Lynn BOYLAN

Policy topics Lynn BOYLAN is active on

What Lynn BOYLAN has said (80)

• 2026-07-15 “And thanks to all of the witnesses and for their presentations. Really, really fascinating stuff. And I think that this question of AI enabled weapons is one of the most profound moral questions of our time. And I think the answer to the question I would find is with the UN Secretary general, Antonio Guterres, when he said, there's no place for lethal autonomous weapon systems in our world, that machines that have the power and discretion to take human lives without human control should be prohibited by international law. I also note that Amnesty International Access Now, and many other organizations and international experts initiated a joint statement last month calling for tech companies and states to halt the provision of AI systems for use in the military kill chain, and to take all steps to ensure that other AI systems they provide do not cause or contribute to violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. And I think that this is important for the framing of the debate. When you have the UN secretary general and the world's leading human rights organizations clearly calling for strong international action and political leadership on this issue, I think we should really be listening to them. I would also, as my colleague in the Greens has raised, I would like to ask the witnesses specifically about Israel's use of AI enabled weapons, because we know multiple, multiple reports have demonstrated that Israel uses utilizes AI at the targeting and repression of Palestinians in Gaza and Palestine has been referred to as the laboratory for the field testing of these weapons. So do the witnesses agree that Europe and the United States are in fact profiting from the reprehensible use of AI against Palestinians?”
  Artificial Intelligence for military purposes
• 2026-07-14 “(16:00:02 - 16:02:20): Thank you very much, chairman, and welcome back, minister. I I want to ask about, the presidency's approach to democratic scrutiny of trade agreements because we're aware that the commission will send the text of the trade agreements to council for approval before the agreement has been translated into official languages. So in effect, beginning scrutiny before it's available in the languages that MEPs and officials speak. The government has said that it wishes to prioritize the use of Irish at an EU level. So I wonder how your your view on how this practice will run counter to that commitment. And secondly, I'd like to address the digital trade agreements. The Irish presidency has committed to championing a digital sovereignty agenda aimed at reducing Europe's dependency on non European technology providers, including through the development of a tech sovereignty package. But at the same time, several digital trade agreements are expected to come forward for ratification, including with South Korea, Indonesia, and as well as at the WTO. So these agreements contain provisions that restrict algorithmic transparency and limit government's ability to require that data generated in Europe be stored and processed in Europe. So how will the Irish presidency reconcile these commitments with its digital sovereignty agenda, and will it support a change of approach and seek to remove these highly problematic provisions from current and future digital trade agreements? And then finally, because others have raised the the illegal settlements and the Israel, so I I won't go over that territory again. But I will echo the comments of my green colleague on the The UAE and the the the concern I have with the EU negotiating a trade agreement with a country where the establishment of a meaningful and independent domestic advisory group is effectively impossible. Organized civil society cannot operate freely under The UAE's regressive legal framework, and The UAE has also explicitly indicated that it does not intend to ratify at least 1 fundamental ILO convention. So I would like to hear what the the Irish presidency's view is on this issue on whether it sees the The UAE as a potential trading partner at all.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-07-14 “(15:19:24 - 15:21:29): Issue of farm animals welfare and welcome the fact that you commit into progressing the important legislation around the EU animal transport legislation. That was 1 of my questions, but you've answered it in your your opening statements. But 1 other area of, animal welfare is an update around concerns of the temperature limits during transport. And we know that farm animals experience severe heat stress when temperatures go above 25 degrees. And especially during these summer heat waves, many are left in overheating barns, left out in the open with no shade, or in tiny transport boxes for hours on end. So my 1st question to you, minister, is, I suppose, how will the Irish government ensure that animals are on the agenda as the EU discusses climate adaptation and resilience? And finally, if Ireland is is to promote stronger animal welfare standards in the new legislation, then we have to be seen, to be serious in our implementation of the already existing rules that we have where it is prohibited to transport animals in a way likely to cause injury to them. Throughout Israel's genocide in Gaza and the US Israel war in Iran, animals have been transported from Ireland into the Middle East, and the commission has said that it is up to the member states to refuse approval for the transport of animals where their welfare cannot be guaranteed. And I understand that the German state of Saxony has already banned animal transport into the Middle East for this this reason. So I would ask that the Irish government would also act as a leader and suspend the transport of animals into conflict zones. And then very finally very quickly, my final question is, minister, we've been waiting since 2020 for the commission, to introduce a ban on the export of pest icides that have been banned in the EU, for public health reasons. Will Ireland use its presidency to finally get the council to put the commission, to bring forward a proposal on this, not only for the public health of the countries we're exporting the products to, but also because of the unfair competition it produces for our farmers in the EU.”
  EU requirements on animal welfare for farmers
• 2026-07-14 “(10:33:04 - 10:35:35): Thank you, chair. I just I suppose, 1st, I'll I'll make a comment just around some key principles about the dual use regulation, which is not only about protecting European security, but it also requires that these sensitive technologies are not exported when there is a risk that they could be used for internal repression or serious violations of of human rights or international humanitarian law. And I I suppose I I would take have take come to a different conclusion than my my colleague in in EPP because human rights, considerations appear to be applied only to a very limited extent. And though although the regulation strengthens controls and cyber surveillance technologies, the fact that only 13 export licenses were refused in 2024, I think this raises questions about how member states are actually assessing the human rights risk, of the technology. I think transparency remains, insufficient. Almost half of all authorized exports are covered by global export authorizations, which makes it very difficult for the parliament to know which technologies are being exported and to whom. And I think that the commission's silence, particularly on Israel, is concerning. We know Israel receives around 2% of EU dual use exports, but the report doesn't provide any assessment of exports to Israel. It doesn't indicate whether any licenses were refused or suspended, and it doesn't explain how the regulations human rights criteria were applied in in that current context. So I suppose my my question for the commission is, 1st, is why does the the annual report contain no specific assessment of dual use exports to Israel when the regulation requires human rights risks to be taken into account and the situation in Gaza raises very serious concerns under international humanitarian law? Secondly, does the commission believe that member states are correctly applying the dual use regulation when they continue to authorize exports of dual use items to Israel, and if so, on what basis? And then I will wrap up here. I think, my own member state, Ireland, has actually, called the genocide in Gaza a genocide, but they have also sent Julia's technology worth at least €20,000,000 to the IDF and other Israeli state bodies since 2024. So I think that this demonstrates that there is real problems with how this regulation is being applied and how the human rights assessments are being applied.”
  Arms export from the EU
• 2026-07-13 “(16:50:03 - 16:52:10): Thanks, chair, and thanks to the colleagues from the commission. I also first want to raise the issue of Egypt and the commission's own conclusion in its report that both the economic conditions and the political precondition set out in the 2025 MFA have been fulfilled. As Macaulay from the S and D has said, we know that there's a coalition of international NGOs who've written to us to challenge this assessment. And what they're saying is that the procedural developments such as dialogue with the EU and the UN, administrative reports, and participation in the UN Universal Periodic Review are seen as if there were real progress on democracy and human rights. What we actually need to see is really concrete and credible steps towards democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, and that, in fact, the commission is weakening this political condition by accepting symbolic rather than tangible progress. I'd also like to ask if the commission has looked at the situation of the Palestinian refugees in Egypt and how they're being treated as part of their assessment because most of the Palestinian refugees have been left undocumented and not recognized as refugees and therefore have no legal protections whatsoever. That includes families who have worked for EU institutions who are now refugees in Egypt. Finally, I wanted to ask about the Ukraine MFA and the wider economic picture. I think we're all in agreement that we hope that this war will end and that a just, lasting peace can be put in place. But in terms of what happens next, I'm concerned that Ukraine will be expected to immediately transition to a free market economy. We know that here in Europe, the postwar economy was led by the public sector, and I don't think we should be expecting a vast privatization in Ukraine. So I'd ask the commission whether they recognize the essential role of the state and public services in building a genuinely just and inclusive postwar recovery.”
  EU-Egypt relations
• 2026-07-07 “(11:27:08 - 11:27:22): Chair, the Irish presidency of the council has an opportunity to be a voice for peace for human rights and international law to put our fundamental values forward. The approach continues to be we will be principled, but only when it costs us nothing. Ireland is a country with a proud record on peace building, disarmament, and international law. That legacy is entirely missing from the government's program. Instead, Taoiseach, we see you embracing the militarization agenda against the wishes of the Irish people and launching a full scale attack on our neutrality. Ireland should use its presidency to deliver EU action to end Israel's illegal occupation of Israel and its apartheid regime. In your speech, you spoke of Netanyahu's government as if it is a rogue government when the reality is that Israel has expanded its settlements under every single Israeli government. It is a rogue state. And as heat waves burn your your program talks of leading the EU at international environmental negotiations, but you embrace the deregulation agenda, giving billionaires more freedom to destroy our planet. I also have concerns that the states that host so much of big tech can truly lead on data protection. Enforcement remains slow, weak, and shaped by the companies that it is meant to regulate. And while discussion on enlargement is welcome, where is the ambition to end partition of our island? Taoiseach, you talk of a shared island, but Irish citizens in the North don't share the benefits of the EU. Concrete measures like observer MEPs and participation in civil society platforms would help to address the democratic deficit. Across our island, the conversation for unity is gaining momentum, yet the Taoiseach is a spectator. But on 1 thing we can agree, Taoiseach, without values, nothing matters. That's why we cannot allow Thank you. Or Slavander Lein to run roughshod over our values and act beyond her mandate. Much. Now is the time for”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-06-22 “(17:17:34 – 17:19:58): Thank you, chair. And I think as others have said, we're sitting here in record temperatures and facing into a super El Nino year, and it's it's only June. The 31st round of of global climate negotiations, I think, are more urgent than ever. And I think it is an opportunity to, 1, reflect on the the progress that we have made, but also, unfortunately, on what is yet to be achieved. And I think if we even if we implement all of the planned emission reductions, we're still on track for a 2.5 degree warmer world. And we're sitting here now at the moment looking around at a 1.5 degree world, so we can only imagine the destruction that 2.5 degrees, will bring. So the the EU and its member states, I think, it's important to acknowledge, have the resources, they have the policy space, and they have the historical responsibility to continue pushing for ambitious agreements at COP 31. And we must do so now more than ever, as others, such as in in The US are are leaving that leadership, vacuum. We must continue to do so in the areas where we'd already do well, which is, like, mitigation. And I think the electrification, ambitions of the COP 31 presidency are aligned with those of the the upcoming electrification action plan, and the EU, I think, believe can be a constructive partner there to progress this work. But we also need to be partners in the areas which we're not so good at, such as stepping up for climate finance for mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage, such as addressing the rights of indigenous peoples, environmental defenders, and climate refugees, and also ending the conflict of interest with the fossil fuel lobby. And the European Parliament stands on COP 31 must insist on these points to push the commission and member states to approach the COP with ambitious positions. So I will be tabling amendments on these issues along with amendments on the gendered aspects of the climate crisis as well, the wildlife declaration, and the need for sector specific mitigation efforts from the digital sphere. And I do look forward, to working with my fellow shadow rapporteurs on this important statement setting out the parliament's priorities for the next, round of COP negotiations.”
  Climate policy
• 2026-06-17 “@CHAIR (15:39:21 – 15:40:47): Thuramaga at the Ootsuran. The electrification plan, action will provide a crucial boost for electrification based on renewables across the EU. And electrification would, of course, not only reduce emissions, but also energy bills by reducing our reliance on volatile fossil fuels. Of course, we should be electrifying end uses where possible, but at the same time, we need policy coherence so as not to create barriers to electrification. In Ireland, data centers are eating up electricity. They will soon account for 30% of Irish electricity demand, and the Irish Climate Change Advisory Council has already warned that data centers are cannibalizing our renewables. Every new wind farm built in Ireland in recent years has gone straight to data centers, and it has not displaced gas demand and has added hundreds of euros to electricity bills according to Friends of the Earth Research. So a recent UN report also called Ireland a cautionary tale. The electrification action plan must listen to Ireland's tale. Data centers and EU AI policy must not jeopardize our electrification goals. Today, the president of the European Data Center Association said the quiet part out loud. EU needs more gas because while policymakers believe the grids, batteries, and nuclear will be ready in time, we all know that that won't happen. Thank you Very much. Please, mister Donen.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-16 “(10:42:16 – 10:44:00): Yesterday, the EU Observer reported that as far back as 2017, the then commissioned top lawyer was very clear. EU was legally entitled to suspend cooperation with Israel, such as Horizon Europe and Erasmus Exchange due to Israel's violations of international law. Almost 10 years and the EU has refused to act. We have witnessed a genocide in Gaza, the annexation of the West Bank, entrenchment of apartheid policies, racialized capital punishment, 1,000 Palestinians killed since the ceasefire, and in the 1st half of 20 26, 88 attacks against Christians in Christian holy sites, and not to mention the 1,000,000 displaced civilians in Lebanon. Yesterday, again, the Foreign Affairs Council took no action because of some member states. So with all due respect to the German government, we are tired of hearing about your sensitivities. A heinous genocide against Jewish people perpetrated by an earlier generation cannot be used to justify an Israeli genocide against Palestinians. Your obstruction is making us all complicit. And finally, I want to raise the issue of a ban on settlement goods and services because where is Maris Sevkovich? Where is the proposal from the commission based on article 2 0 7 of the the treaties? This is the bare minimum that we should be doing. The ICJ confirmed trade with the settlements is illegal. Now we need the trade commissioner to turn up, do his job, and ban this illegal trade.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-03-19 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The EU has repeatedly expressed its deep concern regarding Israel’s offensive in Lebanon and the devastating humanitarian consequences thereof [1] . The EU stresses that attacks on civilians, civilian infrastructure, healthcare personnel and facilities, as well as on the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) personnel are unjustified, unacceptable and in breach of International Humanitarian Law. In light of the deteriorating situation in Gaza, and with the support of a majority of Member States, the High Representative/Vice-President has conducted a review of Israel’s compliance with its obligations under Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement [2] . The conclusion of the review was that there are indications that Israel would be in breach of its obligations. Discussions continue in the Council on the package of measures presented by the Commission following the review. The fight against impunity and the pursuit of justice for international crimes and violations of international law are cornerstones of the EU’s foreign policy, regardless of where conflicts occur. These principles are non-negotiable and reflect the EU’s dedication to a rules-based international order. The EU reiterates its strong and steadfast support for the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, both of which serve as indispensable pillars of the global justice system. [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/moldova/foreign-affairs-council-press-conference-high-representative-kaja-kallas_en. [2] https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf.”
  EU-Lebanon relations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-02-18 “E-000705/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Article 107(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 (Payment Services Directive - PSD2) 1 establishes, subject to limited exceptions, the principle of maximum harmonisation of the rules laid down in the Directive. PSD2 sets out rules governing the allocation of liability for authorised and unauthorised payment transactions. In this context, the possibility for Member States to introduce national liability or reimbursement regimes for authorised push payment (APP) fraud would need to be considered in light of the harmonised framework established by PSD2. The Commission has proposed new provisions in the ongoing revision of the EU payment services framework (the Payment Services Directive 3/Payment Services Regulation package) to strengthen protection against APP fraud, including enhanced fraud-prevention and reimbursement measures 2 . These proposals are currently under negotiation by the colegislators. A provisional political agreement was reached on 26 November 2025 3 , marking an important step in advancing the legislative process. 1 OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, pp. 35–127 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L2366. 2 COM/2023/367 final https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023PC0367. 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-an-economy-that-works-for-people/file-revision-of-eurules-on-payment-services.”
  EU regulation on financial data access · Financial regulation
• 2026-01-21 “– A Uachtaráin, tar éis a bheith ag éisteacht leis an díospóireacht aréir, dhéanfaí dearmad go bhfuil tíortha neodracha san Aontas nach bhfuil fonn ar bith orthu a bheith páirteach sa chlár oibre míleata nó in NATO. Is tír neodrach í Éire agus tá an neodracht sin á creimeadh ag gníomhaíochtaí an Aontais. Tá an Coimisiún meáite ar an aontacht shóisialta a chreimeadh agus méideanna ollmhóra den airgead poiblí a dhíriú ar thionscal na n-arm. Teastaíonn Eoraip shóisialta uainn atá tiomanta don fhíoraontacht shóisialta a thógáil. Teastaíonn Aontas Eorpach uainn atá dílis do bhunphrionsabail an iltaobhachais agus chothú na síochána. Tá neodracht na hÉireann fite fuaite inár streachailt rith go líne ar son an neamhspleáchais agus ar son aontacht na hÉireann. Tuigimid go maith an domhan ina nglaonn neart ceart.”
• 2026-01-21 “– A Uachtaráin, I voted in favour of this report. However, one of the most fundamental human rights which this report does not cover is the right to self-determination. For the Palestinian people, we consistently see that right ignored by the EU and other global powers. Trump's so-called 'Board of Peace' is more a blatant form of colonial rule in Gaza: there are no Palestinians on this board, and we have the likes of Tony Blair, Jared Kushner and now a man with an ICC arrest warrant out for him, Benjamin Netanyahu. The man responsible for the genocide is on a 'board of peace'. This is colonial plundering and the EU has said nothing. Self-determination for the Palestinian people is non-negotiable: the people of Gaza have survived over two years of Israeli genocide and are now being forced to suffer a new coloniser. Trump is charging countries who want a permanent seat at the table USD 1 billion. This is not a peace process, it is colonial rule by mercenaries.”
• 2026-01-14 “Answer given by Mr Micallef on behalf of the European Commission 16.3.2026 Written question The Commission’s Culture Compass for Europe [1] charts a new vision for vibrant, world-leading cultural and creative sectors and aims to make Europe the best place to be an artist. Thriving arts and culture spaces are vital for this vision to be achieved. The Compass recognises culture’s intrinsic value, as well as its societal, civic and economic value, and role as a fundamental public good. Cultural infrastructure must be available equitably across Member States and that investment in youth-led and community-owned creative spaces should be a major element in strategies to develop cultural infrastructure. Creative Europe’s added value lies in supporting project-based actions for collaboration between cultural organisations from different countries participating in the programme. The projects financed contribute to a thriving cultural sector, including community spaces . The Creative Europe — Culture strand of AgoraEU [2] , as proposed by the Commission in the context of the new Multiannual Financial Framework, will continue successful actions in this field. Other EU funding sources such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility or the cohesion policy funds, also provide scope for cultural infrastructure funding. The Compass also underlines the importance for artists and other workers in the creative sectors to have quality jobs, a viable career path and fair remuneration. The Commission will propose an EU Artists’ Charter to outline fundamental principles, guidance, and commitments for fair working conditions in the sectors. [1] https://culture.ec.europa.eu/document/a-culture-compass-for-europe. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0550&qid=1753799477044.”
  EU and national cultural identities
• 2025-11-04 “P-004321/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has taken good note of the Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice of 22 October 2025 on the Obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Advisory Opinions are non-binding but carry legal authority as the Court interprets obligations of Israel under international law. The EU therefore considers that Israel should comply with the Advisory Opinion in its integrity. The Advisory Opinion in question does not address obligations of third states and organisations. Nevertheless, the issues at stake are part of an ongoing dialogue. The registration process for international non-governmental organisations is a significant obstacle to humanitarian partners’ aim of scaling up their operations in Gaza. The EU continues to engage with the Israeli government on this issue. In this context, the EU recalls its continued political and financial support to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. The Commission has disbursed the entirety of the 2025 planned contribution of EUR 82 million. The package of measures announced by the President of the Commission in the State of the Union 2025 address 1 to respond to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza are being discussed in the Council. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en.”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-10-29 “E-004259/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Council of the EU approved a significant reform to the Value added tax (VAT) rates system in 2022 1 . During this process, the Member States unanimously agreed on revised wording for the category relating to goods for disabled persons 2 . This category now includes medical equipment, appliances, devices, items and aids, as well as protective gear, such as health protection masks, which are intended for use in healthcare or by disabled persons, and goods that are essential for overcoming or compensating for disability. In addition to repairs, the Council decided to include the adaptation, rental and leasing of such goods within the scope of eligible transactions. While the goods mentioned by the Honourable Member might be regarded as compensating for or overcoming disability, it must be emphasised that when adopting the VAT rates reform, the Council did not specify the distinct types of goods that fall under this category. As the decision to apply and set VAT rates based on the provisions of the VAT Directive is at the discretion of the Member States, it is also up to them to define the specific transactions eligible for reduced VAT rates in their national law. 1 Council Directive (EU) 2022/542 of 5 April 2022 amending Directives 2006/112/EC and (EU) 2020/285 as regards rates of value added tax, OJ L 107, 6.4.2022, p. 1. 2 Category (4) of Annex III of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ L 347, 11.12.2006) - the VAT Directive.”
  VAT harmonisation
• 2025-10-28 “E-004233/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU Declaration on the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the EU and the Kingdom of Morocco (‘the Agreement’) 1 , signed on 3 October 2025, forms part of the legal relationship between the EU and Morocco. It sets out a series of measures to be taken by the EU in order to provide specific, tangible, substantial and verifiable benefits for the group of beneficiaries referred to in the judgment of 4 October 2024 2 . It fully meets the requirements defined in that judgment and is in conformity with Article 21(1) of the Treaty on EU as interpreted and applied by the Court of Justice (CJEU). The Agreement fully meets the conditions set out by CJEU in the aforesaid judgment, including with respect to the identification of products originating in Western Sahara and the presumed consent of the beneficiaries of the Agreement. The legal and political situation of Western Sahara differs in nature from that of other territories. It is recognised by the UN as a ‘Non-Self-Governing Territory’, whose final status remains to be determined in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and within the framework of the UN-led political process. This is consistent with the long-standing position of the EU, which fully supports the efforts of the UN Secretary-General to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution. No strategic and comprehensive partnership has been concluded yet. Once discussions are taken forward, it will be designed to address all issues of mutual interest, within the overall framework of the EU-Morocco Association Agreement and in full alignment with the principles and objectives guiding the EU’s external action 3 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202502025. 2 Joined Cases C-779/21 P Commission v Front Polisario and C-799/21 P Council v Front Polisario, paragraph 153. 3 As laid down in Articles 3(5) and 21 of the Treaty on EU.”
  Trade relations with Morocco · EU policy on Western Sahara
• 2025-10-17 “E-004109/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Human rights are central to EU policy. The EU remains dedicated to upholding its international obligations and takes note of the provisional orders of the International Court of Justice in the South Africa v Israel case. The EU has repeatedly called on Israel to fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, in all circumstances. The EU considers the International Criminal Court (ICC) of key importance in upholding international criminal justice and the fight against impunity. The EU supports the ICC and the principles set out in the Rome Statute and respects the Court’s independence and impartiality. The European Council has called upon all States to ensure full cooperation with the Court, including by the prompt execution of outstanding arrest warrants, and to enter into voluntary agreements. The EU will continue to cooperate with the ICC, including by adopting initiatives to promote the dissemination of the principles, values and provisions of the Statute.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Support for International Criminal Court
• 2025-09-24 “E-003711/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Since 2023, the Commission has issued a fourth Report on the impact and benefits for the population of Western Sahara of the extension of tariff preferences to products originating in Western Sahara 1 . This was the report for the year 2023, issued on 15 March 2024 and covering trade flows until December 2022. In line with Decision N 1/2020 of the EUMorocco Association Committee, Morocco has continued to transmit data upon request by the Commission, including on 15 July 2024 in view of a possible report in 2024. In accordance with the 2018 Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters, the EU and Morocco agreed to an evaluation mechanism whereby information on the implementation of the agreement is exchanged. The Commission will make best efforts to produce a new report to evaluate the implementation of the 2018 Agreement. Under the terms of the 2025 Agreement, which applies provisionally since 3 October 2025, the EU and Morocco have agreed to continue this exchange of information to allow the parties to assess the impact of the 2025 Agreement. 1 https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/report-impacts-and-benefits-eu-morocco-agreement-extending-tariffpreferences-products-originating_en.”
  Trade relations with Morocco
• 2025-09-24 “E-003709/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission In application of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters of 2018 1 , which entered into force on 27 July 2019, the preferences granted to Moroccan originating products under the Association agreement between the EU and the Kingdom of Morocco 2 were granted to Western Sahara originating products. In its ruling of 4 October 2024 in joined cases C-779/21 P and C-799/21 P 3 , the Court of Justice of the European Union allowed to maintain the effects of Council Decision (EU) 2019/217 4 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters of 2018 for a period of 12 months. This implies that there is no need to differentiate between the situation before and after 4 October 2024 as goods originating in Western Sahara have been entitled to the same tariff preferences as goods originating in Morocco, under the 2018 Agreement, until 3 October 2025. In the proofs of origin issued by Moroccan customs authorities under the 2018 Agreement there was no obligation to use the country code EH. The country code EH is used in the import declaration in the EU for Western Sahara products. The Commission is not aware of any cases of financial fraud linked to the attribution of preferential treatment of goods originating in Western Sahara. 1 OJ L 34, 6.2.2019, p. 4. 2 OJ L 70, 18.3.2000, p.1. 3 Judgment of the Court of 4 October 2024 – European Commission and Council of the European Union v Front Polisario, ECLI:EU:C:2024:835. 4 OJ L 34, 6.2.2019, p. 1.”
  Trade relations with Morocco
• 2025-09-16 “E-003554/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Human rights are central to EU policy. The prevention of genocide and other atrocity crimes form an integral part of the EU's foreign and security policy 1 . The EU remains dedicated to upholding its international obligations, particularly those related to the prevention and punishment of incitement to genocide as outlined by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 2 . The EU's proactive stance involves global partnerships and collaborations with the United Nations to strengthen human rights. The EU will continue to take a strong stance in upholding and promoting the observance of international law, including human rights law and international humanitarian law. The EU has repeatedly called 3 on Israel to fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, in all circumstances. The legal qualification of an act as genocide presupposes the proper establishment of facts and a finding of law. For that, independent and impartial courts are best placed, by possessing the relevant instruments to ensure proper fact-finding and a non-biased application of the law. 1 Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 on the investigation and prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2003/335/oj/eng. 2 https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocitycrimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of %20Genocide.pdf. 3 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/eu-statement-hrc60-item-4-general-debate-human-rightssituations-require-council%E2%80%99s-attention_en.”
  Support for International Criminal Court
• 2025-09-08 “E-003466/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The purpose of implementing and delegated acts is to provide further details on how the basic Regulation should be implemented. During this mandate, the acts that must be adopted have been screened carefully to distinguish those that are essential for effective implementation, and those which can provide administrative relief for businesses and public authorities. The de-prioritisation of certain acts 1 related to the Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation 2 (PPWR) carry an evident potential for simplification and administrative burden reduction. However, the Commission will ensure that they are only set aside if the environmental and circular economy goals of the Regulation, notably in view of the measures on reuse and on Green Public Procurement, are not compromised. The Commission remains committed to the objectives of the PPWR and to the effective implementation of EU legislation. The Commission has also committed to regularly reassess (de-)prioritisation of secondary acts, also taking into account feedback from stakeholders. When an act is legally required, the Commission will take into account the adequate timeframe. The Delegated Act referred to by Article 11(2), establishing the minimum number of rotations for reusable packaging, remains a priority. Its inadvertent omission is being corrected. 1 The Implementing Act in Article 12(7) regarding digital labelling due to significance given the technological development, the Delegated Act in Article 29(12) on pooling due to overall complexity and burdens and the Implementing Act in Article 63(2) concerning green public procurement. 2 Regulation (EU) 2025/40 of 19 December 2024 on packaging and packaging waste, OJ L, 2025/40, 22.1.2025.”
  Circular economy · Sustainable packaging
• 2025-09-08 “E-003467/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission While research related to dual-use products or technologies is not prohibited, any research and innovation activities carried out under Horizon Europe must have an exclusive focus on civil applications. Consequently, funds to beneficiaries based in Israel were only awarded for research activities with civilian purposes. Activities intended for military applications are ineligible 1 . However, Horizon Europe projects’ results 2 may be developed into technologies with a dual-use potential, even if they were originally intended and funded for purely civil applications. This transition could happen beyond the lifetime of the project itself. Article 2(2) of the Agreement on the association of Israel to Horizon Europe 3 sets out the principle that Israeli entities participate in the Horizon Europe programme under terms and conditions equivalent to those applicable to legal entities established in the EU. While any actions of the State of Israel cannot be considered automatically attributable to Israeli entities participating in Horizon Europe, Israel needs to comply with Article 2 of the EuroMediterranean Agreement 4 . In the context of Israel’s intervention in the Gaza Strip and the ensuing humanitarian catastrophe, the Commission has come to the conclusion that Israel is violating human rights and humanitarian law thus breaching Article 2 of the EuroMediterranean Agreement. Therefore, it has proposed to the Council to partially suspend the Horizon Europe Association Agreement with Israel so that legal entities established in Israel would not be eligible to participate in calls for grant and investment support under the Horizon Europe European Innovation Council Accelerator. Furthermore, in her State of the Union Speech on 10 September 2025, the Commission President announced a further package of measures. The XTEND project funded a commercial and financial viability study only, no grant was deployed to develop any technology 5 . The project UnderSec cited above 6 is currently under ethical review. 1 In line with the grant agreement, when implementing the projects all beneficiaries must ensure that all the activities under the project comply with this horizontal rule as well as with ethical principles and relevant national, EU and international legislation. 2 Once the project is over. 3 Agreement between the EU, of the one part, and Israel, of the other part, on the participation of Israel in the EU programme Horizon Europe — the framework Programme for Research and Innovation, OJ L 95, 23/03/2022. 4 ‘Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement.’ 5 At the time of submission, the applicant self-declared the proposal did not involve dual-use items and confirmed it did not raise concerns regarding the exclusive focus on civil applications. During the evaluation process, the company underwent an ethics pre-screening which did not reveal any issues. No other ethics issues were detected during the feasibility study report preparation. Furthermore, by signing the grant agreement, the company assumed a legal obligation to ensure that the activities carried out under the action were exclusively focused on civil applications. Beyond the grant for the feasibility study, which implementation was completed in 2020, no investment component or other funding was provided to the company nor by the SME (small and medium-sized enterprises) Instrument neither by the European Innovation Council Accelerator. 6 Sensor-based prototype system for underwater security: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101121288.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-09-05 “E-003463/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission In 2023, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) carried out a standardisation inspection in Ireland, which concluded that the country is effectively implementing the safety aspects of the existing European drone regulations. As part of the inspection, the team visited operators delivering goods in Dublin and confirmed that their activities were being conducted safely and in full compliance with the applicable rules. It should be noted that verification of compliance with environmental law falls outside the scope of EASA’s inspection. Furthermore, a safety assessment is always required before drone operations may take place. Based on the data periodically collected by the EASA from national aviation authorities, the Irish authority grants operational authorisations only upon receipt of a satisfactory risk assessment, ensuring that activities are carried out in line with the applicable rules. Matters relating to noise and environmental conditions are determined nationally, in accordance with each Member State’s requirements. The Environmental Noise Directive 2002/49/EC 1 requires Member States to develop noise action plans for agglomerations exceeding 100 000 people to manage noise from air operations which may include drones, depending on whether noise exposure is determined through the prior performed strategic mapping on noise. Based on reported data by the competent authorities, there is no information distinguishing the noise exposure from drones in Dublin agglomeration. The framework for drones was developed at European level following extensive public consultation in 2018, ensuring that stakeholders had the opportunity to contribute before the rules were adopted. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/49/oj/eng.”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• 2025-07-31 “E-003160/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission On 16 July 2025, the Commission published its proposals for a Regulation establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 (the ‘fund’) 1 alongside a proposal for a self-standing European Social Fund (ESF) Regulation 2 . As part of the fund, Member States would propose national and regional partnership plans (NRPPs) that would include investments and reforms contributing to, among others, the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, and addressing the relevant countryspecific recommendations. At least 14% of the total budget for the national and regional partnerships, excluding the amounts ring-fenced for farmers and fishers, are proposed to be dedicated to meeting social objectives 3 . Moreover, the proposals contain provisions stipulating that Member States shall concentrate resources in their NRPPs on the following measures 4 : social inclusion, food and/or basic material assistance, implementing the Child Guarantee 5 and the Youth Guarantee 6 . Europe’s social model and investing in people would remain a core aspect of any plan, as it is essential for promoting social inclusion, poverty reduction, economic growth, and Europe’s competitiveness. ESF support as part of any plan would be based on the guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States, as provided for in Article 148 (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and continue to strengthen social cohesion investing in Europe’s people, their future and preparedness. 1 COM(2025) 565 final - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0565&qid=1753718606996. 2 COM(2025) 558 final - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0558. 3 Article 22(2), point (q) of COM(2025) 565 final. 4 Article 22(2), point (g), letter (ii) of COM(2025) 565 final, Annex VI, and recitals 19-22 of COM(2025) 558 final. 5 Council Recommendation 2021/1004 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2021/1004/oj/eng. 6 Council Recommendation 2020/C 372/01 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2020_372_R_0001.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-07-31 “E-003161/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recognises that the Irish Marriage Bar had clear negative consequences for women’s participation in the labour market and their pension entitlements and would have been prohibited by Directive 2006/54/EC, had it still been in force when the Directive entered into application. Nevertheless, the Irish Marriage Bar is not covered by Directive 2006/54/EC since the dispositions regarding the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex in occupational social security schemes are applicable for ‘all benefits under occupational social security schemes derived from periods of employment subsequent to 17 May 1990’ 1 . Hence, the Directive is simply not applicable ratione temporis to the national legislation referred to by the Honourable Member. This time-limit follows from the judgement of the Court in case C-262/88, where the Court clarified that a pension paid under a contracted-out private occupational scheme falls within the scope of then Article 119 of the Treaty (now Article 157 TFEU), but that the direct effect of Article 119 of the Treaty may not be relied upon in order to claim entitlement to a pension, with effect from a date prior to that judgment. 1 Article 12 of Directive 2006/54/EC: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/54/oj/eng.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion · EU policy on aging workforce and pensions
• 2025-07-20 “E-003015/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission's Coordinator on Combating Antisemitism is carrying out her work in line with the EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life. As regards the question on fundraising, Commission staff, as all EU officials, enjoy the right to freedom of expression in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 1 and the staff regulations 2 . As it has been recalled constantly by the Court of Justice of the European Union, the right to freedom of expression is exercised with due respect to the principles of loyalty and impartiality. The Commission authorises in principle occasional social, charity or fundraising activities by staff (e.g. book or bake sales). The EU is a longstanding partner of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and strong supporter of the United Nations’ (UN) work in Gaza and the West Bank. UN agencies must be able to operate without obstruction in humanitarian crises worldwide. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1962/31(1)/2021-01-01/eng.”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism · Support for international humanitarian organisations
• 2025-06-30 “E-002617/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recently evaluated several adequacy decisions including the one for Israel and concluded that the decisions could be kept in place 1 . This assessment covered all relevant elements of the privacy framework as well as the broader institutional and legal system to the extent it affects the level of protection of personal data transferred from the EU. As part of this evaluation, the Commission negotiated a significant strengthening of privacy safeguards and individual rights in Israel, specifically for EU data transfers, which was implemented in Israeli law in May 2023, and which was subsequently extended to also apply to domestically processed data. Monitoring the functioning of adequacy decisions under Article 45(4) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2 is a continuous and comprehensive process, which in practice means that the Commission is following relevant developments in law and practice, based on various sources of information such as reporting from the EU Delegation as well as media reports and information provided by different stakeholders, such as academia, civil society organisations, and the EU’s data protection authorities. The legal framework gives the Commission the tools to react if the level of protection would weaken, including the possibility to propose the amendment, suspension or repeal of the decision. 1 COM(2024) 7 final of 15.1.2024 and SWD(2024) 3 final of 15.1.2025, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the first review of the functioning of the adequacy decisions adopted pursuant to Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC and Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the first review of the functioning of the adequacy decisions pursuant to Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC of 15 January 2024. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02016R067920160504&qid=1532348683434.”
  International data transfers
• 2025-06-30 “E-002618/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Irish competent authority presented their action plan addressing the audit recommendations on 31 January 2024. The action plan has been published on the Commission’s website 1 . In response to recommendation number 4, concerning the feeding of unweaned calves on roll-on roll-off vessels after a total of 19 hours of travelling, the action plan includes a research project on possible technical solutions to safely feed calves with milk replacer on board trucks during the ferry voyage. The welfare of unweaned calves during long-distance journeys remains a matter of concern for the Commission, the Member States, and the wider public. The Commission is monitoring ongoing efforts by the Irish authorities to address the shortcomings identified in the audit report. The Commission has met with the Irish authorities on several occasions and has urged them to take the necessary steps to ensure full implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report/details/4700.”
  EU requirements on animal welfare for farmers
• 2025-06-23 “E-002503/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU remains united in its unequivocal support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1 as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with its Article 6, and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes in accordance with its Article 4. In all relevant fora, such as NPT review conferences and preparatory committee sessions, as well as the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee, the EU reaffirms the importance of the NPT’s universalisation and full implementation and calls on all states that have not yet done so to join the Treaty and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms. The EU regards safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a fundamental component of the NPT. The EU attaches utmost importance to the integrity of the IAEA safeguards system and strongly supports the Agency’s efforts to strengthen its effectiveness and improve its efficiency. The EU repeatedly encourages all IAEA member states to actively promote the universalisation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, which together represent the current verification standard under the NPT. The EU continuously calls upon all remaining states, including Israel, to conclude and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols without further delay. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-weapons-npt_en.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2025-05-23 “E-002089/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission While healthcare delivery is primarily a Member State responsibility 1 , Directive 2011/24/EU 2 stresses that ‘the Member State of affiliation shall take all necessary measures, in addition to the recognition of the prescription, in order to ensure continuity of treatment in cases where a prescription is issued in the Member State of treatment for medicinal products or medical devices available in the Member State of affiliation’ (Article 11(1)). The patient returning to the country of affiliation after a cross-border intervention can continue care in accordance with the national rules, for instance, following the patient pathway in the Member State of affiliation. When the patient is entitled to the healthcare in accordance with Article 7 of the Directive, Member States may not refuse to grant prior authorisation if the healthcare cannot be provided on its territory within a time limit which is medically justifiable (Article 8(5) and Article 8(6)(d) of the Directive). Whether a given waiting period eventually meets the provisions of this Article is based on an objective medical assessment of the patient’s condition and needs amongst other, as stipulated in the Directive. The Directive contains rules on the recognition of prescriptions for medicinal products and medical devices issued in another Member State. No provisions are laid down for referrals and diagnoses from medical professionals registered in other Member States. Member States are allowed to set their own rules and pathway for accessing healthcare. 1 Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:FULL. 2 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare OJ L 88, 4.4.2011, p. 45–65.”
  Public and private sectors role in healthcare services · EU competences on health
• 2025-05-14 “E-001935/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission In 2023, the Commission proposed 1 a targeted revision of the EU passenger rights legislation with a focus on effective enforcement, including Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006 2 (the ‘Regulation’). A broad stakeholder consultation required by the Better Regulation framework 3 preceded the adoption of the Commission proposal, to which representatives of persons with disabilities also contributed. The Regulation already includes several provisions that oblige operators to actively engage with representatives of persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility (PRM). For instance, when establishing quality standards for assisting PRM, airport managing bodies are required to collaborate with organisations representing these individuals 4 . Similarly, airport managing bodies must work with such organisations when designating arrival and departure points where PRM can announce their presence at the airport 5 . Additionally, Recital 10 of the Regulation emphasises that airports and air carriers should have regard to ECAC Doc No 30, Part I, Section 5 6 , when organising disability awareness and assistance training for their personnel. This document underscores the importance of cooperation between airport managing bodies, air carriers, and organizations representing PRM in developing training programs, policies, and procedures. Accordingly, the Commission did not consider that there was a need to impose new obligations on airports and airlines to consult representatives of persons with disabilities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023PC0753. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/1107/oj/eng. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/better-regulation_en. 4 See Article 9(1) of the Regulation. 5 See Article 5(1) of the Regulation. 6 The latest version of the document (13th Edition, December 2023) can be found at: https://www.ecacceac.org/images/activities/facilitation/ECAC-Doc_30_Part_I_Facilitation_13th_edition_13_Dec_2023.pdf.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2025-05-14 “E-001933/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recognises that the Irish Marriage Bar, which required women to leave public sector employment upon marriage and was lifted in 1973–1974 shortly after Ireland’s accession to the EU, was a measure that had clear negative consequences for women’s participation in the labour market and their pension entitlements. As far as the occupational social security schemes that the Honourable Member refers to are concerned, Directive 2006/54/EC 1 , which codified earlier legislation including Directive 76/207/EEC on gender equality in access to employment and occupation (in force since 1976), applies to equal opportunities in access to the labour market. The Irish ban lifted in 1973/74 would on substance not seem to be compatible with this legislation but is not covered by the application of the Directive ratione temporis. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/54/oj/eng.”
  EU policy on aging workforce and pensions · Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2025-05-14 “E-001932/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Irish hare (Lepus timidus) is listed in Annex V of the Habitats Directive 1 and therefore may be exploited if the conditions set out in Article 14 of the Directive are met, that is ensuring that any taking in the wild of specimens is compatible with maintaining the population at favourable conservation status. The species is reported as being in favourable conservation status in Ireland. Article 15 of the Directive states that Member States shall prohibit the use of all indiscriminate means (of capture and killing) capable of causing local disappearance of, or serious disturbance to, populations of such species. The Commission has assessed that hare coursing should not be considered as such to constitute indiscriminate means. 2. The Commission has not held specific discussions with the Irish authorities regarding hare coursing. 1 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50.”
  Nature protection and restoration in the EU
• 2025-05-14 “PE773.570v01-00 EN E-001939/25 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission remains fully committed to advancing the social economy agenda and ensuring its continued integration across relevant EU policies. The recent internal reorganisation of the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and Small Medium Enterprises, including the discontinuation of the unit dealing with social economy, was carried out to enhance efficiency and better integrate social economy objectives across broader industrial and Single Market policies. Social economy features in the Commission 2024-2029 political guidelines 1 , which reaffirm its commitment to reinforce Europe’s social model, promote social fairness and ensure that no one is left behind. Under the political leadership of the Executive Vice-President for Social Rights and Skills, Quality Jobs and Preparedness, the Commission services remain committed to supporting the development of the social economy, notably through the implementation of the Action Plan for the Social Economy 2 , and to ensuring that social economy actors can meaningfully contribute to the prosperity and growth of the Single Market. In spite of the cancellation of two planned calls in the social economy field under the Single Market Programme 3 , the Commission remains committed to supporting the social economy through relevant funding opportunities (e.g. European Social Fund Plus, InvestEU, Horizon Europe, European Regional Development Fund) accessible via the Social Economy Gateway 4 , and through continued policy engagement. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0778. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32021R0690. 4 https://social-economy-gateway.ec.europa.eu/eu-funding-programmes_en.”
  EU industrial funding · EU policy on social criteria in public funding
• 2025-05-14 “E-001937/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The organisation and conduct of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States. It is for Ireland to decide how to address recommendations in that regard of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, in accordance with its constitutional and legislative rules as well as its international obligations.”
  EU engagement with citizens · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
• 2025-05-14 “E-001931/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission is not in a position to comment on specific ongoing proceedings brought by the European Free Trade Association’s Surveillance Authority as regards a possible infringement by Iceland of Directive 2010/63/EU 1 . 2. The Commission is committed to enhancing animal welfare while safeguarding the availability of medicinal products in the Union as well as the competitiveness of the pharmaceutical sector. As regards the use of horses as donor of material for Pregnant Mare Serum Gonadotropin (PMSG) production, the Commission has sent a mandate to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to request a scientific opinion on the welfare of Equidae. This opinion is expected to be delivered in 2026. Based on the EFSA opinion and its recommendations, appropriate follow-up on the matter will be duly considered by the Commission. 1 Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes. OJ L 276, 20.10.2010, p. 33–79.”
  EU requirements on animal welfare for farmers
• 2025-05-14 “E-001934/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The European Accessibility Act (Directive (EU) 2019/882) includes the built environment in its scope. Article 4.4 provides that ‘Member States may decide, in the light of national conditions, that the built environment used by clients of services covered by this Directive shall comply with the accessibility requirements set out in Annex III, in order to maximise their use by persons with disabilities.’ The Directive, including, for Member States that decided to ‘opt in’ on article 4.4., its provision related to the built environment, is applicable since 28 June 2025. Furthermore, the Directive indicates in Article 33, that by 28 June 2030, and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall submit a report on the application of the Directive, including in relation to the relevant provisions concerning the built environment. The Commission, in accordance with Article 15 of the Directive, has also issued a standardisation request M587 1 requiring the development of standards. The standardisation request includes the revision for their adoption as harmonised standard of ‘EN 17210 Accessibility and usability of the built environment - Functional requirements’. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/enorm/mandate/587_en.”
  EU policy on disability inclusion & accessibility
• 2025-05-14 “E-001936/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Council approved and published on 20 June 2025 an Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) report on tax issues 1 and a progress report on the Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive (ETD) 2 , which include updated information on the status of the discussions on the Commission’s proposal to revise the ETD. As for concrete steps, the Commission presented on 26 February 2025 the Action Plan for Affordable Energy together with its Clean Industrial Deal 3 . Both communications call on Member States to complete the revision of the ETD. To that end, the Commission is continuing to provide support to the different Council Presidencies and to engage actively with Member States, notably in the discussions at the Council, to achieve the consensus required for the adoption of the revised Directive. 1 9960/25 FISC. 2 7819/25 FISC. 3 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/affordable-energy_en.”
  EU competences on taxation · Energy (green transition)
• 2025-05-07 “– A Uachtaráin, I abstained on the discharge because the attached resolution is totally out of touch with reality. In the last number of days, the Israeli Government has agreed plans to permanently occupy Gaza, the Freedom Flotilla ship, the Conscience, was attacked and the Israeli authorities are carrying out a mass starvation program in Gaza. Food is rotting at the border, while only a number of miles away, children are starving. The Director of the World Health Organization's Health Emergencies Programme, Dr Mike Ryan, has said that the world is breaking the bodies and minds of the children in Gaza as a result of the inaction and complicity of many world leaders. The Gaza Freedom Flotilla recognises what EU leaders did not. You do not stand by while children are starving. You do not stand by while they are shredded to pieces, as they are bombed in tents. And you do not stand by with those who carry out these crimes against humanity. It's time to end the EU complicity!”
• 2025-05-02 “E-001794/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is very concerned about reports of a drone attack on a ship carrying humanitarian aid and activists heading for Gaza. The EU discourages flotillas as a means for aid delivery. They risk the safety of their participants and carry the potential for escalation. However, nothing justifies attacking participants of flotillas with drones. Humanitarian aid is needed in Gaza to help people in desperate need. The EU repeats its call on Israel to allow unimpeded humanitarian aid to flow at scale into and throughout the strip. The High Representative/Vice-President has been engaged on this issue, including through calls with Israeli Foreign Minister and with international partners including the United Nations (UN). The High Representative/Vice President expressed deep concern at the humanitarian blockade, which has lasted more than two months, and at the intensified Israeli ground operation in Gaza 1 . The EU has consistently reiterated that in exercising its right to defend itself, Israel must fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, in all circumstances. The EU firmly condemns any attack on humanitarian aid workers and calls for accountability. The EU reiterates the importance of ensuring the protection of all civilians, including humanitarian workers, at all times, as well as civilian infrastructures, including medical facilities, schools and UN premises. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/statement_25_1155; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-donor-statement-humanitarian-aid-gaza%C2%A0_en.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-04-30 “E-001762/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Article 16(2) of the Drinking Water Directive 1 states that ‘in order to promote the use of tap water intended for human consumption, Member States shall ensure that outdoor and indoor equipment is set up in public spaces, where technically feasible, […]’. The Directive does not legally define the concept of 'public spaces' for the purpose of Article 16(2). Therefore, the definition of ‘public spaces’ must be determined at national level by the Member States. However, the Directive does provide examples of possible measures and public spaces in its recitals (33) to be considered by Member States when implementing the Directive, and which could be relevant for the question on football stadiums: 'for example by encouraging the free provision of water intended for human consumption in public administrations and public buildings or, for free or for a low service fee, for customers in restaurants, canteens and catering services’. 1 Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption (recast) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1–62.”
  Drinking regulation
• 2025-04-02 “– A Uachtaráin, I voted against this report because it shows just how committed European leaders are to militarisation and the arms race. The EU is founded as a peace project. Indeed, in the Schuman Declaration, it was said that the pooling of coal and steel production will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. Now we have European countries withdrawing from the Cluster Munitions Convention and the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention. In their desperation to give more and more public money to the arms industry, European leaders will next propose cutting public services. A better Europe is possible, one envisaged from 75 years ago, one that is committed to peace and one that defends the international institutions that were born out of the war – those institutions like the ICJ, the ICC and the UN.”
• 2025-03-19 “E-001175/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom’s (UK) customs territory. Exports from Northern Ireland are therefore subject to tariffs imposed on the UK by other countries. The EU countermeasures taken in response to the United States (US) tariffs only concern imports of US originating goods into the EU. They were not envisaged to target Northern Ireland. Therefore, no impact assessment has been carried out on the specific effects of the tariffs and countermeasures on Northern Ireland. For goods imported into Northern Ireland, EU customs and trade rules apply under the Windsor Framework – avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland. It is to be noted that if traders in Northern Ireland can prove that the goods did not enter the EU market, they can claim reimbursement of the duty paid to the UK, from the UK. This is a solution foreseen under the Windsor Framework. The Commission and relevant UK authorities are in contact and continue to exchange regularly.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports · EU-US trade relations
• 2025-03-12 “E-001065/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The ReArm Europe Plan foresees the possibility to incentivise defence-related investments in the EU budget. This has been deemed necessary to support Member States’ defence readiness as underlined in the Joint White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 1 . The ReArm Europe Plan has been devised, in light of the current geopolitical tensions, by the Commission to respond to a European Council tasking, notably to present a set of ‘developed options […] for public and private funding to strengthen the defence technological and industrial base and address critical capability gaps’ 2 . As part of this plan, the Commission adopted on 1 April 2025 measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review 3 of cohesion policy funds via amendments to existing cohesion policy regulations. Those aims at incentivising Member States to voluntarily adjust their cohesion programmes to invest in the EU’s emerging strategic priorities. In particular, the proposal enables Member States to make better use of current possibilities to build resilient infrastructures to foster military mobility and to support and enhance productive capacities of small and large enterprises in the defence sector. Furthermore, the proposal will also encourage skills development in the defence industry to narrow the existing skills gap. All proposals by the Commission respect the procedures foreseen in terms of impact assessment and stakeholder consultations, as outlined in the appropriate Commission Staff Working Document 4 . Rules for adoption of cohesion policy programme amendments are not modified and therefore will be subject to approval by the monitoring committees as applicable to ensure scrutiny by stakeholders. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readines s%202030.pdf. 2 European Council conclusions, 27 June 2024 (conclusion 26, p. 8). 3 COM(2025)123 final; https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/communication/mid-term-review2025/communication-mid-term-review-2025_en.pdf. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/d0bbd77f-bee5-4ee5-b5c46110c7605476_en?filename=swd2021_305_en.pdf.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-02-14 “P-000317/2025 P-000280/2025 E-000336/2025 E-000701/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The EU programme for the environment and climate action (LIFE) 1 provides amongst others financial support for the functioning of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) supporting civil society’s participation in policy making, promoting a pluralistic approach and recognising that NGOs are an integral part of a well-functioning democratic system. Each year 30 to 35 operating grant agreements are awarded under the LIFE Programme, following a call for proposals and a competitive procedure. NGOs applying submit proposals that include their work programme of activities in the policy areas indicated in the LIFE Regulation 2 . The NGOs work programmes, which are annexed to their grant agreements, may mention among other activities, advocacy related to environmental, climate and energy transition policies. The Commission does not prescribe the specific activities to be carried out by the NGOs in their work programme, nor does it instruct them to support specific positions. The Commission emphasises that operating grants are complying with the LIFE Regulation adopted by the co-legislators and their management is fully in line with the EU Financial Regulation 3 . The Commission agrees that funding agreements involving specifically detailed activities directed at EU institutions and some of their representatives, even if they do not breach the legal framework, may entail a reputational risk for the EU. To mitigate this risk, guidance 4 for both existing grant agreements and future calls has been issued, addressed to all Commission services and applicable to all spending programmes. The guidance clarifies which activities should not be mandated as a requirement or condition for EU financing. The Commission adheres strictly to its impartiality and transparency obligations as outlined in Article 38 of the Financial Regulation, which requires publishing information about recipients and does not require the disclosure, of advocacy activities funded through grant agreements. The Commission also promotes transparency by proactively sharing the objectives and outcomes of funded projects on the EU Funding & Tenders Portal 5 . The NGOs benefiting from LIFE support and the grant amount received are published annually in the Commission’s Financial Transparency System webpage 6 as well as on the LIFE website 7 . Furthermore, 1 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life_en 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/783 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing a Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE), and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1293/2013, OJ L 172, 17.5.2021, p. 53–78. 3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/guidance-fundingdev-impl-monit-enforce-of-eu-law_en.pdf 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home 6 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html 7 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life/life-operating-grants_en”
  EU engagement with civil society · Transparency requirements for interest groups
• 2025-02-14 “E-000702/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. In March 2024, six EU reference laboratories (EURLs) for public health 1 were designated by the Commission as per Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 2 . One of these EURLs focuses on high risk, emerging and zoonotic bacterial pathogens (EURL-PH-HEZB), which includes Lyme borreliosis (also known as Lyme disease). This EURL has been tasked with supporting national reference laboratories by providing reference diagnostics and test protocols, reference materials, external quality assessments, scientific advice, technical assistance and training, among other things. These activities will support Member States in implementing accurate diagnostic methods for Lyme borreliosis. The EURL-PH-HEZB started its activities on 1 January 2025 3 and is financially supported by the EU4Health Programme. 2. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) collects surveillance data from Member States on Lyme neuroborreliosis, a severe form of Lyme borreliosis. Surveillance of Lyme neuroborreliosis was deemed more feasible than surveillance of Lyme borreliosis, as a more precise and standardised case definition is possible and as it is likely less susceptible to under-reporting due to its severity 4 . This makes surveillance data more comparable between Member States. ECDC is supporting Member States by identifying inconsistencies in reporting and providing advice on how to improve the data quality. Currently, the ECDC is performing an in-depth analysis of the Lyme neuroborreliosis surveillance data reported by Member States to the ECDC. Based on this analysis, the ECDC plans to develop and implement specific recommendations to improve the reporting of Lyme neuroborreliosis data in 2026. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/892/oj 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2371/oj 3 https://www.rki.de/EN/News/Newsroom/News/Archive/2025-01-20-referencelaboratory.html#:~:text=The%20EURL%2DPH%2DHEZB%20covers,Q%20fever)%2C%20Rickettsia%20spp 4 van den Wijngaard Cees C, Hofhuis Agnetha, Simões Mariana, Rood Ente, van Pelt Wilfrid, Zeller Herve, Van Bortel Wim. Surveillance perspective on Lyme borreliosis across the European Union and European Economic Area. Euro Surveill. 2017;22(27):pii=30569. https://doi.org/10.2807/15607917.ES.2017.22.27.30569”
  EU competences on health · Vaccination
• 2025-02-11 “E-000618/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to ensuring that Palestinians, including those with disabilities, receive the humanitarian assistance they need. The Commission works closely with trusted humanitarian partners to ensure that aid reaches those most in need, including persons with disabilities. Commission experts monitor the situation and engage with partners, such as Palestinian civil society organisations, to assess needs. In 2024, the Commission notably funded the organisation Humanity & Inclusion to ensure that children have access to safe and quality inclusive education and to provide assistive technologies, rehabilitation services and medical assistance to children with disabilities. Since the beginning of the crisis, the Commission has allocated some EUR 450 million to support the humanitarian response, providing persons with disabilities inclusive and accessible assistance. When it comes to return and reconstruction, humanitarian actors stand ready to assist people with emergency and early recovery assistance and to ensure the specific needs of persons with disabilities are duly taken into account. In order to support the ceasefire in Gaza, the EU’s civilian Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) continues to be operational, allowing for the movement of individuals out of Gaza, including some who require medical treatment. The Commission also uses its convening power to sensitise other donors to important issues such as disability inclusion. The Commission exchanges closely with Organisations of Persons with Disabilities (OPDs) at global level and encourages partners to pursue dialogues with local OPDs, in line with the Commission’s localisation guidance.”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations
• 2025-02-10 “E-000593/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2735 (2024) 1 , the EU rejects any attempt at demographic or territorial changes in the Gaza Strip and supports unifying the Gaza Strip with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority, as the EU made clear on the occasion of the 13 th EU-Israel Association Council held on 24 February 2025 2 . This is also in line with the five key principles set by the Commission President in November 2023 on Gaza (Gaza to be an essential part of the future Palestinian State, and no forced displacement of Palestinians) 3 . These messages have also been conveyed to partners in the United States. The EU has been constantly clear in affirming its unwavering commitment to the two-state solution; this is the only solution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The High Representative/Vice-President will continue to spare no effort to revive the political process towards the two-state solution. It would be for the Council to decide on the imposition of new restrictive measures (sanctions) by unanimity. 1 https://docs.un.org/en/s/RES/2735(2024) 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6511-2025-INIT/en/pdf 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_5646”
  EU-US relations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-02-04 “E-000488/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission 1. Since 1996, Israel's association to the EU framework programmes for research and innovation (R&I) has been a success story with clear mutual benefits across various priority areas including information and communication technologies, health, advanced manufacturing, climate change and energy, as well as biotechnology. At this stage, it is premature to discuss which countries would be allowed to participate in or offered association to the successor of the current framework programme for R&I and under which terms as it is still to be scrutinised and adopted by the co- legislators, based on a proposal that is yet to be adopted by the Commission. 2. In accordance with Article 2 Treaty on European Union, the EU is founded on the values of inter alia respect for human rights. In consequence and in application of relevant EU, national and international law 1 , the EU will continue to reaffirm its commitment to the protection and promotion of human rights including in R&I related activities, applicable to all participants in the R&I framework programmes regardless of their nationality. 3. Currently, any R&I activities carried out under Horizon Europe 2 must have an exclusive focus on civil applications, as set forth in applicable rules and in particular in the Horizon Europe Regulation 3 . During the implementation of Horizon Europe projects, all beneficiaries must ensure that the activities under the action comply with these rules. 1 Including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Supplementary Protocols. 2 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32021R0695, OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 1–68.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU competences on human rights
• 2025-01-12 “E-000085/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission In view of the preparation of funding programmes under the next EU multiannual financial framework, the Commission is reflecting on the possibility of providing adequate, strategically targeted support for dual-use technology development, in line with the European Economic Security Strategy 1 . These reflections will take into account the outcome of the public consultation on the White paper on options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential 2 and build on strategic directions and proposals found in important documents that develop a vision for the future, such as the Letta Report 3 , the Draghi Report 4 , the Heitor Report 5 and the Niinistö Report 6 . This is without prejudice to the fact that the defence of the Member States’ territory and citizens is an exclusively national competence. The Commission has defined its overarching political priorities and objectives for the period 2024-2029 7 . In terms of the next EU multiannual financial framework, the Union budget will be more focused on aligning with these priorities and objectives, in a simpler and more impactful way. It will be for the co-legislators to discuss the future Commission’s legislative proposals and adopt the next multiannual financial framework in line with the EU’s priorities, objectives and funding needs. 1 JOIN (2023) 20 final of 20.06.2023. 2 COM(2024) 27 of 24.1.2024. 3 Much more than a market – Speed, Security, Solidarity, April 2024 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf 4 The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe, September 2024 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4cf152a8232961_en?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20_%20A%20competitiv eness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf 5 Align, act, accelerate: Research, technology and innovation to boost European competitiveness, September 2024 https://era.gv.at/public/documents/5177/Align_Act_Accelerate_Research_Technology_and_Innovation_to_boost _European_Comp_rjTSuEu.pdf 6 Safe together – Strengthening Europe's civilian and military preparedness and readiness, October 2024 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b778739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf 7 https://commission.europa.eu/priorities-2024-2029_en”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-01-09 “E-000054/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. There can be many reasons why an air carrier refuses carriage to passengers, such as reasons of health, safety or security, inadequate travel documentation or late arrival at the gate. These situations do not constitute ‘denied boarding’ pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 1 and need to be distinguished from cases where an operating air carrier denies boarding to passengers due to overbooking or for operational reasons, such as the last minute switch to a smaller aircraft. 2. Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 provides for a comprehensive set of rights for passengers who are denied boarding. If an operating air carrier expects to deny boarding to passengers, it has to call for volunteers who surrender their reservation in exchange for benefits to be agreed between them and the carrier. If an insufficient number of volunteers comes forward the operating air carrier may then deny boarding to passengers against their will under the condition that these passengers are immediately compensated and are either re-routed or reimbursed and offered assistance (food and accommodation) while waiting for the departure of their new flights. The website Your Europe and the passenger rights app provide this information in all official EU languages 2 . In view of the effective protection of passengers in case of denied boarding against their will provided by the EU rules on air passenger rights and given the results of previous studies on the topic of overbooking and denied boarding 3 the Commission does not consider it necessary to assess further the impact of overbooking on passengers. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/261/oj/eng 2 https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/travel/passenger-rights/index_en.htm 3 See for example https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/study-protection-eu-air-passenger-rights2020-09-04_en”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• 2025-01-08 “E-000041/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission Article 17 of the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive 1 requires that Member States shall determine penalties applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take all national measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The Irish National Action Plan for the Sustainable Use of Pesticides required by Directive 2009/128/EC states that the national regulations give effect to this Directive’s restrictions on the use of pesticides in areas used by the general public or by vulnerable groups as defined in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No. 1107/2009. The Irish Department of Agriculture and Food is responsible for investigating all pesticiderelated complaints under the applicable legislative framework. The Commission does not provide any specific recommendations to Member States on responding to complaints about pesticide use received from vulnerable groups. Member States have a primary responsibility to monitor the application of the relevant legal provisions and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will continue monitoring the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. 1 Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides.”
  Reduction targets for pesticides · EU policy on pesticides
• 2025-01-08 “E-000042/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission EU product legislation and standards are applicable for products intended for the EU market and which will be made available to consumers in the EU 1 . Toys that are placed on the EU market, whether manufactured in the EU or in a third country, need to comply with EU toy safety rules 2 . However, toys which are manufactured in the EU but exported to other third countries are not subject to the above-mentioned EU toy safety rules. These toys need to comply with the applicable rules for toy safety in the country of destination. Accordingly, toys which are exported outside the EU are not assessed for compliance with EU rules. The Commission does not have data on EU exports of toys that are not compliant with EU toy safety legislation. 1 See section 2 of the Commission Notice ‘The ‘Blue Guide’ on the implementation of EU product rules 2022’ 2022/C 247/01. 2 Directive 2009/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 on the safety of toys, OJ L 170 30.6.2009, p. 1.”
  EU competences on consumer protection and product standards
• 2024-11-19 “E-002585/2024 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission On 3 December 2024 during the meeting on the Consultative Forum on EU External Aviation Policy, the Commission informed EU carriers that, in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 1 , the Euro-Mediterranean aviation agreement between the EU and Morocco does not apply to routes from the territory of an EU Member State to the territory of the Western Sahara. 1 See notably case T-275/18, Front Polisario v Council, paragraph 41.”
  EU policy on Western Sahara · Trade relations with Morocco
• 2024-11-14 “E-002542/2024 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission In 2024, the Commission allocated a total of EUR 4.4 million in humanitarian assistance to Cuba. The Commission has closely followed the impacts of recent hurricanes and earthquakes, compounding an already dire situation in the country. A humanitarian expert was deployed to assess the needs after the disasters stroke. The Commission supported the emergency response with further EUR 3.9 million. In addition, it deployed a humanitarian airbridge to transport more than 100 tons of humanitarian supplies from the United Nations, EU, and Spanish stocks in five flights, providing relief to populations affected by hurricane Oscar. Furthermore, it allocated EUR 500 000 in humanitarian aid to respond to urgent health needs due to medicine shortages across the country. The EU stands ready to provide additional humanitarian aid based on assessments of new needs. In a longer-term perspective, the EU will continue to provide support under the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 1 and through the Global Gateway 2 to strengthen development and resilience. This includes programmes in crucial sectors such as water and sanitation, and energy. The EU has a longstanding cooperation in both sectors and through the Global Gateway there is potential for European investments on renewable energy infrastructure. 1 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/31833263-a4e0-4027-b98783ac795275d9_en?filename=mip-2021-c2021-9130-cuba-annex_en.pdf 2 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/globalgateway_en”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2024-11-04 “E-002394/2024 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Article 5(5) of the Delegated Regulation 2024/1364 1 (Delegated Act) states that the European database on data centres cannot be accessed by the public. In accordance with Article 12(3) of recast Energy Efficiency Directive 2 (EED recast), the public will have access only to the aggregated data (via a webpage, currently under development), which are described in detail in Annex IV of the Delegated Act. Thus, only asking data centre operators to communicate the relevant data and information to the European database, without other means of making this information publicly accessible, would not be adequate for the fulfilment of the Member States’ obligations under Article 12(1) of the EED recast. 1 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1364 of 14 March 2024 on the first phase of the establishment of a common Union rating scheme for data centres: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2024/1364/oj 2 Directive (EU) 2023/1791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on energy efficiency and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 (recast): http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/1791/oj”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-30 “E-002314/2024 Answer given by Commissioner Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) 1 aims to enhance the EU defence industry's responsiveness and build an integrated defence market. It has its legal basis in Article 114 and 173(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2 , which provide that the European Parliament and Council act in line with the ordinary legislative procedure, and it is fully compliant with Article 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union 3 . This legal basis was confirmed by the adoption of ASAP by the European Parliament and Council. Regardless of the profit margins of certain actors in the sector, the programme’s intervention logic addresses the market failure in the production of ammunition and missiles, where capacity throughout the supply chain manifestly failed to match the need in the new global context. To address risks of excessive profits, the Commission has been considering mitigation measures, by including rules on additionality in ASAP (preventing funding of projects that are already fully financed) and proposing a reinforced no-profit rule and a corresponding EU funding recovery mechanism in the European Defence Industry Programme 4 . The programme funds production capacity and delivery activities, but not defence products directly. The Commission has imposed requirements on its funding based on the intended use of EU-financed capacities. Actions related to the production of goods or delivery of services that are prohibited under applicable international law are explicitly excluded. All ASAP actions comply with it. Regarding concerns about ammunition produced under this Regulation being sold outside the EU, export control of all defence-related products and technologies remains the exclusive prerogative of Member States. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union.html 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF 4 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edip-future-defence_en”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence · Arms export from the EU
• 2024-10-17 “E-002151/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU has taken good note of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in respect of the ‘Legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem’ 1 . The EU has a long-standing position of non-recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 and considers Israel’s settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as illegal. EU positions and policies are fully aligned on the United Nations resolutions regarding the status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and are therefore overall consistent with the conclusions of the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ. The EU differentiation policy implies that goods originating from Israeli settlements in occupied territories since June 1967 do not fall within the scope of the EU-Israel Association Agreement 2 and therefore cannot benefit from trade preferences under the Agreement. Member States will discuss further in the relevant Council preparatory bodies the impact of the Advisory Opinion on EU positions and policies. As regards targeted EU restrictive measures (sanctions) imposed on extremist settlers in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, the EU has already listed nine individuals and five entities 3 under the EU's Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime for serious and systematic human rights abuses against Palestinians in the West Bank. Additional proposals brought forward by Member States and the High Representative/Vice-President are currently under discussion in the relevant Council preparatory bodies. Any decision on further sanctions is for the Council to take in unanimity. 1 https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-adv-01-00-en.pdf 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:411c0668-144d-44a1-a5e3dd2342f7a5b5.0017.02/DOC_1&format=PDF 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401175; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401967”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2024-10-17 “E-002143/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The Third Level Access activity (which included the Fund for Student Disabilities (FSD)) ceased being co-financed by the European Social Fund (ESF) 2014-2020 Operational Programme in 2018. The salaries of personal assistants employed by the Higher Education Authority and by the Education and Training Boards are not co-financed by European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) for the 2021-2027 programming period. Starting with the 2020-2021 academic year, SOLAS assumed sole responsibility for the management of the FSD, including the drafting and issuing of guidelines. 1. In the EU, wages are regulated on a national level with the participation of social partners and in full respect of and after taking into account EU law. While Directive 2023/970 1 calls on Member States to apply and support the principle of equal pay for equal work, there are no EU requirements that could guarantee equality of pay for the same work across different funding programmes. The responsibility for equal pay therefore lies on the national level. 2. In the 2021 2027 programming period, the Commission has not issued guidance on how to ensure equal pay across ESF+ funded programmes to Ireland or other Member States. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/970/oj”
  EU policy on social criteria in public funding · EU policy on disability inclusion & accessibility
• 2024-10-17 “E-002142/2024 Answer given by Mr Varhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission recognises the significant medical and socioeconomic consequences of Long COVID and remains committed to supporting effective responses across these areas. The Network of Expertise on Long COVID (NELC), established within the Commission in 2023, aims to strengthen the response to Long COVID. The NELC brings together 39 institutions from 20 Member States and Iceland, working on Long COVID, and it provides a platform for exchanges of national experiences on diagnosis, treatment, and management of Long COVID 1 . Within this group, the Commission promotes relevant research on Long COVID by providing updates on EU-funded projects and by inviting participants to relevant projects or initiatives to share their results to ensure that research results inform the development of efficient public health policies. In addition, a dedicated stakeholder network has been created within the EU Health Policy Platform. It serves to share relevant insights and access resources related to Long COVID, including recent scientific publications. 2. The Commission is currently launching an EU4Health project on Long COVID with the World Health Organization and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. It will include enhancing Long COVID management through international collaboration on clinical guidelines based on evidence. These guidelines will help Member States to support patients of Long COVID. 3. There is a need for paediatric Long COVID care for children and adolescents. The Commission aims to ensure that it is adequately considered and discussed in all ongoing efforts. The Commission’s patient support initiative is inclusive, aiming to serve all population groups, regardless of age. 1 More information can be found on the Commission’s website: https://health.ec.europa.eu/non-communicablediseases/expert-group-public-health/network-expertise-long-covid_en”
  EU competences on health
• 2024-09-03 “E-001600/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Article 30e(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC 1 allows Member States to request a derogation to temporarily exempt regulated entities from the obligation to surrender allowances under the new emission trading system for buildings, road transport and other sectors, subject to conditions. Ireland has notified a request to apply this derogation pursuant to Article 30e(3)(a) of Directive 2003/87/EC. The assessment of this request is ongoing and the final position of the Commission is still pending. As concerns the requirement laid down in Article 30e(3)(h) of Directive 2003/87/EC, in its notification Ireland has committed to allocate an amount equivalent to the revenues to which Article 30d(6) would apply in the absence of derogation, to one or more of the measures listed or referred to in that Article. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/87/oj”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2024-09-03 “E-001599/2024 Answer given by Mr Reynders on behalf of the European Commission Article 14 of Directive (EU) 2024/1203 1 (the Environmental Crime Directive) requires Member States to grant support and assistance to those who report environmental crimes and cooperate in criminal proceedings in accordance with national law. Member States have to transpose the Environmental Crime Directive by May 2026. Since Denmark does not take part in the EU criminal policy according to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Protocol (No. 22) on the position of Denmark, 2 this Directive does not seem to apply to the present case nor places a responsibility on the Danish Government to protect Mr Watson. Extradition is a procedure between competent State authorities based on multilateral, bilateral or EU agreements, taking into account the particular circumstances of each individual case where extradition is requested. In this particular case, it is the Danish Ministry of Justice that decides whether there is a legal basis for extraditing Mr Watson for prosecution to Japan. The Commission cannot interfere or influence the decision taken by the Danish authorities. The Commission remains fully committed to protecting environmental defenders and enforcing international environmental laws, including the moratorium on commercial whaling under the International Whaling Commission (IWC). The case of Mr Watson is followed closely, and the EU has consistently voiced strong concerns about Japan’s whaling activities. The Commission will continue to use all available diplomatic channels to engage with Japan on this, working to discourage such practices, protect environmental defenders and uphold the IWC moratorium. 1 Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and 2009/123/EC, OJ L, 2024/1203, 30.4.2024, Article 14, Recitals (54), (55) and (56). 2 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocols, Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 299–303.”
  Environmental crimes and justice · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2024-08-08 “E-001502/2024 Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission The Visa Code 1 provides under Article 9(2) that, as a rule, appointments for lodging a visa application shall take place within a period of two weeks from the date when the appointment was requested. In line with the Visa Code, Member States may entrust external service providers with the task of collecting data and applications. It appears that the slots for appointments for third country nationals wishing to request a visa in Ireland are released in batches and are booked almost immediately due to high demand from applicants. The surge in traffic and rapid booking of slots can overload websites. The management and operation of the visa appointment system falls under the responsibility of individual Member States. The Commission is in close contact with Member States to try to address this issue, in particular by providing funding through the Border Management and Visa Instrument, to finance additional staff in consulates. Recently, the visa fee has also been increased from EUR 80 to EUR 90, which should bring additional resources to Member States to reinforce their visa processing capacities. 1 Regulation (EC) 810/2009 of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas.”
  Legal migration · Enlargement of Schengen area
• “Thank you, chair, and thank you, commissioner, for being with us today. I'd like to just ask a question about the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, specifically about Britain's potential association with that mechanism. Despite Brexit, Britain and Northern Ireland could have remained covered under the mechanism like the other non-EU participating states. However, the British government decided in their wisdom not to, with potentially severe consequences for Ireland. And as it stands, Northern Ireland cannot receive the support of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism in times of natural disasters. And we know that Ireland benefited from the UCPM after Storm E1 last year, but the expertise of our European partners was unavailable to the six counties. So, commissioner, could you perhaps provide us with an update on talks with the British government about them potentially rejoining the UCPM?”
  EU policy on criminal justice
• “And to get to the substance of the amendments themselves, which are also very problematic. I also want to discuss just the annex of the agreement, the unilateral declaration attached by the annex to the by the EU, outlining a commitment to provide funding for the region is incredibly problematic. We know that Western Sahara is an occupied territory, and by not applying a policy of differentiation between Sahara and Moroccan settlers, the commission could find itself in the awkward position of actually incentivizing occupation and the continued denial of self-determination. So I would like to ask the commission, have you carried out any impact assessment on how this will impact the EU's long standing commitment to the UN referendum process? And did you use the leverage that you have due to the the Court of Justice ruling to put the UN referendum process back on the agenda.”
  Trade relations with Morocco
• “Dear colleagues, there is now no doubt that Israel and the United States represent the greatest threat to global security and are a risk to social cohesion right across Europe. They have not only caused the worst oil and gas crisis in history and for the cost of living in the EU to skyrocket. Israel and the United States are carrying out illegal wars, bombing school children, hunting and killing journalists and paramedics, and targeting our UN peacekeepers. And meanwhile, ordinary citizens in Europe look on aghast not only at the tearing up of international law, but also at their own governments and EU institutions who seem to treat the energy crisis as a natural disaster and not as a direct consequence of US and Israeli actions. Fuel protests have already shut down Ireland, and the protests will spread across Europe if leaders fail to stand up for their citizens, if they fail to hold rogue states to account, if they fail to end their dependence on fossil fuels. Fail to break the link between gas and renewables and fail to rein in the corporate greed and tax the windfall profits.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Over 400 sites under Unwra, four sites under the mercenary led humanitarian fund. We're also told that a human rights environment and labor clauses in international agreements must be respected. We just heard that as others have said, my colleagues have said around Mercosur to tell us that we should trust you, that, you know, we will hold these countries to account, that this is all legally binding and therefore we can allow these deals to go ahead. But yet we are seeing clearly two reports showing that Israel is not complying with the rules of the trade agreement, and there has been no consequences. I also want to address the false claims. We've heard about dialogue that came out of Commissioner Carlos, because the dialogue while the dialogue was happening in February, two deputies, including myself, were being deported at the exact same time as Israel was having dialogue with its EU partners. And two officials of this institution were also deported at that time. So, you know, can the Commission confirm that if the agreement is suspended, we can, of course, continue to have dialogue with Israel through normal diplomatic relationships, as is the case with any other country? And finally, I just want to ask about the ICJ advisory opinion. We know that the differentiation policy is insufficient. And paragraph two, seven, eight of that opinion clarifies that under international law, trade with settlements is illegal. It is the proceeds of crime. So will the Commission bring forward a proposal to ban trade with settlement goods, as is required under international law?”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Thank you chair and hopefully the microphone won't go rogue on me this time. I'm going to remain very calm because I think what we just heard was a lesson in fantasy. I can't go and do my job as the chair of the delegation for relations with Palestine because I have been barred for five years. I have not committed any crime. I have literally spoken up for international law and the freedom of expression, something that this EU institution claims to be a pillar that it holds up to the rest of the world to emulate. So that's the reality on the ground. I would love to go and do my job, the job I'm being paid to do. But here let's talk about facts. If we want to park whether or not there's a genocide, I believe there is a genocide happening. I think the majority of the international community now believe that is happening. But the ICJ ruling also said there was an obligation on third parties to prevent a genocide. So we have obligations whether or not you agree genocide is happening, you have obligations to prevent it from happening. We have got an advisory opinion, a cast iron advisory opinion on the illegal settlements that is indisputable. Paragraph two seven eight also says that the EU institutions must not do anything that entrenches that illegal occupation and shouldn't trade or have economic services with it. They're the facts. As I said, the ICC has two arrest warrants out. They're not just random figures that the arrest warrants are for, they're for the prime minister of Israel. So those are the facts here. And what I have a question for Mister Becheri because I think this is descending now. He's come in, he's given his time as an expert, someone who has expertise in the institutions. Do you believe that the credibility of the EU has been fundamentally damaged on the international stage and damages our credibility in negotiating any human rights clauses and trade agreements because of our failure to act on Israel's breach of Article Two? And secondly, I would like just to hear your view on whether or not the EU has taken into account paragraph two seven eight. Thank you.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “44:19 – 17:46:32): Thank you chair. I think this is a really important study and an analysis and I welcome the fact that we're having a conversation on the report today. I think the loopholes in our legislation let certain dual use goods invisible or untraceable and we thank the authors of the study for highlighting the worrying gaps at a time of heightened conflict and increased militarization. As others have said, the electronic components, industrial bearings, software, civilian drones are all on the surface just ordinary trade but however, as the study confirms, these goods do end up in missiles, in arms factories, in the hands of forces that violate international humanitarian law on a daily basis. And I would kind of ask the authors maybe to comment on the fact that a Belgian court has demonstrated the loophole in 2025 if a Flemish judge ordered the suspension of a shipment of industrial bearings destined for the Israeli defense industry. So it wasn't a parliament, it wasn't the commission, it was actually a court and that's because of course our institutions have failed to act and our legislation has not put in place the necessary mechanisms. And so this is a legal precedent. It is also a huge warning but I would be interested to hear just the author of the report what their view is on that case. And as others have said, it's not necessarily the lack of legislation but it's that the legal framework has a structural problem that unlisted goods circulate freely to countries at war as long as there is no formal embargo. So whether that's Israel, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, there's no embargo so there's no mandatory controls. So this was from the Left's perspective. We are calling for three things and others have made these requests as well and that is to close this legislative loophole but it's also to incorporate humanitarian law as a binding criterion and then of course as has been very very clearly heard and I hope will be listened to by those who can affect the change is that we absolutely need to publish the clear granular data on what we are actually exporting because we cannot rely on courts to do the work where politicians are failing. So I'll leave it there chair.”
  Arms export from the EU
• “So it wasn't seen as a protectionist measure, but was actually seen as part of a climate justice measure. And this redistributive measure was shot down, my understanding at the time, but it now seems that the Commission is able to find a way to redistribute Cbam revenues, but unfortunately not to the LDCs bearing the brunt of climate change, but instead to the large European industries which are responsible for exacerbating climate change. So I think I'd like to see where is the policy creativity when it comes to supporting developing countries? And has the Commission given any thoughts to more redistributive measures, such as a global dimension to the Temporary Decarbonisation Fund? Have you also considered dual carbon pricing measures that would allow third countries to charge a carbon export tax that would actually match the EU ETS price on carbon intensive products, but allow for the revenues then to be retained within the country. So again, just to allay those fears in the global South that this is actually a climate measure and not a protectionist measure.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• “Carmen, good chair. And welcome to Minister Rasmussen. I listened carefully to your opening statement, and you spoke of your intention to have an open and robust Non-robust trading policy. Um, I agree that that trade policy must be one that's based then on rules and enforcement instruments. When parties to trade agreements fail to comply with the terms of the trade agreement, it's really important that we're able to take measures to rectify that. So I'm particularly keen to hear of the Danish presidency will be one that upholds trade agreements and international law. And the eeaS report that was presented to member states at the last council meeting was very clear that Israel is in breach of article two of the EU Association Agreement. And yet, despite this mounting evidence and legal analysis that we heard also in the committee today, the EU and I believe even as recently as an hour ago, have decided that they're not going to take any measures against Israel. And so clearly this damages the EU's credibility in negotiating international trade agreements. I mean, why would any country take the EU seriously on upholding its own agreements when they're failing to uphold Israel and under article two of the EU Israel Association Agreement. But also we now know that both the EU Council and the European Commission are being taken to court for not upholding their own treaties. So my question for Mr. Rossman is will we see leadership coming out of the Danish presidency now in relation to the EU Israel Association Agreement? And just is it your understanding that trade with Israel can be suspended under the Common Commercial Policy as the precedent that was set with Syria provided, and that it does not require unanimity?”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “(15:38:53 – 15:40:01): there, CBAM revenues can indeed, be ring fenced and redirected towards a new fund. So what we get is yet another fund for polluting industries, but with no social conditionality. And I think that that has been criticized by the European Court of Auditors for having very little additional decarbonization benefit. So I think the fund needs much stronger environmental and social conditionality, and at a minimum, all beneficiaries should be making progress towards a climate transition plan. Mister Khanathan's report proposes to extend eligibility for the fund to downstream actors in in the farming sector, and I agree with the intention, I think, to find more support for farmers who are struggling, particularly due to the rise in fertilizer prices caused by the oil and gas crisis. However, again, I think a bit more conditionality is needed there too. And also to avoid administrative burden on farmers, I think we could look to requirements at a national level to to reduce fertilizer use. But I look forward to engaging, and having constructive discussions with both repertoires on these files, and I think there is an awful lot of common ground among us. Thank you.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• “Thank you, chair. And thank you to director Skopje for for her presentation and for being with us today to discuss this important file. Um, I would like to first take to acknowledge the approach that's been taken on the cbam simplification. And because it does actually seek to at least maintain to a large extent the integrity of, of the instrument, um, which can't be said for other files that are included in the omnibus package. Um, that said, I suppose I have two concerns that I want to raise. One is just around the, um, lack of a public consultation and that no public consultation took place that might have allowed for expert scrutiny and a chance to better refine the commission's proposal. And I think that this highlights the major procedural flaws around the whole omnibus, because instead of the public consultation required by the Better Regulation rules, the omnibus seems to have gotten a closed door, invite only consultation meeting that was dominated by industry. And so I think this is an unprecedented step, and it only serves to to feed into that increase in public distrust in the commission's deregulation agenda. So I suppose the first question for Director Scarpia is can you confirm that any future delegated act updating the new Cbam threshold will be open to stakeholder feedback as per the better regulation rules? And the second question I have is just around the exclusion of materials which have been subjected to a carbon price that is fully linked to the EU, ETS. And this is particularly relevant for for Ireland given the customs border on our island. So can you give any updates as to the potential linking of the EU and the British ETS, and whether this provision would remove the cbam charge for goods passing from one customs jurisdiction to another.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• “Sorry. So I think I'm trying to get into the time, but I think that the Commission must recognize the legal situation. So we would like to see their legal advice. That is telling them that what they're trying to do is in compliance with the court ruling.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “When we look at everything that's justified as cutting red tape today, we have to admit that we're really just cutting our social and environmental protections. The environmental omnibus strips down the permitting rules for anything strategic and so-called strategic defense infrastructure, airports and data centers will not help the green transition. In Ireland, data centers are pushing up the price of electricity for ordinary households, and they're blowing a hole in Ireland's climate targets. The Industrial Accelerator Act wants to reduce permitting requirements for all factories and acceleration areas. Despite our growing awareness that industrial pollution is destroying people's soils, water and health across the EU, at the same time, access to justice is being restricted by legal tools. Sweeping cuts to environmental rules and public participation will not give us a stable, just energy transition. For example, what we need is better resourcing of the planning system, not blocking people's rights to access justice. This simplification obsession will bring us errors, but errors that will be felt for decades to come.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you chair, and thanks to the presentation on the report. I'm new to this committee, but I'm pretty sure that the primary objective of EU free trade agreements is to enhance bilateral trade. So I'm a bit bewildered as to why the Commission and the authors of this report did not include in the evaluation how increased trade volumes and specific traded goods could impact climate through increased emissions from transportation, production and consumption. For example, if you look at the increase in trade between the EU and Canada, that free trade agreement led to increases in products such as fertilizers, nickel, uranium and tar, sand oils. And all of these we know are, you know, it's not controversial to say they're particularly harmful, both environmentally and socially. Tar sand oils are known for emitting 23% more greenhouse gases than conventional oil. So I suppose the question is how can the report make a, you know, a positive assessment of CETA in terms of environmental impact, when the analysis clearly has not accounted for the increased trade in those carbon intensive goods such as tar, sand, oils. And so, I mean, if we want to really talk about trade being sustainable and not contributing to the climate crisis, I'm very bewildered as to why that wasn't part of the analysis for the commission and the authors.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• “I think that that was very unhelpful and certainly was raised with with other countries as something that they didn't see coming from the EU. But, um, I think there is a real need for, for all of us to reflect on the process more broadly. Um, I also would say that the, the ban on peaceful civil society demonstrations in Uganda, uh, is deeply regrettable. Civil society already has less access to this process than they would in the cup process, for example. And I would put it to the commission that by tolerating such moves, the EU is undermining WTO reform and is preventing that real and collaborative reform process. So I think what we all want to learn from the saga is if the Commission doesn't want a repeat of MC 14, then we need to stop cheerleading the United States. We need to stop cheerleading the big tech oligarchs as they attempt to dismantle multilateralism and instead work with Global South countries who are there to deliver real reform which will support sustainable and fair trade.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Thank you chair and I suppose the first thing just to say for the record, I think, believe Mister Bachera is a former DG Trade so is very experienced and knowledgeable about the institution so it's hardly a left wing radical that's been brought in to spout left wing talking points. And I also think just we need to deal with the facts here about the EU institutions and putting aside which country it is that's involved in the breaches of international law.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “(16:03:53 – 16:05:26): Thank you, chair. And I think, look, after several rocky years, it is a relief to hear that the deforestation regulation will not be reopened. I think it's finally time to let it do its job. And for that, we need certainty that it will not be undermined again before it is up and running. I mean, other colleagues have raised the issue of leather, and I share their their concerns on that and the lack of coherence. But the simplification report mentions that the EUDR is already driving reforms of forest governance governance worldwide, which, again, I think just shows the importance of EU leadership and why we need the political courage to not stall the EUDR any further. But in relation to, this reform of forest governance, did the secondary literature find any indications of parallel improvements in workers' rights, sorry. I'll slow down, land rights, and the protection of human rights defenders? And I also have a question on the repository of certification schemes. Will you screen the schemes that are included, for example, by requiring them to meet the the relevant ISO standards for certifiers? And then the final question is just around the progress of the IT scheme or the IT system. In order to avoid a repeat of past issues with the readiness of the IT system, can you commit to keeping parliament and stakeholders informed about the progress towards its reopening? And apologies to the interpreters.”
  Trade impact on forests