Lynn BOYLAN

Policy topics Lynn BOYLAN is active on

What Lynn BOYLAN has said (80)

• 2026-06-17 “@CHAIR (15:39:21 – 15:40:47): Thuramaga at the Ootsuran. The electrification plan, action will provide a crucial boost for electrification based on renewables across the EU. And electrification would, of course, not only reduce emissions, but also energy bills by reducing our reliance on volatile fossil fuels. Of course, we should be electrifying end uses where possible, but at the same time, we need policy coherence so as not to create barriers to electrification. In Ireland, data centers are eating up electricity. They will soon account for 30% of Irish electricity demand, and the Irish Climate Change Advisory Council has already warned that data centers are cannibalizing our renewables. Every new wind farm built in Ireland in recent years has gone straight to data centers, and it has not displaced gas demand and has added hundreds of euros to electricity bills according to Friends of the Earth Research. So a recent UN report also called Ireland a cautionary tale. The electrification action plan must listen to Ireland's tale. Data centers and EU AI policy must not jeopardize our electrification goals. Today, the president of the European Data Center Association said the quiet part out loud. EU needs more gas because while policymakers believe the grids, batteries, and nuclear will be ready in time, we all know that that won't happen. Thank you Very much. Please, mister Donen.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-06-16 “(10:42:16 – 10:44:00): Yesterday, the EU Observer reported that as far back as 2017, the then commissioned top lawyer was very clear. EU was legally entitled to suspend cooperation with Israel, such as Horizon Europe and Erasmus Exchange due to Israel's violations of international law. Almost 10 years and the EU has refused to act. We have witnessed a genocide in Gaza, the annexation of the West Bank, entrenchment of apartheid policies, racialized capital punishment, 1,000 Palestinians killed since the ceasefire, and in the 1st half of 20 26, 88 attacks against Christians in Christian holy sites, and not to mention the 1,000,000 displaced civilians in Lebanon. Yesterday, again, the Foreign Affairs Council took no action because of some member states. So with all due respect to the German government, we are tired of hearing about your sensitivities. A heinous genocide against Jewish people perpetrated by an earlier generation cannot be used to justify an Israeli genocide against Palestinians. Your obstruction is making us all complicit. And finally, I want to raise the issue of a ban on settlement goods and services because where is Maris Sevkovich? Where is the proposal from the commission based on article 2 0 7 of the the treaties? This is the bare minimum that we should be doing. The ICJ confirmed trade with the settlements is illegal. Now we need the trade commissioner to turn up, do his job, and ban this illegal trade.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-03-19 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The EU has repeatedly expressed its deep concern regarding Israel’s offensive in Lebanon and the devastating humanitarian consequences thereof [1] . The EU stresses that attacks on civilians, civilian infrastructure, healthcare personnel and facilities, as well as on the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) personnel are unjustified, unacceptable and in breach of International Humanitarian Law. In light of the deteriorating situation in Gaza, and with the support of a majority of Member States, the High Representative/Vice-President has conducted a review of Israel’s compliance with its obligations under Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement [2] . The conclusion of the review was that there are indications that Israel would be in breach of its obligations. Discussions continue in the Council on the package of measures presented by the Commission following the review. The fight against impunity and the pursuit of justice for international crimes and violations of international law are cornerstones of the EU’s foreign policy, regardless of where conflicts occur. These principles are non-negotiable and reflect the EU’s dedication to a rules-based international order. The EU reiterates its strong and steadfast support for the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, both of which serve as indispensable pillars of the global justice system. [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/moldova/foreign-affairs-council-press-conference-high-representative-kaja-kallas_en. [2] https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf.”
  EU-Lebanon relations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-03-09 “Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question Israel has been a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since 1995. As such, it benefits from the most favoured nation treatment (MFN), as WTO members agree to give MFN status to each other. The bilateral trade relations between the EU and Israel are governed by the free trade provisions of the EU-Israel Association Agreement [1] . It gives Israel preferential conditions — compared to the MFN treatment — for accessing the EU market. On 10 September 2025, the President of the Commission announced [2] a set of measures the EU could take to address the catastrophic situation in Gaza and in the West Bank . These include proposals for a reinforced package of sanctions and a partial suspension of the Association Agreement on certain trade-related matters . The President also announced the decision to put on hold EU bilateral financial support to Israel, without adversely affecting work with civil society or Yad Vashem . The proposed measures on sanctions and trade have remained on the table for discussion in the Council as the number of supporting Member States is insufficient for their approval. Yet, if adopted and notified, the suspension would mean that imports from Israel would lose their preferential access to the EU market . [1] https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf. [2] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-02-18 “E-000705/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Article 107(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 (Payment Services Directive - PSD2) 1 establishes, subject to limited exceptions, the principle of maximum harmonisation of the rules laid down in the Directive. PSD2 sets out rules governing the allocation of liability for authorised and unauthorised payment transactions. In this context, the possibility for Member States to introduce national liability or reimbursement regimes for authorised push payment (APP) fraud would need to be considered in light of the harmonised framework established by PSD2. The Commission has proposed new provisions in the ongoing revision of the EU payment services framework (the Payment Services Directive 3/Payment Services Regulation package) to strengthen protection against APP fraud, including enhanced fraud-prevention and reimbursement measures 2 . These proposals are currently under negotiation by the colegislators. A provisional political agreement was reached on 26 November 2025 3 , marking an important step in advancing the legislative process. 1 OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, pp. 35–127 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L2366. 2 COM/2023/367 final https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023PC0367. 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-an-economy-that-works-for-people/file-revision-of-eurules-on-payment-services.”
  EU regulation on financial data access · Financial regulation
• 2026-02-09 “P-000517/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The death penalty bill discussed in the National Security Committee of the Knesset is deeply concerning. The EU opposes capital punishment in all cases and all circumstances and considers that it violates the right to life and the right to be free from torture and other ill-treatment. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by Israel, imposes strict limitations including by guaranteeing a fair trial and provides that ‘nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant’ 1 . Adopting the law would mean that Israel would be retrogressing on its previously principled position with respect to capital punishment and going against the worldwide abolitionist trend. It would also place Israel at odds with its obligations under international law, including due to its discriminatory character and the lack of procedural safeguards. The EU has conducted repeated outreach to the Israeli authorities both locally and in Brussels to raise the issues associated with the death penalty bill and underline the EU’s principled positions on this matter. Israel has long upheld a de facto moratorium on both executions and capital punishment sentencing, thereby leading by example in the region despite a complex security environment. The EU has urged the government to uphold its principled position on this issue. The EU expects Israel to abide by its previous principled position and with its obligations under international law, as well as with its commitment to democratic principles, as also reflected in the provisions of the EU-Israel Association Agreement 2 . 1 https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-politicalrights. 2 https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-01-21 “– A Uachtaráin, tar éis a bheith ag éisteacht leis an díospóireacht aréir, dhéanfaí dearmad go bhfuil tíortha neodracha san Aontas nach bhfuil fonn ar bith orthu a bheith páirteach sa chlár oibre míleata nó in NATO. Is tír neodrach í Éire agus tá an neodracht sin á creimeadh ag gníomhaíochtaí an Aontais. Tá an Coimisiún meáite ar an aontacht shóisialta a chreimeadh agus méideanna ollmhóra den airgead poiblí a dhíriú ar thionscal na n-arm. Teastaíonn Eoraip shóisialta uainn atá tiomanta don fhíoraontacht shóisialta a thógáil. Teastaíonn Aontas Eorpach uainn atá dílis do bhunphrionsabail an iltaobhachais agus chothú na síochána. Tá neodracht na hÉireann fite fuaite inár streachailt rith go líne ar son an neamhspleáchais agus ar son aontacht na hÉireann. Tuigimid go maith an domhan ina nglaonn neart ceart.”
• 2026-01-21 “– A Uachtaráin, I voted in favour of this report. However, one of the most fundamental human rights which this report does not cover is the right to self-determination. For the Palestinian people, we consistently see that right ignored by the EU and other global powers. Trump's so-called 'Board of Peace' is more a blatant form of colonial rule in Gaza: there are no Palestinians on this board, and we have the likes of Tony Blair, Jared Kushner and now a man with an ICC arrest warrant out for him, Benjamin Netanyahu. The man responsible for the genocide is on a 'board of peace'. This is colonial plundering and the EU has said nothing. Self-determination for the Palestinian people is non-negotiable: the people of Gaza have survived over two years of Israeli genocide and are now being forced to suffer a new coloniser. Trump is charging countries who want a permanent seat at the table USD 1 billion. This is not a peace process, it is colonial rule by mercenaries.”
• 2026-01-14 “Answer given by Mr Micallef on behalf of the European Commission 16.3.2026 Written question The Commission’s Culture Compass for Europe [1] charts a new vision for vibrant, world-leading cultural and creative sectors and aims to make Europe the best place to be an artist. Thriving arts and culture spaces are vital for this vision to be achieved. The Compass recognises culture’s intrinsic value, as well as its societal, civic and economic value, and role as a fundamental public good. Cultural infrastructure must be available equitably across Member States and that investment in youth-led and community-owned creative spaces should be a major element in strategies to develop cultural infrastructure. Creative Europe’s added value lies in supporting project-based actions for collaboration between cultural organisations from different countries participating in the programme. The projects financed contribute to a thriving cultural sector, including community spaces . The Creative Europe — Culture strand of AgoraEU [2] , as proposed by the Commission in the context of the new Multiannual Financial Framework, will continue successful actions in this field. Other EU funding sources such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility or the cohesion policy funds, also provide scope for cultural infrastructure funding. The Compass also underlines the importance for artists and other workers in the creative sectors to have quality jobs, a viable career path and fair remuneration. The Commission will propose an EU Artists’ Charter to outline fundamental principles, guidance, and commitments for fair working conditions in the sectors. [1] https://culture.ec.europa.eu/document/a-culture-compass-for-europe. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0550&qid=1753799477044.”
  EU and national cultural identities
• 2025-11-04 “P-004321/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has taken good note of the Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice of 22 October 2025 on the Obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Advisory Opinions are non-binding but carry legal authority as the Court interprets obligations of Israel under international law. The EU therefore considers that Israel should comply with the Advisory Opinion in its integrity. The Advisory Opinion in question does not address obligations of third states and organisations. Nevertheless, the issues at stake are part of an ongoing dialogue. The registration process for international non-governmental organisations is a significant obstacle to humanitarian partners’ aim of scaling up their operations in Gaza. The EU continues to engage with the Israeli government on this issue. In this context, the EU recalls its continued political and financial support to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. The Commission has disbursed the entirety of the 2025 planned contribution of EUR 82 million. The package of measures announced by the President of the Commission in the State of the Union 2025 address 1 to respond to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza are being discussed in the Council. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en.”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-10-29 “E-004259/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Council of the EU approved a significant reform to the Value added tax (VAT) rates system in 2022 1 . During this process, the Member States unanimously agreed on revised wording for the category relating to goods for disabled persons 2 . This category now includes medical equipment, appliances, devices, items and aids, as well as protective gear, such as health protection masks, which are intended for use in healthcare or by disabled persons, and goods that are essential for overcoming or compensating for disability. In addition to repairs, the Council decided to include the adaptation, rental and leasing of such goods within the scope of eligible transactions. While the goods mentioned by the Honourable Member might be regarded as compensating for or overcoming disability, it must be emphasised that when adopting the VAT rates reform, the Council did not specify the distinct types of goods that fall under this category. As the decision to apply and set VAT rates based on the provisions of the VAT Directive is at the discretion of the Member States, it is also up to them to define the specific transactions eligible for reduced VAT rates in their national law. 1 Council Directive (EU) 2022/542 of 5 April 2022 amending Directives 2006/112/EC and (EU) 2020/285 as regards rates of value added tax, OJ L 107, 6.4.2022, p. 1. 2 Category (4) of Annex III of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ L 347, 11.12.2006) - the VAT Directive.”
  VAT harmonisation
• 2025-10-28 “E-004233/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU Declaration on the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the EU and the Kingdom of Morocco (‘the Agreement’) 1 , signed on 3 October 2025, forms part of the legal relationship between the EU and Morocco. It sets out a series of measures to be taken by the EU in order to provide specific, tangible, substantial and verifiable benefits for the group of beneficiaries referred to in the judgment of 4 October 2024 2 . It fully meets the requirements defined in that judgment and is in conformity with Article 21(1) of the Treaty on EU as interpreted and applied by the Court of Justice (CJEU). The Agreement fully meets the conditions set out by CJEU in the aforesaid judgment, including with respect to the identification of products originating in Western Sahara and the presumed consent of the beneficiaries of the Agreement. The legal and political situation of Western Sahara differs in nature from that of other territories. It is recognised by the UN as a ‘Non-Self-Governing Territory’, whose final status remains to be determined in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and within the framework of the UN-led political process. This is consistent with the long-standing position of the EU, which fully supports the efforts of the UN Secretary-General to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution. No strategic and comprehensive partnership has been concluded yet. Once discussions are taken forward, it will be designed to address all issues of mutual interest, within the overall framework of the EU-Morocco Association Agreement and in full alignment with the principles and objectives guiding the EU’s external action 3 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202502025. 2 Joined Cases C-779/21 P Commission v Front Polisario and C-799/21 P Council v Front Polisario, paragraph 153. 3 As laid down in Articles 3(5) and 21 of the Treaty on EU.”
  Trade relations with Morocco · EU policy on Western Sahara
• 2025-10-17 “E-004109/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Human rights are central to EU policy. The EU remains dedicated to upholding its international obligations and takes note of the provisional orders of the International Court of Justice in the South Africa v Israel case. The EU has repeatedly called on Israel to fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, in all circumstances. The EU considers the International Criminal Court (ICC) of key importance in upholding international criminal justice and the fight against impunity. The EU supports the ICC and the principles set out in the Rome Statute and respects the Court’s independence and impartiality. The European Council has called upon all States to ensure full cooperation with the Court, including by the prompt execution of outstanding arrest warrants, and to enter into voluntary agreements. The EU will continue to cooperate with the ICC, including by adopting initiatives to promote the dissemination of the principles, values and provisions of the Statute.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Support for International Criminal Court
• 2025-09-24 “E-003709/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission In application of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters of 2018 1 , which entered into force on 27 July 2019, the preferences granted to Moroccan originating products under the Association agreement between the EU and the Kingdom of Morocco 2 were granted to Western Sahara originating products. In its ruling of 4 October 2024 in joined cases C-779/21 P and C-799/21 P 3 , the Court of Justice of the European Union allowed to maintain the effects of Council Decision (EU) 2019/217 4 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters of 2018 for a period of 12 months. This implies that there is no need to differentiate between the situation before and after 4 October 2024 as goods originating in Western Sahara have been entitled to the same tariff preferences as goods originating in Morocco, under the 2018 Agreement, until 3 October 2025. In the proofs of origin issued by Moroccan customs authorities under the 2018 Agreement there was no obligation to use the country code EH. The country code EH is used in the import declaration in the EU for Western Sahara products. The Commission is not aware of any cases of financial fraud linked to the attribution of preferential treatment of goods originating in Western Sahara. 1 OJ L 34, 6.2.2019, p. 4. 2 OJ L 70, 18.3.2000, p.1. 3 Judgment of the Court of 4 October 2024 – European Commission and Council of the European Union v Front Polisario, ECLI:EU:C:2024:835. 4 OJ L 34, 6.2.2019, p. 1.”
  Trade relations with Morocco
• 2025-09-24 “E-003711/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Since 2023, the Commission has issued a fourth Report on the impact and benefits for the population of Western Sahara of the extension of tariff preferences to products originating in Western Sahara 1 . This was the report for the year 2023, issued on 15 March 2024 and covering trade flows until December 2022. In line with Decision N 1/2020 of the EUMorocco Association Committee, Morocco has continued to transmit data upon request by the Commission, including on 15 July 2024 in view of a possible report in 2024. In accordance with the 2018 Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters, the EU and Morocco agreed to an evaluation mechanism whereby information on the implementation of the agreement is exchanged. The Commission will make best efforts to produce a new report to evaluate the implementation of the 2018 Agreement. Under the terms of the 2025 Agreement, which applies provisionally since 3 October 2025, the EU and Morocco have agreed to continue this exchange of information to allow the parties to assess the impact of the 2025 Agreement. 1 https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/report-impacts-and-benefits-eu-morocco-agreement-extending-tariffpreferences-products-originating_en.”
  Trade relations with Morocco
• 2025-09-18 “E-003623/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission In the annual State of the Union address on 10 September 2025 1 , the Commission’s President announced that the Commission will put on hold the bilateral support to Israel without affecting its work with Israeli civil society and Yad Vashem, the World Holocaust Remembrance Centre. The Commission’s bilateral institutional cooperation with Israel falls under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE) 2 for the period 2021–2027, as well as the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) 3 for commitments dating from 2020. Since mid-September 2025, approximately EUR14 million worth of adopted commitments have been put on hold. The commitments concern: - Twinning programmes and the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) that aimed to help approximating relevant legislation to the EU acquis and promote interinstitutional cooperation between Israeli and EU Member States public administrations. - Projects funded under the EU-Israel Regional integration and cooperation initiative 4 in the framework of the normalisation process (Abraham Accords). In addition, the process to adopt a planned commitment of EUR 6 million under the current Multiannual Financial Framework for 2025 was also put on hold for the time being. This funding is meant to reinforce the EU-Israel bilateral institutional relations. The Commission will regularly assess how the situation evolves both in Gaza and the West Bank to make a decision on the use of the funds. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/232/oj/eng. 4 Financing decisions can be found here: https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/middle-eastgulf/israel_en.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-09-16 “E-003554/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Human rights are central to EU policy. The prevention of genocide and other atrocity crimes form an integral part of the EU's foreign and security policy 1 . The EU remains dedicated to upholding its international obligations, particularly those related to the prevention and punishment of incitement to genocide as outlined by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 2 . The EU's proactive stance involves global partnerships and collaborations with the United Nations to strengthen human rights. The EU will continue to take a strong stance in upholding and promoting the observance of international law, including human rights law and international humanitarian law. The EU has repeatedly called 3 on Israel to fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, in all circumstances. The legal qualification of an act as genocide presupposes the proper establishment of facts and a finding of law. For that, independent and impartial courts are best placed, by possessing the relevant instruments to ensure proper fact-finding and a non-biased application of the law. 1 Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 on the investigation and prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2003/335/oj/eng. 2 https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocitycrimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of %20Genocide.pdf. 3 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/eu-statement-hrc60-item-4-general-debate-human-rightssituations-require-council%E2%80%99s-attention_en.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Support for International Criminal Court
• 2025-09-08 “E-003466/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The purpose of implementing and delegated acts is to provide further details on how the basic Regulation should be implemented. During this mandate, the acts that must be adopted have been screened carefully to distinguish those that are essential for effective implementation, and those which can provide administrative relief for businesses and public authorities. The de-prioritisation of certain acts 1 related to the Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation 2 (PPWR) carry an evident potential for simplification and administrative burden reduction. However, the Commission will ensure that they are only set aside if the environmental and circular economy goals of the Regulation, notably in view of the measures on reuse and on Green Public Procurement, are not compromised. The Commission remains committed to the objectives of the PPWR and to the effective implementation of EU legislation. The Commission has also committed to regularly reassess (de-)prioritisation of secondary acts, also taking into account feedback from stakeholders. When an act is legally required, the Commission will take into account the adequate timeframe. The Delegated Act referred to by Article 11(2), establishing the minimum number of rotations for reusable packaging, remains a priority. Its inadvertent omission is being corrected. 1 The Implementing Act in Article 12(7) regarding digital labelling due to significance given the technological development, the Delegated Act in Article 29(12) on pooling due to overall complexity and burdens and the Implementing Act in Article 63(2) concerning green public procurement. 2 Regulation (EU) 2025/40 of 19 December 2024 on packaging and packaging waste, OJ L, 2025/40, 22.1.2025.”
  Circular economy · Sustainable packaging
• 2025-09-08 “E-003467/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission While research related to dual-use products or technologies is not prohibited, any research and innovation activities carried out under Horizon Europe must have an exclusive focus on civil applications. Consequently, funds to beneficiaries based in Israel were only awarded for research activities with civilian purposes. Activities intended for military applications are ineligible 1 . However, Horizon Europe projects’ results 2 may be developed into technologies with a dual-use potential, even if they were originally intended and funded for purely civil applications. This transition could happen beyond the lifetime of the project itself. Article 2(2) of the Agreement on the association of Israel to Horizon Europe 3 sets out the principle that Israeli entities participate in the Horizon Europe programme under terms and conditions equivalent to those applicable to legal entities established in the EU. While any actions of the State of Israel cannot be considered automatically attributable to Israeli entities participating in Horizon Europe, Israel needs to comply with Article 2 of the EuroMediterranean Agreement 4 . In the context of Israel’s intervention in the Gaza Strip and the ensuing humanitarian catastrophe, the Commission has come to the conclusion that Israel is violating human rights and humanitarian law thus breaching Article 2 of the EuroMediterranean Agreement. Therefore, it has proposed to the Council to partially suspend the Horizon Europe Association Agreement with Israel so that legal entities established in Israel would not be eligible to participate in calls for grant and investment support under the Horizon Europe European Innovation Council Accelerator. Furthermore, in her State of the Union Speech on 10 September 2025, the Commission President announced a further package of measures. The XTEND project funded a commercial and financial viability study only, no grant was deployed to develop any technology 5 . The project UnderSec cited above 6 is currently under ethical review. 1 In line with the grant agreement, when implementing the projects all beneficiaries must ensure that all the activities under the project comply with this horizontal rule as well as with ethical principles and relevant national, EU and international legislation. 2 Once the project is over. 3 Agreement between the EU, of the one part, and Israel, of the other part, on the participation of Israel in the EU programme Horizon Europe — the framework Programme for Research and Innovation, OJ L 95, 23/03/2022. 4 ‘Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement.’ 5 At the time of submission, the applicant self-declared the proposal did not involve dual-use items and confirmed it did not raise concerns regarding the exclusive focus on civil applications. During the evaluation process, the company underwent an ethics pre-screening which did not reveal any issues. No other ethics issues were detected during the feasibility study report preparation. Furthermore, by signing the grant agreement, the company assumed a legal obligation to ensure that the activities carried out under the action were exclusively focused on civil applications. Beyond the grant for the feasibility study, which implementation was completed in 2020, no investment component or other funding was provided to the company nor by the SME (small and medium-sized enterprises) Instrument neither by the European Innovation Council Accelerator. 6 Sensor-based prototype system for underwater security: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101121288.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-09-05 “E-003463/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission In 2023, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) carried out a standardisation inspection in Ireland, which concluded that the country is effectively implementing the safety aspects of the existing European drone regulations. As part of the inspection, the team visited operators delivering goods in Dublin and confirmed that their activities were being conducted safely and in full compliance with the applicable rules. It should be noted that verification of compliance with environmental law falls outside the scope of EASA’s inspection. Furthermore, a safety assessment is always required before drone operations may take place. Based on the data periodically collected by the EASA from national aviation authorities, the Irish authority grants operational authorisations only upon receipt of a satisfactory risk assessment, ensuring that activities are carried out in line with the applicable rules. Matters relating to noise and environmental conditions are determined nationally, in accordance with each Member State’s requirements. The Environmental Noise Directive 2002/49/EC 1 requires Member States to develop noise action plans for agglomerations exceeding 100 000 people to manage noise from air operations which may include drones, depending on whether noise exposure is determined through the prior performed strategic mapping on noise. Based on reported data by the competent authorities, there is no information distinguishing the noise exposure from drones in Dublin agglomeration. The framework for drones was developed at European level following extensive public consultation in 2018, ensuring that stakeholders had the opportunity to contribute before the rules were adopted. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/49/oj/eng.”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• 2025-09-02 “E-003360/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission According to Regulation (EU) 2017/746 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices, before a manufacturer can place tests such as the Lyme disease blood tests on the EU market, they have to fulfil a set of detailed requirements and apply for certification by a notified body. Once the device is on the market, it can be subject to market surveillance by national competent authorities. The Commission is not involved in the assessment of individual devices. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) collects surveillance data from Member States on Lyme neuroborreliosis, a severe form of Lyme borreliosis. Lyme neuroborreliosis testing methods relevant for reporting at Union level are described in the EU case definition 1 . They include serological methods (Lyme borreliosis antibodies in cerebrospinal fluid and blood), presence of an increased number of white blood cells in the cerebrospinal fluid (pleocytosis) and direct pathogen detection methods (isolation of Borrelia bacteria, or detection of its DNA in cerebrospinal fluid); however, each country decides which specific methods to use based on their own (public) health system. The EU has contributed to advancing research on Lyme disease diagnostics through various funding programmes, primarily under the research and innovation frameworks (7 th Framework Programme and Horizon) as well as the POCTEFA cross-border cooperation programme 2 . Funded projects focused on improving diagnostic accuracy and addressing limitations of testing methods for Lyme disease, contributing to the development of more effective diagnostic tools, with an estimated investment of approximately EUR 15 million. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018D0945&from=EN. 2 https://interreg.eu/programmes/spain-france-andorra-poctefa/.”
  Medical devices · Pharmaceuticals regulation in EU
• 2025-07-31 “E-003160/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission On 16 July 2025, the Commission published its proposals for a Regulation establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 (the ‘fund’) 1 alongside a proposal for a self-standing European Social Fund (ESF) Regulation 2 . As part of the fund, Member States would propose national and regional partnership plans (NRPPs) that would include investments and reforms contributing to, among others, the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, and addressing the relevant countryspecific recommendations. At least 14% of the total budget for the national and regional partnerships, excluding the amounts ring-fenced for farmers and fishers, are proposed to be dedicated to meeting social objectives 3 . Moreover, the proposals contain provisions stipulating that Member States shall concentrate resources in their NRPPs on the following measures 4 : social inclusion, food and/or basic material assistance, implementing the Child Guarantee 5 and the Youth Guarantee 6 . Europe’s social model and investing in people would remain a core aspect of any plan, as it is essential for promoting social inclusion, poverty reduction, economic growth, and Europe’s competitiveness. ESF support as part of any plan would be based on the guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States, as provided for in Article 148 (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and continue to strengthen social cohesion investing in Europe’s people, their future and preparedness. 1 COM(2025) 565 final - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0565&qid=1753718606996. 2 COM(2025) 558 final - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0558. 3 Article 22(2), point (q) of COM(2025) 565 final. 4 Article 22(2), point (g), letter (ii) of COM(2025) 565 final, Annex VI, and recitals 19-22 of COM(2025) 558 final. 5 Council Recommendation 2021/1004 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2021/1004/oj/eng. 6 Council Recommendation 2020/C 372/01 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2020_372_R_0001.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-07-31 “E-003161/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recognises that the Irish Marriage Bar had clear negative consequences for women’s participation in the labour market and their pension entitlements and would have been prohibited by Directive 2006/54/EC, had it still been in force when the Directive entered into application. Nevertheless, the Irish Marriage Bar is not covered by Directive 2006/54/EC since the dispositions regarding the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex in occupational social security schemes are applicable for ‘all benefits under occupational social security schemes derived from periods of employment subsequent to 17 May 1990’ 1 . Hence, the Directive is simply not applicable ratione temporis to the national legislation referred to by the Honourable Member. This time-limit follows from the judgement of the Court in case C-262/88, where the Court clarified that a pension paid under a contracted-out private occupational scheme falls within the scope of then Article 119 of the Treaty (now Article 157 TFEU), but that the direct effect of Article 119 of the Treaty may not be relied upon in order to claim entitlement to a pension, with effect from a date prior to that judgment. 1 Article 12 of Directive 2006/54/EC: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/54/oj/eng.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion · EU policy on aging workforce and pensions
• 2025-07-20 “E-003015/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission's Coordinator on Combating Antisemitism is carrying out her work in line with the EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life. As regards the question on fundraising, Commission staff, as all EU officials, enjoy the right to freedom of expression in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 1 and the staff regulations 2 . As it has been recalled constantly by the Court of Justice of the European Union, the right to freedom of expression is exercised with due respect to the principles of loyalty and impartiality. The Commission authorises in principle occasional social, charity or fundraising activities by staff (e.g. book or bake sales). The EU is a longstanding partner of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and strong supporter of the United Nations’ (UN) work in Gaza and the West Bank. UN agencies must be able to operate without obstruction in humanitarian crises worldwide. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1962/31(1)/2021-01-01/eng.”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-06-30 “E-002618/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Irish competent authority presented their action plan addressing the audit recommendations on 31 January 2024. The action plan has been published on the Commission’s website 1 . In response to recommendation number 4, concerning the feeding of unweaned calves on roll-on roll-off vessels after a total of 19 hours of travelling, the action plan includes a research project on possible technical solutions to safely feed calves with milk replacer on board trucks during the ferry voyage. The welfare of unweaned calves during long-distance journeys remains a matter of concern for the Commission, the Member States, and the wider public. The Commission is monitoring ongoing efforts by the Irish authorities to address the shortcomings identified in the audit report. The Commission has met with the Irish authorities on several occasions and has urged them to take the necessary steps to ensure full implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report/details/4700.”
  EU requirements on animal welfare for farmers
• 2025-06-30 “E-002617/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recently evaluated several adequacy decisions including the one for Israel and concluded that the decisions could be kept in place 1 . This assessment covered all relevant elements of the privacy framework as well as the broader institutional and legal system to the extent it affects the level of protection of personal data transferred from the EU. As part of this evaluation, the Commission negotiated a significant strengthening of privacy safeguards and individual rights in Israel, specifically for EU data transfers, which was implemented in Israeli law in May 2023, and which was subsequently extended to also apply to domestically processed data. Monitoring the functioning of adequacy decisions under Article 45(4) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2 is a continuous and comprehensive process, which in practice means that the Commission is following relevant developments in law and practice, based on various sources of information such as reporting from the EU Delegation as well as media reports and information provided by different stakeholders, such as academia, civil society organisations, and the EU’s data protection authorities. The legal framework gives the Commission the tools to react if the level of protection would weaken, including the possibility to propose the amendment, suspension or repeal of the decision. 1 COM(2024) 7 final of 15.1.2024 and SWD(2024) 3 final of 15.1.2025, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the first review of the functioning of the adequacy decisions adopted pursuant to Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC and Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the first review of the functioning of the adequacy decisions pursuant to Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC of 15 January 2024. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02016R067920160504&qid=1532348683434.”
  International data transfers
• 2025-06-23 “E-002503/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU remains united in its unequivocal support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1 as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with its Article 6, and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes in accordance with its Article 4. In all relevant fora, such as NPT review conferences and preparatory committee sessions, as well as the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee, the EU reaffirms the importance of the NPT’s universalisation and full implementation and calls on all states that have not yet done so to join the Treaty and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms. The EU regards safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a fundamental component of the NPT. The EU attaches utmost importance to the integrity of the IAEA safeguards system and strongly supports the Agency’s efforts to strengthen its effectiveness and improve its efficiency. The EU repeatedly encourages all IAEA member states to actively promote the universalisation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, which together represent the current verification standard under the NPT. The EU continuously calls upon all remaining states, including Israel, to conclude and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols without further delay. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-weapons-npt_en.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-05-23 “E-002089/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission While healthcare delivery is primarily a Member State responsibility 1 , Directive 2011/24/EU 2 stresses that ‘the Member State of affiliation shall take all necessary measures, in addition to the recognition of the prescription, in order to ensure continuity of treatment in cases where a prescription is issued in the Member State of treatment for medicinal products or medical devices available in the Member State of affiliation’ (Article 11(1)). The patient returning to the country of affiliation after a cross-border intervention can continue care in accordance with the national rules, for instance, following the patient pathway in the Member State of affiliation. When the patient is entitled to the healthcare in accordance with Article 7 of the Directive, Member States may not refuse to grant prior authorisation if the healthcare cannot be provided on its territory within a time limit which is medically justifiable (Article 8(5) and Article 8(6)(d) of the Directive). Whether a given waiting period eventually meets the provisions of this Article is based on an objective medical assessment of the patient’s condition and needs amongst other, as stipulated in the Directive. The Directive contains rules on the recognition of prescriptions for medicinal products and medical devices issued in another Member State. No provisions are laid down for referrals and diagnoses from medical professionals registered in other Member States. Member States are allowed to set their own rules and pathway for accessing healthcare. 1 Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:FULL. 2 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare OJ L 88, 4.4.2011, p. 45–65.”
  Public and private sectors role in healthcare services · EU competences on health
• 2025-05-14 “E-001935/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission In 2023, the Commission proposed 1 a targeted revision of the EU passenger rights legislation with a focus on effective enforcement, including Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006 2 (the ‘Regulation’). A broad stakeholder consultation required by the Better Regulation framework 3 preceded the adoption of the Commission proposal, to which representatives of persons with disabilities also contributed. The Regulation already includes several provisions that oblige operators to actively engage with representatives of persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility (PRM). For instance, when establishing quality standards for assisting PRM, airport managing bodies are required to collaborate with organisations representing these individuals 4 . Similarly, airport managing bodies must work with such organisations when designating arrival and departure points where PRM can announce their presence at the airport 5 . Additionally, Recital 10 of the Regulation emphasises that airports and air carriers should have regard to ECAC Doc No 30, Part I, Section 5 6 , when organising disability awareness and assistance training for their personnel. This document underscores the importance of cooperation between airport managing bodies, air carriers, and organizations representing PRM in developing training programs, policies, and procedures. Accordingly, the Commission did not consider that there was a need to impose new obligations on airports and airlines to consult representatives of persons with disabilities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023PC0753. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/1107/oj/eng. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/better-regulation_en. 4 See Article 9(1) of the Regulation. 5 See Article 5(1) of the Regulation. 6 The latest version of the document (13th Edition, December 2023) can be found at: https://www.ecacceac.org/images/activities/facilitation/ECAC-Doc_30_Part_I_Facilitation_13th_edition_13_Dec_2023.pdf.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2025-05-14 “E-001933/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recognises that the Irish Marriage Bar, which required women to leave public sector employment upon marriage and was lifted in 1973–1974 shortly after Ireland’s accession to the EU, was a measure that had clear negative consequences for women’s participation in the labour market and their pension entitlements. As far as the occupational social security schemes that the Honourable Member refers to are concerned, Directive 2006/54/EC 1 , which codified earlier legislation including Directive 76/207/EEC on gender equality in access to employment and occupation (in force since 1976), applies to equal opportunities in access to the labour market. The Irish ban lifted in 1973/74 would on substance not seem to be compatible with this legislation but is not covered by the application of the Directive ratione temporis. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/54/oj/eng.”
  EU policy on aging workforce and pensions · Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2025-05-14 “PE773.570v01-00 EN E-001939/25 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission remains fully committed to advancing the social economy agenda and ensuring its continued integration across relevant EU policies. The recent internal reorganisation of the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and Small Medium Enterprises, including the discontinuation of the unit dealing with social economy, was carried out to enhance efficiency and better integrate social economy objectives across broader industrial and Single Market policies. Social economy features in the Commission 2024-2029 political guidelines 1 , which reaffirm its commitment to reinforce Europe’s social model, promote social fairness and ensure that no one is left behind. Under the political leadership of the Executive Vice-President for Social Rights and Skills, Quality Jobs and Preparedness, the Commission services remain committed to supporting the development of the social economy, notably through the implementation of the Action Plan for the Social Economy 2 , and to ensuring that social economy actors can meaningfully contribute to the prosperity and growth of the Single Market. In spite of the cancellation of two planned calls in the social economy field under the Single Market Programme 3 , the Commission remains committed to supporting the social economy through relevant funding opportunities (e.g. European Social Fund Plus, InvestEU, Horizon Europe, European Regional Development Fund) accessible via the Social Economy Gateway 4 , and through continued policy engagement. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0778. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32021R0690. 4 https://social-economy-gateway.ec.europa.eu/eu-funding-programmes_en.”
  EU industrial funding · EU policy on social criteria in public funding
• 2025-05-14 “E-001931/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission is not in a position to comment on specific ongoing proceedings brought by the European Free Trade Association’s Surveillance Authority as regards a possible infringement by Iceland of Directive 2010/63/EU 1 . 2. The Commission is committed to enhancing animal welfare while safeguarding the availability of medicinal products in the Union as well as the competitiveness of the pharmaceutical sector. As regards the use of horses as donor of material for Pregnant Mare Serum Gonadotropin (PMSG) production, the Commission has sent a mandate to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to request a scientific opinion on the welfare of Equidae. This opinion is expected to be delivered in 2026. Based on the EFSA opinion and its recommendations, appropriate follow-up on the matter will be duly considered by the Commission. 1 Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes. OJ L 276, 20.10.2010, p. 33–79.”
  EU requirements on animal welfare for farmers
• 2025-05-14 “E-001936/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Council approved and published on 20 June 2025 an Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) report on tax issues 1 and a progress report on the Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive (ETD) 2 , which include updated information on the status of the discussions on the Commission’s proposal to revise the ETD. As for concrete steps, the Commission presented on 26 February 2025 the Action Plan for Affordable Energy together with its Clean Industrial Deal 3 . Both communications call on Member States to complete the revision of the ETD. To that end, the Commission is continuing to provide support to the different Council Presidencies and to engage actively with Member States, notably in the discussions at the Council, to achieve the consensus required for the adoption of the revised Directive. 1 9960/25 FISC. 2 7819/25 FISC. 3 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/affordable-energy_en.”
  EU competences on taxation · Priorities of taxation policy in the EU
• 2025-05-14 “E-001932/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Irish hare (Lepus timidus) is listed in Annex V of the Habitats Directive 1 and therefore may be exploited if the conditions set out in Article 14 of the Directive are met, that is ensuring that any taking in the wild of specimens is compatible with maintaining the population at favourable conservation status. The species is reported as being in favourable conservation status in Ireland. Article 15 of the Directive states that Member States shall prohibit the use of all indiscriminate means (of capture and killing) capable of causing local disappearance of, or serious disturbance to, populations of such species. The Commission has assessed that hare coursing should not be considered as such to constitute indiscriminate means. 2. The Commission has not held specific discussions with the Irish authorities regarding hare coursing. 1 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50.”
  Nature protection and restoration in the EU
• 2025-05-14 “E-001934/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The European Accessibility Act (Directive (EU) 2019/882) includes the built environment in its scope. Article 4.4 provides that ‘Member States may decide, in the light of national conditions, that the built environment used by clients of services covered by this Directive shall comply with the accessibility requirements set out in Annex III, in order to maximise their use by persons with disabilities.’ The Directive, including, for Member States that decided to ‘opt in’ on article 4.4., its provision related to the built environment, is applicable since 28 June 2025. Furthermore, the Directive indicates in Article 33, that by 28 June 2030, and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall submit a report on the application of the Directive, including in relation to the relevant provisions concerning the built environment. The Commission, in accordance with Article 15 of the Directive, has also issued a standardisation request M587 1 requiring the development of standards. The standardisation request includes the revision for their adoption as harmonised standard of ‘EN 17210 Accessibility and usability of the built environment - Functional requirements’. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/enorm/mandate/587_en.”
  EU policy on disability inclusion & accessibility
• 2025-05-14 “E-001937/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The organisation and conduct of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States. It is for Ireland to decide how to address recommendations in that regard of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, in accordance with its constitutional and legislative rules as well as its international obligations.”
  EU engagement with citizens · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
• 2025-05-07 “– A Uachtaráin, I abstained on the discharge because the attached resolution is totally out of touch with reality. In the last number of days, the Israeli Government has agreed plans to permanently occupy Gaza, the Freedom Flotilla ship, the Conscience, was attacked and the Israeli authorities are carrying out a mass starvation program in Gaza. Food is rotting at the border, while only a number of miles away, children are starving. The Director of the World Health Organization's Health Emergencies Programme, Dr Mike Ryan, has said that the world is breaking the bodies and minds of the children in Gaza as a result of the inaction and complicity of many world leaders. The Gaza Freedom Flotilla recognises what EU leaders did not. You do not stand by while children are starving. You do not stand by while they are shredded to pieces, as they are bombed in tents. And you do not stand by with those who carry out these crimes against humanity. It's time to end the EU complicity!”
• 2025-05-02 “E-001794/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is very concerned about reports of a drone attack on a ship carrying humanitarian aid and activists heading for Gaza. The EU discourages flotillas as a means for aid delivery. They risk the safety of their participants and carry the potential for escalation. However, nothing justifies attacking participants of flotillas with drones. Humanitarian aid is needed in Gaza to help people in desperate need. The EU repeats its call on Israel to allow unimpeded humanitarian aid to flow at scale into and throughout the strip. The High Representative/Vice-President has been engaged on this issue, including through calls with Israeli Foreign Minister and with international partners including the United Nations (UN). The High Representative/Vice President expressed deep concern at the humanitarian blockade, which has lasted more than two months, and at the intensified Israeli ground operation in Gaza 1 . The EU has consistently reiterated that in exercising its right to defend itself, Israel must fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, in all circumstances. The EU firmly condemns any attack on humanitarian aid workers and calls for accountability. The EU reiterates the importance of ensuring the protection of all civilians, including humanitarian workers, at all times, as well as civilian infrastructures, including medical facilities, schools and UN premises. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/statement_25_1155; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-donor-statement-humanitarian-aid-gaza%C2%A0_en.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-04-30 “E-001762/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Article 16(2) of the Drinking Water Directive 1 states that ‘in order to promote the use of tap water intended for human consumption, Member States shall ensure that outdoor and indoor equipment is set up in public spaces, where technically feasible, […]’. The Directive does not legally define the concept of 'public spaces' for the purpose of Article 16(2). Therefore, the definition of ‘public spaces’ must be determined at national level by the Member States. However, the Directive does provide examples of possible measures and public spaces in its recitals (33) to be considered by Member States when implementing the Directive, and which could be relevant for the question on football stadiums: 'for example by encouraging the free provision of water intended for human consumption in public administrations and public buildings or, for free or for a low service fee, for customers in restaurants, canteens and catering services’. 1 Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption (recast) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1–62.”
  Drinking regulation
• 2025-04-02 “– A Uachtaráin, I voted against this report because it shows just how committed European leaders are to militarisation and the arms race. The EU is founded as a peace project. Indeed, in the Schuman Declaration, it was said that the pooling of coal and steel production will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. Now we have European countries withdrawing from the Cluster Munitions Convention and the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention. In their desperation to give more and more public money to the arms industry, European leaders will next propose cutting public services. A better Europe is possible, one envisaged from 75 years ago, one that is committed to peace and one that defends the international institutions that were born out of the war – those institutions like the ICJ, the ICC and the UN.”
• 2025-03-19 “E-001175/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom’s (UK) customs territory. Exports from Northern Ireland are therefore subject to tariffs imposed on the UK by other countries. The EU countermeasures taken in response to the United States (US) tariffs only concern imports of US originating goods into the EU. They were not envisaged to target Northern Ireland. Therefore, no impact assessment has been carried out on the specific effects of the tariffs and countermeasures on Northern Ireland. For goods imported into Northern Ireland, EU customs and trade rules apply under the Windsor Framework – avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland. It is to be noted that if traders in Northern Ireland can prove that the goods did not enter the EU market, they can claim reimbursement of the duty paid to the UK, from the UK. This is a solution foreseen under the Windsor Framework. The Commission and relevant UK authorities are in contact and continue to exchange regularly.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports · EU-US trade relations
• 2025-03-12 “E-001065/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The ReArm Europe Plan foresees the possibility to incentivise defence-related investments in the EU budget. This has been deemed necessary to support Member States’ defence readiness as underlined in the Joint White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 1 . The ReArm Europe Plan has been devised, in light of the current geopolitical tensions, by the Commission to respond to a European Council tasking, notably to present a set of ‘developed options […] for public and private funding to strengthen the defence technological and industrial base and address critical capability gaps’ 2 . As part of this plan, the Commission adopted on 1 April 2025 measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review 3 of cohesion policy funds via amendments to existing cohesion policy regulations. Those aims at incentivising Member States to voluntarily adjust their cohesion programmes to invest in the EU’s emerging strategic priorities. In particular, the proposal enables Member States to make better use of current possibilities to build resilient infrastructures to foster military mobility and to support and enhance productive capacities of small and large enterprises in the defence sector. Furthermore, the proposal will also encourage skills development in the defence industry to narrow the existing skills gap. All proposals by the Commission respect the procedures foreseen in terms of impact assessment and stakeholder consultations, as outlined in the appropriate Commission Staff Working Document 4 . Rules for adoption of cohesion policy programme amendments are not modified and therefore will be subject to approval by the monitoring committees as applicable to ensure scrutiny by stakeholders. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readines s%202030.pdf. 2 European Council conclusions, 27 June 2024 (conclusion 26, p. 8). 3 COM(2025)123 final; https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/communication/mid-term-review2025/communication-mid-term-review-2025_en.pdf. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/d0bbd77f-bee5-4ee5-b5c46110c7605476_en?filename=swd2021_305_en.pdf.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-02-14 “P-000317/2025 P-000280/2025 E-000336/2025 E-000701/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The EU programme for the environment and climate action (LIFE) 1 provides amongst others financial support for the functioning of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) supporting civil society’s participation in policy making, promoting a pluralistic approach and recognising that NGOs are an integral part of a well-functioning democratic system. Each year 30 to 35 operating grant agreements are awarded under the LIFE Programme, following a call for proposals and a competitive procedure. NGOs applying submit proposals that include their work programme of activities in the policy areas indicated in the LIFE Regulation 2 . The NGOs work programmes, which are annexed to their grant agreements, may mention among other activities, advocacy related to environmental, climate and energy transition policies. The Commission does not prescribe the specific activities to be carried out by the NGOs in their work programme, nor does it instruct them to support specific positions. The Commission emphasises that operating grants are complying with the LIFE Regulation adopted by the co-legislators and their management is fully in line with the EU Financial Regulation 3 . The Commission agrees that funding agreements involving specifically detailed activities directed at EU institutions and some of their representatives, even if they do not breach the legal framework, may entail a reputational risk for the EU. To mitigate this risk, guidance 4 for both existing grant agreements and future calls has been issued, addressed to all Commission services and applicable to all spending programmes. The guidance clarifies which activities should not be mandated as a requirement or condition for EU financing. The Commission adheres strictly to its impartiality and transparency obligations as outlined in Article 38 of the Financial Regulation, which requires publishing information about recipients and does not require the disclosure, of advocacy activities funded through grant agreements. The Commission also promotes transparency by proactively sharing the objectives and outcomes of funded projects on the EU Funding & Tenders Portal 5 . The NGOs benefiting from LIFE support and the grant amount received are published annually in the Commission’s Financial Transparency System webpage 6 as well as on the LIFE website 7 . Furthermore, 1 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life_en 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/783 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing a Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE), and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1293/2013, OJ L 172, 17.5.2021, p. 53–78. 3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/guidance-fundingdev-impl-monit-enforce-of-eu-law_en.pdf 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home 6 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html 7 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life/life-operating-grants_en”
  EU engagement with civil society · Transparency requirements for interest groups
• 2025-02-14 “E-000702/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. In March 2024, six EU reference laboratories (EURLs) for public health 1 were designated by the Commission as per Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 2 . One of these EURLs focuses on high risk, emerging and zoonotic bacterial pathogens (EURL-PH-HEZB), which includes Lyme borreliosis (also known as Lyme disease). This EURL has been tasked with supporting national reference laboratories by providing reference diagnostics and test protocols, reference materials, external quality assessments, scientific advice, technical assistance and training, among other things. These activities will support Member States in implementing accurate diagnostic methods for Lyme borreliosis. The EURL-PH-HEZB started its activities on 1 January 2025 3 and is financially supported by the EU4Health Programme. 2. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) collects surveillance data from Member States on Lyme neuroborreliosis, a severe form of Lyme borreliosis. Surveillance of Lyme neuroborreliosis was deemed more feasible than surveillance of Lyme borreliosis, as a more precise and standardised case definition is possible and as it is likely less susceptible to under-reporting due to its severity 4 . This makes surveillance data more comparable between Member States. ECDC is supporting Member States by identifying inconsistencies in reporting and providing advice on how to improve the data quality. Currently, the ECDC is performing an in-depth analysis of the Lyme neuroborreliosis surveillance data reported by Member States to the ECDC. Based on this analysis, the ECDC plans to develop and implement specific recommendations to improve the reporting of Lyme neuroborreliosis data in 2026. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/892/oj 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2371/oj 3 https://www.rki.de/EN/News/Newsroom/News/Archive/2025-01-20-referencelaboratory.html#:~:text=The%20EURL%2DPH%2DHEZB%20covers,Q%20fever)%2C%20Rickettsia%20spp 4 van den Wijngaard Cees C, Hofhuis Agnetha, Simões Mariana, Rood Ente, van Pelt Wilfrid, Zeller Herve, Van Bortel Wim. Surveillance perspective on Lyme borreliosis across the European Union and European Economic Area. Euro Surveill. 2017;22(27):pii=30569. https://doi.org/10.2807/15607917.ES.2017.22.27.30569”
  EU competences on health · Vaccination
• 2025-02-11 “E-000618/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to ensuring that Palestinians, including those with disabilities, receive the humanitarian assistance they need. The Commission works closely with trusted humanitarian partners to ensure that aid reaches those most in need, including persons with disabilities. Commission experts monitor the situation and engage with partners, such as Palestinian civil society organisations, to assess needs. In 2024, the Commission notably funded the organisation Humanity & Inclusion to ensure that children have access to safe and quality inclusive education and to provide assistive technologies, rehabilitation services and medical assistance to children with disabilities. Since the beginning of the crisis, the Commission has allocated some EUR 450 million to support the humanitarian response, providing persons with disabilities inclusive and accessible assistance. When it comes to return and reconstruction, humanitarian actors stand ready to assist people with emergency and early recovery assistance and to ensure the specific needs of persons with disabilities are duly taken into account. In order to support the ceasefire in Gaza, the EU’s civilian Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) continues to be operational, allowing for the movement of individuals out of Gaza, including some who require medical treatment. The Commission also uses its convening power to sensitise other donors to important issues such as disability inclusion. The Commission exchanges closely with Organisations of Persons with Disabilities (OPDs) at global level and encourages partners to pursue dialogues with local OPDs, in line with the Commission’s localisation guidance.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-02-10 “E-000593/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2735 (2024) 1 , the EU rejects any attempt at demographic or territorial changes in the Gaza Strip and supports unifying the Gaza Strip with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority, as the EU made clear on the occasion of the 13 th EU-Israel Association Council held on 24 February 2025 2 . This is also in line with the five key principles set by the Commission President in November 2023 on Gaza (Gaza to be an essential part of the future Palestinian State, and no forced displacement of Palestinians) 3 . These messages have also been conveyed to partners in the United States. The EU has been constantly clear in affirming its unwavering commitment to the two-state solution; this is the only solution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The High Representative/Vice-President will continue to spare no effort to revive the political process towards the two-state solution. It would be for the Council to decide on the imposition of new restrictive measures (sanctions) by unanimity. 1 https://docs.un.org/en/s/RES/2735(2024) 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6511-2025-INIT/en/pdf 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_5646”
  EU-US relations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-02-04 “E-000488/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission 1. Since 1996, Israel's association to the EU framework programmes for research and innovation (R&I) has been a success story with clear mutual benefits across various priority areas including information and communication technologies, health, advanced manufacturing, climate change and energy, as well as biotechnology. At this stage, it is premature to discuss which countries would be allowed to participate in or offered association to the successor of the current framework programme for R&I and under which terms as it is still to be scrutinised and adopted by the co- legislators, based on a proposal that is yet to be adopted by the Commission. 2. In accordance with Article 2 Treaty on European Union, the EU is founded on the values of inter alia respect for human rights. In consequence and in application of relevant EU, national and international law 1 , the EU will continue to reaffirm its commitment to the protection and promotion of human rights including in R&I related activities, applicable to all participants in the R&I framework programmes regardless of their nationality. 3. Currently, any R&I activities carried out under Horizon Europe 2 must have an exclusive focus on civil applications, as set forth in applicable rules and in particular in the Horizon Europe Regulation 3 . During the implementation of Horizon Europe projects, all beneficiaries must ensure that the activities under the action comply with these rules. 1 Including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Supplementary Protocols. 2 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32021R0695, OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 1–68.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU competences on human rights
• 2025-01-14 “E-000129/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is aware of the case of Dr Abu Safiya. Media and non-governmental organisations report that the doctor is being held in arbitrary detention in poor conditions following his refusal to follow evacuation orders, remaining instead in Kamal Adwan hospital to treat his patients. The EU is also aware of the case of Dr Adnan Al-Bursh, Head of the Orthopaedic department at Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, who was held under similar allegations in Ofer prison and passed away after nearly four months in detention. An Israel Defense Forces press release 1 states that Dr Abu Safiya is being investigated on suspicion of being a Hamas terrorist operative. The EU is aware of the appeal for the doctor’s release by Amnesty International and similar demands made by human rights advocates and healthcare professionals around the world. The EU has consistently called on all parties in the Middle East to take all feasible precautions to avoid harm to civilians, humanitarian workers and facilities, in line with their obligations under international humanitarian law 2 . Violations of international humanitarian law need to be thoroughly and independently investigated and accountability ensured. The EU continues to raise its concerns about the human rights’ situation at bilateral and multilateral level and will do so in Dr Abu Safiya’s case should an ongoing investigation warrant such action. 1 https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/december24-pr/the-idf-and-isa-completed-atargeted-operation-against-a-hamas-command-center-in-the-kamal-adwan-hospital-in-jabaliya/ 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/qa3lblga/euco-conclusions-27062024-en.pdf”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-01-12 “E-000085/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission In view of the preparation of funding programmes under the next EU multiannual financial framework, the Commission is reflecting on the possibility of providing adequate, strategically targeted support for dual-use technology development, in line with the European Economic Security Strategy 1 . These reflections will take into account the outcome of the public consultation on the White paper on options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential 2 and build on strategic directions and proposals found in important documents that develop a vision for the future, such as the Letta Report 3 , the Draghi Report 4 , the Heitor Report 5 and the Niinistö Report 6 . This is without prejudice to the fact that the defence of the Member States’ territory and citizens is an exclusively national competence. The Commission has defined its overarching political priorities and objectives for the period 2024-2029 7 . In terms of the next EU multiannual financial framework, the Union budget will be more focused on aligning with these priorities and objectives, in a simpler and more impactful way. It will be for the co-legislators to discuss the future Commission’s legislative proposals and adopt the next multiannual financial framework in line with the EU’s priorities, objectives and funding needs. 1 JOIN (2023) 20 final of 20.06.2023. 2 COM(2024) 27 of 24.1.2024. 3 Much more than a market – Speed, Security, Solidarity, April 2024 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf 4 The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe, September 2024 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4cf152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiv eness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf 5 Align, act, accelerate: Research, technology and innovation to boost European competitiveness, September 2024 https://era.gv.at/public/documents/5177/Align_Act_Accelerate_Research_Technology_and_Innovation_to_boost _European_Comp_rjTSuEu.pdf 6 Safe together – Strengthening Europe's civilian and military preparedness and readiness, October 2024 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b778739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf 7 https://commission.europa.eu/priorities-2024-2029_en”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-01-09 “E-000054/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. There can be many reasons why an air carrier refuses carriage to passengers, such as reasons of health, safety or security, inadequate travel documentation or late arrival at the gate. These situations do not constitute ‘denied boarding’ pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 1 and need to be distinguished from cases where an operating air carrier denies boarding to passengers due to overbooking or for operational reasons, such as the last minute switch to a smaller aircraft. 2. Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 provides for a comprehensive set of rights for passengers who are denied boarding. If an operating air carrier expects to deny boarding to passengers, it has to call for volunteers who surrender their reservation in exchange for benefits to be agreed between them and the carrier. If an insufficient number of volunteers comes forward the operating air carrier may then deny boarding to passengers against their will under the condition that these passengers are immediately compensated and are either re-routed or reimbursed and offered assistance (food and accommodation) while waiting for the departure of their new flights. The website Your Europe and the passenger rights app provide this information in all official EU languages 2 . In view of the effective protection of passengers in case of denied boarding against their will provided by the EU rules on air passenger rights and given the results of previous studies on the topic of overbooking and denied boarding 3 the Commission does not consider it necessary to assess further the impact of overbooking on passengers. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/261/oj/eng 2 https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/travel/passenger-rights/index_en.htm 3 See for example https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/study-protection-eu-air-passenger-rights2020-09-04_en”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• 2025-01-08 “E-000041/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission Article 17 of the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive 1 requires that Member States shall determine penalties applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take all national measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The Irish National Action Plan for the Sustainable Use of Pesticides required by Directive 2009/128/EC states that the national regulations give effect to this Directive’s restrictions on the use of pesticides in areas used by the general public or by vulnerable groups as defined in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No. 1107/2009. The Irish Department of Agriculture and Food is responsible for investigating all pesticiderelated complaints under the applicable legislative framework. The Commission does not provide any specific recommendations to Member States on responding to complaints about pesticide use received from vulnerable groups. Member States have a primary responsibility to monitor the application of the relevant legal provisions and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will continue monitoring the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. 1 Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides.”
  Reduction targets for pesticides · EU policy on pesticides
• 2025-01-08 “E-000042/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission EU product legislation and standards are applicable for products intended for the EU market and which will be made available to consumers in the EU 1 . Toys that are placed on the EU market, whether manufactured in the EU or in a third country, need to comply with EU toy safety rules 2 . However, toys which are manufactured in the EU but exported to other third countries are not subject to the above-mentioned EU toy safety rules. These toys need to comply with the applicable rules for toy safety in the country of destination. Accordingly, toys which are exported outside the EU are not assessed for compliance with EU rules. The Commission does not have data on EU exports of toys that are not compliant with EU toy safety legislation. 1 See section 2 of the Commission Notice ‘The ‘Blue Guide’ on the implementation of EU product rules 2022’ 2022/C 247/01. 2 Directive 2009/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 on the safety of toys, OJ L 170 30.6.2009, p. 1.”
  EU competences on consumer protection and product standards
• 2024-11-19 “E-002585/2024 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission On 3 December 2024 during the meeting on the Consultative Forum on EU External Aviation Policy, the Commission informed EU carriers that, in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 1 , the Euro-Mediterranean aviation agreement between the EU and Morocco does not apply to routes from the territory of an EU Member State to the territory of the Western Sahara. 1 See notably case T-275/18, Front Polisario v Council, paragraph 41.”
  EU policy on Western Sahara · Trade relations with Morocco
• 2024-11-14 “E-002542/2024 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission In 2024, the Commission allocated a total of EUR 4.4 million in humanitarian assistance to Cuba. The Commission has closely followed the impacts of recent hurricanes and earthquakes, compounding an already dire situation in the country. A humanitarian expert was deployed to assess the needs after the disasters stroke. The Commission supported the emergency response with further EUR 3.9 million. In addition, it deployed a humanitarian airbridge to transport more than 100 tons of humanitarian supplies from the United Nations, EU, and Spanish stocks in five flights, providing relief to populations affected by hurricane Oscar. Furthermore, it allocated EUR 500 000 in humanitarian aid to respond to urgent health needs due to medicine shortages across the country. The EU stands ready to provide additional humanitarian aid based on assessments of new needs. In a longer-term perspective, the EU will continue to provide support under the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 1 and through the Global Gateway 2 to strengthen development and resilience. This includes programmes in crucial sectors such as water and sanitation, and energy. The EU has a longstanding cooperation in both sectors and through the Global Gateway there is potential for European investments on renewable energy infrastructure. 1 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/31833263-a4e0-4027-b98783ac795275d9_en?filename=mip-2021-c2021-9130-cuba-annex_en.pdf 2 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/globalgateway_en”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2024-11-04 “E-002395/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 1. Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, Member States must assist the Commission and cooperate in good faith in all phases of State aid proceedings. It follows that if the Commission requests information or documents from the Member State concerned about unlawful aid pursuant to Article 12 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 1 , the Member State must, to fulfil its duty to cooperate with the Commission, provide all the documentation, information and data necessary to enable the Commission to take a decision. However, a repeated failure from the Member State concerned to provide complete information does not prevent the Commission from adopting a decision on the basis of the information available. 2. On the basis of Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a complainant can challenge the validity of a Commission State aid decision before the EU Courts, provided that the complainant has legal standing. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32015R1589”
  Financial regulation
• 2024-11-04 “E-002394/2024 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Article 5(5) of the Delegated Regulation 2024/1364 1 (Delegated Act) states that the European database on data centres cannot be accessed by the public. In accordance with Article 12(3) of recast Energy Efficiency Directive 2 (EED recast), the public will have access only to the aggregated data (via a webpage, currently under development), which are described in detail in Annex IV of the Delegated Act. Thus, only asking data centre operators to communicate the relevant data and information to the European database, without other means of making this information publicly accessible, would not be adequate for the fulfilment of the Member States’ obligations under Article 12(1) of the EED recast. 1 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1364 of 14 March 2024 on the first phase of the establishment of a common Union rating scheme for data centres: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2024/1364/oj 2 Directive (EU) 2023/1791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on energy efficiency and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 (recast): http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/1791/oj”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-30 “E-002314/2024 Answer given by Commissioner Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) 1 aims to enhance the EU defence industry's responsiveness and build an integrated defence market. It has its legal basis in Article 114 and 173(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2 , which provide that the European Parliament and Council act in line with the ordinary legislative procedure, and it is fully compliant with Article 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union 3 . This legal basis was confirmed by the adoption of ASAP by the European Parliament and Council. Regardless of the profit margins of certain actors in the sector, the programme’s intervention logic addresses the market failure in the production of ammunition and missiles, where capacity throughout the supply chain manifestly failed to match the need in the new global context. To address risks of excessive profits, the Commission has been considering mitigation measures, by including rules on additionality in ASAP (preventing funding of projects that are already fully financed) and proposing a reinforced no-profit rule and a corresponding EU funding recovery mechanism in the European Defence Industry Programme 4 . The programme funds production capacity and delivery activities, but not defence products directly. The Commission has imposed requirements on its funding based on the intended use of EU-financed capacities. Actions related to the production of goods or delivery of services that are prohibited under applicable international law are explicitly excluded. All ASAP actions comply with it. Regarding concerns about ammunition produced under this Regulation being sold outside the EU, export control of all defence-related products and technologies remains the exclusive prerogative of Member States. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union.html 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF 4 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edip-future-defence_en”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence · Arms export from the EU
• 2024-10-17 “E-002143/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The Third Level Access activity (which included the Fund for Student Disabilities (FSD)) ceased being co-financed by the European Social Fund (ESF) 2014-2020 Operational Programme in 2018. The salaries of personal assistants employed by the Higher Education Authority and by the Education and Training Boards are not co-financed by European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) for the 2021-2027 programming period. Starting with the 2020-2021 academic year, SOLAS assumed sole responsibility for the management of the FSD, including the drafting and issuing of guidelines. 1. In the EU, wages are regulated on a national level with the participation of social partners and in full respect of and after taking into account EU law. While Directive 2023/970 1 calls on Member States to apply and support the principle of equal pay for equal work, there are no EU requirements that could guarantee equality of pay for the same work across different funding programmes. The responsibility for equal pay therefore lies on the national level. 2. In the 2021 2027 programming period, the Commission has not issued guidance on how to ensure equal pay across ESF+ funded programmes to Ireland or other Member States. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/970/oj”
  EU policy on social criteria in public funding · EU policy on disability inclusion & accessibility
• 2024-10-17 “E-002142/2024 Answer given by Mr Varhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission recognises the significant medical and socioeconomic consequences of Long COVID and remains committed to supporting effective responses across these areas. The Network of Expertise on Long COVID (NELC), established within the Commission in 2023, aims to strengthen the response to Long COVID. The NELC brings together 39 institutions from 20 Member States and Iceland, working on Long COVID, and it provides a platform for exchanges of national experiences on diagnosis, treatment, and management of Long COVID 1 . Within this group, the Commission promotes relevant research on Long COVID by providing updates on EU-funded projects and by inviting participants to relevant projects or initiatives to share their results to ensure that research results inform the development of efficient public health policies. In addition, a dedicated stakeholder network has been created within the EU Health Policy Platform. It serves to share relevant insights and access resources related to Long COVID, including recent scientific publications. 2. The Commission is currently launching an EU4Health project on Long COVID with the World Health Organization and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. It will include enhancing Long COVID management through international collaboration on clinical guidelines based on evidence. These guidelines will help Member States to support patients of Long COVID. 3. There is a need for paediatric Long COVID care for children and adolescents. The Commission aims to ensure that it is adequately considered and discussed in all ongoing efforts. The Commission’s patient support initiative is inclusive, aiming to serve all population groups, regardless of age. 1 More information can be found on the Commission’s website: https://health.ec.europa.eu/non-communicablediseases/expert-group-public-health/network-expertise-long-covid_en”
  EU competences on health
• 2024-10-17 “E-002151/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU has taken good note of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in respect of the ‘Legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem’ 1 . The EU has a long-standing position of non-recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 and considers Israel’s settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as illegal. EU positions and policies are fully aligned on the United Nations resolutions regarding the status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and are therefore overall consistent with the conclusions of the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ. The EU differentiation policy implies that goods originating from Israeli settlements in occupied territories since June 1967 do not fall within the scope of the EU-Israel Association Agreement 2 and therefore cannot benefit from trade preferences under the Agreement. Member States will discuss further in the relevant Council preparatory bodies the impact of the Advisory Opinion on EU positions and policies. As regards targeted EU restrictive measures (sanctions) imposed on extremist settlers in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, the EU has already listed nine individuals and five entities 3 under the EU's Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime for serious and systematic human rights abuses against Palestinians in the West Bank. Additional proposals brought forward by Member States and the High Representative/Vice-President are currently under discussion in the relevant Council preparatory bodies. Any decision on further sanctions is for the Council to take in unanimity. 1 https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-adv-01-00-en.pdf 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:411c0668-144d-44a1-a5e3dd2342f7a5b5.0017.02/DOC_1&format=PDF 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401175; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401967”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2024-09-03 “E-001600/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Article 30e(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC 1 allows Member States to request a derogation to temporarily exempt regulated entities from the obligation to surrender allowances under the new emission trading system for buildings, road transport and other sectors, subject to conditions. Ireland has notified a request to apply this derogation pursuant to Article 30e(3)(a) of Directive 2003/87/EC. The assessment of this request is ongoing and the final position of the Commission is still pending. As concerns the requirement laid down in Article 30e(3)(h) of Directive 2003/87/EC, in its notification Ireland has committed to allocate an amount equivalent to the revenues to which Article 30d(6) would apply in the absence of derogation, to one or more of the measures listed or referred to in that Article. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/87/oj”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2024-09-03 “E-001599/2024 Answer given by Mr Reynders on behalf of the European Commission Article 14 of Directive (EU) 2024/1203 1 (the Environmental Crime Directive) requires Member States to grant support and assistance to those who report environmental crimes and cooperate in criminal proceedings in accordance with national law. Member States have to transpose the Environmental Crime Directive by May 2026. Since Denmark does not take part in the EU criminal policy according to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Protocol (No. 22) on the position of Denmark, 2 this Directive does not seem to apply to the present case nor places a responsibility on the Danish Government to protect Mr Watson. Extradition is a procedure between competent State authorities based on multilateral, bilateral or EU agreements, taking into account the particular circumstances of each individual case where extradition is requested. In this particular case, it is the Danish Ministry of Justice that decides whether there is a legal basis for extraditing Mr Watson for prosecution to Japan. The Commission cannot interfere or influence the decision taken by the Danish authorities. The Commission remains fully committed to protecting environmental defenders and enforcing international environmental laws, including the moratorium on commercial whaling under the International Whaling Commission (IWC). The case of Mr Watson is followed closely, and the EU has consistently voiced strong concerns about Japan’s whaling activities. The Commission will continue to use all available diplomatic channels to engage with Japan on this, working to discourage such practices, protect environmental defenders and uphold the IWC moratorium. 1 Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and 2009/123/EC, OJ L, 2024/1203, 30.4.2024, Article 14, Recitals (54), (55) and (56). 2 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocols, Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 299–303.”
  Environmental crimes and justice · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2024-08-08 “E-001502/2024 Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission The Visa Code 1 provides under Article 9(2) that, as a rule, appointments for lodging a visa application shall take place within a period of two weeks from the date when the appointment was requested. In line with the Visa Code, Member States may entrust external service providers with the task of collecting data and applications. It appears that the slots for appointments for third country nationals wishing to request a visa in Ireland are released in batches and are booked almost immediately due to high demand from applicants. The surge in traffic and rapid booking of slots can overload websites. The management and operation of the visa appointment system falls under the responsibility of individual Member States. The Commission is in close contact with Member States to try to address this issue, in particular by providing funding through the Border Management and Visa Instrument, to finance additional staff in consulates. Recently, the visa fee has also been increased from EUR 80 to EUR 90, which should bring additional resources to Member States to reinforce their visa processing capacities. 1 Regulation (EC) 810/2009 of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas.”
  Legal migration · Enlargement of Schengen area
• “Thank you, chair, and for anybody who hasn't seen it, I think if you read the eeaS report that was leaked from the in advance of the council meeting, could not deny that there are war crimes being committed and that article two has been breached and absolutely requires the Commission to take action and not to hide behind the European Council. The report highlighted the systemic fashion in which hospitals have been targeted. It talked about the block complete blockade of Gaza, the specific blocking of food, medicine and fuel. Large scale displacement, deadly attacks around the so-called aid delivery sites. 450 are dead in three weeks just trying to access aid and many more violations of human rights and international law. So there is no denying article two is breached. But if you don't like that report, we also have the other report from November 2024, which also identified a number of actions of Israel and both Gaza and the West Bank that constitute war crimes under international law. In fact, if you don't like those reports, I suggest you go on your phone and look at social media as well, and you can witness that a genocide is being perpetrated against the people of Palestine and in Gaza. So we know that Israel is in breach of article two of the EU, Israel Association Agreement. And the Foreign Affairs Council meeting yesterday was a display of moral cowardice, and the commission now must take action. Since yesterday, more than 25 people have died again, going to the mercenary run er, Gaza or the humanitarian fund or humanitarian aid that has replaced Unwra, as opposed to allowing Unwra to do the job that they are well equipped to do.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Thank you. Chair. Um, I suppose on this file first raise a very specific issue that I'd like to hear from the commission. And that's around the north of Ireland. And the application of Cbam to the north remains legally and politically ambiguous. Um, while Britain plans to introduce its own cbam in 2027, it will not automatically apply to the north of Ireland. And according to the protocol, the Protocol, the region remains aligned with the EU's internal electricity market in order to maintain the single electricity market on the island of Ireland. So as a result, power plants in the north are still covered by the EU ETS. So this raises the possibility that the EU cbam will be applied to electricity exports from Britain to the island of Ireland, which potentially subjects renewable energy and low carbon exports to unnecessary carbon charges. The issue is then exacerbated by the lack of clarity on whether the British carbon price under the UK ETS will be recognised by the EU. Um, so I just like to hear the Commission's view on that. But also the European Parliament must be fully involved in any geographical extension of Cbam, particularly regarding the North and the Windsor framework. My other concern, um, is regarding the enforcement of the 50 tonne annual import threshold. And again, as others have said, it's completely understandable that this is a new tool and therefore that tweaks or minor adjustments. Are necessary, especially to reduce the administration burden on SMEs. But however, we do need to ensure that evasive strategies don't happen, like splitting shipments or manipulating supply chains. Um, so while I know that the commission has said that there will be monitoring, uh, ongoing, but have we done any sort of analysis as to will member States have the capacity within their own customs systems to actually do that monitoring and to make sure that the, the objective of, of the tool isn't undermined by those trying to evade the 50 tonne threshold.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• “Thank you. Chair. And I think others have addressed the question around the timing of the NDC and also about the logic of a four year flexibility on international credits. I mean, it is a case, it seems that member states are going to spend a huge amount of money on credits that are not proven at all, rather than actually directing that money and investment towards reducing their own domestic emissions. So I don't understand the logic of it at all. But I will ask a specific question, um, around the equity within the proposal. So when the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change prepared its recommendation on the 2040 target, it advised that the net target of 90 to 95% reductions would be technically feasible. However, they were unable to identify scenarios that were both technically feasible, and that allowed the EU to play its fair share in climate mitigation. So the recommendation was that to make up that gap was that the EU would have to commit more to global climate finance and technology transfer. So now that we have the 2040 proposal and with the flexibilities included even lower than the lowest threshold that was recommended by the advisory board. How does the Commission propose that we are going to address the equity gap? What concrete new commitments will the Commission make towards climate finance in the form of grants, not loans? And what new commitments will you make towards the fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, which currently receives a pitiful 0.03% of the annual financing needs for loss and damage? So how can we ensure that the EU is set in setting a non equitable 2040 target? Still respects the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and climate justice.”
  Climate efforts
• “And so, as I can see it in its current form, it actually would be risking fuelling deforestation and social conflict. Um, I think we, you know, we all know that we're living through turbulent geopolitical times, but signing agreements to sacrifice sustainability and human rights in the name of stability, I don't think, is the direction of travel that we should be going. Um, so I think ratifying the agreement in its current form sends the wrong message that Europe's green agenda has ended and where its trade and cooperation interests begin. Um, but I do have a number of specific questions for the commission. So the first is, given Indonesia's recent deforestation surge and President Prabowo support for palm oil expansion in indigenous areas like West Papua. How will the commission prevent this agreement from actually accelerating forest loss and human rights abuses without enforceable sustainability clauses? And then secondly, is how will the Commission ensure that the responsible sourcing of raw materials from Indonesia without binding requirements for sustainable mining or indigenous peoples consent.”
  Trade impact on forests
• “We're now at a point where gunning down hungry people as they desperately try to get aid, is a daily occurrence. There was international shock the first time. But just like with the bombing of the first hospital, when there are no consequences for Israel, they are emboldened and they carry on. 700 Palestinians have now been slaughtered at aid sites. Baby formula is blocked. They are literally starving babies to death. And still the EU does not act. In fact, instead of holding Israel to account, president von der Leyen has Netanyahu, a war criminal on speed dial, and she's actively encouraging to carry out illegal strikes on Iran. There is more outrage from EU leaders about artists calling out a genocide than there is against those who are actually carrying out that genocide. Solidarity with Palestine is being criminalized, and the EU is sacrificing its civil liberties to support Israel. But Palestinian solidarity grows stronger every day. The people won't be silenced. The people are demanding suspension of trade with Israel. The people are demanding sanctions against Israel. The people are demanding an end to their complicity with Israel's war crime and its genocide. And they are demanding that their EU leaders act and listen to them.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “(15:37:03 – 15:38:52): Thank you, chair. And, like others, I want to thank both rapporteurs, for their draft reports. I'll start with my comments just on the the carbon border adjustment mechanism because I think it is, as we all agree, an important climate tool creating a level playing pitch pitch for EU industries. But in this sense, extending the CBAM downstream to more product groups, I think, is a positive step and 1 that can be taken further in future extensions to cover, for example, the the chemicals industry. At the same time, I do think that CBOM is a new instrument, and we should also be careful not to overburden the system that's only sort of getting started. And in this vein, I welcome the approach of the rapporteur, mister Chaim, which mainly makes targeted improvements to the commission's proposal to remove inconsistencies. I also, support the, the the rapporteur's proposals around the misguided article 27 a. I also appreciate, the additions on the need to support developing countries, with the application of CBAM, and this is the direction that I will go, with my amendments. I am leading the the Inter's opinion on CBAM. And in that committee, I think what we often see is opposition to CBAM from trade partners, as well as the challenges that they face in implementation. So I think that the CBAM needs to be accompanied by international cooperation around pricing, technical assistance, and climate finance to support the decarbonization of the least developed countries and those lower, middle income countries. It was, I think, the parliament's position, I wasn't here in the last Monday, but that a share of CBAM revenues needed to support the decarbonization of developing countries. And while this ambition didn't make it into the final text, we've now seen with the temporary decarbonization fund, we can”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• “Thank you, chair. And I suppose I'll start just by thanking the Secretariat for organizing the mission. It was my first ministerial council, and I know I could see the amount of work that went into organizing it and just to, to compliment them on on a seamless mission. I'd also like to thank the Cameroonians for the hospitality. I think it you know, it was a very successful mission in that sense, maybe not less so in the the outcome of MC 14. But I think as we're reflecting on it today, maybe I'll start for change with where we have agreement. And that is that I think we all want to see a stronger multilateral system. The divergence between us on the left, and maybe some of my colleagues, is just how do we achieve that? And I think personally, going into as I said, it was my first ministerial council, but I thought that the collapse in the talks was inevitable, looking at where the various delegations were in those talks. I think the attitude of the US and the EU, to a lesser extent, but certainly the US, you know, was blatantly self-serving to anyone who was observing from from the outside. And it did lack the concessions that developing countries have been demanding.”
  EU-Cameroon relations
• “Thank you, chair, and thank you to Vice President. Commissioner, I would like to raise two points today. The first is around critical raw materials. I had a meeting this afternoon with representatives from Kachin State in Myanmar, and two thirds of global supplies of terbium and dysprosium come from Kachin State. They're rare earth metals. They're in high demand for the magnets used in electric vehicles and wind turbines. And the mining they're on indigenous lands is causing deforestation. It's causing landslides. It's causing water pollution. Workers without protective gear are becoming sick. They're dying. And yet there are alternatives. So we know that some wind turbine manufacturers have made design changes so that they can use 90% fewer magnets, but others continue to rely on terbium, dysprosium, and their bloodstain supply chain. And now that we have the butchering of the CS triple D, it means that this directive won't be able to hold those companies to account for human rights. So far down their supply chains. So what other tools will the commission use? Will it be through the Net Zero Industry Act, the Critical Raw Materials Act, the Circular Economy Act, or any other policy to ensure that companies reduce to the utmost their demand for these critical raw materials and that address the impact they're having in countries in like Myanmar. And the second question, very briefly, is just around the announcement that DG grow will no longer have a unit responsible for the social economy, and social enterprises employ over 11 million people. They're an important pillar of the European economy and that helps us realize our social environment, environmental and economic objectives. So removing responsibility for. For this important economic sector from DG grow will result in a loss of institutional knowledge and stall future advances. So can you please explain the rationale for this change, but also outline how you'll ensure that your policies continue to support and promote the social economy?”
  Sourcing of critical raw materials
• “I do welcome this important discussion on nitrous oxide. The so-called laughing gas we know is a growing threat to public health. And young people are particularly impacted. Nitrous oxide canisters with sweet flavors are being marketed at children, and inhaling nitrous oxide, as others have said, can cause sensory issues, heart problems, mental health issues, and even long term long term spinal cord injuries. Added to this, we do have the littering the greenhouse gas emissions from nitrous oxide. The cost of the waste management and the risk to worker safety when they explode in waste processing centers. So it is promising that the commission is working on the EU wide restriction, but at national level, we can also have practical laws to manage access to nitrous oxide. And this week we heard how Ireland was a leader when it came to introducing Coco's law. I think, again, Ireland has the opportunity to become a European leader in regulating the sale of nitrous oxide. My Sinn Fein colleague, Mark Ward, has proposed legislation that would restrict its Restricted sale to authorized users while banning the sale of nitrous oxide to under 18 seconds. Unfortunately, the Irish government has chosen to delay this legislation and every week that nitrous oxide goes unregulated, the damage to young people's health, worker safety and our environment increases. So it is unfathomable why Fine Gael and Fianna Fail will not act now to protect young people and progress the sale of nitrous oxide. Bill, while we await our Commission colleagues to bring forward their proposals.”
  Cannabis consumption
• “Well, I do come from a working class background in Tallaght, in south west Dublin. And unfortunately, you're right, that is in working class areas that we see a lot more nitrous oxide canisters. I think we need to also invest. So while we need to restrict the nitrous oxide sales, we also need to invest in our working class communities. We need to invest in providing community services for young people so that they have alternatives to using nitrous oxide. So you're right, it doesn't. This bill or this action that we're calling for today won't address the systemic problem of inequality that we have in society.”
  EU expenditure on social policy
• “I also want to very briefly touch on the Dispute Settlement chapter, which allows Mercosur to raise complaints against any new environmental, climate or human rights measures if those have an impact on Mercosur exports to the EU and vice versa. Does the Commission not find it bizarre? We have just had the EU recognise the danger of dispute mechanisms contained in the Energy Charter treaty, and we are now on a path to enter into a new treaty, which will allow our environmental and climate measures to be challenged. So I would like to ask you, and why do those challenges have to be kept confidential? And does the public in both regions not have a right to know when those laws are being challenged?”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Thank you, chair. And thank you to the Commissioner for presenting on the important strategy. I think that now that more policy focus is being put on water resilience, I am sure that consumers will start seeing more products for sale that will claim to help reduce water waste or companies that are claiming that they are using water resources more sustainably. But how are we to know that these claims are actually true? How are we to know whether we are actually making more sustainable purchases, when 40% of environmental claims are not substantiated at all? How are we to protect consumers from greenwashing. Now that you have chosen to abandon the very piece of legislation that tried to tackle the problem. So, Commissioner, I think the debacle around the Green Claims Directive, as was mentioned in the first round of speeches, shows a real disrespect for the legislative process and the goodwill of the co-legislators. It is also hugely disrespectful, I think, to the commission's own officials who worked diligently on this directive for years. Most of all, it is disrespectful to the consumers who are increasingly frustrated by greenwashing and expect policy makers to protect them against it. So I do think that the House deserves an explanation as to why the Commission, at the behest of the EPP group, conspired to collapse the Green Claims Directive.”
  Green claims
• “And I'd like to thank the rapporteur for his constructive work on this report. But that said, I still think that we're not fully reflecting the significant challenges that AI present for workers and for our economies and for our very society. Specifically on trade policy, I think there are significant concerns about how data flows and digital trade agreements will undermine our data protection system here in Europe, and the hugely destabilising influence that AI in general will have on our way of life in Ireland. This digital expansion is already exacting a massive social toll. By making a housing crisis even more dire. The government's own officials have been warned you can have AI or houses, but not both. Because of the strain that data centres put on grids. We have consistently prioritized Big tech. While households and small businesses subsidize the infrastructure costs and pay for the carbon emissions that is associated with this technology. Not all AI is good, and we need to regulate the industry.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• “Thank you. Chair. I think as others have said, we know the Social Climate Fund is essential to protect the vulnerable people from the costs of the climate transition, and not only because that's the right thing to do from a climate justice perspective, but also because in order to to have the clean transition, we have to build that popular support for climate action. And currently, we know that low income households face higher fuel and heating costs, with no immediate Alternatives being provided. So there are two key points which I want to raise with the commission today. One is in order to build that public buy in and as was said in the presentation, to ensure that those vulnerable groups are actually even aware of what schemes are available for them, but also to ensure that those schemes are fit for purpose, are tailored to the needs of communities. And that will depend not just between different member states, but also even within a member state. The needs of different communities can be very, very different. So therefore we have to have high quality public consultation and real input from civil society workers, affected communities and energy experts.”
• “And that, of course, was to be commended on the work of, of the the European Commission on ensuring that. But we must work to ensure that workers across our island are protected from Trump's tariff chaos. And there's very little information in the public domain about what has been agreed in terms of food standards between Britain and the US. And we know that already under the Windsor Framework Agreement, that the phytosanitary sanitary divergence is causing problems on the island. We're seeing lanes in Larne of backed up trucks trying to get in because of divergence. So any further divergence or lowering of standards of, of food or importation of, of US lower standard food agriculture products will only make that problem worse. So I'd like to just to hear if you have any views or any further information on the details of that.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU
• “(09:25:43 – 09:28:18): Thank you, chair. And I suppose as we're discussing the future of the EU trade and investment relations, I think it is a crucial conversation because I think it goes beyond, trade flows, it speaks to our political, historical, and climate responsibilities. I think it's very important to be clear that Africa will be 1 of the regions most severely affected by climate change. And already today, some countries are losing between 25% of their j GDP due to extreme climate events, and they're spending up to 9% of their budgets to cope with them. So in this context, I think continuing to frame our relationship primarily around access to resources is a major political mistake, but that is precisely the risk that we are facing. The global competition for access to critical raw materials is clearly intensifying, and China, The United States, and Russia are all advancing their interests often through extractive and coercive approaches. And I think that the European Union must not enter such a race. Doing so amounts to reproducing a neocolonial pattern that we claim to reject. So for the left group, the position is very clear. There can be no credible partnership without a genuine sharing of added values, and this means local transformation. It means industrial development on the African continent. It means skills development, and it means technology transfer. And this applies both to the raw materials and agricultural products. And I think without us, we're simply just perpetuating the extractive model that structurally weakens African economies. We must learn from the past. Trade relations must no longer be instruments of dependency, but they must be tools for emancipation. And it is precisely by committing to this approach that we can distinguish ourselves from other global powers. And I think credibility also requires democratic accountability, that's very clearly lacking today, the global gateway instrument, which is central to our strategy. It suffers from insufficient transparency and clear deficit of democratic oversight. And I believe that the European Parliament must be fully involved, properly informed, and able to exercise effective scrutiny, and there can be no blank check for the commission on such strategic engagements. And finally then, I'll I'll stress 1 fundamental point, and that is the role of women in Africa. We know that women are at the heart of economic, social, and entrepreneurial dynamics. And if we're serious about building a fair and sustainable partnerships, then we must invent we can build a credible common future.”
  EU policy on social & environmental impact of foreign investments
• “Thank you, chair, and thank you to Mr. Vandenberg for taking the time to share with us the preparations for the upcoming Cop 30. Um, I think it seems that every year we say this cop is more crucial than the last one. But I think now listening to some of the colleagues from the right of this House, um, they'd like to see us like lemmings. And following, jumping off the cliff like our counterparts in the United States, whereas instead we should be showing true leadership. And the cost of inaction is one that the EU and EU member states can't afford. I have got a few questions and like others have said in relation to the EU's Nationally Determined contribution for for 2035, that deadline has been and gone. We're still waiting on our new 2040 target to be able to determine the new NDC for 2035. So, like others have said, what does in good time mean? Um, two months ago we were told we would have it by the end of quarter one in good time. Sounds to me like something a parent would say to their child when they asked for a biscuit. So maybe you might clarify what does in good time mean? Um, secondly, I'd like to raise the issue of the conflicts of interest on fossil fuel lobbying at Cop. The European Parliament has consistently called for a unfcc accountability framework that would address the presence of polluter interests at Cop, and as have broad movements of civil society. And the Secretary is now actively looking at developing an accountability framework. And discussions on this will continue at the Inter-sessional meeting in Bonn this summer. So the EU's support for it is vital to ensure that we have progress. So could you tell us to what extent DG climate is currently engaging with the Secretariat and other parties around that framework? And can you also commit to repeating last year's important precedent that no fossil fuel lobbyists will be included in the Commission's delegation to Cop 30?”
  Fossil fuels