- 2026-03-10 “Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question The assessment of third-country extraterritorial sanctions on Cuba should be framed within the EU’s commitment to safeguarding legitimate trade and humanitarian access. The EU rejects the extraterritorial application of unilateral sanctions by third countries, as it considers such measures contrary to international law. In this context, the EU has established legislative instruments, notably the ‘Blocking Statute’ [1] , which shields European economic operators from the legal effects of third-country sanctions and to ensure the continuity of lawful business activities, including with Cuba. Member States’ authorities are responsible for implementing the Blocking Statute, including with respect to penalties for possible breaches. EU operators whose economic and financial interests are affected by the extra-territorial application of those laws are obligated to inform the Commission. Since 1994, the Commission has been actively engaged in addressing the most pressing needs of the population in Cuba. In 2024-2025, the Commission released close to EUR 10 million to provide lifesaving health services, as well as emergency relief to hurricane-stricken communities. As an immediate response to the steadfast deterioration of the humanitarian crisis in 2026, the Commission has allocated additional EUR 6 million in humanitarian aid to support the most vulnerable with health and food assistance and potable water. Regarding support in the areas of health and energy, biotechnology and renewable energy are the priority sectors under the EU’s Global Gateway Investment Agenda in Cuba [2] . [1] Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/2271/oj/eng. [2] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/cuba_en.”
EU-Cuba relations · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
- 2026-03-10 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 27.5.2026 Written question 1. The presence of the United Kingdom (UK) Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in Cyprus is a matter for Cyprus. 2. The EU Treaties do not apply to the UK SBAs as these areas are the territory of the UK, except a limited application by virtue of Protocol No 3 [1] and of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement [2] , notably the Protocol relating to the SBAs of the UK in Cyprus. 3. The European Council of 19 March 2026 acknowledged the intention of Cyprus to initiate a discussion with the UK on the UK bases in Cyprus and expressed readiness to provide assistance as needed. The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure Eastern Mediterranean. [1] Protocol No 3 on the Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Cyprus annexed to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, Official Journal L 236, 23/09/2003 P. 0940 — 944. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12020W/TXT.”
EU-UK relations · EU competences on foreign affairs
- 2026-02-25 “P-000806/2026 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, national administrative or judicial bodies are primarily responsible to verify compliance of individual projects with the EU environmental legislation. In principle, renewable projects can be permitted in Natura 2000 areas subject to the conditions laid down in the Habitats Directive (HD) 1 , which shall be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, the Commission has launched an infringement procedure against Greece 2 on non-compliance of the Special Framework for spatial planning and sustainable development for renewable energy resources with the obligations under Article 6(3) of the HD, as the Special Framework did not undergo an appropriate assessment procedure under the HD. A reasoned opinion was sent on 15 February 2023. The Commission is in close contact with the Greek authorities following the sending of the reasoned opinion (e.g. the case was discussed during the package meeting that took place in April 2024). In this meeting and subsequent correspondence, the Greek authorities informed the Commission on steps taken in order to address the breaches identified. The Commission reserves the right to take a further step and refer the case to Court of Justice of the European Union, should Greece fail to ensure that it conforms with its obligations. The Commission follows closely the application of the relevant rules on strategic environmental assessments as well as the requirements of the Aarhus Convention 3 on public participation, when licenses are granted. While it is important to avoid undue delays, it is crucial to respect the provisions of both the Convention and its Protocol on environmental impact assessment in a transboundary context 4 and the Aarhus Convention. 1 Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50. 2 INFR(2014)4073, https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/search-infringementdecisions/?langCode=EN&version=v1&typeOfSearch=byDecision&refId=INFR(2014)4073&page=1&size=10 &order=desc&sortColumns=decisionDate. 3 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/law-and-governance/aarhus_en. 4 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE): Convention on environmental impact assessment in a transboundary context, signed at Espoo on 25 February 1991, and its Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment, signed in Kyiv on 21 May 2003.”
EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects · Nature protection and restoration in the EU
- 2026-02-16 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 4.6.2026 Written question The Commission attaches great importance to minority rights, education and good neighbourly relations. As part of the accession negotiations, Albania is required to take measures to foster inclusive education, including for persons belonging to minorities. Albania must uphold educational rights stemming from its law on the Protection of National Minorities, which will have to be fully implemented. Furthermore, the 2025 Enlargement report [1] by the Commission sets out that Albania needs to strengthen the quality and inclusiveness of its education system. The Commission will continue monitoring developments related to this field. The EU common position on Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process sets clear and ambitious interim benchmarks that Albania needs to fulfil to advance in accession negotiations, including protection of rights and rights of persons belonging to minorities, whose education-related issues are assessed and monitored in conjunction with Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth. [1] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/fe9138b7-90fe-4277-a12c-3a03f6d1957f_en?filename=albania-report-2025.pdf.”
EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Albania relations
- 2026-02-16 “E-000654/2026 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. In this context, it remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded and the acquis 1 . The only project that the Commission is supporting politically and financially in order to terminate Cyprus’ energy isolation is the Great Sea Interconnector, which is also one of the eight Energy Highways set out in the Grids Package 2 , has the status as Project of Common Interest, and was awarded a grant of EUR 657 million from the Connecting Europe Facility. A potential interconnection project between Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot Community is not included in the 2026 Ten Year Network Development Plan of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). The Commission is not aware of any contacts between the ENTSO-E and the Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation (TEİAŞ) on the potential project mentioned, however, it will continue to monitor this matter. In the context of the Observer Membership Agreement with ENTSO-E, TEİAŞ committed to ensure cooperation with all European Transmission System Operators (TSOs) at panEuropean, regional and bilateral levels. Fulfilling this requirement entails that the process of developing any type of interconnection is done with the consent of the TSO certified for the island of Cyprus under EU law. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bb4ddd1-4f20-4ee0-92db926996ec8dd1_en?filename=t%C3%BCrkiye-report-2025.pdf, p. 62 and 63. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2945.”
EU-Turkey relations · EU policy on Western Sahara
- 2026-01-27 “E-000329/2026 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The provisions of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA) will not modify the current situation with regard to the use of the term ‘Feta’ within the territory of the European Union but will only regulate the use of the term ‘Feta’ within the Mercosur countries. There is then no ‘exemption regime’ with regard to the ‘Feta’ within the EU but only a phasing out period of 7 years for the use of the term ‘Feta’ in the territory of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay (under specific conditions also to avoid any misleading of consumers) after which the term ‘Feta’ will be fully protected.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Import of agri-food products in the EU
- 2026-01-27 “E-000327/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission monitors rule-of-law developments in all Member States, including Greece, through its annual Rule of Law Report. In the 2025 edition, it highlighted that the length of court proceedings still raises serious challenges and, although initial signals from the implementation of recent reforms are encouraging, it is still early to assess results 1 . Under the European Semester, the Commission noted that Greece’s prolonged civil, criminal and administrative proceedings—among the EU’s longest—create significant backlogs, hindering economic growth, business formation and investment. Following a recommendation of the Commission, the Council issued a recommendation to Greece to address this 2 . The Commission remains committed to support the Greek authorities in improving the efficiency of its justice system, using all the tools and instruments at its disposal, including the European Semester and the Rule of Law Report process. Greece’s recovery and resilience plan includes measures to enhance justice quality and efficiency 3 , including digital transformation of justice, training of judges, large infrastructure projects in court buildings and enhancement of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/f2eb4e57-317a-4be4-8baab667c9f801d9_en?filename=12_1_63944_coun_chap_greece_en.pdf. 2 OJ C, C/2025/3982, 20.8.2025. 3 Council of the European Union (2021), Council Implementing Decision of 13 July 2021 on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Greece with Annex, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10152-2021-ADD-1/en/pdf.”
EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
- 2026-01-27 “E-000330/2026 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has not issued specific instructions to Greece regarding the control of sheep pox and goat pox (SPGP), including vaccination, as these matters are addressed within the comprehensive EU regulatory framework. This framework includes Regulation (EU) 2016/429 1 , Delegated Regulation 2020/687 2 , Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/689 3 , and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/361 4 , which govern the use of vaccines. Furthermore, to support the Greek competent authorities, a mission by the European Veterinary Emergency Team 5 was carried out on-site in May 2025, concluding that vaccination was highly recommended as a powerful additional tool for the control and eradication of SPGP 6 . As a result, the Commission recommended Greece to consider vaccinating against SPGP and assisted the Greek competent authorities in making an informed decision, as the decision to implement vaccination or not lies with the Member State’s competent authority. It also requested that the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) provides a scientific report 7 on the safest and most effective vaccines against SPGP, as well as suitable strategies under different epidemiological scenarios. Finally, a Commission audit in March 2025 evaluated the implementation of animal health controls for SPGP in Greece. The audit’s findings will offer guidance for targeted recommendations, with the final report to be published on the Commission’s website 8 . 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj. 2 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 of 17 December 2019 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and the Council, as regards rules for the prevention and control of certain listed disease, OJ L 174, 3.6.2020, p. 64–139, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/687/oj. 3 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/689 of 17 December 2019 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards rules for surveillance, eradication programmes, and disease-free status for certain listed and emerging diseases (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 174, 3.6.2020, p. 211–340 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/689/oj. 4 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/361 of 28 November 2022 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and the Council as regards rules for the use of certain veterinary medicinal products for the purpose of prevention and control of certain listed diseases , OJ L 52, 20.2.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2023/361/oj. 5 https://food.ec.europa.eu/animals/animal-diseases/veterinary-emergency-team_en. 6 https://food.ec.europa.eu/document/download/feb626db-6599-425e-b908-79cf7e3d01ce_en?filename=regcom_ahw_20250521_pres-09.pdf. 7 https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/9928. 8 https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report.”
Animal diseases prevention and management in the EU
- 2026-01-16 “E-000180/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Since 2011, the EU has in place restrictive measures targeting individuals and entities for their involvement in serious human rights violations in Iran, as a means to pressure a change of behaviour. These measures have been substantially expanded over the years 1 , including most recently at the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) meeting of 29 January 2026 2 following the brutal repression of peaceful protests, and this approach will continue as long as necessary. During this meeting, the FAC reached the political agreement to list the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) under CP931 as a terrorist organisation. The EU’s commitment to addressing the human rights situation in Iran extends as well to UN fora. The EU is a strong advocate for accountability mechanisms related to human rights violations in Iran, including those committed during the brutal repression of peaceful protests this year. The EU urges Iran to allow free and unhindered access for UN mandate holders and to cooperate fully with the independent, international fact-finding mission and the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran. At the special session of the Human Rights Council on 23 January 2026 3 , the EU strongly supported the work of UN mechanisms and the extension of their mandate. The EU is also supporting civil society organisations, both outside and inside the country. The EU has a comprehensive policy approach towards Iran aimed at addressing all issues of concern and considers all options at its disposal, including further sanctions. In this context, the EU remains committed to peace, security and stability in the Middle East and contributes to diplomatic efforts towards de-escalation, urging all parties, including Iran, to abide by international law. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-iran/. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2026/01/29/. 3 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/eu-statement-special-session-human-rights-situationiran_en.”
EU-Iran relations
- 2026-01-16 “Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 30.3.2026 Written question 1. Civil aviation flights operate under EU aviation safety rules implemented by the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H-CAA) which oversees HASP (Greek Air Navigation Service Provider). The incident on 4 January 2026 underlines the need for Greece to continue implementing safety rules under Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 [1] , and the urgency to modernise its air traffic management (ATM) system. The H-CAA should determine whether additional measures are needed to ensure safety, based on the outcome of the investigations and the likelihood of future outages. 2. The Commission is addressing the ATM situation in Greece and engaging closely with the Greek authorities and HASP. The Commission has opened three infringement procedures for the deployment of datalink capabilities [2] , of modern radars [3] , and for the publication of performance-based navigation procedures [4] . The Commission, supported by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) and the SESAR Joint Undertaking Deployment Manager, are reviewing Greece’s regular progress reports on the actions to achieve compliance with EU law. 3. The Commission expects the new Greek Law n 5240/2025 will provide to HASP the autonomy and resources necessary to recruit sufficient staff and modernise the Greek ATM infrastructure, including air traffic control communications systems. The Commission will closely follow up on the independent safety investigation findings and the implementation of recommendations to avoid similar incidents in the future. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1139/oj/eng. [2] INFR(2020)2050, Letter of formal notice sent on 03/10/2024, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_24_4561. [3] INFR(2024)2237, Reasoned Opinion adopted on 11.12.2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_25_2745. [4] INFR(2024)2014, Referral decision adopted on 11.12.2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2864.”
Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure · EU policy on aviation safety
- 2025-10-15 “E-004049/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission In the 2021-2027 period, the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) supports EU countries' actions that, among others, provide food and/or basic material assistance to the most deprived and address material deprivation challenges, in line with the principles enshrined in the provisions of Regulation 2021/1057 1 . In Greece, material assistance actions are part of the ESF+ Human Resources and Social Cohesion 2021-2027 (HRSC) Programme, with an allocation of EUR 400 million to be used until 2029 for the provision of food aid and/or material assistance to the most deprived. The measures are implemented by the Ministry of Social Cohesion and Family under the direct supervision the Managing Authority for the HRSC Programme and consist of distribution of food of high nutritional value adapted to the beneficiary’s nutritional background as well as material assistance for hygiene, cleaning and living, related to the target group served. The foreseen measures are currently in contracting phase. ESF+ social inclusion measures in Greece are implemented under shared management. It is the responsibility of the Member State to ensure that the operations delivered on the ground are well targeted and best support vulnerable groups. In this respect there are reliable mechanisms and assurance models in place, for the overall management and evaluation of the performance of the measures to support vulnerable persons in Greece in the 2021-2027 programming period. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013.”
Child poverty policy · EU expenditure on social policy
- 2025-10-13 “E-004000/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue within the United Nations framework, in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and its acquis. The EU has expressed, most recently in the European Council Conclusions of April 2024, its readiness to play an active role in supporting all stages of the United Nations-led process, with all the appropriate means at its disposal. To this end, the Commission appointed Johannes Hahn as Special Envoy on Cyprus on 14 May 2025 1 . 2. Pursuant to Protocol 10 of the 2003 Act of Accession 2 , the acquis in the areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Republic of Cyprus Government does not exercise effective control is suspended. The suspension may be lifted only upon the conclusion of a settlement. 3. Türkiye, as an EU candidate country and long-standing member of the Council of Europe, is expected to adhere to its respective commitments 3 . In its 2025 report on Türkiye 4 , the Commission emphasised that Türkiye is expected to actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue within the United Nations framework, in accordance with the relevant UNSC Resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the EU acquis. 1 https://cyprus.representation.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-designates-special-envoy-cyprus-202505-14_en?prefLang=hr. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/acc_2003/act_1/pro_10/sign/eng. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5638-2025-INIT/en/pdf. 4 .https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/8010c4db-6ef8-4c85-aa06814408921c89_en?filename=T%C3%BCrkiye%20Report%202024.pdf.”
EU-Turkey relations · EU competences on foreign affairs
- 2025-10-08 “E-003961/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality in the areas covered by EU law. The general rule in this respect is that – when they are in a similar situation – nationals of an EU Member State should be treated outside of their Member State of origin in the same way as the nationals of the host Member State. The Greek Law 4957/2022 provides that English-language undergraduate programmes at Greek universities are intended exclusively for foreign students. This law thereby prevents Greek nationals from enrolling in these programmes. Inasmuch as this situation gives rise to reverse discrimination to the detriment of Greek students, it is purely internal to Greece. According to case law, the principle of equal treatment enshrined in EU law cannot be invoked in purely domestic situations. In such a case, it is the responsibility of national courts to determine whether discrimination prohibited by national law has occurred and, where relevant, decide on the measures needed to remedy it 1 . Moreover, and pursuant to Article 6 of the TFEU, the EU has only the ‘competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States’ in the field of education. Furthermore, Article 165(1) of the TFEU obliges the EU to fully respect ‘the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems’. 1 Order of 5 April 2004, Mosconi and Ordine degli Ingegneri di Verona e Provincia, C-3/02, EU:C:2004:224, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 2 April 2020, PF and Others, C-830/18, EU:C:2020:275, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited.”
Governance of academic priorities within the EU
- 2025-09-22 “E-003669/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a robust legal framework for cybersecurity in critical sectors. Notably, the NIS2 Directive 1 sets cybersecurity requirements for entities in sectors such as air transport. Aviation security acquis, notably Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1583 2 , establishes measures to protect critical information and communication systems supporting aviation security operations. Aviation safety acquis, including Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/203 3 and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1645 4 , sets out further cybersecurity and information security requirements for relevant entities. Successful implementation of applicable rules, including supply chain cybersecurity measures set out for instance in Article 21(2)(d) of NIS2, is crucial for cyber resilience in airports. The Commission urges all Member States to complete the transposition of NIS2. NIS2 defines minimum requirements for essential and important entities in the air transport sector. The Directive also requires the reporting of significant cybersecurity incidents, although the required contents of incident reports are not tailored for specific types of incidents such as ransomware. Protection of passengers’ personal data is ensured by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 5 . Acting as controllers, airports must put in place measures to ensure an appropriate level of data security. Ability to prevent a data breach in a timely way is a key element of 1 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive). https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj/eng. 2 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1583 of 25 September 2019 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1998 laying down detailed measures for the implementation of the common basic standards on aviation security, as regards cybersecurity measures. https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/1583/oj/eng. 3 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/203 of 27 October 2022 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards requirements for the management of information security risks with a potential impact on aviation safety for organisations covered by Commission Regulations (EU) No 1321/2014, (EU) No 965/2012, (EU) No 1178/2011, (EU) 2015/340, Commission Implementing Regulations (EU) 2017/373 and (EU) 2021/664, and for competent authorities covered by Commission Regulations (EU) No 748/2012, (EU) No 1321/2014, (EU) No 965/2012, (EU) No 1178/2011, (EU) 2015/340 and (EU) No 139/2014, Commission Implementing Regulations (EU) 2017/373 and (EU) 2021/664 and amending Commission Regulations (EU) No 1178/2011, (EU) No 748/2012, (EU) No 965/2012, (EU) No 139/2014, (EU) No 1321/2014, (EU) 2015/340, and Commission Implementing Regulations (EU) 2017/373 and (EU) 2021/664. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/203/oj/eng. 4 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1645 of 14 July 2022 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards requirements for the management of information security risks with a potential impact on aviation safety for organisations covered by Commission Regulations (EU) No 748/2012 and (EU) No 139/2014 and amending Commission Regulations (EU) No 748/2012 and (EU) No 139/2014. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2022/1645/oj/eng. 5 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance). https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng.”
Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure · Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
- 2025-09-22 “E-003651/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The European Strategy of Universities, the Erasmus+ Programme Guide 1 and the European Research Area Policy Agenda highlight the EU’s commitment to fundamental values, including academic freedom 2 and institutional autonomy, as cornerstones of the European Higher Education Area. Based on the 2024 Tirana Communiqué 3 , the Commission works on guiding principles for protecting fundamental academic values. The Jean Monnet Actions (JMA) aim to promote a better understanding of the EU, reflecting the EU’s commitment to democracy, inclusion and free expression 4 . Through targeted funding, the JMA empower universities to engage independently with complex European issues. They foster critical thinking, intercultural understanding and civic engagement, in line with Europe’s shared values of freedom, equality and respect for human rights 5 . The JMA support academic research, teaching and inquiry that critically examines EU policies and institutions. They promote pluralism, open debate and critical thinking, ensuring that all projects respect academic freedom and intellectual diversity. All Jean Monnet projects are selected through a transparent technical evaluation based on clearly defined criteria, linked to education and research. During this process, all applications are assessed by external experts free from political influence. The Expert Code of Conduct ensures impartiality of their work. In addition, neither the funding authority nor the Commission influences the content of the projects during the grant agreement or implementation phases. 1 https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2025-01/erasmus-programme-guide-v2.2025_en.pdf. 2 Enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng 3 https://ehea.info/Immagini/Tirana-Communique.pdf. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1339/oj Council conclusions on the contribution of education and training to strengthening common European values and democratic citizenship, OJ C, C/2023/1339, 29.11.2023. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018H0607(01) Council Recommendation of 22 May 2018 on promoting common values, inclusive education, and the European dimension of teaching.”
Governance of academic priorities within the EU · Focus of EU policy on education (shaping workers vs citizens)
- 2025-09-19 “E-003644/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Respect for fundamental rights and democratic values is at the heart of the Commission’s work. The Commission firmly believes that political violence must be consistently condemned in all its forms. In the Communication on the European Democracy Shield 1 adopted in November 2025, the Commission announced several measures focused on fostering safety in politics. To better ensure the safety of political candidates and elected representatives from threats, attacks and violence online and offline, the Commission will prepare a Recommendation on safety in politics, will work with Member States on a dedicated guide of best practices, and will support capacity-building, voluntary commitments and ethical standards on this matter. It is not the role of the Commission to take a stance on possible resolutions of the European Parliament, which is for the Parliament to decide according to its own rules. 1 JOIN(2025) 791 final.”
Disinformation & online freedoms
- 2025-09-18 “E-003630/2025 Answer given by Mr Micallef on behalf of the European Commission Safeguarding cultural heritage and the assessment of the impact of infrastructure projects on cultural heritage is a national responsibility. The EU supports Member States in preserving and protecting cultural heritage of European significance. The Commission advances this objective through initiatives such as the European Heritage Label, the European Heritage Days and the European Heritage Awards, for example, which celebrate and strengthen Europe’s diverse cultural heritage. Funding to support cultural heritage is available through several European funding programmes. For example, EU planned European Regional Development Fund support for culture and cultural heritage in Greece amounts to EUR 273.7 million for the period 20212027. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization provides financial and technical assistance to World Heritage Sites, including for site management, through its World Heritage Fund. The CulturEU 1 funding guide provides information about available EU funding opportunities for the cultural and creative sectors. The EU action plan against trafficking in cultural goods 2 of 13 December 2022 aims to deter criminals effectively, address evolving security threats and to protect cultural heritage within and beyond the EU. The action plan addresses ongoing challenges by improving the prevention and detection of crimes by market participants and cultural heritage institutions; strengthening law enforcement and judicial capabilities; boosting international cooperation, including with source and transit countries of cultural goods affected by conflicts and crises. 1 https://culture.ec.europa.eu/funding/cultureu-funding-guide/discover-funding-opportunities-for-the-culturaland-creative-sectors. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/AUTO/?uri=CELEX%3A52022DC0800.”
EU and national cultural identities · EU strategy for tourism development
- 2025-09-17 “E-003614/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission EU’s energy policy, also in support of Member States, is to ensure security of energy supply in the EU. According to article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1 , Member States have the full right to determine the conditions for exploiting their energy resources, their choice between different energy sources and the general structure of their energy supply, while respecting EU law and adopting measures in view of the commitment for the EU to become climate-neutral by 2050 2 . Regarding the exploitation of hydrocarbons, the EU legal framework is based on Directive 94/22/EC 3 (Hydrocarbons Directive) 4 which lays down common rules for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons resources located on its territory. It applies to both onshore and offshore fields. The Directive underlines the sovereign rights of the Member States over hydrocarbon resources within their territories, e.g. determine the geographical areas and authorise entities to exercise those rights. The Commission can intervene only in cases where the EU legal framework is not correctly implemented. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/eu-energy-policy.html. 2 As laid out in the European Climate Law. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1994/22/oj/eng. 4 On conditions for granting and using authorisations for prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons.”
EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Natural gas
- 2025-09-17 “E-003613/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission Based on their climate risk assessments, Member States can use Cohesion Policy to support disaster risk management, notably prevention, response and resilience measures in islands or coastal areas, including measures to address coastal erosion. In Greece, over EUR 726 million in public funding is allocated to prevent and manage climate-related flood risks, including coastal and land erosion management. Under the shared management principle governing these Funds, the design and implementation of such projects primarily fall under the responsibility of national and regional authorities. Greece’s Recovery and Resilience Plan 1 invests in anti-erosion and flood protection across Greece in response to the floods and wildfires in 2023 2 . The related interventions include the construction of dams, stream stabilisation structures and rainwater retention systems 3 . By end2025, a total area of 6 200 hectares of anti-erosion works and 400 000 square meters of flood protection works is expected to be completed. The Commission’s legislative proposal 4 establishing the Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security, provides flexibility for Member States to address regional needs, including erosion prevention, within National and Regional Partnership Plans. In the event of disasters, Member States may reprogramme funds and, where needed, access additional support through the EU Facility. The Commission encourages integrated strategies and urges countries to ratify the Barcelona Convention’s Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean which provides a legal framework for the integrated management of coastal zones. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resiliencefacility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en. 2 (measure 16849). 3 With the aim to improve soil retention, biodiversity conservation and agricultural production. 4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security for the period 2028-2034 and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.”
Cohesion and rural funding
- 2025-09-17 “E-003607/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Under the revised Waste Framework Directive (WFD) 1 , the extended producer responsibility (EPR) obligations for textiles must be fulfilled collectively by Producer Responsibility Organisations (PROs) on behalf of producers. This approach ensures that individual producers, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), are not solely responsible for the costs of collection, sorting, and recycling activities. PROs will implement EPR obligations, including the fulfilment of administrative tasks, and must avoid imposing excessive burdens on SMEs 2 . Also, EPR obligations do not apply to self-employed tailors producing customised products, and their application is deferred by twelve months 3 for microenterprises. The WFD establishes that separately collected textiles are considered waste and introduces sorting requirements prior to shipping of used textiles. Without such prior sorting, textiles remain waste, and their shipment is subject to the Waste Shipment Regulation (WSR) 4 . The WSR rules differ for waste exports to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries compared to non-OECD countries. Shipments of hazardous textile waste to non-OECD countries are prohibited. Shipments of non-hazardous waste to non-OECD countries will be prohibited as of 21 May 2027. Non-OECD countries may continue importing non-hazardous textile waste from the EU if they notify the Commission of their intent to import such waste and demonstrate their capability to manage it in an environmentally sound manner. PROs are mandated to use EPR fees to organise waste management, including the related support for research and development. This is also expected to incentivise the development of adequate infrastructure. 1 Article 22c(1): Directive (EU) 2025/1892 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 September 2025 amending Directive 2008/98/EC on waste, . OJ L, 2025/1892, 26.9.2025. 2 In line with the overall simplification objective. 3 Taking effect on 17 April 2029. 4 Regulation (EU) 2024/1157 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on shipments of waste, amending Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) 2020/1056 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006.”
Circular economy · Sustainable fashion
- 2025-09-17 “E-003615/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission In 2020, 2022 and 2023, Greece has received country-specific recommendations under the European Semester to ensure adequate and equal access to healthcare, notably for primary healthcare. In the 2025 Semester, Greece also received a recommendation to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the social protection system to address poverty and social exclusion. Without prejudice to national responsibilities for the Greek health system (Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), the current grant component of the Greek Recovery and Resilience plan (RRP) includes measures with estimated costs equal to EUR 1,558 million to improve resilience, accessibility and sustainability of the healthcare system. One important measure concerns a reform of the primary health care system, including increased curricula in family medicine and renovation of primary healthcare health centres. An additional EUR 276 million (EU allocation) has been allocated under the European Regional Development Fund to co-finance infrastructure and equipment at all levels of care in the Greek national health system. Moreover, around EUR 250 million are allocated by the European Social Fund Plus towards investments to improve the accessibility and effectiveness of Greek primary healthcare services. The above measures are expected to support health services in Greece, including equal access, efficiency and social cohesion, also by strengthening primary care.”
Public and private sectors role in healthcare services
- 2025-09-17 “E-003617/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Drinking Water Directive 1 establishes that Member States shall perform an assessment of water leakage levels within their territory and of the potential for improvements in water leakage reduction. By 2028, the Commission shall set out a maximum leakage threshold. Member States having a leakage rate exceeding that threshold shall present by 2030 an action plan to reduce their leakage rate. Moreover, in the context of the Water Resilience Strategy 2 , the Commission has announced the adoption of an Action Plan for the digitalisation of the water sector in 2026. Cohesion policy 3 has already allocated EUR 13 billion of EU funding (2021–2027 period) for water services and infrastructure in Member States and EUR 10 billion for climate adaptation related to water challenges including droughts and floods. The Commission recently amended the Cohesion Policy related regulations to introduce measures to accelerate investment in water resilience 4 . Implementation relies on Member States’ authorities managing the funds to present proposals for increasing investments in water. Under the Recovery and Resilience Plan 5 , Greece established the Regulatory Authority for Waste, Energy and Water 6 to strengthen the institutional framework, supervise the water sector including the water tariff policy in line with the ‘polluter pays’ principle, and ensure the sustainability of water services. Cohesion policy programmes support capacity building for water providers. Member States can request technical help via the Technical Support Instrument 7 (TSI) or Cohesion for Transitions (C4T) 8 . 1 Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption (recast), OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1–62. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/environment/water-resilience-strategy_en. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/what/investment-policy_en. 4 Regulation (EU) 2025/1914 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review, OJ L, 2025/1914, 19.9.2025. 5 https://greece20.gov.gr/en/the-complete-plan/. 6 https://www.raaey.gr/. 7 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/technical-supportinstrument/technical-support-instrument-tsi_en. 8 Managing Authorities and beneficiaries planning to implement water-related projects under Cohesion Policy Objective 2 (Greener Europe) can apply for technical assistance under Cohesion For Transitions (C4T) Community of Practice, with a new call for support open until 17 November 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/communities-and-networks/cohesion-4-transition_en#inline-nav-3.”
EU policy on infrastructure for preventing climate-related disasters (floods, droughts, extreme weather etc.) · EU policy on water management
- 2025-09-09 “E-003489/2025 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to good-neighbourly relations, expecting the avoidance of unilateral acts contrary to EU interests, international law and Member States’ sovereign rights. The Commission implements Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 1 as and when applicable. Identifying a non-EU country as non-cooperating in the fight against illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing rests on examining the information foreseen in the Regulation in relation to that country’s international obligations (Article 31 et seq.). The information received by Member States does not substantiate the fulfilment of the relevant conditions to identify Türkiye as a non-cooperating country. Sightings trigger examinations by the Commission but become documented IUU cases only when complemented by Member State investigations. The Regulation applies without prejudice to provisions adopted by regional fisheries management organisations (RFMO) (Article 48.6). The General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) and the International Commission on Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) are the relevant RFMOs which established a comprehensive framework to fight against IUU fishing and improve compliance with the established rules. Imports of fisheries products into the EU, including from Türkiye, are controlled by Member States under the EU catch certification scheme (Article 17 et seq.), to prevent products from IUU fishing from entering the EU market. This system will become fully digital on 10 January 2026 through IT CATCH, further harmonising import controls. The Commission works closely with the Member States to ensure the traceability of fishery products. Operational decisions and enforcement powers on imports remain with national authorities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/1005/oj/eng.”
Environmental regulation of fisheries
- 2025-09-04 “E-003425/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The enlargement process is and remains a strict, fair and merit-based process, based on the objective progress achieved by each enlargement country, in line with the Copenhagen criteria. This process aims to ensure that the EU will continue to deliver and function as was the case in previous enlargements, and not undermine the cohesion, functionality and legitimacy of the EU. Moreover, following the Communication of March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews 1 , the Commission is currently carrying out pre-enlargement reviews, assessing the extent to which policies and governance of the EU will be affected by future enlargement and what changes could be considered to address any identified gaps. The Commission recalls that under the EU Treaties, any decision to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting in Council requires the unanimous support by all Member States. 1 COM(2024)146 final.”
EU-Ukraine relations · EU relations with Western Balkans · EU enlargement
- 2025-09-03 “E-003387/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission In July 2025, the Commission proposed to review the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 1 to ensure a further strengthened and comprehensive EU prevention, preparedness and response to crises, and it intends to secure the maintenance and scaling up the EU strategic reserve – rescEU 2 – in line with the EU Stockpiling Strategy 3 . For the next Multiannual Financial Framework 4 , the Commission proposed an allocation of EUR 10.7 billion for civil protection and health emergency and in the 2025 State of the Union address, the President of the Commission proposed a new European hub in Cyprus that could support regional neighbours 5 . Under the UCPM, there are tools to support Member States 6 and the Commission is providing financial support for different actions 7 , to boost wildfire prevention and preparedness efforts. Regarding Natura 2000 sites, the Habitats Directive 8 requires Member States to take appropriate steps to avoid deterioration of natural habitats, as well as significant disturbance of species for which the sites have been designated. The Nature Restoration Regulation 9 requires Member States to put in place measures to restore degraded forest habitats and enhance biodiversity in forest ecosystems beyond those habitats. To support farmers affected by fires, specific measures exist under the Common Agricultural Policy 10 , including forest fires prevention, risk management tools and interventions to restore agricultural and forestry potential. In the event of wildfires, the EU Solidarity Fund 11 can be activated 1213 as well as other EU 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A548%3AFIN&qid=1752821050670. 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/resceu_en. 3 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c57d4067-1900-4616-9239ca4598b55d69_en?filename=COM_2025_528_1_EN_ACT_combined.pdf. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/eu-budget-20282034_en#:~:text=On%2016%20July%202025%2C%20the%20Commission%20presented%20its,national%20in come%20on%20average%20between%202028%20and%202034%29. 5 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en. 6 https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/disaster-prevention-and-risk-management/ucpm-peerreview-programme. 7 https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/eu-funding-disaster-management. 8 See Article 6(2) of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora. OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50. 9 See Articles 4 and 12 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869. OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.202. Requires Member States to put in place measures to restore certain degraded forest habitats and to enhance biodiversity also in forest ecosystems beyond those habitats. Member States need to incorporate the restoration of forest ecosystems into their nature restoration plans, which are due by September 2026. 10 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/2024-05-25. 11 Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3) as amended by Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 143) and by Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European”
EU policy on infrastructure for preventing climate-related disasters (floods, droughts, extreme weather etc.) · Nature protection and restoration in the EU
- 2025-08-13 “E-003231/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission Greece is among the front runners in absorption of Cohesion policy funds, with a payment rate of 18.4% against an EU average of 12.1% 1 . In water management, project selection stands at 77%, with a payment rate of 19% (EUR 105 million) for water infrastructure and 21% (EUR 18 million) for water resource management 1 . Under Greece’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) 2 , the Regulatory Authority for Waste, Energy and Water 3 (R.A.A.E.Y) has been set up to supervise inter alia the water sector, implement rational water management policy, strengthen the institutional framework, and ensure sustainable services, including tariff rationalisation in line with the ‘polluter pays’ principle. The Greek cohesion policy programmes include dedicated allocations for strengthening the capacity of water providers. Member States can also request targeted technical support through instruments such as the Technical Support Instrument 4 (TSI) or the Cohesion for Transitions 5 (C4T) platform to implement reforms and improve governance in the sector. Water management is primarily a Member State competence 6 including the responsibility for organising water services and choosing ownership models. However, water management must always comply with EU law and EU environmental objectives. Water pricing policies should respect the Water Framework Directive 7 , and be based on socio-economic and environmental analysis to ensure adequate cost recovery. Member States may apply different mechanisms to preserve affordability, including social tariffs or progressive block tariffs. Investments should rely on a sound demand forecast quantifying water demand, including future trends and tariff elasticity, and an analysis of technical options where relevant. 1 https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/2021-2027/2021-2027-Finances-Detailed-Planned-vs-Implemented/3gitmd5z/data_preview. 2 https://greece20.gov.gr/en/the-complete-plan/. 3 https://www.raaey.gr/. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/technical-supportinstrument/technical-support-instrument-tsi_en. 5 Managing Authorities and beneficiaries planning to implement water-related projects under Cohesion Policy Objective 2 (Greener Europe) can apply for technical assistance under Cohesion For Transitions (C4T) Community of Practice, with a new call for support to be opened in Q4 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/communities-and-networks/cohesion-4-transition_en#inline-nav-3. 6 Based on TFEU art.345 http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2008/art_345/oj. 7 Article 9 of the directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1-73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32-35.”
Cohesion and rural funding
- 2025-07-23 “E-003038/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Over the last decade, Greece has increased the resilience of its economy and strengthened business confidence thanks to budgetary consolidation and structural reforms, including trade facilitation. The budget balance has improved and reached a surplus in 2024, and public and external debt ratios have declined. EU funds have provided significant support. For instance, important reforms and investments have been carried out with the support of the Recovery and Resilience Facility 1 . Greece has also benefitted from technical support 2 . Remaining challenges are discussed in recent publications from the Commission 3 . Regarding the external balance, sustained deficits reflect a relatively small export base coupled with high import dependency. The latest Country-specific recommendations issued by the Commission and endorsed by the Council of the European Union outline key challenges and provide policy guidance to Greece 4 . Among others, these are targeted at increasing productivity, strengthening export capacity and reducing import dependence. At European level, the Commission is pursuing a wide range of measures to strengthen the Union’s business climate and improve conditions for domestic manufacturing – in Greece and in all other Member States. The Competitiveness Compass 5 provides a key policy framework, with actions to meet industry’s needs 6 . Furthermore, the Commission recently proposed a modernisation of the EU’s budgetary framework – the multiannual financial framework 7 – to ensure that it further supports competitiveness objectives for the period post-2027. Strengthening domestic manufacturing capacity in selected critical technologies is part of the priorities 8 . 1 See https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resiliencefacility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en. 2 The Commission supported the Greek authorities in the past in carrying out the Export Promotion Action Plan in the context of the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP). See https://reformsupport.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/competitiveness/action-plan-promote-exports-greece_en. 3 For further details, see the Commission’s latest analysis and assessment in 2025 https://economyfinance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e4a67707-7a12-4af0-8f3a9b01301e263f_en?filename=EL_CR_SWD_2025_208_1_EN_autre_document_travail_service_part1_v4.pdf and https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2af158ef-d561-47c2-a0e05f689f1bac28_en?filename=ip309_en.pdf on Greece. 4 See https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10967-2025-INIT/en/pdf. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0030 - COM(2025) 30 final. 6 Specific measures to improve conditions for European industry are laid out: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0085 (COM(2025) 85 final) and https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0378, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0079 (COM(2025) 79 final), sectoral industrial Action Plans and https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0500 – (COM(2025) 500 final). Sectoral industrial action plans have been adopted for steel and metal industry, automotive industry and chemical industry, with further ones under consideration. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0570 - COM(2025) 570 final. 8 Tailored measures are being implemented in areas such as critical raw materials, net-zero technologies, artificial intelligence and semiconductors.”
EU Single Market harmonisation · EU industrial funding
- 2025-07-11 “E-002849/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission As stated in the President’s letter 1 before the last European Council, the political and security situation in Libya is extremely critical and political engagement by the EU and Member States is crucial considering the geopolitical consequences of developments in the country for the EU. To this end, the Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration was asked to visit Libya and to meet with authorities in the West and East of the country. The mission took place in a Team Europe approach, along with the Ministers responsible for migration of Greece, Italy and Malta. The mission was always expected to be difficult, yet necessary, which is why engagement shall continue. In Tripoli the Commissioner and Ministers held fruitful discussions with the government including the Prime Minister. The meetings in Benghazi could not take place under the circumstances. The EU has an interest to cooperate with all key actors in Libya, in a Team Europe approach, to be able to insist on strengthening border management and the fight against migrant smuggling, managing work visas and onward movements to the EU, as well as ensuring protection and voluntary returns from Libya to countries of origin. The EU is closely working with the Member States most impacted by the increase in irregular departures from Libya, including from eastern Libya towards Crete. The EU also remains committed to a lasting political solution, anchored in the United Nations-led mediation. The EU calls all actors – domestic, regional and beyond – to support the United Nations initiative as the only credible option to chart the way forward towards a stable, secure and prosperous Libya. 1 https://www.eunews.it/wpcontent/uploads/2025/06/Letter_from_President_UvdL_on_Migration_EUCO_June_2025__1_.pdf.”
Asylum & border control · EU-Turkey relations · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
- 2025-07-07 “E-002753/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has been in contact with the French authorities on the text of the Agreement on the prevention of dangerous journeys between France and the United Kingdom (UK) in order to ensure its compatibility with the EU acquis. The Agreement between France and the UK will run until the entry into application of the Pact on Migration and Asylum (11 June 2026) 1 , unless terminated beforehand, and its implementation will also be subject to a real-time monitoring. France and the UK have agreed to invite the Commission as an observer to the Joint Committee established for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the Agreement. The Commission will thus be able to monitor the implementation of the Agreement in practice, to make sure that it remains compatible with the EU acquis and that it does not impact the ongoing implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum. While the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the UK 2 does not include provisions on asylum, returns, family reunion for unaccompanied minors, or illegal migration, the Parties of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement took note in a joint Declaration 3 of the UK’s intention to engage in bilateral discussions with the most concerned Member States to discuss suitable practical arrangements on these issues, in accordance with the Parties’ respective laws and regulations. 1 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en. 2 Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part, OJ L 149 of 30 April 2021, p. 10. 3 Declarations referred to in the Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement and of the Agreement concerning security procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information – Joint political declaration on asylum and returns, OJ L 149 of 30 April 2021, p. 2552.”
Asylum & border control
- 2025-06-27 “E-002612/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Prespa Agreement between the Republic of North Macedonia and Greece, which is binding under international law, is a cornerstone of regional stability and an example of reconciliation for the Western Balkans and beyond. As highlighted in the December 2024 Council conclusions 1 , in the 2024 Commission enlargement package 2 and, recently, in the European Parliament resolution of 9 July 2025 on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on North Macedonia 3 , it is crucial that all parties fully implement the agreement in good faith and achieve concrete outcomes. The enlargement process is and will remain a merit-based process. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation form an essential part of North Macedonia’s EU integration process. They contribute to stability, reconciliation and a climate conducive to addressing open bilateral issues and legacies of the past. The Commission continues to actively engage with North Macedonia to ensure that bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries remain unchallenged and are fully upheld. The Commission will continue to support North Macedonia in all efforts to build trust with countries in the region. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 2 SWD(2024) 693 final. 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0157_EN.pdf.”
EU relations with Western Balkans · EU enlargement
- 2025-06-23 “E-002518/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Greece’s recovery and resilience plan (RRP), amounting to nearly EUR 36 bn and financed by the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), is the largest plan in the EU in terms of gross domestic product (circa 15%). Greece has made solid progress in implementing this plan and, to date, has received five payments following the satisfactory fulfilment of related milestones (corresponding to 59.4% of the total RRF funds allocated to the country). The specific challenges that have been identified in the course of implementing the Greek plan and the related recommendations are discussed in the 2025 Country Report on Greece 1 and the country-specific recommendations. 2 The Commission is striving for a high level of transparency in the implementation of the national RRPs. In the case of Greece, information can be found on the Commission’s dedicated website 3 , which also contains an RRP map that provides details on a number of investments and reforms 4 . Further, the website of the Greek coordinating authority (EYSTA) 5 publishes information on the 100 largest final recipients as required by the RRF Regulation 6 . The RRPs are designed in a way to benefit all segments of Member States’ economy and society, including Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and local authorities. In the case of Greece, SMEs benefit from a wide range of measures. For instance, nearly half of the loans approved to date through the loan facility have been signed by SMEs. According to the RRF Regulation 7 , it is also mandatory that Member States provide a summary of the consultation process they did, in accordance with their national legal frameworks, when submitting initial and revised plans 8 . 1 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e4a67707-7a12-4af0-8f3a9b01301e263f_en?filename=EL_CR_SWD_2025_208_1_EN_autre_document_travail_service_part1_v4.pdf (pages 6, 113-116). 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/85a2084c-36ee-4495-9258bde3413aec8f_en?filename=COM_2025_208_1_EN_ACT_part1_v3.pdf (recommendation 2 and recitals 21-41). 3 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resiliencefacility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en. 4 For Greece the RRP currently includes details on 92 investments and 5 reforms. 5 https://greece20.gov.gr/. 6 This information is updated twice a year. 7 Article 18(4)(q). 8 Available at the Commission’s website: https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economicrecovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en.”
Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Conditions to access EU budget
- 2025-06-14 “E-002404/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission While Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 1 mentions environmental protection, it does not address issues related to illegal landfilling. This aspect is covered by the Waste Framework (WFD) 2 and Landfill 3 Directives. The primary responsibility for tackling illegal landfilling lies with national environmental authorities, rather than market surveillance authorities. The WFD lays down the principles of the waste hierarchy. Waste that cannot be prevented should be prepared for reuse or recycled and only as a last resort sent to landfills or incineration 4 . The Commission monitors Member State compliance with applicable targets. The Early Warning Reports concluded that Greece relies heavily on landfilling and significant illegal dumping rates and insufficient biowaste treatment capacity 5 . The Commission supports Greece in tackling these issues: by providing technical support and advice; and where this fails, by taking enforcement actions. On 2 December 2014 6 the Court of Justice of the EU imposed financial sanctions that Greece is paying until it can demonstrate that all illegal landfills covered by the ruling are closed and rehabilitated. The Commission also urged Greece 7 to take urgent actions and investments in waste management and the circular economy in order to move away from its reliance on landfilling. The Commission envisages to continue applying this compliance strategy in order to minimise illegal landfilling and its negative impacts on human health and the environment. In parallel, Greece has allocated under the Cohesion Policy 2021-2027 EUR 911 million 8 to improve waste management practices and reduce landfill dependency, with a particular focus on waste prevention, recycling and the circular economy. 1 Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 on market surveillance and compliance of products, OJ L 169, 25.6.2019, p. 1–44. 2 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste, OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3–30. 3 Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste, OJ L 182, 16.7.1999, p. 1–19, amended by Directive (EU) 2018/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 100–108. 4 Article 4 of Directive 2008/98/EC. 5 The reports published in 2023 can be found at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/b7434520-0350-11ee-87ec-01aa75ed71a1/language-el. 6 C-378/13, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157398&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode= lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=38646. 7 Environmental Implementation Report published on 7 July 2025: SWD(2025) 311 final https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025SC0311. 8 https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/2021-2027-Categorisation/2021-2027-Planned-finances-detailedcategorisation/hgyj-gyin/about_data.”
Circular economy · Environmental crimes and justice
- 2025-06-14 “E-002403/2025 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission Under Regulation (EC) 1005/2008 1 , any unauthorised fishing activity of third-country fishing vessels into a Member State's territorial sea constitutes illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The Member State concerned is primarily responsible for monitoring waters, inspecting suspicious vessels, and applying effective, proportionate sanctions. Rigorous verification of Turkish catch certificates and targeted port inspections further prevent IUU products from entering the EU market. The Commission remains closely engaged with the Greek authorities. Greek data shows a notable peak in vessel sightings in late summer 2024, with significantly fewer incidents in early 2025. The EU supports national efforts. The European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) coordinates joint deployment plans in the Eastern Mediterranean including using the patrol vessel ‘Ocean Sentinel’, aerial surveillance, and satellite imagery. Collaboration among EFCA, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Frontex ensures swift information exchange. The European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) supports advanced monitoring equipment and inspector training. The EU seeks a stable Eastern Mediterranean and cooperative relations with Türkiye, emphasising good neighbourliness, respect for international law, and sovereignty under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Commission continuously urges Türkiye to align its fisheries control with EU standards and cooperate constructively in investigations. The Commission has also emphasised to Türkiye the importance of ratifying UNCLOS. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 1447/1999, OJ L 286, 29.10.2008.”
Environmental regulation of fisheries · Funding for fisheries and aquaculture
- 2025-06-06 “E-002290/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Articles 1 and 3 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 1 protect human dignity and any person’s right to integrity, including for newborns, requiring free, informed consent for medical and biological procedures, with the Charter applying to EU institutions and national authorities only when they are implementing EU law. The Council of Europe’s Oviedo Convention 2 , ratified by Greece, further requires that medical interventions on minors unable to consent must be authorised by a legal representative or a designated authority. Processing of personal data in the scope of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 3 – among other requirements – requires a legal basis, such as a law assigning a task in the public interest for the performance of which the processing is necessary, or the consent of the data subject. The controller must also inform the data subjects about the processing under the rules of the GDPR. The monitoring and enforcement of the application of the GDPR falls within the competence of the national authorities and courts, without prejudice to the competences of the Commission as guardian of the Treaties. The Commission does not assess individual cases of compliance with the GDPR, nor conduct investigations into such matters. Regarding processing carried out by or on behalf of Greek public sector bodies, this falls into the competence of the Greek Data Protection Authority 4 . Regarding the second and third questions, the Commission has neither detailed information about Member States’ general screening programmes for newborns using full genome sequencing, nor any details about samples being sent to the United States referred to by the Honourable Member. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. 2 https://rm.coe.int/168007cf98. 3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 119 4.5.2016, p. 1. 4 https://www.dpa.gr/.”
Processing of health data · EU competences on health
- 2025-05-30 “E-002182/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission It is up to the national authorities to verify whether obligations arising from applicable EU legislation regarding the project in question have been respected, including with regard to Directive 2009/31/EC 1 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and with regard to commitments under the Barcelona Convention 2 which forms part of EU law. It is also up to national authorities to check whether a given project requires an environmental assessment and, if so, whether the assessment carried out complies with EU law requirements. The Commission may decide to take appropriate action in case a systemic issue of non-compliance with EU law can be detected, either on the basis of the various obligations Member State may have or on the basis of complaints received, for example in case Greek law does not completely and correctly implement EU law. Under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive 3 , Greece is required to monitor the state of the marine environment including, among others, its hydrographical conditions and its seabed integrity. Without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, it is primarily the responsibility of the national authorities to monitor the implementation of projects. In case of doubt, as regards compliance with EU environmental legislation, national Courts are fully competent to verify the compatibility of a permit with national and EU law. 1 Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, p. 114–135. 2 Convention on the protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution (Barcelona Convention), OJ L 240, 19.9.1977, p. 3–11. 3 Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy, OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19–40.”
EU ocean policy · Carbon capture storage and utilisation
- 2025-05-23 “P-002088/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The stark deterioration of the security context in 2025 requires Member States to massively increase their expenditures in defence industrial capabilities. In this context, the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation 1 aims to provide temporary financial assistance to Member States seriously threatened with severe difficulties by exceptional occurrences beyond their control. This objective is fully in line with the scope of Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The requirements set out in Article 122 TFEU in term of competence and procedure for the adoption of acts based on that legal basis have been fully respected. SAFE does not undermine the role of the European Parliament in Articles 12, 13 and 36 of the Treaty on European Union. The Commission recalls that it made extensive use of legal bases which involve the ordinary legislative procedure for all legislative proposals adopted in relation with the defence industrial policy since the beginning of Russia’s unjustified aggression of Ukraine and even before. This demonstrates the Commission’s commitment to ensuring both the respect of the competences of the different institutions, as enshrined in the Treaties, and the principle of sincere cooperation. In addition, the Commission has fully respected its commitment towards the European Parliament, as set out in the Joint Declaration of 22 December 2020 2 , by replying to the questions of its Honourable Members in two meetings held on 8 April and 19 May 2025. The Commission stands ready to regularly update the European Parliament on the implementation of SAFE and to continue providing answers to its questions. 1 OJ L, 2025/1106, 28.5.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj. 2 OJ C 444I, 22.12.2020, p. 5–5, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2020_444_I_0005.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
- 2025-05-20 “E-002029/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has clearly stated that any attempt to illegally access data of citizens, including journalists and political opponents, if confirmed, is unacceptable and remains fully committed to ensuring that Member States’ actions in this context fully respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The European regulatory framework includes several different safeguards to address the use of spyware within the EU. Firstly, the data protection and privacy acquis offers comprehensive protection to the confidentiality of communications and users’ personal data and terminal equipment. EU data protection law is applicable to the processing of personal data by private entities, even where such processing is required for national security purposes. Under the ePrivacy Directive 1 , the interception or surveillance of communications without the consent of the user is in principle prohibited. While restrictions are permitted for important public objectives, they are subject to strict conditions and safeguards. Moreover, the Law Enforcement Directive 2 is also applicable when competent authorities process personal data for law enforcement purposes. Supervisory authorities have effective powers to examine any allegations of misuse, and data processed can be subject to judicial review. Finally, as regards the protection of journalistic sources and confidential information, the Commission recalls that Article 4(3)(c) of the European Media Freedom Act 3 (EMFA) will become applicable as of 8 August 2025. The application of this and other safeguards in EMFA will ensure free and independent media across the EU and protect them against interference. The Commission will use all tools at its disposal to ensure the effective application of EU law. 1 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37. 2 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L 119, 4. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1083. The provision stipulates that ‘Member States shall ensure that journalistic sources and confidential communications are effectively protected’ and that, subject to a strictly limited derogation, ‘Member States shall not deploy intrusive surveillance software on any material, digital device, machine or tool used by media service providers, their editorial staff or any persons who, because of their regular or professional relationship with a media service provider or its editorial staff, might have information related to or capable of identifying journalistic sources or confidential communications’.”
Surveillance equipment & spyware
- 2025-05-17 “E-001985/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission In January 2024, EUR 101 million were granted to Greece from the EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) 1 to cover costs 2 for emergency and recovery operations in response to the disaster caused by the storm ‘Daniel’. Private damage and the agricultural sector are not eligible for EUSF support. Greece needs to submit to the Commission an implementation report describing the implemented operations 24 months after the disbursement date. In December 2023, the Commission provided EUR 43 million emergency financial support for the agricultural sectors most impacted by wildfires and floodings which affected Greece during August and September 2023 3 , from which the amount of EUR 42,591,470.10 was disbursed by 28 April 2025, based on payments made to beneficiaries within the deadline. It is under Member States responsibility to ensure that payments are disbursed to the beneficiaries in full and within the payment deadlines as laid down by Union law 4 . The Commission is closely reviewing the implementation of all the measures and interventions of both the Rural Development Programme 5 and the Common Agriculture Policy Strategic Plan of Greece (CSP) 6 . Commission representatives participate in the Monitoring Committees of the above programmes in an advisory role. In this context, the Commission reviews the financial data, the result indicators, and the progress towards quantified target values and milestones, encouraging the authorities to concentrate their efforts and speed up the implementation of all measures. A broad range of activities contributing to improving the administrative capacity necessary to ensure a smooth implementation of interventions and related payments, could be supported through the technical assistance aid available within the CSP. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3) as amended by Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 143) and by Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 March 2020 (OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002R2012. 2 This means, for example, the recovery of essential infrastructure, provision of temporary accommodation to the population, cleaning-up operations, and protection of the cultural heritage. 3 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/2820/oj. 4 Article 38, Article 44 and Article 59 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 - http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2116/oj. 5 RDP 2014-2022: https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/paa-2014-2020/egkriseis-tropopoiiseis/. 6 CAP Strategic Plan 2023-2027: https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/category/sskap-2023-2027/sskap-egkrisitropopoiiseis/.”
Agricultural funding · Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1)
- 2025-05-17 “E-001986/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the challenges Greece is facing in implementing the waste management legislation 1 . Member States are primarily responsible to ensure compliance with the EU rules. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission monitors the application of the relevant legal provisions and, where appropriate, may decide to take appropriate action. The Commission has initiated an infringement procedure (INFR(2021)2166) 2 concerning the non-compliance with EU law of 84 Greek landfills and the insufficient capacity of installations for treatment of mixed municipal waste before landfilling. A reasoned opinion was sent on 16 December 2024 3 . The Commission has no data on the compliance of municipalities with regard to recycling targets and separate waste collection as Directive 2008/98/EC requires Member States to report on national level. Information and data on compliance of municipalities can be found in the Greek Waste Management plan, which is publicly available. The recycling rates of Greece suggest that it will not meet the targets for 2025. The Commission closely monitors the situation in Greece and may decide to launch an infringement procedure, if appropriate. It also assists Member States by providing EU funding for investments into waste recycling infrastructure, for instance via the EU programme for the environment and climate action on Circular Economy (LIFE-IP CEI-Greece) 4 . 1 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3–30, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/851 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 109–140. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/search-infringementdecisions/?langCode=EN&version=v1&typeOfSearch=byDecision&refId=INFR(2021)2166&page=1&size=10 &order=desc&sortColumns=decisionDate. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_24_6006. 4 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/life/publicWebsite/project/LIFE18-IPE-GR-000013/circular-economyimplementation-in-greece.”
Circular economy · EU policy towards plastics
- 2025-05-17 “E-001989/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission Greece’s recovery and resilience plan (RRP) 1 supports reforestation in response to the 2021 wildfires by investing in tree planting, erosion control and sustainable forest management (measure 16849). The aim is to restore forest ecosystems, protect biodiversity, regulate carbon emissions, enhance human infrastructure and create job opportunities. The RRP indicates a total area of 5 700 hectares of degraded forest ecosystems in Attica, Thessaloniki and North Evia to be restored by the end of 2025. Under the regional programme ‘Sterea Ellada’, cohesion policy finances flood protection measures, including in the wildfire-affected area 2 at the north of Evia. In addition, an integrated territorial investment (ITI) of Northern Evia is planned for the reconstruction of the municipalities of Istiaia-Edipsos and Mantoudi-Limni-Agia Anna 3 . This ITI has a budget of EUR 13 million, as part of the announced overall reconstruction plan for Northern Evia. The ITI was approved on 24 July 2025. To ensure the successful implementation of the recovery and resilience facility (RRF), the RRP for each Member State includes milestones and targets, which the Commission assesses to authorise payments. In addition, the RRF provides the flexibility to upscale measures in response to changing circumstances. Following the natural disasters that affected Greece over the past years, measure 16849 in Greece’s RRP was upscaled by EUR 406 million to invest in anti-flood, anti-erosion and fire-prevention actions across the entire country. Under cohesion policy programmes, the Commission monitors the implementation of EUfunded projects and works closely with the national and regional authorities to ensure effective absorption of funds and address critical delays in the implementation. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resiliencefacility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en. 2 For example, a call for the cconstruction of flood protection works in the region has already been launched, giving priority to the wildfire-affected areas and are included in the Eastern Central Greece flood risk management plan: https://www.stereaellada.gr/proskliseis/kataskeyi-ergon-antiplimmyrikis-prostasias-neespraxeis. 3 https://www.stereaellada.gr/proskliseis/stratigiki-olokliromenis-horikis-ependysis-ohe-boreias-eyboias.”
Cohesion and rural funding
- 2025-04-29 “E-001718/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Although the project is still in a planning phase, it is essential to ensure that all necessary assessments and evaluations are conducted to determine its potential impacts on the environment and local communities. According to Article 4 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 1 , prior to granting a consent for such projects, it is up to Member States to determine whether an environmental impact assessment is necessary, based on a case-bycase analysis or by setting specific criteria (such as the location, size or type of project). Such an assessment, if required, needs to take into account the impacts of the projects on cultural heritage and the environmental aspects as well as the opinion of the local community concerned. In case a project impacts a Natura 2000 site, Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive 2 applies 3 . Projects should be planned and implemented covering all aspects of sustainability 4 , including ensuring environmental protection and the prevention and minimisation of adverse social or health effects. Without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, Member States are primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with EU law. In line with its strategic approach on enforcement action 5 , which focuses on cases of systemic non-compliance, the Commission considers that the means of redress available under national legislation would be the most appropriate mechanism to address individual cases of possible non-compliance. 1 Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1–21, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014, OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1–18. 2 Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50. 3 Article 6(3) requires that any plan or project likely to significantly impact the site, individually or combined with others, undergo an appropriate assessment of its implications, considering the site’s conservation objectives, and can only be approved if it does not adversely affect the site’s integrity. Exceptions are allowed under Article 6(4)’s conditions. 4 As highlighted in the Commission’s publication ‘EU principles for sustainable raw materials https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/23e4b6a0-41da-11ec-89db-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. 5 As set out in the Communication of 19 January 2017 (EU law: Better results through better application C/2016/8600, OJ C 18, 19.1.2017, p. 10–20) and in the Communication of 13 October 2022 COM(2022) 518 final - Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers.”
Nature protection and restoration in the EU · Sourcing of critical raw materials
- 2025-04-29 “E-001717/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission and the EU Agencies are providing financial, technical and operational support to Greece to address the challenges it faces in migration and border management 1 . The Commission conducts audits and on-the-spot checks to ensure that funds from the EU budget are spent in line with the applicable rules 2 , and generate Union added value 3 . Member States’ authorities are responsible for selecting the projects to finance in accordance with the relevant EU rules. Non-governmental organisations and international organisations are audited as part of the Commission audit procedures 4 . If the Commission discovers deficiencies, it can intervene by interrupting or suspending payments to beneficiaries or Member States. If at a later stage the Commission spots any wrongdoing, it can introduce financial corrections and recover the funds already paid. In the event of fraud, the European Anti-Fraud Office steps in to investigate, and, if it confirms that fraud has been committed with EU money, the Commission recovers the funds. With regards to regulating EU-funded activities, the current EU framework envisages effective mechanisms to ensure that the implementation of the EU budget is in compliance with the principle of sound financial management. 1 The total amount of financial support under the EU Home Affairs Funds made available to Greece since 2015 is just over EUR 5 billion, while more than 1000 experts and officers are currently deployed in Greece on behalf of the EU Agency for Asylum (EUAA), the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and Europol, providing Greece with the means for an ambitious, robust and comprehensive migration management policy. 2 Common Provisions Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Home Affairs Funds Regulations (Regulations (EU) 2021/1147, 2021/1148/2021 and 2021/1149). 3 In the case of the financial support under the Home Affairs Funds implemented in shared management, the Member States’ authorities are responsible for selecting the projects to finance in accordance with the relevant EU rules and assume responsibility for the day-to-day management and for ensuring that the actions supported by the Funds are implemented correctly and effectively. 4 In accordance with Article 127 of the Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast).”
Asylum & border control · Regulation of NGOs in Europe
- 2025-04-23 “E-001644/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Having children is a matter of individual choice. The Commission supports Member States in creating favourable social and economic conditions for all Europeans to create a family. Indeed, as outlined, for example, in the Demography Toolbox 1 , demographic challenges can be addressed through a wide range of adaptation measures, including addressing gaps in labour markets, reforming pension and health systems, promoting the transition to a longevity society, and addressing territorial imbalances through Cohesion policy. The Commission is currently analysing the fertility gap, i.e. the difference between desired and actual children per woman, to explore how its determinants can be addressed, where this falls into the Commission competences. The Commission has conducted several studies on the impact of migration on population dynamics, labour markets, fiscal systems, and integration in cities. 2 There are no studies ongoing nor planned for the near future, that specifically look at the sociocultural impacts linked to migration from culturally diverse areas. The Action Plan on integration and inclusion 2021-2027 3 lays down the measures to be adopted by the Commission and Member States to support the integration of migrants. The Action Plan emphasises the importance of creating cohesive communities and considers the respect of the common European values an essential part of living and participating in European society. In that regard, the Action Plan promotes the development of civic orientation courses to help migrants gain an understanding of the laws, culture and values of the receiving society as early as possible, and places a specific emphasis on addressing vulnerabilities faced by migrant women. 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Demographic change in Europe: a toolbox for action, COM/2023/577 final. 2 Studies include, for instance, Demographic Scenarios for the EU https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC116398, A Demographic Perspective on the Future of European Labour Force Participation https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC141153, Projecting the net fiscal impact of immigration in the EU https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC121937 or Diversity, residential segregation, concentration of migrants: a comparison across EU cities https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC115159. 3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Action plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027, COM/2020/758 final.”
Support for families · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination · EU strategy on population growth
- 2025-04-22 “E-001601/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Non-Performing Loans (NPL) Directive 1 established transparency obligations for credit purchasers and servicers in their relationships with borrowers. According to Article 10, after any transfer of a credit agreement, the credit purchaser or credit servicer must inform the borrower about the transfer, outline the amounts due - including capital, interests, fees and other permitted charges - and provide a contact reference point and contact details of the relevant authorities for complaints. The Directive applies as of 30 December 2023. Consequently, all transfers occurring after this date must comply with the Greek legislation transposing the NPL Directive. Furthermore, it is essential to guarantee that borrowers affected by these transfers are granted the rights and protections provided by this law. The Commission requires Member States to comply with relevant EU legislation. It is currently assessing the compliance of the Greek national law transposing the NPL Directive and will work closely with Greek authorities to address any issues related to implementation. The Commission is committed to ensuring that the principles of good administration, transparency, and consumer protection are upheld. However, the Commission does not monitor the maintenance and transfer of complete bank records for individual loans. The national competent authorities and courts are responsible to ensure that EU rules are correctly applied in the Member States. 1 Directive (EU) 2021/2167 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2021 on credit servicers and credit purchasers and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17/EU, OJ L 438, 8.12.2021, p. 1.”
Financial regulation · Non-performing mortgages
- 2025-04-22 “P-001602/2025 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission On 27 February 2025, the Court of Justice ruled that, by not having drawn up a maritime spatial plan by 31 March 2021 and by not having sent copies of that plan to the Commission and the other Member States concerned, Greece has failed to comply with its obligations under Directive 2014/89/EU 1 to adopt and communicate to the Commission its maritime spatial plan (Court judgment in Case C-128/24). Greece has taken steps towards ensuring compliance, i.e. towards finalising, adopting and communicating to the Commission its maritime spatial plan, but these are still to be finalised. The Commission is currently in a dialogue with Greece to support and ensure compliance with the judgment and will continue to closely monitor the situation. It is to be noted that no fine is currently running against Greece following the Court judgment. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/89/oj/eng.”
EU ocean policy · Environmental crimes and justice
- 2025-04-22 “E-001606/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. No official complaint to the Commission has been registered, however the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA) has been subject to standardisation inspections by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) monitoring the application by the competent authorities of the Member States of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 1 and of its delegated and implementing rules, and to report to the Commission about the results. No particular findings have been raised regarding the air collision avoidance system. 2. The latest standardisation inspection of HCAA as the authority responsible for the safety oversight of Air Traffic Management/Air Navigation Services has been performed at the end of 2023 The implementation of the subsequent Corrective Action Plan by HCAA is progressing. 3. The Commission has opened infringement cases INFR(2024)2237 2 and INFR(2024)2014 3 regarding the established shortcomings. Finally, as a result of lack of implementation of the requirements related to data link services, the Commission has opened infringement case INFR(2020)2050 4 . The Commission is closely following up on implementation of the related rules. 1 Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 (Text with EEA relevance.) OJ L 212, 22.8.2018, p. 1–122, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1139/oj. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/search-infringementdecisions/?langCode=EN&version=v1&typeOfSearch=byDecision&refId=INFR(2024)2237&page=1&size=10 &order=desc&sortColumns=decisionDate. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/search-infringementdecisions/?langCode=EN&version=v1&typeOfSearch=byDecision&refId=INFR(2024)2014&page=1&size=10 &order=desc&sortColumns=decisionDate. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/search-infringementdecisions/?lang_code=EN&typeOfSearch=true&active_only=0&noncom=0&r_dossier=2020%2F2050&decisio n_date_from=&decision_date_to=&title=&submit=Search&langCode=EN.”
EU policy on aviation safety
- 2025-04-22 “E-001608/2025 Answer given by Commissioner Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The ProtectEU Strategy 1 highlights that the threat of violent crime is at all-time high in the EU and has a strong impact on local communities. To reinforce the fight against this phenomenon, the Commission is implementing several policies and is preparing a new EU Drugs Strategy and Action Plan against drug trafficking, and a legislative proposal to modernise the rules on organised crime. Furthermore, the Commission supports the mainstreaming of security into all EU policies. In line with Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union 2 , maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security remains the sole competence of Member States. With the help of the European Crime Prevention Network and the European Network on the Administrative Approach, the Commission promotes evidence-based crime prevention policies tailored to local contexts, including on combating criminal infiltration and recruitment of young people into organised crime. In addition, the EU Agenda for Cities will address security challenges in cities. Furthermore, drug trafficking is a major threat to security in local communities 3 . The EU Drugs Agency 4 held a European Conference on drug-related violence 5 where experts explored issues ranging from public safety and health implications to responses and innovative strategies, and interventions. A study is being conducted to advance the monitoring and analysis of drug-related violence and homicide in the EU to better understand its nature and scope. 1 COM/2025/148 final. 2 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union - Title I Common Provisions - Article 4, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 18, http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2012/art_4/oj. 3 https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf. 4 https://www.euda.europa.eu/activities/drug-related-violence_en. 5 26-27 November 2024.”
EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · EU policy on criminal justice
- 2025-03-20 “E-001193/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has stated repeatedly its deep concern about such actions and statements, expressing its expectation for Türkiye to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean 1 . In particular, the Commission has underlined in the 2024 enlargement report on Türkiye 2 that, as stemming from obligations under the Negotiating Framework, Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes, including through the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations and respect the sovereignty of all Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including inter alia the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This is essential to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye 3 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57442/2022-06-2324-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/8010c4db-6ef8-4c85-aa06814408921c89_en?filename=T%C3%BCrkiye%20Report%202024.pdf 3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/16679fa1-cb73-4481-bc02e3620b8c6dd3_en?filename=Joint%20Communication%20to%20the%20European%20Council%20%20State%20of%20play%20of%20EUTurkiye%20political%2C%20economic%20and%20trade%20relations.pdf”
EU-Turkey relations · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
- 2025-03-20 “E-001194/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Directive (EU) 2024/2853 1 on a liability for defective products (the ‘2024 Directive’) updates the EU liability framework under Council Directive 85/374/EEC 2 (the ‘1985 Directive’), by ensuring that victims of damage caused by a defective product can claim compensation from the manufacturer of the defective product. The 2024 Directive maintains the key principles established by the 1985 Directive. Specifically, it requires the victim to prove the defect, the damage, and the causal link between the two in order to obtain compensation in court. Similar to the 1985 Directive, the 2024 Directive applies to all manufacturers, regardless of their size, with the objective of providing a safety net for victims when a defective product causes damage. The Directive does not impose obligations on small and medium-sized enterprises, except that they must compensate victims for damage caused by a product they placed on the market that failed to provide the appropriate level of safety. The Commission is actively monitoring implementation of the 2024 Directive and, while the Commission does not intend to introduce any additional specific measures at this point, a review procedure is provided for in the Directive 3 . 1 Directive (EU) 2024/2853 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on liability for defective products and repealing Council Directive 85/374/EEC PE/7/2024/REV/1. 2 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, OJ L 210, 7.8.1985, p. 29–33. 3 Article 20 of Directive (EU) 2024/2853.”
EU competences on consumer protection and product standards
- 2025-03-07 “E-001006/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The protection of minors online is a Commission priority. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 sets out an unprecedented standard for providers of online platforms’ accountability regarding this protection. Measures that manage the amount of screen time for minor users and the type of content they are exposed to may be a potential mitigation measure to ensure the DSA’s high level of privacy, safety and security requirements for online platform providers accessible to minors. The Commission is committed to swift DSA enforcement and has initiated proceedings against TikTok 2 , Instagram, and Facebook 3 based on suspicions that they may have breached the DSA in areas related to the harmful effects on minors of their systems. With Digital Service Coordinators 4 , the Commission continues to monitor the situation across all online platforms. Moreover, the Commission is working on protection of minor guidelines to assist online platform providers DSA compliance 5 .The protection of young consumers will also be a Digital Fairness Act priority 6 addressing matters such as influencer marketing, addictive design, personalisation or dark patterns. The European Strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+) 7 promotes responsible use of technology by supporting children, their carers and teachers through Safer Internet Centres and the BIK platform 8 . Building on the BIK+ Strategy, the Commission is developing an action plan against cyberbullying. The Commission prioritises addressing social medias’ mental health impact and screen time on young people and will launch an EU-wide enquiry to allow an informed debate 9 . Under the Digital Education Action Plan, the Commission published Guidelines 10 to help educators tackle disinformation and digital literacy. A new version will be rolled out this year to address artificial intelligence, social media, influencers and pre-bunking. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:4625430 2 In 2024, following the opening of an investigation by the Commission, the provider of TikTok committed to permanently withdraw the TikTok Lite Rewards programme in the EU due to the potentially addictive feature of the app. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/tiktok-commits-permanently-withdraw-tiktok-lite-rewardsprogramme-eu-comply-digital-services-act 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses 4 Digital Services Coordinators are responsible for enforcing Article 28 (1) in the Member States. 5 This non-exhaustive list of recommendations is aimed to be adopted by the Commission after a public consultation in 2025. 6 The Commission plans to propose in 2026. 7 COM/2022/212 final. 8 https://www.betterinternetforkids.eu 9 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/b628b5a2-ac1e-4b9c-bbdd35b82da0ac6b_en?filename=mission-letter-varhelyi.pdf 10 Guidelines published in 2022: https://education.ec.europa.eu/focus-topics/digital-education/action-plan/action7”
Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Safety features & content control for child protection online
- 2025-02-28 “E-000885/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Since 2015 the Commission and the EU Agencies active in the field of migration 1 have provided significant operational support, while the financial support made available to Greece under the Home Affairs Funds is over EUR 5 billion 2 , providing Greece with the means for an ambitious and comprehensive migration management policy. In the context of the reform of the Pact on Migration and Asylum 3 , the EU has a permanent, legally binding but flexible solidarity mechanism as laid down in the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation 4 , guaranteeing that no Member State will be left alone when under pressure. Greece has so far benefitted from various solidarity schemes, for example the relocation schemes established by the 2015 Commission Decisions, the 2020 voluntary relocation scheme 5 , and the ongoing Voluntary Solidarity Mechanism (VSM) 6 . The Commission supports external border management through policy, funding, and operational support. This support includes the multiannual strategic policy for European integrated border management by the European Border and Coast Guard 7 , strengthened European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) operations, and deploying digitalised systems 8 . Under the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, Greece is benefitting from more than EUR 1.1 billion under the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 9 to implement measures related to border surveillance and integrated border management. The 1 EU Agency for Asylum (EUAA), European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). 2 During the 2014-2020 programming period, more than EUR 3.39 billion were made available to Greece to manage migration and borders under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), the Internal Security Fund (ISF- Borders and Visa, Police) and the Emergency Support Instrument (ESI). Under the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, so far more than EUR 1.66 billion have been made available under the Home Affairs Funds (AMIF, Border Management and Visa Policy Instrument, ISF) to support the implementation of existing and upcoming priorities in the area of migration, border management and internal security. 3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM/2020/609 final. 4 Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, PE/21/2024/REV/1, OJ L, 2024/1351, 22.5.2024; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1351/oj. 5 more than 5,300 vulnerable persons were relocated from Greece, including 1,500 unaccompanied minors (UAMs). 6 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/migration-management/relocation-eusolidaritypractice_en#:~:text=Voluntary%20relocations%20from%20Greece&text=Under%20this%20plan%2C%20follo wing%20the,Greece%20to%20other%20European%20countries. 7 The national authorities of Member States responsible for border management, including coast guards to the extent that they carry out border control tasks, the national authorities responsible for return and Frontex constitute the European Border and Coast Guard. 8 like the Entry Exit System and the European Travel Information and Authorisation System. 9 Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy PE/57/2021/INIT, OJ L 251, 15.7.2021, p. 48–93.”
Asylum & border control
- 2025-02-28 “E-000883/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission In line with the political guidelines of the President of the Commission 1 , the recent Commission’s communication on ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (MFF) 2 underscores the need for a policy-based budget that is more focused, more impactful, and simpler to deliver on EU priorities. The next EU budget will include a strengthened cohesion and growth policy with regions at the centre and build on the commitment to defend a fair and sufficient income for farmers, with a common agricultural policy that finds the right balance between incentives, investments and regulation. This new approach for a modern EU budget should include a plan for each country with key reforms and investments, designed and implemented in partnership with national, regional, and local authorities. The next MFF should also continue to help address challenges related to managing migration, including effective protection of the EU external borders and comprehensive partnerships with countries of origin and transit. It should thus continue to support Member States to ensure they have the expertise, operational and financial capacity they need for the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum 3 . In addition to the simplification measures proposed by the Commission to simplify EU rules for businesses, the recently adopted Clean Industrial Deal 4 will contribute to bringing climate and competitiveness under an overarching growth strategy. As regards the next MFF, a European Competitiveness Fund 5 should establish an investment capacity that will support strategic sectors and technologies critical to the EU competitiveness. It will ensure better use of EU’s budget to leverage further national, private and institutional financing, to the benefit of the entire single market, including small and medium-sized enterprises. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0046 3 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0085 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0030”
Asylum & border control · Cohesion and rural funding · Agricultural funding
- 2025-02-26 “E-000868/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission strongly condemns any illegal access or any form of unlawful interception of users’ communications. EU law on data protection and privacy offers comprehensive protection to the confidentiality of communications and users’ personal data and terminal equipment. Without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, the monitoring and enforcement of the EU laws lies primarily with the competent national authorities and courts. Moreover, EU Member States are required under Directive 2013/40/EU 1 on attacks against information systems to ensure that cyberattacks, such as illegal system interference and illegal interception, are punishable as criminal offences. The responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of such offences falls under the responsibility of competent national authorities. The 2024 Rule of Law Report 2 , which was published on 24 July 2024, follows up on developments concerning the alleged illegal use of spyware in the context of the functioning of national checks and balances in response to such allegations. The Commission continues to monitor developments in this area in the context of the 2025 Rule of Law Report. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/40/oj/eng 2 2024 Rule of Law Report, country chapter on the rule of law situation in Greece. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/6741f4b2-6a10-44ba-b40c97a5a38e6827_en?filename=21_1_58062_coun_chap_greece_en.pdf”
Surveillance equipment & spyware
- 2025-02-17 “E-000707/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the press article and the report. It regularly mandates independent scientific experts to assess new scientific evidence in view of the limits set in Council Recommendation 1999/519/EC 1 on the limitation of exposure of the general public to electromagnetic fields (0 Hz to 300 GHz). In its most recent Opinion 2 , which includes the assessment of non-thermal effects, the Scientific Committee on Health, Environmental and Emerging Risks (SCHEER) concludes that there is no moderate or strong level of evidence for adverse human health effects from exposure under the recommended limits to electro-magnetic fields in the frequency range 100 kHz to 300 GHz. As a consequence, there does not appear to be any risk from the development of wireless technologies including 5G, using these frequencies in respect of the recommended limits. The SCHEER Committee advised to revise the Council Recommendation 1999/519/EC to align it with the 2020 Guidelines of the International Commission of Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) 3 , which introduced new dosimetric quantities while maintaining existing exposure limits. The Commission is analysing the evidence with a view to a possible update of the Recommendation. Additionally, the Commission supports the collection of evidence in the topic and is currently funding the CLUE-H network (2022-2026) 4 , a group of four Horizon Europe 5 research projects studying the impacts of electromagnetic fields on human health and wellbeing. 1 1999/519/EC: Council Recommendation of 12 July 1999 on the limitation of exposure of the general public to electromagnetic fields (0 Hz to 300 GHz) OJ L 199, 30.7.1999, p. 59–70. 2 https://health.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/scheer_o_044.pdf 3 https://www.icnirp.org/cms/upload/publications/ICNIRPrfgdl2020.pdf 4 https://www.emf-health-cluster.eu/ 5 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en”
5G
- 2025-02-17 “E-000723/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission As set out in the Treaty on the European Union, the Commission promotes the general interest of the Union and is fully independent in carrying out its tasks. This applies to energy as well as all other areas within its competences. The Commission maintains an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society, including broad consultations with all parties concerned. In its recent decision to close the inquiry into the Commission's decision on the composition of the EU Energy Platform Industry Advisory Group (IAG), the European Ombudsman (EO) found no maladministration 1 . The EO found that the Commission provided a reasonable explanation for the composition of the group’s membership at the time of its creation, as it appears reasonable to assume that only companies, as the end users of AggregateEU, could have provided meaningful user feedback on the design and development of the tool. The EO made two suggestions for improvement: i) the Commission should reassess whether the mandate and composition of the IAG, or of any similar future expert group set up under the Gas and Hydrogen Regulation is appropriate; ii) where possible and justified, allow other stakeholders observer status in expert groups composed solely of corporate members. The Commission underlines that the mandate of the IAG members expired at the end of October 2024. At this stage, there is no need to reassess the expert group’s mandate or composition. As already replied to the EO 2 , The Commission fully agrees on the need for aligning the mandate and composition of possible future new expert groups with the tasks that these groups would actually perform, as per its usual practice for expert groups in general. 1 https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/192725 2 https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/doc/correspondence/en/200799”
Energy (green transition) · Natural gas
- 2025-02-14 “E-000749/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has taken note of the executive orders of the Trump administration to terminate 83% of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programmes. The impact will be immediate and felt globally with wide ranging consequences on people’s lives and on global stability and security. The EU continues monitoring and assessing the overall impact and possible areas where intervention may be needed, with particular emphasis on key EU interests and life-saving humanitarian assistance. Together with Member States, the EU already provides 42% of development aid and 28% of humanitarian aid globally and remains fully committed to the affected regions. However, the EU will not be able to fill in the gap left by the United States’ decision. It is not common practice for the EU to co-finance actions together with USAID. However, the EU has engaged in regular exchange of information and coordination at local level, notably through donor coordination frameworks in areas of common interest (support to democracy, civil society, media, etc.) in the Western Balkans. With regards to the impact of USAID funding to Cyprus 1 , the USAID programme was the main assistance provided for bicommunal activities until 2006 when the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot community 2 was launched and USAID withdrew. The Commission did not formally evaluate USAID funding to Cyprus. 1 Among other things, USAID helped civil society organisations from both communities cooperate (until 2003, there were no crossing points in Cyprus), supported bicommunal activities, restored buildings in old Nicosia and formalised the bicommunal Nicosia Master Plan for the divided city, which the two Cypriot leaders had developed. 2 Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 of 27 February 2006.”
EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-US relations · Foreign interference in Europe
- 2025-01-27 “E-000341/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The EU is determined to engage in large-scale investments in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). At the AI Action Summit of February 2025, the President of the Commission announced ‘InvestAI’ 1 , a large public-private partnership which aims to mobilise EUR 200 billion for investment in AI, including EUR 20 billion for ‘AI Gigafactories’. Recognising the strategic importance of AI, over the period 2021-2027 the EU and Member States will have mobilised a total investment in supercomputing infrastructures and AI Factories in the EU of EUR 10 billion. AI Factories will be accessible for small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) and research organisations. Moreover, AI Gigafactories will take the concept to the next level, by enabling large-scale facilities integrating massive computing power designed to develop, manufacture, and deploy large AI models, together with energyefficient data centres, and talent. Moreover, the AI Factories, the upcoming ‘AI Continent Action Plan’ and the ‘Apply AI Strategy’ will complement the ‘Union of Skills’ and the ‘Competitiveness Compass’ 2 in tackling the skills gap in Europe for practitioners and users of AI. These measures will include actions to train the next generation of AI specialists, up-skill and re-skill professionals to use AI for innovative applications in key industries, including via an ‘AI Skills Academy’. The AI Act 3 was adopted to promote trustworthy AI. It strengthens the single market and proposes a risk-based approach, introducing rules commensurate to the risk of violating fundamental rights and safety by certain AI applications. The Act fosters an environment where AI can be developed and utilised responsibly, enhancing trust among EU citizens and organisations, increasing adoption and therefore incentives to invest in AI. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_467 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_339 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng”
Artificial Intelligence
- 2025-01-27 “E-000340/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission attaches great importance to protection of fundamental rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities and the principle of self-identification, and closely monitors the consolidation of these rights as part of the EU integration process of Albania. In its 2024 report on Albania 1 , the Commission called for implementing legislation to be adopted, in order to address issues of free self-identification of national minorities and the use of minority languages, in line with European standards. The Commission noted the adoption in December 2024 of three by-laws related to free selfidentification and on the use of languages of persons belonging to minorities. The draft bylaws were consulted with relevant stakeholders and Council of Europe experts, including experts of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention on National Minorities, who assessed the draft by-laws as compatible with European standards. The Commission will continue to monitor the application of the legal framework in compliance with European standards and the principle of self-identification, as part of the accession commitments of Albania 2 alongside other competent international organisations, including the Council of Europe. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a8eec3f9-b2ec-4cb1-87489058854dbc68_en?filename=Albania%20Report%202024.pdf 2 EU Common Position on Cluster 1 Fundamentals Albania, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/AD-18-2024-INIT/en/pdf”
EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Albania relations
- 2025-01-27 “E-000342/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The December 2024 Council conclusions on Enlargement 1 highlighted the EU’s strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. The Türkiye Report 2024 2 noted that since 2023, bilateral relations between Türkiye and Greece have improved, with Türkiye not engaging in any unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean or in flights over Greek islands. As highlighted in the Council conclusions in December 2022 3 and the European Council’s conclusions of June 2022 4 , and in line with the obligations under the Negotiating Framework 5 , Türkiye must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States. It is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations (an essential part of Türkiye’s accession process), international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. Accession negotiations with Türkiye have been at a standstill since June 2018, following decisions by the Council 6 . As a result, the Commission has significantly reduced pre-accession financial support to Türkiye, redirecting funding for fundamental rights towards civil society organisations and to support EU-wide objectives such as the green and digital transition. As a candidate country, Türkiye remains eligible for Instrument for Pre-accession assistance funding. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2024_en 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/60797/st15935-en22.pdf 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57442/2022-06-2324-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 5 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2018-12/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf 6 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35863/st10555-en18.pdf”
EU-Turkey relations
- 2025-01-27 “E-000352/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission follows closely the developments in the banking sector across the EU. With a return on equity of 13.9%, in the third quarter of 2024, Greek banks’ profitability was ninth among 16 examined euro area countries 1 . The Commission is aware of the recent intervention by the Hellenic Government in the Greek bank market that reduced or abolished six types of bank fees 2 . The Commission does not have any indication that bank fees in Greece would not be in line with EU legislation. Unless otherwise regulated by law, banks operating in the EU are free to set their fees and interest rates as they see fit. EU legislation generally does not regulate fees and charges nor prescribes their level 3 . Exceptions to this include the Payment Account Directive 4 that requires that services for payment account with basic features are offered free of charge or for a reasonable fee only, the Instant Payments Regulation 5 that requires that fees for instant credit transfers are not higher than fees for regular credit transfers and the Consumer Credit Directive that requires Member States to introduce measures to ensure that consumers cannot be charged with excessively high borrowing rates, annual percentage rates of charge or total costs of credit 6 . While the EU legislator has regulated fees in some cases and taken measures to ensure transparency of fees to enable consumers to take informed choices, the Commission does currently not envisage to limit bank fees more generally. 1 European Central Bank Supervisory banking statistics. 2 https://minfin.gov.gr/apo-simera-meionontai-i-katargountai-oi-6-vasikes-trapezikes-promitheies-giaekatommyria-polites/ 3 For information on national rules see the European Banking Authority report ‘Thematic review on the transparency and level of fees and charges for retail banking products’. https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/document_library/Publications/Reports/2022/1045497/Report%20o n%20the%20thematic%20review%20on%20fees%20and%20charges.pdf 4 Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 214–246. 5 Regulation (EU) 2024/886 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 amending Regulations (EU) No 260/2012 and (EU) 2021/1230 and Directives 98/26/EC and (EU) 2015/2366 as regards instant credit transfers in euro (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L, 2024/886, 19.3.2024. 6 Directive (EU) 2023/2225 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Directive 2008/48/EC, OJ L, 2023/2225, 30.10.2023.”
EU policy on banks profits · Financial regulation
- 2025-01-10 “E-000070/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission In general, it is possible for the EU and the Member States to cooperate with countries outside the EU in managing migration. This must be done in full respect of EU and international law. Based on the information available to the Commission, Italy’s initiative originally aimed at transferring certain categories of third-country nationals intercepted in the high seas to centres in Albania, under Italian jurisdiction, to examine their applications for international protection. In case of rejection of such applications, Italy would carry out return procedures from these centres. When Member States extend the application of national law implementing EU law to situations falling outside the scope of EU law, they must do it in a way that does not undermine or circumvent the application of harmonised rules or obligations under EU law. As per the latest available information, Italy is now using the centre for the purpose of detention of returnees, in the same way as it uses pre-removal centres in Italy, and therefore it is conducting procedures with the same requirements, time limits and guarantees as those performed in Italian territory. The Commission is following the implementation of the protocol and is in contact with the Italian authorities.”
Asylum & border control
- 2025-01-10 “E-000069/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Türkiye has since 1996 a Customs Union with the EU, but it is not part of the European single market. The car manufacturers that have chosen to produce cars in Türkiye and export them to the EU have to introduce navigation maps that comply with the EU ‘whole vehicle type’ approval (Regulation (EU)2021/1958 1 ). Turkish map data approval is only needed for products (imported or produced locally) that will enter and be registered in the Turkish market. In other words, EU map data, even if it contradicts Türkiye’s Map Law, can be imported to be used in mass production in Türkiye and then be exported again. Therefore, the fact that the car manufacturers in Türkiye need to use two separate navigation systems for the domestic and export markets does not seem to have a cost effect on the cars sold in the EU. Should the EU industry consider this issue a trade barrier they should provide all the relevant information to the Commission and there is a single entry point procedure for market access complaints at the Commission they can use for this purpose. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2021/1958/oj/eng”
Trade relations with Turkey
- 2025-01-10 “E-000087/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission In line with the Treaties, the primary responsibility for social inclusion policies lies with the Member States. The Commission supports Member States in addressing poverty and social exclusion. The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan proposed an ambitious and realistic EU target to reduce the number of people at risk of poverty or exclusion by at least 15 million by 2030. All Member States have defined national targets relating to this EU headline target. A number of EU initiatives 1 that directly relate to poverty reduction and their implementation at national level will be key to achieve the EU target. EU funding, including the European Social Fund Plus 2 and the European Regional Development Fund 3 , supports social inclusion. The number of persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) has declined by around 1.6 million in the EU since the reference year of the EU target (from 2019 to 2023), with a rate of 21.4% of the population in 2023. Trends in the Member States have been heterogenous with some increases in some Member States and declines in others. This also shows that the policies put in place by the Member States and the EU in recent years have been mitigating to a large extent the negative social impacts of the pandemic, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine as well as by the high energy prices and increases in the costs of living. Looking forward, the target remains within reach, but this will require further substantial efforts. The Political Guidelines 2024-2029 4 announced a new action plan for implementing the European Pillar of Social Rights and the first-ever EU anti-poverty strategy, which will aim to help people to get access to the essential protections and services they need, along with addressing the root causes of poverty. 1 European Child Guarantee, Council Recommendation (EU) 2021/1004 of 14 June 2021 - https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021H1004 Directive on adequate minimum wages, Directive (EU) 2022/2041 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32022L2041 Council Recommendation on adequate minimum income ensuring active inclusion, Council Recommendation (EU) 2023/C 41/01 of 30 January 2023 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023H0203%2801%29 European Platform on Combating Homelessness, Lisbon Declaration on the European Platform on Combatting Homelessness of 21 June 2021 Council Recommendation on Access to social protection, Council Recommendation (2019/C 387/01) of 8 November 2019 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019H1115%2801%29 Commission Communication on the European care strategy COM/2022/440 final - https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0440 Commission Communication on better assessing the distributional impact of Member States' policies, COM(2022) 494 final - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52022DC0494 2 European Social Fund Plus - Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R1057 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R1058 4 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf”
EU expenditure on social policy · Minimum income harmonisation at EU level
- 2025-01-10 “E-000072/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully aware that large-scale agro-industrial mergers may have an adverse impact on competition, small farmers, local cooperatives and sustainability. These considerations are central to the Commission’s recent merger control investigations in the agricultural sector. For instance, in Case M.11204 Bunge/Viterra, the Commission assessed the effects of increased concentration of oilseed processing capacity in Central Europe, with potential negative effects on farmers. In Case M.11382 AGCO/Trimble/JV, it assessed an acquisition in precision agriculture systems, which farmers use daily to optimize efficiency, productivity and sustainability of their operations. European farmers were invited to contribute to these investigations and their feedback was integral to the Commission’s analysis. When necessary, the Commission has taken measures to prevent mergers from harming the EU agricultural sector’s competitiveness. In Case M.11204 Bunge/Viterra, approval was conditional upon the divestment of Viterra’s entire oilseed businesses in Hungary and Poland. The independence, financial position, expertise and competitiveness of the proposed buyer will also be vetted, ensuring oilseed farmers in Hungary and Poland retain a diversified customer base. The Commission will continue using all available tools to ensure agro-industrial concentration does not undermine the EU’s agricultural and environmental goals. It will assess competition effects under the Merger Regulation, prevent distortions caused by third-country financial contributions under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, and cooperate with Member States screening transactions under the Foreign Direct Investment Regulation.”
GMOs
- 2025-01-10 “E-000068/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The United Kingdom-Türkiye free trade agreement came into effect on 1 January 2021, coinciding with the day of Brexit. The consecutive conclusions of the Council 1 and the European Council emphasised the EU’s readiness to engage with Türkiye in areas of common interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and recalled the need to address difficulties in the implementation of the Customs Union, including ensuring its effective application to all Member States. The Commission reiterates the imperative to apply the Customs Union to Cyprus in all the high-level meetings with Türkiye. Most recently the issue was discussed at the EU-Türkiye Customs Union Joint Committee on 4 December 2024. 1 See for most recent conclusions: Council conclusions on Enlargement as approved by the Council on 17 December 2024, recitals 98 and 99.”
Trade relations with Turkey
- 2025-01-10 “E-000071/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission shares the Honourable Member’s concerns about the housing situation in the EU. The high overburden rate 1 of households shows the seriousness of the situation. The Commission has therefore appointed for the first time a Commissioner responsible for Housing and established a Task Force for Housing to coordinate the different work streams. The Commission will support Member States and local authorities to address structural drivers of the housing crisis and unlock public and private investment for affordable and sustainable housing. The Commission will put forward a European Affordable Housing Plan. To develop the Plan, the Commission will consult extensively stakeholders in 2025 to further consider all the issues on housing, including through a Youth Dialogue on housing. In respect of funding and financing, various EU funds are already available for Member States and local authorities to support social and affordable housing and student housing 2 . The Commission already proposed to double the amount of cohesion policy funding dedicated to affordable housing 3 . However, EU funds will not be enough to overcome the housing crisis and there is a need to attract more public and private investment for housing. This is why, the Commission works closely with financial institutions such as the European Investment Bank (EIB), national promotional banks and other relevant stakeholders on this matter. As a first step, the Commission and the EIB group have recently laid foundations for a new pan-European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing 4 . The Commission will continue to strengthen its contribution to mitigating the housing crisis, including for youth in its future actions. 1 The housing cost overburden rate is the percentage of the population living in households where the total housing costs ('net' of housing allowances) represent more than 40 % of disposable income ('net' of housing allowances). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=Glossary:Housing_cost_overburden_rate 2 To assist Member States, the Commission has published a toolkit that provides an overview of available EU funding opportunities in housing: Social Housing and beyond. https://european-social-fundplus.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-launches-toolkit-support-social-housing-member-states; The Recovery and Resilience Facility; the European Regional Development Fund; the European Social Fund Plus; the InvestEU; the Horizon Europe; the Technical Support Instrument; the Single Market Programme; the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund; the Social Climate Fund. Details on each EU support in the toolkit. In addition, the Cohesion Fund and the Just Transition Fund also support the investments in the energy efficiency of housing stock. Details are available in story ‘how cohesion policy supports housing’ at the Cohesion open data platform. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_929/ - Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review (COM(2025) 123). 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_671”
EU housing policy · EU engagement with youth
- 2024-12-16 “E-002963/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 (the Aid Regulation) 1 provides that the Commission shall ensure that in the implementation of actions financed under the Regulation the rights of natural or legal persons, including the rights to possessions and property, are respected. To this end, the Commission systematically consults the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus to avoid infringing property rights by such actions. Outside the scope of the Aid Regulation, the Commission has no competence to ensure that property transactions in the non-government-controlled areas respect the rights of the owners concerned, due to the suspension of the acquis in those areas pursuant to Protocol 10 of the 2003 Act of Accession 2 . The Commission is aware of civil cases decided by courts of the Republic of Cyprus against EU citizens involved in illegal property transactions and property developments in the areas not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. All courts of the Member States are obliged to comply with the judgment of the Grand Chamber in the Case C420/07 Apostolides v Orams 3 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32006R0389 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A12003T%2FPRO%2F10 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html”
EU-Turkey relations
- 2024-12-16 “P-002962/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The fall of the Assad regime marks a historic moment for the Syrian people, who - irrespective of their beliefs or affiliations - have endured immense suffering under its rule. 1. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria resulted in no targeted violence to either EU citizens or any specific community in Aleppo. Since then, the EU has been advocating a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned inclusive political transition, respectful of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is essential that all Syrians be protected, and that the future governance be inclusive of all components of society. 2. Whereas the competence for safety and diplomatic protection of their citizens lies primarily with the Member States, the EU supports Member States' efforts to evacuate or repatriate citizens from conflict zones through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism 1 , which coordinates disaster response and contributes with transport or logistical support. The EU provides humanitarian aid on a needs basis. Despite the highly challenging security environment, EU humanitarian partners, together with local organisations, are providing emergency assistance to all affected communities throughout the country. 3. The High Representative/Vice-President is personally engaging with Syria's new leadership to urge the need for protecting the rights of all Syrian citizens without distinction, as well as the rule of law, accountability and justice. The EU Delegation continues to engage with a whole range of relevant stakeholders including representatives from civil society organisations and religious minorities, in line with the EU’s strong commitment to promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, as well as freedom of religion or belief. 1 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en”
EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU-Syria relations
- 2024-10-30 “E-002360/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Fighting impunity, ensuring accountability and supporting transitional justice are priorities of the EU external human rights action, as reflected in the Multiannual Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy for 2020-2024 1 , extended until 2027, and the thematic programme for Human Rights and Democracy that includes EUR 50 million for projects promoting fight against impunity 2 . Among others, the EU supports the civil society Global Initiative Against Impunity, the Office of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Criminal Court and the Eurojust European Network for investigation and prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (Genocide Network). Within the UN Human Rights Council, the EU and Member States support the adoption of the biennial resolution on the Prevention of Genocide 3 . In addition, the EU funds in-country projects to promote justice and accountability for core international crimes (including genocide). The EU supports the UN International Residual Mechanism of Criminal Tribunals and the national jurisdictions in the Western Balkans in war crimes investigations and prosecutions connected to the 1990s wars of former Yugoslavia 4 . The EU supports the Yad Vashem World Holocaust Remembrance Center in Israel 5 , as well as the European Holocaust Research Infrastructure (EHRI) Implementation Phase 6 . The European External Action Service (EEAS) organises regular human rights training sessions for the EU and Member States diplomats. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, that receives financial support through the Foreign Policy Instrument, periodically briefs EEAS and Commission staff on at-risk situations of mass atrocity. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-extends-its-action-plan-human-rights-and-democracy-until-2027_en 2 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/aa9340d0-7cc3-4f33-bb941b7da126e0d2_en?filename=aap-2022-2024-c2022-5452-human-rights-democracy_en.zip 3 Last adopted on 3 April 2024: https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/059/80/pdf/g2405980.pdf 4 There is also an educational programme based on resolved cases by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The ongoing support of EUR 3 million covers the years 2024-2026. 5 With EUR 20 million adopted between 2023 and 2024. 6 With over EUR 1.4 million from Horizon Europe. A Commission Decision is imminent to set up this infrastructure as a European Research Infrastructure Consortium. This legal form will contribute to the sustainability and recognition of EHRI. See: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101129732”
Governance of academic priorities within the EU
- 2024-10-30 “E-002362/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully aware of the interrelated demographic challenges that the EU and its Member States are facing. That is why it adopted the Demography Toolbox Communication 1 in 2023 to lay out a comprehensive set of tools and measures to support Member States in managing demographic change, in full respect of the division of competences and the diverse local realities. The toolbox aims to facilitate the reconciliation of personal family aspirations and paid work, to empower younger and older generations to thrive, while helping to tackle labour shortages through managed legal migration where necessary. The Toolbox also underlines that gender equality, non-discrimination, respect of fundamental rights and intergenerational fairness must guide these efforts at all times. The implementation of the Toolbox and the initiatives therein is ongoing. While demographic challenges concern all Member States, their impact differs depending on national, regional and local circumstances. To contribute to the implementation of the upcoming National Action Plan for Demography, Greece will establish a dedicated Observatory, with support from the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+). Moreover, the Commission’s Atlas of Demography will be transformed into a dynamic platform for the creation and dissemination of knowledge on demographic issues at EU level. It facilitates mutual learning and exchange by combining evidence, stories and networking with Commission services and demographic experts, as well as regional, national and local authorities. The Commission and Member States also exchange relevant information as part of the Pension Adequacy Reports 2 and the implementation of the Council Recommendation on long-term care 3 . 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/communication-demographic-change-europe-toolbox-action_en 2 https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&furtherNews=yes&newsId=10854 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2022.476.01.0001.01.ENG”
EU competences on demographic policy · EU strategy on population growth · Support for families
- 2024-10-30 “E-002364/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is deeply alarmed by the situation in the Middle East. The EU has consistently called on all parties to exercise the utmost restraint, put an end to all hostilities immediately and fully abide by international law, including international humanitarian law 1 . The EU welcomes the ceasefire agreements reached between Israel and Lebanon on 27 November 2024 and between Israel and Hamas on 19 January 2025. The EU is constantly monitoring the humanitarian and human rights situation in the Middle East. Since the onset of the crisis in Gaza, the EU has deployed all available humanitarian instruments to ease the suffering of Palestinians, providing a total of EUR 330 million in aid, operated a humanitarian air bridge with 65 flights, and activated the EU Civil Protection Mechanism 2 for medical evacuations. The EU increased its humanitarian aid to Lebanon by EUR 40 million, bringing the total to over EUR 104 million for 2024. The EU also continues to support the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East with EUR 82 million and a top of EUR 10 million disbursed in 2024. The EU raises its concerns about the human rights’ situation at bilateral and multilateral level. The EU deplores the unacceptable number of civilian casualties, especially women and children. The EU remains committed to ending impunity and ensuring accountability for all violations of international law. The EU is active in upholding international justice, including supporting the International Criminal Court as an independent and impartial judicial body. The EU is engaging with its partners to revitalise a political horizon and is ready to contribute to reviving a political process, on the basis of the two-state solution premise. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en”
EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
- 2024-10-30 “E-002361/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and has called on Türkiye to fully respect international law, to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to promote good neighbourly relations in a sustainable way 1 . As highlighted by the European Council on several occasions, the EU remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the United Nations (UN) framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions 2 and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the acquis. Most lately, in April 2024, the European Council reiterated the particular importance the EU attributes to the resumption of and progress in the Cyprus settlement talks in further enhancing EU-Türkiye cooperation 3 . From a legal and institutional point of view, decisions regarding restrictive measures against any third state rest solely with the Council of the EU, by the unanimity of Member States. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57442/2022-06-2324-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 2 https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-councilresolutions/?ctype=Cyprus&cbtype=cyprus 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf”
Trade relations with Turkey · EU-Turkey relations
- 2024-10-30 “E-002366/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission A total of 15 cooperation projects or youth mobility activities led by this organisation have been supported by the current Erasmus+ programme (grant amount of EUR 717 103 1 ) and seven projects by the European Solidarity Corps (for an overall EUR 58 956 2 ). They have been selected by the national agency responsible for the implementation of the programme in Türkiye, in line with indirect management procedures and the criteria defined in the programmes’ calls for proposals. This organisation is also a partner in Erasmus+ projects from other organisations, selected by other national agencies. The Commission is bound to ensure that persons and entities involved in criminal, unethical practices or activities incompatible with EU values do not receive EU financial support. The Financial Regulation introduced an explicit ground under the Early Detection and Exclusion System 3 , for excluding entities from receiving EU funding where they have been found to engage in activities contrary to the values on which the EU is founded, such as incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence. Mechanisms framed by the EU Financial Regulation 4 and relevant agreements concluded with recipients of EU funds have been put in place to safeguard and monitor the proper use of these funds. Should the Commission become aware of any evidence in this respect, it will immediately act on any evidence of such violations by specific entities by taking appropriate measures such as suspension of contract or payments, contract termination, recovery or exclusion from EU financing. The Commission, through the national agency, will continuously monitor the situation and, if problems arise with the proper implementation of the projects, will decide on the above possible measures. 1 https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/projects 2 https://youth.europa.eu/solidarity/projects/ 3 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/how-it-works/annuallifecycle/implementation/anti-fraud-measures/edes/edes-database_en 4 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024.”
Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Regulation of NGOs in Europe
- 2024-10-30 “E-002359/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Schengen Borders Code allows Member States to temporarily reintroduce internal border control to address a serious threat to public policy or internal security 1 . The Commission is engaged in an ongoing dialogue with all Member States concerned to ensure that mitigating measures limit the impact on cross-border travel, whilst at the same time encouraging them to use alternative measures, as listed in the Commission’s Recommendation of November 2023 2 , to address security threats. Under the Treaties, there is no possibility to suspend the Schengen rules. Consequently, the Commission does not have the power to propose such a measure The Schengen area guarantees free movement to more than 450 million EU citizens. Around 3.5 million people cross internal borders daily, and almost 1.7 million people reside in one Schengen country while working in another. Schengen brings important economic benefits to citizens and businesses, contributing to a smooth functioning of the internal market by enhancing economic activity, creating jobs, and supporting the EU’s competitiveness. 1 Article 25a, Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, p.1-52, as amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1717. 2 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/268 of 23 November 2023 on cooperation between the Member States with regard to serious threats to internal security and public policy in the area without internal border controls, OJ L, 2024/268, 17.1.2024.”
Asylum & border control
- 2024-10-30 “E-002358/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The rule of law, democracy and human rights are the founding values of the European Union set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Under the rule of law, all public powers must always act within the constraints set out by national and EU law, in accordance with the values of democracy and respect for fundamental rights, and under the control of independent and impartial courts, irrespective of who holds political power. The judiciary is at the heart of the rule of law and judicial independence, which is integral to the task of judicial decision-making, is a requirement in EU law stemming from the principle of effective judicial protection referred to in Article 19 TEU, and from the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Since 2020, the Commission has been monitoring the respect of the rule of law in all Member States, including Italy, in the context of the annual rule of law report. This includes the independence, efficiency and quality of the justice system, as well as a well-functioning system of institutional checks and balances.”
Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
- 2024-10-30 “E-002363/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Under the Schengen Borders Code 1 , Member States are allowed to reintroduce internal border control as a temporary measure of last resort to address serious threats to public policy or internal security. The Commission, through its Schengen Coordinator, is in close contact with the Member States concerned to ensure that checks are necessary and proportionate and have limited impact on cross-border traffic. The control of the external borders must take place in full compliance with fundamental rights. The Commission is stepping up the fight against human trafficking and smuggling. In 2023, the Commission adopted proposals for a Directive on preventing and countering the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the EU and a regulation to reinforce EU’s law enforcement agency (Europol)’s role against migrants smuggling and trafficking 2 . International cooperation is promoted through the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling. The Commission and EU Agencies 3 have provided significant operational, technical and financial support to Greece to address migration and border management challenges. Member States, including Greece, receive EU financial support under the Home Affairs Funds to address high migratory pressure. Under its new mandate, the Commission will present a new approach on return and increase the operational capabilities of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, 23/03/2016, p. 1–52, as amended by Regulation (EU) 1717/2024. 2 COM(2023) 755 final and COM(2023) 754 final. 3 EUAA, Frontex, Europol.”
Asylum & border control · Enlargement of Schengen area
- 2024-10-14 “E-002046/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Freedom of religion is protected under Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. However, according to Article 51 of the Charter, the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law. In this context, the Commission is committed to protecting Christians and members of other religious groups from persecution inside and outside the EU. The EU has clear rules in place to address racism and intolerance, including hate crime and hate speech 1 . To prevent and counter the spread of illegal hate speech online, the Commission agreed in 2016 with major IT companies on a ‘Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online’ 2 , which is to become a code of conduct within the meaning of Article 45 of the Digital Services Act 3 , as part of the broader due diligence obligations aiming to tackle the dissemination of illegal content online provided for in that Regulation. The Commission has also taken steps to protect places of worship. While the implementation of security measures remains primarily a national competence, the Commission provides support to improve the protection of places of worship in cooperation with religious communities. The Commission provides targeted funding to support Member States in their efforts to protect places of worship and religious communities, mainly via the Internal Security Fund. The 2022 funding call provided EUR 8.3 million of funding in the realm of protection of places of worship. Out of the five projects awarded, two included consortium members from Greece, such as law enforcement agencies and faith organisations. 1 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. 2 The aim of the ‘Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online’ is to prompt platforms to react swiftly to hate speech notices by users and remove the content when necessary. The Code also aims to foster cooperation among IT companies, civil society organisations and public authorities, e.g. on counter speech (see details under: https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=54300 3 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).”
EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
- 2024-10-14 “E-002049/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Court of Justice of the European Union ensures that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaties 1 . The Court of Justice of the EU has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the Treaties and the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the EU 2 . By its judgment in joined cases C-608/22 and C-609/22, AH and FN v Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl, the Court of Justice of the EU gave a preliminary ruling on questions submitted by an Austrian national court concerning the interpretation of an act of EU law, namely Directive 2011/95/EU 3 . The Court of Justice of the EU therefore acted within the limits of its competences, as defined by the Treaties. 1 Article 19(1) Treaty on European Union. 2 Article 267 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 3 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), OJ L 337, 20.12.2011, p. 9–26.”
Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
- 2024-10-14 “E-002047/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not have the competence to classify groups as terrorist organisations. However, the EU has taken the requisite measures to sanction Boko Haram, based on its designation by the United Nations. On 22 May 2014, the United Nations Security Council AlQaida Sanctions Committee added Boko Haram to its sanctions list, pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011). That decision was transposed at EU level through Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 583/2014 of 28 May 2014 amending for the 214 th time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the Al Qaida network. Accordingly, Boko Haram has been subject to restrictive measures at EU level, under the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL - Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions framework since 28 May 2014. The restrictive measures include the freezing of all assets belonging to, owned, held or controlled by Boko Haram and a prohibition for EU operators to make available to the group any funds or economic resources, directly or indirectly 1 . 1 A mapping of all persons and entities subject to sanctions in the EU can be found at https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/”
EU policy on African region · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
- 2024-10-04 “E-001967/2024 Reply As set out in successive Council conclusions, the Council has repeatedly emphasised to North Macedonia the importance of good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation. The Council has also consistently called on North Macedonia to achieve tangible results and implement bilateral agreements in good faith, including the Prespa agreement with Greece.”
EU enlargement