- 2026-07-30 “Dear Minister Foley, High Commissioner El Haïry, Deputy Minister Grigaliené, Irish Presidency and Commission colleagues, Policy Makers and Practitioners, But – above all – dear children and young people, I am delighted to see so many of you here today. In this historic site of Dublin Castle – we are truly bringing together the old with the new. This is very appropriate, as this conference is about reconsidering the ‘old school' ways that decisions are made and policy is formed. And, most importantly, we are doing so by asking children and young people! Youth participation is an aim shared by the Irish Presidency of the Council and the European Commission. And it is important to me personally as European Commissioner for Democracy. Because children and young people are not simply today's citizens of Europe – they are the leaders of tomorrow. Their voices must be heard in shaping the democracies that they will inherit.
This commitment is not just a matter of good policy – it is grounded in fundamental rights. The EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights enshrines these rights in Article 24, which is dedicated to the rights of the child. It recognises every child's right: to protection and care, to express their views freely, to have those views taken into account in matters that concern them. And – in all actions relating to children, whether public or private – their best interests must come first. These rights are reinforced throughout the Charter – from Article 14's Right to Education to Article 21's Right to Non-Discrimination. And the Charter is legally binding on EU institutions, as well as on Member States when they implement EU law. Article 24 therefore provides the foundation for the Commission's work to promote the participation, inclusion and protection of children and young people. To turn these principles into action, the Commission came forward with an EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child in 2021. We didn't develop this on our own – it was developed for children, with children – drawing on feedback from more than 10,000 of them! The Strategy had several pillars, covering initiatives across participation, inclusion, and protection. But one of its flagship initiatives was the EU Children's Participation Platform. We established the Platform to give practical effect to one of the Strategy's core objectives: ensuring children can meaningfully participate in political and democratic life.
Today's conference – and tomorrow's discussions - reflect that same ambition. Today, you will explore how children and young people can be involved in decision-making where they live, learn and spend their time. Tomorrow, you will examine the barriers that can prevent them from participating fully and how we can overcome them. For my part, I would now like to highlight some of the initiatives under my own portfolio that are helping to strengthen the participation, inclusion, and protection of children and young people across our European Union.
I would like to begin with protection through child-friendly justice – a pillar of the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child. It is hard enough to be caught up in a crime and to have to work through it. Children and young people in the justice system need extra support. It is imperative that we build a justice system that responds to the rights and needs of children. We want to ensure that children who are victims, witnesses, or accused of a crime are treated fairly, protected from harm, and supported throughout. During the five years covered by the first EU Strategy on Victims' Rights, we have developed a framework of laws to help make this a reality. Front-and-centre, we adopted a directly applicable EU law that covers a host of family matters across borders (Brussels IIb Regulation). And at the end of last year, we agreed a revision of the Victim's Rights Directive – providing more support services than ever before. Now, our work continues towards the EU's next Strategy on Victims' Rights, which I will present later this year. The Strategy will have a strong focus on children's rights. Because when a child becomes a victim, their age must never be a barrier to justice, protection or support. I look forward to hearing what today's panel on Children in Justice and Legal Settings discusses, and taking these learnings back to Brussels as we develop our next Strategy.
Now, I would like to turn to participation and inclusion – another pillar of the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child, and fundamental to the future of our democracies. Across Europe, young people are granted the right to vote when they turn 16 or 18. But no-one becomes an informed citizen on the night before their 16th or 18th birthday! This is why civic education and experiencing democracy must be close to our young citizens, and start in their early years. As a child in Spain once said to me: “We need to be in all the spaces where policies that directly affect us are designed.” I agree. There is no doubt in my mind that involving our youngest citizens makes our policies better and democracies stronger. Participation in our democracies can happen anywhere and everywhere – in families, schools, and communities. But the European Commission wants to provide a formal and structured way for children and young people to feed into our decision making. This is why we set up the EU Children's Participation Platform in 2022. This Platform connects the ways in which children participate at local, national, and European level. By bringing together under-18s, we connect with them by hearing from them. They talk policy with decision-makers – using their rights as EU citizens, and impacting the policies that will affect them longer than it affects us!
But participation alone is not enough. Children must also be able to participate safely. And in today's world, that increasingly means ensuring they can navigate the online environment in a way that protects their rights, well-being and development. That brings me to what is perhaps the biggest policy debate affecting young people today - and one that falls directly within my portfolio: online safety.
Across Europe and beyond, countries are considering or introducing age restrictions for access to social media. President of the European Commission, President Ursula Von der Leyen, has asked a group of experts to recommend how we might move forward at EU-level. And, earlier this month, this Special Panel on Online Safety for Children presented their Report. Children's voices were again a big part in shaping this Report. And, from its findings, we could put it this way: Children don't have to fit their own seat belts: we have safety-by-design – so online platforms need to show how their services protect against risks. You can't sell a car to a child: we are not about to ban children's access to social media – it's about when social media can access Europe's children. Children can't have the car keys before they have a licence, and they can't get a licence under a certain age – so a starting age for social media makes sense. With all this input and these ideas, the Commission is spending this summer learning from the Report, and thinking about how to act on its recommendations. But this work does not stand alone. It forms part of a broader effort to make the digital world safer and fairer for children and young people.
For my part, I was in Slovenia just last month to speak with children and young people in a Youth Policy Dialogue on Digital Fairness. I shared with them the Commission's ideas for a Digital Fairness Act, which we are currently working on. We want this Act to better protect all users online. We don't want users to be exposed to unfair marketing or addictive design features that exploit them. And this is why we surveyed nearly 5,000 12-to-17 year olds across the EU to hear their views too.
But today's Conference is not about the adults in the room, or what they are doing, but about the children and young people, and what you want us to do! You've heard from me. But I'm also here so that I can listen to you! Now, I'm looking forward to my conversation with Gabrielius.”
Focus of EU policy on education (shaping workers vs citizens)
- 2026-07-20 “E-001154/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission considers that the Treaties provide a high level of protection of EU values and are complemented by a variety of instruments under EU law that ensure respect and protection of the EU values. Respect for the rule of law is essential for receiving and using EU funds. When implementing the EU budget, Member States and the Commission must ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 1 and respect for EU values. Existing EU rules protect the EU budget against breaches of the rule of law and of the Charter. Significant amounts of funding for Hungary have been blocked under the Conditionality Regulation 2 , the Charter horizontal enabling condition of the Common Provisions Regulation 3 , and the Recovery and Resilience Facility 4 . The Commission is engaging constructively with the new Hungarian government to help address outstanding rule of law concerns. The importance of the respect for EU values is also reflected in the Commission proposal for a Regulation on national and regional partnership plans under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028-2034, based on a combination of financial support for measures aimed at strengthening the rule of law and fundamental rights together with strong safeguards and conditionalities to ensure the protection of the EU budget. The Conditionality Regulation will remain in force under the MFF 2028-2034 and applies to breaches of the principles of the rule of law affecting the EU budget. The Commission shall use that Regulation if the relevant conditions are met, unless other procedures set out in EU legislation would allow it to protect the EU budget more effectively. The Commission continuously evaluates the situation in all Member States and is prepared to use all the applicable tools. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj/eng. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02021R0241-20240301.”
Rule of law in Hungary · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · EU political integration
- 2026-07-14 “(10:43:13 - 10:44:42): Thank you very much, Chair. I'd just like to pick up the point that was made about consistency of approach by by the European Commission because it was raised on a number of occasions. And I can speak from direct experience as commissioner over the last year and a half or so, And I can testify to the rigor that is applied to our approach in the preparation of the annual rule of law report. So for example, the methodology on the use of sources that we use, as the basis of the rule of law report every year, that methodology is published. Sources are referenced clearly in footnotes, in the report itself, and also listed in a dedicated annex. And I see the painstaking efforts that are made by all of my colleagues in the commission, to make sure that there is full accuracy in the rule of law report and that it is fair and balanced and that a consistent approach, is taken. In relation to the amendments to the fundamental law that have been raised by colleagues, the 16th amendment and indeed the 17th amendment, we are aware of, the constitutional amendment adopted by the Hungarian National Assembly on yesterday. We understand that the constitutional amendment will only enter into force after promulgation, and the commission will continue to monitor developments on an ongoing basis.”
Rule of law in Hungary
- 2026-07-14 “(10:14:42 - 10:16:38): Thank you very much, Chair. If I can just pick up on a number of the points in relation to the reforms concerning asylum issues and LGBTIQ plus persons in addition to the Charter Horizontal Enabling Condition dimension of that.
Of course, we have court rulings from the Court of Justice of the European Union, and I would point to the importance of those rulings being respected and being responded to in the appropriate way.
And, of course, we always remain available to support Hungary and to support other member states when it comes to full compliance with judgments of the court of justice.
In relation to the functioning of the single market and related internal market issues, as you know, as part of the rule of law report process, last year, we introduced for the first time a single market dimension to the annual rule of law report, and I can confirm that that will continue again in the report that will be considered and I expect adopted by the commission later on this week.
And on the question of employment standards and employment law within Hungary or in any other member state, the question here is one of where the work is done in general determines and is determined by the place of employment, which then has an impact on the jurisdiction of the employment laws that apply.
So, where national laws and EU wide employment laws are relevant, then they should be applied in the context of where the work is done because that is what determines the place of employment.
And we monitor these issues in terms of the functioning of the internal market. And as you know, in the past, the commission has taken action against Hungary, under internal market issues. Thank you.”
Rule of law in Hungary
- 2026-07-14 “(10:28:48 - 10:31:02): Thank you very much, Cher. I'd like to, add some brief remarks in relation to the question concerning, corruption, and we recognize the commitment of the new government to fight corruption under the revised recovery and resilience plan. We do see important reforms, in this area. They have been explained already by EVP, Fito. And as you know, in the context of the annual rule of law report, the measures in place to tackle corruption is 1 of the the key pillars of that annual report, which is not just at a point in time because there is a whole of year cycle in the context of our rule of law, permanent monitoring mechanism. So it's not just a once off assessment that is done. I would also point to the political agreement that has been reached on the anticorruption directive. I look forward to seeing that being transposed in a timely fashion, by all of the member states of the European Union, which now for the 1st time provides for harmonized definitions of certain corruption offenses and also a harmonized approach in relation to penalties. And later on this year, we will bring forward an EU wide anticorruption strategy. I would also point to the reasoned opinion that provides the basis of Article 7 as triggered by the European Parliament that has enabled considerable debate and examination of the question of corruption in Hungary, over the course of the various debates that we have had on that Article 7 procedure at the General Affairs Council. And more broadly, I would say in relation to the different reforms, the focus of the commission will continue to be on implementation. The commission has demonstrated a willingness to act, in the past. That will continue to be the case. We are satisfied that there are appropriate safeguards in place within the current budgetary architecture, and it will be for all of the institutions now to agree a strong and appropriate safeguards within the context of the architecture of the upcoming MFF. Thank you, Chair.”
Rule of law in Hungary
- 2026-07-14 “(11:05:38 - 11:08:23): Thank you, chair, and thanks to all of the honorable members for their, additional questions to complement my colleague, commissioner Serafin, and his reply in relation to the EPO, under the regulation. Of course, there are some practical steps that need to be taken, including the appointment of the European prosecutor and delegated prosecutors. We would like the work to be completed as soon as possible and to have the EPO operational in Hungary certainly in the coming months, and I would agree with the assessment of commissioner Seraphin in that regard.
In relation to the court judgment, concerning Article 2 and the child protection law, it is, as with other judgments from the court of justice, binding judgment, and we expect, all judgments of the court of justice to be, fully complied with. In that regard, I would also highlight that to unfreeze the suspended €500,000,000 in cohesion policy funds under the Charter HEC. There is a need to repeal the provisions of the so called child protection law as well as any other related legal provision or amendments introduced as a result of this act, which have an impact on fundamental rights in the implementation of EU funds as indicated in the commission's decision.
On the question of judicial independence, I can point to the rule of law recommendations that we currently have, and we will support Hungary in addressing outstanding issues relating to judicial independence. For example, we have highlighted issues concerning judicial salaries and also case allocation, matters in the lower courts.
On the question of whether reforms are irreversible and what level of assurance we can give, on that point, We continue to monitor the situation in Hungary and in every member state. We have a well developed toolbox, thanks in part, to the work of the members of this house. And I think we have demonstrated a willingness and a capacity to act in the past, including in the case of Hungary, through not least, the application of the conditionality mechanism that Commissioner Seraphin has covered, already.
In relation to the upcoming rule of law report, I anticipate it will be adopted by the commission on Friday of this week. It will set out the commission's assessment of the rule of law environment in the 27 member states, including Hungary and 4 of the candidate countries as well, and it will take account of recent developments that are relevant. Thank you, Chair.”
Rule of law in Hungary
- 2026-07-14 “(09:58:49 - 10:04:06): Dear chairs, honorable members, thank you very much for the invitation to be here with you today. I'm delighted to join my colleagues, EVP Fito and Commissioner Serifen.
On the June 2, I visited Hungary shortly after the elections. I notably met with several ministers and chairs of key parliamentary committees. The visit provided a valuable opportunity to take stock of the political situation and to engage constructively with the new authorities.
My interlocutors emphasized their commitment to restoring the rule of law by the means of the rule of law, underlining that on some aspects, this process will take time.
On the June 16, I gave an update in the General Affairs Council under the Article 7 procedure. Member states welcomed that developments in Hungary were moving in the right direction while underlining the importance of the effective implementation of the planned reforms and keeping the momentum.
Since Hungary's new government took office 2 months ago, significant progress has already been made in this short period towards bringing Hungary closer into line with the values of Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.
Pressure on independent media and civil society organizations has been alleviated. Concretely, the draft law on the transparency of foreign funded civil society and media organizations influencing the public discourse tabled under the former parliament was removed from the legislative agenda when the new parliament was formed.
On the June 30, the National Assembly abolished the Sovereignty Protection Office, which is the object of an ongoing infringement procedure launched by the commission and is pending before the Court of Justice. The commission is analyzing this and will assess how to proceed on this basis.
The state of danger that allowed the government to override acts of parliament through emergency measures expired on the May 13.
On the May 29, Hungary and the commission reached a political agreement the necessary reforms to significantly strengthen its anticorruption and integrity framework by the end of August this year. The Hungarian Omnibus Law prepared in consultation with the Commission has entered into force already.
On the July 10, the commission adopted the decision confirming Hungary's participation in the European Public Prosecutor's Office following Hungary's request in May. This marks an important step in strengthening the protection of EU funds and the rule of law in Hungary.
Once operational, the EPO will be granted jurisdiction over crimes committed after the 1st of June 2021. Legislation adopted on the June 23 amended the media act to introduce reforms to the rules governing the national media regulator, for example, in relation to its competences, tasks, and roles, its media council, its president, vice presidents, and its office.
The law establishes new criteria for the nomination, appointment, and dismissal of all relevant officeholders within these structures. Hungary also introduced new rules on the governance and funding of public service broadcasting.
The media situation in Hungary has been a concern for many years, and we welcome these developments.
Let me also note that the annual Budapest Pride March took place on the June 27 with the assistance of the Hungarian authorities and that criminal charges brought against the organizers of the 2025 Pride March under the previous government have been dropped. This is another welcome development.
The commission has always stood on the side of the LGBTIQ plus community in Hungary.
It's also important that Hungary implements the ruling of the European Court of Justice of the April 21. We trust that the Hungarian government will address all measures that were found to be in violation of EU law.
On the June 22, prime minister, Magar, announced the 17th amendment to the fundamental law. Parliament adopted this yesterday. These legislative changes would address issues to go beyond the requirements of the RRP super milestones, such as, for example, giving the judiciary a stronger role in the appointment and removal of the president of the courier and the president of the national office for the judiciary.
A national asset recovery and protection office with public prosecution functions would be established. It would be tasked with recovering the proceeds of crimes related to the disbursement of public funds.
The commission will continue following the closely the developments in Hungary. The rule of law report, which the college will adopt later this week, will provide a more detailed assessment of the developments in Hungary in 4 key areas for the rule of law, justice, anti corruption, media pluralism, and institutional checks and balances.
There is a clear change of direction in Hungary. Authorities are making important reform efforts and concrete progress has already been made. Looking ahead, we will continue to engage in close dialogue with Hungary and to support the country on its reform path. Thank you.”
Rule of law in Hungary
- 2026-07-14 “E-001134/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Fairness Act (DFA) is a key initiative provided in the Commission work programme for the fourth quarter 2026. The Commission is currently conducting the impact assessment. Based on the findings of the Digital Fairness Fitness Check 1 , the DFA aims to address the identified gaps tackling the problems that consumers and, especially, minors often face when using online services. These may include dark patterns and addictive design, unfair personalisation targeting their vulnerabilities, problematic marketing by social media influencers, unfair marketing practices related to price and difficulties with managing contracts concluded online. The aim of the DFA is to propose targeted and proportionate measures to address the identified problems in this area, in full coherence with existing legislation, in particular the Digital Services Act 2 , the Digital Markets Act 3 and the AI Act 4 . Wherever relevant, the DFA will propose simplification of the existing rules without compromising consumer protection. Clearer rules lead to easier enforcement and a more level playing field for all traders, benefiting both consumers and businesses. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/707d7404-78e5-4aef-acfa82b4cf639f55_en?filename=commission%20staff%20working%20document%20fitness%20check%20on%20eu %20consumer%20law%20on%20digital%20fairness.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng.”
EU rules on digital competition · Privacy & digital economy
- 2026-06-24 “Dear Representatives, of the Member States and EU institutions, from academia, civil society, media, and the private sector. Dear Rapporteurs, Tomas Tobé, Stephen de Ron, and Christian Moos, good afternoon to you all and thank you for being here!
I am delighted to see so many of you at today's High-Level Event on Democracy. Thank you also to my services in DG JUST, a small but highly dedicated team, for bringing us together today. I would like to begin with the reflections of one of Europe's founding fathers – Jean Monnet: “Nothing is possible without people, but nothing is lasting without institutions.” This encapsulates both democracy and the European project that was founded to protect and promote democracy across our continent. Democracy depends on citizens who engage, participate, and contribute to the common good. And democracies last when they are supported by public institutions that are founded on our shared values and built to serve our citizens.
This is the message I would like to convey today: Democracy is for people and about people. But democracy can only be delivered with people - whoever they are, and wherever they are. The very foundations of our democracies are free people, free elections, and free media – supported by resilient democratic institutions. And it is democracy that in turn provides the foundation of rights, freedoms, and opportunities that we all enjoy – whoever we are, and wherever we are, across our Union. European citizens understand this. According to the Eurobarometer survey from November last year, respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law is among the European Union's greatest strengths and among the expectations citizens place most highly on our Union. This is precisely why the European Commission presented the European Democracy Shield last year. Democracy is the shield that “protects what matters” – our rights, freedoms, and opportunities. And that's why we have all come together today - to assess our progress and strengthen our collective efforts.
The European Democracy Shield is built on three pillars: First - safeguarding the integrity of the information space; Second - strengthening democratic institutions, free and fair elections, and free and independent media; and third - boosting societal resilience and citizens' engagement. These are not abstract policy goals. Together, they form a single objective: to ensure that democracy remains strong, trusted, and resilient in a rapidly changing world. And over the last six months I am proud to say that we are translating these ambitions into concrete actions. Almost 30 deliverables are planned by the end of this year alone!
A central driver of this work is the new European Centre for Democratic Resilience, which is up and running since February of this year. It is a working hub: bringing together EU institutions, Member States, and experts to respond to real, practical challenges to our democracies. Already, this approach is producing tangible results. We are developing a Handbook to Support Resilient Elections. This will provide an overview of EU legislation and policy tools that help protect electoral processes. Work has also already begun on a Blueprint for countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference and Disinformation, to help Member States better anticipate, detect, and respond to such threats. Looking ahead, we will broaden participation further by establishing a non-institutional Stakeholder Platform – involving actors from civil society organisations and think tanks, to academia, fact-checkers and media providers. And we will also associate candidate countries and potential candidates in the Centre's work. In this way, the Centre is becoming what it was always meant to be: a shared operational space for defending democracy together - by working with those who live and shape it every day.
The first pillar of the Shield focuses on something fundamental; how are we better safeguarding the integrity of our information space? Because without trusted information, there is no meaningful democratic participation. Here, our priority is to address foreign information manipulation, interference, and disinformation. We are not starting from scratch. The Digital Services Act, AI Act and Political Advertising Regulation already work to protect the transparency and integrity of the information space. But the Shield takes us further The European Digital Media Observatory mandate was renewed in March of this year – fostering research and analysis to counter foreign information manipulation and interference and preparing its expansion to more candidate countries. And we have already launched the European Network of Fact-Checkers. Together with the European Board for Digital Services, we are preparing a DSA incidents and crisis protocol. This will enhance cooperation between national authorities and online platforms to ensure swift reactions to information operations that are large-scale and potentially transnational.
The second pillar is about ensuring that democratic institutions, elections, and media remain strong, independent, and trusted. First, on free and fair elections - they are, of course, a national competence. Our role is to support Member States with coordination, tools, and shared learning. At the centre of this is the European Cooperation Network on Elections, which connects national authorities and helps them respond to shared challenges.
One of the most pressing of these challenges is technological change, in particular artificial intelligence. AI is transforming political communication and electoral campaigning. It offers unprecedented opportunities, but also new vulnerabilities – often acting as a launchpad for large-scale disinformation campaigns. This is why we are working together with the Member States and stakeholders to prepare dedicated guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes.
Another area that matters to all of us in a democracy is safety in politics. Across Europe, political candidates and elected representatives are being subjected to abuse, threats, and even violence. In my travels as European Commissioner across the EU and beyond, I have seen that this is not only a European challenge, but a global one. Indeed, it is one of the rare issues on which there is near-universal agreement that we must tackle it. This phenomenon has unacceptable consequences not only for the victims, but also for our democracies. We are seeing: that candidates are discouraged from seeking office; elected representatives are stepping back from public life; and women, local politicians and groups at heightened risk of discrimination are disproportionately affected. By the end of this year we will deliver a Guide of Best Practices as well as a Commission Recommendation on safety in political life. And because this is a global phenomenon – I will engage on this topic at an event planned during the United Nations General Assembly in September.
Second, on free, plural, and independent media – the watchdogs of any democracy – the Commission will continue to support journalists and protect them from undue pressure. The anti-SLAPP Directive to tackle Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation has started to apply since the 7th of May and we will follow diligently on its transposition. Last month, we also held a High-Level Event on Combatting SLAPPs: inaugurating the renewed Anti-SLAPP Expert Group, and initiating the review of the 2022 Commission Recommendation. Work is also ongoing to update the Recommendation on the Safety of Journalists. Furthermore, work on the revision of the Audio-Visual Media Services Directive is well advanced. A key objective is to ensure the sustainability and prominence of media content in today's evolving online information space. Equally important is the implementation of the European Media Freedom Act. We are closely monitoring developments across the Member States to ensure that this landmark legislation becomes not only a set of groundbreaking rules on paper, but a meaningful reality for media professionals and citizens across Europe.
And finally, under the third pillar of the Shield, how are we boosting societal resilience and citizens' engagement? To help hone the critical thinking skills of young people, in March this year we published Guidelines for teachers and educators on tackling disinformation and promoting digital literacy. And just yesterday, we concluded our first ever Civic Tech Hackathon – bringing together developers, civil society organisations, and public authorities. This was all about how innovation can enhance participation and engagement and will feed into the launch of the European Civic Tech Hub later this year. And tomorrow, we will hold the first-ever meeting of the Network of National Authorities on Citizen Participation – bringing together national authorities to share experience and insight.
This matters to me both professionally and personally. I began my political career knocking on doors in my home constituency in County Cork Ireland, because democracy can only be for people if it is with people. This Network will focus on local democracy, youth empowerment, and intergenerational dialogue. Most recently I had the possibility to host a Youth Dialogue in Slovenia and I could once more see how much it matters not only to engage with young people, but also to protect democracy for the future generations. We want everyone, everywhere to feel they have a stake in shaping their democracies. This is also why we adopted the first-ever EU Strategy for Civil Society – to support organisations and initiatives who connect citizens to democratic life. And through our public outreach, we want to remind everyone that – together – democracy helps “protect what matters” – the rights, freedoms, and opportunities we have across our Union!
Finally, because Democracy is with people – whoever they are and wherever they are – since the beginning of my mandate I have made a point of visiting every Member State of our Union. During these missions, I have heard from governments, authorities, and stakeholders how the Shield has provided impetus and momentum for their own initiatives to protect and promote democracy. In some Member States, I saw strategies and structures to facilitate the detection and countering of foreign information interference. In others, I heard about cooperation between national electoral authorities and academic institutions to monitor online platforms in response to cases of disinformation and deepfakes. Some Member States shared with me their nationwide action plans to ensure the safety of political candidates and elected representatives – from awareness raising to threat response.
As Jean Monnet reminds us, democracy is not something that institutions can deliver on their own, but it is something that takes institutions to last. This means democracy depends on all of us - governments, civil society, media, academia, and above all, citizens. The initiatives I have described today are important. But ultimately, the strength of our democracies will not be measured only by the policies we adopt, the legislation we pass, or the institutions we build. It will be measured by the willingness of people to participate, to engage, and to contribute to the common good.
Democracy is for people and about people. But above all, democracy is delivered with people.
Thank you!”
EU political integration
- 2026-06-24 “Dear Ambassadors, Members of the European Parliament, Provost Doyle, Professor Geoghegan, distinguished members of Trinity College Dublin and friends. I am deeply honoured to accept the Trinity European Laureate Award and I thank Trinity College Dublin and Teneo for this recognition and for bringing us together this evening.
As someone from Cork whose public life has always been shaped by a deep commitment to service, community and education, this occasion carries a very special meaning for me. Like so many Irish people, I grew up with a strong awareness of Trinity College Dublin's place in our national life. As Ireland's oldest university, its walls have borne witness to Ireland's civic and political history. For generations, Trinity has been a place of scholarship, debate, discovery and public service. It has helped shape not only Ireland's intellectual life, but also Ireland's engagement with Europe and the wider world. To receive an award from an institution with such a history is both a great honour and a humbling experience.
For more than four centuries, Trinity has stood at the intersection of tradition and innovation, national identity and international engagement. Trinity has shown that it is possible to be deeply rooted in one's own history while remaining open to new ideas and new perspectives. And that is one of the great lessons of Trinity. Education is not simply about preserving knowledge. It is also about questioning, challenging, renewing. It is about forming citizens as well as minds. And it is about public service in the fullest sense: the belief that ideas matter because they help us build better societies.
That is why this award means so much to me. I accept it with gratitude, but also with a strong sense of responsibility. And I accept it as an encouragement to keep going — to continue serving, and to stand up for the values that give public life its meaning. For me, those values have always included education, integrity and service. Education, because informed citizens are the strongest foundation of any democracy. Integrity, because trust in institutions depends on honesty, fairness and accountability. And service, because public office is not about status; it is about responsibility to others.
Europe was never meant to be only a market, a regulatory space, or an economic arrangement. Of course, economic integration matters and the Single Market has brought opportunity, prosperity and connection. But Europe's deeper purpose has always gone further than that. The European Union was built as a community of values: peace after conflict, solidarity over division, cooperation ahead of nationalism, and human dignity above all else. Those principles remain the true foundation of our Union. They are what make Europe more than a transactional arrangement. They are what make it a shared political and moral project.
And today, those ideals matter more than ever. War has returned to our continent. Geopolitical competition is intensifying. New technologies are transforming how we work, communicate and understand facts. Polarisation is growing. Trust is fragile. And many citizens are asking whether democratic institutions can still protect them, represent them and deliver for them. In such a moment, Europe must be clear about what it stands for. The founding vision of Europe was not naive. It was realistic in the best sense. It understood that peace requires effort. That cooperation requires compromise. That freedom requires rules. And that human dignity must be protected not only in speeches, but in laws, institutions and daily practice.
That is why the rule of law is so central to the European Union. It is not an optional principle. It is not a box to tick. It is the foundation stone on which everything else rests. If courts are not independent, rights cannot be guaranteed. If laws are not applied fairly, trust breaks down. If commitments are not respected, cooperation becomes impossible. The rule of law underpins mutual trust between Member States. It supports economic confidence and investment. It gives citizens and businesses the certainty they need to plan, act and thrive. And it makes political cooperation possible, because it ensures a level playing field. In a Union of democracies, this matters enormously. The rule of law is what allows freedom to endure. It protects the individual against arbitrariness, ensures that power is exercised within limits, and reminds us that in Europe, no one is above the law.
But we also know that democracy itself is under pressure. Across Europe, democratic systems are being tested in new and serious ways. Disinformation spreads rapidly. Foreign interference seeks to distort public debate and weaken democratic confidence. Online abuse discourages public participation. And in some places, distrust in institutions has become so deep that citizens begin to doubt whether democratic politics can still solve real world problems. In simple terms, we cannot take democracy for granted. Democracy must be renewed and defended continuously. That means: protecting the integrity of our elections strengthening transparency and accountability equipping citizens with the tools to navigate the digital world critically and confidently and confronting those who seek to manipulate our public sphere from within or from outside.
This is the thinking behind our work to strengthen democratic resilience and to build what we have called the European Democracy Shield. The purpose is simple: to make our democracies more resilient, more transparent and better able to withstand the pressures of a changing world. The intention is not to close debate, but to safeguard it. Not to restrict freedom, but to ensure that freedom can flourish. This is why in the Democracy Shield we have actions to ensure that reliable information, developed by free and independent media, is visible in the current online information space. We have actions to support the economic viability of media – we have a phenomenon of “news deserts” in many places across Europe. But local media must not die out, they are the first line of community engagement so vital for democracies. We have actions to ensure that people's views are not drowning in a sea of disinformation. We have actions to safeguard the integrity of electoral processes against new challenges such as AI generated deepfakes or safety in politics. We have actions to support the role of science in the public space and for policy-making. And not the least, we have actions to give a voice to our youth. The protection for democracy is for today and for the future generations. In a nutshell, the actions in the Democracy Shield are about protecting what matters: our freedoms which Europeans highly cherish and expect us to strongly defend.
Yet democracy and the rule of law must also be felt in people's everyday lives. That brings me to the areas of my portfolio of justice and consumer protection.
Justice must not be a distant promise. It must be a lived reality for European citizens. Rights only matter if they can be enforced. Protections only matter if they are accessible. Rules are only useful if people can rely on them. The Single Market does not stop at national borders and neither can justice. Citizens should not lose protection when they cross an internal border. Businesses, especially small businesses, should be able to rely on clear and fair rules. Victims should be supported. Consumers should be protected. Families should be able to navigate legal systems without being overwhelmed by complexity. Europe of justice is a Europe in which people feel that the Union is present when it matters most: when rights are challenged, when harm is done and when fairness is at stake.
The same is true of consumer protection. Consumer protection is one of the most practical ways in which Europe earns people's trust. When citizens buy a product, sign a contract, use an online platform or share personal data, they need to know that the rules are fair, transparent and enforceable. This is especially important in the digital economy. Technology has created enormous possibilities, but it has also created new risks: unsafe products sold online, misleading commercial practices, manipulative design, opaque pricing, and uncertainty about who is responsible when something goes wrong. In that environment, trust becomes essential. Consumers will only participate fully in the Single Market if they feel protected. Innovation will only deliver lasting benefits if it is accompanied by fairness and accountability. That is why the European Union has put in place a comprehensive framework of consumer protections — from stronger online marketplace rules and product safety requirements to safeguards against unfair commercial practices and greater transparency in the digital environment. A strong economy and strong consumer rights are not in conflict. On the contrary: trust is the basis of sustainable growth.
And that brings me back to Trinity, and to the wider role of education. Education, research and openness are among Europe's greatest sources of resilience. Universities do more than prepare people for jobs, important though that is. They help societies think. They create spaces where complexity can be explored rather than denied. They strengthen our ability to distinguish evidence from assertion, argument from noise. In a world of rapid technological change and geopolitical uncertainty, Europe will only remain competitive and cohesive if it invests in knowledge, skills and mobility. We need people who can adapt, innovate and collaborate across borders. We need institutions that welcome exchange and debate. And we need to preserve the openness that has always been one of Europe's greatest strengths.
Trinity represents that tradition powerfully. It speaks to an Ireland that is confident and engaged with the world. It speaks to a Europe that understands that learning and openness are not luxuries, but necessities. And that makes this moment especially meaningful, as Ireland prepares for the next EU Council Presidency. For Ireland, the EU Council Presidency is an important opportunity to serve Europe — to help forge agreement, build bridges, and keep our common work moving forward. Ireland has long brought to the European table a strong belief in dialogue, fairness and practical solutions. I have no doubt that the forthcoming Presidency will reflect those strengths and will once again show Ireland at its best: committed, constructive and deeply European.
So, as I accept this award today, I do so in that spirit: with gratitude, but also with a renewed sense of duty. Our responsibility is clear. We must uphold European values not only in words, but in action. We must defend democracy, the rule of law and justice with seriousness and consistency. We must deliver real outcomes for citizens, so that Europe is experienced not as something distant, but as something that protects, enables and empowers. And we must ensure that our Union remains strong, fair and relevant for the generations that follow us. That is the task before us now: to protect what is best in Europe, and to renew it for those who come after us. That is not the work of one institution, one office, or one generation alone. It is a shared task. It belongs to governments, parliaments, courts, universities, civil society, journalists and citizens. It belongs to all those who believe that Europe is worth strengthening because its values are worth defending.
I thank Trinity College Dublin and Teneo for this extraordinary honour. I thank you for the confidence it expresses, and for the example you continue to offer as a place of learning, debate and public purpose. And I thank the Irish community here in Brussels, whose presence is a reminder of something important: that being proudly Irish and deeply European are not competing identities. They enrich one another. Let us continue that work together — with confidence, with humility, and with a firm belief that Europe's best chapters are yet to be written
Thank you very much.”
Role of education (social change vs. tradition)
- 2026-06-19 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 19.6.2026 Written question The Commission does not comment on ongoing cases. The EU reacted swiftly after the tragic fire in the bar during the New Year's celebrations at the ski resort Crans-Montana. In response to Switzerland’s request for assistance via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, the EU coordinated the evacuation of severely injured patients for specialised treatment, with Member States offering hospital capacity and medical transport support. The EU's Emergency Response Coordination Centre swiftly deployed liaison officers to oversee the medical evacuation and liaise with the Swiss national authorities on-site. As stated by the President of the Commission, the EU stands in full solidarity with Switzerland and with those affected by this tragedy. The Commission trusts that the Swiss authorities will conduct a thorough investigation into the circumstances surrounding this tragedy.”
EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
- 2026-06-17 “Madam president, can I thank the representatives of the political groups for those initial contributions to this debate? And can I thank you for putting the interests of the citizen at the heart of this debate, because EU citizens have a right to have their personal data protected, and when that right is not respected or when it is breached, we know that it can have far reaching ramifications in terms of their trust and confidence in public institutions and indeed in the very democratic system itself. Many of you have called for a united response. You have called for a coordinated response, both at a national and also at an EU level. And I believe that that is what we are doing, and we need to review how we can step up and strengthen our efforts in working together in relation to the framework of the new European Centre for Democratic Resilience. We are taking a number of steps. We are developing a capacity building project rooted in the train, the trainer logic. We are bringing together the member state expertise under the French stewardship to ensure coherence by defining common concepts and methodologies for detecting FEMA. We will make sure that we boost our capabilities of preventing and detecting threats, providing Member states states with the right tools and solutions.”
Disinformation & online freedoms
- 2026-06-17 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 17.6.2026 Written question The organisation and conduct of elections are solely the competence of the Member States. Supporting Member States to safeguard election integrity is a key objective of the European Democracy Shield. The EU has in place a robust toolbox, which includes the Digital Services Act (DSA) [1] , the Political Advertising Regulation, the recommendation on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union [2] , the European Cooperation Network on Elections and specific support for independent fact-checkers and civil society to expose online manipulation and disinformation campaigns [3] . On 5 March 2026, the National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH), the Digital Services Coordinator of Hungary, organised a DSA Election Roundtable with representatives of very large online platforms, very large online search engines, relevant national authorities and the Commission. As for every national and European election, the signatories of the Code of Conduct on Disinformation, part of the DSA, applied the Rapid Response System for the Hungarian elections, which ran for the period of 16 March to 19 April 2026. The Commission has also encouraged observation of elections by citizens and international organisations, which endorse relevant international standards, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Ahead of the elections, various stakeholders, including the Hungarian hub of the European Digital Media Observatory [4] , reported on attempts of possible Russian interference. Preparing for elections requires continuously building up resilience, through a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. With the European Democracy Shield, the Commission has considerably reinforced its capacities by setting up a European Centre for Democratic Resilience [5] in February 2026. The Centre supports Member States anticipate and counter threats to democratic processes while strengthening election preparedness and protecting the integrity of the information space. The Commission is fully committed to using all available tools to assist Member States in ensuring free and fair elections, without interference, in full respect of their competences. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. [2] Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 of 12 December 2023 on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2829/oj/eng. [3] European Digital Media Observatory and its regional hubs, the European Network of fact-checkers and the development of a Common Research Support Framework. [4] Russian disinformation campaigns against Hungarian opposition figures, 457 political ads in six weeks and AI-generated videos once again’ (2026): https://edmo.eu/publications/russian-disinformation-campaigns-against-hungarian-opposition-figures-457-political-ads-in-6-weeks-and-ai-generated-videos-once-again/; ‘The Matryoshka’s operation has been activated…’ (2026): https://edmo.eu/publications/the-matryoshkas-operation-has-been-activated-peter-magyar-got-the-truth-serum-on-fringe-tiktok-channels/; ‘A Russian attempt to embroil an opposition politician in the Epstein case, statistical distortions and good old cheapfakes’ (2026): https://edmo.eu/publications/a-russian-attempt-to-embroil-an-opposition-politician-in-the-epstein-case-statistical-distortions-and-good-old-cheapfakes/. [5] https://commission.europa.eu/european-centre-democratic-resilience_en.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Foreign interference in Europe
- 2026-06-17 “Thank you, president. Can I thank the representatives of the political groups for those initial contributions, to this debate? And can I thank you for putting the interests of the citizen at the heart of this debate because, EU citizens have a right, to have their personal data protected? And when that right is not, respected or when it is breached, we know it can have far reaching ramifications in terms of their trust and confidence in public institutions, and indeed in, the very democratic system itself. Many of you have called for a united response. You have called for a coordinated response both at a national and also at an EU level. And I believe that that is what we are doing, and we need to review how we can step up and strengthen our efforts in working together. In relation to the framework of the new European Center for Democratic Resilience, we are taking a number of steps. We're developing a capacity building project, rooted in the train, the trainer logic. We are bringing together the member state expertise under the French stewardship to ensure coherence by defining common concepts and methodologies for detecting FME. We'll make sure that we boost our capabilities of preventing and detecting threats, providing member states with the right tools and solutions. For example, the Nordic Baltic Cyber Hub will support early detection of such threats and enhance cross border cooperation, between partners. And let me also use the opportunity to highlight that in 2 weeks time, in line with the protect EU strategy, we will propose a strengthening of the mandate of both Eurojust and Europol, which will improve their capacity to support national authorities encountering criminal threats, where they have a hybrid dimension. Deterring cyber attacks requires also that our national authorities, have better tools and support so that they identify or attribute attacks to those behind them and can effectively prosecute and sanction them. We need to have digital evidence and effective tools building on the road map for lawful and effective access to data for law enforcement also. Finally, to conclude, chair, hybrid threats, Fimi, and cyber attacks are designed to exploit the fragmentation that a number of you have highlighted here already this afternoon. So, therefore, we must work together, and I take that as the key message away with me so far in the debate, to collectively build our defense in the interest of national security, in the interest of European security, but also in the interest of upholding the fundamental rights of EU citizens, including the right to have their personal data fully protected. Thank you.”
EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
- 2026-06-17 “For example, the Nordic Baltic Cyber Hub will support early detection of such threats and enhance cross-border cooperation between partners. And let me also use the opportunity to highlight that in two weeks time. In line with the protect EU strategy, we will propose a strengthening of the mandate of both Eurojust and Europol, which will improve their capacity to support national authorities in countering criminal threats, including where they have a hybrid dimension. Deterring cyber attacks requires also that our national authorities have better tools and support so that they identify or attribute attacks to those behind them and can effectively prosecute and sanction them. We need to have digital evidence and effective tools, building on the roadmap for lawful and effective access to data for law enforcement also. Finally, to conclude, hybrid threats and cyber attacks are designed to exploit the fragmentation that a number of you have highlighted here already this afternoon. So therefore, we must work together. And I take that as the key message away with me so far in the debate to collectively build our defense in the interests of national security, in the interests of European security, but also in the interests of upholding the fundamental rights of EU citizens, including the right to have their personal data fully protected. Thank you.”
EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
- 2026-06-17 “Thank you very much, president, dear deputy minister, dear honorable members. Today, the threats we face are not isolated incidents, but coordinated waves of hybrid attacks aimed at weakening the very fabric of our democracies. This is why cases such as the Lithuanian case of the data breach that you put on the agenda of the plenary today must be treated, with the utmost seriousness. While the specifics of the Lithuanian case would need to be addressed by the competent authorities, the scale of such a breach can generate distrust in the ability of democratic authorities and frameworks to safeguard the fundamental rights of our citizens. The only durable and effective way forward against threats and challenges like these is to take a whole of government, a whole of society, and a whole of cycle approach to protect our collective democracies. As part of this approach, the commission adopted the European Democracy Shield in November of last year to strengthen and to protect our democracies. Its actions complement the broader EU work to counter hybrid threats. In particular, we have now set up the European Center for Democratic Resilience as a hub for strategic and practical cooperation between, EU member states and EU institutions and bodies supporting the sharing of information, best practices, and capacity building. It can also serve as a nexus for facilitating practical cooperation and enabling the member states to develop common response options when faced with similar challenges. When we talk about hybrid threats, a key component is indeed cybersecurity. The NIST 2 directive ensures that our essential services know what measures to take in order to work on preventing cyber incidents. Additionally, once it enters into application next year, the Cyber Resilience Act will make sure digital products are secure all across the EU. In addition, the Cyber Solidarity Act establishes a European cybersecurity reserve, a pool of trusted experts who can be called upon to support any country that may be in need. We should also make use of the e EU hybrid toolbox and its associated cyber diplomacy and FIME toolboxes, which give us the means to identify those responsible for malicious hybrid activities and to respond through coordinated diplomatic action. We've also proposed a revision of the cybersecurity act to strengthen the mandate of ANESA, equip it with the right resources, and to address risks across ICT supply chains. Democratic resilience also depends on the enforcement of rules in reality, including the application of the general data protection regulation. The GDPR places clear obligations on controllers to secure personal data through appropriate technical and organizational measures and to notify national data protection authorities and affected individuals when breaches pose a high risk. Enforcement is then a matter for national authorities who must investigate and follow-up accordingly. I look forward to hearing your contributions to today's debate and indeed to, responding to them. Thank you.”
Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
- 2026-06-17 “Thank you very much. President. Dear Deputy Minister, dear honourable members, today, the threats we face are not isolated incidents, but coordinated waves of hybrid attacks aimed at weakening the very fabric of our democracies. This is why cases such as the Lithuanian case of the data breach that you put on the agenda of the plenary today must be treated with the utmost seriousness. While the specifics of the Lithuanian case would need to be addressed by the competent authorities, the scale of such a breach can generate distrust in the ability of democratic authorities and frameworks to safeguard the fundamental rights of our citizens. The only durable and effective way forward against threats and challenges like these is to take a whole of government, a whole of society, and a whole of cycle approach to protect our collective democracies. As part of this approach, the Commission adopted the European Democracy Shield in November of last year to strengthen and to protect our democracies. Its actions complement the broader EU work to counter hybrid threats. In particular, we have now set up the European Centre for Democratic Resilience as a hub for strategic and practical cooperation between EU member states and EU institutions and bodies, supporting the sharing of information, best practices and capacity building. It can also serve as a nexus for facilitating practical cooperation and enabling the Member States to develop common response options when faced with similar challenges.”
Disinformation & online freedoms
- 2026-06-17 “When we talk about hybrid threats. A key component is cybersecurity. The two directive ensures that our essential services know what measures to take in order to work on preventing cyber incidents. Additionally, once it enters into application next year, the Cyber Resilience Act will make sure digital products are secure all across the EU. In addition, the Cyber Solidarity Act establishes a European cybersecurity reserve, a pool of trusted experts who can be called upon to support any country that may be in need. We should also make use of the hybrid toolbox and its associated cyber diplomacy and FEMA toolboxes, which give us the means to identify those responsible for malicious hybrid activities and to respond through coordinated diplomatic action. We have also proposed a revision of the Cybersecurity Act to strengthen the mandate of Enisa, equipped with the right resources and to address risks across ICT supply chains. Democratic resilience also depends on the enforcement of rules in reality, including the application of the General Data Protection Regulation. The GDPR places clear obligations on controllers to secure personal data through appropriate technical and organisational measures, and to notify national data protection authorities and affected individuals when breaches pose a high risk. Enforcement is then a matter for national authorities, who must investigate and follow up accordingly. I look forward to hearing your contributions to today's debate and indeed, to responding to them. Thank you.”
Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
- 2026-06-17 “(14:34:15 – 14:39:21): Thank you very much. 1000 electric cars were registered across the EU in the 1st quarter of this year. That's enough to reduce oil consumption by 2,000,000 barrels per year. Meanwhile, in the same period, the combined sale of residential heat pumps in France, Germany, and Poland surpassed 400,000 units, representing a 25% increase compared to the 1st quarter of last year. Europeans are now reading the signs for sure, and they are choosing electricity. We need to follow their lead, and we need to seize this momentum. This is what we will aim to do in the electrification action plan. The commission plans to adopt an ambitious electrification target, and it will focus on supporting those sectors that are stalling the most.
For industry, there is potential to expand the use of eboilers, heat pumps, electric drying technologies, and small scale electric furnaces. We also need to promote research and innovation to make new electrification solutions commercially viable for European industries. Horizon Europe is supporting the development and upscaling of innovative technologies, including storage and renewable heating and cooling.
For transport, the benefits of electric vehicles are abundantly clear. Thanks to lower running costs and more affordable cars, EVs are now at a turning point in Europe with battery electric vehicles becoming competitive with conventional vehicles over their time of ownership. To spread these benefits, we need to improve price transparency for EV charging, the deployment of vehicle to grid technologies, and corporate fleet strategies.
We also need to continue our efforts to drive electrification in buildings. The expansion of heat pumps, batteries, and smart technologies offer game changing possibilities. By installing these technologies across Europe, we can make a huge difference in the lives of millions of our citizens while scaling up EU manufacturing, creating high quality jobs, and strengthening the resilience and sustainability of industrial energy supply.
But to deliver the full savings potential of electrification, we need to supply it with homegrown and affordable clean energy. This requires increasing domestic production of clean energy, strong and interconnected European grid with the adequate storage and flexibility capacities. To proceed swiftly, we are helping member states to speed up and to simplify permitting procedures for clean energy projects.
Beyond electrification, we can harvest efficiency gains in heating and cooling. This includes supporting the business case of clean heating, which is essential to complement electrification and make it efficient and affordable. Meanwhile, our clean energy investment strategy will help to derisk projects and attract a wider base of investors with important support from the European Investment Bank.
We should not forget that we will need electricity in abundance also because of the rapid scale up of data centers and artificial intelligence. With the strategic roadmap for digitalization and AI, we outlined how we can best utilize AI for our energy system. The US export ban on, Anthropic's latest AI model just last weekend also shows that the EU needs tech sovereignty and its own digital capacity.
Honorable members, to conclude, Europe is at a pivotal moment for its independence and economic security. With the electrification action plan, we will accelerate the energy transition, and we will remove barriers to proceed with structural changes to become more energy independent. I look forward to your contributions this afternoon. Thank you.”
Energy (green transition)
- 2026-06-17 “(14:52:00 – 14:57:41): Well, thank you very much, president, and I'm delighted to have the opportunity to respond to the initial contributions in this debate from the representatives of the political groups. And even in those early contributions, I think some of the the key themes have already emerged. You've highlighted very clearly the benefits of electrification, decarbonization of our economy and our society, being chief among them, the benefit of energy security, the need for which has been underlined once again for us by geopolitical developments outside of our control.
But you've also highlighted the importance of competitiveness and how the electrification of our economy and of industry can bring significant competitiveness benefits, but on the basis of 1 proviso, and that is that we make improvements on the question of affordability. And that electrification leads to, more affordable energy for our citizens, but also for industry. And I think that is ultimately, the key litmus test, and it is important that we work together to ensure, that this is the case. And indeed, by providing the upfront investment and by coordinated action across the European Union, we do believe that we can, achieve that.
In terms of the detail of the electrification action plan, it is currently being finalized, by the commission. We aim for adoption, before the summer recess. So it's too early to discuss the details of the concrete measures that do remain under development. But we welcome the ideas and the recommendations from the parliament.
On the 1 hand, the electrification action plan will integrate an electrification target. The target framing needs to be ambitious. It will be supported by measures to overcome barriers and put us on an ambitious electrification track. Some measures will be horizontal and others will be sector specific, for example, targeting transport buildings, and industry. We intend to follow a value chain approach and to support business models in Europe.
The commission will, in teraleo, propose action to lower the electricity fossil fuels price ratio and measures to accelerate the uptake of electrification solutions such as through a market based instrument on heat pumps. This includes phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, which undermined the relative competitiveness of electricity vis a vis other energy carriers. And, again, the question of the comparative cost of electricity vis a vis gas is 1 where we need to make progress, for sure.
The commission will adopt a legal proposal on network charges and taxation. The proposal will provide incentives to make an optimal and cost effective use of the grid while ensuring that electricity is taxed less than gas.
Electrification of key sectors means lowering import dependencies on fossil fuels and improving our energy security. And while the EU has achieved already a lot in transforming the electricity mix into a mix of abundant and clean sources, 70% renewables and nuclear. This is not the case in sectors such as industry, transport, and buildings, which continue to be dominated still today by imported fossil fuels. This needs to change.
And how we approach the design of, an electricity target, will, be designed to ensure that this is achieved. Increasing the share of homegrown clean energy and the share of electricity in key sectors where technically and economically viable requires reinforcing our energy system flexibility through crucially more interconnectors, grids, storage, and demand response as some of you have already highlighted.
So the electrification target, supported by measures that enable reaching us because the target is only as good as the measures that underpin how we will deliver it. Will provide a clear political signal and take into account the key performance indicator, of the clean industrial, deal. So those nuts and bolts are really important interconnectors, grids, storage, and indeed, demand, response.
In addition, we already have had mentioned in the debate this afternoon concerning nuclear. And as colleagues, know the precise energy mix is a matter for, member states, concerned. But we need all clean sources of energy to achieve the objective of reducing our dependence on fossil fuels while keeping system costs in check and strengthening grid stability.
Next to renewables, nuclear remains the other core component of our domestic supply of clean electricity, and we should use our existing power generation efficiently and look at new technologies such as small modular reactors.
So I look forward to the remainder, of the debate. As I said, the key issues have already been touched on, decarbonization, energy security, affordability, improving competitiveness. But to achieve all of this will require a collective effort on behalf of all of the institutions, to make these ambitions a reality. I look forward to remaining contributions. Thank you. Thank you, commissioner. Can we continue with the list of interventions? And we continue with colleague Radan Kanev for 1 minute and a half.”
EU approach to electricity market and prices
- 2026-06-16 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 16.6.2026 Written question Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR) [1] does not provide for a general right or an obligation to refuse disclosure of personal data on the grounds of personal data protection as such. Member States have a primary responsibility to monitor the application of the relevant legal provisions and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. Any natural or legal person acting as a controller or processor of personal data, including public authorities, are subject to the GDPR. The supervision and enforcement of the GDPR falls within the competence of the national supervisory authorities and courts, without prejudice to the competences of the Commission as guardian of the Treaties. [1] Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1-88.”
Privacy & digital economy · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
- 2026-06-16 “22:38 – 16:24:24): Yes, please. Thank you, Marilyn, and thank you for the progress report, that you have prepared and circulated. And I would like to thank you for the progress made and for your ambition to reach more council mandates by the end of this month.
The commission, as you know, has advanced an ambitious simplification agenda at this stage putting forward 10 omnibus packages aligned with the political priorities set by the EU leaders as well as our recent action plan on deep cleaning.
And while we want to maintain a high pace in line with the agreed timelines into 1 Europe, 1 market road map, we are concerned that the simplification ambition is often reduced notably in the chemical, digital, environmental, automotive, and food and feed safety proposals.
Just to give you a few examples, the reintroduction of double notification procedures for chemicals, the deletion of the GDPR amendment on personal data, and the abandonment of the single entry point for cybersecurity incident reporting into digital omnibus and the watering down of several measures for plant protection products in the food and feed safety proposal.
We count to you in the remaining time during the Cyprus presidency and then on the Irish presidency to turn the leader's commitment to simplification into tangible results for businesses and for national administrations.
And this brings me to my final point, the related issue of substantial amendments. It is essential that each institution takes responsibility for assessing these. To that end, the commission is ready to restart joint work to develop a practical and workable approach, on these issues. Thank you, chair.”
Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
- 2026-06-05 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 5.6.2026 Written question In its judgment in case Shipova [1] , the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) recalled that as EU law currently stands, a person’s status, which is relevant to the rules on changing the family name, patronymic, first name or legal gender identity of a person, is a matter which falls within the competence of the Member States. EU law does not detract from that competence. Nevertheless, in exercising that competence, each Member State must comply with EU law, in particular the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the right conferred on all EU citizens to move and reside within the territory of the Member States . In that judgment, the Court found that legislation of a Member State that does not permit, in civil registers, changes of gender data [2] of one of its nationals who has exercised the right of free movement is contrary to Article 21 TFEU and Article 4(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC [3] , in light of Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The Commission is committed, as guardian of the Treaties, to ensuring the correct application of EU free movement law as interpreted by the Court. [1] Judgment of 12 March 20216, K. M. H. v Obshtina Stara Zagora , C-43/24, EU:C:2026:183. [2] Data such as the sex, family name, patronymic, first name and personal identification number. [3] Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.”
LGBTIQ+ · Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
- 2026-06-01 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 1.6.2026 Written question The Commission does not have a general power to intervene in matters related to the regulation or oversight of national political party financing. Member States are competent to lay down the rules regarding the functioning and financing of national political parties, and their competent national authorities ensure compliance with national legislation, EU law and their international obligations. At the EU level, Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2025/2445 [1] has strengthened transparency and control mechanisms of the funding received by European political parties and foundations. As transparency and accountability of the party financing rules are an important factor for preventing corruption, the Commission monitors developments in Member States related to the funding of national political parties in the context of its annual Rule of Law Report [2] . The Commission also supports the exchange of practices in the framework of the European cooperation network on elections [3] . Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising [4] facilitates oversight of some aspects of political party funding, including by requiring political advertising publishers to disclose essential information on political advertisements. As announced in the European Democracy Shield [5] , in the framework of the European cooperation network on elections the Commission will further support common work with the Member States on the transparency and integrity of funding in politics [6] , looking at issues of common interest such as anonymous donations and cryptocurrency, in full respect for the allocation of competences on electoral matters. [1] Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2025/2445 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2025 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations (recast), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32025R2445. [2] 2025 Rule of Law Report: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle/2025-rule-law-report_en. [3] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/eu-citizenship/democracy-and-electoral-rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R0900&qid=1774661372049. [5] JOIN(2025) 791 final, https://commission.europa.eu/document/2539eb53-9485-4199-bfdc-97166893ff45_en. [6] This will notably rely on the work to support the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, the Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament, Directive (EU) 2026/1021 on combating corruption recently adopted by co-legislators based on the Commission’s proposal COM(2023)234 final, EU anti-money laundering (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/oj/daily-view/L-series/default.html?&ojDate=19062024) and other relevant EU rules.”
Transparency requirements for interest groups · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
- 2026-05-27 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 27.5.2026 Written question The Digital Fairness Act (DFA) that the Commission plans to propose in the fourth quarter 2026 will update EU consumer protection rules. It will seek to tackle specific identified consumer protection gaps, with a particular focus on the protection of minors. More concrete EU consumer rules will facilitate enforcement against unfair practices. In parallel, the Commission plans to revise the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Regulation [1] and assess the need to centralise enforcement in specific cases directly at EU level. The Digital Services Act (DSA) [2] provides a robust framework applicable to intermediary services, addressing the dissemination of illegal content online, including scams and fraud. Ensuring consistency of the potential DFA measures with other EU rules, such as the DSA, is an important part of the ongoing impact assessment analysis for the DFA. The Commission has already issued a report on the interplay of the DSA with existing EU law. [3] Moreover, the Commission plans to adopt in 2026 an action plan against digital fraud. It will focus on prevention measures, disruption of fraudulent activities and cooperation with Member States and stakeholders to support and protect victims. [4] A provisional political agreement was reached in November 2025 [5] to revise the Payment Services Directive [6] and to establish a Payment Services Regulation, introducing stronger safeguards against online fraud with measures to strengthen awareness and prevention of payment fraud, targeting vulnerable groups such as younger and older persons and individuals with low digital skill . [1] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2394/oj. [2] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj. [3] Report from the Commission on the application of Article 33 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 and the interaction of that regulation with other legal acts, COM(2025) 708 final, 17.11.2025, and the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the report, SWD(2025) 368 final, 17.11.2025, available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/report-application-article-33-regulation-eu-20222065-dsa-and-interaction-regulation-other-legal. [4] Call for evidence available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/16313-Fighting-online-fraud-action-plan_en. [5] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/11/27/payment-services-council-and-parliament-agree-to-step-up-the-fight-against-fraud-and-increase-transparency/. [6] http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/2366/oj.”
Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Privacy & digital economy
- 2026-05-18 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 18.5.2026 Written question Economic operators are obliged to offer only safe textile products to consumers, taking into account the factors relevant for assessing safety and laid down in Article 6 of the General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR) [1] . The GPSR also sets obligations for economic operators in case of distance sales as well for providers of online marketplaces that apply to textiles products. It should also be noted that there are provisions in other pieces of EU legislation that apply to textile products covered by the Textile Labelling Regulation (TLR), namely in the Market Surveillance Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and, once ecodesign requirements are introduced for textile products, provisions in the Ecodesign for Sustainable Product Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 as well. [1] In accordance with point b) of the last subparagraph of Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) 2023/988 General Product Safety Regulation (EU) 2023/988 — EUR-Lex ( GPSR), textile products covered by the Textile Labelling Regulation No 1007 /2011 (TLR), being products subject to specific requirements imposed by Union harmonisation legislation, are not subject to certain GPSR obligations, including Section 1 of Chapter III containing Articles 9-18. Importantly, however, the GPSR provisions not mentioned in point b) of the last subparagraph of Article 2(1) of the GPSR apply to textile products covered by the TLR, notably the general safety requirement in Chapter II of the GPSR.”
EU competences on consumer protection and product standards · EU Single Market harmonisation
- 2026-05-11 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question The Commission generally does not comment on draft legislation. Accordingly, it is not in a position to provide an answer to the questions submitted by the Honourable Members.”
EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Asylum & border control
- 2026-05-07 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 7.5.2026 Written question The Commission has followed the developments regarding the adoption of Act XLVIII on the Protection of Local Identity and the related local decrees. The Commission is currently assessing these measures including their possible impacts and implications on EU law and stands ready to take action, as appropriate .”
Rule of law in Hungary · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
- 2026-05-05 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The Commission fully supports the mission of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and remains firmly committed to further strengthening the EU’s anti-fraud architecture (AFA), of which the EPPO is a key component. Further to the adoption of its related White Paper in July 2025 [1] , the Commission is currently reviewing the EU’s AFA. In this context, the Commission is assessing the cooperation and information exchange among the relevant actors, including the EPPO, as well as the recovery of misused EU funds, with a view to identifying targeted improvements where appropriate. The Commission will also take due account of the relevant recommendations of the European Court of Auditors in this process. Furthermore, the forthcoming evaluation of the EPPO Regulation and the directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (the PIF Directive) [2] , the joint impact assessment supporting the possible revision of the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) Regulations [3] , as well as the ongoing consultations carried out in the context of the review of the EU’s AFA, will provide an opportunity to assess the functioning of the current EPPO’s framework, including the tools and conditions under which the EPPO operates. In that context, the Commission could consider whether any adjustments are needed to further enhance its effectiveness, including as regards the recovery of misused EU funds. [1] White Paper for the Anti-fraud Architecture Review, COM(2025) 546 final, Brussels, 16.7.2025. [2] Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law, OJ L 198, 28.7.2017. [3] Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), OJ L 283, 31.10.2017 and Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), as amended, OJ L 248, 18.9.2013.”
Accounting and auditing of EU budget
- 2026-05-05 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The Commission is monitoring the interaction between Directive (EU) 2024/2853 on Product Liability (PLD), the directive (EU) 2020/1828 on Representative Actions (RAD) and developments in third-party litigation funding (TPLF), including their implications for legal certainty, costs and the internal market. The PLD strikes a careful balance between innovation and consumer protection. The Commission does not plan to issue specific guidelines but supports consistent implementation through cooperation with Member States, expert meetings, bilateral exchanges and transposition checks. In March 2025, the Commission published a study on TPLF [1] which served as a basis for discussions with the European Parliament, the Member States and stakeholders in the High-Level Forum on Justice for Growth. TPLF remains limited overall and does not reveal systemic risks. Participants expressed scepticism about the need for regulation and invited the Commission to continue monitoring developments, while assessing whether further action may be warranted. Under Article 23 of RAD, the Commission will evaluate its application by June 2028 in line with the 2030 Consumer Agenda and action plan for consumers in the single market. [2] This evaluation will allow the Commission to determine whether further measures are necessary. It is therefore premature to draw conclusions on the combined effects of these legal instruments. [1] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/civil-justice/civil-and-commercial-law/third-party-litigation-funding-tplf_en. [2] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/consumers/consumer-protection-policy/2030-consumer-agenda_en.”
EU restrictions on unfair commercial practices · Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
- 2026-05-05 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The European Centre for Democratic Resilience is a cooperation framework, under the leadership of the Commissioner responsible for democracy, justice, the rule of law and consumer protection, for exchange primarily between EU institutions, Member States and civil society to empower, protect, and promote strong and resilient democracies across the EU. The Centre is a core component of the European Democracy Shield [1] , which defines a broad, whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach to strengthening democracy. There are no planned organisational, functional or reporting links between the Centre and any intelligence structure. The Centre fully respects EU and national competences and the independence of existing structures at national and EU level. It will be rolled out progressively, based on Member States’ voluntary participation, and on their input and needs for support and cooperation, to ensure that it delivers the best support to national authorities and jointly at EU level. The Centre brings together expertise and resources to increase collective capacity to anticipate, detect and respond to threats to our democracies, such as foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and disinformation. The Centre builds on existing networks and structures working on prevention, detection, analysis, and response to patterns of threats in the information space. The information shared via the Centre is based on open sources . The Centre will also support capacity-building activities, including trainings. It could further support response capacity. [1] JOIN(2025) 791 final.”
Disinformation & online freedoms · Foreign interference in Europe
- 2026-04-30 “P-000603/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is closely monitoring the matter and assessing the information available. The Commission is committed, within the remit of its competences, to ensure that fundamental freedoms, such as the free movement of capital, and fundamental rights, as established under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 1 , including the right to freedom of expression, the right to property and the right to non-discrimination, are upheld. In accordance with Article 51(1) of the Charter, its provisions only apply to Member States when they implement EU law. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng.”
Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass) · Disinformation & online freedoms
- 2026-04-30 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 30.4.2026 Written question Pursuant to the definition of food laid down in Article 2 of the General Food Law Regulation [1] , the primary intention of food is to be ‘intended to be or reasonably expected to be ingested by humans’. Energy powders for inhalation are neither intended to be ingested, nor chewed or swallowed via the mouth; instead, these powders are intended or reasonably expected to be inhaled through the nose and therefore cannot be considered food. Consequently, neither the Food Supplements Directive [2] nor the Nutrition and Health Claims Regulation [3] are applicable. Such products accordingly fall under the scope of the General Product Safety Regulation [4] (GPSR), which provides the relevant legal framework as a safety net, for the safety of products. The Member States are responsible for monitoring the safety of products on their territories and to take enforcement measures or to ban specific products when they consider it necessary. So far Member States have notified measures four times to the Safety Gate [5] , concerning energy sniffing powders to inhale, posing serious risks. The Commission is monitoring these notifications and their follow-ups. The Commission can act only in certain very specific situations where the risk cannot be dealt with otherwise under EU law and, at the same time, the risk can be eliminated in an effective manner only by adopting measures applicable at EU level [6] . Should the conditions of this EU level action be met, the Commission might consider taking measures on this type of products. [1] Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety. OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, pp. 1-24. [2] Directive 2002/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to food supplements. OJ L 183, 12.7.2002, pp. 51-57. [3] Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods. OJ L 404, 30.12.2006, pp. 9-25. [4] Regulation (EU) 2023/988 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 on general product safety, amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and the Council, and repealing Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 87/357/EEC, OJ L 135, 23.5.2023, pp. 1-51. [5] https://ec.europa.eu/safety-gate-alerts/. [6] Article 28 of the General Product Safety Regulation.”
EU policy on novel foods · EU measures on lifestyle-related behaviours (smoking, drinking, eating, etc.)
- 2026-04-30 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 30.4.2026 Written question The European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) announced in the European Democracy Shield [1] (EDS) is a voluntary cooperation framework primarily bringing together expertise and capacities from Member States and relevant EU institutions and bodies, building on existing networks and structures. This work will contribute to supporting the EU’s whole-of-society approach to increase awareness and build democratic resilience. The Council conclusions of May 2024 [2] highlighted the need to bring these efforts together. The Council conclusions of March 2026 [3] invite the Commission to make the full use of the relevant EU instruments, take note of the establishment of the Centre and underline the commitment to work together with the Commission and the European External Action Service to enhance the EU’s democratic resilience. The Centre fully respects the competences of the EU and its Member States and the independence of existing structures. Its work does not interfere with Member States’ competences in the areas highlighted by the Honourable Member, such as the organisation and running of electoral processes, national security or counterintelligence. The information shared in the framework of the Centre is based on open sources. The Centre is also supported by the Rapid Alert System [4] , an established mechanism to address foreign information manipulation and interference. [1] https://commission.europa.eu/document/2539eb53-9485-4199-bfdc-97166893ff45_en. [2] The Council conclusions of May 2024 on democratic resilience, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10119-2024-INIT/en/pdf. [3] The Council conclusions of March 2026 on advancing the European Union’s capacity to counter hybrid threats, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7349-2026-INIT/en/pdf. [4] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/factsheet-rapid-alert-system_en.”
Foreign interference in Europe · EU competences on foreign affairs
- 2026-04-29 “E-000925/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission condemns all forms of political violence, which undermine the fundamental values of democracy, pluralism and the rule of law enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. Violent acts demonstrate the need to protect the civic space and ensure that all citizens can participate in public debate without fear of intimidation or violence. It is important to highlight that Member States are solely competent for maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security, including as regards the protection of citizens from politically motivated violence and attacks. A priority of the European Democracy Shield 1 is to strengthen the fairness and integrity of electoral and other democratic processes and, in this context, to better ensure the safety of political candidates and elected representatives, including through a dedicated Commission recommendation and a guide of best practices, which are under preparation in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/2539eb53-9485-4199-bfdc97166893ff45_en?filename=JUST_template_comingsoon_standard_1.pdf.”
Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass) · Regulation of NGOs in Europe
- 2026-04-29 “E-000811/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission In May 2024, the Commission decided to formally close the procedure of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) for Poland, by withdrawing its reasoned proposal that had triggered this procedure in 2017. The decision to close the Article 7 procedure followed a thorough analysis which concluded that ‘a clear risk of a serious breach’ of the rule of law no longer exists 1 . The concerns regarding the situation of the rule of law in Poland between 2015 and 2023 have been clearly set out in the Commission’s reasoned proposal under the Article 7 TEU procedure, in several judgments of the Court of Justice, and in the Commission’s Rule of Law Reports. The Commission continues to monitor rule of law related developments in Poland, including progress made by Poland to implement the Action Plan on the Rule of Law, in the annual Rule of Law Reports 2 . 1 See the Commission press release of 6 May 2024 IP/24/2461, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/lv/ip_24_2461/IP_24_2461_EN.pdf. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/bac7fb6c-b5f2-4593-b62ab9a4b87269e4_en?filename=2025%20Rule%20of%20Law%20Report%20%20Country%20Chapter%20Poland.pdf.”
Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass) · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
- 2026-04-29 “E-000756/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not comment or intervene in individual cases. Under EU law, the examination of applications for international protection is the responsibility of the Member States. If the applicant is an EU citizen, their application can be declared admissible by another Member State only in very exceptional circumstances listed under Protocol 24 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 1 . The level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms in all Member States is such that all Member States are considered safe countries in relation to asylum matters. 1 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - Protocols – Protocol (No 24) on asylum for nationals of Member States of the European Union Official Journal 115, 09.05.2008 pp. 0305 – 0306.”
Rule of law in Hungary · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · Asylum & border control
- 2026-04-29 “E-000805/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Without prejudice to the role of the Commission as guardian of the Treaties, it is for the independent data protection authorities in the Member States (DPAs), under the control of national courts, and ultimately the Court of Justice of the European Union where questions of Union law are involved, to determine whether transfers of personal data from national tax authorities to the US carried out under the bilateral agreements to improve international tax compliance and to implement the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) take place in compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The Commission closely follows developments in this regard, including in collaboration with the European Data Protection Board. The preliminary ruling in Case C-804/25 on the questions referred by the Cour des Marchés of Brussels is likely to provide important clarifications in this regard. In general, an appropriate balance must be struck between the right to protection of personal data and the legitimate objectives of general interest, such as the fight against tax avoidance and evasion, including by identifying financial assets that taxpayers may hold abroad.”
Anti-money laundering regulation · EU competences on taxation
- 2026-04-29 “E-000852/2026 E-000853/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Experts interested in evaluating proposals register in the Commission database. When proposals need to be evaluated, the Commission searches the database using keywords linked to the relevant programme and call. The Commission then selects experts based on their relevant expertise, experience and qualifications as recorded in the database. Before selection, each expert's professional profile is thoroughly reviewed, including professional background, reputation, and potential conflicts of interest. The corporate template of the experts’ contract used under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme (CERV) 1 requires experts to comply with the Experts Code of Conduct 2 which outlines the principles of impartiality and confidentiality that must guide the experts’ work. Various checks are performed to identify potential conflicts of interest; moreover, each proposal is independently assessed by two experts, who prepare separate evaluation reports, while a consensus report (CR) is prepared normally by a third expert. Proposals are evaluated on the basis of the pre-announced selection and award criteria. The selection and award of proposals are under the direct responsibility of an evaluation committee, which for CERV is composed exclusively of staff from the Commission and the European Education and Culture Executive Agency. External experts may assist the evaluation committee, but do not have decision-making authority. The evaluation committee analyses the proposals received and reviews all CRs. On this basis, the evaluation committee drafts the Evaluation Summary Report that documents the merits and shortcomings of each proposal, the decisions taken, and it ranks the proposals up to the available budget. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme (OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1); ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/692/oj. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/experts/code-of-conduct_en.pdf.”
Conditions to access EU budget · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
- 2026-04-29 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 29.4.2026 Written question There are several elements in Directive (EU) 2019/1023 on Restructuring and Insolvency [1] that protect the interests of creditors during debt discharge procedures. The directive only harmonises the basic principles of that procedure and, beyond those principles, Member States have considerable flexibility in their national transposition. Details such as the exact content of the concept of ‘viability’ and the procedure to assess this are determined in national law. Furthermore, Member States can decide to derogate from the general principles of debt discharge. Member States can interpret these derogations broadly, as confirmed by recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union [2] . The impact of these measures, including on the access to credit, will be assessed in due course. The notification of creditors and the access to insolvency registers are matters already regulated in Regulation (EU) 2015/848 [3] . The access to data in the insolvency registers is granted to any member of the general public, including through the EU-wide interconnection system of insolvency registers, which is accessible online through the European e-Justice Portal in all EU languages. Debt discharge procedures, if public, are also included in the scope of this regulation. Furthermore, the regulation requires individual notification of all known foreign creditors of the opening of insolvency proceedings of their debtors. Finally, Directive (EU) 2026/799 [4] harmonising certain aspects of insolvency law contains rules that enhance the powers of insolvency practitioners and courts to access registers, including bank account registers, in insolvency proceedings. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/1023/oj/eng. [2] See judgment of 7 November 2024, Corván and Bacigán , C-289/23 and C-305/23, EU:C:2024:934. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/848/oj/eng. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2026/799/oj/eng.”
Financial regulation
- 2026-04-29 “E-000611/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) sets up a dialogue between the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the courts of the Member States, in which the latter are closely involved in the uniform interpretation and correct application of EU law and the protection of individual rights. In its recent judgment of 24 March 2026 1 , the Court of Justice recalled that a national court or tribunal of last instance is subject to an obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling, of which it may be relieved only in three situations: lack of relevance of the question of EU law raised, where the EU law at issue had already been interpreted by the Court of Justice or where that interpretation of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt of the national court. The Court of Justice further held that a national court or tribunal of last instance must give in all cases, specifically and concretely, the reasons why one of these exceptions applies when refusing to refer questions for a preliminary ruling. The Commission monitors structural deficits in the dialogue under Article 267 TFEU. As guardian of the Treaties, the Commission may initiate infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU for possible non-compliance with Article 267(3) TFEU when a Member State adopts legislation preventing proper judicial cooperation under that provision, or when evidence shows a systematic breach. 1 C-767/23 - Remling.”
Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
- 2026-04-28 “E-001137/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission On 18 March 2026 the Commission presented its proposal for the 28th regime corporate legal framework – ‘EU Inc.’ 1 . The Commission considers Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU as the appropriate legal basis for the proposed Regulation. The proposal approximates national laws governing the activities of EU businesses throughout their lifecycle. It will improve the functioning of the internal market by creating an efficient corporate legal framework for companies and investors, also facilitating the free movement of capital. For details on the choice of legal basis, please refer to section 2 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal. As regards the formation of EU incorporated (Inc.) companies through a centralised EU interface, any formation of an EU Inc. company will be subject to preventive control and a legality check. Effective coordination with national systems will be ensured, inter alia, through the EU central interface and the underlying Business Registers Interconnection System for making information about EU Inc. companies publicly available and for enabling the ‘once-only’ digital exchanges of information about EU Inc. companies between business registers and with other authorities. The proposal does not amend EU or national employment law. Rules protecting workers will fully apply to the EU Inc. companies. Recital 16 of the proposal recalls that Regulation (EC) 593/2008 2 also applies to individual employment relationships involving an EU Inc. company. Regarding other stakeholder interests, the proposal notably protects creditors through modern safeguards on distributions of company assets, including the requirement for balance sheet and solvency tests for such distributions. 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 28th regime corporate legal framework – ‘EU Inc.’, COM(2026) 321 final. 2 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I).”
Overall simplification of regulation in the EU · EU Single Market harmonisation
- 2026-04-27 “E-000970/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 1 aims to facilitate the free movement of citizens within the EU by abolishing legalisation or apostille requirements for certain public civil status documents, introducing multilingual standard forms and simplifying translation procedures. The Regulation is an important piece of legislation cutting red tape and costs for citizens, when they need to present in a Member State a public document issued in another Member State. The Commission monitors the correct application of EU legislation by Member States and may decide to take appropriate actions in cases showing a persistent failure by a Member State to apply EU law correctly. In the case of Regulation (EU) 2016/1191, there are no concrete indications of such infringements by Greece to the knowledge of the Commission. If evidence comes to light of a practice of Greek administrative or consular authorities demanding apostilles, certified translations or other additional paperwork in violation of the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 on a general and consistent basis, the Commission would, where appropriate, take the necessary steps. Citizens who encounter problems which are allegedly caused by the misapplication of the Regulation by Greece can file a complaint to the Commission providing details of the alleged breach. On this basis the Commission is able to examine the matter and contact Greece if needed. The Commission is not able to examine the alleged breach on the basis of a general statement but would need further details. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1191/oj/eng.”
EU political integration
- 2026-04-27 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 27.4.2026 Written question The award of EU funding is the outcome of a highly competitive and transparent process under which proposals submitted after open calls for proposals are evaluated based on pre-announced award criteria. The award criteria used for evaluating proposals under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme (CERV) [1] are relevance, quality and impact, and they have remained unchanged since the launch of the programme and are applied consistently to all applicants. The selection and award of proposals are under the direct responsibility of the Evaluation Committee made of European Education and Culture Executive Agency’s and Commission’s staff. The Committee may be assisted by independent external experts. Before starting their work, experts are thoroughly briefed on evaluation procedures, the award criteria of the relevant call for proposals and the terms of their contracts. The list of experts is published on the EU Funding and Tenders Portal [2] in the year following the evaluation, in line with the Financial Regulation [3] . All applicants are informed about the results of their proposal’s evaluation and provided with feedback that can serve to improve future applications. As for all the calls, applicants have the possibility to appeal the results of the evaluation. Unsuccessful applicants can apply for other funding opportunities under the CERV programme or, where relevant, other programmes such as Horizon Europe [4] or Erasmus+ [5] . Funding opportunities are published on the Funding and Tender portal [6] . [1] Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme (OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1); ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/692/oj. [2] https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/how-to-participate/reference-documents?programmePeriod=2021-2027&frameworkProgramme=43251447. [3] Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast); ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj. [4] Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe — the framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013 (Text with EEA relevance); ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/695/oj. [5] Regulation (EU) 2021/817 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 establishing Erasmus+: the Union Programme for education and training, youth and sport and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013 (Text with EEA relevance); ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/817/oj. [6] EU Funding and Tenders Portal https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home.”
Conditions to access EU budget · Regulation of NGOs in Europe
- 2026-04-24 “E-000619/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission In May 2023, the Commission adopted an anti-corruption package, including a Joint Communication 1 , a proposal for a Directive on combating corruption 2 and a proposal for a new sanctions’ regime targeting serious acts of corruption worldwide 3 . The Directive, on which provisional interinstitutional agreement was found on 2 December 2025, will replace the Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on combating corruption in the private sector 4 for those Member States to whom it applies, including provisions on jurisdiction as the Commission considered it necessary to ensure one legal, modernised act 5 . An overview of the transposition of the 2003 Council Framework Decision can be found on EUR-Lex 6 . The Commission has comprehensively assessed its transposition in a dedicated report 7 . At the time of publication of the report, 16 Member States 8 had decided not to apply certain rules on jurisdiction (when the offence has been committed by one of its nationals or committed for the benefit of a legal person with its head office in the territory of the Member State). In some Member States 9 a dual criminality requirement is foreseen, and may be subject to further conditions, such as a report submitted by the victim or the proceeding initiated by the prosecutor. The Commission has not identified additional notifications from Member States invoking the exemptions listed under Article 7(4) of the Decision. Once the Directive will have entered into force, Member States will have two years to transpose it into national law (for most provisions); and the Commission will closely monitor and follow-up to ensure a correct transposition. Regarding the proposal for a sanctions’ regime targeting serious acts of corruption worldwide, the Council has thus far not reached a consensus on it 10 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023JC0012. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023PC0234. 3 JOIN(2023) 13 final. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_framw/2003/568/oj/eng. 5 The European Parliament formally endorsed the provisional agreement in a plenary vote on 26 March 2026. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/NIM/?uri=CELEX:32003F0568. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52019DC0355. 8 Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Finland, Sweden. 9 Denmark, France, Finland. 10 However, several country-specific sanctions regimes (with regards to Lebanon, Guatemala, Moldova and Haiti) already allow targeting corruption and the Council has already adopted sanctions based on the relevant listing criteria.”
EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
- 2026-04-23 “P-001159/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is an independent body of the EU. Accordingly, the Commission does not comment on ongoing investigations or on matters relating to EPPO cases. It is for the EPPO to ensure the continuity of its investigations and the appropriate internal allocation of resources, including with regard to the case in question. The Commission is currently carrying out an evaluation of the EPPO Regulation 1 . This provides an opportunity to reflect on the functioning of the current framework, including the rules governing appointments of the European Prosecutors and whether any adjustments are necessary to further strengthen the selection procedures. 1 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’), OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, pp. 1–71.”
EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
- 2026-04-23 “E-000745/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Directive (EU) 2024/1760 will only enter into application in July 2029. Under the Directive, the Commission is not designated as a supervisory authority. Rather, it is for the Member States to designate independent national supervisory authorities (Article 24). These authorities will have investigative and enforcement powers (e.g. the imposition of penalties). They will be able to conduct investigations and inspections on their own initiative or based on complaints raising substantiated concerns, including in relation to conduct in third countries, in line with applicable national law and while respecting the limits of their jurisdiction. Under Article 29, Member States must also ensure that companies can be held liable for damage caused by a failure to comply with due diligence obligations. The Commission’s role is to support consistent application of the Directive, in particular through the European Network of Supervisory Authorities and guidance. These functions are complementary to, but distinct from, the supervisory and investigatory powers of national authorities. This does not, however, preclude the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), within wider external action, from engaging with countries and stakeholders, including through the institutional framework of the Multiparty Trade Agreement, the Trade Committee and the Trade and Sustainable Development Subcommittee. These might be additional ways to support supervisory authorities in their tasks after the Directive enters into application. In addition, the Commission may also build on existing EU tools, projects and other actions to help with the due diligence implementation in the EU and in third countries.”
EU policy on social & environmental impact of foreign investments · Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights)
- 2026-04-23 “E-000536/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) ‘Stop Destroying Video games’ was submitted to the Commission on 26 January 2026. On 23 February 2026, the Commission met with the ECI organisers to enable them to present the objectives of the initiative in detail, clarify its requests and provide further background information. By July 2026, the Commission will adopt a formal reply, in the form of a communication, setting out its conclusions on the initiative and the measures, if any, it intends to take. As regards the substantive issues raised by the ECI, the Commission refers to its previous reply to written question E-003581/2025. The ECI does not concern price differences for video games in the EU, and this matter is not being addressed by the Commission in the context of its reply to the ECI. EU consumer legislation, in particular, the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU 1 requires traders, including video game providers, to provide consumers with information about the total price of their offers but it does not regulate the level of prices. Copyright-protected services, such as video games, are not covered by the principle of non-discrimination under the Geoblocking Regulation (EU) 2018/302 2 . However, other rules in the Regulation, such as on blocking access to online interfaces or re-routing without the customer's prior consent as well as discrimination for reasons related to payment, apply. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/83/oj. 2 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/302/oj.”
Radio equipment (common charger) · EU rules on digital competition
- 2026-04-22 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 22.4.2026 Written question The complaint procedure referred to is still pending. The Commission cannot offer further details at this stage. Following the case law of the Court of Justice on Article 267 of t he Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union , national courts may refer questions regarding the interpretation of EU law to the Court of Justice and must do so if they are courts of last instance . However, courts of last instance are not required to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice in cases where the question posed is irrelevant, where the EU legislation has already been interpreted by the Court of Justice, or where the application of EU law is clear and leaves no room for reasonable doubt [1] . [1] See also judgment of 23 November 2001, C-564/19, IS, ECLI:EU:C:2021:949, p.61 and Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 24 March 2026 in Case C-767/23: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62023CJ0767&qid=1774375930787.”
Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts · Privacy & digital economy
- 2026-04-16 “E-000602/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not comment on individual cases. To protect journalists and human rights defenders from strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), the Commission adopted the Anti-SLAPP initiative on 27 April 2022, consisting of a Directive 1 for which Member States have a transposition deadline of 7 May 2026 and a Recommendation 2 which is implemented since its adoption. As announced by the European Democracy Shield 3 , the Commission will organise, in the coming months, a high-level event on combating SLAPPs to support the review of its antiSLAPP Recommendation. Moreover, adopted in September 2021, the Recommendation on the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists helps strengthen media freedom and media pluralism in the EU 4 . It aims to ensure safer working conditions for all media professionals, free from fear and intimidation, whether online or offline. It sets out concrete actions for Member States to take, including on better protection for journalists through strengthened cooperation with law enforcement authorities, as well as support mechanisms such as legal advice and psychological support. The European Democracy Shield foresees an update of the Recommendation on the safety of journalists. 1 Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj. 2 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’), OJ L 138, 17.5.2022, pp. 30–44, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2022/758/oj. 3 JOIN(2025) 791 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0791. 4 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union, OJ L 331, 20.9.2021, pp. 8– 20.”
Disinformation & online freedoms · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
- 2026-04-15 “E-000437/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The ECPS (European Centre for Populism Studies) is the beneficiary of one running grant for the implementation of the project Uncovering Neglected Truths and Outlining Legacies of Decolonization (UNTOLD Europe 1 ) awarded under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme (CERV) 2 . The funding earmarked for ECPS amounts to EUR 18 500. ECPS is a beneficiary of the grant for the completed project Unveiling emotional dimensions of politics to foster European democracy (ENCODE 3 ) awarded under the Horizon Europe programme 4 . Its share of funding amounts to EUR 269 125. The objectives of EU funding are defined in programmes such as the CERV Programme, which are adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. The programmes are implemented through work programmes approved by representatives of the Member States and open calls for proposals. Proposals are evaluated, based on pre-announced selection and award criteria along the rules and principles set in the Financial Regulation 5 . The award of a grant is the outcome of a highly competitive process at the end of which the highest ranked proposals that best align with the objectives of the programmes are selected for funding. The Commission is fully in line with all the transparency requirements as they were written by the co-legislators. Information about the beneficiaries of funding is published on the Financial and Transparency System and project related information is published on the Funding and Tenders portal 6 . The Commission refers to its replies to the Special Report 35/2018 of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) 7 . The Commission accepted three out of 1 Further details on the project are publicly available on the EU Funding & Tenders Portal https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projectsdetails/43251589/101196163/CERV?order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=10&sortBy=es_SortDate&keyw ords=101196163&frameworkProgramme=43251589. 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme (OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1); ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/692/oj. 3 Further details on the project are publicly available on the EU Funding & Tenders Portal https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projectsdetails/43108390/101132698/HORIZON?order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=10&sortBy=es_SortDate&k eywords=101132698. 4 Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/695/oj. 5 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast) ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj. 6 EU Funding & Tenders Portal https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projectsresults?order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=10&sortBy=es_SortDate. 7 https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_35/SR_NGO_FUNDING_EN.pdf., pp. 38-48.”
Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
- 2026-04-13 “P-000936/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission proposal for a Regulation on the 28 th regime corporate legal framework – ‘EU Inc.’ 1 , adopted on 18 March 2026, concerns corporate law. It does not affect EU or national employment laws. These laws will apply to EU Inc. companies as they apply to any other limited liability company in the EU. For instance, the rules protecting workers will fully apply. This includes rules stemming from national and EU laws, including on wages, working time, working conditions, health and safety, equal opportunities for women and men, protection against discrimination, and dismissal protection. This also includes employees’ rights to information, consultation and participation in company boards (co-determination). In the same way, the EU Inc. proposal will not affect any existing EU or national rules or safeguards related to tax avoidance or evasion or the circumvention of labour rules. In addition, the Commission proposal provides that the formation of an EU Inc. should be subject to preventive control and to specific safeguards such as authentication and rules related to disqualified directors. Moreover, the extension of the ‘once-only’ principle, i.e. the direct sharing at national level of relevant company information contained in business register with tax authorities, social security authorities and the beneficial ownership register, will ensure consistency and legal certainty and will further contribute to preventing fraud and abuse. 1 COM(2026) 321 final.”
Overall simplification of regulation in the EU · EU Single Market harmonisation
- 2026-04-10 “E-000327/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission monitors rule-of-law developments in all Member States, including Greece, through its annual Rule of Law Report. In the 2025 edition, it highlighted that the length of court proceedings still raises serious challenges and, although initial signals from the implementation of recent reforms are encouraging, it is still early to assess results 1 . Under the European Semester, the Commission noted that Greece’s prolonged civil, criminal and administrative proceedings—among the EU’s longest—create significant backlogs, hindering economic growth, business formation and investment. Following a recommendation of the Commission, the Council issued a recommendation to Greece to address this 2 . The Commission remains committed to support the Greek authorities in improving the efficiency of its justice system, using all the tools and instruments at its disposal, including the European Semester and the Rule of Law Report process. Greece’s recovery and resilience plan includes measures to enhance justice quality and efficiency 3 , including digital transformation of justice, training of judges, large infrastructure projects in court buildings and enhancement of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/f2eb4e57-317a-4be4-8baab667c9f801d9_en?filename=12_1_63944_coun_chap_greece_en.pdf. 2 OJ C, C/2025/3982, 20.8.2025. 3 Council of the European Union (2021), Council Implementing Decision of 13 July 2021 on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Greece with Annex, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10152-2021-ADD-1/en/pdf.”
EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
- 2026-04-09 “E-000359/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) 1 prohibits misleading advertising that gives false information or in any way, including overall presentation, deceives the average consumer causing them to take a transactional decision that the average consumer would not have taken otherwise. In particular, the Directive prohibits misleading claims as regards the existence of a specific price advantage 2 . It has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all the circumstances, whether online advertising of price promotions is unfair when only the smallest or largest size of the respective product is available at the advertised price. Member States’ competent bodies are responsible for the enforcement of the UCPD. The compliance of price marketing with consumer law is regularly addressed by the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Network, 3 e.g. in its ongoing coordinated actions regarding Temu 4 and Shein 5 . It has also been addressed in the CPC Network’s periodic website screenings (‘sweeps’), i.e. a set of checks carried out on websites simultaneously to identify breaches of EU consumer law in a particular sector 6 . 1 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, pp. 22–39. 2 Article 6(1)(d) of the Directive. 3 In order to protect consumers when shopping across national borders, Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 established a network of competent public enforcers to tackle these issues in a coordinated manner: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32004R2006. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5707. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1331. 6 https://commission.europa.eu/live-work-travel-eu/consumer-rights-and-complaints/enforcement-consumerprotection/sweeps_en, including, for example, a specific focus on online discounts in 2022.”
Geo-blocking
- 2026-04-08 “E-000680/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The creation of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience was announced in the Joint Communication on the European Democracy Shield (EDS) 1 , after extensive consultations with Member States, EU institutions, as well as the public. The European Parliament and its Special Committee on the EDS significantly contributed to the design of the EDS and the Centre. The Centre, its framework and responsibilities, is being set up in close consultation with Member States. As outlined in the European Democracy Shield, its aim is to offer a framework to strengthen coordination and information sharing between EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and Member States, building on existing networks and structures, such as the Rapid Alert System. This is done in full respect of the allocation of competences provided for in the Treaties and the independence of existing structures at national and EU level. Participation is voluntary. The Centre is not an EU institutional oversight body, nor will it have decisionmaking powers. The Commission will continue to engage with the European Parliament, notably the Special Committee on the EDS, as it is progressing with the setting up of the Centre and the implementation of the measures announced in the EDS. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025JC0791.”
EU political integration · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
- 2026-04-08 “E-000387/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union lays down the right for EU citizens to move to another Member State for the purpose of employment and be treated in an equal way for that purpose as the nationals of that Member State. The Court of Justice has defined a ‘worker’ as a person who undertakes genuine and effective work for which he or she is paid under the direction of someone else, to the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary 1 . As ‘marginal and ancillary’ is not defined in EU law, the assessment is to be done on a case-bycase basis by the national authorities. It cannot be ruled out that an activity may be considered to be real and genuine, independently of the limited remuneration and the number of hours 2 . The conditions for legal residence of EU citizens in another Member State are found in Directive 2004/38/EC 3 . One way of qualifying for residence longer than three months is to be a worker, as defined by the Court in the above-mentioned case law. EU citizens who do not meet the residence conditions set out in Directive 2004/38/EC are not entitled to benefit from equal treatment with nationals of the host Member State under Article 24(1) of that Directive, including when it comes to access to social assistance. In addition, Member States may expel from their territory EU citizens who no longer satisfy the requirements for a right of residence. In such a case, the relevant safeguards of the Directive apply. The Commission is not aware of a systematic failure to correctly apply the relevant EU legislation by Germany. The Commission cannot comment on individual situations, which are for national courts to review. Moreover, the Commission has not proposed any legislative changes to the underlying legal framework at EU level. 1 C-138/02, Collins, ECLI:EU:C:2004:172, paragraph 26; C-456/02, Trojani, ECLI:EU:C:2004:488, paragraph 15 or C-46/12, LN, ECLI:EU:C:2013:97, paragraphs 40-42. 2 C-14/09, Genc, ECLI:EU:C:2010:57, paragraph 26. 3 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, pp. 77).”
EU competences on social policies · EU regulation of cross-border and posted workers
- 2026-04-01 “P-000903/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Any processing of personal data, including in the context of AI development, must comply with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 12 . Such processing must be based on one of the six lawful grounds for processing 3 . It is the obligation of the controller to select the most appropriate ground 4 . The controller must also meet all other GDPR requirements, including regarding transparency and processing of special categories of personal data 5 . As regards the alleged transfer of personal data to Kenya, any international transfer must comply with the specific rules under the GDPR 6 . The enforcement of the rules of the GDPR in individual cases, such as the case at hand, lies with the national data protection authorities and courts. The Commission has proposed targeted amendments of the GDPR 7 . They enhance legal clarity, cut unnecessary administrative burden for operators and data protection authorities and contribute to a more consistent application of the GDPR which also benefits data subjects. The Commission considers that the amendments comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 8 and that no additional fundamental rights assessment is required beyond what is already set out in the accompanying Commission Staff Working Document 9 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88. 2 European Data Protection Board, Opinion 28/2024 on certain data protection aspects related to the processing of personal data in the context of AI models. 3 Article 6(1) GDPR. 4 Article 5(2) GDPR. 5 Article 13, Article 14 GDPR and Article 9(2) GDPR. 6 In particular, Chapter V GDPR. This can be done, for example, by putting in place a transfer instrument (such as a contract) that provides for appropriate data protection safeguards and enforceable rights for individuals (Article 46 GDPR). Companies using such a transfer instrument must, in accordance with the Schrems II judgment of the Court of Justice, assess whether they can ensure a level of protection that is essentially equivalent to that in the EU, including in light of possible conflicting laws in the third country (e.g.on government access to data). 7 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2016/679, (EU) 2018/1724, (EU) 2018/1725, (EU) 2023/2854 and Directives 2002/58/EC, (EU) 2022/2555 and (EU) 2022/2557 as regards the simplification of the digital legislative framework, and repealing Regulations (EU) 2018/1807, (EU) 2019/1150, (EU) 2022/868, and Directive (EU) 2019/1024 (Digital Omnibus), COM/2025/837 final. 8 Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. 9 See also Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Commission’s Proposal, SWD (2025) 836 final, section 1.2.”
GDPR · Artificial Intelligence · International data transfers
- 2026-03-27 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 27.3.2026 Written question As the Commission noted in its replies to written questions E-004182/2025 and E-004689/2025, the Political Advertising Regulation [1] does not ban political advertising, nor does it require providers of online platforms to do so. Providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) must identify, analyse and assess systemic risk under Article 34(1)(c) of the Digital Services Act [2] (DSA) on a case-by-case basis. The Commission is monitoring the implications of the relevant companies’ decisions also in light of the Election Guidelines [3] issued by the Commission in April 2024, which recommend concrete measures for the providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs to reduce risks to civic discourse and electoral processes. Article 39 of the DSA applies notwithstanding the removal of political advertising library initiatives previously offered by the providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs. These were voluntary practices which predated the DSA. The advertising repositories mandated by Article 39 of the DSA allow the research community and civil society organisations to identify advertisements including political advertisements disseminated in Member States on VLOPs and VLOSEs during the entire period they are presented and for one year after the advertisement was presented for the last time. [1] Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng. [2] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. [3] Communication from the Commission, Commission Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes pursuant to Article 35(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024XC03014&qid=1714466886277.”
EU rules on digital competition · Digital advertising
- 2026-03-27 “E-000655/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission must carry out its assessment in full compliance with EU law and on the basis of all relevant legal and factual elements. Given the complexity of the file and the involvement of multiple actors in the analysis, it is not possible at this stage to indicate a concrete deadline for the completion of the examination in this matter or possible follow-up measures. The Commission will decide on the appropriate follow-up once its examination has been completed.”
Rule of law in Malta
- 2026-03-24 “P-00783/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The issuance of identity cards is a responsibility of the Member States. Member States are not required to report statistics on the number of identity cards in circulation whose validity is affected by the phasing-out deadline laid down in Article 5(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2025/1208. As a result, the Commission does not have statistics on this point. The Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2025/1208 by unanimity on 12 June 2025. The phasing-out periods for identity cards laid down in Article 5 of that Regulation were also supported by the European Parliament 1 . In view of the clear position of the legislator, the Commission does not envisage proposing an extension of the deadline laid down in Article 5(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2025/1208. However, the Commission is in contact with Italy and Greece, two Member States whose identity cards are (partially) affected by the deadline laid down in Article 5(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2025/1208. 1 European Parliament legislative resolution of 2 April 2025 on the proposal for a Council regulation on strengthening the security of identity cards of Union citizens and of residence documents issued to Union citizens and their family members exercising their right of free movement (COM(2024)0316 – C10-0112/2024 – 2024/0187(CNS).”
Electronic identity
- 2026-03-23 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 23.3.2026 Written question The Commission is aware of the December 2025 ruling from Poland's Constitutional Tribunal banning the Communist Party of Poland. The Commission is committed to protect and promote EU values and fundamental rights enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), including its Article 10 on the right to freedom of thought and conscience, within the remit of its competences. According to its Article 51 (1), the Charter applies to EU bodies or to Member States only when they are implementing EU law. Based on the information available, it does not appear that the matter raised by the Honourable Member is linked to the implementation of EU law. The Commission has no general powers to intervene in the registration of national political parties and national electoral matters. It is for the national competent authorities in each Member State to follow up on matters relating to the applicable regulations.”
EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
- 2026-03-18 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 18.3.2026 Written question The Commission understands that the Honourable Member refers to situation where EU consumers buy goods from non-EU online shops and are requested by the courier firms, that manage the delivery of such goods, to pay VAT and customs duties. Directive 2011/83/EU [1] requires traders (including non-EU traders which target EU consumers) to inform consumers, before concluding the contract, about the total price of the goods inclusive of taxes and fees or, if such charges cannot reasonably be calculated in advance, the fact that they may be payable. Consumers do not have to bear additional charges of which they have not been informed. The directive also provides consumers with the right of withdrawal from online purchases (subject to specific exceptions), without providing any reasons. The consumer can exercise that right also before the delivery and refuse taking physical possession of the goods. Furthermore , Directive 2005/29/EC [2] , which applies also to delivery firms, prohibits misleading and aggressive commercial practices towards consumers. EU consumer protection rules are transposed in national laws and Member States’ competent bodies deal with individual complaints. The Commission is not aware of complaints regarding the problem raised by the Honourable Member. Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 [3] enables national authorities to alert and assist each on suspected consumer law breaches. Comprehensive information on the calculation of customs fees and VAT, and on how this information is communicated to parcel recipients in the EU, is available online [4] . [1] The Consumer Rights Directive — Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, pp. 64-88. [2] The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive — Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, pp. 22-39. [3] Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 OJ L 345, 27.12.2017, pp. 1-26. [4] https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/buying-goods-online-coming-non-european-union-country_en.”
EU restrictions on unfair commercial practices · EU competences on consumer protection and product standards
- 2026-03-17 “E-000340/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission NextGenerationEU is a temporary instrument (2021–2026) established to support the European Union’s economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis and to emerge stronger and more resilient from it. It consists mainly of loans and grants provided to Member States through the Recovery and Resilience Facility. Information about the instrument, the recipient countries and the funded projects can be found on the NextGenerationEU web site 1 , the Recovery and Resilience Facility page 2 and the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard 3 . Under the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, funding is provided through EU programmes adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in accordance with the applicable legislative procedures. Depending on the implementation mode, EU programmes are implemented through Commission work programmes and open calls in direct management, or through national and regional programmes under shared management. All the information about the programmes, the work programmes, the calls for proposals, and their objectives are published on the Funding and Tender Portal 4 . Information about the funded projects, abstracts, achievements of the projects and deliverables are published on the same site. 1 https://next-generation-eu.europa.eu/index_en. 2 https://reforms-investments.ec.europa.eu/recovery-and-resilience-facility-1_en. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/recovery-and-resilience-scoreboard/. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home.”
Accounting and auditing of EU budget
- 2026-03-17 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 17.3.2026 Written question The processing of personal data requires a lawful ground under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). [1] Consent is only one of the six lawful grounds for processing. [2] It is the obligation of the controller to select the most appropriate ground. [3] If the conducted activity involves storing or accessing information stored in the users’ terminal equipment such activity must also comply with the e-Privacy Directive which requires user’s consent, subject to limited exceptions. [4] That consent must comply with the GDPR. The enforcement of the rules of the GDPR and the e-Privacy Directive in individual cases, such as the case at hand, lies with the national supervisory authorities and courts. The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) [5] , which starts to apply in full in December 2027, introduces mandatory cybersecurity requirements for manufacturers of products with digital elements, which may also cover browser extensions. Accordingly, manufacturers must follow a security-by-design approach. Amongst others, the products must protect the integrity of stored, transmitted or otherwise processed data, personal or not. The Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) [6] includes rules on high-risk AI systems which may apply depending on the intended use of the chatbot. The rules provide for risk management and cybersecurity requirements appropriate to the risks. Providers must therefore implement security controls, which may include securing the interface of the AI system when communicating with the browser extension. Requirements for high-risk AI systems should start to apply by August 2026, however, the Digital Omnibus on AI [7] proposes to postpone that deadline until standards and relevant tools are available to ensure a clear compliance pathway for providers. [1] Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1-88. [2] Article 6(1) GDPR. [3] Article 5(2) GDPR. [4] Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37. [5] Regulation (EU) 2024/2847. [6] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act). [7] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2024/1689 and (EU) 2018/1139 as regards the simplification of the implementation of harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Digital Omnibus on AI).”
GDPR · Artificial Intelligence
- 2026-03-16 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 16.3.2026 Written question Before awarding EU funding, the Commission carries out a rigorous selection process on grant beneficiaries based on objective criteria, such as the exclusion criteria or the EU restrictive measures. The revised Financial Regulation [1] introduced an explicit ground for excluding entities from receiving EU funds if they have engaged in incitement to hatred or violence. EU funded projects are then closely monitored to ensure that they are implemented according to the grant agreement which requires that beneficiaries must respect EU values also during the implementation. Measures such as the termination of the grant can be taken in cases of fraud, irregularities, substantial errors or serious breach of contractual obligations, including the violation of EU values. Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law [2] , referred to by the Honourable Member, defines the criminal offence of public incitement to violence or hatred against a group or a member of such group defined by reference to a number of criteria, including religion. It also requires Member States to ensure that the racist and xenophobic motive of crimes, including those based on religion, is considered an aggravating circumstance or is otherwise taken into account when determining the penalty. It remains however a national competence to investigate or prosecute cases of alleged hate offences, including those targeting Christians and those arising in the context of cultural or digital publications. [1] Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024. [2] Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, pp. 55-58.”
Disinformation & online freedoms
- 2026-03-12 “P-000438/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The proposed amendments of the General Data Protection Regulation 1 (GDPR) enhance legal clarity, cut unnecessary administrative burden for operators and data protection authorities and contribute to a more consistent application of the GDPR which also benefits data subjects. The Commission considers that the amendments comply with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 2 and there is not a need for an additional fundamental rights assessment beyond what is already presented in the accompanying Commission Staff Working Document 3 . As the Commission previously replied, cross-system profiling is prohibited under the specific legal instruments, and these instruments are not affected by the proposed amendments 4 . For example, the European Digital Identity Regulation 5 limits the personal data processing to what is necessary for the provision of the wallet services and provides for privacy preserving techniques to ensure unlinkability, thereby effectively prohibiting profiling across systems. The Commission will continue supporting the co-legislators in their discussion on this proposal. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation). 2 Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. 3 See also Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Commission’s Proposal, SWD (2025) 836 final, Section 1.2. 4 Reply to written question E-004566/2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025004566-ASW_EN.html; reply to written question P-004565/2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-004565-ASW_EN.html. 5 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.”
Privacy & digital economy
- 2026-03-12 “E-000014/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission As enshrined in Articles 2 and 10 of the Treaty on European Union, democracy is a founding value on which the EU is built. The Commission, together with all other EU institutions and the Member States, is responsible under the Treaties for promoting the founding values of the EU, including democracy. Free and fair elections are at the core of democracy. The conduct and organisation of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their constitutional and legislative rules, subject to EU law and their international obligations. For elections to the European Parliament, certain common principles are set out in the European Electoral Act 1 , in line with Article 223(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Political Advertising Regulation 2 and the Digital Services Act 3 have been adopted on the basis of Article 114 and Article 16 TFEU, and Article 114 TFEU respectively, in full respect of the allocation of competences between the EU and Member States. They do not regulate elections. Instead, they establish common standards within the internal market for ensuring the transparency of political advertising and, respectively, for ensuring that online platforms and search engines put in place measures to mitigate risks related to negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes. The Commission is fully committed and actively engaged to help Member States in their efforts to ensure the fairness and integrity of elections, including by supporting the application of this legislation. The Council 4 also stressed the importance of maximising the use of EU tools, including the Political Advertising Regulation and the Digital Services Act, to safeguard free and fair elections in the EU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A41976X1008%2801%29&qid=1746537901793. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 4 Council conclusions on democratic resilience: safeguarding electoral processes from foreign interference approved on 21 May 2024 (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10119-2024-INIT/en/pdf).”
EU political integration · Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
- 2026-03-09 “E-003649/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Anti-SLAPP (Strategic lawsuit against public participation) Directive 1 and Recommendation 2 provide a solid toolbox of safeguards and measures to fight against SLAPPs in the EU and to protect persons who engage in public participation. In accordance with Article 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which is the EU legal basis allowing the EU to take measures in this area, the Directive covers SLAPPs with crossborder implications. With a view to expand protection to other cases of SLAPP, the Commission Recommendation has called on all Member States to ensure that their applicable framework provides for the necessary safeguards also in domestic cases. The implementation of these two instruments is a priority for the Commission. The Directive is currently being transposed by Member States with a transposition deadline on 7 May 2026, after which the Commission will verify and ensure that Member States have complied with their obligations. The Commission closely monitors and assists Member States, including Greece, in the transposition process to guarantee effective implementation. Measures to follow-up on the implementation of the Recommendation started immediately after its adoption and the Commission is working with all Member States, including Greece, to this end 3 . 1 Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’). 2 C/2022/2428 final. 3 A first overview of the information received by the Commission from Member States has been issued at the end of 2024, see SWD(2024) 292 final.”
Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Disinformation & online freedoms
- 2026-03-03 “P-000108/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not comment on ongoing investigations. Member State authorities are responsible for the investigation and prosecution of corruption offences and the enforcement of other rules mentioned by the Honourable Member, such as those concerning electoral campaign finance. This must be done according to the Member State’s constitutional and legislative rules, subject to EU law and its international obligations. Strengthening the rule of law and the fight against corruption are key priorities for the Commission. The annual Rule of Law Report is a key tool enabling the Commission to monitor developments in all Member States, including their anti-corruption framework, through active dialogue with the national authorities. The Report includes concrete recommendations to all Member States, including Cyprus, helping them identify what improvements are needed. The Directive on combatting corruption 1 , which is expected to enter into force in the first half of 2026, will greatly facilitate the investigation and prosecution of corruption offences in and across Member States. It will also help strengthen Member States’ preventive and integrity measures. As announced in the European Democracy Shield 2 , the Commission will further support common work with the Member States on the transparency and integrity of funding in politics 3 , looking at issues of common interest such as anonymous donations and cryptocurrency. 1 COM(2023) 234 final https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023PC0234. 2 JOIN(2025) 791 final https://commission.europa.eu/document/2539eb53-9485-4199-bfdc-97166893ff45_en. 3 This will notably rely on the work to support the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, the Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament, the proposed Directive on combating corruption COM(2023)234 final, EU anti-money laundering and other relevant EU rules.”
Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass) · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
- 2026-03-03 “P-000315/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission In its e-Commerce Communication 1 , the Commission outlined a comprehensive approach to addressing challenges posed by e-commerce imports, relying on several legislative frameworks and policy initiatives. The General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR) 2 requires providers of online marketplaces to design interfaces enabling traders to provide and display required product safety and traceability information for each product offered, including EU responsible person details where applicable. National market surveillance authorities (MSAs) ensure trader compliance and accuracy of this information. With Commission coordination, the Consumer Safety Network carried out in 2025 the first product safety sweep 3 of online offers of childcare articles. MSAs also verified whether listings contained the required EU responsible person information and found this missing in 32% of the verified listings. The findings were used to support enforcement and were communicated to online marketplaces providers to improve their compliance. The upcoming revision of the New Legislative Framework 4 and the Market Surveillance Regulation 5 under the European Product Act aim to close regulatory loopholes notably for online sales, ensure manufacturer traceability and the existence of an EU-established economic operator responsible for compliance of products, while strengthening market surveillance capacity and cooperation. Under the Digital Services Act 6 online marketplaces must comply with due diligence obligations on trader traceability, compliance by design and the right to information. Online marketplaces are however not liable when acting as intermediaries. 1 A comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable e-commerce, COM(2025) 37 final. 2 Regulation 2023/988 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 on general product safety (OJ L 135, 23.5.2023, pp. 1–51). 3 https://ec.europa.eu/safety-gate/#/screen/pages/SafetyProductsOnlineSweeps. 4 Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, pp. 30–47). 5 Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on market surveillance and compliance of products (OJ L 169, 25.6.2019, pp. 1–44). 6 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1).”
Liability for online marketplaces
- 2026-02-20 “E-000002/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Financial Support to Third Parties provided for in the Financial Regulation 1 allows, if expressly foreseen in the grant agreement, the beneficiaries to provide financial support to entities that are not part to the grant agreement. This is possible if done in line with the provisions of the Financial Regulation. The DigiRise project does not foresee this possibility to redistribute funding. The DigiRise project is funded through an action grant, whereby funding is provided to implement the project described in the agreement. The costs of implementing the action are set out in a budget that is part of the grant agreement. The grant is paid to the beneficiaries only if the action is implemented in line with the agreement, if the foreseen activities are implemented and the deliverables approved by the Commission. Funding cannot be used for other purposes that the ones listed in the grant agreement. The general objective of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) 2 funding programme adopted by the EU Member States in the Council and by the European Parliament is to protect and promote rights and values as enshrined in the Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Funding is provided in full transparency and in line with the Financial Regulation after a highly competitive process following open calls published on the Funding and Tender portal. Proposals are evaluated against award criteria such as quality and relevance in order to make sure that they implement the objectives of the funding programme. 1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast) ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj. 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/692/oj.”
Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
- 2026-02-19 “E-000005/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of cases relating to the implementation of Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of EU law 1 being brought to the attention of the Committee on Petitions of the European Parliament. The Commission opened infringement proceedings against Ireland 2 on 27 January 2022 for failure to notify transposition measures for the Directive. Following these proceedings, Ireland notified the relevant measures to the Commission. After assessing these measures and confirming they ensure the complete transposition of the Directive’s requirements, the Commission decided on 16 November 2023 to close the infringement proceedings against Ireland. The Commission is monitoring the correct implementation of the Directive in all Member States, including Ireland. The Commission monitors the situation in the Member States and aims to follow up on systemic issues involving the application of EU law. It is for the national authorities, including national courts, to analyse individual cases in light of the national legal framework providing for whistleblower protection, and to ensure that citizens' rights under EU law are protected. 1 Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law, 26.11.2019, OJ L 305, p. 17–56 2 INFR(2022)0098, see specific webpage on infringements https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/searchinfringementdecisions/?lang_code=en&langCode=EN&version=v1&typeOfSearch=byDecision&refId=INFR(2022)0098&dg =JUST&policyArea=JUST-123&memberState=IE&page=1&size=10&order=desc&sortColumns=decisionDate.”
Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU engagement with citizens
- 2026-02-17 “P-000206/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) obliges Member States to provide for exemptions or derogations from Chapter VI (independent supervisory authorities) if they are necessary to reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the freedom of expression and information. In such cases, Member States must, in any event, fulfil the requirements laid down for ‘a control by an independent authority’ under Article 8(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 1 . They are essentially the same as those in Article 52 GDPR, notably the authority tasked with the supervision must act objectively and impartially, free from external influence, and be structurally capable of exercising its functions independently. According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the processing for ‘journalistic purposes’, as referred to in Article 85(2) GDPR, refers to situations where the sole purpose of publication is to disclose information, opinions or ideas to the public. Any processing for other purposes, such as administrative or technical purposes, must be carried out in compliance with all the requirements set for supervision under Chapter VI of the GDPR. The Commission has collected information from the Member States on the application of Article 85 GDPR and the topic has been discussed in several meeting of the Member States’ experts group on the GDPR and the Data Protection Law Enforcement Directive 2 . The overview of Member States’ legislation is available in the Register of Commission expert groups. 3 The Commission is also following the application of Article 85 in the context of its general monitoring of the application of the GDPR. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/680/oj/eng. 3 Register of expert groups https://commission.europa.eu/about/service-standards-andprinciples/transparency/register-expert-groups_en.”
GDPR
- 2026-02-10 “E-004717/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The European Democracy Shield is designed in full respect of the allocation of competences between the EU and its Member States. It stresses that Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) and disinformation campaigns are often enabled by manipulation techniques, like AI-generated content or AI-driven amplification. The EU has a strong regulatory framework to address these challenges, including the AI Act 1 and the Digital Services Act 2 . In addition, the Regulation on political advertising 3 provides that political advertising must be clearly labelled and include information on who paid for it and whether targeting or ad-delivery techniques have been used. Building on this framework, the European Democracy Shield sets out further measures, including work with signatories of the Code of Conduct on Disinformation 4 to improve the detection and labelling of AI-generated and manipulated content on social media. Furthermore, the Commission announced guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes. The European Centre for Democratic Resilience will provide a framework for cooperation and coordination among participating Member States and EU institutions and bodies, in full respect of the allocation of competences. Under the European Democracy Shield, support to free and independent media and media pluralism is a priority, building on the EU regulatory and policy framework. To further support the viability of the media sector, the Commission will assess ways to strengthen the prominence of media services of general interest and modernise advertising rules as part of the evaluation and upcoming review of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 5 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence, OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024. 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services, OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, pp. 1–102. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj). 4 https://disinfocode.eu/the-code. 5 Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities, OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, pp. 69–92.”
EU political integration · Disinformation & online freedoms
- 2026-02-03 “E-004689/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission cannot comment on the presented case, which falls under the responsibility of the national competent authority. Indeed, national competent authorities, including data protection ones, are primarily responsible for supervising and enforcing the Political Advertising Regulation 1 . A dedicated network of contact points has been established for cooperation at EU level among Member States and with the Commission on all aspects of the Regulation. To support the effective implementation of the Regulation, on 8 October 2025, the Commission published guidelines 2 with practical guidance and detailed explanations on scope of the definition of political ads, transparency and accountability rules and obligations for the different actors involved in political advertising. According to the Regulation, content subject to editorial responsibility shall generally not be considered political advertising 3 , while a message by, for or on behalf of a political actor constitutes a political advertisement, unless it is of a purely private or purely commercial nature 4 . The Regulation further clarifies that an entity directly or indirectly related to the sphere of activity of a political party also qualifies as a political actor. The Commission will continue to support and monitor the application of the rules, together with the network of contact points and with the support of a dedicated expert group, and provide additional guidance where relevant. The Commission will also organise an implementation dialogue in 2026 to draw insights from the application of the rules. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 provides common transparency standards for political ads and addresses the targeting and ad-delivery of online political ads relying on the processing of personal data, upholding the fundamental right to data protection - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C_202505514. 3 Article 1(2) of the Regulation. 4 Article 3(2), point a) of the Regulation.”
Disinformation & online freedoms · Transparency requirements for interest groups
- 2026-01-30 “E-003793/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges the importance of the video games industry as an innovative and dynamic sector of the EU economy. The Commission has long been supporting the sector through several funding programmes such as Horizon Europe or Creative Europe and under the proposed AgoraEU. The Commission remains committed to boost the competitiveness of the sector and will also adopt an EU Strategy for video games this year. The Commission is aware that the preparation of the Key Principles on In-Game Virtual Currencies 1 , developed by the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network, involved consultation with stakeholders, including video game industry and consumer organisations, over the past few years. The upcoming Digital Fairness Act (DFA) will address identified consumer protection gaps in the digital sphere 2 , without duplicating matters addressed by digital legislation. It will also include a simplification element. Regarding video games, the DFA impact assessment will examine whether further action is needed to address specific unfair commercial practices. The protection of minors from harmful functionalities will be a transversal priority of the DFA. In addition, the Digital Services Act (DSA) 3 created a harmonised EU-wide framework for intermediaries that protects users’ fundamental rights and promotes a competitive European digital ecosystem. Notably Article 28 of the DSA requires online platforms accessible to minors to provide the highest levels of privacy, safety, and security for minors on their services. The recent Guidelines on the Protection of Minors 4 provide the Commission’s perspective on how online platforms should comply with their obligations under that provision. 1 CPC network is composed of national authorities responsible for enforcing EU consumer law. The principles are available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/8af13e88-6540-436c-b1379853e7fe866a_en?filename=Key%20principles%20on%20in-game%20virtual%20currencies.pdf. 2 See Commission Staff Working Document ‘Fitness Check of EU consumer law on digital fairness’ of 3.10.2024, SWD(2024) 230 final. 3 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022. 4 Available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/commission-publishes-guidelines-protectionminors.”
Safety features & content control for child protection online · EU rules on digital competition
- 2026-01-29 “E-004384/2025 Answer given by Commissioner McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Political Advertising Regulation 1 does not ban political advertising, nor does it regulate its content or impose general monitoring obligations on online platforms. These new rules ensure a level playing field, online and offline, help to protect the integrity of electoral processes and support an open democratic debate. On 8 October 2025, the Commission published Guidelines 2 to support the Regulation implementation. They offer guidance for sponsors and providers of political advertising services, including civil society actors and online platforms. The decisions of some online platforms to discontinue political advertising services in the EU are commercial decisions. The Commission is in contact with stakeholders and Member States to monitor and support the application of the Regulation and will organise an implementation dialogue in 2026 to draw insights from its application. A new stakeholder Expert Group will help monitoring the application of the Regulation. The Commission also announced a revision of the EU public procurement Directives for the second quarter of 2026. As part of this revision, the Commission intends to assess to what extent the definition of contracting authority can be clarified. To prepare this revision, the Commission intends to carry out an impact assessment to ensure that any proposed measure achieves its intended objectives, including simplification. As both the impact assessment and a preparatory open public consultation on policy options are ongoing, the Commission is not in a position at this stage to commit to any possible aspect of its forthcoming proposals. The Commission recently adopted the EU Strategy for Civil Society 3 which aims to further support and empower civil society actors. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng. 2 C(2025) 6829 final — Communication from the Commission — Guidelines to support the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising. 3 COM(2025) 790 final – Communication from the Commission – EU Strategy for Civil Society.”
Disinformation & online freedoms · EU engagement with civil society
- 2026-01-26 “E-004490/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission With regard to the application of the Victims’ Rights Directive 1 and the EU funding opportunities in the area of victims’ rights, the Commission wishes to refer the Honourable Member to the response it had provided to parliamentary question E-003059/2025 2 . There is currently no additional update. Furthermore, the EU Policy Framework on Transitional Justice was designed to guide EU support to third countries emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule, and it does not operate as an internal legal instrument within the EU. Nonetheless, the same victim-centred principles that underlie the Policy Framework – such as truth, justice and reparation – also inform the EU’s approach to victims’ rights inside the EU, notably through, the Victims’ Rights Directive, interpreted in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as through the EU Strategy on Victims’ Rights (2020 – 2025). 1 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57. 2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html.”
EU policy on victims' compensation rights · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
- 2026-01-26 “E-004492/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission As already indicated in the reply to parliamentary question E-001695/2024 and E002766/2024, which also related to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, the European arrest warrant is an entirely judicial procedure between the judicial authorities in the Member States based on the particular circumstances of each individual case where surrender is requested. Neither the Commission nor the Member States’ governments can interfere with or influence the decisions taken by judicial authorities. As the Honourable Members know, on 3 December 2025 the Council presidency and the European Parliament’s representatives reached a provisional agreement on the Commission’s proposal for a regulation to phase out imports of Russian natural gas. The regulation constitutes a central element of the EU's REPowerEU roadmap to end dependency on Russian energy following Russia's weaponisation of gas supplies with significant effects on the European energy market.”
EU-Ukraine relations · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2026-01-23 “E-004229/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Member States may restrict the freedom of movement of EU citizens on grounds of public policy or public security, including by adopting expulsion measures. In particular, it is within the competence of the Member States to apply public policy and public security measures to prevent violence and hooliganism at sports events. Such measures must respect the substantive and procedural safeguards set out in the Free Movement Directive 2004/38/EC 1 . The Commission does not have evidence of a general practice by the Netherlands consisting of adopting expulsion measures without respecting the above-mentioned requirements. As regards the individual measure at hand, it is for the competent national courts to establish the facts and assess whether the national authorities correctly applied EU law. The Netherlands has reintroduced border control at internal borders under Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code, enabling it to carry out entry and exit checks. However, this reintroduction does not affect the rights of EU citizens under Directive 2004/38/EC, who can enter and exit a Member State upon production of a valid passport or identity card and provided they do not constitute a danger to public policy or public security. The Commission works closely with Member States to monitor and promote the correct application of EU free movement law and the Schengen acquis, including by providing guidance 2 and fostering cooperation and exchange of best practices between Member States in dedicated fora 3 . 1 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, pp. 77–123. 2 See, for example, Commission Notice – Guidance on the right of free movement of EU citizens and their families, http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1392/oj. 3 For example, in the expert group on the right to free movement of persons, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expert-groups/consult?lang=en&groupID=2397.”
Asylum & border control