Loucas FOURLAS

Policy topics Loucas FOURLAS is active on

What Loucas FOURLAS has said (80)

• 2026-07-08 “(11:01:44 - 11:02:55): Thank you very much, president, commissioner. I come from a country in which heat waves are a daily event. In last year, we had over 10,000, hectares burned by, wildfires. In my country, we have an information system system for wildfires, and they have seen a, extreme increase in, the surface areas birds. We have, record numbers around Europe. We have many resources around European territory ready to react where necessary. We want to know whether there's a plan for how to, distribute those. Could you tell us? We fully, support the permanent, presence of this, service in Cyprus because it's a very vulnerable area. We think we're going in the right way, and we need to continue to strengthen this effort. We”
  EU policy on infrastructure for preventing climate-related disasters (floods, droughts, extreme weather etc.)
• 2026-03-20 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question The Commission will continue monitoring the evolution of the crisis and assessing its potential impacts across a range of plausible scenarios. While there are no immediate concerns for the EU’s security of supply, oil and gas prices, particularly for refined products like diesel and jet fuel, face significant price volatility. To address the impacts of the disruption of oil and gas transit, the Commission has put forward on 22 April 2026 its new initiative AccelerateEU [1] , proposing timely, targeted and temporary measures to bring relief to consumers, while avoiding fragmented national responses. This includes a set of concrete measures to save and protect consumers and promote immediate energy savings, alongside structural reforms. By scaling up homegrown, clean energy and improving energy efficiency, electrification, flexibility and interconnectivity, Europe will reduce fossil fuel imports and become more resilient. The Commission’s response includes measures for coordinated energy interventions, such as in the areas of gas storage filling, oil stock releases, scenario analysis and sharing of best practices. The Energy Union Task Force, the Oil Coordination Group, the Gas Coordination Group and other platforms will support such coordination. Among others, the Commission will also propose legislative action on network charges, taxation and carbon costs to further support lowering energy bills. [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/accelerateeu-strengthen-eu-energy-resilience_en.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Fossil fuels
• 2026-03-20 “Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 10.6.2026 Written question In the short term, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz are unlikely to lead to shortages of fertilisers in the EU, notably due to limited direct import exposure and the existence of sufficient levels of commercial stocks. However, they have contributed to increased global price volatility for fertilisers and other inputs that will affect prices in the EU. The Commission is closely monitoring the fertiliser markets through the Fertiliser Market Observatory [1] , which met on 21 May 2026 to discuss recent developments. During the meeting, participants confirmed that fertiliser availability is currently not affected. To relieve pressure, the Commission adopted the Middle East temporary state aid Framework to support farmers and energy intensive industries [2] . In addition, imports of ammonia, urea and other nitrogen fertilisers will benefit from tariff suspension, within given quotas, for a period of one year. On 19 May 2026, the Commission adopted the Fertiliser Action Plan [3] to diversify import sources, reinforce EU production capacity and reduce dependencies on imported energy and feedstocks. Short term actions include the mobilisation and possible top up of the agricultural reserve, reinforced liquidity support under the CAP and flexibility for advance payments. Longer term measures focus on supporting low carbon and bio-based fertilisers, promoting circular and recycled nutrients, and supporting nutrient use efficiency, precision farming to reduce farmers’ exposure to fertiliser price volatility and production costs over time. [1] https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/markets/overviews/market-observatories/fertilisers_en. [2] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_26_894/IP_26_894_EN.pdf [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_1099.”
  Use of fertilisers
• 2026-03-18 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 1.6.2026 Written question The Commission is very attentive to the impact of external conflicts and geopolitical events on EU’s internal security and is closely monitoring the evolution of the terrorist and extremist threat stemming from the conflict in the Middle East, relying on threat assessments produced by the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre and analysis from the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). While the terrorist threat was already high in the EU, Europol has reported a heightened security threat since the beginning of the conflict in Iran, that is duly taken into account. According to the Treaties, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State [1] . The Commission is not competent for the cooperation between national security services. ProtectEU [2] , the European Internal Security Strategy of April 2025, encourages enhanced intelligence-sharing at EU level through the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity, to improve EU-wide situational awareness and support informed policy work at EU level. Under the umbrella of ProtectEU, the Commission adopted on 26 February 2026 a new Agenda to prevent and combat terrorism [3] that sets out a comprehensive strategic framework. It fully takes into account the importance of the external dimension and proposes specific measures to tackle the spillover effects of geopolitical developments on the EU’s terrorism threat landscape. In parallel, the initiatives foreseen under the action plan [4] of the Pact for the Mediterranean will strengthen regional-level security cooperation with partner countries, as well as contribute to establishing new cooperation channels and hence increase situational awareness and operational preparedness in the EU and the Member States. [1] Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union. [2] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy; COM/2025/148 final. [3] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions ProtectEU: Agenda to prevent and counter terrorism; COM/2026/101 final. [4] https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-presents-first-action-plan-under-pact-mediterranean-2026-04-17_en.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2026-03-18 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 7.5.2026 Written question At this stage, the situation in Iran has not led to increased migratory flows towards the EU. The situation remains highly volatile. The Commission is closely monitoring developments in coordination with Member States, EU agencies, partner countries, international organisations and the European External Action Service, notably through the EU Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint Network [1] . This supports situational awareness, forecasting and early warning, enabling better anticipation and preparedness. Member States are responsible for contingency planning across different areas of border and migration management, enabling them to respond to a range of possible scenarios. At EU level, this is complemented by coordination and support measures, including the readiness of EU agencies to provide operational and technical assistance, and flexible EU funding, including emergency support where necessary. In the context of preparations for the Pact on Migration and Asylum [2] , the Commission is supporting Member States in ensuring a well-prepared migration management system by June 2026, including coordinated crisis response. As reaffirmed by leaders during the 19-20 March 2026 European Council, the EU is ready to mobilise its diplomatic, legal, operational and financial tools to prevent uncontrolled migratory movements to the EU and preserve security in Europe. [1] Commission Recommendation (EU) 2020/1366 of 23 September 2020 on an EU mechanism for preparedness and management of crises related to migration, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2020/1366/oj/eng. [2] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2026-01-28 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 21.5.2026 Written question There are serious doubts about a number of elements in the charter of the Board of Peace related to its scope, its governance and its compatibility with the UN Charter. The EU is ready to work together with the US on the implementation of the comprehensive Peace Plan for Gaza, with the Board of Peace carrying out its mission as a transitional administration, in accordance with the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2803 (2025) [1] . The EU welcomed the adoption of the UNSC resolution 2803, which refers to the Board of Peace, and it has called on all parties to implement the Resolution in its entirety. The EU has been clear about the readiness to work together with partners on the implementation of the comprehensive Peace Plan for Gaza in accordance with UNSC resolution 2803. In relation to the third question, the Commission does not take a position in this regard. [1] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4093207?v=pdf.”
  EU-US relations · Support for international humanitarian organisations
• 2026-01-21 “E-000233/2026 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission Under the national Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Strategic Plans, beekeepers can benefit from specific apiculture support with an annual EU budget of EUR 60 million, which is at least doubled with national co-financing to support measures aimed at strengthening the sector in response to challenges including climate change. These include training and advisory services to adopt climate resilient practices, investments and actions to prevent damage caused by adverse weather and to adapt to climate change, restocking of beehives and bee breeding as well as cooperation for research. Under the Cypriot CAP Strategic Plan 2023-2027 1 , over EUR 1.69 million (public expenditure) have been earmarked to support beekeepers through targeted interventions for apiculture. In addition, rural development interventions in the plan can also support farmers, including beekeepers, for investments to mitigate the impact of events or restore productive potential from natural disasters. To enhance transparency and address honey adulteration, the Commission has strengthened official controls through coordinated actions, reinforced import requirements (including authenticity attestations 2 and listing of authorised establishments 3 ), and enhanced traceability rules. Following the 2024 revision of the Honey Directive 4 , the Commission will adopt – by 14 June 2028 – implementing acts laying down analytical methods to detect honey adulteration, and – by 14 June 2029 – delegated acts on methods and criteria to determine the place where honey has been harvested and Union-wide traceability requirements. All these measures aim to create fair conditions for EU producers. 1 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/cap-my-country/cap-strategic-plans/cyprus_en. 2 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/36 of 11 January 2022 amending Annex III to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2235 as regards model certificates for the entry into the Union of consignments of certain live aquatic animals and products of animal origin. C/2022/18 OJ L 8, 13.1.2022, p. 36–91 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2022/36/oj. 3 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/2652 of 15 September 2023 amending and correcting Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2292. OJ L, 2023/2652, 28.11.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2023/2652/oj. 4 Directive (EU) 2024/1438 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 amending Council Directives 2001/110/EC relating to honey, OJ L, 2024/1438, 24.5.202: https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1438/oj/eng.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU · Agricultural funding
• 2026-01-19 “E-000194/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission can clarify that the total funding available under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation 1 is set at EUR 150 billion, as outlined in Article 6 of the Regulation. The Regulation does not foresee an ex ante distribution key among Member States for the financial assistance being provided to them. The Commission launched a call for expression of interest, requesting Member States to provide for an indicative loan amount based on their own assessment of risks, needs and other pertinent criteria. 2. The tentative allocation of financial assistance was based on the requests from the Member States and respecting the caveat of the Regulation in Article 13. The Member States submitted their requests for financial assistance before 30 November 2025. When submitting the proposals for Council Implementing Decisions on financial assistance to Member States, the Commission considers existing and expected financing needs of the requesting Member State as expressed in the requests for financial assistance, applying, in accordance with Article 8(5), the principles of equal treatment, solidarity, proportionality and transparency. 3. The Commission establishes guidance and procedures for all stages of the implementation of the instrument (assessment of the plans, assessments of requests for payments, amendments) that guarantee the proportionality of the controls and equal treatment of the Member States. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2026-01-12 “E-000069/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission shares the assessment made in the 2025 Report on payment fraud 1 regarding the need for more effective redress mechanisms available to users for the costs of payment fraud, which continue to be largely borne by users. The data in the report confirm the importance of strong customer authentication (SCA), with overall lower fraud rates in transactions where SCA is applied. The Commission shares the expectation expressed in the report that additional safety measures such as VoP 2 , which became mandatory 3 for all credit transfers in euro in October 2025, will further reduce fraud. The Commission’s proposal for a Payment Services Regulation (PSR) 4 included measures to improve the application of SCA and extend the application of VoP to all credit transfers in any currency in the EU. It also proposed a new refund right for consumers where they fall victim to fraudsters pretending to be payment service providers (PSPs) 5 and an obligation for providers of communication services to cooperate with PSPs to prevent spoofing fraud. In November 2025, co-legislators provisionally agreed to strengthen the refund rights of users, including where security credentials are fraudulently obtained, or where PSPs do not block suspicious payments. The provisional agreement, which remains subject to final approval by co-legislators, would also attribute secondary liability to intermediaries such as online platforms towards PSPs, subject to conditions, where the content they store gives rise to fraudulent transactions. Provided the provisional agreement is approved by the co-legislators, with fraud prevention and redress rules set out in a regulation, a more harmonized application is expected under the PSR compared to the current framework 6 . 1 EBA/REP/2025/40 2025 Report on Payment Fraud, European Banking Authority and European Central Bank; available here: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/intro/publications/pdf/ecb.ebaecb202512.en.pdf. 2 Verification of payee, or service ensuring the verification of the payee. 3 Pursuant to Article 5c of Regulation (EU) 2024/886 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 amending Regulations (EU) No 260/2012 and (EU) 2021/1230 and Directives 98/26/EC and (EU) 2015/2366 as regards instant credit transfers in euro. 4 COM/2023/367 final. 5 In November 2025, co-legislators provisionally agreed to include this new refund right in the Payment Services Regulation. Under the current Directive (EU) 2015/2366 (PSD2), payers are protected from losses resulting from unauthorized payment transactions. Subject to confirmation of the provisional agreement by the co-legislators, the new refund right would extent the protection of consumers to cases where a consumer is deceived into authorizing one or several payment transactions by a third-party impersonating the consumer’s payment service provider. 6 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35).”
  Financial regulation · Anti-money laundering regulation
• 2026-01-12 “E-000079/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has reacted swiftly, strongly and in a united fashion to this unprecedented violence. On 9 January 2026, on behalf of the EU27, the High Representative/Vice-President firmly condemned 1 the use of violence, arbitrary detention, and intimidation tactics by security forces, and expressed the solidarity with the Iranian people. The Foreign Affairs Council on 29 January 2026 reached the political agreement 2 to list the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation, sending a strong political message that there can be no impunity for the brutality which with peaceful demonstrations have been suppressed. The EU has also imposed new restrictive measures on several individuals and entities directly involved in the repression and the internet censoring, among them the Minister of Interior and several members of the IRGC. With those listings, more than 290 individuals and entities directly involved in human right violations in Iran are now listed under the dedicated Iran human rights regime. The Council also imposed restrictive measures on four persons and six entities under the EU sanctions regime related to Iran’s military supports to Russia’s war of aggression, with a specific focus on the Iranian state-sponsored programme for the development and production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The EU is ready to continue to send strong and clear messages to Iran, including, if necessary, through additional targeted sanctions. There will be zero tolerance for abuses and violations of human rights by the Iranian authorities. At the same time, open channels with Iran should also remain part of the toolbox, to safeguard critical EU interests. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/01/09/iran-statement-by-the-hr-on-behalf-of-theeu-on-the-situation-in-the-country/. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2026/01/29/.”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2026-01-12 “E-000064/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU will continue to insist that international law and the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter must be fully upheld in all cases and under all circumstances. The Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland have the full support of the EU. Greenland belongs to its people and it is solely for Denmark and Greenland to decide on matters concerning their future. This reflects the EU firm commitment to the principles of international law, territorial integrity and national sovereignty, which are essential for Europe and for the international community as a whole. These principles will continue to inform and guide the EU action. The EU will continue to stand up for its interests and will defend itself, its Member States, its citizens and its companies, against any form of coercion. It has the power and the tools to do so and will do so if and when necessary.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU-US relations
• 2026-01-12 “E-000061/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has repeatedly made clear that it recognises only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law, in accordance with the respective United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 1 . It has also actively expressed its concerns to the members of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), at all levels, and continues to call upon OTS members to refrain from actions that might imply the recognition of the so-called, internationally not recognised, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The EU remains fully committed to ensuring that the UNSC resolutions and generally recognised principles and norms of international law, particularly with respect to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, are fully upheld. In this context, the EU recalls the commitment of the Central Asian partners to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states within the framework of all international and regional fora, and to refrain from taking any steps that run contrary to those principles. The EU also recalls the reaffirmation of the strong commitment of the Central Asian partners to the relevant UNSC resolutions 541(1983) 2 and 550(1984) 3 . Respect of these international principles remain essential to the enhancement of EU-Central Asia relations 4 . 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/cyprus-statement-spokesperson-observer-status-turkish-cypriot-secessionistentity-organisation_en. 2 https://unscr.com/en/resolutions/541/. 3 https://unscr.com/en/resolutions/550/. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/04/04/joint-declaration-following-the-firsteuropean-union-central-asia-summit/.”
  EU policy on Central Asia · EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-01-12 “Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 14.4.2026 Written question The Commission attaches great importance to support competitiveness of farmers. It closely monitors the market and income developments in the EU agricultural sector. Besides, the Commission set up the Agri-Food Chain Observatory to improve the transparency in price formation and margins along the value chain. On 7 January 2026, together with the Cypriot Presidency, the Commission convened an extraordinary meeting of EU ministers of agriculture to discuss the situation following the farmers protest [1] . The outcome document lays out several concrete actions. The Commission recognises the strategic importance of agriculture by ensuring its continued support from the EU budget, with a budget of EUR 300 billion dedicated exclusively to farming, while providing Member States with the possibility to use additional resources to top up this secured allocation from non-ringfenced National and Regional Partnership funds [2] . To ensure affordability and availability of fertilisers, the Commission has adopted the temporary suspension of Most Favoured Nation tariffs, lowering of the mark-up for Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism from 30% to 1% and announced an Action Plan on Fertilisers for more medium-term solutions. The Commission also announced a ‘health check’ of the agricultural markets to identify their key challenges as well as opportunities for their further development. Simplification is a key objective of this Commission mandate. The Commission presented the Omnibus III proposal on the common agricultural policy with potential cost savings of up to EUR 1.6 billion annually for farmers [3] , which is in force since December 2025. Further measures have been proposed for the organic legislation [4] and in the Food and Feed Omnibus [5] . An implementation dialogue on the challenges of implementing environmental legislation was held on 18 February 2026 and feed reflections on possible solutions to the challenges identified. The Commission is pursuing a stronger alignment of standards for products imported into the EU. It has established the principle that the most hazardous pesticides are not allowed back to the EU, which has been already deployed in the case of three active substances, carbendazim, benomyl and thiophanate-methyl, and analysis is under way to inform future cases. The Commission has also announced reinforced import controls. The number of audits carried out on non-EU countries are increased by 50%, and those carried out on EU Border Control Posts are increased by 33% in 2026-27. [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/read_26_50. [2] This includes the ringfenced allocation of EUR 293.7 billion and the Unity Safety Net of EUR 6.3 billion (both in the NRPP proposal). Additionally, the President of the Commission proposed in letters to the co-legislators sent on 09.11.2025 and 06.01.2026 a rural target introduced on the non-ringfenced budget equivalent to EUR 48,7 billion and the use of a frontloading amount of EUR 45 billion that can be immediately mobilised to support farmers from the amount that would normally be available for the midterm review. [3] Regulation (EU) 2025/2649 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2025 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 as regards the conditionality system, types of intervention in the form of direct payment, types of intervention in certain sectors and rural development and annual performance reports and Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 as regards suspensions of payments, annual performance clearance and controls and penalties — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202502649&qid=1767605831627. [4] https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/media/news/organic-rulebook-fit-future-2025-12-17_en. [5] https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal-topics/simplification-legislation_en.”
  EU policy on farmer–buyer relations in the agri-food supply chain · Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1)
• 2026-01-12 “E-000080/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s foreign policy is firmly anchored in international law, including the UN Charter. National sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of borders are non-negotiable principles, and should be applied consistently and universally. This approach is guided by the same rules-based order the EU upholds globally, whether in Europe or beyond. Greenland is an autonomous territory in the Kingdom of Denmark. Decisions about the future of Greenland are for Greenlanders and Danes to decide. They are essential not only for the EU, but for nations around the world and EU will keep defending them. Even more if the territorial integrity of a Member State is questioned. The EU has shown impact and resolve through a strong and united European position in defending our values and interests, in support to Denmark and Greenland. Dialogue remains essential. The establishment of the high-level working group between the United States, Greenland and Denmark was a positive move away from threats and towards the negotiating table. Guided by the universal values and principles embedded in the UN Charter and international law, the EU remains the best defender of the rule of law throughout the world, including international law. This is reflected in much of its actions at multilateral level, including in various UN fora, but also through specific public statements when these rules are violated. Furthermore, the primacy of international law is also raised in many high-level bilateral engagements and dialogues.”
  EU foreign policy approach · EU-US relations
• 2026-01-12 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 4.6.2026 Written question The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. Türkiye is expected to respect international law, good neighbourly relations and the sovereignty of Member States. Türkiye is expected to actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including their external aspects, and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the acquis. Türkiye also needs to fulfil its obligation to ensure full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey Association Agreement [1] . The Commission follows a phased, proportionate and reversible approach to energise key areas of cooperation with Türkiye, in line with the Joint Communication of 29 November 2023 [2] and the April 2024 European Council conclusions [3] . Türkiye’s own constructive engagement will be instrumental in advancing cooperation across all relevant areas. Resumption of and progress in the Cyprus settlement talks is of particular importance in this context. [1] Additional Protocol of 23 November 1970, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:21970A1123(01)&from=EN. [2] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-political-economic-and-trade-relations-0_en. [3] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-01-12 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 7.4.2026 Written question The Commission adopted the first-ever European Affordable Housing Plan (EAHP) [1] on 16 December 2025. This Plan is accompanied by an analysis [2] that assesses the severity of the housing situation in the EU. The analysis reveals, for instance, that purchasing a home has become progressively more challenging over the past decade and that the rental market is characterised by a widening gap between new market rents and existing ones, with significant regional variations. The EAHP includes actions and tools — including on financing — that the Commission has or intends to put forward as well as ones the Commission encourages Member States, regions and local authorities to implement to strengthen affordable and social housing. These actions are for instance the development of a new pan-European investment platform; mobilising new investments in housing under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) and new opportunities to scale up housing investments under the next MFF; exploring voluntary, market-led investment framework for affordable and social housing; and providing guidance to Member States to assist them in designing financial and legal solutions to support social and affordable housing. Furthermore, on 16 December 2025, the Commission adopted revised EU State aid rules [3] that will make it easier for Member States to financially support affordable and social housing. As announced in the EAHP, the Commission will present in 2026 an analysis of housing price dynamics, including available evidence of speculation patterns, data gaps and economic consequences . Where needed, the Commission will propose follow-up actions, in full respect of the subsidiarity principle. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC1025. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025SC1053. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/2630/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on social policies · EU housing policy
• 2025-10-27 “E-004215/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Member States had to apply the national measures transposing Directive (EU) 2020/1828 1 as of 25 June 2023. To date, four Member States (Bulgaria, Spain, France, and Luxembourg 2 ) have not yet fully communicated measures transposing the Directive into national law. Pursuant to Article 4(7) of the Directive, Member States may designate public bodies as qualified entities for the purpose of bringing representative actions. 17 Member States made use of this regulatory choice: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, and Sweden. Among these, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Croatia, Italy, Lithuania, Finland, and Sweden have designated as qualified entities, for the purpose of bringing cross-border representative actions, public bodies who are at the same time competent authorities under Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 3 . The list of qualified entities designated to bring cross-border actions is publicly available on the Commission webpage 4 . Concerning the record of representative actions brought before national courts, in accordance with Article 23(2) of the Directive, Member States are expected to notify the Commission of the representative actions concluded before any courts or administrative authorities for the first time by 26 June 2027 and annually thereafter. Considering the foregoing, the Commission does not dispose yet of an exhaustive list of ongoing and concluded representative actions across the EU jurisdictions. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/consumer-protection-law/representative-actions-directive_en; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2020.409.01.0001.01.ENG. 2 Luxembourg is expected to notify relevant measures following the recent adoption of the transposing law on 30 October 2025: https://gouvernement.lu/fr/actualites/toutes_actualites/communiques/2025/10-octobre/30consommateurs-recours-collectif.html. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2394/oj/eng. 4 https://representative-actions-collaboration.ec.europa.eu/cross-border-qualified-entities.”
  EU competences on consumer protection and product standards
• 2025-10-27 “E-004216/2025 Answer given by Mr Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. Recognising the challenges Cyprus faces due to its insularity and remoteness, an additional total amount of EUR 200 million have been allocated to Cyprus for the 2021–2027 programming period from Cohesion policy funding, as per Annex XXVI, paragraph 21 and 22 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 1 . Furthermore, the Commission will soon launch a call for evidence to prepare an EU-wide strategy covering islands and coastal communities. 2. Under the Thalia 2021–2027 Programme, Cohesion Policy provides EUR 969 million 2 , out of which EUR 147 million for research, innovation and digitalisation, EUR 357 million for the green transition, and EUR 97 million from the Just Transition Fund to speed up the energy transition and reinforce energy security. The programme also supports e-health actions to strengthen the national health system. Under the Connecting Europe Facility, the Commission also supports the Great Sea Interconnector, both politically and financially, with a EUR 657 million grant. In addition, to safeguard the connectivity of isolated regions and islands, Member States may impose Public Service Obligations (PSOs) 3 on air routes, when the market alone fails to provide adequate air services 4 . Cyprus has imposed such a PSO on the Larnaca-Brussels air route from 1 December 2025 5 . Under State aid rules, the Commission has approved targeted measures to support Cyprus’ connectivity, such as a route development scheme for airlines in 2022 67 . Finally, the Commission’s Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines 8 allow targeted support for airports in isolated areas facing structural disadvantages. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 547–548. 2 EU contribution. 3 Setting fixed standards of continuity, regularity, pricing or minimum capacity. 4 Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008, OJ L 293, 31.10.2008, p. 3–20. 5 See information notice (C/2025/1995) published in the EU Official Journal on 28 March 2025. 6 See State aid case SA.101311 of 18 February 2022 (https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202211/SA_101311_60D6637F-0000-C98B-8E815CFC2B20A612_33_1.pdf). 7 Established under Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 8 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines, OJ C 99, 4.4.2014, pp. 3–34.”
  Funding for OCTs and outermost regions
• 2025-09-25 “E-003724/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission In full respect of the distribution of competences between the Member States and the EU, the Commission has adopted a comprehensive strategy to address the challenges posed by demographic change. A wide range of policy options are outlined in the Demography Toolbox Communication 1 . It includes adaptation measures on the labour market, social infrastructure, health systems and long-term care provision, intergenerational fairness and territorial cohesion, along the four pillars of supporting parents, empowering youth, older people and where it is necessary attracting talent from outside the EU. The Demography Toolbox contains initiatives, tools and funding opportunities that can help create favourable conditions for people to pursue their life and family aspirations. The Commission is keen to promote an EU-wide dialogue and exchange on demographic issues, in line with the Commission President’s political guidelines and the relevant mission letter 2 . 1 Communication ‘Demographic change in Europe: a toolbox for action’ https://commission.europa.eu/publications/communication-demographic-change-europe-toolbox-action_en. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/24039223-f92e-40a0-a440-a27d9715051a_en.”
  EU competences on demographic policy · Support for families · EU strategy on population growth
• 2025-09-25 “E-003723/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The amended Anti-Trafficking Directive 1 has to be transposed into national laws by 15 July 2026. The Anti-Trafficking Directive obliges Member States to criminalise new forms of exploitation, provides reinforced tools for public authorities to investigate and prosecute trafficking offences and significantly strengthens the victim assistance measures. The Commission supports Member States in the implementation by organising transposition workshops and facilitates exchanges of best practices through the EU Network of National Anti-Trafficking Coordinators and Rapporteurs. In addition, the Commission established the EU Anti-trafficking Hub on 5 June 2025, which amongst others helps to implement the Directive and the EU Strategy combating trafficking in human beings 2 . Furthermore, trafficking in human beings remains a primary crime area under the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats in 2026-2027, ensuring strong multi-agency law enforcement cooperation in the EU against the trafficking of human beings. Stronger support of the victims will be achieved by the establishment of formal referral mechanisms in Member States, as well as single national focal points for cross border referrals. Through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 3 , the Commission supports national and cross-border initiatives aimed at enhancing the identification, assistance and integration of trafficking victims. Moreover, victims of trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation will also benefit from the measures of support and protection laid out in the Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence, which is to be transposed by June 2027 4 . 1 Directive (EU) 2024/1712 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims (OJ L, 2024/1712, 24.6.2024). 2 COM/2021/171 final. 3 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/funding/asylum-migration-and-integration-funds/asylum-migration-andintegration-fund-2021-2027_en. 4 Directive (EU) 2024/1385 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on combating violence against women and domestic violence (OJ L, 2024/1385, 24.5.2024).”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · EU policy on criminal justice
• 2025-09-22 “E-003655/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The principles of the rule of law and human rights are integral elements of the EU-Azerbaijan bilateral relations, as enshrined in the EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 1 . The EU has repeatedly expressed concern, both bilaterally and in public, about the shrinking space for civil society and the increasing number of arrests of independent journalists, human rights defenders and political activists. These developments were also raised by the High Representative/Vice-President during a visit to Azerbaijan in April 2025 and during other contacts with the Azerbaijani authorities. The EU continues to urge the Azerbaijani authorities to uphold obligations under domestic and international law, and to release all those imprisoned for exercising fundamental rights. It is of great importance that Azerbaijan ensures the right to a fair trial and adequate detention conditions, in line with its international commitments. All allegations of mistreatment need to be investigated transparently. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A01999A0917%2801%29-20091101.”
  EU-Azerbaijan relations
• 2025-09-22 “E-003653/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Commission Notice Guidance on Independent Living 1 aims to support Member States’ progress in developing the conditions for independent living and to apply good practices in deinstitutionalisation processes, in compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Through mainstreaming a disability perspective, the Commission also seeks to ensure that the rights of persons with disabilities are respected in all its policies and internal regulatory framework. The EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 set the ambition for the Commission to lead by example. In this spirit, the Commission has included in its 2022 Human Resources strategy actions to boost the recruitment, effective employment and career perspectives of staff members with disabilities and to create inclusive work environments. The Joint Sickness Insurance Scheme (JSIS) provides comprehensive health insurance for all staff members, including those with disabilities or with dependent family members. For the latter, the applicable coverage depends on their individual circumstances, notably whether they are primarily insured under JSIS or through a national health insurance system. The Commission is analysing possible improvements in the area of long-term care, in the context of the forthcoming revision of the General Implementing Provisions (GIPs) of the JSIS. Payments by the JSIS should not be seen in isolation: staff members with a disability or their dependent family members can also benefit from financial support beyond medical expenses linked to a disability, such as receiving a double dependent child allowance, financial support for special schooling, or benefitting from reasonable accommodations. 1 https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-adopts-guidance-independent-living-personsdisabilities-2024-11-20_en”
  EU policy on disability inclusion & accessibility
• 2025-09-22 “E-003656/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Strengthening external border control is one of the priorities of the Commission. In the Political Guidelines 2024-2029 1 , the President of the Commission announced plans to strengthen Frontex to ensure it can protect the external borders under all circumstances, emphasising that there should be zero tolerance for the rise of hybrid and other security threats. The Commission intends to present a proposal to amend the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation 2 , which outlines the mandate and operational rules of Frontex, in the third quarter of 2026. The proposal will be accompanied by an impact assessment. Currently, the Commission is conducting consultations 3 on this important initiative. The state of play related to this proposal has been presented twice 4 in the European Parliament’s Schengen and Borders Scrutiny Working Group. The Communication of the Commission on countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of migration and strengthening security at the EU’s external borders provides an overview of the main available measures against this kind of hybrid threats and previous action taken at EU level 5 . In addition, as part of the Pact on Migration and Asylum adopted in May 2024, the Regulation addressing situations of crisis and force majeure 6 which will apply from 1 July 2026 provides a framework for responding to situations of instrumentalisation. The revised Schengen Borders Code 7 also explicitly recognises that instrumentalisation may justify the temporary closure or limitation of opening hours at specified border crossing points, when circumstances require. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf. 2 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14640-European-Border-and-CoastGuard-update-of-EU-rules/public-consultation_en. 4 24 April and 16 October 2025. 5 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of migration and strengthening security at the EU’s external borders, COM/2024/570 final. 6 Regulation (EU) 2024/1359. 7 Regulation (EU) 2024/1717.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-09-22 “E-003654/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The new Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation 1 defines a series of actions to accelerate the use of more reusable and fully recyclable packaging and to reduce packaging waste generation with concrete measures. The Regulation establishes reuse targets for transport packaging and beverage containers by 2030 and obligations for the take-away sector to offer reusable packaging, thus reducing waste generation. To improve sorting and collection of waste for recycling, harmonised waste sorting labels will be required by 2028. ‘Design for recycling’ criteria will incentivise packaging manufacturers to design their packaging in a way that increases recycling. These measures will reverse the current trend of consistently increasing quantities of packaging waste. It will tackle the low levels of reuse and improve high quality recycling in the EU. Small and medium-sized enterprises are vital for the transition to a circular economy. The Regulation provides targeted exemptions for micro-enterprises to minimise their adaptation costs. The harmonised rules will boost demand for sustainable packaging helping start-ups to scale up their production in new circular materials, packaging formats or systems. 1 Regulation (EU) 2025/40 of 19 December 2024 on packaging and packaging waste, OJ L, 2025/40, 22.1.2025.”
  Sustainable packaging · Circular economy
• 2025-09-05 “E-003435/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The EU welcomes the ceasefire in Gaza as a crucial first step towards alleviating the suffering of the people. Although EU humanitarian partners are scaling up their assistance and reopening essential services, the humanitarian situation in Gaza continues to be dire and of a deep concern for the EU. Under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), civilians must have unimpeded access to aid and the basic services essential for their survival. While some aid is entering in Gaza, more needs to get in. The Commission has consistently called on Israel to allow unimpeded access and sustained distribution of humanitarian assistance into and throughout Gaza, and to fully comply with its obligations under international law, including IHL 1 . The Commission will continue to provide humanitarian aid, prioritising life-saving assistance, protection, and access to essential services. EU humanitarian aid is delivered according to the humanitarian principles of humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality. On 24 September 2025, the Commission announced an additional EUR 50 million in emergency humanitarian aid to support partners on the ground to deliver life-saving assistance both in Gaza and the West Bank 2 . This brings the 2025 humanitarian allocation to Palestine * to nearly EUR 220 million, and to over EUR 550 million since 2023. While humanitarian aid addresses the immediate needs, the EU is also engaged diplomatically for a sustained ceasefire, to promote de-escalation, adherence to international law, and a longterm solution to the conflict. Humanitarian work goes hand-in-hand with the EU’s broader efforts for peace and stability in the region. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-position-situation-middle-east. 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-provides-additional-eu50-millionemergency-humanitarian-aid-palestine-2025-09-24_en. * This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-09-05 “E-003445/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Decade Policy Programme is the Union’s monitoring framework for the EU’s digital transformation, and thanks to the deployment of funding programmes such as Digital Europe Programme (DEP) 1 , Connecting Europe Facility 2 , Horizon Europe and the Recovery and Resilience Facility 3 the EU has achieved significant milestones. For instance, under DEP, a network of supercomputers 4 has been deployed and Digital Innovation Hubs 5 have been established. Moreover, testing and experimentation facilities 6 and AI factories 7 have been set up to support the uptake of digital technologies by small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). Building on the Competitiveness Compass, the Economic Security Strategy, and responding to insights of the Draghi, Niinistö, and Letta reports, the Commission is committed to advancing the EU’s tech sovereignty and competitiveness with initiatives such as the AI Continent Action Plan, the Quantum Europe Strategy, the upcoming Cloud and AI Development Act, the Chips Act 2.0 and Quantum Act. In line with the Protect EU Strategy 8 , the Commission looks at the Information and Communication Technology supply chains security to avoid and de-risk critical dependencies. The Startup and Scaleup Strategy 9 aims to boost EU’s ecosystem for tech-driven companies, focusing on innovation-friendly regulation, access to finance, talent, and infrastructure. The Lab to Unicorn Initiative of the Startup and Scaleup Strategy will support leading European startup and scaleup hubs rooted in strong university ecosystems. Moreover, the proposed Horizon Europe 10 fosters university-industry collaboration, strengthens innovation in SMEs and research centres, and through a streamlined approach with the European Competitiveness Fund, it covers the continuum from research to market. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/digital-europe-programme_en. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/activities/cef-digital. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en. 4 https://www.eurohpc-ju.europa.eu/jupiter-launching-europes-exascale-era-2025-09-05_en. 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/edihs. 6 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/testing-and-experimentation-facilities. 7 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-factories. 8 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-presents-protecteu-internal-security-strategy-2025-04-01_en. 9 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/strategy-research-and-innovation/jobs-and-economy/eustartup-and-scaleup-strategy_en. 10 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/horizon-europe-20282034-twice-bigger-simpler-faster-and-more-impactful-2025-07-16_en.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty · EU industrial funding · EU research funding
• 2025-09-05 “E-003452/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 1 prohibits traders’ commercial practices that mislead consumers and requires traders to provide consumers with the information that they need to make informed purchasing decisions. Commercial claims such as ‘last room available at this price’ or ‘only one ticket remaining at this price’ could be qualified as unfair commercial practices and prohibited if they are incorrect and likely to lead average consumers to taking transactional decisions they would not have taken otherwise, based on a case-bycase assessment. The Commission does not have direct enforcement powers to address EU consumer law infringements. This responsibility lies with national consumer protection authorities (CPC authorities 2 ) and courts. The Commission coordinated the work of CPC authorities in the CPC actions against Airbnb, Booking, and Expedia in 2019 and 2020 resulting in the companies improving information on their price and room availability. Since then, CPC authorities have been monitoring the sector 3 . Following the results of the Fitness Check 4 , the Commission has started working on a Digital Fairness Act to strengthen consumer protection regarding, amongst others, commercial practices related to manipulative interface design. The ongoing Impact Assessment will explore the need for more specific and stricter consumer protection rules to facilitate enforcement against unfair commercial practices. Public consultation runs until 24 October 2025 5 . 1 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, p. 22. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2394/oj/eng. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/live-work-travel-eu/consumer-rights-and-complaints/enforcement-consumerprotection/coordinated-actions/accommodation-booking_en. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/consumer-protection-law/review-eu-consumer-law_en. 5 Have your say portal: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14622-DigitalFairness-Act_en.”
  EU restrictions on unfair commercial practices
• 2025-09-05 “E-003440/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The threat posed by extremist radical views in Europe is serious. In cooperation with Member States’ authorities, the Commission closely monitors the evolving risks linked to organisations espousing such views, including radical and extremist non-state actors, as well as risks arising from interference from third countries. The EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation supports these efforts, inter alia through regular reports on Online Jihadist Propaganda 1 and on the EU Terrorism Situation and Trends 2 . To improve prevention and resilience, the Commission also launched the EU Knowledge Hub on Prevention of Radicalisation 3 in June 2024, gathering all relevant stakeholders in a common effort to better understand and respond to the phenomenon of radicalisation and extremism in all its forms. Furthermore, as announced in the new European Internal Security Strategy (ProtectEU) 4 , the Commission will present a new EU Agenda on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism by the end of 2025, based on a wide range of consultations with Member States, civil society and other stakeholders. 1 https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/publications/online-jihadist-propaganda-2023-in-review. 2 https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-reports/tesat-report. 3 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/eu-knowledge-hub-prevention-radicalisation_en. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0148.”
  EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination · EU policy on Islam
• 2025-09-05 “E-003437/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU, in coordination with partners, will continue to provide political, financial, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine, in line with the joint security commitments 1 . So far, the EU and its Member States have provided EUR 177.5 billion in overall support to Ukraine and Ukrainians, including about EUR 63.5 billion in military support, with EUR 6.1 billion via the European Peace Facility. The EU will also continue with restrictive measures against Russia. On 6 March 2025, the European Council called to accelerate the development of defence capabilities. The White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2 linked these capabilities with actions to strengthen the European defence industry, the required investments, and the work with partners, including Ukraine. The Security Action for Europe instrument 3 will provide EUR 150 billion for Member States’ common procurement. 16 Member States have also activated the EU National Escape Clause enabling budgetary flexibility of up to 1.5% of gross domestic product for additional defence expenditure over the next 4 years. Efforts in the field of energy resilience and the protection of critical infrastructure are directed at achieving the EU’s full energy independence from Russia. Timely implementation of the REPowerEU roadmap 4 is a priority. To accelerate Russian energy import phase-out, the Commission proposed a ban on Russian Liquefied Natural Gas imports by end-2026, as part of the 19 th sanctions package. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/oredhmis/eu-ukraine-security-commitments-en.pdf. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/white-paper-european-defence-readiness2030_en. 3 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/safe-security-actioneurope_en#:~:text=Adopted%20by%20the%20Council%20of,European%20defence%20industry%2C%20with %20a. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/energy/repowereu_en.”
  EU-US relations · EU competences on defence · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2025-09-05 “E-003436/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Full respect of international law, including the United Nations (UN) Charter and the fundamental principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states is at the core of EU’s approach. In their international relations, all states are obliged to refrain from the threat or use of force, to respect international humanitarian law and to resolve conflicts peacefully. On Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, the European Council has repeatedly reaffirmed its continued and unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. The European Council has also expressed its support for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law, welcoming all efforts towards achieving such a peace 1 . The European Council remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the acquis 2 . The EU is ready to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process, with all appropriate means at its disposal. It remains crucial that Türkiye commits and actively contributes to such a comprehensive settlement, including its external aspects, normalise its relations with the Republic of Cyprus and respect the sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all Member States. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/et2pfmcs/20250626-text-ukraine-en.pdf. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-09-05 “E-003439/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission supports all Member States in their efforts to strengthen the Rule of Law, including Poland. It notably does so by engaging on a regular basis with the authorities and by monitoring the progress made through its annual Rule of Law Report. The latest edition of the Report was presented in July this year. The Commission will continue monitoring the situation in Poland and other Member States within the framework of this process. There are currently no EU funds withheld from Poland in view of previous infringements related to the rule of law.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
• 2025-07-25 “E-003091/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has a supporting competence in civil protection, including in forest firefighting, while the main responsibility for prevention, preparedness and response lies with the Member States. The EU is financing the acquisition of aerial resources via the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 1 to be part of the EU strategic reserve, rescEU 2 . rescEU assists where overall national capacities and those pre-committed by Member States to the European Civil Protection Pool 3 are not sufficient for an effective response. Other EU funds are available to strengthen national capacities. A needs analysis based on scenarios, initiated in 2019 by the Commission and experts in the Member States and participating states in the UCPM, identified the geographical areas where rescEU aircrafts would provide the most benefit to Europe 4 . The ongoing development of rescEU will continue to ensure a balanced geographical coverage with assets able to intervene in Cyprus, if needed. The EU is co-financing the stand-by costs of national aerial firefighting capacities, which are made available for EU operations. Two aerial firefighting planes are stationed in Cyprus on stand-by for operations following an activation of the UCPM 5 . On 23 July 2025, Cyprus requested assistance through the UCPM. The Emergency Response Coordination Centre responded by sending two medium firefighting planes from Spain and offering two light planes from Sweden. Cyprus declined the offers as the situation improved. The Spanish planes returned home before arriving in Cyprus. A Greek firefighting team was deployed from 25 to 27 July 2025 and returned on 28 July 2025. In the State of the Union address, the President of the Commission proposed to create a new European firefighting hub in Cyprus, which can support the regional neighbours. 1 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en. 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/resceu_en. 3 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/european-civil-protection-pool_en. 4 The conclusions and recommendations were subsequently presented to, and endorsed by, the Civil Protection Committee and shared with the Directors General for Civil Protection in Member States and participating states. 5 For their availability, the EU is supporting the national Cypriot response by financing 75% of the stand-by costs from 15 June to 31 October 2025.”
  Funding for OCTs and outermost regions
• 2025-07-02 “E-002690/2025 Answer given by Mr Micallef on behalf of the European Commission Member States are competent for undertaking measures to raise young people’s awareness about the risks of anabolic steroids (AS). At European level, the Commission provides support in sharing practices. In 2021 a study on mapping the EU legislation regarding AS in sport was conducted 1 . In 2022 the Commission supported a project of the World Anti-Doping Agency aimed to increase anti-doping intelligence, including awareness raising of the threat of doping in youth amateur sports. The Erasmus+ programme plays an important role in raising awareness about integrity in sport and physical activity, including risks associated with the use of AS. It empowers youth organisations, sports clubs, and educational institutions to develop initiatives to promote clean sport values and healthy lifestyles. The #BeActive campaign engages young people across Europe by encouraging participation in physical activity while promoting integrity in sport. The European Anti-Fraud Office also plays an active role in the detection of dangerous goods affecting human health and safety, including AS. It works in close cooperation with customs authorities to support cross-border investigations and to coordinate joint operations. In 2024, the Europol Operation ‘Shield V’ targeting inter alia the misuse and distribution of counterfeit medicines, doping substance and illegal supplements was conducted 2 . Once AS fall under the relevant definitions 3 , they would be covered by the monitoring and competence development tasks of the European Union Drugs Agency. 1 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/76890558-f016-11eb-a71c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/olaf-report/2024/investigative-activities/protecting-eu-revenue/operations-withpartners_en.html#SHIELD-V. 3 See Article 3(1) and (2) of the EUDA mandate, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32023R1322.”
  EU measures on lifestyle-related behaviours (smoking, drinking, eating, etc.)
• 2025-06-26 “E-002588/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The European Accessibility Act (Directive 2019/882) 1 applies since 28 June in Member States. It sets accessibility requirements for certain digitally relevant products and services of everyday use such as phones, computers, e-books, consumer banking services and electronic communications. It makes it easier for persons with disabilities to fully participate in society covering accessibility requirements for a wide range of disabilities. The Commission monitors its implementation across the EU. Sustainable and equal access to healthcare is an area of action of the Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030. With EU4Health 2 funding, the forthcoming guidelines on access to healthcare for persons with disabilities will pinpoint measures for Member States to improve the uptake of this right for persons with disabilities. The European Health Union also supports Member States in improving the resilience of their health systems by addressing barriers for persons with disabilities, taking account of the Commission initiative on Digital Transformation of Health and Care 3 . Information and Communication Technology (ICT) helps improve long-term care services, as highlighted in the Council Recommendation on long-term care 4 . As shown by the national reports on the implementation of the Recommendation 5 , ICT can improve access to quality and affordable care and support independent living, while overcoming territorial gaps in delivery. The European Care Strategy 6 promotes scaling up the use of innovative technology and investments in ICT. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/882/oj/eng. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/assets/sante/health/funding/wp2022_en.pdf. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ehealth. 4 2022/C 476/01 see at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:JOC_2022_476_R_0001. 5 See at: https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?advSearchKey=lltimprep&mode=advancedSubmit&catId=22&doc_submit= &policyArea=0&policyAreaSub=0&country=0&year=0&iframe=true. 6 A European Care Strategy: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5169.”
  EU policy on disability inclusion & accessibility
• 2025-06-26 “E-002583/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the practice described and has taken the necessary action to address the fiscal implications. In accordance with EU rules 1 , vehicles (new or used) from third countries to be placed on the EU market must have an approval confirming their compliance with the EU safety and environment standards to be registered in the EU. Privately imported cars are also subject to individual vehicle approval. The rules for registration of vehicles are currently not harmonised, hence, the administrative and fiscal procedures (e.g. registration tax) largely vary between Member States. Member States’ authorities may cooperate with each other, including in the exchange of data on vehicle registration, driving licences, vehicle owner/holder, insurance and traffic offenders. On 24 April 2025, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Directive 2 which will require that Member States assist one another, in particular by providing access to relevant vehicle registration data. To facilitate this exchange of data, Member States will be required to interconnect their registers with the Commission’s MOVE-HUB system so that this information can be exchanged in real time. The Commission is committed to strengthen and modernise the EU’s customs framework. In May 2023, the Commission put forward an ambitious EU Customs Reform proposal 3 , part of which is the creation of an EU Customs Authority (EUCA). EUCA will develop and operate an EU Customs Data Hub, a unique digital tool for customs data, which will facilitate realtime sharing of centralised information between the customs authorities of the Member States, thus, significantly improving cooperation. 1 Regulation (EU) 2018/858 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the approval and market surveillance of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles, OJ L 151, 14.6.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/858/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0179. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023PC0258.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-06-10 “E-002326/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission Reference is made to the answer given by the Commission on the parliamentary question E-002776/2024 on 18 March 2025. As already pointed out, risk to aviation posed by the operational activities of Tymbou airport do not fall within the scope of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) recommendations resulting from armed conflict. Data from the Eurocontrol acting as Network Manager show that traffic to and from Türkiye, which is the only traffic possible for this airport, has remained stable for some time. The Commission can only take action when a legal basis has been provided under Union law. Under the relevant provisions of the Single European Sky Regulatory framework, airspace management falls under the competence of the individual Member States.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-06-06 “E-002297/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The new EU Drugs Strategy and Action Plan against drug trafficking announced in ProtectEU will reinforce EU’s resilience against drug market threats 1 . The EU Drugs Agency’s (EUDA) Early Warning System is at the core of the EU response to new psychoactive substances. Regulation (EU) 2023/1322 2 strengthened the Agency’s mandate to identify, exchange information on and respond rapidly to the emergence of new substances with a new European Drug Alert System and health and security threat assessment capabilities. Moreover, a network of forensic and toxicological laboratories was set up in 2024 to generate data and exchange information on new trends. The EU4Health programme 3 supports actions to complement Member States’ efforts in improving the health of children and young people 4 , and in capacity-building 5 to tackle mental health challenges. Horizon Europe supports research aimed at better understanding the mechanisms of addiction and build resilience, or at fighting addictions and improving lives with a comprehensive drug rehabilitation programme 6 . The EUDA cooperates with international organisations, such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Health Organization, to share best practices and coordinate responses on a global scale. As part of the implementation of the EU Drugs Strategy 7 and Action Plan 2021-2025 8 , the EUDA makes available comprehensive information on evidence-based prevention interventions contributing to raising awareness on the adverse effects of drugs and effective prevention measures 9 . The ongoing Commission evaluation of the Drug Strategic Framework also covers the effectiveness of its measures and their implementation at EU and national level. Results will be available in the autumn of 2025. 1 COM(2025)148 final; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0148. 2 Regulation (EU) 2023/1322 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2023 on the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006. 3 https://health.ec.europa.eu/funding/eu4health-programme-2021-2027-vision-healthier-european-union_en. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/sante/items/863796/en. 5 https://eu-promens.eu/eu-promens. 6 https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101155881. 7 EU Drugs Strategy 2021-2025, OJ C 102I, 24.3.2021. 8 EU Drugs Action Plan 2021-2025, OJ C 272, 8.7.2021. 9 EUDA (n.d.). Xchange programme, https://www.euda.europa.eu/best-practice/xchange_en.”
  Cannabis consumption · EU measures on lifestyle-related behaviours (smoking, drinking, eating, etc.)
• 2025-06-06 “E-002300/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy 1 confirms that protection of children from all forms of violence is a core objective of the EU. Child trafficking is a particular serious form of trafficking in human beings, which leads to higher penalties in accordance with Article 4(2)(a) of the Anti-trafficking Directive 2 . The amended Directive, to be transposed by Member States by 15 July 2026, explicitly includes exploitation of illegal adoption in the scope of offences of trafficking in human beings. Furthermore, cross-border law enforcement cooperation, with the support of the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, has been reinforced through a dedicated operational action under the European Multi-disciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats - trafficking in human beings to fight illegal commercial surrogacy and selling of babies. The Commission will present a legislative proposal for modernised rules on organised crime in 2026 to strengthen the fight against organised crime networks, including criminal networks trafficking babies. The Anti-trafficking Directive includes specific measures on assistance, support, and protection of child victims of trafficking. The revised Directive encourages Member States to ensure that national integrated child protection systems 3 develop specific plans to prevent trafficking in human beings, including that of children in residential or closed-type institutions, while encompassing early warning and reporting mechanisms, cross-sectoral support, and ongoing monitoring. Rules on adoption and birth registration fall under substantive family law, which is a national competence. The functioning of child protection agencies is not regulated by EU law. 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy, COM(2025) 148 final. 2 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victim as amended by Directive (EU) 2024/1217, OJ L 101, 15.4.2011, p. 1–11. 3 Recommendations (EU) 2024/1238 on developing and strengthening integrated child protection systems in the best interest of the child, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32024H1238.”
  EU policy on criminal justice · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-06-06 “E-002299/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Detention issues are primarily responsibility of the Member States. However, on 8 December 2022, the Commission adopted a non-legally binding instrument: the Recommendation on the procedural rights of suspects and accused in pre-trial detention and on material detention conditions 1 . One of the guiding principles of this recommendation is that Member States are encouraged to manage detention in such a way as to facilitate the social reintegration of detainees, with a view to preventing recidivism. Paragraphs 47 and 48 of the recommendation provide specific guidance on work and education of detainees to promote their social reintegration. As regards funding instruments, with a budget of over EUR 140 billion, the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) is the EU’s main instrument for investing in people. EUR 45.5 billion are dedicated to investments in social inclusion. The ESF+ can co-finance activities aimed at enhancing the employability of former prisoners, at collecting best practices regarding prisoners and former prisoners’ reintegration and at improving transition from prison into the labour market and society more broadly. The ESF+ can also facilitate access to essential support services such as mental health care and housing assistance. The Erasmus+ Programme supports the cooperation between organisations across Europe in the fields of vocational education and adult education to foster exchanges of practices and innovation. Numerous excellent projects addressing the Erasmus+ “inclusion and diversity” transversal priority have involved organisations dealing with former prisoners’ reintegration. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_7570.”
  EU competences on social policies · Youth employment & training · Funding for vocational training
• 2025-06-06 “E-002296/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to its written answers to question E-004041/19, which concluded that the specific equipment designed and constructed for use in fairgrounds or amusement parks was at the time subject to the national laws while referring to the relevant European Standard EN 13814:2004, and E-002179/2024, which clarified that such equipment is under the scope of the General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR) 1 . In addition, the Commission would like to complement these written answers with the elements below. While there is currently no EU harmonisation legislation covering specifically the safety of amusement parks or fairground installations or products intended for such installations, these are indeed covered by the GPSR when made available to consumers. Under the GPSR, only safe products may be placed or made available on the EU market. The GPSR does not require third party certification for this purpose. However, the GPSR introduces reinforced obligations for economic operators, including requirements to provide technical documentation and to carry out an internal risk analysis. Concerning amusement parks or fairground installations or products intended for such installations, there is currently no plan to request the development of specific technical standards. The Commission supports national authorities through tools such as the Safety Gate Rapid Alert System, coordinated market surveillance actions, and guidance on risk assessment methodologies. It continues to facilitate cooperation among Member States to strengthen enforcement and ensure a high level of consumer protection across the EU. 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/988 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 on general product safety, amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and the Council, and repealing Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 87/357/EEC, (OJ L 135, 23.5.2023), p. 1–51.”
  EU competences on consumer protection and product standards
• 2025-05-30 “E-002181/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with the Treaty on EU, the EU pursues in its actions the objectives of preserving the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States, including those of the Republic of Cyprus. Whilst Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 on Security Action for Europe (SAFE)1 does not include references to specific foreign policy situations or occupations, it aims at supporting the financial efforts of the Member States to increase their defence readiness in accordance with these objectives. SAFE also establishes eligibility conditions for the participation of defence entities in common procurement under that instrument, which ensures the preservation of the security and defence objectives of the EU and of its Member States. In SAFE, entities established in third countries or under the control of third countries (to the exception of Ukraine and countries of the European Free Trade Association also members of the European Economic Area) are, in principle, not allowed to participate in common procurement under the instrument. SAFE foresees the possibility for entities from third countries to participate in common procurements under SAFE only on condition that the third country in question is firstly an acceding, potential candidate or candidate country or has concluded with the EU a security and defence partnership agreement, and, secondly, an international agreement in accordance with Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. These agreements must ensure that there is no conflict with common foreign security policy’s interests. The EU has not concluded any agreement with Türkiye on these matters. It follows that Turkish companies are not authorised to participate in SAFE common procurements. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on defence
• 2025-05-20 “E-002008/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has consistently supported a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine, grounded in the international law. It joined Ukraine and international partners, including the United States, in calling for a full, unconditional ceasefire of 30 days, as a vital step to reduce civilian suffering and to allow space for meaningful talks on genuine peace, aimed at ending Russia’s war of aggression 1 . Russia has so far not shown willingness to engage in real negotiations and continues to escalate its systematic campaign of air attacks against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and civilians 2 . Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including its repercussions for European and global security, constitutes an existential challenge for the EU 3 . Thus, Europe is ready to boost its defence spending, including also to support Ukraine 4 . The EU is helping Ukraine to defend itself through the delivery of military support and deepening cooperation and integration between the EU’s and Ukraine’s defence industry. The EU will continue to work closely with Ukraine to support its reform efforts on its European path 5 . Through the EUR 50 billion Ukraine Facility, the EU provides stable and predictable assistance for the 2024-2027 period, supporting Ukraine’s financing needs and reconstruction, mobilising investments and promoting reforms necessary for EU accession. The EU continues to deliver on its EUR 18.1 billion contribution under the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loans to Ukraine. 1 Statement by the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) on behalf of the European Union on call for ceasefire, 10 May 2025: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/10/ukrainerussiastatement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-call-for-ceasefire/. 2 Statement by the President of the Commission with HR/VP on the 18th package of sanctions against Russia: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/statement-president-von-der-leyen-hrvp-kallas-18th-packagesanctions-against-russia_en?s=232; Foreign Affairs Council: press remarks by (HR/VP) after the informal videoconference meeting: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-highrepresentative-kaja-kallas-after-informal-videoconference_en. 3 European Council conclusions on European defence, 6 March 2025: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/06/european-council-conclusions-oneuropean-defence/. 4 Press statement by President von der Leyen on the defence package of 4 March 2025: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_673. 5 European Council conclusion, 19 December 2024: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/eucoconclusions-19122024-en.pdf.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Ukraine relations · EU enlargement
• 2025-05-15 “E-001969/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to strengthening strategic cooperation between the EU and the United Kingdom (UK). The first EU-UK Summit held in London on 19 May 2025 marked the beginning of a new chapter in EU-UK relations and delivered several concrete outputs including an EU-UK Joint Statement, a Security and Defence Partnership, and a Common Understanding between the Commission and the UK. The ‘Common Understanding - a renewed agenda for European Union – United Kingdom cooperation’ adopted at the Summit identified five broad areas of future work to strengthen EU-UK relations: (i) security and defence; (ii) people-to-people contacts; (iii) economy and sustainability; (iv) internal security and judicial cooperation; and (v) irregular migration. The Common Understanding also consolidates existing cooperation between the EU and the UK. It notes the political agreement leading to full reciprocal access to waters to fish until 30 June 2038 and to extend the application of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement's energy title on a continuous basis. The necessary steps to formalise this political agreement will be finalised in the coming weeks. Both sides will proceed swiftly on the commitments made in the Common Understanding in accordance with their respective procedures and legal frameworks.”
  EU-UK relations
• 2025-05-02 “E-001778/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The ‘Choose Europe’ initiative announced by the President of the Commission on 5 May 2025 1 will dedicate EUR 500 million in 2025–2027 to ensure Europe continues to attract the brightest researchers around the world, with a new long-term ‘super grant’ from the European Research Council, and a pilot under Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions 2 to attract scientists early in their career in Europe. The Commission’s Action Plan on labour and skills shortages 3 sets out 87 actions that the EU, Member States and social partners should take to tackle these shortages, including supporting skills development and attracting talent from outside the EU. The Commission is setting up new skills partnerships under the Pact for Skills 4 , co-financing more Centres of Vocational Excellence 5 and boosting the work on Skills Academies in net zero technologies and cyber skills 6 . Once established, the EU Talent Pool 7 will facilitate the recruitment of jobseekers from non-EU countries in EU-wide shortage occupations. The Union of Skills 8 , adopted on 5 March 2025, aims for a ‘radical’ step-up in both ambition and action to deliver education and skilling in the EU. It is accompanied by a new Action Plan on Basic Skills 9 and a STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) Education Strategic Plan 10 . It announces a European Skills High Level Board, a European Skills Intelligence Observatory and a new EU-27 Recommendation on education and skills. The Commission will adopt in 2026 a new European Strategy for Vocational Education and Training and a Skills Portability Initiative. Attracting, developing and retaining talent in the EU is a key part of the Union of Skills. The Commission will present a new Visa Strategy for skilled workers and is fostering cooperation through reinforced talent partnerships 11 . 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ac_25_1137/AC_25_1137_EN.pdf. 2 https://marie-sklodowska-curie-actions.ec.europa.eu/. 3 Commission Communication on Labour and skills shortages in the EU: an action plan, COM(2024) 131 final (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52024DC0131). 4 https://pact-for-skills.ec.europa.eu/about/regional-skills-partnerships_en. 5 https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-and-activities/skills-and-qualifications/skillsjobs/centres-vocational-excellence_en. 6 https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-and-activities/skills-and-qualifications/workingtogether/blueprint-sectoral-cooperation-skills_en. 7 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an EU Talent Pool (COM/2023/716) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023PC0716). 8 Commission Communication on the Union of Skills, COM(2025) 90 final (https://op.europa.eu/publicationdetail/-/publication/5c5c5399-fa8a-11ef-b7db-01aa75ed71a1). 9 https://education.ec.europa.eu/document/action-plan-on-basic-skills-legal-document. 10 https://education.ec.europa.eu/document/stem-education-strategic-plan-legal-document. 11 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/legal-migration-and-resettlement/talentpartnerships_en.”
  EU policy on brain drain · Funding for vocational training · Youth employment & training
• 2025-05-02 “E-001793/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission In the EU, 43.1% of persons in a household with one adult and dependent children are at risk of poverty or social exclusion (against 21% of the total population) in 2024. The Commission acknowledges the importance of the challenge. To tackle child poverty, the Commission Recommendation ‘Investing in children: breaking the cycle of disadvantage 1 ’ calls for multi-dimensional strategies, with a focus on households at risk of poverty, such as single parent families. It stresses the need to ensure adequate resources, through support to parents’ participation in the labour market and benefits, and access to quality services. The Council Recommendation establishing a European Child Guarantee 2 asks Member States to guarantee access of children in need, including children living in a single-earner household, to a set of key quality services. The Council Recommendation on adequate minimum income ensuring active inclusion 3 recognizes the specificity of single-parent households, and encourages Member States to facilitate take-up of adequate minimum income schemes. EU funding (e.g. the European Social Fund +) is available to support Member States in these efforts. The Commission expects to adopt in 2026 the first ever EU Anti-Poverty Strategy announced in the 2024-2029 Political Guidelines 4 . The Strategy will address the systemic, different drivers of poverty. It will look into what works through a lifecycle approach to addressing poverty risks. Preparation is ongoing and public consultation planned. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2013/112/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021H1004. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2023_041_R_0001. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf.”
  Support for families · Child poverty policy
• 2025-05-02 “E-001777/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) (formerly EuroAsia Interconnector), included on the Union list of projects of common interest (‘PCIs’) 1 . is aimed at linking the electricity systems of Greece, Cyprus and Israel. It is also a Global Gateway project. It has received EUR 657 million from Connecting Europe Facility for the Cyprus-Crete part. This underscores its importance for ending Cyprus’s energy isolation. It will also help renewable energy integration and energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean region. As a PCI the GSI has the full support of the Commission, which monitors its implementation and is ready to assist where needed. It also has priority status for permitting. With the EU Action Plan on Cable Security 2 the Commission recognises that security and resilience of EU submarine cable infrastructures is paramount and must be enhanced to protect EU’s vital strategic interests. The EU has repeatedly underlined that Türkiye is expected to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in Eastern Mediterranean 3 and make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and peaceful settlement of disputes, including through the International Court of Justice 4 . Türkiye must respect the sovereignty of all Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including inter alia to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 5 . This is essential to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye 6 . 1 Under Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure (‘TEN-E Regulation’). 2 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council 'EU Action Plan on Cable Security' JOIN(2025) 9 final. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57442/2022-06-2324-euco-conclusions-en.pdf. 4 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 5 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/8010c4db-6ef8-4c85-aa06814408921c89_en?filename=T%C3%BCrkiye%20Report%202024.pdf. 6 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6157.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · EU energy infrastructure integration
• 2025-05-02 “E-001780/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission To ensure a coherent and coordinated approach to all the risks faced by children in relation to crime, the EU will, as announced in ProtectEU: A European Internal Security Strategy 1 , develop an action plan on the protection of children against crime. The plan will encompass both the online and offline dimensions. In the meantime, many initiatives have been or will be undertaken at EU level to prevent juvenile delinquency. Promoting the full inclusion of young people aged 15 - 29 within society is a key objective of the EU youth strategy 2 , Erasmus+ Youth 3 , the European Solidarity Corps 4 and the European Youth Work Agenda 5 . The Reinforced Youth Guarantee 6 remains a priority to support young people becoming unemployed or leaving formal education. Through the Union of Skills 7 and the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 8 , the EU will work to provide stronger educational foundations for everyone and promote social inclusion, integration, and resilience to recruitment into crime. The 2024 EU Recommendation on integrated child protection systems 9 also emphasises that children involved in legal proceedings as victims, suspects, accused or convicted persons, witnesses or as other parties must be treated in a child-centred, individualised, and rightsbased manner, with a focus on prevention, rehabilitation, and the best interests of the child. The Commission is planning to issue guidelines on the protection of minors under Article 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on ProtectEU: A European Internal Security Strategy, COM(2025) 148 final. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:4617911. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32021R0817. 4 https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/888/oj/eng#:~:text=Regulation%20%28EU%29%202021%2F888%20of%20the%20E uropean%20Parliament%20and,%28EU%29%20No%20375%2F2014%20%28Text%20with%20EEA%20releva nce%29%20PE%2F30%2F2021%2FINIT. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2020_415_R_0001. 6 Council Recommendation of 30 October 2020 on A Bridge to Jobs – Reinforcing the Youth Guarantee and replacing the Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on establishing a Youth Guarantee, OJ C 372, 4.11.2020, p. 1–9. 7 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on The Union of Skills, COM(2025) 90 final. 8 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Action plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027, COM(2020) 758 final. 9 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=celex:32024H1238.”
  EU engagement with youth · Youth employment & training
• 2025-05-02 “E-001774/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s competitiveness and its attractivity as an investment location are at the top of the EU’s political agenda. To this end, the Commission has identified three priority areas for policy action in its Competitiveness Compass 1 : closing the innovation gap, having a joint roadmap for decarbonisation and competitiveness, as well reducing excessive dependencies and increasing security. Additional actions on horizontal enablers, such as cutting red tape, deepening the Single Market and boosting digitalisation, complement the Compass. Under the second pillar of the Compass, the Clean Industrial Deal 2 brings forward targeted initiatives to support the deployment of green innovation and the competitiveness of industrial production in Europe. These aim at improving access to affordable energy, lead markets, public and private investments, materials and resources, global markets and international partnerships, skills and quality jobs. For instance, they include simplification of permitting to access energy infrastructure and more funding through the revision of InvestEU 3 and the Industrial Decarbonisation Bank. The Single Market Strategy 4 of 21 May 2025 presents an action plan to improve the functioning of the Single Market, including by removing the most harmful barriers and reducing red tape, thereby promoting intra-EU trade and investment. As regards simplifying EU rules and their implementation, the Commission has adopted Omnibus packages to reduce complexity and compliance costs for businesses, including in sustainability reporting 5 . Further measures are planned in the Commission’s 2025 work programme 6 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0030. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0085. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32021R0523. 4 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/single-market-our-european-home-market-uncertainworld_en. 5 Sustainability Omnibus: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/commission-simplifies-rules-sustainabilityand-eu-investments-delivering-over-eu6-billion_en. 6 2025 Commission work programme: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategydocuments/commission-work-programme_en.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU · EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2025-04-28 “E-001683/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has consistently opposed any actions or statements that seek to upgrade the international status of the so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, a territory not recognised by the international community. Such moves undermine the United Nations (UN) efforts to create a conducive environment for settlement talks. The EU only recognises the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law, in line with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The EU has been closely monitoring developments since the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) Summit in Samarkand in November 2022, when the Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity became an observer to the organisation. The EU has expressed its concerns through public statements, including one from the European External Action Service (EEAS) Spokesperson 1 , and has actively engaged with all OTS Member States, including Azerbaijan, at all levels on this worrying development. The High Representative/Vice-President has reiterated these concerns in statements made in July 2 and November 2024 3 . The EU expects its partners to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states and to avoid taking any steps that contradict this principle. This expectation has been clearly communicated to Azerbaijan during the visit of the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission on 25 April 2025, and the EU will continue to convey this message at all levels of political dialogue. The EU remains committed to upholding relevant UN Security Council resolutions and fundamental principles of international law, particularly regarding state sovereignty, independence, and integrity. It will continue to work towards ensuring that these principles are fully respected. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/cyprus-statement-spokesperson-observer-status-turkish-cypriot-secessionistentity-organisation_en?s=230. 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/443430_fr. 3 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ots-statement-hrvp-josep-borrell-attempts-legitimise-turkish-cypriotsecessionist-entity_en.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU-Azerbaijan relations
• 2025-03-24 “E-001223/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission In line with Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 1 , the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care is a national competence. Regulation (EU) 2017/745 on medical devices 2 , including on type 1 diabetes, provides the regulatory framework for a high level of safety and supports innovation. In line with the Mission letter for Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare 3 , the Commission will also step up the implementation of the current framework and evaluating the need for potential legislative changes. A targeted evaluation of this Regulation is currently looking at the scope for simplification, burden-reduction, more harmonisation, support for small and medium enterprises, digitalisation, increase of competitiveness and support to innovation, which contributes to access to these devices. Regulation (EU) 2021/2282 on health technology assessment 4 provides a framework to assess the clinical aspects of innovative health technologies. On that basis, national authorities can make more timely and informed decisions on the pricing and reimbursement of health technologies. The scope of the Regulation is limited to some high-risk medical devices. It could include a technology for type 1 diabetes mellitus if that technology receives an opinion from the expert panels 5 under the Regulation (EU) 2017/745. The ‘Healthier Together’ initiative 6 supports Member States in disease prevention and collaborative action between Member States on cardiovascular diseases and diabetes 7 is supported. The Commission will step up work on preventative health by building on existing actions. A European Cardiovascular Health Plan is being developed to address also diabetes and obesity. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2008/art_168/oj. 2 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/745/oj. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/b1817a1b-e62e-4949-bbb8ebf29b54c8bd_en?filename=Missionletter-VARHELYI.pdf. 4 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2282/oj. 5 https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical-devices-expert-panels/overview_en. 6 https://health.ec.europa.eu/non-communicable-diseases/healthier-together-eu-non-communicable-diseasesinitiative_en. 7 https://jacardi.eu/.”
  EU competences on health
• 2025-03-17 “E-001122/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission was made aware of the reported violations in the Special Protective Zone Hermitage of Saint Peter of Koriša in Prizren in early March 2025. Consequently, the Commission engaged in efforts to address the matter with various authorities and international partners, including in the framework of the Implementation and Monitoring Council which serves as a platform to solve disputes between the government of Kosovo * and the Serbian Orthodox Church. In this context, the EU Special Representative (EUSR)/EU Office in Kosovo has been in regular contact with the Serbian Orthodox Church. The EUSR in Kosovo/Head of Office also met the Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, to raise this issue, on 10 March 2025. It is essential that Kosovo central and local institutions fully comply with the provisions of the Law on Special Protective Zones. The EU, through its EUSR/EU Office in Kosovo, remains ready to facilitate any dispute resolution between the Kosovo authorities and the Serbian Orthodox Church in the framework of the Implementation and Monitoring Council. With the 2023 Agreement on the Path to Normalisation 1 , Kosovo and Serbia agreed to formalise the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and afford a strong level of protection to the Serbian religious and cultural heritage sites. The EUSR for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue continues to work with both Kosovo and Serbia on the implementation of their respective obligations stemming from the Agreement. * This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovoand-serbia_en”
  EU-Serbia relations · EU-Kosovo relations · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2025-03-06 “E-000967/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Türkiye is a candidate country and a longstanding partner in the Common Security and Defence Policy. Respect of rule of law and progressive alignment with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy are integral parts of the EU-Türkiye relationship. The EU recognises the contribution of all non-EU allies, including Türkiye, to the European and Transatlantic security. The EU is engaging with Türkiye on a phased, proportionate and reversible manner in line with the November 2023 recommendations of the ‘Joint Communication on the state of play of the EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations’ 1 and the Conclusions of the European Council of April 2024 2 . The Council has reiterated the EU’s full commitment to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the United Nations agreed framework, in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. It remains crucial that Türkiye commits and actively contributes to such a peaceful settlement 3 . The existing European defence initiatives, such as the European Defence Fund 4 or Act in Support of Ammunition Production 5 specify that eligible entities should be established and have their executive management structures in the EU or in an associated country. In case such entity is controlled by a non-associated third country or a non-associated third-country entity, additional guarantees need to be made available to the Commission. These guarantees should provide assurance that the involvement of such entity does not contravene the security interests of the EU and its Member States. The proposed Regulation on Security Action for Europe 6 is under discussion in the Council and the conditions for cooperation with partners will be settled in this Regulation, once adopted. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/202311/Joint%20Communication%20to%20the%20European%20Council%20%20State%20of%20play%20of%20EUTurkiye%20political%2C%20economic%20and%20trade%20relations.pdf. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 4 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpageeuropean-commission_en. 5 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en. 6 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6d6f889c-e58d-4caa-8f3b8b93154fe206_en?filename=SAFE%20Regulation.pdf.”
  EU enlargement · EU competences on defence
• 2025-03-03 “E-000892/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Pakistan’s position on the internationally unrecognised so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is well known to the Commission and the European External Action Service, which have taken note of the statement in question and of the Joint Declaration of 13 February 2025 1 . Representatives of the EU Delegation to Pakistan and embassies of Member States as a rule refrain from participating in official events attended by representatives of the so-called TRNC representation office in Islamabad. The EU remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the United Nations (UN) framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 2 and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the acquis. At every reiterates this position to the Government of Pakistan and calls for respect of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and UNSC resolutions. Ahead of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in July 2024, the EU Delegation to Pakistan carried out a demarche voicing opposition to the Turkish-sponsored Draft Resolution no 19/50. It emphasised that references to the so-called Turkish Cypriot State were at odds with possible occasion, most recently at the Joint Commission meeting of November 2024, the EU fundamental principles of international law and the UN Charter 3 . 1 https://mofa.gov.pk/press-releases/joint-declaration-of-the-7th-session-of-pakistan-turkiye-high-level-strategiccooperation-council-further-deepening-diversifying-and-institutionalizing-the-strategic-partnership 2 https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-councilresolutions/?ctype=Cyprus&cbtype=cyprus 3 https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter”
  EU foreign policy approach · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-03-03 “E-000893/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the reports on transformations of Hagia Sophia’s surroundings. Istanbul Municipality sealed a historical cistern next to Hagia Sophia used as a spa complex, and, in December 2024, took a decision to ban the unauthorised use of the cistern as a spa. In January 2025, concrete instructions for the required restoration were issued. Türkiye should respect the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 1972 World Heritage Convention and, therefore, avoid any implementing measure, without prior discussion with UNESCO, that would affect the protection and conservation of the site in its original, historical context. Any steps that would endanger its outstanding value should be prevented. The Commission will continue following the developments regarding the site of Hagia Sophia, also in the framework of its annual Türkiye report 1 , as it has done over the past years. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2024_en.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-02-27 “E-000873/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission regrets the decision of the United States (US) to impose tariffs on EU exports of steel and aluminium on 12 March 2025. The Commission sees no justification for these tariffs on EU steel and aluminium exports. The Commission has emphasised to the US its wish to work together on this and that the EU is not the problem – but is part of the solution. The Commission’s priority is to avoid disruptions to EU-US trade and to seek negotiated solutions. The EU has stated its clear preference to find negotiated outcomes with the US, which would be balanced and mutually beneficial. In light of the decision by the US to delay by 90 days its country-specific ‘reciprocal’ tariffs on EU exports, the EU has decided to put its countermeasures on EUR 21 billion of US exports on hold for the same length of time. This gesture of goodwill will give time for negotiations to proceed. If, however, the talks are not satisfactory, the EU countermeasures will come into force on 14 July 2025. At the same time, the Commission is taking forward its internal policy agenda to boost European competitiveness.”
  EU-US trade relations
• 2025-02-27 “E-000872/2025 Answer given by Mr Micaleff on behalf of the European Commission The protection of children’s rights is a priority for the Commission, as confirmed in the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child 1 , and the Commission Recommendation on integrated child protection systems 2 , which calls on Member States to protect children from all forms of physical or mental violence, including corporal punishment and by actively raising awareness of the rights and needs of children among those who are in contact with children, including parents and care givers. In addition, the Victims’ Rights Directive 3 recognises the special needs of child victims and the pending revision proposes an improved access to integrated and multidisciplinary support and protection services, to ensure that child victims are better supported and protected. The Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence – which Member States need to transpose by June 2027 – equally recognizes the need to protect child victims of domestic violence. Reporting procedures need to be accessible in a child-friendly manner, the child shall be assisted by a trained professional and authorities shall implement state-wide effective, comprehensive and coordinated policies. The Commission is fully committed to monitor implementation of the above-mentioned recommendation, pursue the adoption of the revision to the Victims’ Rights Directive and ensure the timely and appropriate implementation of the Violence Against Women Directive, which aims to ensure a speedy and coordinated response to domestic violence by competent authorities. 1 EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021) 142 final), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021DC0142. 2 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/1238 of 23 of April 2024 on developing and strengthening integrated child protection systems in the best interests of the child, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2024/1238/oj. 3 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/29/oj.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion · EU policy on victims' compensation rights
• 2025-02-12 “E-000649/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 1. Despite significant progress in cross-border cooperation against financial crimes, it is important that Member States systemically launch financial investigations when investigating serious criminal offenses. Swift transposition of the new Directive on asset recovery 1 will ensure that asset-tracing is part of all investigations into organized crime. The new rules on exchange of information 2 also boost police cooperation against financial crime. Europol and Eurojust support operational cooperation to tackle financial crimes, and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) prosecutes crimes, playing a key role in dismantling criminal activities across the EU, while OLAF, the European Anti-Fraud Office, complements these efforts by detecting, investigating, and preventing fraud, both affecting the EU’s financial interests. 2. Acting as the ‘information hub’ for EU law enforcement, Europol provides the EPPO access to information from national law enforcement authorities stored in its information system. The Commission will take into account the cooperation with EPPO, and the need to further enhance it, when evaluating the current legal framework for Europol 3 , and in any proposals that may follow. 3. The Commission has launched reflections, supported by the High-Level Forum on the Future of EU Criminal Justice 4 , on areas in which the EPPO will need more powers to look at crossborder serious crime, in particular corruption that impacts EU funds and cannot be handled alone by Member States. The EPPO’s role, and cooperation with Eurojust and Europol, will also be considered. 1 OJ L, 2024/1260, 2.5.2024. 2 OJ L 134, 22.5.2023, p. 1–24. 3 OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53, as amended in 2022 OJ L 169, 27.6.2022, p. 1. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_745”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-02-12 “E-000646/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission On 11 March 2025, the Commission adopted the Critical Medicines Act 1 to strengthen the availability and security of supply of critical medicines. Its main goal is to address supply chain vulnerabilities and reduce the EU’s dependencies. In particular, strategic projects which create, increase or modernise EU manufacturing capacity of critical medicines, their active substances and other key inputs may benefit from easier access to funding and fast-tracked administrative, regulatory and scientific support. In addition, it incentivises the diversification and resilience of supply chains through public procurement. Collaborative procurement, including joint procurement at EU level, is also one of the tools proposed to improve the availability of critical medicines. This Act complements the regulatory measures to address shortages and improve the security of supply of medicines proposed in the reform of the EU Pharmaceutical legislation 2 , currently under negotiation. Furthermore, the scope of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism 3 was extended in 2020 to include the stockpiling of medical counter measures aimed at combating serious cross-border threats to health, through the EU level stocks under rescEU. The Commission has invested EUR 1.65 billion in medical and chemical, biological and radio-nuclear (CBRN) stockpiles, which now offer a safety net in cases where Member States’ national response capacity is insufficient. In June 2025, an EU stockpiling strategy and a medical counter measures strategy will be published, covering strategic stockpiling for medical countermeasures. 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying a framework for strengthening the availability and security of supply of critical medicinal products as well as the availability of, and accessibility of, medicinal products of common interest, and amending Regulation (EU) 2024/795. 2 https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/legal-framework-governing-medicinal-products-human-useeu/reform-eu-pharmaceutical-legislation_en 3 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en”
  Government stockpiling of critical medicines · Supply chain diversification requirements in medicine procurement · Joint EU procurement of medicines
• 2025-02-12 “E-000648/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1. The recast Drinking Water Directive 1 , which had to be transposed into national law by January 2023, sets quality standards for bottled spring waters when the water is put into the bottles, ensuring that the initial water quality is guaranteed. The Natural Mineral Waters Directive 2 aims to ensure the protection of consumer’s health, preventing them from being misled and ensuring fair trading. 2. The Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation 3 sets requirements for substances in packaging. It limits the use of certain hazardous substances 4 on food contact packaging materials, including those used for bottled water to ensure they do not pose a risk to human health. The placing on the market of food contact materials (FCM) and articles is governed in the EU by Regulation No 1935/2004 5 . Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 6 establishes a list of substances permitted for use in the manufacture of plastic packaging materials in contact with foods, including bottled water. Regulation (EU) No 2022/1616 7 sets strict safety requirements for using recycled plastic in FCM. Furthermore, Regulation (EU) 2017/625 8 requires that Member States conduct official controls for the verification of compliance of food and food packaging. 3. The main aim of the recast Drinking Water Directive is to ensure access to clean drinking water. It includes new provisions on substances of concern such as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, microplastics and endocrine disruptors. The Directive promotes the use of tap water by ensuring that outdoor and indoor equipment is set up in public spaces and encourages the provision of tap water, for instance in restaurants. 1 Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption (recast), OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1–62. 2 Directive 2009/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 on the exploitation and marketing of natural mineral waters (Recast), OJ L 164, 26.6.2009, p. 45–58. 3 Regulation (EU) 2025/40 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 on packaging and packaging waste, amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2019/904, and repealing Directive 94/62/EC, OJ L, 2025/40, 22.1.2025. 4 Article 5 of the (EU) 2025/40 limits in food contact packaging the use of Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances and concentrations levels of lead, cadmium, mercury and hexavalent chromium (< 100 mg/kg) resulting from substances present in packaging or packaging components. 5 Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food and repealing Directives 80/590/EEC and 89/109/EEC, OJ L 338, 13.11.2004, p. 4–17. 6 Commission Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 of 14 January 2011 on plastic materials and articles intended to come into contact with food, OJ L 12, 15.1.2011, p. 1–89. 7 Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/1616 of 15 September 2022 on recycled plastic materials and articles intended to come into contact with foods, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 282/2008, OJ L 243, 20.9.2022, p. 3–46. 8 Regulation (EU) 2017/625 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on official controls and other official activities performed to ensure the application of food and feed law, rules on animal health and welfare, plant health and plant protection products, OJ L 137, 24.5.2017, p. 40.”
  Drinking regulation · Microplastics
• 2025-01-30 “E-000419/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission cannot comment, neither on negotiations leading to arms sales by Member States, nor on Member States’ decisions in individual cases regarding their arms export authorisations, which remain generally their national prerogative. Such export is subject, inter alia 1 , to Council Common Position (CP) 2008/944/CFSP 2 . Under its Article 2(5)(b), when assessing export licence applications, Member States shall take into account the risk of use of the items against their forces or those of other Member States, as well as those of friendly and allied countries. The EU has stressed that Türkiye must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States. The EU has also underlined its expectations from Türkiye to fully respect international law, to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to promote good neighbourly relations in a sustainable way 3 . The Council has taken good note of the recent improvements in relations between Türkiye and Greece in the expectation that they will be sustainable 4 . In its conclusions of 14 October 2019 5 , the Council recalled the decision taken by some Member States to halt arms exports to Türkiye. Member States committed to strong national positions on the basis of the CP, including strict application of criterion 4 (regional stability) as a basis for denying a licence. Member States continuously work in the Common Foreign and Security Policy framework to promote convergence in arms exports. The Council’s Working Party on Conventional Arms Export remains seized of arms exports to Türkiye. 1 This includes also national legislation and the Arms Trade Treaty, https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyperimages/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008E0944 3 This was stressed by the European Council conclusions of June 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/24/european-council-conclusions-23-24-june2022/, p.7. 4 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16707-2023-INIT/en/pdf 5 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13090-2019-INIT/en/pdf”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-01-15 “E-000154/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Kosovo 1 ’s recent actions against and closure of Serbia-supported structures, conducted in the midst of the election campaign for the 9 February 2024 parliamentary elections, go against its obligations towards the EU under the normalisation process. The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo is monitoring the conduct of these recent actions in accordance with its mandate. The status of Serbia-supported structures is foreseen to be resolved through the EU-facilitated Dialogue. Kosovo must demonstrate and remain consistent with its obligations under the EU-facilitated Dialogue and its recent recommitment to it. As stated in the 2024 Council conclusions on enlargement 2 , the EU will gradually lift the measures vis-à-vis Kosovo in parallel with further steps by Kosovo to de-escalate the tensions in the north. However, these actions are not conducive to this goal. 1 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/1999 and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf”
  EU-Kosovo relations · EU-Serbia relations · EU relations with Western Balkans
• 2025-01-15 “E-000152/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission As indicated by the Honourable Member, trade relations between the EU and the United Kingdom (UK) pose different challenges following the latter’s withdrawal from the EU. The trade relations between the EU and the UK are ruled by the provisions of the trade part of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement 1 . The Commission continuously monitors the correct application of the provisions of the EUUK Trade and Cooperation Agreement to ensure that the UK complies with its obligations under it, and regularly engages with the UK government in the context of the institutional framework created by the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement to discuss any issue that may arise. As stated in the EU’s Strategic Compass 2 , cooperating with like-minded partners around the world, on a reciprocal basis, is essential for enhancing the EU’s resilience. The President of the Commission, in her political guidelines 3 , committed to strengthening cooperation with the UK on security issues. This matter will be discussed at an EU-UK summit, scheduled to take place on 19 May 2025. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement, in its Part Six already provides for an efficient dispute settlement mechanism concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. In relation to cooperation in defence, each additional legally binding instrument would need to also address the issue of possible dispute resolution. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2021/689(1)/oj 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en”
  EU-UK relations · EU competences on defence
• 2025-01-15 “E-000153/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU considers that resuming a credible peace process aiming for a sustained political solution to the Kurdish issue would be a positive step, also essential for the stability in the region. The Commission is following the situation of Abdullah Öcalan and has taken note of the concerns expressed by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture that the prisoner’s contact with the outside world had been limited. He was prevented from seeing his lawyers and his relatives for 43 months until October 2024. Afterwards, delegations from Türkiye’s Halkların Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party, DEM) visited Öcalan several times. The Commission also notes that the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK) remains on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. As Türkiye is an EU candidate country and as a member state of the Council of Europe, the Commission expects Ankara to treat inmates according to the principles laid down in the European Convention of Human Rights and the relevant United Nations documents.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU relations with Kurdish people
• 2025-01-14 “E-000115/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission As each other’s largest trading and investment partners, the EU and the United States (US) share a very robust and deeply interwoven economic relationship. The EU remains committed to fostering a stable, balanced and predictable trade partnership, while expanding cooperation in key areas such as critical supply chains and emerging technologies. The EU looks forward to working closely with the new US administration in order to tackle pressing global challenges. Open markets and respect for international trade rules are essential for strong and sustainable economic growth. Thanks to a common trade policy, including different autonomous measures, the EU will be unified and firm in its response to any unfair or arbitrary imposition of tariffs or other trade measures on EU goods. The EU will stand by its principles to protect the EU’s interests. The EU is resolute in its ambition to build a resilient, sovereign Europe capable of addressing current and future challenges, including the green and digital transitions. In recent years, the EU has accelerated the rollout of renewable energy and energy efficiency solutions that are increasing the EU’s energy independence. The EU has also diversified its supply of gas, including through Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). The US currently provides 45% of EU LNG and 17% of total gas imports. There is room for additional LNG imports in the EU from diverse origins. The Commission will publish a plan in March 2025, which will set out a roadmap to complete the REPowerEU 1 objective and phase out remaining Russian gas in the EU by 2027. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereuaffordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en”
  EU-US trade relations · EU-US relations
• 2025-01-13 “E-000097/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is deploying the InvestEU Innovation and Digitalisation Guarantee 1 - a panEuropean instrument implemented by the European Investment Fund (EIF) 2 and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) for digitalisation of their business models, supply chain management, business development, cybersecurity, training and upskilling. Equity support for start-ups in the area of EU’s digital transformation and independence is equally available under InvestEU 3 . Under the Pact for Skills 4 , the Commission supports the development of digital skills in SMEs. A large-scale partnership is governed by the European Digital SME Alliance 5 and other organisations that are either SMEs or support skills development in SMEs. Activities include matchmaking events to improve access to finance, analyses of skills bottlenecks and definition of key performance indicators. As digital skills are important for all industrial ecosystems, regular information activities and events ensure smooth dialogue and coordination across all sectors. The Commission is committed to enhancing the competitiveness and fostering the adoption of breakthrough technologies by SMEs by implementing several initiatives 6 not only to reduce the cost of accessing advanced technologies, but also to ensure that European SMEs can fully participate in the EU's digital transformation. The Commission will shortly present a third Omnibus, including on small mid-caps and removal of paper requirements. 1 https://www.eif.org/InvestEU/guarantee_products/index.htm 2 https://www.eif.org/index.htm 3 https://www.eif.org/InvestEU/equity_products/index.htm 4 https://pact-for-skills.ec.europa.eu/about/industrial-ecosystems-and-partnerships/digital_en 5 https://www.digitalsme.eu/ 6 European Digital Innovation Hubs; Artificial Intelligence Innovation Package; Digital Single Market Strategy etc.”
  Artificial Intelligence · EU industrial funding
• 2025-01-13 “E-000096/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The Vision for Agriculture and Food presented on 19 February 2025 1 contains an ambitious roadmap and the different work streams towards an agri-food system that is attractive, competitive, future-oriented and fair for current and future generations. The Commission is of the opinion that working towards a more environmentally sustainable and competitive sector must and can go hand in hand. Going forward to achieve both objectives, the vision envisages a more inclusive approach, with a focus to build trust and dialogue across the entire agri-food system in the EU, to work towards solutions that are tailored to specific contexts in a pragmatic way. Working towards a sustainable agri-food sector, the transition must integrate economic, environmental and implementation challenges, as well as the need for a just transition in social terms. It must also recognise specificities of farming: on the one hand, agriculture will always have a degree of impact on natural resources, with limitations in terms of mitigation compared to other sectors of the economy. On the other, it needs to cater for the resources it depends on. Also, situations across regions and territories differ greatly. This calls for welltailored and targeted solutions. The future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the period post-2027 will consider all these elements. Meanwhile, the Commission continues its efforts to simplify the delivery of the current CAP in view of reducing the administrative burden and providing more flexibility to farmers and national administrations. The second simplification package of the current CAP is expected for the second quarter of 2025. 1 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/vision-agriculturefood_en#:~:text=Shaping%20the%20future%20of%20farming%20and%20the%20agrifood,entire%20value%20chain%20within%20the%20EU%20and%20globally”
  GMOs
• 2025-01-10 “E-000076/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. There are no safe levels of tobacco or nicotine consumption, including from smoke-free nicotine products. The Scientific Committee on Health, Environmental and Emerging Risks underlined the negative health effects associated with e-cigarettes 1 . 2. These challenges are being carefully considered as part of the ongoing comprehensive evaluation of the EU legislative framework on tobacco control 2 . Future steps will depend on its findings. 3. The Council recently adopted the Council Recommendation on smoke- and aerosol-free environments 3 . It aims to better protect people in the EU, especially children and more vulnerable people, from exposure to second-hand smoke and aerosols, in both indoor and certain outdoor spaces. The Commission is supporting Member States to implement the Recommendation through funding from the EU4Health programme 4 . The Commission is also developing a prevention toolkit 5 focused on various aspects of children's health such as protecting children from the promotion of harmful products including tobacco and nicotine, while promoting good mental health. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/default/files/scientific_committees/scheer/docs/scheer_o_017.pdf 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13481-Evaluation-of-the-legislativeframework-for-tobacco-control_en 3 https://commission.europa.eu/news/commission-proposes-extend-coverage-smoke-free-environments-2024-0917_en#:~:text=The%20revision%20calls%20on%20EU%20countries%20to:%20extend%20the%20coverage 4 https://hadea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/eu4health/about_en 5 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/sante/items/863796/en”
  Electronic cigarettes · EU measures on lifestyle-related behaviours (smoking, drinking, eating, etc.) · Smoking regulation
• 2024-12-17 “E-003004/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The fall of Assad’s regime marks a historic moment for the Syrian people. The EU urges all actors to exercise maximum restraint and avoid any further violence, to ensure the protection of civilians and to uphold international law, including international humanitarian law. Türkiye has a legitimate right to fight against terrorism, in accordance with the rule of law, respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighbouring states. On 19 December 2024, the European Council conclusions 1 called for full respect for Syria’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within secure borders, in accordance with international law. The EU stands ready to continue supporting the new phase in Syria in coordination with regional partners (such as Türkiye, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq) and others. The High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) is calling on all stakeholders, and notably the new authorities, to engage in ‘an inclusive and Syrian-led political process that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people’. The EU ‘calls on all parties to preserve national unity and ensure the protection of all civilians, the provision of public services as well as the creation of conditions for an inclusive and peaceful political transition’, guided by the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, pluralism and tolerance among all components of society, including women and religious minorities. The HR/VP is in close contact with her counterparts in the region, and keeps stressing the EU’s position in international meetings, including in Aqaba, in Riyadh and most recently in Ankara. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU-Syria relations · EU relations with Kurdish people
• 2024-12-10 “E-002850/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission To better respond to challenges and evolving situations, the new legislative framework set by the Pact on Migration and Asylum 1 introduced several new and complementary measures to ensure preparedness, contingency planning and crisis response across the EU. The Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint Operational framework 2 for monitoring and anticipating migration flows and migration situations is already in place. The Commission is monitoring the situation in relevant third countries with the support of the European External Action Service, EU delegations, EU agencies, and United Nations partners through the Blueprint Network, and exchanges with Member States within the Network. The Commission is in close contact with Member States at risk of being affected by developments in the Middle East in order to discuss operational needs and to provide support jointly with EU agencies. The Commission and the Member States have held high-level meetings and had multiple exchanges at technical level to assess preparedness, evaluate operational readiness, contingency planning and enhanced security measures. The EU will continue to provide financial and operational support to help Member States, particularly those at the external borders, address migratory challenges and stands ready to act quickly to adapt support to emerging challenges. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1351/oj/eng 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2020/1366/oj/eng”
  Asylum & border control · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2024-12-06 “E-002806/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In April 2024, the European Council reiterated the particular importance the EU gives to resumption of and progress in the Cyprus settlement talks in further enhancing EU-Türkiye cooperation 1 . This emphasises that the topic is a priority on the European agenda. In line with this political guidance, EU officials regularly raise this topic in their meetings with Turkish counterparts, at all levels. This meeting was thus not an exception. The High Representative/Vice-President will continue to reiterate the need for a constructive Turkish engagement on the Cyprus issue in all her future meetings with the Turkish Foreign Minister. The EU is fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the United Nations (UN) agreed framework, in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the acquis. It remains crucial that Türkiye commits and actively contributes to such a peaceful settlement, including its external aspects. Welcoming the recent steps taken by the UN Secretary-General towards a resumption of settlement talks, the EU remains ready to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process, with all appropriate means at its disposal 2 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2024-11-21 “E-002606/2024 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission To address decades of underinvestment in defence in the EU, in March 2024 the Commission and the High Representative/Vice President presented a European Defence Industrial Strategy 1 proposing a framework to enhance the competitiveness of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, notably by incentivising Member States to spend more, better, together and European. The Commission also presented a proposal for a European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) 2 to complement the toolbox in support of the defence industry, with a budget of EUR 1.5 billion. EDIP is meant to be a bridge towards the next multi-annual financial framework, alongside the European Defence Fund 3 , keeping on with the intervention logics of the Act in Support of Ammunition Production 4 and the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act 5 , whilst further incentivising cooperation via novel types of actions. Also, in line with the Political Guidelines of the President of the Commission, in the first 100 days of the new mandate, the Commission and the High Representative/Vice President will present a White Paper on the Future of European Defence 6 . Member States are the sole customers of defence systems and decision-makers on procurement of defence systems and their origin. Despite insufficient capacities in light of the current security situation, the EU defence industry still exports a considerable share of its production 7 . Together with Member States, the Commission will amplify its work to ensure that the EU is ready to address the most extreme military contingencies in the upcoming years. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edip-future-defence_en 3 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpageeuropean-commission_en 4 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en 5 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa-addressing-capability-gaps_en 6 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf 7 https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/facts-figures/defence/”
  Arms export from the EU · Defence spending
• 2024-11-21 “E-002609/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act 1 aims at ensuring trustworthy and human-centric AI while fostering innovation and AI uptake in the EU. The Commission is also taking additional non-legislative measures to stimulate innovation and AI uptake. The Commission is preparing the Apply AI strategy to boost industrial and public sector uses of AI: a public consultation will be launched soon. The Commission is funding AI research and development under Horizon Europe 2 complemented by the AI for Science initiative 3 . To support business deployment of AI, the Commission is building on two existing initiatives of the Digital Europe Programme (DEP) 4 : European Digital Innovation Hubs (EDIHs) 5 and Testing Experimentation Facilities (TEFs) 6 . Over 150 EDIHs have delivered over 20 000 services to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to support their digitalisation and use of AI. TEFs in four sectors (healthcare, manufacturing, smart cities and agri-food) help SMEs test AI. DEP also funds the euroLLM project 7 to develop an open-source Large Language Model that covers all official EU languages. At the Action Summit in Paris, the Commission launched InvestAI 8 , an initiative to mobilise EUR 200 billion for investment in AI, including a European fund of EUR 20 billion for AI gigafactories. This large AI infrastructure is needed for open development of AI models and to make Europe an AI continent. AI Regulatory Sandboxes will allow developers test AI in controlled conditions, facilitating compliance with the AI Act. The EU-funded ‘AI on Demand Platform’ 9 connects innovators with AI tools and expertise. The Commission is internationally promoting the EU’s approach to trustworthy AI. This includes collaboration with institutions including standardisation bodies (e.g. CENCENELEC). 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng 2 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9224c3b4-f529-4b48-b21b879c442002a2_en?filename=ec_rtd_he-investing-to-shape-our-future.pdf 3 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/research-area/industrial-research-and-innovation/artificialintelligence-ai-science_en 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/activities/digital-programme 5 https://european-digital-innovation-hubs.ec.europa.eu/edih-catalogue 6 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/activities/testing-and-experimentation-facilities 7 https://interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu/collection/open-source-observatory-osor/news/eurollm-pioneeringeuropean-open-source-ai 8 https://digital-skills-jobs.europa.eu/en/latest/news/commission-launches-new-investai-initiative-mobiliseeu200-billion-investment-ai 9 https://www.ai4europe.eu”
  Artificial Intelligence · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2024-11-21 “E-002608/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to strengthening the European film industry, notably through the MEDIA strand of the Creative Europe programme 1 , and to helping European cinema contribute to promoting European principles, values and the European way of life at the European and international levels. It does so by supporting skills and talent development, film development and production, as well as distribution, festivals, markets and innovation. The Commission also adopted a Media and Audiovisual Action Plan in 2020 2 . The Commission pursues that regulation, funding and policy effectively support each other in building a stronger audiovisual and media sector, which plays an important role in facilitating democratic debate, enriching our culture and driving the digital transformation with strong media players. While boosting the national film industries mostly falls under the responsibility of the Member States, MEDIA supports actions such as the mini-slate development targeting countries with a small audiovisual capacity and other actions increasing through cooperation the entire European audiovisual industry, thereby contributing to a level playing-field within the EU. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/818, OJ L 189, 28.5.2021, p. 34–60. 2 COM(2020) 784 final. After COVID, the Media and Audiovisual Action Plan (MAAP), has empowered the European media and supported their recovery and strengthened Europe’s cultural and technological autonomy.”
  EU and national cultural identities
• 2024-11-21 “E-002607/2024 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 1. Fair competition within the EU is ensured through a combination of legal provisions such as those laid down in the Common Agricultural policy (CAP), including the Common Market Organisation, State aid rules and competition policy, as well as trade defence rules to tackle dumped and subsidised imports. 2. The CAP plays a key role to contribute to a fair income for European farmers and increase their competitiveness in the global market. An income support is provided to farmers subject to specific conditions, as well as funding opportunities for on-farm investments, knowledge transfer activities, cooperation, risk management tools which help farmers to be more competitive, while pursuing sustainability objectives. A set of measures are available to strengthen farmers’ position in the agri-food supply chain, for which a recent amendment has been proposed 1 . All agricultural products entering the EU from any third country are also subject to the Union’s rules on sanitary and phytosanitary standards. Regular audits are carried out in third countries to evaluate the reliability of their export certification systems. Furthermore, the EU has also adopted autonomous measures to promote sustainability standards related to common concerns on health, environment, and animal welfare (e.g., EU legislation on deforestation or antimicrobial resistance). All recent EU trade agreements (FTAs) also contain a dedicated chapter on trade and sustainable development requiring compliance with social and environmental standards. In addition, the latest FTAs with Chile and New Zealand include a dedicated chapter on Sustainable Food Systems promoting cooperation on matters such as pesticides use reduction, or antimicrobial resistance. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6321”
  GMOs
• 2024-10-29 “E-002293/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is conscious of the human dimension of the consequences of the tragic events of 1963-1964 and 1974 for the population throughout the island of Cyprus. Unanswered questions, especially those about missing relatives, prevent Cypriots from both communities from leaving their painful past behind. It is crucial that the families concerned learn what happened to their loved ones, obtain their remains, and are able to organise dignified burials and mourn their passing. For this reason, the Commission has been fully supportive of the work of the bi-communal Committee on Missing Persons since 2006. The EU is the main donor to the Committee with an overall contribution of EUR 38.5 million since 2006 through contribution agreements with the United Nations Development Programme under the Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot community 1 . The Commission has allocated another EUR 2.6 million for 2025, which is scheduled to be contracted before the end of 2024. The EU’s support accounted for 80% of total funding to the Committee on Missing Persons in the period 2006-2023 2 . It has allowed the Committee to exhume, identify and hand over the remains of 1,051 persons from an official list of 2,002 missing persons 3 . It is the Committee’s role to be in contact with the two communities and the relevant authorities, including those of Türkiye, to conduct its investigations, identify excavation and burial sites, and exhume, identify, and return the remains of the missing persons to their families. The Commission stands ready to support the Committee’s efforts whenever requested by the Committee. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 of 27 February 2006 establishing an instrument of financial support for encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2667/2000 on the European Agency for Reconstruction, OJ L 65, 7.3.2006, p. 5‐8: https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32006R0389 2 Commission annual report on the implementation of the Union assistance under Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 of 27 February 2006 for the year 2023, Brussels 4 July 2023, COM(2024) 268 final: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/ca821174-2038-46c8-962b2f51dde0bde4_en?filename=COM_2024_268_1_EN_ACT_part1_v4_0.pdf 3 Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, Statistics: https://www.cmp-cyprus.org/statistics/”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2024-10-28 “E-002272/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The control on the export of arms by Member States is subject, inter alia 1 , to the Council Common Position (CP) 2008/944/CFSP 2 . Under its Article 2(5)(b), when assessing export licence applications, they shall take into account the risk of use of the items against their forces or those of other Member States, as well as those of friendly and allied countries. This also includes the potential export of the Eurofighter, which is subject to the unanimous approval of state participants of the project. The Commission has no mandate to influence Member States’ decisions in individual cases regarding their arms export authorisation. Member States continuously work in the Common Foreign and Security Policy framework to promote convergence in arms exports. The Council’s Working Party on Conventional Arms Export remains seized of arms exports to Türkiye. The EU stressed that Türkiye must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States. The EU also underlined its expectations from Türkiye to fully respect international law, to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to promote good neighbourly relations in a sustainable way 3 . The Council has taken good note of the recent improvements in relations between Türkiye and Greece in the expectation that they will be sustainable 4 . In its conclusions of 14 October 2019 5 , the Council recalled the decision taken by some Member States to halt arms exports to Türkiye. Member States committed to strong national positions on the basis of the CP, including strict application of criterion 4 (regional stability) as a basis for denying a licence, but did not impose an arms embargo. There have been no subsequent proposals to further restrict arms exports to Türkiye. 1 This includes also national legislation and the Arms Trade Treaty, https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyperimages/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008E0944 3 This was stressed by the European Council conclusions of June 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/24/european-council-conclusions-23-24-june2022/, p.7. 4 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16707-2023-INIT/en/pdf 5 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13090-2019-INIT/en/pdf”
  Arms export from the EU
• 2024-10-21 “E-002189/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s Eastern border neighbouring Russia and Belarus is being subjected to tactics of hybrid warfare, exercising pressure by weaponising migration, undermining the security of the EU. Member States have a responsibility to protect the external borders, in line with EU and international law. On 11 December 2024, the Commission adopted a Communication on countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of migration 1 , setting out the legal context in which exceptional measures can be taken to tackle this threat, including as arising from case-law, and in full compliance with EU and international law. To complete the set of legislative reforms undertaken with the Pact on Migration and Asylum 2 , the Commission works with Member States to pursue EU level responses to common challenges related to irregular migration. For instance, in November 2023, the Commission launched a Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling and proposed to strengthen the EU legal framework against migrant smuggling with two legal instruments 3 . The Commission has presented a proposal for a new Regulation on a common approach on the return of irregular migrants 4 , to increase the efficiency of the return process by providing Member States with clear, simplified and uniform rules for managing returns. 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of migration and strengthening security at the EU’s external borders, COM/2024/570 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52024DC0570 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en 3 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum rules to prevent and counter the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the Union, and replacing Council Directive 2002/90/EC and Council Framework Decision 2002/946 JHA, COM(2023) 755 final, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2023:755:FIN; and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on enhancing police cooperation in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, and on enhancing Europol’s support to preventing and combating such crimes and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/794, COM(2023) 754 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023PC0754 4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC, COM(2025) 101 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0101”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-10-21 “E-002188/2024 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The enlargement process is merit-based and depends on the objective progress made by each of the partners. The speed of the accession process depends on the speed and implementation of reforms. Credible reforms and irreversible progress especially on the fundamentals of enlargement are essential. This is at the core of the revised Enlargement Methodology 1 adopted in 2020 and continues to guide the process. The inclusion of some enlargement countries in the Rule of Law Report as of 2024 2 (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia) supports the implementation of the related recommendations under the enlargement package 3 . Other accession countries will be included in the Rule of Law Report as and when they are ready. Reaping the benefits of EU membership requires thorough preparation and the putting in place of appropriate safeguards against backsliding on reforms. The experience of the 2004 EU enlargement demonstrates the positive impact that membership of the EU single market and structural funds has on economic convergence. Accelerating socio-economic convergence already prior to accession is being pursued through dedicated instruments such as the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans 4 , as well as the association agreements, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. 1 COM(2020) 57 final. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rulelaw/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle/2024-rule-law-report_en 3 COM (2024) 690 final. 4 COM(2023) 691 final.”
  EU enlargement
• 2024-09-30 “E-001884/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and has called on Türkiye to fully respect international law, to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to promote good-neighbourly relations in a sustainable way 1 . The EU is fully committed to a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem, within the United Nations (UN) framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the EU acquis. It remains crucial that Türkiye commits and contributes to such a peaceful settlement, including its external aspects. Türkiye must normalise its relations with the Republic of Cyprus and respect the sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all EU Member States 2. The EU, including through the High Representative/Vice-President, continues to stress to Turkish officials the particular importance it attaches to resumption of and progress in the Cyprus settlement talks in further enhancing EU-Türkiye cooperation. This was emphasized in the European Council Conclusions of 17 April 2024 3 . Decisions regarding restrictive measures against companies and individuals in a third country are strictly a prerogative of the Council of the EU and, as such, are taken exclusively, with unanimity, by Member States in the Council. Currently, there are restrictive measures in view of Türkiye’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Council established the restrictive measures framework on 11 November 2019, targeting natural and legal persons responsible for or involved in the unauthorised drilling activity of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57442/2022-06-2324-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16707-2023-INIT/en/pdf 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/04/18/european-council-conclusions-on-ukraineand-turkiye/”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2024-09-25 “E-001810/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and has called on Türkiye to fully respect international law, to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to promote good-neighbourly relations in a sustainable way 1 . In particular, Türkiye must respect the sovereignty of all Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including inter alia the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 2 . According to the Commission 2023 annual report on Türkiye, there were no unauthorised drilling activities by Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean during the reporting period 3 . The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57442/2022-06-2324-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 2 https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 3 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/eb90aefd-897b-43e9-8373bf59c239217f_en?filename=SWD_2023_696%20T%C3%BCrkiye%20report.pdf”
  EU-Turkey relations