look now all our sectors that we don't have that kind of risk dependencies. And nobody isn't having that kind of kill switch possibility to our services. And for, for the companies we were recommending the same, especially to companies who are working in the critical fields like in energy systems, in transport systems and, and so on. But it's of course, it's not happening overnight because now really, like it was said here earlier, 80% of our technologies is coming outside. And that's why it's now important to focus to the to those critical areas, which are the most critical for us when it comes to our digital omnibus and simplification efforts. Our intention is not to lower any standards with our digital omnibus. We want it to simplify the things and clarify the things, and also make more European approach on these legislations. But our intention is not lower our European standards because for us, it's also important all the time that our citizens can trust our technologies.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-24 “We know that around 20 of our member states are now discussing about this topic that should, should, should there be some kind of legal age. Also legislation, legislation on the age. Now, according to terms and conditions of the most online platforms, the users. They should be at least at least 13 years old. But we know that they are not really controlling that. We also very recently published preliminary findings on meta on this topic, because they are not really checking if the user is 13 years. And we also opened investigations against Snapchat about this topic. But the right age is of course one topic. And then the content, what is shown. And then also the addictive design of certain services is also something that we have been investigating. We also already published preliminary findings on TikTok about this topic. So I think it's our common interest now to make sure that online environment is safe for everybody, but especially for our children, and we are ready to take actions also in the European level on this matter.”
  Age restrictions on children's access to social media
• 2026-06-24 “Yes, thank you very much. And media freedom. Of course, it's something that it's a cornerstone of. Our democracy is free independent media. And we see overall globally now that our media is very much under pressure. Uh, often the main reason for that is the economic situation because of digitalization, very large online platforms and big tech companies, they have been taking big part of the advertisement. And also people are not used to buying newspapers, for example, like they did before. And this has meant a lot of economic pressure for for our media. And that's why the Commission has now put forward a different initiatives, really to support our free independent media. In the last year, our Media Freedom Act came into force and now member states are implementing it. And together with the Commission, I'm working on this topic and really supporting and looking that the member States are now implementing the Media Freedom Act like they should. But at the same time, we also in the last year we published our Democracy Shield and they're also. Media was very important part of this package. And also in our next MFF, we have first time also proposed funding for news media, because we see that this is something that we have to pay more attention in the European Union as well, how to support and protect our independent free media. And this is also traditionally has been something that we have been addressing also in our rule of law report every year. Also the status of media freedom of each member states. And the next report will be published in a couple of weeks time.”
  EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
• 2026-06-24 “Yes, thank you very much. We know that in our different member states, there is some sometimes limitations to different political mandates in in certain positions. But when it comes to Hungary, I have understood that the discussions are now ongoing there. And of course, then it's up to also a decision makers that. What will be the outcome of these discussions. I will travel to to Hungary on Monday, and then I have also a possibility to discuss with the ministers more detailed about the proposals of what they are planning to do in this respect.”
  Rule of law in Hungary
• 2026-06-24 “This year, we have fully leveraged these tools to drive meaningful change for children online with our preliminary findings against TikTok, meta and for pornographic platforms. If our findings are ultimately confirmed, we may issue a non-compliance decision, and these preliminary findings are just part of our action to make online spaces safer. We are committed that online safe environments should be safe for everybody, but especially for our children. In the first months of this year alone, we opened also proceedings against Snapchat X and shine. We have also witnessed that the digital threat of child sexual abuse has really evolved significantly over the past years. The current EU rules, as we know in this area, they were agreed in 2011, so 15 years ago and had to be adapted now to address the revolution in the digital world that took place since. To give you an order of magnitude of this change, reports of child sexual abuse online increased from 1,000,000 in 2010. So 1 million reports 2010 and more than 23 million in last year. So in 15 years, from 1 million to 23 million reports. So we are making progress in tackling now this horrible crime. On Monday, a provisional agreement was reached on the directive on child sexual abuse. And this indeed represents now a very significant achievement. But however, we know that it will only be effective if we are also able to identify these offenders.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• 2026-06-24 “Thank you so much, honorable chair, honorable members. It's very timely to be here today with you as we presented our package on strengthening Europol and Eurojust just few hours ago. And our aim is to strengthen the union's capacity to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute serious cross-border crime in increasingly complex security environment. And we also want to strengthen cooperation and complementarity between these two agencies, Eurojust and Europol, as well as with other relevant union actors in justice and home affairs, home affairs, field and anti-fraud architecture areas. And tomorrow, Commissioner Brunner will come here and he will present this new proposal to you in in detail. So in my opening remarks, I will touch some topical points. And then, of course, I'm very much looking forward to our discussion. So first about our simplification package digital omnibus. So the commission simplification objective with the digital omnibus is clear. Set the path for the development of responsible AI in Europe in line with our values and protection of fundamental rights. By simplifying our data rules, we support the innovation capacity of European industry and provide for ourselves the means to spearhead AI development. We also want to unlock the full potential of data sharing with the consolidation of the Data Act, and we transform also GDPR into a more forward looking harmonised legislation in line with important technological developments, and this provides much needed legal certainty to operators that want to innovate with AI in Europe and strengthens also our enforcement, all while preserving the key safeguards present in the GDPR.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2026-06-24 “And today, up to 80% of criminal investigations into child sexual abuse are launched because of reports of images and videos of such abuse from online service providers. So I urge you to reach an agreement with the Council on Rules for such reports that effectively prevent and combat child sexual abuse online. And when we speak about protection of minors online, it's also, of course, important to speak about how to verify the age of user. And mid-April, president von der Leyen and I announced that the harmonised EU Age Verification solution is a feature complete and ready to be rolled out to our citizens. And at the end of April, we also adopted a recommendation encouraging now all our member states to make use of this blueprint, implement national age verification solutions, and make sure that all EU citizens have a robust and privacy preserving age verification by the end of this year. Besides, as you are aware, president von der Leyen is also currently seeking expert advice through the Special Panel of Child Safety Online, without pre-empting the findings of the recommendations of the co-chairs. The president has raised the idea of social media delay and depending now on the content of the recommendations, we could come forward with a proposal by this summer already. So, dear members, this was my opening remarks. And now I'm very much looking forward to hear your your priorities and questions.”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online
• 2026-06-24 “For example, we were proposing to establish that kind of European police cloud to Europol, that our police from different member states, that they are able to really work together in real time and use the same resources. So this is very important in Interlinkage we have between security and technologies nowadays, and we have to always look to the aspect of security and resilience when we are making new, new initiatives. And I very much, of course, thank all of you for the good cooperation, and I very much encourage also you to find a fast solutions for the sexual abuse of children online. This part we know that we urgently need now solution for that because this is horrible crime we are facing. And also with the digital omnibus. I also encourage co-legislators to work now hard on this proposal, because we have to really make it easier for our for our companies to, to create innovations in Europe, because this is crucial for our tech sovereignty. Thank you.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• 2026-06-24 “Yes. Thank you very much. Member. And these are, of course, very, very important questions you were raising and not always simple questions. Also, because we know that online environment is very important part of our everyday life. And also miners. They have right to be connected with, connected with their friends. And they have right also to have access to information. But at the same time, when they are online, the content should be fit for their age. So we have to make sure that our online environment is safe for everybody, and especially for children. In our Digital Services Act, we have also a very clear obligation for the online service providers that when minors are using the services, very high level of safety, privacy and security has to be ensured for them. And one year ago, we also published guidelines on that topic, really to also show for the online platforms that what kind of practices we are expecting and what what does it mean in practice. And now we are using this as an enforcement tool also. But the question about minimum age is something that we are now seeking the advice of the expert panel. They are supposed to publish it in the middle of July, and after that we are ready to take actions.”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online
• 2026-06-24 “Yes. Thank you very much. I think now when we want to really boost our technological capacity and when we want to digitalize our society, it has to happen in a sustainable manner. And I'm thinking about and when I'm speaking about sustainability, I'm not speaking only about environment, which is very important, but also social and economic dimension. And all this has to be balanced, as we know, and especially the environmental impact of this digitalization and AI and data centers. Of course, it's something that we have to address. And that's why also in our cloud and AI Development Act, we were addressing this topic that we have to really use the best energy efficient technologies always when we are investing to these infrastructures. And it really matters also because there is big difference also how you are running, how you are running the system and the data centers that, how much it's using energy and also other natural resources like water. So we want to support most sustainable technologies in Europe, and we are very committed to that and we are supporting our member states really also on that and our AI act. It's also addressing this part about the transparency about the energy consumption of these models. So I think our legislators have taken this into account already. But this is very serious concern, of course, that when we are now building this capacity, that we have to look all the time, that we are doing it in a sustainable manner and our citizens that they can really trust also these technologies, because we see also in some countries where the citizens are already now very much against of that infrastructure, because they have fears about environmental and energy impacts of these infrastructures.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-24 “Yes. Thank you very much. Yeah. When we speak about the risks, what the very capable AI models are, what they are posing, what kind of risks to our cyber security environment, for example. I see that international cooperation is very much needed here. And it was also under discussion in last week in G7 meeting because no one of country can address alone that kind of risks in the European Union. We are better position when it comes to these risks, because we have our AI act in place, and our AI act states that when when service provider, when they are coming with very capable model to our markets, they have to notify that to our AI office. And they have to also assess and mitigate the risks. And also we have obligations that they have to have certain safety and security features in place. So with our AI act, we are prepared for that kind of situation. But as we know in USA, they don't have a similar regulation. A few weeks ago, a president of the United States was signing an executive order on this matter where they decided also that they want to do more cooperation with tech companies, especially about the security aspects of AI. But very soon after that, they will also deciding export control about the most capable anthropic models, and it means that no foreign nationalities can have access to these models now.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-24 “Yes, thank you very much. Like I underlined already earlier, and we have been debating about this also earlier in this committee and also in the plenary debate. When we speak about illegal use of spyware, it's it's illegal when there is not clear, clear rules, respected. And always our member states, of course, they have to respect our European Union legislation and the commitments they have made under our legislation. And if they are not doing that, then the Commission, of course, is ready to take also actions.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2026-06-24 “Thank you very much. And this is a very important topic. Of course, we are speaking about here. And it's important, of course, to underline always when we speak about illegal use of spyware, that it's totally illegal. And we have been looking at it from various angles of the EU law and also through a non-legislative action. And I think it's important to underline that we have already many legislations in place. For example, law enforcement directive, GDPR E-privacy directive. We have the European Media Freedom Act, as well as the Cyber Resilience Act and also dual use regulation. And the Commission also will continue to report also on the issue of spyware, when appropriate, through our annual Rule of Law report, which we will publish very soon again, and especially from the perspective of checks and balances and that of the protection of journalists as well. But I think it's important also now to underline that when we speak about investigations into alleged misuse of spyware, that it is a matter of national authorities. It's not Commissioner doesn't have that kind of power to do that kind of investigation. So it's a matter of national authorities. And this applies notably to allegations of abuse of intrusive surveillance technologies by governments to spy on journalists or activists. So all in all, the issue has the commission's full attention, and we will continue to explore options for any other further action in this area.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2026-06-24 “And that's why we have to be able also to, to protect and respond very fast to that kind of threats. So in a few weeks time, we will adapt our action plan, especially focusing to AI and cybersecurity. And also here in the Parliament, you have our revision of our Cyber Security Act currently under discussion. And there we also proposed that we will look now all our critical infrastructures, and we will look all the components there. And we want to make sure that we don't have that kind of high risk vendors inside in our critical infrastructure. So all these fields which are covered under this directive. But this is very, very true that we have to now always take to security and resilience aspect into account. And that's why it's important to be very well prepared in all the areas.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
• 2026-06-24 “And we also want to address the issue of cookie consent fatigue. And the rules under E-privacy directive need to be updated to provide more flexibility to businesses, not to need to collect consent when there are low risks to the fundamental rights of users. Another aspect is to make users privacy choices online easier and also enhance their control on the cyber security side. The Commission proposed the EU single entry point for cyber security reporting is a very concrete delivery on our promise to cut red tape and reduce reporting burden, because that burden has become often the reason why reporting does not take place as it must, and this has serious consequences on our capacity building. I am resolute in making the necessary efforts to prepare our continent for the challenges ahead of us, and work ambitiously towards increased sovereignty. In line with the tax sovereignty package proposed by the Commission a few weeks ago. Then a few words about the cyber security, especially because today's geopolitical context. We see that every link in our complex and very digitalised supply chain is also a potential target for exploitation of malicious actors, with potentially devastating consequences to our security. With the revision of the Cyber Security Act, our objective is providing the necessary regulatory means to protect member states and the union with the ICT supply chain framework, we will ensure that the measures proposed are targeted and proportionate through assessment of their economic and social impacts.”
  Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
• 2026-06-16 “Thank you very much, honorable, chair, honorable members. I I very much agree what many of you said that Europe is really having everything what is needed to be competitive in technologies. So I think it's important that we are building to our own strengths. It's it's good to also underline that we have really world class class science and research in Europe. We have very strong industrial base in Europe. We have also huge potential in our startups. We have 45,000 startups with great ideas, but now we have to pay sure that and make sure that our startups, they are able to scale up their businesses in Europe, and that's why we have to focus very much to our single market really to remove the barriers between member states, really to accelerate our savings and investments union to attract investments, and also to make Europe easy and faster for the businesses by cutting red tape and bureaucracy from our businesses. And in the same time, we have to use much more actively also public procurement to boost our own homegrown technologies in Europe. And, of course, via using open source, we can really do that. And it's important also to underline, like many of you said, that tech sovereignty, that it's not about isolation or protectionism, but we see, certainly, that we have to build up our own capacities in critical fields, like in AI, in semiconductors, also in quantum computing, cybersecurity technologies, in space technologies. So these are very critical technologies where we have to have our own capacity. But in the same time, we wanna work very closely with our trusted partners because nobody can't be competitive alone. So we need always our partners. So this package is very much about resilience and security of European Union because we wanna be sure in the same time, we are when we are open for investments, open for trade, that these very long global supply chains, they can't be weaponized against us, that we have also our own capacity, we have alternatives, and nobody isn't having so called kill switch element to our critical technologies.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty · Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2026-06-16 “Honourable president, honourable members, on the 8th of June, the European Commission adopted a technological sovereignty package. This is a crucial step for Europe. We are positioning ourselves for the future of digital technologies and addressing our strategic dependencies. Europe needs to be in the position to make its own choices, avoiding dependence on single dominant suppliers. Because we live in a world where geopolitics and technology go hand in hand. Those who lead technological innovation will shape the future. We must ensure that Europe plays the leading role. The recent US Export Control Directive on Anthropic's most advanced AI models is a case in point. We are seeing a new generation of highly capable AI models reach the market. These models offer significant benefits, including for cyber defense, but they also raise serious cybersecurity concerns that need to be addressed. And this is not only about single jurisdiction or single company, it is a shared challenge. We believe that contingency measures taken in this light, should not be discriminatory against partners with our tax sovereignty package. We are taking concrete steps to address such challenges. The package has three main objectives to transform our economy by driving the adoption of new technologies and AI in Europe, to reinforce the resilience of our supply chains and to promote the European way for tech sovereignty. And the package is designed to deliver through four key elements. First, the Chips act 2.0 that builds on the success of European Chips act. It includes a set of demand side measures to stimulate the uptake of chips made in Europe, bringing chip manufacturers closer to growth sectors like AI, cloud services and data centers.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-16 “And this is a clear market failure to address, especially for large scale ventures and scale ups. Just for the initiatives of this package, the total investments needs are estimated up to €450,000,000,000 in next 10 years. And we know that public funding is very crucial, but it will be in no way sufficient to bridge such a big investment gap. So we need ways to crowd in large amounts of private investments. The reform of the EU's capital markets under the savings and investment union will improve how the EU's financial system channels savings to productive investments. At the same time, the commission is launching now a consultation with our member states and with the European Investment Bank Group and other key stakeholders on the idea of setting up a European equity capacity. In other words, we aim to create a mechanism managing a portfolio of equity investments in advanced technologies and infrastructure that are critical for our economic security, such as digital, but also clean energy and biotechnologies. And this can be a true game changer for Europe, and I count on your support.”
  EU industrial funding (mechanism level: EU-pooled vs nationally-financed)
• 2026-06-16 “Thank you very much. Thank you, honourable members, for this. I think very encouraging and lively debate, because you have illustrated also very well that why tax sovereignty is so crucial at this time and age. Many of you was very much underlining how important it is to build up our own capacity on AI. And I very much, of course, agree. We have also great strengths here because we have, for example, 30% more AI engineers per capita than the USA. So we have a great talent pool. And also we have 8000 startups which are developing and training AI. But one big obstacle for these companies has been that they have not had access to computing capacity. And that's why it's so important that now we are investing together with our member states to 19 AI factories, and we are able to open up this computing capacity for our startups to train AI models in Europe. And also in a very, very short time. We will now open also the official call for those gigafactories, and then we will be able to have even much more computing power. But AI factories is not only about computing power, it's also bringing together high quality data sets to train AI and also talented people.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-16 “Honorable president, honorable members, on that of June, the European Commission adopted a technological sovereignty package. This is a crucial step for Europe. We are positioning ourselves for the future of digital technologies and addressing our strategic dependencies. Europe needs to be in the position to make its own choices, avoiding dependence on single dominant suppliers. Because we live in the world where geopolitics and technology go hand in hand. Those who lead technological innovation will shape the future. We must ensure that Europe plays the leading role. The recent US export control directive on Anthropix's most advanced AI models is a case in point. We are seeing a new generation of highly capable AI models reach the market. These models offer significant benefits, including for cyber defense, But they also raise serious cybersecurity concerns that need to be addressed. And this is not only about single jurisdiction or single company. It's a shared challenge. We believe that contingency measures taken in this light should not be discriminatory against partners. With our tech sovereignty package, we are taking concrete steps to address such challenges. The package has 3 main objectives, to transform our economy by driving the adoption of new technologies and AI in Europe, to reinforce the resilience of our supply chains, and to promote the European way for tech sovereignty. And the package is designed to deliver through 4 key elements. 1st, the Chips Act 2 that builds on the success of European Chips Act. It includes a set of demand side measures to stimulate the uptake of chips made in Europe, bringing chip manufacturers closer to growth sectors like AI, cloud services, and data centers. It also reinforces the European supply side side capabilities across the entire value chain, including through strategic projects with strong EU added value focusing on advanced manufacturing, design, and packaging. And also following the AI content and action plan, the cloud and AI development act turns the vision of tripling Europe's data center capacity within the next 5 to 7 years into reality and doing so in a sustainable manner. Very importantly, the act also encourages tech sovereignty of our public sector. It established clear criteria for sovereign cloud and also strengthens support for the development of AI services, notably EU frontier models, while using its buying power to boost EU security and resilience. And here, the commission own internal digital sovereignty action plan is paving the way. From migrating our core IT systems to EU based cloud infrastructure to deploying sovereign AI tools in our daily operations, we are proving that strategic autonomy is not just an aspiration. It's a very concrete action. And with the open source strategy, we are making and working to ensure that European companies and public administration are never again locked into a handful of platforms controlled elsewhere. In all of this, I want to underline that technological sovereignty does not mean isolation or it does not mean protectionism. It's about making Europe stronger, more resilient, and less exposed to critical dependencies. We will remain open to trade, investment, and cooperation with trusted partners. But Europe must also be able to develop, deploy, and protect the technologies that our economy, public services, and security dependent on. Honorable members, 2 more points before I conclude. Firstly, our technological sovereignty package takes its climate and environmental footprint very seriously. Europe's structurally higher energy costs, They are a genuine competitive constraint, for technologies that consume power at scale. And this is precisely why the package also includes the strategic road map for digitalization and AI in energy. And secondly, technological sovereignty also requires investments. Other tech leading countries have invested massively while Europe continues to suffer from a huge gap in equity and high risk financing to tech.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-16 “It also reinforces the European supply side capabilities across the entire value chain, including through strategic projects with strong EU added value focusing on advanced manufacturing, design and packaging, and also following the AI Continent Action plan. The cloud and AI Development Act turns the vision of tripling Europe's data centre capacity within the next 5 to 7 years into reality, and doing so in a sustainable manner. Very importantly, the act also encourages tech sovereignty of our public sector. It established clear criteria for sovereign cloud and also strengthens support for the development of AI services, notably EU frontier models, while using its buying power to boost EU security and resilience. And here, the Commission's own internal Digital Sovereignty Action Plan is paving the way for migrating our core IT systems to EU based cloud infrastructure, to deploying sovereign AI tools in our daily operations. We are proving that strategic autonomy is not just an aspiration, it is a very concrete action. And with the open source strategy, we are making and working to ensure that European companies and public administration are never again locked into a handful of platforms controlled elsewhere. In all of this, I want to underline that technological sovereignty does not mean isolation or it does not mean protectionism. It is about making Europe stronger, more resilient and less exposed to critical dependencies. We will remain open to trade, investment and cooperation with trusted partners. But Europe must also be able to develop, deploy and protect the technologies that our economy, public services and security dependent on. Honourable members. Two more points before I conclude.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty · Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-16 “Thank you very much. Honourable Chair, honourable members, I very much agree with what many of you said, that Europe is really having everything, what is needed to be competitive in technologies. So I think it's important that we are building to our own strengths. It's good to also underline that we have really world class science and research in Europe. We have very strong industrial base in Europe. We have also huge potential in our startups. We have 45,000 startups with great ideas, but now we have to be sure that and make sure that our startups, they are able to scale up their businesses in Europe. And that's why we have to focus very much to our single market, really to remove the barriers between member states, really to accelerate our savings and investments union, to attract investments, and also to make Europe easier and faster for the businesses by cutting red tape and bureaucracy from our businesses. And at the same time, we have to use much more actively also public procurement to boost our own homegrown technologies in Europe. And of course, via using open source, we can really do that. And it's important also to underline, like many of you said, that tech sovereignty, that it's not about isolation or protectionism, but we see certainly that we have to build up our own capacities in critical fields like in AI, in semiconductors, also in quantum computing, cybersecurity technologies, in space technologies. So these are very critical technologies where we have to have our own capacity. But at the same time, we want to work very closely with our trusted partners because nobody can't be competitive alone. So we need always our partners. So this package is very much about resilience and security of European Union, because we want to be sure at the same time, when we are open for investments, open for trade, that this very long global supply chains, they can't be weaponized against us, that we have also our own capacity. We have alternatives. And nobody isn't having so-called kill switch element to our critical technologies.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-16 “Firstly, our technological sovereignty package takes its climate and environmental footprint very seriously. Europe's structurally higher energy costs. They are a genuine competitive constraint, particularly for technologies that consume power at scale. And this is precisely why the package also includes the strategic roadmap for digitalisation and AI in energy. And secondly, technological sovereignty also requires investments. Other tech leading countries have invested massively, while Europe continues to suffer from a huge gap in equity and high risk financing to tech. And this is a clear market failure to address, especially for large scale ventures and scale ups. Just for the initiatives of this package, the total investment needs are estimated up to EUR 450 billion in next ten years. And we know that public funding is very crucial, but it will be in no way sufficient to bridge such a big investment gap. So we need ways to crowd in large amounts of private investments. The reform of the EU's capital markets, under the Savings and Investment Union, will improve how the EU's financial system channels savings to productive investments. At the same time, the commission is launching a consultation with our member states and with the European Investment Bank Group and other key stakeholders on the idea of setting up a European equity capacity. In other words, we aim to create a mechanism for managing a portfolio of equity investments in advanced technologies and infrastructure that are critical for our economic security, such as digital, but also clean energy and biotechnologies. And this can be a true game changer for Europe. And I count on your support.”
  EU industrial funding (mechanism level: EU-pooled vs nationally-financed)
• 2026-06-16 “Thank you very much, chair. Thank you, honorable members for this, I think, very encouraging and lively debate because you have illustrated also very well that why tech sovereignty is so crucial at this time and and age. Many of you was very much underlining how important it is, to build up our own capacity capacity on on AI, and I very much, of course, agree. We have also great strengths here because we have, for example, 30% more AI engineers per capita than USA, so we have a great talent pool. And, also, we have 8,000 startups which are developing and training AI. But 1 big obstacle for these, companies has been that they haven't had access to computing capacity. And that's why it's so important that now we are investing together with our member states to 19 AI factories, and we are able to open up this computing capacity for our startups to train AI models in Europe. And also in in very, very short time, we will now open also to official call for those gigafactories, and then we will able to have even much more, computing power. But AI factories, it's not only about computing power. It's also bringing together high quality datasets to train AI and also talented people. And here, I also wanna encourage parliament also to proceed with our digital omnibus because we have to also clarify the rules to access to data because this is needed to train and develop AI models. Also encouraging in developments we have seen in the businesses because in last year, our AI uptake among our businesses in Europe, it was increasing already 50% in last year. But still, we have to work, especially with our key industrial sectors and public sector, to support them also to uptake and use AI. So I wanna very much, assure you that the technical technological sovereignty package we have proceed is not only about statement of ambition. It's really concrete action plan, and the work is already ongoing. And then just a small, also, notice about this, very capable AI models, which are now coming to the markets. We are also working with the with the concrete list of actions also that what is needed to address the new cybersecurity threats with these new new capable models. Thank you.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-16 “And here I also want to encourage Parliament also to proceed with our digital omnibus, because we have to also clarify the rules for access to data, because this is needed to train and develop AI models. Also encouraging developments we have seen in the businesses because in the last year, our AI uptake among our businesses in Europe, it was increasing already 50% in last year. But still we have to work, especially with our key industrial sectors and public sector, to support them also to uptake and use AI. So I want to very much assure you that the technological, technological sovereignty package we have to proceed is not only about statement of ambition, it is really concrete action plan, and the work is already Ongoing. And then just a small. Also notice about this very capable AI models which are now coming to the markets. We are also working with with the concrete list of actions. Also that what is needed to address the new cybersecurity threats with this new new capable models. Thank you.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-03 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 3.6.2026 Written question The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act [1] is a landmark legislation, delivering trust in AI through a single legislative framework. The AI Act complements existing product safety rules with horizontal requirements that ensure that high-risk AI systems are safe and trustworthy. The Commission acknowledges that stakeholders have questions on how to apply the new rules in practice, in particular together with existing law. To build clarity regarding the applicable rules and their practical application, the Commission has launched initiatives such as the AI Act Service Desk [2] where businesses, and especially small companies, can obtain clarification concerning any concrete questions they may have. Furthermore, the Commission is preparing guidelines and other support tools. Likewise, the AI Act complements existing EU data protection law. The Commission and the European Data Protection Board are preparing joint guidelines. To further address implementation challenges and simplify compliance with the AI Act, the Commission has proposed the Digital Omnibus on AI [3] on 19 November 2025, which builds on the lessons learned during the progressive roll-out of the AI Act. In particular, the Omnibus allows more time for the AI Act’s rules on high-risk AI systems to come into force since standards and specifications are not yet available. Moreover, targeted amendments aim to further clarify the interplay with other EU law, in particular the Machinery Regulation [4] . The Digital Omnibus on AI was provisionally agreed by the co-legislators on 7 May 2026 and is expected to be adopted by July 2026. [1] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024. [2] https://ai-act-service-desk.ec.europa.eu/. [3] COM(2025) 836 final. [4] Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2023 on machinery and repealing Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 73/361/EEC, OJ L 165, 29.6.2023, pp. 1-102, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1230/oj.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-01 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 1.6.2026 Written question The protection of children in the digital age is a key priority for the Commission. The existing legal framework already includes very high standards. The Digital Services Act (DSA) [1] regulates, inter alia , systemic risks posed by providers of very large online platforms like TikTok, including risks to minors [2] , and on how the selection of advertisements influence such risks [3] . Providers must establish appropriate measures of privacy and safety [4] for minors and ban profiling-based advertisements [5] using their personal data. In addition, the Protection of Minors guidelines [6] cover advertising on online platforms and the DSA requires establishing a functionality to flag commercial communications [7] . The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive [8] ensures strict consumer protection, including shielding children from misleading commercial practices. It applies to influencers, requiring them to be clear about commercial communication. The Audiovisual Media Services Directive [9] sets minimum standards for audiovisual commercial communications (ACC), which must not cause physical, mental or moral harm to minors. Direct exhortations to acquire products or services are prohibited (applicable to influencers who qualify as audiovisual media service providers) and video-sharing platforms must ensure compliance with ACC to different degrees [10] . Minors’ personal data collected for age verification or parental control may not serve commercial purposes [11] . The forthcoming Digital Fairness Act [12] will aim to strengthen consumer protection online. Its priorities will include addressing unfair influencer marketing that capitalises on the relationship between young users and content creators . The Commission is currently assessing potential measures, including a clarification of the requirement for a salient disclosure of commercial content [13] . Such further measures will be informed, inter alia , by the recommendations of the Commission’s Special Panel on Child Safety Online. [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act. [2] Article 34 DSA. [3] Article 34(2) DSA. [4] Article 28 DSA. [5] As defined in Article 4(4) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng. [6] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/commission-publishes-guidelines-protection-minors. [7] Article 26(2) DSA. [8] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2005/29/oj/eng, OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, pp. 22-39. [9] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/13/oj/eng. [10] Article 9(1)(g) of Directive 2010/13/EU. [11] Article 28(b).3 of Directive 2010/13/EU. [12] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/consultations/commission-launches-open-consultation-forthcoming-digital-fairness-act. [13] https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14622-Digital-Fairness-Act/public-consultation_en.”
  Digital advertising · Safety features & content control for child protection online
• 2026-05-27 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 27.5.2026 Written question Secure use of drones and the security of drones placed in the internal market are a priority of the Commission. The action plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security [1] (‘Action Plan’) envisages measures including a Drone Security Package to adapt the regulatory framework to new threats. In this context, the Commission will work also on establishing an EU Trusted Drone Label to further enhance trust in civil drones. The label would rely on independent third-party verification and define additional product-level trust and resilience criteria without duplicating existing EU cybersecurity legislation. The Commission has not been involved in discussion on an import ban against specific drone manufacturers, including DJI. All drones placed in the internal market must comply with the applicable regulatory framework, including Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 [2] and relevant delegated and implementing acts, such as Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 [3] and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 [4] . Based on the Cyber Resilience Act [5] , a large majority of drones placed on the EU market will also be subject to mandatory cybersecurity requirements. Moreover, the proposal for revision of the Cybersecurity Act [6] sets out an objective and risk-based framework to address non-technical cybersecurity risks in information and communications technologies (ICT) supply chains in the EU, which may also occur in relation to drones and counter-drone systems. As part of the action plan, the Commission proposed to initiate work with Member States on a coordinated risk assessment on drones and counter drone capacities. This could be followed by a Drone and Counter-Drone Security Toolbox proposing proportionate security mitigation measures. [1] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security. COM(2026)81 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0081. [2] Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1139/oj/eng. [3] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators of unmanned aircraft systems. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/945/oj/eng. [4] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/947/oj/eng. [5] Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj/eng . [6] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the European cybersecurity certification framework, and ICT supply chain security and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/881. COM(2026)11 final.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · EU-US trade relations
• 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The Voices European Festival of Journalism and Media freedom receives co-funding from the Commission, following an open call for proposals with a maximum total contribution of EUR 3 000 000, for the duration of 27 months. This is a preparatory action initiated by the European Parliament, which are typically defined as experimental initiatives designed to test the feasibility of new actions and prepare new programmes. The festival is organised as a project carried out by a consortium of European and local organisations with strong EU-wide networks for media. As such, the choice of speakers is made by a dedicated coordinator designated by each of the organising partners. The Commission has no involvement in this process. It should also be recalled that the concerned call for proposals included strict, transparent and pre-established criteria to select projects and that the Commission does not have a role in implementation decisions taken by the beneficiaries. The Commission is committed to ensuring that projects are properly implemented in accordance with the terms of each agreement in line with the Financial Regulation [1] . [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng.”
  EU research funding · Conditions to access EU budget
• 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The action plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security [1] responds to security needs for the protection of European critical infrastructure and public spaces, covering drones as well as hybrid threats from other unmanned threat vectors such as balloons. In 2025, suspensions of flight operations due to drones, near-miss with an aircraft, violation of airspace by military drones, and the entry of unmanned balloons into national airspace were all observed in Europe. Such incidents attest to the pressing need to take measures to ensure the safe operation of drones in airspace, and to protect against threats arising from drones and other unmanned threat vectors. While incidents like these pose a security threat, attribution of responsibility for individual incidents is not within the Commission’s competence. [1] COM(2026)81 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0081.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The Commission has no specific comment to make on potential plans of the freedom.gov initiative and does not speculate on design or intent. The Commission is thus not planning to issue further comments. By law, the Commission cannot block websites in the EU. Only Member States' authorities may block a website if it is illegal under national or European law. This includes websites promoting child-sexual abuse material, terrorist content or copyright-infringing material. The Commission remains open to engagement with the US. The enforcement of EU law, in digital like in other areas, is the EU’s sovereign right. The Commission has a responsibility to enforce its laws, including the Digital Services Act [1] , effectively, fairly and without discrimination towards all companies operating in the EU. [1] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng.”
  EU-US data transfers · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-05-21 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 21.5.2026 Written question In the context of Pillar 3 of the EU Chips Act [1] , the Commission is monitoring the supply of memory chips, including prices and lead times, via regular expert reports. Early warning indicators may be used to flag shortages and price-shock risks to the Member States authorities represented in the European Semiconductor Board. Under Article 23 of the Chips Act, the activation of the ‘crisis stage’ is a prerogative of the Council. The Commission may, after consulting the European Semiconductor Board, propose to the Council the activation of a crisis. This would require evidence of serious disruptions of the supply chain affecting essential products used by critical sectors as defined in Annex IV, and evidence that the activation of the crisis stage would have a positive impact. At the moment this is not the case. The Commission has not specifically assessed whether long-term supply arrangements may have an influence on shortage of supply or pricing. The Commission welcomes proactive action from industry to manage risks of supply disruptions through commercial practices. Investment decisions under the Chips Act framework lie primarily with companies and Member States, and any public support must comply with EU competition and state aid rules. The Commission already supports, through open, competitive calls, research and innovation in embedded and specialty memories, which can serve important EU end-markets such as automotive, industrial and edge applications. The Commission recognises the strategic importance of strengthening EU capabilities in the memory ecosystem and is considering how to further reinforce this aspect in the context of the forthcoming revision of the Chips Act. [1] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1781/oj.”
  EU industrial funding
• 2026-05-20 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 20.5.2026 Written question Safeguarding the integrity of the information space to support everyone in society to access reliable and trustworthy information and exercise their democratic rights is essential for democracy as outlined in the European Democracy Shield (EDS) Communication [1] . In this vein, the Commission has supported the development of technological tools that enable journalists, fact-checkers, civil society groups and all citizens to detect disinformation and foreign interference (FIMI) campaigns, including through support for consecutive projects under Horizon 2020 [2] and Horizon Europe [3] such as InVID [4] , WeVerify [5] and vera.ai [6] , with around EUR 34 million through EU Horizon Europe Cluster 4 funding. Results developed under vera.ai are being further taken up by some members of the consortium in the ongoing AI-CODE project, which ensures continuity of tools and expertise supported through earlier EU funding. Furthermore, the Commission also supports other relevant projects contributing to information integrity, such as European Narrative Observatory pilots, recurring funding to foster media literacy under Creative Europe, and support to the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) under Digital Europe [7] . As part of the EDS, the Commission has also launched new initiatives, such as a call for proposals for a common research framework [8] that will support technical infrastructure and research on information integrity. This is complemented by support for a European Network of Fact-Checkers. Europe must be better equipped to protect the integrity of its public debate and democratic processes. For that reason, under the new Multiannual Financial Framework, the Commission proposes to continue supporting innovation across the media sector. As part of the proposed new AgoraEU programme [9] , the Commission intends to step up support actions that promote and protect a free, viable and diverse EU information ecosystem. [1] Communication on the European Democracy Shield: https://commission.europa.eu/document/2539eb53-9485-4199-bfdc-97166893ff45_en. [2] https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-2020_en. [3] https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe_en. [4] https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/687786. [5] https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/825297. [6] https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101070093. [7] Latest call: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/DIGITAL-2026-BESTUSE-TECH-EDMO-09-HUBS?keywords=edmo&isExactMatch=true&status=31094501,31094502,31094503&order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=50&sortBy=relevance. [8] https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/DIGITAL-2026-BESTUSE-RSF-10-AWARENESS?order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=50&sortBy=startDate&isExactMatch=true&status=31094501,31094502,31094503&frameworkProgramme=43152860. [9] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the ‘AgoraEU’ programme for the period 2028-2034, and repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/692 and (EU) 2021/818: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0550.”
  EU industrial funding · Disinformation & online freedoms · Promotion of open-source softwares
• 2026-05-19 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The guidelines on the protection of minors [1] under the Digital Services Act (DSA) [2] set out guidance for where age assurance technologies should be deployed. They include minimum specifications to ensure that age assurance measures are accurate, robust, non-intrusive, reliable, and non-discriminatory. The guidelines are aligned with European Data Protection Board guidance [3] , requiring platform providers to only process data that is necessary for age assurance purposes, and to ensure that data processed for this purpose is not stored or used for other purposes. The Commission developed an age verification solution [4] allowing users to prove they are 18+ online. A blueprint is available to Member States for customisation and publication. Designed to meet the highest privacy standards, it uses ‘zero-knowledge proof’ technology to securely prove that the user has a valid age credential without revealing the credential or any other information. The user’s identity is only checked once during the issuance of the proof of age. The proof does not contain any identity data, only disclosing that the user is 18+. The trusted proof provider is not informed about online services for which the proof is used. On 29 April, the Commission adopted a recommendation urging Member States to accelerate the rollout of the age verification app and make it available by the end of 2026 [5] . Under the DSA, online platforms accessible to minors are required to provide them a high level of privacy, safety, and security. The aforementioned guidelines outline steps that platforms can take to do so, including to reduce addictive design. The Commission recently adopted preliminary findings against TikTok [6] where the Commission informed the provider that they must disable features that can contribute to excessive use. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C_202505519. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. [3] https://www.edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/statements/statement-12025-age-assurance_en. [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/factpages/blueprint-age-verification-solution-help-protect-minors-online. [5] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-urges-member-states-rollout-eu-age-verification-app [6] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_312.”
  Electronic identity · Safety features & content control for child protection online
• 2026-05-19 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question Directive (EU) 2022/2555 [1] aims to increase the cybersecurity of entities operating in 18 critical sectors, including public administration. Under this directive, Member States must ensure that certain public administration entities take cybersecurity risk-management measures and report significant incidents. This directive does not apply to public administration entities that carry out their activities in the areas of national security, public security, defence or law enforcement. In the current global threat landscape, cyberattacks disrupt critical infrastructure and economic stability. Robust cybersecurity is paramount and the transposition of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 a strategic imperative. Spain must urgently advance with the full transposition of this directive. An infringement procedure [2] has already been initiated by the Commission in this respect. The urgency of the transposition is not just about the obligation under the law; it is fundamental to reinforce the cyber standards of our critical infrastructure. The Commission remains fully committed to assisting Member States’ efforts and helping them overcome any challenges in the transposition process, while respecting the ongoing infringement processes concerning the Member States that have not yet notified full transposition of Directive (EU) 2022/2555. [1] Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80). [2] INFR(2024)0270 Lack of transposition of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union by Spain, source: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_25_982 (Section 8. Digital economy).”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware · Privacy & law enforcement
• 2026-05-19 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The upcoming Audiovisual Media Services Directive [1] review will aim to streamline the regulatory framework for video-sharing platforms to ease complexity as well as compliance burden for businesses. Additionally, the review will consider the emerging role of content creators in the audiovisual media landscape, to ensure that the rules applicable to them are fit for purpose, while protecting audiences and fostering creativity. In addition, the EU supports the audiovisual sector through different programmes, currently mainly via Creative Europe’s MEDIA strand [2] . The Digital Services Act [3] requires providers of online platforms to set out in their terms and conditions the main parameters used in their recommender systems, including the most significant criteria in determining which content is suggested to users. Very large online platforms and very large online search engines are also required to assess and mitigate systemic risks stemming from their services, including those related to recommender systems. In January 2026, the Commission extended its investigation into X's compliance with its recommender systems’ risk management obligations. The Digital Markets Act [4] also applies to YouTube, TikTok and Instagram to ensure that these services are contestable and do not impose unfair conditions on content creators and audiences. EU competition law does not prohibit dominant positions as such. If a company acquires a strong position lawfully, this is authorised. However, once companies become dominant, they have the responsibility to avoid abusing that position. The Commission enforces Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU vigorously in digital markets. It also enforces merger control in the digital sector. The Commission can block such mergers if the parties do not offer suitable commitments. [1] Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1808/oj/eng. [2] https://culture.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/creative-europe-media-strand. [3] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R2065. [4] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (Text with EEA relevance) available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng.”
  Recommender systems · EU rules on digital competition · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-05-19 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) ‘Stop Destroying Video games’ [1] was submitted to the Commission on 26 January 2026. On 23 February 2026, the Commission met with the ECI organisers to allow them to present the objectives of the initiative in detail, clarify its requests and provide further background information. The initiative was subsequently presented to the European Parliament on 16 April, and it is now in examination phase in the Commission. In line with Regulation (EU) 2019/788 on the European Citizens’ Initiative [2] , the Commission will adopt its formal reply, in the form of a communication, no later than 27 July 2026. The communication will set out the Commission’s conclusions on the initiative, as well as the action it intends to take (including a possible envisaged timeline), if any, and its reasons for taking, or not taking, any action. [1] https://citizens-initiative.europa.eu/initiatives/details/2024/000007_en. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019R0788.”
  EU competences on consumer protection and product standards
• 2026-05-13 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question The Digital Services Act (DSA [1] ) entitles recipients of hosting services to a statement of reasons, and recipients of online platforms to an internal complaint-handling system, if their content is restricted by providers of those services. It also entitles recipients to access out-of-court dispute settlement bodies [2] . On this basis, millions of moderation decisions have been reversed since 2024 [3] . The DSA further mandates providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs [4] ) to identify, analyse and assess systemic risks in the EU stemming from their services, and to mitigate those risks. The Commission Guidelines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes pursuant to Article 35(3) of the DSA [5] point out that collaborating with independent fact-checkers who work on the basis of high ethical and professional standards can be one way for VLOPs to mitigate risks to civic discourse. All content moderation decisions based on fact-checking are subject to the transparency and redress measures mentioned above. The Commission initiated proceedings in relation to Meta for the suspected demotion of political content through Facebook and Instagram’s recommender systems [6] . The Commission is continuously monitoring compliance with the obligations of the DSA. The Commission published the European Democracy Shield [7] , which aims at reinforcing the integrity of the information space in the EU, and where the EU’s commitment to academic freedom is reaffirmed. Pursuant to Article 91(2) of the DSA, the Commission shall evaluate the DSA by 17 November 2027, addressing, among others, its impact on the respect for the right of freedom of expression and information. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. [2] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-out-court-dispute-settlement. [3] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-content-moderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops. [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3014/oj/eng. [6] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373. [7] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2660.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The objective of Article 25 of the European Media Freedom Act [1] , applicable as of 8 August 2025, is to ensure transparency in the allocation and use of public funds for state advertising, thereby supporting undistorted competition between media service providers and online platforms and reducing the risk of covert subsidies and undue political influence on the media. For Article 25 to apply, public funds have to be made available by a ‘public authority or entity’, defined as a national or subnational government, a regulatory authority or body, or an entity controlled, directly or indirectly, by a national or subnational government; the recipient has to be a media service provider or a provider of online platform; and the aim of spending has to be ‘state advertising’, defined as the placement, promotion, publication or dissemination of a promotional or self-promotional message or a public announcement or an information campaign. Therefore, without prejudging what a possible interpretation by the Court of Justice of the EU may find , organisations constituted under private law would be covered where they are controlled, directly or indirectly, by a national or subnational government and make available public funds for state advertising to media service providers or providers of online platforms . Article 25 does not provide for general thresholds limiting its application based on the level of expenditure. The only flexibility explicitly foreseen concerns certain subnational authorities, which may be exempted from publishing specific information (namely, business group data under Article 25(2)(b)), reflecting proportionality considerations. [1] Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj/eng.”
  EU engagement with civil society · Transparency requirements for interest groups
• 2026-05-04 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 4.5.2026 Written question The Commission has consulted the data centre industry from the outset when it drafted the Energy Efficiency Directive [1] and subsequent proposal delegated acts on reporting, rating scheme and minimum performance standards on water and energy usage. The introduction of these measures has not affected their investment decisions in the EU but rather the opposite: colocation data centres invested EUR 7,7 billion in 2024, and they plan to invest over EUR 26 billion in 2030 [2] . The upcoming Cloud and AI Development Act will address the urgent and growing data centre capacity gap, aiming to at least triple the EU’s data centre capacity within the next five to seven years. It will do so by harmonising the conditions for investment in data centres across the EU with a focus on sustainable and innovative data centres, ensuring their operators find access to land, water, finance and energy in the EU. Additionally, through the upcoming Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI in the Energy Sector the Commission will facilitate the sustainable integration of data centres into the EU energy system. The Commission has conducted various regulatory impact assessments and cost benefit analyses related to investment barriers in the energy, network, and raw materials sectors, particularly in the context of the Green Deal Industrial Plan [3] , REPowerEU [4] , Critical Raw Materials Act [5] and Net-Zero Industry Act [6] . It will conduct an impact assessment that will accompany any proposal for a regulation on minimum performance standards later this year. [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-efficiency/energy-efficiency-targets-directive-and-rules/energy-efficiency-directive_en. [2] https://www.eudca.org/new-2026-state-of-european-data-centres. [3] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/green-deal-industrial-plan_en. [4] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/energy/repowereu_en. [5] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/green-deal-industrial-plan/european-critical-raw-materials-act_en. [6] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/green-deal-industrial-plan/net-zero-industry-act_en.”
  Climate efforts · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-05-04 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 4.5.2026 Written question The Commission rejects the report’s unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations. Freedom of expression is a fundamental right enshrined in the Charter [1] . The Digital Services Act (DSA) [2] protects users by entitling them to explanations, appeals and redress when their content is removed or restricted. Since its application, online platforms have reversed almost 50 million decisions [3] , demonstrating how the DSA empowers users and effectively protects them against arbitrary platform moderation. The DSA does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined purely by national law or other EU laws. The Commission cannot order providers of online services to remove or amend specific content from their services . Platforms remove content based on their own policies. The DSA mandates the largest platforms [4] to identify, analyse and assess systemic risks in the EU stemming from their services, and to mitigate those risks. This includes risks to electoral processes. The DSA brings accountability and transparency. For example, it requires providers of online platforms to issue statements of reasons explaining their moderation decisions in a Transparency Database [5] . Here, providers must specify the reason for restricting or removing content. The DSA requires the Commission and national competent authorities to publish all key enforcement decisions. This is done through a dedicated website [6] , with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of providers and to the protection of confidential information concerning other persons involved, in line with established practice amongst all similar regulatory and enforcement frameworks. Moreover, the Commission’s general transparency rules apply to meetings involving Senior Managers. [1] https://fra.europa.eu/en/eu-charter/article/11-freedom-expression-and-information. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. [3] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-content-moderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops. [5] https://transparency.dsa.ec.europa.eu/. [6] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-04-29 “E-000965/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has no specific comment to make on potential plans of the freedom.gov initiative and does not speculate on design or intent. The Commission does not block websites in the EU. Only Member States' authorities may block a website if it is illegal under national or European law. This includes websites promoting child-sexual abuse material, terrorist content or copyright-infringing material. The Commission has a responsibility to enforce its laws, including the Digital Services Act 1 , effectively, fairly and without discrimination towards all companies operating in the EU. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-04-29 “P-001161/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Rapid Response System (RRS) for elections is a cooperation and communication framework among relevant signatories of the Code of Conduct on Disinformation. It allows non-platform signatories, like independent fact-checkers, researchers and civil society to swiftly report time-sensitive content, accounts, or trends that they deem to present threats to the integrity of the electoral process and discuss them with the platforms in light of their respective policies 1 . The flagged content is reviewed against the social media platforms’ policies, and any content moderation decision lies exclusively on the platforms. The signatories decided to apply the RRS to all national elections in the EU and European elections 2 . Thus, it is not the Commission, but the signatories who launched the RRS. As part of the Code's commitments, it is the Code's signatories and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) that have access to the RRS. The participants that are nonplatform signatories differ for each RRS iteration: usually the signatories with specific understanding of the local context and language of the election participate in the iteration, together with the local EDMO hub. In the case of the RRS for the Hungarian elections, the participants were Democracy Reporting International, Alliance4Europe, CEE Digital Democracy Watch, and the Hungarian EDMO hub (HDMO). The signatories of the Code report about their activities in the context of elections taking place in the EU, including where it pertains to the RRS, in their periodic reports, which are publicly available through the Transparency Centre of the Code. 1 European Commission (2025) Code of Conduct on Disinformation, https://disinfocode.eu/the-code/read 2 Transparency Centre of the Code of Conduct on Disinformation, Rapid Response System Q&A, https://disinfocode.eu/elections”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-04-29 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 29.4.2026 Written question The Commission has extensively invested in the EU’s technological sovereignty including in semiconductors and AI Chips. The Chips Act (CA) [1] has resulted in EUR 80 billion in announced investments in semiconductor manufacturing capacity since 2022. Furthermore, through the CA, the EU has invested in over EUR 1.8 billion in pilot lines that are ensuring that the research required to manufacture the most advanced chips is done in Europe. Further investment has been made in setting up semiconductor competence centres across the EU, equity investment in start-ups and the launch of a Design Platform. More investment is expected through the future revision of the CA. Furthermore, via Horizon Europe, the EU and Member States are investing over EUR 239 million in the development of European chip solutions for High-Performance Computing and AI data centres [2] . Cohesion policy supports critical technologies, including semiconductors, through programmes agreed with Member States and regions, which are responsible for project selection and implementation. In 2025, EUR 8.8 billion was allocated by Member States to the specific objective covering semiconductors and other technologies critical to EU technological sovereignty. Over the course of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, EUR 4.8 billion was allocated by Member States to semiconductor-related measures, including through the Important Project of Common European Interest on Microelectronics and Communication Technologies [3] . The last available data by the Commission on the EU’s market share in semiconductors is the 2025 State of the Digital Decade report, which showed a market share for Europe of 10.5% in 2024 that is projected to reach 11.5% by 2030 [4] . From 2022 to 2030, manufacturing capacity should increase by 30% in absolute terms if announced CA investments materialise. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1781/oj/eng. [2] https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101202459. [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3087. [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/state-digital-decade-2025-report.”
  EU industrial funding · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-04-23 “P-000489/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The censorship allegations of the Committee on the Judiciary of the US House of Representatives report are unsubstantiated and unfounded. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 brings unprecedented transparency and accountability for users of platforms 2 in the EU. It protects their freedom of expression by entitling them to explanations, and redress if their content is removed or restricted. The DSA does not prescribe what content is illegal; this is determined by national or other EU laws. The Commission cannot order platforms to remove specific content; such decisions are taken by the providers themselves. The DSA does not regulate electoral processes or political debate. Conducting and organising elections is solely the competence and responsibility of Member States. Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs), independent national authorities that implement the DSA at Member State level, can organise election roundtables 3 to facilitate information sharing and coordination between relevant stakeholders. Upon an explicit request from the national DSC, the Commission can provide support for the organisation of such roundtables. Such activities have been hosted with the support of the Commission in Slovakia and the Netherlands in 2023; Ireland, France and Romania in 2024; and Romania, Netherlands, Ireland in 2025. No such activities were organised for Polish elections in 2023, 2024 and 2025. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/dsa-elections-toolkit-digital-services-coordinators.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-04-23 “E-000937/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Drawing on the learning from the programmes under the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF 1 foresees simpler and integrated support for stakeholders, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). These include the use of a single work programme for the entire digital leadership window, a single rulebook, a common set of instruments, and a coherent approach to leveraging private investments through the European Innovation Council (EIC) and the European Competitiveness Fund 2 (ECF) InvestEU Instrument. The proposal also foresees dedicated actions to increase SME participation, business support and the establishment of the ‘EU for Business’ Network. The integrated approach between the ECF and the successor of Horizon Europe 3 will ensure a comprehensive support to the entire innovation journey from research to pilots, early industrialisation, manufacturing and deployment, with the EIC playing a key role. It aims to provide key infrastructure support. The ECF will have dedicated support for scaling up, such as the scale up facility under the ECF InvestEU Instrument, and support for advanced skills development needed by SMEs to develop and deploy innovative solutions. The Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 4 will be a policy framework for the ECF and National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPPs). The State of the Digital Decade reports will ensure coordination and track progress towards the digital transformation, issuing semester-like recommendations on areas for reform and investment. 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘A dynamic EU Budget for the priorities of the future – The Multiannual Financial Framework 2028–2034’ (COM(2025) 570 final). 2 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European Competitiveness Fund ('ECF’), including the specific programme for defence research and innovation activities, repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/522, (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/697, (EU) 2021/783, repealing provisions of Regulations (EU) 2021/696, (EU) 2023/588, and amending Regulation (EU) [EDIP] (COM/2025/555 final). 3 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Horizon Europe, the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, for the period 2028-2034 laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulation (EU) 2021/695 (COM/2025/543 final). 4 Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 (OJ L 323, 19.12.2022, pp. 4–26, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/2481/oj).”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU · EU industrial funding
• 2026-04-20 “E-000528/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission rejects the unsubstantiated and unfounded claims made by the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in its report of 3 February 2026. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 empowers users of online platforms to appeal removals, receive explanations and seek redress where their content is removed or restricted by platforms. This protects users’ freedom of expression. For example, between April 2024 and June 2025, Meta reversed almost one third 2 of 68 million contested content moderation decisions on Facebook and Instagram. Users can also appeal platform decisions through outof-court dispute settlement. In early 2025, they overturned 52% of decisions out of the more than 1 800 complaints 3 submitted. The DSA does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined by national law or other EU laws. The Commission does not have the competence to mandate the removal of lawful content and has no role in individual moderation decisions. These decisions lie with platforms themselves, according to their own terms and conditions. However, the DSA obliges platforms to specify the reasons for restriction or removal of content and mitigate systemic risks. When online platforms fail to meet these transparency and accountability obligations, the Commission acts. In April 2024, the Commission opened an investigation into Meta for suspected demotion of political content through their recommender systems 4 . In October 2025, the Commission preliminarily found Meta failed to provide adequate reporting tools for illegal content or effective appeals mechanisms 5 . The President of the Commission and the Commission are fully focused on keeping Europe independent, secure and competitive, including in technical matters. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-impact-platforms#ecl-inpage-greater-transparency-incontent-moderation-and-more-options-to-appeal. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-contentmoderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373. 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-preliminarily-finds-tiktok-and-meta-breach-theirtransparency-obligations-under-digital.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-04-20 “E-000592/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission firmly rejects unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations made by the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in its report of 3 February 2026. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined purely by national law or other EU laws. The Commission cannot order providers of intermediary services to remove specific online content from their services. The DSA does not regulate political speech or debate. It requires providers to assess and mitigate systemic risks stemming from their services to fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, and to electoral processes. Engaging with providers on how their systems and practices operate across jurisdictions is a normal and necessary part of regulatory oversight. Interpreting such exchanges as a means to influence political debate misrepresents the nature of regulatory dialogue. Freedom of expression is at the core of the DSA, which lays down rules ensuring that such freedom as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 2 , is effectively protected. The DSA brings unprecedented transparency on content moderation and DSA compliance by mandating online platforms to make their annual risk assessments and audits public 3 . It also requires the Commission to publish all key enforcement decisions, which is done on a dedicated website 4 . Thanks to the unparalleled standards set by the DSA for user empowerment, fundamental rights safeguards, and accountability of providers, almost 50 million decisions affecting users’ content or accounts have been reversed in just two years 5 . The Commission’s role and powers as an enforcer are laid out in the DSA itself. All enforcement decisions are subject to judicial oversight. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-brings-transparency#ecl-inpage-lsets8qr. 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses. 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-contentmoderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-04-20 “E-000681/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission firmly rejects the allegations contained in the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee’s report of 3 February 2026 as unsubstantiated and unfounded. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 does not prescribe which content is illegal. The Commission cannot order providers or intermediaries of online services to remove specific content from their services. Decisions on such content are taken by the providers themselves. The DSA obliges the Commission to publish decisions with due regard to protecting confidential information of affected companies. That is why, before publication, the Commission gives companies a chance to redact sensitive business information. This due process and regard for confidential information should be followed by all sides. The publication of unredacted documents including personal data potentially exposes the respective companies to legal liability for personal data breaches under the General Data Protection Regulation 2 . The publication of personal data of EU staff and civil society experts is deeply concerning, and the Commission takes this very seriously. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Staff Regulation 3 , staff can request assistance from the Commission in this kind of situation and affected staff members have already been provided with information on how to obtain support in case of threats, insults, defamation or other attacks to their person or property. Moreover, the Commission already provides needs-based counselling and assistance to staff enforcing the DSA. The enforcement of the EU’s democratically adopted digital regulations is a sovereign matter. The Commission remains committed to enforcing the DSA at full speed. The Commission stands behind its staff. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02016R067920160504&qid=1532348683434. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A01962R0031-20210101.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-04-20 “E-000858/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The European citizens’ initiative is still in examination phase in the Commission. The Commission will adopt by 27 July 2026 at the latest its formal reply in the form of a communication. The communication will then set out the Commission’s legal and political conclusions on the initiative, as well as the action it intends to take (including an envisaged timeline), if any, and its reasons for taking or not taking action. Whether videogames publishers should conclude agreements with other private entities for the exploitation or maintenance of discontinued videogames lies within the exclusive discretion and contractual freedom of those publishers.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2026-04-20 “E-000549/2026 E-000552/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 operates under a high level of transparency. It requires platforms to publish reports on content moderation 2 , risk assessments, mitigation measures and audits. In turn, the Commission publishes information on the platforms it supervises and on its main enforcement actions, including requests for information, the opening of proceedings, preliminary findings and decisions 3 . The Commission’s transparency framework is further governed by the Transparency Register 4 and the rules on public access to documents 5 . Since 1 January 2025 6 , staff holding management functions may meet interest representatives if they are registered in the Transparency Register, and minutes of such meetings are published 7 ; unless exempted from these obligations 8 . Public access to Commission documents can be requested in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Access to documents related to enforcement proceedings is examined on a case-by-case basis. Where necessary, access may be limited in order to protect the legitimate interests of providers, including business secrets and confidential information, as well as the integrity of ongoing investigations, as recognised in the DSA 9 and the Detailed Rules for the application of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 10 . All enforcement-related documents, including exchanges with external parties, are duly filed in dedicated internal case-management systems, ensuring traceability, institutional oversight and access to the file in line with companies’ rights of defence 11 . This balance between transparency, effective enforcement and protection of confidential information reflects established practice in comparable regulatory and enforcement frameworks. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R2065. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/harmonised-transparency-reports-under-dsa-bring-enhancedclarity-content-moderation-practices. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses. 4 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en. 5 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001R1049. 6 Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3081, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3081/oj/eng, and Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3082, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024D3082. 7 https://commission.europa.eu/about/service-standards-and-principles/transparency/transparencyregister_en#meetings-with-interest-representatives. 8 See Article 3 of Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3081 and Article 3 of Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3082. 9 Articles 79(4), 80 and 84 of the Digital Services Act. 10 Article 4(2)(e) of Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3080, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3080/oj, and Article 4(1) to (3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 11 Article 79 of the Digital Services Act.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2026-04-17 “E-000813/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the report and rejects its unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations. The Commission is not planning to issue further explanations. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 aims to create a safe, predictable online environment, protecting fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 2 . The Commission acts when providers of very large online platforms (VLOP) and very large online search engines (VLOSE) fail to meet the transparency and accountability obligations. In April 2024, the Commission opened an investigation into Meta for suspected demotion of political content through their recommender systems 3 . The DSA does not define illegal content, hate speech or disinformation, nor does it contain criteria for determining this. What constitutes illegal content is determined by national law or other EU laws 4 . The Commission cannot issue orders to act against illegal content; only national judicial or administrative authorities can issue orders to providers of intermediary services, on the basis of other EU legislation or national law in compliance with EU law. Providers must inform authorities of any effect given to the order without undue delay, if such orders fulfil the requirements stated in Article 9 of the DSA. Content moderation decisions are taken by providers themselves, while the DSA obliges them to specify the reasons for restricting or removing content and provide effective redress. 30% of appealed moderation decisions 5 have been reversed since the DSA’s application. In relation to elections, the Commission has issued guidelines 6 for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373. 4 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_framw/2008/913/oj/eng. 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-contentmoderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. 6 Communication from the Commission – Commission Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes pursuant to Article 35(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3014/oj/eng.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-04-17 “E-000947/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission published on 31 March 2026 a report 1 on the overall amount of costs incurred for the fulfilment of the tasks under Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, Digital Services Act (DSA) 2 in 2025, in accordance with Article 43(7) of that Regulation. This mandatory annual report covers the entirety of the expenditure, beyond the Commission’s supervisory tasks covered by the supervisory fee pursuant to Article 43(2) DSA 3 . The information requested by the Honourable Members on the number of recruited staff and resulting personnel costs is included in this report in paragraphs 9 and 10. The information on the total personnel costs for the fulfilment of the supervisory tasks under the DSA is publicly available in the staff working document published by the Commission on 27 June 2025 4 . The overall number of full-time equivalents (FTEs) necessary for the fulfilment of the tasks referred to in Article 43(2) DSA is estimated for the year 2026 at 270 FTEs. This figure includes existing staff and further appointments. The associated cost is estimated at EUR 34.82 million. The number of staff working on DSA implementation is set by the authorised staffing levels agreed in the standard budgetary procedure and can evolve subject to budgetary availabilities and anticipated needs, estimated on annual basis, for instance in the case of new designated services. The DSA clarifies that the Commission should be in possession of all the necessary resources, in terms of staffing, expertise and financial means, for the performance of its tasks under the Regulation. 5 None of those tasks involve the moderation of content. 6 The resources allocated to the DSA implementation are annually estimated and subject to the scrutiny of the European Parliament and Council via the above mentioned annual report. 1 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the overall annual costs incurred for the fulfilment of the Commission’s tasks pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 in the period from 1 January 2025 until 31 December 2025 and the total amount of the annual supervisory fees charged pursuant to Article 6(4) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/1127 in 2025: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2026:147:FIN. 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act): https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 3 Article 43(2) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. 4 SWD(2025) 175: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/overview-elements-accounted-estimationamount-external-assigned-revenues-stemming-0. 5 Recital 101 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. 6 That is a matter for specific laws and the courts to determine, same as for offline content. The DSA does not determine which content is illegal and the Commission does not have the power to order providers of intermediary services to remove specific content from their services.”
  Digitalization of public governance & administration (pace & safeguards)
• 2026-04-16 “E-000763/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission fully supports the successful operation of the mObywatel application. Poland is constructively cooperating with the Commission and is efficiently implementing a comprehensive development plan managed by the Ministry of Digital Affairs, positioning itself as one of the frontrunners in the development of European Digital Identity Wallets. Under the European Digital Identity Regulation 1 , Member States are required to provide European Digital Identity Wallets by December 2026. The Commission has been informed that Poland is preparing a new version of mObywatel application, which will comply with the requirements for the European Digital Identity Wallets. According to the information received, the European Digital Identity Wallet will constitute an additional component of the mObywatel application ecosystem. All documents used in mObywatel will stay accessible to the users. Existing national eID solutions and the European Digital Identity Wallets may continue to coexist. Poland is actively participating in the European pilot projects POTENTIAL 2 and APTITUDE 3 supporting the development and testing of digital identity wallets. The experience gained contributes to the design of the Polish implementation of the European Digital Identity Wallet. The Commission cooperates with Member States through these projects and the broader implementation process to ensure that European Digital Identity Wallets meet legal requirements and function across the EU. 1 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0910. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-buildingblocks/sites/spaces/EUDIGITALIDENTITYWALLET/pages/924976339/LSP-POTENTIAL. 3 https://aptitude.digital-identity-wallet.eu/.”
  Electronic identity
• 2026-04-16 “E-000550/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 requires providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large search engines (VLOSEs) to assess the systemic risks stemming from their services and to mitigate them. This includes risks related to content moderation systems. The Commission assesses the risk assessment reports that providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs are required to compile and transmit to the Commission at least annually. Should the Commission identify shortcomings in those reports, it may send requests for information or open proceedings. In parallel, the Commission engages in regulatory dialogues with providers. To mitigate systemic risks stemming from their services, providers have the freedom to choose from a wide range of measures. One among many options is adhering to a voluntary code of conduct deemed to contribute to the proper application of the DSA. Examples of such codes include the Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online+ 2 . The DSA sets a framework to create a safe online environment in which fundamental rights, including freedom of expression and information, are protected. Requirements to mitigate risks are limited to what is proportionate. To prevent ‘over moderation’, intermediary service providers must apply their terms and conditions in a diligent, objective, and proportionate manner, be transparent about all content moderation decisions, inform users of content moderation decisions affecting them and give them clear and specific statements of reasons, and provide effective appeal mechanisms. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act). 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-04-15 “E-000461/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission firmly rejects the censorship allegations made in the report of 3 February 2026 by the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, which are unsubstantiated and unfounded. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 protects freedom of expression by empowering users to obtain explanations and redress if their content is removed or restricted. It sets unparalleled standards for user empowerment, fundamental rights safeguards, transparency 2 . It also requires all key enforcement decisions to be published, which is done on a dedicated website 3 . Engaging with providers on how their systems and practices operate is a normal and necessary part of regulatory oversight. Interpreting such exchanges as a means to influence political debate misrepresents the nature of regulatory dialogue. The Code of Conduct on Disinformation 4 is a self-regulatory instrument developed by its signatories, including online platform providers and other relevant players. It promotes a transparent and fair online environment while fully upholding freedom of speech: the Code focuses on providing more context for users to navigate safely in the online environment and counter manipulative practices (e.g. the use of fake accounts or bots), not on removing content. The Commission does not provide financial support to signatories for their participation in the Code 5 . None of the instruments mentioned by the Honourable Member provides grants or financial support to any other organisations. Every year, the Commission reports to the European Parliament and the Council on the costs of the Commission's actions in the scope of the DSA 6 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-contentmoderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses. 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-disinformation. 5 All the information about EU funded projects is available at the EU Funding & Tenders Portal, https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home. 6 Latest report on the overall amount of the costs incurred for the fulfilment of the tasks under DSA; for the year 2024, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/annual-report-costs-incurred-fulfilment-commissions-tasksunder-digital-services-act-dsa-2024.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-04-15 “E-000632/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The AI Act 1 applies to AI systems and general-purpose AI models. It prohibits AI systems that employ subliminal or deceptive techniques or exploit vulnerabilities that have the objective or effect of materially distorting behaviour, when this is reasonably likely to lead to significant harm 2 . Discriminatory content produced or amplified by AI systems may be covered by this prohibition. AI systems classified as high-risk 3 need to comply with certain requirements, including on data governance to avoid bias and discriminatory content. For AIgenerated or -manipulated content, such as deepfakes, transparency obligations apply 4 . Providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic risk must identify and address concrete risk scenarios arising from their models, which may include the generation of illegal, violent, hateful, radicalising, or false content, and report the results of this risk management process to the AI Office before placing those models on the market. The rules on enforcement of the AI Act will apply from August 2026. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 5 requires online platforms to put in place a notice and action mechanism through which users can report content that they consider illegal. If providers are made aware of illegal content on their services, they must remove it expeditiously. In addition, the DSA requires providers of very large online platforms and search engines to identify, analyse and assess the systemic risks stemming from their services in the EU and mitigate such risks. This includes the risk of the dissemination of illegal content, such as illegal hate speech, and the risk of negative impacts on users’ mental health and wellbeing. These provisions apply irrespective of whether the content is AI generated. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng. 2 Articles 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) of the AI Act. 3 Article 6 of the AI Act. 4 Article 50 of the AI Act. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32022R2065.”
  Artificial Intelligence · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• 2026-04-14 “E-000527/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission firmly rejects the report’s unfounded and unsubstantiated allegations, including those concerning Slovakia’s 2023 elections. Freedom of expression is a cornerstone of the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 . It helps protect this freedom by entitling users to explanations, appeals and redress when their content is removed or restricted by platforms. The DSA does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined purely by national law or other EU laws. The Commission does not have the competence to mandate the removal of specific items of lawful content; moderation decisions lie with platforms themselves. Since its application, 30% of appealed moderation decisions 2 have been reversed, proving users have real recourse mechanisms. No other law matches the DSA’s protections against arbitrary platform moderation or its demand for accountability on how platforms operate. TikTok’s alleged content removals must therefore stem from its own policies. The DSA ensures accountability and transparency through annual transparency reports, where platforms must justify restriction or removal of content (e.g., under legal provisions or terms of service). Compliance is annually checked by an external audit. The DSA also requires very large online platforms to assess systemic risks to civic discourse and elections, while considering the exercise of fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of expression and information 3 . Engaging with platforms to ask how their systems and practices operate across different jurisdictions is a normal and necessary part of regulatory oversight. Interpreting such exchanges as a wish to influence political debate or pressure platforms misrepresents the nature of regulatory dialogue. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-contentmoderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed. 3 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng.”
  EU political integration · Disinformation & online freedoms · LGBTIQ+
• 2026-04-14 “E-000660/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission attaches great importance to upholding and fostering pluralistic and independent media and condemns any form of interference in the professional activities of journalists and their editorial independence. Article 5 of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) 1 requires Member States to ensure that public service media providers are editorially and functionally independent and that the procedures for the appointment and the dismissal of the head of management or the members of the management board of public service media providers aim to guarantee the independence. It also sets out requirements for transparent, open and objective procedures to appoint the heads and management boards of such providers. The Commission is in close contact with all Member States, including Portugal, to make sure that their laws comply with the EMFA, applicable as of 8 August 2025, and will use its enforcement powers to ensure such compliance as appropriate, focusing on systemic issues. In addition, the Commission is monitoring relevant developments related to media freedom and pluralism in all Member States, including Portugal, under the annual Rule of Law Report. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1083.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
• 2026-04-13 “E-000560/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with EU law, a measure constitutes State aid if, cumulatively, (i) it is imputable to the State and financed through State resources, (ii) it confers a selective advantage to an undertaking, (iii) it is liable to affect trade between Member States and (iv) it distorts or threatens to distort competition. Financing granted by a State-owned investment bank, therefore, may not automatically constitute State aid. If a Member State intends to grant State aid, it is under an obligation to notify the measure to the Commission and obtain the Commission’s approval before the measure is implemented, unless the measure is covered by block exemptions. The European Media Freedom Act 1 does not prohibit investments or acquisitions in the media sector as such. It provides a framework for assessing media market concentrations that may affect media pluralism and editorial independence. National regulatory authorities and, where relevant, competition authorities remain responsible for the assessment of such transactions, in accordance with EU and national law. The European Media Board or the Commission may issue an opinion where the concentration is likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services. The conduct and the organisation of free and fair elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional and legislative rules, while respecting their international obligations and EU law. National competent authorities and courts have the primary responsibility of ensuring compliance with these rules, including several EU rules applicable in electoral contexts such as the political advertising Regulation 2 or the General Data Protection Regulation 3 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1083. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng. 3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng.”
  EU rules on digital competition · EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
• 2026-04-08 “E-000748/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of Google’s announcement to introduce this verification process, starting from September 2026 in some jurisdictions (not including the EU based on publicly available information). The Commission understands that, as a result of this process, Android will require that all applications (apps) are registered by verified developers in order to be installed on certified Android devices. The Commission is also aware of public campaigns such as ‘Keep Android Open’ which have emerged in reaction to Google’s announcement. Article 6(4) of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) 1 obliges gatekeepers like Alphabet to allow and technically enable the effective distribution of apps on their operating system through third party app stores or the web. At the same time, the DMA also permits Google to introduce strictly necessary and proportionate measures to ensure that third-party software apps or app stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system, provided that such measures are duly justified by Alphabet. The Commission is actively engaged in a regulatory dialogue with Alphabet concerning Article 6(4) of the DMA and is diligently monitoring Alphabet's compliance with the relevant legal framework to ensure that apps, including open-source apps, can be effectively distributed on Android outside Google Play. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng.”
  EU rules on digital competition · Promotion of open-source softwares
• 2026-03-31 “E-000458/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The allegations of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee are unsubstantiated and unfounded. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 brings unprecedented transparency in relation to and accountability of online platforms. The DSA does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined by national law or other EU laws. It protects freedom of expression and entitles users to explanations and redress if their content is removed. From July to December 2025, of 3.4+ billion content removals, most breached terms of service, while others involved unsafe products, scams, illegal hate speech, violence, or Internet Protocol violations 2 . The Commission's guidelines and codes of conduct support providers of online platforms with DSA compliance; these are entirely voluntary. Platforms choose mitigation measures; codes are one option among many, designed by platforms themselves. Engaging with platforms on how their systems operate across different jurisdictions is a normal and necessary part of regulatory oversight. Trusted flaggers operate exclusively in specific areas of expertise (e.g., protection of minors’ violations or intellectual property infringements) where they can submit notices related to illegal content. These notices are not legally binding; just like any notice of any other user, they serve solely as alerts to platforms, which must conduct their own independent assessment of the content’s legality before acting. The trusted flagger status is awarded by the independent Digital Services Coordinators of Member States following strict criteria set by the DSA and subject to various safeguards, such as objectivity, quality and transparency requirements, and the revocation of the trusted flagger status in case of misuse. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://transparency.dsa.ec.europa.eu/dashboard.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-03-31 “E-000299/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recalled the applicability of the General Data Protection Regulation 1 in its reply to written question E-000182/2025, including requirements to ensure security of processing and conditions for the transfer of personal data to third countries. In addition, the gaining of access to personal and non-personal data in the terminal equipment of a user are governed by Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive 2 . The Network and Information Systems Cooperation Group, the Commission and the European Network and Information Security Agency, conducted a cybersecurity risk assessment on connected and automated vehicles which demonstrated espionage and physical security risks 3 . The report contains mitigation recommendations. In addition, the revised Cybersecurity Act 4 proposed by the Commission sets out a framework to deal with strategic risks and de-risk EU critical infrastructure from high-risk suppliers. The Commission would be able to propose measures to address identified risks in key information and communication technology (ICT) assets, ranging from requiring supplier information in the ICT supply chain and data processing within the EU, to prohibition for EU critical infrastructure to use, install or integrate such ICT components from high-risk suppliers. Connected vehicles are not foreseen as an area for future European cybersecurity certification. For technical risks, vehicle type-approval rules 5 require vehicle manufacturers to identify and assess risks and apply appropriate measures to manage those risks and that vehicle manufacturers obtain a cybersecurity management system certificate to ascertain its implementation. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1-88. 2 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, pp. 37–47. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/toolbox-improve-ict-supply-chain-security. 4 COM(2026) 11 final. 5 Regulation (EU)2018/858, Article 5(1) and Part 1 of Annex II; Regulation (EU) 2019/2144, Article 4(5)(d) and Annex II; UN Regulation No 155.”
  Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations · International data transfers
• 2026-03-30 “E-000292/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 1 (UCPD) prohibits traders’ from misleading consumers, including with false information about the product’s main characteristics that deceives average consumers or is likely to lead them to a transactional decision that they would not have taken otherwise 2 . The UCPD applies only to business-to-consumer transactions and therefore does not apply to transactions concluded solely between consumers, which may occur on platforms such as Vinted when the seller acts as a private individual. The UCPD, transposed into national laws of the Member States, which are in charge of its enforcement with respect to individual traders, acts as safety net ensuring consumer protection and complementing the requirements of specific EU legislation, such as the Digital Services Act (DSA). The DSA, applicable to providers of intermediary services like Vinted, establishes a framework for tackling misleading practices and the dissemination of illegal products such as counterfeit goods on online platforms. Under the DSA, providers of online marketplaces must put in place notice and action mechanisms to report illegal products, process it in a timely manner and provide feedback on their decision 3 , establish complaints handling mechanisms for users 4 , take firm measures against repeat offenders 5 and make best efforts to assess if the information obtained from trader is reliable and complete 6 . As Vinted is not designated as very large online platform, the Member state in which its main establishment is located in the EU (i.e. Lithuania) is competent to supervise and enforce the DSA against it. Vinted is also a signatory of the Memorandum of Understanding on counterfeiting, industryled and facilitated by the Commission 7 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2005/29/oj/eng. 2 Article 6 UCPD. 3 Article 16 DSA. 4 Article 20 DSA. 5 Article 23 DSA. 6 Article 30 DSA. 7 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/strategy/intellectual-property/enforcement-intellectualproperty-rights/memorandum-understanding-sale-counterfeit-goods-internet_en.”
  EU restrictions on unfair commercial practices · Liability for online marketplaces
• 2026-03-26 “P-000628/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Telegram is not designated as a very large online platform but must comply with the applicable rules of the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 . These rules include obligations related to notice and action procedures, independent means of redress, and transparency regarding terms of service and content moderation decisions. Telegram has appointed its legal representative in Belgium; the Belgium Digital Services Coordinator (DSC) is therefore competent for the supervision and enforcement of the DSA with respect to Telegram. The Commission is in regular contact with the Belgium DSC, notably to discuss Telegram and the actions foreseen or already taken by them and assist when required. Telegram is a hybrid service consisting of online platform and non-online platform features. According to Telegram’s published information, and in contrast with WhatsApp’s published information, the users of its online platform features are below the designation threshold 2 . In light of Article 24 DSA and the ruling in Case T-348/23 3 , if a provider is able to isolate the online platform features’ users from the total number of users, then it is possible to count only the former for the purposes of the reporting obligation laid down in that provision. The Commission monitors the evolution of user numbers and takes into consideration all relevant sources of information. The Commission under Article 33(3) DSA may adopt a delegated act to supplement the provisions of the DSA by laying down the methodology for calculating the number of average monthly active recipients of online platforms and of search engines in the EU. The Commission continues to monitor the appropriateness of adopting such a delegated act. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1-102. 2 https://telegram.org/tos/eu-dsa; https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/transparencyreports. 3 Judgment of 3 September 2025, Zalando v Commission, T-348/23, EU:T:2025:821.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-03-26 “E-000392/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 requires providers of very large online platforms and very large online search engines to diligently identify and assess and effectively mitigate systemic risks stemming from their services, including any negative effects on civic discourse. Providers are required to analyse whether and how these risks are influenced by a manipulation of their service, such as the use of bots or fake accounts. In addition, these providers must undergo yearly independent external audits to assess their DSA compliance. The DSA obliges providers of hosting services to set up a user-friendly and easy-to-access notice and action mechanism, empowering users to report content considered to be illegal, including fake identities and to publish transparency reports, including the number of notices received and actions taken. The Code of Conduct on Disinformation 2 , which was integrated into the DSA, includes commitments for its signatories to combat the use of bots and fake accounts to artificially amplify content, deceive users and disinform. Enforcing the DSA is a priority and proceedings on systemic risks to civic discourse are ongoing. For example, the Commission’s investigation of Meta’s policies and practices also concern deceptive advertisements and disinformation due to suspicion that it does not comply with DSA obligations to address coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the EU 3 . The Democracy Shield 4 proposes to reinforce the existing framework with operational measures, such as setting up a DSA incident and crisis protocol or improve the detection and labelling of AI-generated and manipulated content on social media services and voluntary user verification tools. All actions should be progressively rolled out by 2027. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1–102: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-disinformation. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/stronger-measures-protect-our-democracy-and-civilsociety-2025-11-12_en.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-03-24 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 24.3.2026 Written question The Commission shares the objective of strengthening Europe’s technological sovereignty. Under the European Chips Act [1] , the Commission and the European Semiconductor Board monitor the semiconductor value chain and may carry out targeted analytical assessments. These can also cover memory, mapping EU demand, capacity and supply-chain risks. While the EU currently has limited capabilities in standard random-access memory (RAM) and data-centre memory components, the Commission supports research and development via open, competitive calls (e.g. under the Chips Joint Undertaking) in embedded and specialty memories, including promising next-generation non-volatile memory developments, for automotive, industrial and edge/Internet of Things (IoT) applications. It has also authorised state aid under Article 107(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2] for semiconductor research and first industrial deployment in the context of two Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) on microelectronics in 2018 and 2023, totalling up to EUR 10 billion. Under the European Chips Act, the Commission aims to increase manufacturing capacity of semiconductor products, including RAM. The type of manufacturing facility to support depends primarily on companies’ and Member States’ decisions. Member States may grant support if it complies with EU State-aid rules and may notify support for projects for first-of-a-kind facilities under Article 107(3) TFEU to undergo Commission approval; to date, up to EUR 13.8 billion has been approved. [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/european-chips-act. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E107.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-03-24 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 24.3.2026 Written question The revision of the Chips Act [1] is ongoing, with the proposal for a Chips Act 2 foreseen in spring 2026. Preparatory work is carried out in an inclusive way, with the possibility for stakeholders to voice their priorities via the call for evidence. Printed circuit boards and electronics manufacturing services are not excluded from the scope of the Chips Act but the Commission is assessing whether the first-of-a-kind definition needs to be clarified to provide legal certainty to actors in the semiconductor value chain planning investments in the EU. The level of customs duty rate applicable depends on the tariff classification of the goods. Levels of bound duty rates, including where it is ‘duty-free’, result from EU commitments under the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The Commission is committed to protecting EU industries from unfair competition where it finds that EU industry is suffering from dumped and/or subsidised imports. Industries can contact the Commission’s trade defence services [2] for such issues. The Commission aims to tackle strategic dependencies as cybersecurity risks. The proposed Cybersecurity Act 2 [3] aims to reduce risks in the EU’s information and communication technology (ICT) supply chain from third-country suppliers with cybersecurity concerns. It sets a trusted ICT supply chain security framework using a harmonised, proportionate and risk-based approach. [1] OJ L 229, 18.9.2023, pp. 1-53, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1781/oj. [2] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/contacts/trade-defence-enquiries_en. [3] COM(2026) 11 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026PC0011.”
  EU industrial funding · EU digital & tech sovereignty