Piotr MÜLLER

Policy topics Piotr MÜLLER is active on

What Piotr MÜLLER has said (80)

• 2026-07-14 “Thank you so much. I just want to say that I would like to thank. All Co-rapporteurs. Thank you for your cooperation and it was very important for me to mention strengthening the market and the institutions which are responsible for customs control and all these institutions that really want to make sure that our internal market rules are observed. And there are many other issues related to this report, but you know it very well. Thank you.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2026-07-07 “(09:28:27 - 09:29:29): Ladies and gentlemen, the automotive sector is key for the whole of Europe. We know very well what the supply chains look like, how many member states are involved in the industry, and making money on it. I'm amazed in this room today when I'm listening to the debate because I feel that nothing can be done. You think, for example, that the climate objectives by 2040, minus 90, this is going to help the automotive industry that the ban on registering internal combustion engines is going to assist our industry. The fact that we have energy prices that are twice as expensive in as in China or or in The US, is this going to help? I think that many people in this room think that everything is okay, and you're going to be talking about state aid for establishments. But I think you should be talking about doing away with the ETS, the ban on”
  2040 climate ambition: binding 90% reduction target vs. lower or flexible goal
• 2026-07-07 “(09:24:01 - 09:25:11): me wait until you put the headsets on. I am happy that you noticed that the automotive sector in Europe is in dire straits. I would like to understand your statement. You are saying about you are speaking about the need to support the industry on the 1 hand. I understand there is a problem with the interpretation. You don't hear it. You are saying that the automotive industry is in a very difficult situation, and I do agree. But you were talking about accelerating climate objectives. I would like to understand your statements. Do you think that this is going to help the automotive industry in Europe? Do I understand you correctly? Or should we approach it in a more pragmatic way? And the objectives that you have set in this very room are 1 of the”
  2035 ICE phase-out: strict zero-emission target vs. flexibility for carmakers
• 2026-06-25 “Thank you for your. For sharing your positive opinions. I'm open for technical amendments. Very soon we'll start our work on the Multiannual financial framework to tackle some broader objectives. Thank you very much.”
  Size of EU budget
• 2026-06-25 “Thank you. I will speak polish uh. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. I have the honor of projecting the draft general budget for the EU 2027. We're talking about the MFF, but I wanted to talk about the budget in general. The idea is less bureaucracy while maintaining security standards and competitiveness. So for 2027, what we need is precisely that. It's important to support SMEs because they're important for creating jobs and they need simplification. That's what we're doing in the framework of the omnibus, for example. So we need to be consistent with our activities when it comes to the implementation. From a customs union to market surveillance. We believe that Fighting illegal products which are flooding our markets, coming in from Asian countries need to be beefed up. And that's why we need to also strengthen the authorities responsible for that. Then. When it comes to security, we believe that countries like Poland facing specific challenges, countries at the borders and the EU need to do more. When it comes to the defence budget. Then we need real competitiveness fund to ensure that we're more competitive. That is also our climate strategy. Competition which mustn't eat into competitiveness. 2027 budget must mitigate the financial impact of environmental regulation. Thank you.”
  Defence spending · Climate policy
• 2026-06-24 “Thank you very much. I will speak Polish. Thank you very much, chairman. And first of all, I would like to say thank you very much to all concerned working on the omnibus with regards to the cosmetics. And I would like to say thank you very much to my co-rapporteurs as well. I compromised, has been hammered out and there is a significant certification of requirements afoot. This will bring a major savings for the European entrepreneurs and will enhance our competitiveness against our competitors from Asia. I'd like to thank the European Commission as well. The Commission was very active during the Trilogues and giving us a nuanced explanation with regards to how the certain provisions actually work in practice up to the size of the font. And this actually was, uh, a major lion's share of negotiations. We focused on the size of the fonts. Probably that was a bit too much, but the compromise itself, an agreement, uh, is, uh, we should work, we should vote in favour at the plenary session.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2026-06-17 “(15:53:33 – 15:54:03): We all we all know that we need stable and renewable energy sources in our mix. And, question, do you believe that the policy of the Green Party in Germany, which has led to the process of winding down, nuclear power plants. Is this was this a good policy, or is this a faulty policy? And who do you be capable of saying Please go ahead, miss Paulus.”
  Nuclear energy
• 2026-06-16 “Ladies and gentlemen, I'm glad we are talking about digital sovereignty, but we will not have it without cheap energy. So I wanted to ask you, as you are representing the Greens, because you are one of those who co-created the ETS system, which makes the prices of energy in Europe one of the highest in the world. You did not want nuclear energy for years, and this is such a reliable source of energy. Would you say today that it was a mistake on your behalf? Because where we we lost a lot thanks to your policy.”
  Nuclear energy
• 2026-06-16 “Ladies and gentlemen, I'm glad we are talking about digital sovereignty, but we will not have it without cheap energy. So I wanted to ask you as you are representing the Greens because you are 1 of those who co created the ETS system, which makes the prices of energy in Europe 1 of the highest in the world. You did not want nuclear energy for years, and this is such a reliable source of energy. Would you say today that it was a mistake on your behalf because we're we we lost a lot thanks to your policy?”
  Nuclear energy
• 2026-06-16 “I have a feeling that the Greens do not know how the energy system works. I think you realise that for the energy system in Europe to work, we need stable sources of energy. Renewables are important in the system. However, what we need is stable energy, such as exactly nuclear energy, for example. They are necessary to keep the stability of the system and if you cannot see it, then it's not surprising for me that you don't know how to build a sovereignty in Europe, digital or otherwise. And this surprises me a lot.”
  Nuclear energy
• 2026-06-16 “I have a feeling that the greens do not know how the energy system works. I think you realize that for the energy system in Europe to work, we need stable sources of energy. Renewables are important in the system. However, what we need is stable energy, such as exactly nuclear energy, for example. They are necessary to keep the stability of the system. And if you cannot see it, then it's, not surprising for me that you don't know how to build sovereignty in Europe, digital or otherwise. And this surprises me a lot.”
  Nuclear energy
• 2026-03-04 “E-000914/2026 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The proposal for a Regulation on a monitoring framework for resilient European forests 1 was rejected by the European Parliament on 21 October 2025 and the Council of Ministers envisaged significant modifications affecting the objectives of the proposal. Consequently, the Commission announced its intention to withdrawal. EU action on climate, biodiversity and circular economy as well as their benefits inherently relate to natural ecosystems, including forests. The proposal aimed to set up an EU-wide forest monitoring system on forest ecosystems and resources in the EU for accurate, timely and comparable data on forests across the EU, in view of increasing pressures and stressors, and their cross-border impacts. By improving and combining national monitoring systems with satellite-based Earth observation, the system would have: (i) supported public authorities in evidence-based policymaking, (ii) provided stakeholders with accurate information for effective decisionmaking, (iii) supported new business models such as the certification of carbon farming schemes, (iv) supported new markets for digital monitoring services. It did not touch on forest management. The EU has a variety of competences shared with Member States that address forests and forestry, including climate, environment and agriculture policies. The Union has repeatedly exercised these competences respecting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. In exercising the shared competences, the Commission is working in close cooperation with Member States’ competent authorities and stakeholders, respecting subsidiarity and based on the adequate legal basis. 1 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-regulation-forest-monitoring-framework_en.”
  Management of EU forests
• 2026-03-04 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 4.5.2026 Written question The Commission has consulted the data centre industry from the outset when it drafted the Energy Efficiency Directive [1] and subsequent proposal delegated acts on reporting, rating scheme and minimum performance standards on water and energy usage. The introduction of these measures has not affected their investment decisions in the EU but rather the opposite: colocation data centres invested EUR 7,7 billion in 2024, and they plan to invest over EUR 26 billion in 2030 [2] . The upcoming Cloud and AI Development Act will address the urgent and growing data centre capacity gap, aiming to at least triple the EU’s data centre capacity within the next five to seven years. It will do so by harmonising the conditions for investment in data centres across the EU with a focus on sustainable and innovative data centres, ensuring their operators find access to land, water, finance and energy in the EU. Additionally, through the upcoming Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI in the Energy Sector the Commission will facilitate the sustainable integration of data centres into the EU energy system. The Commission has conducted various regulatory impact assessments and cost benefit analyses related to investment barriers in the energy, network, and raw materials sectors, particularly in the context of the Green Deal Industrial Plan [3] , REPowerEU [4] , Critical Raw Materials Act [5] and Net-Zero Industry Act [6] . It will conduct an impact assessment that will accompany any proposal for a regulation on minimum performance standards later this year. [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-efficiency/energy-efficiency-targets-directive-and-rules/energy-efficiency-directive_en. [2] https://www.eudca.org/new-2026-state-of-european-data-centres. [3] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/green-deal-industrial-plan_en. [4] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/energy/repowereu_en. [5] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/green-deal-industrial-plan/european-critical-raw-materials-act_en. [6] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/green-deal-industrial-plan/net-zero-industry-act_en.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty · Climate efforts
• 2026-03-04 “Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 5.6.2026 Written question 1. The December 2025 Commission proposal amending the CO 2 emission standards for cars and vans is aligned with the climate targets and objectives established in the European Climate Law [1] . It maintains ambitious emission reduction targets to ensure a strong market signal for zero-emission vehicles, while providing vehicle manufacturers with more flexibility to achieve their targets. 2. And 3. The ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation [2] aims to scale up sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) to decarbonise aviation, while preserving internal market and decrease reliance on imported fossil fuels. The 2025 ReFuelEU Aviation Annual Technical Report [3] shows that the sector is on track to meet its SAF obligations for 2025-2029. The Sustainable Transport Investment Plan [4] aims to accelerate the transition to SAF and mobilise at least EUR 2.9 billion until the end of 2027 for production of sustainable fuels for aviation and maritime transport. In response, eight Member States launched in December 2025 an Early Movers Coalition for hydrogen-based SAF (eSAF) [5] . To address the EU aviation’s new pressures stemming from rapidly changing global environment, as illustrated by the supply shock caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the Commission is preparing an EU Aviation Strategy. The strategy will aim to support the EU aviation industry’s competitiveness and global leadership by embracing the sector’s green and digital transformation, boosting investments in innovation, while enhancing the EU strategic autonomy and shielding from unfair competition. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0995. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2405/oj/eng. [3] https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/document-library/general-publications/refueleu-aviation-annual-technical-report-2025. [4] https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/73447373-de2a-4ba4-9371-36d1186035d4_en?filename=COM_2025_664_STIP.pdf. [5] https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/eu-launches-early-movers-coalition-accelerate-sustainable-aviation-fuel-uptake-2025-12-04_en.”
  Decarbonisation of aviation sector · Road transport environmental policy
• 2026-02-10 “E-000550/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 requires providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large search engines (VLOSEs) to assess the systemic risks stemming from their services and to mitigate them. This includes risks related to content moderation systems. The Commission assesses the risk assessment reports that providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs are required to compile and transmit to the Commission at least annually. Should the Commission identify shortcomings in those reports, it may send requests for information or open proceedings. In parallel, the Commission engages in regulatory dialogues with providers. To mitigate systemic risks stemming from their services, providers have the freedom to choose from a wide range of measures. One among many options is adhering to a voluntary code of conduct deemed to contribute to the proper application of the DSA. Examples of such codes include the Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online+ 2 . The DSA sets a framework to create a safe online environment in which fundamental rights, including freedom of expression and information, are protected. Requirements to mitigate risks are limited to what is proportionate. To prevent ‘over moderation’, intermediary service providers must apply their terms and conditions in a diligent, objective, and proportionate manner, be transparent about all content moderation decisions, inform users of content moderation decisions affecting them and give them clear and specific statements of reasons, and provide effective appeal mechanisms. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act). 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-02-10 “P-000551/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission firmly rejects the report’s unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations. Freedom of expression is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter 1 , as well as a cornerstone of our democracy. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 2 , sets unparalleled standards for user empowerment; fundamental rights safeguards; and accountability of platforms as concerns illegal content online, based on what is defined as illegal in EU and national law. The DSA brings unprecedented transparency on content moderation. The DSA shines light on online platforms by requiring them to make publicly available their risk assessment, mitigation and audit reports. The DSA also requires the Commission and national competent authorities to publish all key enforcement decisions, which is done on a dedicated website 3 , with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of the provider, and other concerned person’s confidential information 4 in line with established practice amongst all comparable regulatory and enforcement frameworks. The DSA is a proportionate, democratically enacted regulation, adopted in accordance with the EU legislative procedure and reflecting the EU’s sovereign right to regulate its internal market. The Commission has repeatedly clarified the DSA’s objectives to the US administration, and remains open to dialogue, while continuing its enforcement. The DSA addresses globally recognised societal challenges, including the abuse of AI tools, online scams, addictive design and threats to minors. Governments worldwide have identified and acted on these problems, including the US. We will continue enforcing the DSA in a firm, fair and evidence-based manner while working closely with the US on our shared challenges. 1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2012/C 326/02 https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 3 Supervision of the designated very large online platforms and search engines under DSA https://digitalstrategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses. 4 Article 80(2) and recital 146 of the DSA https://www.eu-digital-servicesact.com/Digital_Services_Act_Article_40.html.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-02-10 “E-000549/2026 E-000552/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 operates under a high level of transparency. It requires platforms to publish reports on content moderation 2 , risk assessments, mitigation measures and audits. In turn, the Commission publishes information on the platforms it supervises and on its main enforcement actions, including requests for information, the opening of proceedings, preliminary findings and decisions 3 . The Commission’s transparency framework is further governed by the Transparency Register 4 and the rules on public access to documents 5 . Since 1 January 2025 6 , staff holding management functions may meet interest representatives if they are registered in the Transparency Register, and minutes of such meetings are published 7 ; unless exempted from these obligations 8 . Public access to Commission documents can be requested in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Access to documents related to enforcement proceedings is examined on a case-by-case basis. Where necessary, access may be limited in order to protect the legitimate interests of providers, including business secrets and confidential information, as well as the integrity of ongoing investigations, as recognised in the DSA 9 and the Detailed Rules for the application of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 10 . All enforcement-related documents, including exchanges with external parties, are duly filed in dedicated internal case-management systems, ensuring traceability, institutional oversight and access to the file in line with companies’ rights of defence 11 . This balance between transparency, effective enforcement and protection of confidential information reflects established practice in comparable regulatory and enforcement frameworks. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R2065. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/harmonised-transparency-reports-under-dsa-bring-enhancedclarity-content-moderation-practices. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses. 4 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en. 5 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001R1049. 6 Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3081, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3081/oj/eng, and Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3082, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024D3082. 7 https://commission.europa.eu/about/service-standards-and-principles/transparency/transparencyregister_en#meetings-with-interest-representatives. 8 See Article 3 of Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3081 and Article 3 of Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3082. 9 Articles 79(4), 80 and 84 of the Digital Services Act. 10 Article 4(2)(e) of Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3080, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3080/oj, and Article 4(1) to (3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 11 Article 79 of the Digital Services Act.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2026-01-22 “E-000253/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Over the period 2017-2024, vehicle prices in the EU have increased slightly faster than inflation. Various market dynamics impacted the sector, related to higher energy costs, shortage of key components such as chips, and lower domestic demand, which impacted price and cost structures in the automotive sector. The Commission’s impact assessment for the revision of the CO 2 standards for cars and vans 1 shows cost impacts and confirms that electric vehicles have a cheaper total cost of ownership, due to lower operating costs. The Commission has taken measures to support the competitiveness of EU industry and stimulate the deployment of affordable clean vehicles, in particular via the Action Plan for the European automotive sector 2 and the Automotive Package 3 , which includes an Omnibus that will bring annual cost cuts of about EUR 700 million for industry, and a Battery Booster to enhance cost competitiveness of the EU battery value chain. Such measures also include the Industrial Accelerator Act 4 , Action Plan for Affordable Energy 5 and the Critical Raw Materials Act 6 . The proposal to amend the CO 2 standards for cars and vans provides industry with more flexibility, enhancing technology neutrality while maintaining a strong signal towards zeroemission mobility, which is key to competitiveness as electric vehicles is the only growing segment globally. It also supports the deployment of small affordable electric cars through ‘super credits’. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:52025SC1058. 2 https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/action-plan-future-automotive-sector_en. 3 https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/action-plan-future-automotive-sector/automotive-package_en. 4 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/industrial-accelerator-act_en. 5 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/action-plan-affordable-energy-unlocking-true-value-our-energy-unionsecure-affordable-efficient-and_en. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401252.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · Climate efforts
• 2026-01-22 “E-000252/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission As per the Commission’s Better Regulation framework, EU added value is considered from two perspectives: a forward-looking dimension (before the regulation proposals), reflected in impact assessments accompanying regulation proposals, and a backward-looking dimension (analysing past implementation and lesson learnt), which is carried out through annual performance monitoring and in the evaluations. Annual performance monitoring will be conducted through the Performance Regulation 1 framework, which relies on a common set of intervention fields for expenditure monitoring and on harmonised output and result indicators for performance measurement. In addition, EU added value is a key criterion in the evaluations, which allow for a more comprehensive and in-depth assessment of the programmes. The Commission has proposed streamlining the EU budget to minimise overlaps and maximise synergies, reducing administrative burdens for Member States and others. Shared management and directly managed programmes (e.g. the European Competitiveness Fund 2 (ECF) and the Connecting Europe Facility 3 ) include provisions for cumulative funding, allowing a single legal commitment and unified rules for actions funded by two programmes. This aims to simplify procedures, reduce audit risk, and improve efficiency and coherence. Specific coordination mechanisms in the ECF Regulation will enhance connections with complementary programmes. A new steering mechanism will strengthen ties between policy coordination and the EU budget, fostering discussions about key financing priorities and enhancing budget flexibility to address evolving EU priorities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0545. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0555. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02021R1153-20251224.”
  EU industrial funding · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2026-01-21 “E-000235/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The negotiations of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with India were finalised on 27 January 2026 during the 16 th EU-India Summit. The FTA will positively contribute to EU output and employment. EU gross domestic product is expected to grow by up to EUR 47.9 billion. EU exports will significantly expand, including in important sectors such as chemicals, electronics, machinery, transport equipment, beverages, textiles, minerals and metals 1 . The FTA includes safeguards allowing for the temporary suspension of tariff preferences in case of a sudden surge in imports that could harm the EU industry. Such bilateral safeguards may be introduced during a period of 22 years from the date of entry into force of the FTA. The FTA fully preserves the possibility to apply trade defence measures against dumping, subsidised imports or import surges. Global safeguard measures such as those introduced in 2025 on ferroalloys will remain possible. It will not affect either the anti-dumping duties currently in place on ceramic tiles. The FTA will be no obstacle to the introduction of a stricter import regime for steel as envisaged in the Commission’s proposal of 7 October 2025 2 . The Commission nonetheless acknowledges that energy-intensive industries face particular challenges that are independent of the EU’s FTA policy. Those challenges require a multipronged strategy by public and private actors. The Commission’s Clean Industrial Deal 3 and other EU competitiveness initiatives are important elements in that regard. 1 Findings of the independent Sustainability Impact Assessment of 2023, available on https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/analysis-and-assessment/sustainability-impact-assessments_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0726. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0085.”
  EU-India relations · Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-01-21 “E-000236/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission agrees that the Single Market for services has potential for further development. In its Single Market Strategy 1 , it proposed a new sectoral policy approach to boost European services markets, zooming in on specific services sectors that could bring the highest economic added value and are relevant for the twin transition. The announced initiatives are complemented by concerted action to take down the most harmful Single Market barriers, the so-called Terrible Ten. The Single Market Roadmap will further offer an opportunity to reinforce the actions of the Strategy. To assess competitiveness bottlenecks and to track progress in the integration of the Single Market, each year the Commission presents the Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report together with the Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard, which is now making use of 29 Key Performance Indicators 2 . However, the well-functioning of the Single Market is a joint responsibility of the EU and the Member States. Therefore, Member States need to address proactively regulatory and administrative barriers at regional and national level. The strategic enforcement of Single Market rules has been a consistent Commission priority over the last years 3 . Enforcement has been structured around three pillars, namely prevention of new barriers (notification procedures and proportionality assessments), cooperation with Member States (Single Market Enforcement Task Force) and infringement procedures. The Commission will continue working with Member States and deploy relevant means to tackle unjustified obstacles to business in the EU. The Single Market Strategy proposes specific actions to strengthen enforcement of the Single Market rules. As one of the deliverables of the Strategy, the Commission recently announced the first annual Single Market enforcement agenda 4 as part of the Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0500. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0046. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0094; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0518; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023DC0162. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0046.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2026-01-06 “Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission 25.3.2026 Written question The Commission implements a robust evaluation process for Horizon Europe designed to ensure equal treatment, fairness, transparency, and impartiality. Proposals are assessed by external independent experts who collaborate to reach a consensus, which helps mitigate individual biases. In two-stage calls, first-stage proposals are evaluated blindly where possible, providing an additional safeguard against bias . Evaluator panels reflect geographical diversity, including representatives from widening countries. An independent study [1] concluded that the evaluation system in Horizon Europe is broadly fair. The Commission is committed to continuous improvement, focusing on maintaining the same high quality in the process, with particular attention to the inclusion of w idening countries. The European Research Council (ERC) uses scientific excellence as the sole award criterion for assessing proposals. In 2024, the ERC [2] introduced further reforms to reduce bias and to ensure that the excellence of the research project carries more weight than the applicant’s track record. The new Horizon Europe proposal [3] strives to align European, national, and regional priorities, to strengthen research and innovation ecosystems by creating close links with the European Competitiveness Fund proposal [4] and coordinated investments through the proposed new National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPPs) [5] . Having a simplified framework for nationally pre-allocated envelopes within the NRPPs will allow in that respect to better exploit synergies with other instruments of the EU budget, including the European Competitiveness Fund and Horizon Europe [6] . [1] https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/f54dbfed-7743-11ec-9136-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. [2] See Article 28 (2) of the Horizon Europe Regulation, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0695. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0543. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0555. [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0558. [6] Member States also have the possibility to transfer funds from shared management funds, e.g. European Social Fund Plus or European Regional Development Fund to Horizon Europe to support excellent proposals which would otherwise have received a seal of excellence. This can help strengthen participation in Horizon Europe by beneficiaries from regions/Member States that have traditionally had a low participation and success rate; boost projects in areas identified as priorities through smart specialisation; and help preserve administrative capacity at national/regional level in the selection and follow up of research and innovation projects. The Commission currently implements such transfers from Malta, Lithuania and Germany (Brandenburg).”
  EU research funding · EU-level coordination of research agendas
• 2025-11-11 “E-004475/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Full electrification maximizes energy efficiency, reduces dependence on imported fossil fuels, and uses fewer resources over time, with long-term trends show decreasing material intensity and increasing circularity. The Commission acknowledges that access to raw materials is essential to achieving the EU’s clean and digital transition objectives. It is actively working to ensure the EU’s raw materials security by increasing availability and diversity of sources of strategic raw materials. The Commission frequently performs a risk assessment for raw materials 1 , as well as foresight studies considering the growing demand for new technologies 2 . The specific measures are laid out in the Critical Raw Materials Act 3 which aims to boost EU production capacity of strategic raw materials along the value chain, e.g. through the EU strategic projects. Measures to facilitate access, aggregate demand and increase recycling are also included. ResourceEU 4 will contribute to accelerating the achievement of these objectives. The EU also concluded 15 Strategic Raw Materials Partnerships. 1 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/study-critical-raw-materials-eu-2023-final-report_en. 2 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/202303/Raw%20Materials%20Foresight%20Study%202023.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02024R1252-20240503. 4 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/01c448d6-dc93-40d7-9afe-4c2af448d00c_en.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2025-10-16 “E-004092/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission In the evening of Friday 5 September 2025, the Commission adopted a decision fining Google for breaching EU antitrust rules. Given the adoption of the decision on a Friday evening, the Commission chose to publish a written statement by the Executive Vice-President for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition 1 and provide a technical briefing to journalists that same evening. This approach ensured that key information was communicated promptly, without unnecessary delay. This arrangement was collectively agreed upon internally and consistently explained by the Commission’s spokesperson during the technical briefing on 5 September 2025, the midday briefing on 8 September 2025, and in written responses to media. It was also confirmed by the Executive Vice-President and the Cabinet in follow-up interactions with journalists. The Commission as an institution upholds high standards of transparency, particularly in cases of significant public interest, such as this high-profile antitrust decision. While press conferences are a valuable tool for direct engagement, the Commission must also balance the need for timely, accurate, and comprehensive communication, especially when decisions are announced at unconventional times. The Commission will continue to assess the most effective way to communicate major decisions, ensuring that citizens and stakeholders receive clear explanations while maintaining timely communication. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/statement_25_2034.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-10-16 “E-004093/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission presented in December 2023 a proposal for a Directive on interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries 1 , currently being discussed by the colegislators. The proposed requirements would apply to entities carrying out interest representation on behalf of third countries, regardless of their legal form. The European Democracy Shield 2 builds on existing measures to support the resilience of our democracies, including by supporting work with the Member States on the transparency and integrity of funding in politics. The Commission adheres strictly to its transparency obligations as outlined in Article 38 of the Financial Regulation 3 , which requires publishing information about recipients. Information about EU fund recipients, including NGOs, is published on the Financial Transparency System. 4 The Commission proactively shares the objectives and outcomes of funded projects on the Funding & Tenders Portal 5 . Furthermore, interest representatives that register in the Transparency Register as not representing commercial interests, which could typically include NGOs, are required to report their lobbying activities and disclose their main funding sources in the Transparency Register 6 . The Commission undertook a screening exercise, covering also grants to environmental NGOs financed under the LIFE Programme, and found that advocacy towards EU decisionmakers under grant agreements does not breach any contractual obligations. Moreover, the Commission issued comprehensive guidance 7 applicable to all spending programs to clarify which activities should not be mandated as a requirement or condition for EU financing. 1 COM(2023) 637 final. 2 JOIN(2025)791 final. 3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the EU (recast), ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html (The annual publications are based on Article 38 of the Financial Regulation whereby data on recipients is not disclosed for very low value contracts below EUR 15 000 and where disclosure risks threatening the rights and freedoms of the persons or entities). 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home. 6 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en. 7 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/guidance-fundingdev-impl-monit-enforce-of-eu-law_en.pdf.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Transparency requirements for interest groups
• 2025-10-02 “E-003852/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission In 2016, the Commission approved a measure for the closure of lignite-fired power plants in case SA.42536. Plants in the scope of this measure were mothballed for four years, before they were planned to shut down permanently. Payments under this measure were scheduled annually to compensate for forgone profits due to the mothballing. In 2022, following the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, Germany decided to transfer some of these mothballed plants to a temporary reserve with the view to temporarily allow those plants to return to the market, to be on stand-by and ready to be activated to the extent needed in the event of natural gas shortages. The Commission approved this latter measure in case SA.103662 pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to remedy a serious disturbance in the German economy. This measure was limited until 31 March 2024 and the Commission assessed specifically in that decision that there is no overlap in compensation with the measure for the closure of lignite-fired power plants, given that the eligible costs are different. Furthermore, the Commission approved several German measures concerning the early closure of lignite power plants. These plants were or will be closed permanently at the agreed date.”
  Energy transition (state support) · Fossil fuels
• 2025-10-02 “E-003861/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. On the basis of the EU-UK Common Understanding, the Commission and the United Kingdom have concluded their negotiations on the United Kingdom’s association to Erasmus+ on 17 December 2025. The United Kingdom is set to join the programme as of 1 January 2027, subject to both sides formalising the conclusion of the negotiations in accordance with their respective procedures and legal framework. 2. The Commission and the United Kingdom agreed in the Common Understanding 1 to work towards a Youth Experience Scheme. The Youth Experience Scheme ‘should facilitate the participation of young people from the European Union and the United Kingdom in various activities, [...], studies…’. Following the adoption of the Council Decision (EU) 2025/1286 2 , the negotiations started in September last year. The level of tuition fees is an important factor determining whether young EU citizens will move to the United Kingdom to study. Therefore, the Commission has been raising this issue with the United Kingdom. 3. Once the United Kingdom joins the Erasmus+ programme on 1 January 2027, students who will be studying in the United Kingdom during the academic year 2027/2028 with Erasmus+ support, awarded further to the 2027 call for proposals, will benefit from the same conditions applying to Erasmus+ students in an EU Member State or another third country associated to the programme. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_1267. 2 Council Decision (EU) 2025/1286 of 20 June 2025 authorising the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for an agreement on a youth experience scheme, OJ L, 2025/1286, 1.7.2025.”
  EU volunteering programs
• 2025-10-02 “E-003851/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission On 23 October 2025 1 , the European Council invited the Commission to present options for financial support based on an assessment of Ukraine’s financing needs and invited the Commission and the Council to take work forward to revert to this issue at its next meeting in December 2025. In its deliberations, the Commission’s considerations include several key parameters, namely that funding must address Ukraine’s critical defence requirements, funding must be rapidly available, any new financial package must safeguard Ukraine's debt sustainability, funding must also be flexible enough to cater for the evolving defence needs and the significant uncertainties regarding Ukraine’s financing needs in the years ahead, as well as the need for a fair burden sharing with international partners. The Commission’s proposals will not discriminate against or favour the defence industry of any particular Member State. The final decision on the conditions upon which the EU will provide financial support to Ukraine will be taken by the co-legislators. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2025/10/23/.”
  Arms export from the EU
• 2025-10-02 “E-003850/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The ‘Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ 1 clearly underlines that the proposed European readiness flagships require massive and coordinated investments into panEuropean projects that will shield Europe as a whole and thus benefit all Member States. The European Drone Defence Initiative, for example, will be designed with a 360 degrees approach. It will address threats that can reach any Member State. Investments into European readiness flagships do not come from a single, central funding source, on the contrary, funding will come from diverse sources, public and private. At EU level, possible defence industry related options for investments are the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Instrument 2 , the European Defence Industry Programme 3 (once in force), or the European Defence Fund (EDF) 4 . These programmes have clear governance rules that will be observed. Start-ups, scale-ups, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps play an important role in the overall European Defence Readiness agenda. EU defence initiatives encourage participation of smaller players and new defence actors. For example, nearly 40% of EDF beneficiaries are SMEs. On 19 November 2025 5 , the Commission put forward a Defence Industry Transformation Roadmap, that will focus on the role of innovation and the opportunities of such companies. This will include the issue of access to finance and contracts. Such an approach will be particularly inclusive and aims to promote and accelerate the thriving of national innovation ecosystems existing across Europe. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/readiness-roadmap-2030_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024PC0150. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 5 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/513de692-d08c-40cc-80c3cb6611ace178_en?filename=EU-Defence-Industry-Transformation-Roadmap.pdf.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-09-23 “E-003680/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The decarbonisation of the EU economy implies a steep reduction of fossil fuel imports 1 and associated costs, which will allow to invest in the deployment of decarbonised energy supply and energy efficiency, reinforcing our energy security and creating new economic opportunities and jobs. The impact assessment accompanying the 2040 climate target provides an analysis on the exposure of EU regions to climate change impacts 2 and to the transition on the basis of their economic activity. The implications of the EU-wide 2040 target at Member State level will depend on the design of climate policies, the broader enabling framework as well as on how Member States implement it. Impacts will also depend on national policy choices and decisions. The assessment of the post-2030 policy framework will be possible once the Commission starts developing the proposals for specific policies to deliver the 2040 target. The policy proposals will be accompanied by impact assessments 3 . The Commission's analyses will embed, to the extent technically possible, the national policies and measures as expressed in the National Energy and Climate Plans. 1 See for instance section 2.6 of Annex 8 in Part 3/5 of the impact assessment of the 2040 climate target (SWD/2024/63 final): Securing our future, Europe’s 2040 climate target and path to climate neutrality by 2050 building a sustainable, just and prosperous society. 2 Section 2.3 and 3.3 of the Annex 7 in Part 2/5 of the impact assessment of the 2040 climate target (SWD/2024/63 final). 3 As per the Better Regulation system: https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/betterregulation_en.”
  Climate efforts
• 2025-09-23 “E-003681/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The co-legislators adopted the current trans-European transport network (TEN-T) Regulation on 13 June 2024 1 . The Commission does not plan to revise the TEN-T Regulation soon and has no correspondence with the Member States concerning a possible revision. The Commission prepared the last revision over several years and was in close contact with Member States and stakeholders during this process. At the time, Poland advocated for an extension of the European Transport Corridors, in particular along the Eastern border. Poland has not informed the Commission about the inclusion of Via Pomerania expressway in regional transport plans. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401679.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-09-23 “E-003662/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Companies offering recreational genetic testing services in the EU and processing personal data in that context, such as where they may re-identify the data subject despite the application of pseudonymisation, are bound by the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) 1 . The processing of genetic data must be based on a valid legal basis under Article 6(1) GDPR. Furthermore, genetic data is considered a special category of personal data requiring that those data can only be processed if one of the conditions in Article 9(2) GDPR is fulfilled. Member States may introduce further conditions pursuant to Article 9(4) GDPR. Article 13 GDPR already obliges the companies, acting as controllers, to provide detailed information to individuals, such as on the purposes for which the data is processed, the recipients and storage period of the data, and, where relevant, transfers of the data to a third country. The monitoring and enforcement of the application of the GDPR falls within the competence of the national data protection authorities (DPAs) and courts, without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties. It is for the competent DPA to examine the practices of the companies concerned to ensure that EU citizens’ genetic data are effectively protected. The companies concerned are also subject to consumer protection law. In particular, the Unfair Commercial Practice Directive 2 prohibits misleading practices towards consumers, such as advertising and marketing that is likely to deceive the average consumers, or omissions of material information, when that leads to consumers taking a transaction decision they would not have taken otherwise. National courts and consumer protection authorities are in charge of enforcing these rules in individual cases. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88. 2 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, pp. 22–39.”
  GDPR · Processing of health data
• 2025-09-23 “E-003664/202 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Making energy more affordable is a key aim of EU energy policy. On 26 February 2025, the Commission presented the Action Plan for Affordable Energy 1 alongside the Clean Industrial Deal 2 . The Plan outlines eight measures to lower energy costs and attract investment. Implementation is already underway. Key measures include guidance on more efficient network charges and lowering electricity taxes, that can offer immediate relief especially for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), as taxes and network charges make up around 40% of electricity costs. Additional initiatives include guidance on two-way Contracts for Difference (CfDs) to stabilise prices and boost clean energy investment, and the launch of Tripartite Contracts for offshore wind, grids, and storage to unlock investments for affordable homegrown energy. The European Grids Package, adopted on 10 December 2025 3 , included further measures aimed at lowering energy prices by enabling energy to flow more efficiently across all Member States, integrating cheaper clean energy and accelerating electrification. Climate policies are designed to keep costs to industry in check, including through carbon leakage protection and targeted use of Emission Trading System (ETS) revenues. Member States can also use their ETS revenues to address energy costs by supporting industrial decarbonisation investments and providing aid for the indirect carbon cost passed on to electro-intensive sectors in line with the State aid rules. In the new ETS for buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2), impacts on the most vulnerable consumers are also being addressed through the Social Climate Fund and accompanying Social Climate Plans 4 . 1 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/affordable-energy_en. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en. 3 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/infrastructure/european-grids_en. 4 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/carbon-markets/social-climate-fund_en.”
  Energy (green transition) · Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• 2025-09-09 “E-003483/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission announced, as part of the Action Plan for Affordable Energy, the intention to work on tripartite agreements for affordable energy for Europe’s industry. Through political and sectoral commitments, they aim to bring together a trio of actors: developers and the supply chain; industrial consumers; and the public sector, supported where relevant by financial institutions such as the European Investment Bank. By coming together and agreeing on the needs and possible contribution of each actor, and making respective commitments, they will contribute to a favourable investment climate that benefits all parties. This may include, for example, increasing scale or certainty of demand for particular types of energy, securing the readiness of supply chains, or providing regulatory instruments. On 4 September 2025, the Commissioner for Energy and Housing announced the launch of work in two sectors: offshore wind and grids, and energy storage. The EU could have as much as 88 Gigawatt (GW) of offshore renewables by 2030, and up to 360 GW by mid-century. This can support quicker large-scale deployment and rapid integration of home-grown, reliable and affordable energy. Energy storage enables the penetration of more renewable energy, while optimising grid use and mitigating price spikes. In addition, the Commission has also announced a tripartite on biomethane on the occasion of the adoption of REPowerEU roadmap 1 . The Commission is currently assessing the usefulness of tripartite agreements for other sectors, such as for energy efficiency, energy integration of data centres, or areas within the field of nuclear energy such as small modular reactors, and remains open to receive views from stakeholders on possible needs for these or other sectors. 1 COM(2025) 440 final/2.”
  Nuclear energy · Energy transition (state support) · Off-shore renewables
• 2025-09-04 “E-003433/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission France has been subject to an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) since July 2024. On 21 January 2025, the Council adopted a recommendation for France with a net expenditure path aimed at correcting its excessive deficit by 2029. France should report on the effective action at least every 6 months 1 . France submitted its first Annual Progress Report in April 2025. Following the Commission’s assessment, the Council concluded 2 that the projected deviation from the recommended net expenditure growth in 2025 was small (below 0.3% of GDP) while the cumulative growth rate of net expenditure, when taking 2024 and 2025 together, was projected to be below the recommended maximum growth rate. Thus, the EDP for France was held in abeyance. The next assessment will take place with the Commission’s opinion on the French Draft Budgetary Plan, to be submitted by 15 October 2025. The Commission is conducting fiscal surveillance of Member States based on the agreed legal framework, adhering to the principles of equality and transparency. The provisions governing the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure are laid down in Article 126 TFEU and further specified in Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97. The effective action will be assessed based on the net expenditure indicator and its deviations from the net expenditure path to which France committed. The excessive deficit procedure will be abrogated once France brings its headline deficit durably below 3% of GDP. 1 Council Recommendation 5033/1/25 of 21 January with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive deficit. 2 Council Recommendation 10970/25 of 1 July 2025 on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of France.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2025-08-28 “E-003329/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission All imports of agricultural products from any third country into the EU are subject to the Union’s rules on sanitary and phytosanitary standards. Moreover, as part of the review of the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), Ukraine committed to align its legislation to most relevant EU agri-food production standards by 31 December 2028. These encompass, among others, EU legal acts on animal welfare or plant protection products. If the EU assesses the alignment as unsatisfactory, it may suspend all or part of the preferences granted in this review. When negotiating the DCFTA review, the Commission has listened carefully to stakeholders in the agricultural sector and adopted a balanced, fair and realistic approach. The revised DCFTA, once in force, sets clear limits to preferential imports of some of the most sensitive products, at levels lower than under the autonomous trade measures which had applied since 2022. In addition, it includes a broad safeguard mechanism to shield EU markets where imports cause or threaten to cause serious difficulties at EU or Member State level. The revised DCFTA will also increase export opportunities for EU farmers.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU · Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• 2025-08-28 “E-003328/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission In the European Steel and Metals Action Plan 1 presented in March 2025, the Commission identified the challenges of the steel sector and other metals sectors and proposed concrete solutions to address them. These challenges include high energy costs, exposure to an unlevel playing field in international competition, decarbonisation investment needs and regulatory burden. Under the Framework for State aid measures to support the Clean Industrial Deal 2 , sectors that are particularly exposed to international trade and heavily dependent on electricity may receive aid in form of temporary price relief. Moreover, aid for decarbonisation is also possible. In addition, the Commission has initiated the process of the revision of the 2014 Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty (R&R Guidelines) 3 and, on 22 August 2025, it launched a call for evidence and a public consultation to seek input on the scope and content of the revision. The consultation concerns in particular the potential inclusion of the steel sector into the scope of the R&R Guidelines. While State aid to the steel sector is and has been possible in general, overcapacities that existed back in 2014 justified the exclusion of steel producers in difficulty from the benefit of rescue and restructuring aid. While there is no longer structural overcapacity in steel in the EU itself, global overcapacities still exist. Therefore, the Commission contemplates a modification of the R&R Guidelines which would address a potential unequal treatment of companies in sectors that have similarities (e.g. aluminium). The Commission welcomes the views from stakeholders and other interested parties in response to its consultation. 1 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/european-steel-and-metals-action-plan_en. 2 OJ C 3602, 4.9.2025, p.1. 3 JO L 246, 24.9.2015, p. 9.”
  Climate efforts · EU industrial funding
• 2025-08-12 “E-003229/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The new Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation 1 applies from 12 August 2026. Following its adoption, the Commission has launched a study to assess whether the 100% reuse target for pallet wrappings and straps in transport operations in Article 29 (2 and 3) can feasibly be achieved by 2030 without undermining the environmental performance, disrupting supply chains or transport safety, or imposing economic constraints on the sector. The study is at its final stage and, based on its results, the Commission intends to propose a delegated act under Article 29(18) before the end of 2025 which will exempt those wrappings and straps for which the economic, environmental and operational data do not support the application of the 100 % target. The Commission will actively involve Member States and relevant industry stakeholders through the Expert Working Group on waste in the discussions on the draft delegated act. Finally, the Commission’s impact assessment 2 concluded that reuse targets on the transport packaging formats listed in Article 29(1) of the Packaging Regulation are feasible, do not undermine environmental performance, and do not lead to negative economic impacts on the concerned economic operators. The Commission is thoroughly assessing all available scientific input 3 to see if the prerequisites to revise the provisions in Article 29(1) are scientifically underpinned. 1 Regulation (EU) 2025/40 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 on packaging and packaging waste, amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2019/904, and repealing Directive 94/62/EC, OJ L, 2025/40, 22.1.2025. 2 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/document/download/920f946e-4e98-4de5-b1e5-c948a81a10f5_en. 3 Including recently published studies from the Institut für Energie- und Umweltforschung (IFEU) and RDC Environment.”
  Sustainable packaging · Re-use of packaging
• 2025-06-24 “E-002531/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has proposed a multi-annual financial framework post-2027 that maintains a robust Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Anchored to the EU Treaty objectives, the CAP will retain an essential role, providing a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, guaranteeing food security, ensuring market stability as well as support for rural areas and generational renewal while contributing to environmental and climate objectives. Farmers and rural communities will be able to rely on all CAP tools available today and will continue to benefit from the support provided under Pillar II of the CAP, integrated into a single funding instrument. This will also help lower administrative burden. Income support is guaranteed with stable and predictable support for farmers, while allowing Member States to tap into the National and Regional Partnership Fund of EUR 865 billion to finance other CAP measures, e.g. to increase connectivity in rural areas or to support rural entrepreneurship via LEADER. The Commission engaged in a collaborative approach to shape the next EU budget, including public consultations and Citizens' Panels, and held continuous dialogue with stakeholders, a Strategic dialogue on the future of EU agriculture 1 and a Vision Conference 2 bringing together over 6.500 participants to discuss the future of the sector in the EU. This consultation involved key stakeholders, such as the European Board for Agriculture and Food 3 and the Civil Dialogue Group on the CAP, whose views and expertise helped shaping the CAP proposal. 1 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/overview-vision-agriculture-food/main-initiatives-strategic-dialogue-future-euagriculture_en. 2 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/media/events/shaping-future-farming-and-agri-food-sector-2025-05-08_en. 3 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/cap-overview/committees-and-expertgroups/ebaf_en.”
  Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1) · Agricultural funding
• 2025-06-18 “E-002451/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission On 9 April 2025, the Commission adopted the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Continent Action Plan 1 , which announces a Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA). One of the objectives of the Act is to facilitate private investment in sustainable cloud and AI capacity, to triple the EU’s data processing capacity in the next 5 to 7 years, thus ensuring that, by 2035, the EU is equipped with sufficient data processing capacity to meet the needs of its businesses and public administrations. To gather stakeholder views on these initiatives, the Commission held a public consultation between the 09 April and 03 July 2025. Adding new data centres to the grid presents important challenges, notably in terms of potential impacts on consumption, other energy consumers, networks and decarbonisation. The Strategic Roadmap for digitalisation and AI in the energy sector will propose measures to facilitate the sustainable integration of data centres into the energy system and address other energy-related issues resulting from the large-scale deployment of data centres in the EU. Published together with the Strategic Roadmap, the Data Centre Energy Efficiency Package will continue the work foreseen in the Energy Efficiency Directive by introducing a rating scheme for the energy efficiency of data centres. This aims to increase transparency and promote the most sustainable practices in the industry. Looking ahead, the Commission aims to strengthen a competitive EU cloud industry and recognizes the significant untapped potential in the sector. Through the CADA, the Commission aims to mobilise the cloud industry, both in terms of infrastructure and services. 1 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/ai-continent-action-plan.”
  Artificial Intelligence · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2025-06-18 “E-002452/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The main focus of the Commission is on implementing the Methane Regulation 1 . This will preserve legal certainty and achieve the objective of tackling methane emissions, which is the second-largest contributor to climate change after carbon dioxide. A pragmatic approach to implementing the Regulation is the most effective way to address the questions raised by Member States. The Commission services are facilitating implementation by, for instance, holding workshops with industry to encourage the development of viable solutions that meet monitoring reporting and verification requirements; developing an EU reporting framework; facilitating discussions and common approaches within the network of national competent authorities, which is the expert group newly established by the Commission to coordinate implementation efforts. Security of supply and competitiveness are at the core of the Regulation’s architecture, ensuring the EU market remains attractive for liquefied natural gas suppliers. The Commission will continue considering pragmatically market and technological realities in the development of non-legislative acts set in the Regulation. To do so, the Commission is conducting informal consultations on the implementing act on leak detection and repair measures and on recommendations on model clauses for supply contracts scheduled for adoption in 2025. The Commission services are also working with the European Committee for Standardisation to formulate technical standards that will provide clarity to the industry. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942 (OJ L, 15.7.2024, p.1).”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU · Natural gas
• 2025-06-18 “E-002450/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The objective of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) 1 is to restore openness and fairness in the digital sector across the EU where gatekeepers are present, including for small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs). Article 6(5) DMA pursues this objective by prohibiting gatekeepers from treating more favourably, in ranking and related indexing and crawling, their own services and products. This should allow better visibility for smaller providers offering searches in specialised areas as well as to smaller suppliers of goods and services. In this respect, the Commission opened an investigation into Alphabet’s compliance with Article 6(5) DMA in relation to Google Search. On 19 March 2025, the Commission informed Alphabet of its preliminary view that certain features and functionalities of Google Search treat Alphabet’s own services more favourably than rival services. The Commission has not endorsed the measures currently implemented by Alphabet to comply with Article 6(5) DMA. When assessing a gatekeeper’s compliance with Article 6(5) DMA, the Commission is cognizant of the impact of any compliance measures on users of the gatekeeper’s service, such as SMEs and consumers. To this end, the Commission held several meetings with impacted suppliers, including hotels, airlines and restaurants, as well as their industry associations and the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC). In addition, the Commission organised multiple workshops to collect feedback on Alphabet’s proposed compliance measures. The Commission is currently assessing Alphabet’s compliance measures. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R1925.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2025-06-13 “E-002396/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission On 26 February 2025 the Commission adopted the so-called ‘Omnibus 1’ proposals to simplify the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), as well as the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive 1 . If accepted by the co-legislators, the omnibus package should result in very significant burden reduction for companies without undermining the essential policy objectives of each directive. The Commission’s proposal also strengthens existing protections for companies in the value chain by prohibiting companies subject to the CSRD from asking for more information than what would be contained in a future voluntary standard for smaller companies. In the explanatory memorandum accompanying the omnibus proposals, the Commission committed to adopting a delegated act to revise and simplify the existing European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) that must be applied by companies subject to the CSRD. The revised standards will, amongst other things, substantially reduce the number of datapoints, clarify provisions deemed unclear and improve consistency with other pieces of EU legislation. The Commissioner for Financial Services and the Savings and Investments Union has asked EFRAG 2 , the Commission’s technical advisory body for sustainability reporting standards, to submit revised draft ESRS by the end of November 2025. EFRAG will launch a public consultation on the draft revised ESRS in early August 2025. It is therefore not possible at this stage to indicate exactly which datapoints will be deleted. In view of the different purposes and target audiences of different reporting requirements related to sustainability, the Commission is not currently considering merging all such requirements into one legal act. 1 COM(2025) 81 final and COM(2025) 80 final. 2 EFRAG was formerly the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group but is now just ‘EFRAG’.”
  Sustainable corporate governance · Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights)
• 2025-06-13 “E-002397/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission In 2025, the Commission adopted the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Continent Action Plan 1 . It links different AI initiatives relating to data, skills, and infrastructure such as the coinvestment into the AI Factories 2 and Gigafactories 34 . The Commission envisages these resources to grant prioritised access and dedicated services to European AI researchers and startups. In May 2025, the Commission adopted the EU Startup and Scaleup Strategy 5 , which includes many actions that are expected to benefit European software startups and scaleups, including by facilitating access to venture capital and growth funding. The European Competitiveness Fund will invest in strategic technologies to foster innovation and support digital leadership policy 6 . The objective of the 28 th regime is to provide companies with a single set of rules to facilitate the scaling-up and operations across borders and to attract investment in the Single Market. It should set out a new corporate legal framework covering a wide range of key issues for companies, building on online procedures and digital tools in EU company law. A public consultation was launched on 8 July 2025 7 . Under the Digital Europe Programme 8 , the Commission is calling for proposals 9 to fund scalable generative AI pilots for public administrations based on European models. Furthermore, the public sector will be a leading strategic driver of the Apply AI Strategy which will ensure that safe and trustworthy AI is used to improve the quality and the efficiency of public services and strategic sectors. Moreover, the European Innovation Council is helping scale deep tech startups and small and medium-sizes enterprises to develop and apply AI technologies with a combination of grant and investment including through targeted challenges, such as GenAI4EU 10 . 1 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/ai-continent-action-plan. 2 https://eurohpc-ju.europa.eu/ai-factories_en. 3 https://eurohpc-ju.europa.eu/document/download/e91bde77-f975-4012-93a70224fe71b75c_en?filename=AI%20Gigafactories%20-%20Workshop%2022%20May%202025.pdf. 4 The Commission has adopted a proposal to amend the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking Regulation to support the creation of AI Gigafactories. https://www.eurohpc-ju.europa.eu/europeancommission-proposes-amendment-eurohpc-regulation-support-gigafactories-and-include-quantum-2025-0716_en. 5 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/strategy-research-and-innovation/jobs-and-economy/eustartup-and-scaleup-strategy_en. 6 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/european-competitiveness-fund_en. 7 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14674-28th-regime-a-singleharmonized-set-of-rules-for-innovative-companies-throughout-the-EU_en. 8 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/digital-europeprogramme_en. 9 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/DIGITAL2025-AI-08-SUPPLY-AI?isExactMatch=true&status=31094501,31094502,31094503&callIdentifier=DIGITAL2025-AI-08&order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=50&sortBy=startDate. 10 https://eic.ec.europa.eu/eic-funding-opportunities/eic-accelerator/eic-accelerator-challenges-2025/genai4eucreating-european-champions-generative-ai_en.”
  EU industrial funding · Artificial Intelligence
• 2025-06-13 “E-002385/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission TSMC has already established a joint venture with three European companies (Bosch, Infineon, and NXP) called the European Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (ESMC), with a facility in Dresden, one of Europe's main hubs for semiconductor manufacturing. The venture focuses on chips for the automotive sector but will also benefit other sectors. To support ESMC’s customers, TSMC has opened a semiconductor design centre in Munich, a leading hub for automotive chip design. The Commission remains committed to supporting the growth of semiconductor companies across all Member States and consistently promotes a balanced geographic distribution of semiconductor activities. For example, semiconductor competence centres, as foreseen in the Chips Act 1 , have been established in every Member State. They each receive equal funding to foster local innovation ecosystems. The Commission welcomes TSMC’s investment in Europe and will continue to support companies developing advanced chips, particularly in areas such as artificial intelligence processing, which is a strategic priority to drive demand for leading-edge semiconductor fabrication. Related to the Chips Act, financial support to semiconductor facilities is typically provided by Member States, which will need to comply with EU State aid rules where relevant, considering as positive effects, for example, the strengthening of the semiconductor value chain in Europe and the positive impact on innovation in Europe, bringing benefits to small and medium-sized enterprises and end users. 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Chips Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1781/oj/eng.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty · EU industrial funding (mechanism level: EU-pooled vs nationally-financed)
• 2025-06-13 “E-002398/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is in close and constructive contacts with the Polish authorities concerning this State aid case. The Commission is fully conscious of the significance this project has for Poland and treats this case with a high priority. On 18 December 2024, the Commission adopted a decision initiating the formal investigation procedure concerning the aid package supporting the first nuclear power plant, as notified by Poland. This decision was published in the Official Journal on 4 March 2025 1 , inviting interested parties to submit comments within one month of that date. These comments were forwarded to Poland to provide its replies to the submitted comments. Poland submitted its replies to the Commission. In view of the ongoing procedure, the Commission is neither in a position to comment further on the content of the contacts with the Polish authorities, nor can it predict the timing or outcome. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1389/oj/eng.”
  Nuclear energy · Energy transition (state support)
• 2025-05-08 “E-001863/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The decline in industrial production capacities for the steel industry stems from several economic and geopolitical factors, particularly the energy price crisis, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, global non-market overcapacity, and unfair global competition. To address these factors, the EU is taking several measures. Since 2018, EU steel safeguards measures have been in place to prevent or remedy serious injury to the EU’s steel industry. In March 2025, the Commission adopted the Steel and Metals Action Plan 1 , announcing a tightening of the safeguard and the introducing of new trade measures to replace it after 2026. The Affordable Energy Action Plan 2 adopted in February 2025 sets out measures to reduce energy prices. The proposal for an Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act 3 , due in 2025, will aim to address further industry challenges, including the creation of lead markets. The Commission, as reiterated in the Clean Industrial Deal 4 , is committed to maintaining industrial production in the EU while making decarbonisation a growth engine. It recognises that energy-intensive industries as central to critical value chains and aims to reduce strategic dependencies across key sectors. The European steel industry’s supplies essential sectors such as automotive, clean tech, and defence. The Commission will carry out a comprehensive review of the Emissions Trading System by mid-2026. The review will focus both on specific review clauses and on a framework for the trading period post-2030, that will contribute to the EU’s overall climate target in an economically responsible way for all sectors concerned. The impacts on the steel sector will be duly taken into consideration, as has been the case in all previous reviews. 1 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/european-steel-and-metals-action-plan_en. 2 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/action-plan-affordable-energy-unlocking-true-value-our-energy-unionsecure-affordable-efficient-and_en. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14505-Industrial-DecarbonisationAccelerator-Act-speeding-up-decarbonisation_en. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_550.”
  Carbon leakage support · Energy (green transition)
• 2025-03-26 “E-001263/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not intend to propose the prolongation of the current Autonomous Trade Measures Regulation 1 providing duty free and quota free imports for Ukraine. Instead, the Commission is pursuing consultations with Ukraine to review the reciprocal tariff liberalisation under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 2 in accordance with Article 29 of that Agreement. This review will lead to a well-balanced solution that will allow for reciprocal trade between the EU and Ukraine in agricultural goods, while at the same time protecting EU farmers and addressing interests flagged by some Member States and Members of the European Parliament. Furthermore, the Commission is proposing that the negotiated solution would also include a safeguard clause that would be triggered to prevent any adverse impacts of trade flows on the EU market, including one Member State. As mandated by Article 4(2) of the Autonomous Trade Measures Regulation, the Commission monitors on a regular basis the impact of the Autonomous Trade Measures adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. The monitoring report is shared with the European Parliament and with the Member States. So far, this monitoring has not shown any adverse effect on the EU market or the market of one or several Member States. The Commission is regularly consulting Member States on this issue. The views of the Member States, as well as the European Parliament and relevant stakeholders, feed into the Commission’s decision-making process. The Commission is not in a position to share the specific feedback received from Member States since it is not the author of such documents. 1 OJ L, 2024/1392, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1392/oj. 2 http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/295/oj.”
  Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports · Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2025-03-26 “E-001261/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The development and implementation of the carbon footprint for batteries is based on a stepwise approach with a gradual and cumulative increase in the carbon footprint requirements in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 1 . The overarching aim is to increase transparency on the batteries’ carbon footprint and shift the EU market towards batteries with a lower carbon footprint, regardless of where they are produced. As required by Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542, the Commission is currently working on the first step, which is developing a methodology for calculating and verifying the carbon footprint of electric vehicle batteries on the basis of Annex II to the Regulation. After publication of a draft delegated act on the ‘Have your say’ portal on 30 April 2024 2 and a dedicated meeting of the Member State expert group on 11 July 2024, the Commission is currently analysing the way forward for the adoption of the delegated act, taking into account the feedback received. Requirements related to the carbon footprint of batteries will apply to all batteries covered by Article 7 that are placed on the EU market, including imported products. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1542/oj/eng. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13877-Batteries-for-electric-vehiclescarbon-footprint-methodology_en.”
  Carbon leakage support · Sustainability of batteries regulation
• 2025-03-06 “P-000973/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The conduct and the organisation of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional and legislative rules, while respecting their international obligations and EU law. The Commission does not interfere in the electoral processes of Member States. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 requires providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) to assess and mitigate systemic risks linked to electoral processes and civic discourse, while protecting fundamental rights, including the freedom of expression 2 . The DSA does not define what constitutes illegal content or disinformation, 3 nor does it determine what type of content may be posted online. The Commission issued guidelines for VLOPs and VLOSEs on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes, which recommend different mitigation measures 4 . The Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs) coordinate work at national level with the aim of ensuring VLOPs and VLOSEs’ compliance with the DSA, including during electoral periods. The European Board for Digital Services, composed of the DSCs, compiled a DSA Elections Toolkit aiming to support DSCs in this task 5 . DSCs can organise election roundtables to facilitate information sharing and coordination between relevant stakeholders within the scope of the DSA and based on their legal competences and local election legislation. Upon the concerned DSC’s request, the Commission can provide support in this exercise. The Commission has so far not received a request to provide support for a roundtable in Poland. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1–102: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng 2 Articles 34 and 35 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. 3 Article 3(h) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024XC03014&qid=1714466886277 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/dsa-elections-toolkit-digital-services-coordinators”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-02-14 “E-000697/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission promotes a best price-quality approach to public purchases which takes into account the environmental impact and externalities of the purchase. Procuring green products at a reasonable price means creating added value for the community by reducing environmental impact. It promotes the competitiveness of EU businesses, which are often leaders in sustainable solutions. A broad array of recent EU legislation already makes certain forms of green public procurement (GPP) mandatory or lays the basis for the EU to adopt minimum harmonised GPP requirements, taking into account several elements including their economic feasibility. This is the case, for instance, for the Clean Vehicles Directive 1 (setting Member States targets for the purchase of low-emission vehicles), the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation 2 (regulating how product specific GPP requirements will be adopted at EU level), or the Energy Efficiency Directive 3 (requiring the application of the energy efficiency first principle to all procurements). In view of the upcoming public procurement reform, the Commission will reflect on how to clarify, simplify and mainstream the use of sustainability requirements. 1 Directive (EU) 2019/1161 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 amending Directive 2009/33/EC on the promotion of clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 establishing a framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for sustainable products, amending Directive (EU) 2020/1828 and Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 and repealing Directive 2009/125/EC. 3 Directive (EU) 2023/1791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on energy efficiency and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 (recast).”
  EU policy on sustainability criteria in public funding
• 2025-02-09 “E-000586/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The EUR 1.8 billion 1 in EU support mentioned on the occasion of the political agreement reached on the EU-Mercosur Agreement are intended to facilitate a fair green and digital transition in Mercosur countries. It reflects the EU’s broader commitment to invest in mutually beneficial partnerships through the European Union - Latin America and the Caribbean (EU-LAC) Global Gateway Investment Agenda. The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – GE) Regulation 2 provides that the Commission should inform the European Parliament before mobilising funds from the emerging challenges and priorities cushion. The Parliament was informed by a letter sent on 20 December 2024. The mobilisation of the funds is not planned before 2026. Mobilisation will comply with the NDICI – GE Regulation as its legal basis. The uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the trade negotiations until the last moment did not allow for earlier information and consultation of the Parliament or the Council. In compliance with NDICI – GE, Member States are formally consulted prior to adoption of decisions by the College of Commissioners. As always, documents will be simultaneously shared with the Parliament to uphold its right to scrutiny. The Parliament and the Council will also be informed of the committee proceedings. The package will be implemented in accordance with the EU’s standard budgetary procedures, ensuring transparency and accountability through robust monitoring, evaluation, and control mechanisms. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6244 2 https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj/eng#:~:text=Regulation%20%28EU%29%202021%2F947%20of%20the%20E uropean%20Parliament%20and,%28EC%2C%20Euratom%29%20No%20480%2F2009%20%28Text%20with% 20EEA%20relevance%29”
  EU-Brazil Relations
• 2025-02-09 “E-000588/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission refers the Honourable Member to its Communication on the Common Implementation Plan 1 setting out the key actions required for the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum 2 , including on relocation. The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation 3 (AMMR) establishes a system of permanent and flexible solidarity among Member States. Each Member State has full discretion to choose its contribution to this solidarity system, and can choose from relocation, financial contributions and alternative measures (in-kind support). According to the AMMR, this solidarity mechanism will start applying in June 2026. 1 COM(2024) 251 final, available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/common-implementation-plan-pactmigration-and-asylum_en. 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, OJ L, 2024/1351, 22.5.2024, (ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1351/oj/eng).”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-02-09 “E-000587/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission wants to preserve and expand the EU-United States (US) trade partnership for the benefit of the respective people and businesses. The Commission regrets US announcements on the possible imposition of tariffs on goods imported from the EU. As the EU and US economies are so closely intertwined, it should also be in the US’ interest to avoid tariff hikes. The Commission’s priority is to avoid disruptions to EU-US trade and to seek negotiated solutions. Therefore, the Commission decided to delay the imposition of EU countermeasures to allow for negotiations. At the same time, the Commission is ready to ensure that the EU will react firmly, swiftly and proportionately to any unjustified tariffs or trade measures if no mutually beneficial solution is otherwise attainable. The Commission recognises the challenges EU industries and agriculture face in terms of competitiveness. To address those, the recently presented Competitiveness Compass 1 and Clean Industrial Deal 2 provide a strategic framework to enhance industrial resilience while ensuring that decarbonisation drives growth. The aim is to lower energy prices with the measures proposed in the Affordable Energy Action Plan 3 , to secure critical raw materials, increase access to capital markets, and to introduce regulatory simplification, which is being done through the Omnibus Simplification Package 4 . The Commission remains committed to evaluating further measures to mitigate competitive imbalances while reinforcing Europe’s economic and industrial leadership. Conversely, the new Vision for Agriculture and Food 5 identifies a fairer global level playing field as a key element of the EU’s agri-food economic diplomacy while keeping in line with World Trade Organization rules. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0030. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0085. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2025:79:FIN. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/omnibus-i_en. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0075.”
  EU-US trade relations · Climate efforts
• 2025-02-04 “E-00482/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The EU programme for the environment and climate action (LIFE 1 ) provides amongst others financial support for the functioning of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), supporting civil society’s participation to policy making, in line with the LIFE Regulation 2 and the EU Financial Regulation 3 . Each year, 30 to 35 operating grant agreements are awarded competitively under the LIFE Programme, while annually the amount committed to these grants is around EUR 14,5 million. These operating grants are awarded following a competitive procedure. Calls published annually 4 set out the criteria under which the grants will be awarded. Applicants submit proposals that include the description of their work programmes of activities in areas indicated in the LIFE Regulation. This description is annexed to the grant agreement. The work programme may mention, among other activities, advocacy activities. The Commission does not prescribe the specific applicant’s activities in their workprogrammes. The Commission also does not require NGOs to advocate in favour or against specific EU policy initiatives as a condition for Union financing, nor does it instruct them to support any specific positions. According to the grant agreements, any opinions expressed, and activities carried out remain the sole responsibility of NGOs. The Commission has recently issued guidance 5 addressed to all Commission services for all spending programmes, clarifying which activities should not be mandated as a condition for Union financing. 1 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life_en 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/783 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing a Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE), and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1293/2013. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509 4 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/funding-opportunities/calls-proposals/framework-partnership-agreements-fpa-og_en and https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/funding-opportunities/calls-proposals/specific-operating-grant-agreements-sgaog_en 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/guidance-fundingdev-impl-monit-enforce-of-eu-law_en.pdf”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · EU funding of advocacy NGOs (operating grants)
• 2025-01-22 “P-000261/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The presidential elections in Romania were annulled by the decision of the Romanian Constitutional Court. The conduct and the organisation of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional rules and legislation, as well as their international obligations and EU law. National authorities and courts are primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with the applicable rules. The Commission will not comment on the alleged private statements of previous Commissioners. The Commission supports Member States on electoral matters, mainly through the framework of the European cooperation network on elections. This brings together national authorities with competence in electoral matters and facilitates the exchanges of information and best practices. While the electoral processes are regulated under the Member States’ national legislation enforced by their national competent authorities and courts, different EU rules are relevant in national electoral contexts within the EU, such as the Digital Services Act 1 , the Regulation 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising 2 (which will become fully applicable in October 2025), the General Data Protection Regulation 3 (where personal data are involved), the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act 4 (if AI is used, for instance, in a campaign), and the European Media Freedom Act 5 . Furthermore, in 2023, the Commission published a Recommendation on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union 6 . In 2024, it also published Guidelines for providers of very large online platforms and very large online search engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes 7 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj/eng 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2829/oj/eng 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024XC03014&qid=1714466886277”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
• 2025-01-22 “E-000284/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Democracy is a core value of the EU, with free and fair elections at its heart. Member States are responsible for organising elections according to national legislation and constitutional rules, international obligations and EU law. The Commission has been promoting election integrity, in full respect of national competences, including in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections 1 . Other networks such as the Rapid Alert System 2 and cybersecurity coordination networks 3 exchange on improving cybersecurity and countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. These networks consist of representatives of relevant competent national authorities, enable the exchange of best practices and information among such authorities and are supported by Commission services. Under Digital Services Act (DSA), very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) need to assess and mitigate risks to civic discourse and electoral processes while respecting fundamental rights. In April 2024 the Commission published guidelines in this area. 4 The European Board for Digital Services (EBDS), consisting of Member States’ Digital Service Coordinators (DSCs) and chaired by the Commission, established a working group on the integrity of the information space 5 . It exchanges on elections and civic discourse risks in the context of enforcement of the DSA. The EBDS published a DSA Elections Toolkit for DSCs with instruments, best practices and lesson learnt. 6 For example the roundtable 7 and stress test 8 , with VLOPs and VLOSEs, German authorities, and civil society organisations that the German DSC and the Commission organised ahead of the German federal election in February 2025. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/democracy-eucitizenship-anti-corruption/democracy-and-electoral-rights/european-cooperation-networkelections_en#:~:text=This%20network%20brings%20together%20representatives%20of%20Member%20States %E2%80%99,elections%2C%20including%20data%20protection%2C%20cybersecurity%2C%20transparency%20and%20awareness 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/factsheet-rapid-alert-system_en 3 EU-CyCLONe, CSIRTs Network (Commission is an observer in both networks), NIS Cooperation Group. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024XC03014&qid=1714466886277 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/working-group-4-european-board-digital-services-integrityinformation-space 6 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/dsa-elections-toolkit-digital-services-coordinators 7 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/digital-services-coordinator-germany-hosts-roundtable-onlineplatforms 8 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/german-digital-services-coordinator-tests-platforms-readinessunder-digital-services-act”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-01-22 “E-000260/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Omne Energia and Gazprom are not listed under EU restrictive measures (sanctions). In addition, the import of Russian natural gas into the EU is not prohibited under EU sanctions. Restrictions on public procurement which prohibit the award of public contracts to Russian entities and those majority owned by them foresee an exemption for the purchase, import or transfer of natural gas 1 . Therefore, the Commission cannot comment on this specific procurement procedure mentioned by the Honourable Member. Any additional sanctions would need to be adopted unanimously by the Council of the EU. The Commission cannot comment on the removal of Omne Energia from the Polish sanctions list, its original inclusion not being based on EU sanctions. Such action would therefore not be considered as circumvention. The Commission is not aware of similar situations in other Member States. 1 Article 5k paragraph 2(e) of Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2025-01-22 “E-000283/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen On behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act 1 (DSA) aims to enable a safe, predictable and trusted online environment that facilitates innovation and in which fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, such as freedom of expression, are effectively respected and protected. The DSA does not define ‘hate speech’ nor regulate what content is illegal. Illegal content remains defined by applicable EU and national laws. Instead, the DSA regulates the responsibility of intermediary services for the systems they have in place. It sets a series of due diligence obligations on hosting services, requiring them, for instance, to set up notice and action mechanisms to report illegal content and act effectively once they are notified that illegal content is accessible on their platform in the EU. On 20 January 2025, the Commission adopted the Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online + 2 . The integrated Code of conduct will facilitate compliance with and the effective enforcement of the DSA. The 2008 Framework Decision requires Member States to consider as a criminal offence hate speech, defined as publicly inciting violence or hatred against individuals or groups based on race, colour, religion, descent, or national/ethnic origin. Several Member States have extended the scope of hate speech as an offence with additional grounds, which is a possibility provided in the Framework Decision. The Commission’s powers in relation to accessing technical interfaces under the DSA are strictly limited to data access requests and monitoring actions, under Articles 40 and 72 thereof, and they do not imply intervention in content moderation. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act). 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-01-13 “E-000094/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The EU is supporting Moldova through the energy crisis. From 2021 to 2024, the EU has provided EUR 240 million in direct budget support to Moldova to support the most vulnerable people. On 27 January 2025, the Commission announced an emergency assistance package of EUR 30 million to tackle the crisis 1 , including EUR 20 million allocated for purchasing emergency gas for the population in the Transnistrian region and to avert the humanitarian crisis imposed by Russia’s decision to halt supplies. On 4 February 2025, the Commission and Moldova agreed on a 2-year Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience, with an overall support of EUR 250 million 2 . This strategy seeks to mitigate Moldova's dependence on Russian energy supplies and to fully integrate the country into the EU energy market. The support package includes immediate assistance to alleviate the impact of rising electricity costs on Moldovan consumers, with a focus on compensating excess costs for households, social institutions, and vulnerable businesses. In addition, an offer of EUR 60 million is available to the Transnistrian region, subject to conditions, including on fundamental freedoms and human rights. The EU is taking steps to build Moldova’s resilience, energy independence and clean transition, supporting the overall stabilisation of the country. The EU Partnership Mission in Moldova is extended for two years. It will build the country's crisis management and hybrid threat response capacities, including countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. Support to counter electoral interference, enhance cybersecurity, and improve strategic communication are key components of the EU’s support ahead of the parliamentary elections. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_329 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-and-moldova-agree-2-year-comprehensivestrategy-energy-independence-and-2025-02-04_en”
  EU-Moldova relations · EU relations with Eastern Neighbourhood · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2024-12-20 “E-003078/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The country chapter for Poland of the 2023 Rule of Law Report mentions the case of Pablo González under the pillar of media freedom and factually reports on his arrest by the Polish Security Services and the charge of illegal espionage on behalf of Russia 1 . The information related to the case included in the Report had been brought at the time to the attention of the Commission by different organisations as well as an alert published on the Council of Europe’s platform. The Commission did not make an assessment about such information and usually refers to such alerts in its Rule of Law Report in relation to all Member States. The Commission is aware of the subsequent outcome of the case revealed in 2024 and considers it important and pays careful attention to any references to individual cases in the Rule of Law Reports. The Commission has strongly condemned Russia’s espionage, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns and there can be no doubt of its position in this regard. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/b576c76e-0755-4690-92667895c4294433_en?filename=48_1_52627_coun_chap_poland_en.pdf”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
• 2024-12-19 “E-003047/2024 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission adopted the Competitiveness Compass 1 on 29 January 2025. The Compass builds on the Draghi Report 2 by setting out measures to close the innovation gap, a joint roadmap for decarbonisation and competitiveness, and reducing excessive dependencies and increasing security. It furthermore sets out horizontal enablers of EU competitiveness. The Competitiveness Compass identifies flagship actions and initiatives such as the Clean Industrial Deal 3 that will further implement the priorities set out in the Compass. Private financing and a refocussed EU budget are needed to mobilise investments for competitiveness. On 19 March 2025, the Commission adopted a Communication on the Savings and Investments Union 4 , a key initiative to improve the way the EU financial system channels savings to productive investments. In 2025, the Commission will present a new approach for a modern and reinforced EU budget, which will be simpler, with fewer programmes and a plan for each country linking reforms with investments. The European Competitiveness Fund will make investment in strategic technologies and de-risk private investment. Energy prices are central to the competitiveness of EU companies. The Commission adopted an Action Plan for Affordable Energy 5 to bring down energy prices for industry and households. The Action Plan sets out measures to pass on the lower generation cost of fossilfree electricity to consumers, make the energy system more resilient, and unlock investment. This is part of the wider Clean Industrial Deal initiative which was adopted on the same day to support two closely linked sectors in the transition to meet the EU’s agreed decarbonisation goals, namely the energy intensive industries and the clean-tech sector. 1 A Competitiveness Compass for the EU, COM(2025) 30 final. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en 3 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0124 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0079”
  Own EU resources · EU industrial funding · Climate efforts
• 2024-12-18 “E-003036/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission As the Commission noted in its reply to the written question E-001750/2024 of 30 November 2024, in the context of the enforcement of the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 , the Commission has specific powers to supervise and enforce this Regulation, as specified under Article 56 thereof. In this context, the Commission does not seek to enforce or impose any specific content moderation actions. There are therefore no circumstances in the context of the DSA that are in the scope of questions 1 and 2. Concerning question 3, in addition to the answer provided previously, the Commission can confirm that any request for public access to documents in possession of the institution will be assessed on a case-by-case basis, in line with applicable rules laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 2 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act). 2 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-12-05 “E-002798/2024 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission takes allegations of money laundering or any other financial misconduct seriously. It has a zero-tolerance policy for fraud and corruption and is committed to ensuring the highest standards of integrity among its staff. As regards measures against money laundering, the Commission refers to the applicable EU and national legislation in this area, to which staff of EU institutions are also subject. Inside the institution, the Commission already relies on a comprehensive framework of compliance and awareness raising mechanisms on ethics and fraud prevention, while continuously strengthening its procedures and internal controls. In case of violations of staff obligations, disciplinary measures may be applied. 2. At this stage and pending possible further information from the Belgian judicial authorities, the allegations about the former European Commissioner for Justice do not concern the EU budget or the management of EU funds. Thus, based on the information available to the Commission so far, there is no need to revise the rules and procedures regarding the prevention and the fight against fraud currently in place, as they are solid and comprehensive. 3. The Commission did not receive such information. However, the Commission can confirm that any information, tip-offs, or notices received, be it from internal or external sources, are systematically assessed and, where necessary, referred to the competent investigative authorities (such as the European Anti-Fraud Office, the European Public Prosecutor's Office and the national authorities) for examination.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2024-12-04 “E-002761/2024 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Under Regulation (EU) 833/2014 1 , the import of Russian oil is prohibited, with limited exceptions for oil supplied by pipeline. No Russian oil transported by the ‘dark fleet’ vessels can be imported into the EU. As part of the 14 th package of sanctions adopted against Russia in June 2024, the EU for the first time targeted 27 vessels for their contribution to Russia’s warfare against Ukraine. On 16 December 2024, as part of its 15 th sanctions package 2 the EU listed 52 additional vessels, thereby making them subject to a port access ban and a ban on provision of services. The Commission is continuously monitoring the developments related to vessels belonging to Russia’s shadow fleet, as part of its efforts to combat the circumvention of the EU’s sanctions to Russia. It has also reached out to third countries providing flagging services to these vessels raising concerns of environmental protection and maritime safety. All decisions on EU sanctions are taken unanimously by Member States in the Council, including decisions on the sanctioning of vessels. The Marine Strategy Framework Directive 3 requires Member States to address significant pollution events in their marine strategies. Where such pollution events occur, Member States should intervene as they are responsible for creating and maintaining oil spill contingency plans, with support available through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and the European Maritime Safety Agency’s deployable oil spill response vessels. Flag states ensure that vessels meet insurance and certification requirements, while the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds provide additional financial compensation for cleanup and damages. 1 OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 1–11, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj/eng 2 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-15th-sanctions-package-against-russia-itscontinued-illegal-war-against-ukraine-2024-12-16_en 3 Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy, OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19–40.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2024-11-27 “P-002687/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. and 3. On 29 November 2024, Poland submitted an application for the EU Solidarity Fund 1 , which is being assessed by the Commission. If the conditions for mobilising the Fund are met, the Commission will determine the amount of financial assistance, within the limits of the financial resources available, propose it to the budgetary authority and make it available as quickly as possible. 2. Poland will be able to make use of flexibilities under the 2021-2027 cohesion policy framework based on the recently adopted Regulation ‘RESTORE’ 2 , entered into force on 24 December 2024, following the co-legislative negotiations. Member States could reprogramme part of their European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund Plus and Cohesion Fund allocations for actions and projects in response to natural disasters, including reconstruction and repair measures to alleviate the negative socio-economic consequences of natural disasters. The increased EU financing and pre-financing rates will ease the budgetary pressure on affected Member States and regions. Poland will have 6 months from the entry into force of this Regulation to submit amendments to its cohesion policy programmes to make use of the support and flexibilities provided in this context. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3) as amended by Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 143) and by Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 March 2020 (OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002R2012 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/3236 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1057 and (EU) 2021/1058 as regards Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction (RESTORE), available at this link : http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3236/oj”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2024-10-29 “E-002289/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU is the world’s largest exporter of agri-food products, with a trade surplus of EUR 70 billion in 2023. This is also thanks to its network of trade agreements. Mercosur is a large and highly protected market with great potential for high quality European agri-food exports such as some dairy products, processed foods, olive oil, malt, some fruits, wines, spirits and nonalcoholic beverages. Regarding sensitive EU agricultural products, such as beef and poultry, the EU has negotiated limited concessions in the form of tariff rate quotas that represent a small fraction of EU consumption. These partial openings will be introduced in gradual stages to allow for a smooth transition. They will be coupled with safeguard clauses to protect the EU market in case imports from Mercosur would cause serious injury. As regards standards, the EU has negotiated legally binding chapters on trade and sustainable development in all recent comprehensive trade agreements to ensure EU trading partners implement strong labour and environmental commitments. In addition, the EU Deforestation Regulation 1 requires that certain commodities to be placed on the EU market must originate from non-deforested areas. Finally, as regards health and safety the EU’s sanitary and phytosanitary standards are nonnegotiable and are not affected by this or any other trade agreement. The decisions that the EU takes to protect its production and its consumers are underpinned by risk assessments, which are performed by the European Food Safety Authority. Imported products must always comply with the EU’s stringent food safety requirements regardless of the existence of a trade agreement with the exporting country. 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023R1115”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU · Trade relations with Mercosur
• 2024-10-21 “E-002201/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has launched a range of initiatives to facilitate broadband investments, both regulatory (e.g. Gigabit Infrastructure Act 1 ) and capacity building related (e.g. Broadband Competence Offices 2 ). Concerning funding, the Connecting Europe Facility Digital 3 (EUR 2 billion) also supports the deployment of 5G infrastructures in rural areas for public services. The budget allocated to the development of broadband infrastructure under the Recovery and Resilience Facility 4 reaches almost EUR 14 billion. Connectivity is also supported under the cohesion funds, e.g. by the European Regional Development Fund 5 (circa EUR 2.3 billion) and through InvestEU 6 . Funded by the Digital Europe Programme, the GovTech4All project 7 has been supporting the development of innovative digital public services accelerating their deployment since 2023. The coordination and support action 8 for ‘Innovative and Connected Public Administrations’ allows Member States to collaborate, identify common needs and to develop interoperability solutions needed for seamless cross-border digital public services. Future initiatives include a European Digital Infrastructure Consortium 9 to leverage investments to develop interoperability solutions for new cross-border public services. The Interoperable Europe Act 10 gives public administrations new instruments for a harmonious digitalisation of their services, e.g. by introducing interoperability assessments to detect legal and technical barriers. Additionally, the Commission plans to work on a renewed European Interoperability Framework, which will focus on concrete implementation recommendations, and on the Digital Networks Act 11 to help boost secure high-speed broadband connectivity. 1 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/gigabit-infrastructure-act 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/bco-network 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/activities/cef-digital 4 https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/recovery-and-resiliencescoreboard/assets/thematic_analysis/scoreboard_thematic_analysis_connectivity.pdf 5 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/available-budget_en 6 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/eu-funding-broadband-2021-2027 7 https://interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu/collection/govtechconnect/govtech4all 8 https://interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu/collection/joinup/news/call-proposals-innovative-and-connectedpublic-administrations 9 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/edic 10 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/interoperable-europe-act-proposal_en 11 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_941”
  EU policy on accessibility of digital infrastructure
• 2024-10-21 “E-002203/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Overall, the Commission is highly committed on reducing administrative burdens and simplifying legislation. The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act 1 limits administrative burden placed on providers and deployers of AI systems. Regulatory requirements are, for the most part, only imposed on a small number of AI systems deemed to be ‘high-risk’ for the health and safety of EU citizens. The vast majority of AI systems is not subject to the main obligations of the Act. Moreover, for these few high-risk AI systems the requirements imposed on providers and deployers are limited. For example, for many such systems conformity with obligations of the Act is limited to self-assessment, leading to simpler risk management. Under the AI Act, Member States are obliged to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) providing AI systems by creating regulatory sandboxes to provide a controlled environment to facilitate development, training, and validation of AI systems. A key aim of such sandboxes is to accelerate access to the EU market for AI systems of SMEs which have limited access to legal expertise. The AI Act also foresees delivery by Member States of training activities for SMEs about application of the Act. The Commission is building on two existing initiatives of the Digital Europe Programme: European Digital Innovation Hubs (EDIHs) 2 and Testing and Experimentation Facilities (TEFs) 3 . Over 150 EDIHs have delivered over 20 000 services to SMEs. TEFs in four sectors have been launched to help SMEs test AI technologies while adhering to regulatory requirements. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1689&qid=1736788860336 2 https://european-digital-innovation-hubs.ec.europa.eu/edih-catalogue 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/activities/testing-and-experimentation-facilities”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU (free access) · Artificial Intelligence
• 2024-10-21 “E-002199/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission focuses its attention on e-commerce within the single market to boost innovation and growth. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 establishes consistent rules for online platforms to reduce barriers on e-commerce among Member States. The DSA is without prejudice to EU law on consumer protection. The DSA harmonises due diligence obligations applicable to providers of intermediary services, which facilitates cross-border trade. All online intermediaries in the single market have to comply with rules aiming to counter the spread of illegal content or products online, helping ensure traceability of third-party sellers on online marketplaces and compliance with pre-contractual information and product safety information requirements. The E-commerce Directive 2 prohibits Member States from placing restrictions on crossborder information society services. The Commission may initiate infringement proceedings and it is also working to facilitate notification of ad hoc restrictive measures pursuant to Article 3(4) of the Directive. The Geo-blocking Regulation 3 aims to eliminate obstacles to cross-border online trade by prohibiting unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers' nationality, place of residence or establishment within the EU. The NIS2 Directive 4 requires providers of online marketplaces to implement cybersecurity risk-management measures and the Cyber resilience act 5 requires manufacturers to provide sufficient information to customers about the cybersecurity of their products. The Commission will take action in this mandate to tackle further challenges with ecommerce platforms, notably to protect consumers and ensure they benefit from a level playing field. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC. 2 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’). 3 Regulation (EU) 2018/302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2018 on addressing unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers' nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the internal market and amending Regulations (EC) No 2006/2004 and (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC. 4 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive). 5 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/10/cyber-resilience-act-council-adopts-newlaw-on-security-requirements-for-digital-products/”
  Privacy & digital economy · Geo-blocking
• 2024-10-21 “E-002200/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The claim that there was any secret deal between the Commission and X is manifestly unfounded. There has never been any secret deal, nor any proposal for any such secret deal, of any kind, offered to X during the ongoing proceedings, nor to any other entity regulated under the Digital Services Act (DSA). All acts and decisions adopted by the Commission on the basis of the DSA 1 are taken within the limits of the Commission’s powers, following due process and subject to judicial review. In its actions, the Commission is bound by the principle of transparency. At any point during the proceedings, before and after the issuing of preliminary findings, any provider that is subject to proceedings under the DSA may offer commitments to the Commission pursuant to Article 71 of the DSA to ensure compliance with its DSA obligations. Where such commitments are accepted by the Commission, the relevant decisions are published in full transparency, pursuant to Article 80 of the DSA (for example the recently published commitment decision regarding Tik Tok Lite) 2 . The DSA aims to enable a safe, predictable and trusted online environment that facilitates innovation and in which fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 3 , in particular freedom of expression, are effectively protected. It does not censor users in the EU and protects them against over-removal of lawful content. The DSA sets a series of ‘due diligence’ obligations on platforms, requiring them, for instance, to act effectively once they are notified that illegal content is accessible on their platform in the EU. In this respect, the DSA does not stipulate whether content is illegal, which remains defined by national laws, and the Commission has no power to order the removal of content. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4161 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-10-21 “E-002202/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission According to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 on the internal market for electricity, Member States can request a derogation, until end-2028, from current rules which limit the participation to capacity mechanisms to generation capacities meeting the CO2 emissions thresholds defined by Article 22 (4). In order to benefit from the derogation, Poland must submit a request to the Commission, subject to the conditions under Article 64 (2b), (2c) and (2d) of the Regulation. Derogation requests under Article 64 (2b) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 can be consulted on the Commission’s website 1 . Stakeholders can also send comments to be taken into account in the context of the Commission's decision on a request for derogation, following relevant procedures and timeframes. Member States have the right to determine their choice between different sources in their energy mix under Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) while at the same time, pursuing the requirements and objectives of the European Climate Law and of the EU legislation adopted under that same Article of the TFEU, including the Renewable Energy Directive. They are also obliged to set their concrete ambitions and commitments, including on the fulfilment of energy and climate targets, in their National Energy and Climate Plans (NECP) under the Governance Regulation. Poland communicated its coal phase out commitment in its draft NECP in autumn 2023 and set the deadline for coal phase out for the year 2049. The Commission has not yet received its final NECP 2 . Regarding the Emissions Trading System 2, there are no plans to reform the system, which will start in 2027. The start of the system can be postponed until 2028 in the case of exceptionally high gas or oil prices in 2026 3 . 1 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-and-consumers/wholesale-energy-market/access-infrastructureexemptions-and-derogations_en 2 INFR(2024)2260 – Launched in November 2024. 3 See Article 30k of Directive 2003/87/EC.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-20 “E-002183/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Council of the European Union has been discussing the proposal for a Regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse 1 to reach a general approach; the European Parliament has already adopted its position for the interinstitutional negotiations. The Commission supports the discussions to adopt a new legislative framework before the expiration of the Interim Regulation 2 in 2026. In this process, as in all its work, the Commission is committed to guaranteeing the fundamental rights of children by preventing and combating child sexual abuse, offline and online, as well as guaranteeing the right to privacy and confidentiality of all users. To that end, the proposal contains strict and detailed safeguards for the privacy of users, including a mandatory case-by-case assessment of all detection orders against the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and other EU law. Furthermore, while providers required to execute detection orders may select technologies best suited to their services, including those end-to-end encrypted, the technologies and accompanying measures must comply with the General Data Protection Regulation 3 and the ePrivacy Directive 4 . 2. In light of the foregoing, it is currently for the Council and the European Parliament to propose amendments to the proposal. 3. The legislative discussions are ongoing. The Commission is committed to supporting the co-legislators to reach an agreement as soon as possible that effectively protects children and safeguards all fundamental rights at stake. 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A209%3AFIN 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 July 2021 on a temporary derogation from certain provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC as regards the use of technologies by providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services for the processing of personal and other data for the purpose of combating online child sexual abuse (OJ L 274, 30.7.2021, p. 41). 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679 4 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (‘Directive on privacy and electronic communications’) (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37).”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• 2024-10-14 “E-002066/2024 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. The road section in question is not part of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) as specified in Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 of 13 June 2024 1 . The definition of the TEN-T network is the result of interinstitutional negotiations and has been agreed upon with each Member State. The Regulation does not allow for an inclusion of new road sections into the TEN-T network at this stage. Article 63 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 contains a review clause that foresees that the Commission shall evaluate in consultation with the Member States by 2033, whether the extended core network and the comprehensive network should be modified to take into account developments in transport flows and national investment planning. 2. One of the key objectives of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) is to complete the TEN-T network. Since the road in question is not located on the TEN-T network, it is not eligible for CEF funding. Cohesion policy for transport focuses also on completion the TEN-T network. Moreover, Cohesion Policy funding is only possible if the road is included in the regional transport plans which is not the case of the road in question. 3. The Commission undertakes studies for all European Transport Corridors in view of analysing the compliance of the corridors with the TEN-T requirements. However, these studies do not include an analysis of non-TEN-T sections. The Commission does not intend to conduct studies aiming at the revision of the alignment of the European Transport Corridors as they have just been established. Any up-to-date national studies at the time of the review process might inform and help the Commission to evaluate the network. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1679”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2024-09-27 “E-001848/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recognises the significant and multifaceted threat posed by munitions and chemical weapons on the Baltic seabed. In addition to the pilot project ‘Saving our Seas’, the Commission is collaborating closely with the Baltic states and international partners 1 , to develop a comprehensive strategy for the clean-up of the Baltic Sea. In addition, during the ‘Our Baltic’ Conference in 2023, Baltic Sea Member States agreed on a set of comprehensive commitments on UneXploded Ordnance (UXO) 2 . This cooperation will enhance monitoring, risk assessment, and the development of best practices for the safe removal of hazardous materials and optimise the clean-up of seadumped chemical munitions and unexploded ordnances. The Commission has supported projects in the Baltic Sea, starting with Chemsea 3 (2007– 2013) for munitions mapping and later with Daimon 1 4 and Daimon 2 5 (2014–2020) for underwater detection. Projects like Basta 6 and Explotect 7 (2019–2022) developed methods to neutralize munitions. Currently, the Commission funds the following projects: Muni-risk 8 , Mine-sweeper 9 , and Munimap 10 that assess unexploded ordnance risks and further map contaminated areas, reflecting its commitment to safeguarding the Baltic Sea. The Commission is undertaking a comprehensive evaluation of the Common Fisheries Policy. As part of this process, a public consultation will be opened in the fourth quarter of 2024. The results of the evaluation, expected towards the end of 2025, will inform future policy development. The European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund 11 , the European Regional Development Fund 12 and Horizon Europe 13 continue to provide relevant funding. 1 The Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (known as Helsinki Convention - HELCOM) and the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). 2 https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/publications/our-baltic-conference-2023-commitments_en 3 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/projects/finland/chemsea-tackles-problem-of-chemical-munitions-inthe-baltic-sea 4 https://interreg-baltic.eu/project/daimon/ 5 https://interreg-baltic.eu/project/daimon2/#:~:text=The%20project%20DAIMON2%20optimised%20the%20tools%20that%20allow,decisions%20on%2 0the%20management%20of%20the%20dumped%20munitions . 6 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/featured-projects/basta_en 7 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/featured-projects/explotect_en 8 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projectsdetails/43392145/101173075/EMFAF 9 https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101167839 10 https://interreg-baltic.eu/project/munimap/ 11 https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/funding/emfaf_en 12 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/erdf_en 13 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-09-19 “E-001762/2024 Answer given by Mr Lenarčič on behalf of the European Commission Central and Eastern Europe have been affected by heavy rains and strong winds. As of 13 September 2024, Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania pro-actively activated the Copernicus Rapid Mapping for flood delineation and damage assessment 1 . The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) 2 works on a 24 hours / 7 days basis to carry out its mandate that includes, among other tasks, monitoring of unfolding or potential disasters and their impacts. In this context, the ERCC daily monitors the forecast estimates for potential flooding across Europe, through the dedicated European Flood Awareness System (EFAS) 3 of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service. EFAS complements the national systems to raise awareness, while retaining the supporting role that the Commission has in this field. From the onset, the ERCC was in contact with the national civil protection authorities of Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia to raise awareness about possible upcoming floods and offered support through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 4 . On 18 September 2024, Poland activated the UCPM and requested support to strengthen its response to the floods. 1 https://emergency.copernicus.eu/mapping/node/157182 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/emergency-response-coordinationcentre-ercc_en 3 https://european-flood.emergency.copernicus.eu/en 4 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en”
  Climate efforts
• 2024-09-12 “E-001698/2024 Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission 1. On 9 September 2024, Germany notified the Commission of its decision to reintroduce border control at its internal borders with Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxemburg and the Netherlands in accordance with Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code 1 . In the notification, it explains that it considers the reintroduction of internal border control a necessary and proportionate measure of last resort. The Commission is assessing the notification and remains in close touch with the German authorities to evaluate the situation. 2. The obligation to comply with EU law flows from the well-established principles of primacy of EU law and loyal cooperation and applies to all Member States equally. Efforts at a full and timely implementation of the Pact are under way. The Commission published a Common Implementation Plan 2 in June 2024 that provides the framework for a joint work programme for the next two years including the legal and operational deliverables, the structures for discussion, and relevant operational and financial support. Gaps and needs assessments have been carried out in all Member States and the Commission is currently formulating its recommendations to Member States for preparing their national implementation plans. 3. The Commission, including the Schengen Coordinator, continues to work closely together with all Member States concerned by internal border control, including Germany and Poland. The Commission, at the same time, recognises the important work of Member States situated at the external borders of the EU, in fulfilling their task of managing and protecting those borders in compliance with the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (codification), OJ L 77, 23/03/2016, p. 1. 2 COM(2024) 251 final.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-08-28 “E-001563/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission Freedom of expression and information is a pillar of democracy and protected under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 1 , which is binding on the EU institutions and the Member States when they are implementing EU law, as well as under the European Convention on Human Rights 2 . The Digital Services Act (DSA) 3 does not stipulate whether content is illegal 4 . Its objective is to ensure that users in the EU can enjoy online platform services safely while respecting fundamental rights. It defines the platforms’ responsibilities and provides for mechanisms to mitigate risks, preventing algorithmic amplification of illegal content and over-removal of lawful content, especially for very large online platforms and search engines (VLOPSEs) 5 . The Commission supervises DSA compliance by the VLOPSEs. To this effect, the co-legislator entrusted the Commission with investigative and enforcement powers. These powers and related procedures are laid out in the DSA 6 , and allow the Commission to accept and make binding commitments, i.e. remedial measures offered by platforms on voluntary basis to address the Commission’s concerns without proceeding to a non-compliance decision and imposition of fines. The Commission stands ready to explain to companies its concerns, so as to enable them offering appropriate commitments. The Commission adopted the first DSA commitment decision on 5 August 2024, making binding TikTok’s commitments to permanently withdraw TikTok Lite Rewards programme from the EU 7 . All acts and decisions adopted by the Commission based on the DSA, including in the case concerning X and all other enforcement actions, are undertaken within the limits of its powers and are subject to judicial review. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A12012P%2FTXT 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/european-convention-on-human-rights-echr.html 3 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act). 4 As in the offline world, that is a matter for specific laws and the courts to determine. 5 VLOPSEs are designated online platforms with more than 45 million users in the EU (10% of the EU population). 6 DSA, Section 4. 7 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_24_4161”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “It's. I think it's clear now because we will have a meeting tomorrow and I hope so. Prepare some compromise. Thanks. ***Cooperation among enforcement authorities responsible for the enforcement of Directive (EU) 2019/633 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain;”
  EU policy on farmer–buyer relations in the agri-food supply chain
• “Thank you very much. I will speak Polish. First of all, I'd like to thank our guests for, uh, presenting your ideas. But I would not agree with what some people say that is, uh, that, uh, excessive protectionism of our market will mean that the know how will grow exponentially. Uh, the problems, uh, the problem is in Europe that our, uh, technology level is lower. We don't have, uh, we are not so competent technologically. And also we don't have enough capital. Second, I'd like to ask about security and interoperability, because as Europe, we need to, uh, secure safety and security of data. But if we, uh, cooperate with countries that can. Provide us with security guarantees. That's okay. But with some countries, it may be a question mark. Um, so we may be tempted to go in the direction of European protectionism, but this could mean that the competitiveness of Europe would fall. So what would the representative of, say, what would it mean to your company if at the European level, you could not be using services from outside of Europe. Would your clients how would your clients react? Uh, would it mean that they would lose competitiveness?”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty