Emmanouil FRAGKOS

Policy topics Emmanouil FRAGKOS is active on

What Emmanouil FRAGKOS has said (80)

• 2026-03-09 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question The EU stands firmly and unequivocally in support of any Member State in the face of any threat. The EU strongly condemns the indiscriminate military strikes by Iran. In the context of the overall security situation within the continent and its neighbourhood, discussions on implementing Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union are ongoing. Invocation of the mutual assistance clause is the sovereign prerogative of a Member State that is the victim of an armed aggression. Moreover, it is the attacked Member State that communicates the type of assistance it requires in a given situation. This could include support at EU level, whether in terms of EU instruments and tools, or coordination support, if so requested. In this context, there is a need to develop a common understanding of the article’s implementation, specifically what could be done concretely in a situation where the article is invoked, in order for a Member State to ask for and receive help and what instruments and tools can be used in such an occasion, including at EU level, should the attacked Member State(s) so request.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · EU competences on defence
• 2026-02-28 “E-000840/2026 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission monitors the official controls performed on honey imported into the EU to verify compliance with the EU food safety legislation in general, and with Directive 2001/110/EC 1 in particular. Every consignment of honey is subject to official controls at the border control post of first arrival, including documentary and identity checks at a frequency of 100%, as well as physical checks on 15% of consignments 2 . During 2025, two coordinated measures of intensified official controls were launched at EU level 3 , with 22 consignments controlled under these measures, none of them related to Greece. 2. Directive (EU) 2024/1438 4 introduced mandatory origin labelling for honey blends and new provisions on traceability and authenticity. From June 2026, the countries of origin will have to be labelled for blends, including the percentage share represented by each country. By June 2029, the Commission will adopt delegated acts laying down methods and criteria to determine the place where honey has been harvested and EU-wide traceability requirements 5 . The Commission is also working to reinforce the capacity to detect honey adulterated with sugar syrups thanks to a project, running until end of 2026, that aims to harmonise analysis methods. The Commission has until June 2028 to adopt implementing acts laying down methods of analysis to detect adulterated honey 6 . 3. The Commission supports efforts to strengthen short supply chains and promote the consumption of local honey through the Common Agricultural Policy, which provides funding for advisory services, technical assistance, investments and actions aimed at supporting local beekeepers to improve production and quality of honey and enhance consumer confidence in local products. 1 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/110/oj. 2 Pursuant to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2129. 3 Pursuant to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1873. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32024L1438. 5 Pursuant to Article 4a (1), point (e) of Directive 2001/110/EC, as amended by Directive (EU) 2024/1438. 6 Pursuant to Article 4, second paragraph of Directive 2001/110/EC, as amended by Directive (EU) 2024/1438.”
  EU policy on country of origin food labelling · Food labelling harmonisation at EU level
• 2026-02-28 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question The rules on the assessment of applications for international protection are laid down in Directive 2011/95/EU [1] and Directive 2013/32/EU [2] . The Commission does not assess the merits of individual applications and related decisions taken by national authorities, as this responsibility falls entirely within the competence of the Member States. When applying these directives, Member States have to respect fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU [3] , including the principle of non-refoulement and the right to an effective legal remedy. The Commission may decide to follow up on an individual case if the latter reveals a general practice of incorrect application of EU law in the Member State concerned or if it relates to a problem of compliance of national legislation with EU law. The Commission closely monitors all Member States’ implementation of the EU asylum rules, including compliance with fundamental rights. [1] Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast) (OJ L 337, 20.12.2011, p. 9-26: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/95/oj/eng). [2] Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, pp. 60-95, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/32/oj). [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2026-02-20 “E-000721/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The EU Agenda for Cities 1 reinforces the approach to urban development in areas such as housing, social inclusion and equality, mobility, climate and environment. Cities and other urban areas are supported to address challenges of today. The agenda emphasises the urban – rural linkages, and the logic is also embedded in policy objective 5 ‘Europe closer to citizens’ of cohesion policy funds 2021–2027 2 . The European Urban Initiative 3 under cohesion policy supports innovation and builds capacities of cities and provides policy learning, also on the effects of ever-increasing urbanisation. The quality of life in European cities survey 4 analyses perceptions of residents on issues such as mental health, access to green spaces, earning of a living and satisfaction with urban infrastructure. As to policy action contributing to voluntary relocation and related issues, the communication on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions 5 stepped up efforts to counter the risk of growing territorial disparities caused by demographic challenges. The talent booster mechanism offers technical assistance to some of the most affected regions. The multiannual financial framework proposal for 2028-2034 identifies the ‘right to stay’ as an enabler for sustainable prosperity across all EU regions under the proposal for a Regulation establishing European fund for economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and rural, fisheries and maritime, prosperity and security 6 . 1 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information-sources/publications/communications/2025/eu-agenda-forcities-2025_en. 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/1058: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32021R1058. 3 https://www.urban-initiative.eu. 4 The survey covers 83 capital cities and other major cities in the EU, the EFTA, the UK, the Western Balkans and Turkey with a total of more than 70 000 interviews: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/informationsources/publications/reports/2023/quality-of-life-in-european-cities_en. 5 Harnessing talent in Europe’s regions: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information-sources/publications/ communications/2023/harnessing-talent-in-europe-s-regions_en. 6 COM(2025) 565 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0565&qid =1753801752960.”
  EU policy on urban development · Cohesion and rural funding
• 2026-02-18 “E-000704/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The Commission promotes Europe’s linguistic diversity and multilingualism in general, rather than prioritising individual languages. The Erasmus+ programme 1 (2021–2027) supports a wide range of cooperation partnerships and mobility actions which involve Greek organisations and produce multilingual outputs, such as learning materials, digital tools and training resources, including in Greek. For instance, 77 projects focusing on language learning included organisations from Greece. Projects are designed bottom-up by educational institutions, civil society and cultural actors, so they reflect the needs of language communities. In cultural and media sectors, programmes such as Creative Europe 2 promote linguistic diversity by strengthening the presence of European languages in the media, digital sphere and creative industries. The Commission supports the circulation and visibility of works in European languages including through translation, subtitling, dubbing and encouraging media stakeholders to adopt multilingual approaches. The proposed AgoraEU programme 3 , when adopted, will continue promoting linguistic diversity, as set out in the 2025 Culture Compass. The Commission, at the request of the Member States, has created The Alliance for Language Technologies 4 to preserve EU linguistic diversity and promote excellence in AI-based language technologies. The Commission is not considering establishing a new dedicated European body for the protection of linguistic diversity. It already cooperates extensively in this area with the European Centre for Modern Languages of the Council of Europe, since both organisations pursue similar objectives in promoting multilingualism and linguistic diversity. 1 https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/about-erasmus. 2 https://culture.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/agoraeu_en. 4 https://www.alt-edic.eu/.”
  EU and national cultural identities
• 2026-02-08 “E-000507/2026 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission Food products from third countries, regardless of their origin, must comply with EU food safety requirements laid down in EU legislation. According to Regulation (EU) 2017/625 1 , Member States must carry out risk based official controls and enforcement activities among others at the stage of distribution, including for imports. Where food of non-animal originating from third countries poses a risk, the Commission may adopt measures through Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1793 2 , including increased control frequency, sampling and laboratory analysis and special conditions governing their entry into the EU. Several products originating from Türkiye are listed in Annexes of Regulation (EU) 2019/1793. Each consignment of goods listed in Annex II to that Regulation must be accompanied by an official certificate and the results of laboratory analyses issued by the Turkish competent authority. These measures are reviewed at least twice a year and adjusted as necessary, considering new information related to risks and instances of non-compliance, including information from Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) notifications, and other available information provided by the Member States. The Commission performs audits in Member States and in third countries to ensure that their official control systems guarantee that goods intended for export to the EU comply with the applicable EU rules 3 . On 9 December 2025 the Commission announced a series of measures to strengthen import controls at EU borders and in third countries, among them (i) 50% increase of audits in nonEU countries, (ii) 33% increase of audits in EU border control posts, and (iii) training for over 600 national authority staff. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/625/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/1793/oj. 3 Health and Food Audits and Analysis https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal-topics/official-controls-andenforcement/health-and-food-audits-and-analysis_en.”
  Pesticides & trade · Maximum residue levels · Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2026-02-08 “E-000511/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission Pursuant to Protocol 10 to the Accession Act 1 , the application of the acquis is suspended in the areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 2 applies across the EU. However, the DSA itself does not regulate specific content. Instead, it imposes procedural obligations on online platforms, requiring them to have systems in place so that illegal content can be detected, flagged and addressed. Illegal content is defined in other EU laws or in relevant national legislation. At EU level, Directive (EC) 2005/29 3 seeks to protect the economic interests of consumers in the EU by prohibiting misleading advertising that causes, or is likely to cause, consumers to take a transactional decision that they would not have taken otherwise. However, for practical and legal reasons, there are difficulties to enforce the Directive if the sellers are registered in an unrecognised jurisdiction. The EU recognises only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The EU remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework, in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the acquis. It is ready to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process, with all appropriate means at its disposal. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/acc_2003/act_1/pro_10/sign/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2005/29/oj.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-02-08 “E-000509/2026 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Every life lost at sea is a tragedy. The Commission is aware of the incident off the coast of Chios and remains in contact with the Greek authorities. As per information received, an investigation has been launched by the Central Port Authority of Chios which will establish the facts and determine the circumstances of this incident. The Commission is committed to step up the fight against smuggling to prevent dangerous journeys, including through the reinforced Global Alliance as well as new tools to track digital and illicit financial activities and a new sanctions regime. In January 2026, the Commission put forward the European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy 1 which sets concrete priorities for the next five years, also focusing on the prevention of illegal migration and on breaking the business of criminal smuggling networks. The Commission is open to contribute to the debate on innovative solutions to counter irregular migration. Any such solutions must fully comply with EU law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and respect international law, in particular the principle of non-refoulement. 1 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/ce0d294e-5dd9-4e2a-bf6853d9d16fc95a_en?filename=European%20Asylum%20and%20Migration%20Strategy.pdf.”
  Asylum & border control · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2026-02-08 “Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 4.6.2026 Written question The Commission is addressing infrastructure gaps to strengthen Greek exports through the new trans-European transport network (TEN-T) Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 [1] , which establishes the Western Balkans-Eastern Mediterranean (WBEM) European Transport Corridor and mandatory standards for 2030, 2040 and 2050. Focus is placed on three pillars: 1. Completing Corridor X. Corridor X is the operational backbone linking the ports of Piraeus and Thessaloniki to Central Europe; it is the most effective way to boost the flow of Greek exports. 2. Binding technical standards. By 2030, the core rail network must be electrified, support 100km/h freight speeds, and European Rail Traffic Management System deployment. 3. Coordinated governance. The European Coordinator for the Western Balkans-Eastern Mediterranean Core Network Corridor will deliver the WBEM work plan by July 2026, seeking to synchronize cross-border investments to eliminate bottlenecks. Financial support is provided through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, the Western Balkans Investment Framework, and the Connecting Europe Facility [2] . Crucially, the new EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility [3] links funding to reforms and TEN-T compliance. Finally, the memorandum of understanding signed by Greece, Bulgaria and Romania on Enhanced Cross-Border Cooperation in the framework of the Black Sea-Aegean Sea Corridor Platform (BACP) strengthens the key north-south corridor in South East Europe. The trilateral political agreement reinforces connectivity for citizens and businesses and reinforcing Europe’s security, competitiveness and resilience across the Aegean, the Black Sea and the Danube. [1] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1679/oj. [2] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1153/oj. [3] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration · EU funding for transportation
• 2026-02-08 “E-000508/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The Commission attaches high importance to fostering youth entrepreneurship across the EU, including in the digital field. In the 2014-2020 programming period, which is currently closing, the Youth Employment Initiative mobilised over EUR 500 million to finance training, work experience and entrepreneurship support programmes for unemployed young people in Greece. Similar measures are currently funded by the European Social Fund Plus allocation (at least approximately EUR 700 million) in the 2021-2027 programming period. Furthermore, the Digital Europe Programme 1 provides funding for equipping the workforce with the advance digital skills. The education and training offer in digital areas like AI, data, computer science, quantum, cybersecurity, robotics is available throughout all Members States, with Greece well represented 2 . Under Horizon Europe, promising companies, such as Brite Hellas in Greece, are supported. In addition, the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) through its Knowledge and Innovation Communities offers a wide range of entrepreneurship activities 3 . Moreover, the EIT implements the EIT Regional Innovation Scheme, which aims to reduce Europe’s regional innovation disparities. Under the latter, an EIT Community Hub operates today in Athens. Finally, the Commission collaborates with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, for instance with the ‘Missing Entrepreneurs’ publication series 4 and the Youth Entrepreneurship Policy Academy (recently terminated) 5 , to help Member States to fully develop their youth entrepreneurship potential and hopefully reduce existing disparities within the EU. 1 Digital Europe Programme includes funding for advance digital skills topics of EUR 400.5 million in the period 2021-2027, https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/digital-europeprogramme_en. 2 Greece’s participation in the Digital Europe Programme Advanced digital skills signed grants: Greek entities are present in 26 ongoing projects out of total 59, and Greece EU funding amounts to EUR 19.46 million. 3 For information on the amount of funds committed in EIT grants towards Greek entities and key results achieved in Greece, see https://www.eit.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2025-07/Greece%202024%20Country%20Factsheet.pdf. 4 https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/the-missing-entrepreneurs-2023_230efc78-en.html. 5 https://yepa-hub.org/.”
  Research priorities within the EU
• 2026-02-06 “E-000503/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Between 2013 and 2015, the Commission investigated preliminary concerns that certain investment banks had coordinated to foreclose moves to establish exchange-based trading of credit default swaps (CDS) derivatives products but closed this investigation due to lack of sufficiently conclusive evidence 1 . In 2016, the Commission adopted a decision that rendered legally binding commitments to license inputs for CDS, offered separately by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and information service provider Markit 2 . The Commission had competition concerns relating to the licensing of intellectual property that is needed to offer trading services on the market for CDS. These concerns related to the ‘final price’, which is used to value CDS if there is a default, and to the licensing of specific CDS indices. Monitoring trustees have assisted the Commission in monitoring the compliance of ISDA and Markit with the commitments. The Commission does not have any indications of any speculative activity in the CDS market. 1 https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/AT.39730. 2 https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/AT.39745.”
  Financial regulation · Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
• 2026-02-06 “E-000504/2026 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission Within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) framework, all Member States, are obliged to ensure the effective protection of the financial interests of the Union, including, through the Area Monitoring System, required to be fully operational in all Member States since 2024 1 . IT tools available to Member States to this end, such as Arachne to score risks of irregularities, are used by the national authorities to prevent and report irregularities, including suspected or established fraud affecting CAP funds. Arachne will progressively be modernised and combine data from several databases. Member States must also perform systematic checks that target, inter alia, areas where the risk of errors is the highest 2 . Further investigations and additional checks should be conducted when warning signals or indicators pointing to possible irregularities, fraud or corruption are spotted. When the Commission becomes aware of any suspected case of fraud, corruption or any illegal activity affecting the EU budget, it informs the European Anti-Fraud Office and, if applicable, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office promptly. In recent years, the Commission has conducted numerous audits of the management and control system of the CAP expenditure in Greece, identifying several recurrent issues. Thus, the Commission requested the Greek authorities to put in place an action plan for the expenditure under the integrated administration and control system, which is currently being implemented. A second action plan addresses persistent non-compliances with the accreditation criteria 3 by the Greek Paying Agency, which was placed under probation in September 2024. One of the actions of that plan is the implementation of an effective antifraud strategy. 1 Art. 70 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116. 2 Art. 60.1 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116. 3 Annex 1 Point 1 (C) of Regulation (EU) 2022/127.”
  Agricultural funding
• 2026-02-06 “E-000505/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not have the competences to decide on the organisation of the military conscription in the Member States, this remains a national competence. The Commission, together with the High Representative/Vice-President, put forward the White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 1 . It focuses on how to support Member States in filling their most urgent and critical capability gaps, backed by funding options presented by the President of the Commission on 4 March 2025 through the ReArm Europe Plan 2 . In this regard, it proposes actions and instruments in particular to financially support Member States, increase the European defence industrial readiness and work more closely with Ukraine and other partners. On 19 November 2025, the Commission and the High Representative/Vice President adopted the Military Mobility Package 2025 3 , a comprehensive set of measures to ensure the swift, coordinated and secure movement of military personnel and equipment across the EU. The package seeks to strengthen Europe's defence posture by addressing barriers to military mobility across regulatory, infrastructure and capability dimensions - critical areas that currently hinder military transport across borders. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/white-paper-for-european-defence-readiness-2030_en. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_673. 3 https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/military-mobility_en.”
  EU competences on defence
• 2026-01-29 “PE784.580v01-00 EN E-000385/2026 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission Any food product placed on the EU market domestically produced or imported must comply with the EU’s sanitary and phytosanitary requirements 1 . These apply regardless of trade agreements with third countries such as the EU-Mercosur agreement. The EU prohibits the use of hormones for growth promotion, also to imported meat products. From 3 September 2026 2 stricter rules will apply. Food-producing animals and products derived therefrom exported to the EU must originate from animals that have never been administered antimicrobials for promoting growth or increasing yield, nor those reserved in the EU for the treatment of certain infections in humans. This requirement is applicable throughout the animal’s lifetime. For pesticides residues, the Commission established a principle that the most hazardous pesticides banned in the EU for health and environmental reasons are not allowed in the EU through imports. Several actions were already taken for this. A study informing an impact assessment was launched last year. The Food and Feed Safety Simplification package adopted on 16 December 2025 3 operationalises this principle. Updates to maximum residue levels are also continuously based on developments in international standards. These rules are enforced through rigorous border controls and regular audits on third countries. When a shortcoming is identified, the third country is required to place the necessary corrective measures. If these measures prove insufficient and there is a serious risk to human and/or animal health, the goods’ import from the third country may be suspended. EU food labelling rules apply also to all food products, including imports, and require mandatory origin labelling for certain products. On 9 December 2025 4 the Commission announced a 50% increase of audits in third countries over the next two years as well as the establishment of a Task Force to further strengthen controls on imports. 1 https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal-topics/official-controls-and-enforcement/import-controls-food-and-feedqas_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2023/905/oj. 3 COM(2025) 1021 final; COM(2025) 1030 final. 4 This was announced at the Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare’s Implementation Dialogue on import controls. https://food.ec.europa.eu/events/implementation-dialogue-import-controls-commissioner-olivervarhelyi-2025-12-09_en.”
  EU policy on pesticides · Pharmaceuticals regulation in EU
• 2026-01-29 “P-000386/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes a comprehensive approach to protect the EU’s financial system. The fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive 1 mandates the Commission to identify third countries posing a significant threat. The anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) package adopted in 2024 2 further strengthens these efforts. Türkiye’s removal from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring in June 2024 followed a rigorous process, including verification of both legislative reforms and their effective implementation, on an on-site visit to the country. While FATF removed Türkiye from its ‘grey list’, the Commission agrees that close monitoring of the effectiveness of Türkiye’s AML/CFT framework remains essential. Türkiye will continue to be monitored on this basis, including in light of future findings. As a candidate country, Türkiye remains subject to regular and structured assessments by the Commission, including through the annual enlargement country report, the latest one being issued in November 2025 3 . While accession negotiations with Türkiye have remained at a standstill since 2018, the Commission continues to closely assess developments relevant to the protection of the EU’s financial system. Against this background, and as part of its overall risk-assessment framework, the Commission keeps its list of high-risk third countries under regular review. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/849/oj/eng. 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/latest-update-anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorismlegislative-package-2024-04-24_en. 3 SWD(2025) 756 final.”
  Anti-money laundering regulation
• 2026-01-25 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The pace of progress in the accession process is based on the fundamentals cluster. The Commission is closely monitoring Albania’s progress in the areas of rule of law, fundamental rights, democracy, and anti-corruption measures. One obligation under the cluster requires the presentation of a roadmap on the functioning of democratic institutions . As stated in the Commission’s Progress Report on Albania 2025 [1] , Albania’s legal framework sets out a generally good basis for the protection of fundamental rights. The adoption in 2025 of a new law on personal data protection, as well as the adoption of implementing legislation on the rights to persons belonging to national minorities represented significant achievements. As part of the EU integration process, the Commission will continue to support the consolidation of the rule of law and judicial independence in Albania and discuss with the Albanian authorities the proper alignment with the relevant European standards in this area . The EU closely followed the 2025 parliamentary elections in Albania, including the preliminary findings of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe. The Commission will continue to monitor developments in Albania’s democratic institutions, including the adoption of further electoral reforms addressing all ODIHR's key recommendations, also those that are still outstanding from previous elections. Building on the assistance provided thus far, for example by supporting campaign finance transparency tools and the role of civil society organisations in monitoring the electoral process, targeted technical assistance will continue as relevant, notably to the Central Elections Committee. Furthermore, the Commission is also monitoring progress in the field of property rights, which is part of the fundamentals cluster. [1] SWD(2025) 750: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/albania-report-2025_en.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Albania relations
• 2026-01-25 “E-000280/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Since Russia’s unprovoked and illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU has adopted comprehensive sanctions and has suspended or terminated engagement, cooperation, programmes, and projects with Russian public bodies. Alongside sanctions and international isolation, the EU has remained committed to supporting Russian civil society and independent media including in exile, recognising the clear link between external aggression and internal repression. The EU has been providing substantial support to civil society organisations, nongovernmental organisations human rights defenders, and independent journalists. For many years, the EU provided substantial support to organisations assisting persons with disabilities and specific health conditions, despite the hostile operating ground in Russia. Since 2022 and Russian aggression against Ukraine, support to civil society and independent media is part of EU’s approach to Russia which aims to uphold democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, protect vulnerable groups, and counter state censorship and propaganda. The EU will continue to apply international pressure on Russia for its human rights violations and to support individuals affected by the repression.”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2026-01-25 “E-000278/2026 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission Compliance with EU aviation safety standards is a primary responsibility of the Greek National Competent Authority, under the oversight of the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). There are three ongoing air traffic management (ATM) related infringement procedures against Greece: on Datalink 1 , deployment of radars 2 , and implementation of performance-based navigation at airports 3 . The Commission expects the new Greek Law n°5240/2025 will provide the Greek air navigation service provider with the autonomy, resources and capabilities necessary to modernise the Greek ATM infrastructure. The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) under the Single European Sky ATM Research initiative (SESAR) is the main EU instrument for ATM infrastructure modernisation. Since 2014, Greece has been awarded nearly EUR 30 million with a 50% absorption for closed/concluded projects. Under the cohesion policy, EUR 46.3 million were spent for airport infrastructure and air safety projects in the 2014-2020 programming period, and some EUR 26 million were allocated since 2021 for security, safety and ATM systems. As part of its recovery and resilience plan 4 , Greece has prioritised EASA compliance rectification works at 13 regional airports for more than EUR 120 million 5 . The European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency monitors the use of EU funding for CEF projects, in accordance with applicable rules. EU funding for mandated modernisation is not available beyond regulatory deadlines. Since June 2025, the Commission services, supported by EASA, EUROCONTROL and the SESAR Deployment Manager, are reviewing Greece’s progress reports on its actions to achieve compliance with EU law, including its investments in critical infrastructure. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_24_4561, letter of formal notice sent on 03/10/2024. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_25_2745, reasoned opinion adopted on 11.12.2025. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2864, referral decision adopted on 11.12.2025. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resiliencefacility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en#repowereu-measures-in-greeces-plan. 5 Under recovery and resilience plan measure 16833 titled ‘Implementation of airport safety works’.”
  EU funding for transportation · EU policy on aviation safety · Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2026-01-25 “E-000279/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has expressed its concerns to the members of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) and continues to call upon OTS members to refrain from actions that might imply the recognition of the so-called, internationally not recognised, ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’. The EU recalls the commitment of the Central Asian partners to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states and recalls the reaffirmation of the strong commitment of the Central Asian partners to the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions 541(1983) and 550 (1984). Respect of these international principles remain essential to the enhancement of EU-Central Asia relations 1 . EU cooperation with Central Asia States is driven by the EU Strategy for Central Asia of 2017 2 and the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia of 2023 3 . The priorities and level of engagement of the EU with Central Asia have been further repeated during the first EU Central Asia Summit held in Samarkand on 4 April 2025 and its joint declaration 4 . The EU seeks to offer a stable, predictable and long-term framework for cooperation with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan through partnership agreements and financial instruments such as Global Gateway, improved access to the single market, as well as support for institutional and administrative reforms that strengthen the rule of law, transparency and sustainable economic growth. The EU aims to build a stable, long-term partnership with Central Asia Region through its Global Gateway investment agenda, focusing on transport, digital connectivity, critical raw materials, and water/energy/climate change. Democratic values, good governance, and institutional reforms are central to these investments. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/04/04/joint-declaration-following-the-firsteuropean-union-central-asia-summit/. 2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762300. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14587-2023-INIT/en/pdf. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/04/04/joint-declaration-following-the-firsteuropean-union-central-asia-summit/.”
  EU policy on Central Asia · EU-Azerbaijan relations
• 2025-11-28 “E-004736/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Through its programmes in Syria, the EU is committed to support an inclusive and peaceful Syrian-led transition that guarantees human rights and fulfils the aspirations of all Syrians from all ethnic and religious backgrounds. On 23 June 2025, the Council adopted conclusions 1 which recalled that human rights and fundamental freedoms must be respected for everyone in Syria, without discrimination of any kind. The EU remains attentive to the actions of the Syrian transitional authorities in ensuring the protection of all Syrians and calls for accountability, inclusivity and respect for human rights, and for the full, equal and meaningful participation of all Syrians in all spheres of political life and society. Similarly, in Lebanon, the EU support focuses on strengthening national systems of delivery of public services benefitting the whole population in Lebanon, independently from their origin and religious background. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/06/23/syria-council-approves-conclusions/.”
  EU-Syria relations · EU-Lebanon relations · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2025-11-28 “E-004737/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission closely monitors developments around corruption allegations in Ukraine. The uncovering of corruption cases in Ukraine demonstrates that anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine are delivering on their mandate and building a track record of investigations. There are no confirmed cases of EU funding being misappropriated in Ukraine. There are three main channels of disbursement of funds to Ukraine from the Commission: the Ukraine Facility 1 , the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration 2 and the European Peace Facility 3 . All budget support is disbursed to the Government of Ukraine upon the fulfilment of defined conditions, which include safeguards concerning corruption and the proper use of funds. All financial support received by the Government of Ukraine from the EU is subject to antifraud measures and provisions allowing for controls of funds, with the possibility to take corrective action if issues arise. This includes provisions allowing the European Anti-Fraud Office, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Court of Auditors to carry out any technical or financial controls and investigations that they consider necessary. In the case of the funds disbursed under the Ukraine Facility, an independent Audit Board has been set up, to provide oversight, including in the area of public procurement. Furthermore, in the context of the EU accession negotiations, Ukraine has committed to achieve high levels of alignment with relevant EU acquis in the areas of public procurement, defence procurement, audit and control systems. The Commission will continue to closely monitor implementation and, where appropriate, assess the need for adjustments on the basis of identified risks, including corruption risks. 1 OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024. 2 OJ L, 2024/2773, 28.10.2024. 3 OJ L, 2024/890, 19.3.2024.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-11-19 “E-004630/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. Greece has allocated EUR 1.46 billion from Cohesion Policy 1 to support integrated territorial strategies (ITIs), including for remote and small areas. These locally designed strategies prioritise, among other 2 , the promotion of the areas as tourist destinations. In addition, the 2023-2027 common agricultural policy (CAP) Strategic Plan for Greece also includes ‘Liaison Entre Actions de Développement de l'Économie Rurale’ (LEADER) links between activities for the development of rural economy, local development, support to investments and rural business start-ups, cooperation and technical assistance 3 . Finally, the Creative Europe Programme offers opportunities for cultural heritage which can be a driver for social and economic development, especially in rural areas 45 . 2. Greece has recently adopted its Administrative Capacity Building Roadmap under the ‘Technical Assistance’ programme, to strengthen small municipalities in preparing and implementing co-financed projects, within their approved ITIs. The proposal for the 2028-2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, foresees a budget increase and higher technical assistance rates for Interreg 6 . Interreg will continue to support territorial approaches, including smaller municipalities, and tourism. Furthermore, technical assistance is available to the Member States under the CAP Strategic Plan. 3. Under Cohesion Policy, Member States must ensure equal access to all beneficiaries. Tools such as Project Advisory Support Service Agreement and Technical Assistance and Information Exchange 7 support administrative capacity, while the Commission shares best practices, including through the CAP Network 89 , and provides advice in the Monitoring Committee on implementation and selection criteria. 1 Under the 13 regional programmes. 2 ITIs also promote accessibility and connectivity, circular and blue economy, energy and digital transition, local entrepreneurship, social infrastructure. 3 Including networking-particularly relevant for traditional rural infrastructure and soft tourism. 4 Actions such as the European Heritage Awards have been highlighting outstanding achievements in the field of cultural heritage from rural regions on a European level, thus providing best practise examples for communities facing similar challenges in Greece and beyond. Moreover, the European Heritage Label provides supports to the heritage sector through networking, capacity building and some direct funding opportunities. 5 No funding of infrastructure works. 6 Greece participates in five 2021-2027 Interreg cross-border cooperation programmes with its neighbours with whom it shares land or maritime border (Italy, Cyprus, Bulgaria, North Macedonia and Albania). Cross-border programmes covering NUTS3 regions support small-scale operations which may include beneficiaries such as smaller municipalities who would like to work with their counterparts on the other side of the border. 7 PASSA and TAIEX. 8 Technical assistance in the CAP Strategic Plan is managed in a shared mode in line with Articles 94 and 125 of Regulation 2021/2115.”
  Cohesion and rural funding · EU strategy for tourism development
• 2025-11-18 “E-004600/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission applies robust safeguards to ensure that entities involved in activities incompatible with EU values do not receive EU financial support at any stage of an award procedure. The Commission carries out rigorous selection processes, including different checks on applicants based on objective criteria, such as the exclusion criteria or the EU restrictive measures. The 2024 Financial Regulation (FR) recast 1 introduced an explicit exclusion ground on incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence, or similar activities contrary to EU values 2 . EU funded grant projects are subsequently monitored to ensure that beneficiaries respect EU values during the implementation phase, as explicitly required in the grant agreement 3 . Furthermore, the 2024 FR introduced the possibility to exclude or impose a financial penalty on beneficial owners and affiliated entities of the excluded entity that were involved in the misconduct of the excluded entity. This allows further protection of the EU budget by preventing that an excluded entity could continue to participate in award procedures, through a new company or existing affiliated entities. Based on these mechanisms, the Commission can immediately act 4 when it becomes aware of any evidence of breaches of EU values. The Commission will ensure effective implementation, including by raising awareness, establishing an internal network to exchange information, and reinforcing processes to take account of information from Member States and other sources where it can be used to assess beneficiaries’ and projects’ respect for EU values. Effective protection of the EU budget also relies on Member States actively contributing information to support the Commission’s efforts. The outcome of the review of the Anti-Fraud Architecture in 2026 will strengthen oversight and accountability to ensure a more efficient protection of the EU's financial interests. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng. 2 Article 138(1)(c)(vi) of the FR requires that such misconduct negatively affects or risks affecting the performance of legal commitments. 3 See Article 14 of the Annotated Grant Agreement (https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/aga_en.pdf). The obligation to respect EU values is also contractually extended to other persons and entities linked to the beneficiaries, such as the affiliated entities, associated partners, subcontractors, recipients of financial support to third parties. Furthermore, measures may be taken also if persons having powers of representation, decision-making or control, or persons essential for the award/implementation of the grant breached EU values. 4 As part of these measures, the grant may be suspended, terminated or reduced and funds may be recovered, and the concerned entity may be excluded from receiving further EU funds in the future.”
  Foreign interference in Europe · EU policy on Islam
• 2025-11-08 “P-004426/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Regulation (EU) 910/2014 1 clearly stipulates that the use of the European Digital Identity Wallet is voluntary. Access to public and private services, the labour market or economic activity may not be restricted or made disadvantageous for citizens who choose not to use it. Member States must ensure that alternative identification and authentication channels, including non-digital ones, remain available. It also strengthens the protection of user’s personal data 2 thereby ensuring that the personal data are not used across various services. The Commission monitors the application of Regulation (EU) 910/2014 and works with Member States and national supervisory authorities to ensure compliance. The issuance of European Digital Identity Wallets does not require the use of any personal numbers. The use of personal numbers is in the discretion of Member States. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 3 does not prohibit the use of personal identification numbers, subject to specific conditions for the personal data processing and appropriate safeguards to the rights and freedoms to data subjects in the national law. 4 All other rules of the GDPR must also be complied with, including the principles of purpose limitation, data minimisation, integrity and confidentiality as laid down in Article 5 GDPR. 1 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0910-20241018. 2 Article 5a(14), Article 5a(17), Article 45h of European Digital Identity Regulation: https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0910-20241018. 3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679. 4 Article 87 GDPR: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679.”
  Digitalization of public governance & administration · Electronic identity
• 2025-11-07 “E-004421/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission According to Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Member States are responsible for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care, including the reimbursement of treatments 1 . Therefore, it is up to Member States to decide on the coverage of treatments by national health systems. As announced in the President of the Commission’s Political Guidelines 2 and the mission letter for the Commissioner on Health and Animal Welfare 3 , the Commission will step up its work on preventive health. Under the ‘Healthier Together’ initiative 4 , the Commission supports Member States in developing and implementing actions on health promotion and prevention of non-communicable diseases. Examples include the joint actions PreventNCD 5 that addresses health determinants and MENTOR 6 that promotes mental health and wellbeing. In addition, the Commission supports the collection and sharing of proven practices via the EU Best Practice Portal on Public Health 7 . The Commission regularly exchanges views with Member States via the Expert Group on Public Health 8 on how to address public health challenges, and to promote coordination of initiatives based on national and EU priorities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2008/art_168/oj/eng. 2 Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/b628b5a2-ac1e-4b9c-bbdd35b82da0ac6b_en?filename=mission-letter-varhelyi.pdf. 4 https://health.ec.europa.eu/non-communicable-diseases/healthier-together-eu-non-communicable-diseasesinitiative_en. 5 https://www.preventncd.eu/. 6 JA MENTOR https://ja-mentor.eu/. 7 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/dyna/bp-portal/. 8 https://health.ec.europa.eu/non-communicable-diseases/expert-group-public-health_en.”
  EU competences on health · Public and private sectors role in healthcare services
• 2025-11-07 “E-004418/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The Union only has a supporting role in the area of education. In accordance with Article 165 of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union, the responsibility for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems falls under Member States’ competence. As with education, admission to a Member State’s territory as well as decisions on issuing residence permits are national competencies.”
  EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2025-11-07 “E-004419/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges the importance of reliable and comparable crime statistics for effective prevention policies and police cooperation across the EU. However, the Commission emphasises that the collection and publication of specific types of data remain within the competence of Member States, and any action in this area must respect the subsidiarity principle. Regarding the nationality of those arrested and convicted, Eurostat and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime have been conducting a joint annual data collection 1 on crime and criminal justice statistics since 2014, covering 38 jurisdictions for data from 2019 onwards. Where available, data are broken down by country of citizenship (foreigners or nationals). However, at EU level, the statistics do not contain information on the origin of perpetrators of crimes. Notably, in accordance with Article 30 of the Europol Regulation 2 , Europol may process personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin only when strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of research and innovation projects and operational purposes, within Europol’s objectives, and only for preventing or combating crime that falls within Europol’s objective. Consequently, Europol is not able to produce such information. The Commission remains committed to supporting Member States in their efforts to enhance the intelligence picture on organised crime, in full compliance with EU data protection standards. As laid down in ProtectEU 3 , the Commission will propose a renewed legal framework on organised crime in 2026 to strengthen the response. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/crim_sims.htm. 2 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), OJ L 135 24.5.2016, p. 53. 3 COM/2025/148 final.”
  Privacy & law enforcement · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-11-06 “E-004399/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The Commission agrees that cable cars can support tourism, recreation and public transport. Several EU regions and cities already have significant experience integrating them into their transport systems 1 . Cohesion policy programmes 2 can, in principle, support cable car projects in European regions and cities 3 . Under shared management governing these funds, project selection is the Member States’ responsibility, provided choices align with the respective Programme and the National Transport Plan and contribute to holistic sustainable urban mobility measures. Local authorities may also include such interventions within their Integrated Territorial Investment strategies. As a rule, operating and maintenance costs are not eligible 4 . The Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) under the Recovery and Resilience Facility Regulation 5 may also include measures regarding the installation and operation of cable cars 6 . There are no EU specific rules on the installation of cable cars. However, Regulation (EU) 2016/424 governs cableways installations designed to carry persons, ensuring a high and uniform level of safety while facilitating the free movement for components. It also establishes forms of cooperation between Member States' authorities and stakeholders primarily focused on market surveillance, safety compliance, and coordinated action against risks 7 . European cooperation on market surveillance takes place through an informal group, called Administrative Cooperation Group on the Cableways Regulation. Finally, many organisations, conferences, trade shows and exhibitions facilitate exchange of best practices and experience at international, European and national level between manufacturers and of cable car systems. 1 For example, in Toulouse (“3S”), Brest (“Bibus téléphérique”), Gaia (“Teleférico de Gaia”), or Koblenz (“Seilbahn Koblenz”). 2 A first entry point for obtaining more information about cohesion policy funding can be obtained via: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/in-your-country_en. 3 This support can cover all stages of the project cycle, i.e. studies, development, and implementation. 4 However, the specific opportunities for obtaining such support would need to be explored on a case-by-case basis. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0241. 6 For instance, Measure 16735 of the Greek RRP, which aims to improve physical access to cultural venues, including for older people and persons with disabilities. 7 More information available here: https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/mechanicalengineering/cableways_en.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration · EU funding for transportation
• 2025-11-05 “E-004381/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission In June 2025, the Commission adopted the Water Resilience Strategy 1 , with water efficiency as a key focus across all sectors in the EU, including water supply. This strategy strengthens the implementation of the recast Drinking Water Directive 2 , which was adopted in December 2020 and has since been transposed into national law by Greece. The Directive includes provisions for Member States to reduce leakage levels in the water supply chain. By 12 January 2026, Member States were required to report to the Commission the results of their assessments of water leakage levels within their territories and identify potential improvements for reducing leaks. By January 2028, the Commission will review these assessment results and establish a water leakage threshold through a Delegated Act. By January 2030, Member States that exceed this threshold must present an action plan outlining measures to reduce their leakage levels. In this context, the 2021-2027 Cohesion Policy 3 programmes support water management and water resource conservation across Greece, including measures to reduce leakages, with an EU contribution of EUR 71.7 million. In collaboration with representatives and experts from Member States 4 , the Commission has developed an indicator for water leakage levels. This indicator facilitates the use of harmonised water leakage data and enables effective benchmarking. The Commission has encouraged Member States to include this indicator in their reporting, which was due by 12 January 2026. Monitoring of and steering on this indicator should enable Member States to achieve the required water leakage level targets. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/environment/water-resilience-strategy_en. 2 Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption (recast) OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1–62. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/2021-2027_en. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expertgroups/consult?lang=en&do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3030&Lang=EN.”
  EU policy on water management
• 2025-10-29 “E-004262/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The sales descriptions to be used for drinking milk are set out in Annex VII, Part IV, point III of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 1 . Food business operators can inform consumers on the use of , e.g., a ‘low and slow’ manufacturing process and its impact on the product under the condition that this information is not misleading, ambiguous or confusing for the consumer as to the characteristics of the food – in particular as to its nature, properties, composition or method of manufacture - and, where relevant, based on relevant scientific data (Articles 7 and 36 of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 2 ). In this respect, if milk producers intend to use a ‘low and slow’ milk label, they should specify on the label that ‘low and slow’ refer respectively to the lower pasteurisation temperature and the longer duration of pasteurisation, to avoid that the terms are misunderstood as referring to ‘low fat’ or another nutritional claim or as referring to specific environmental or sustainable characteristics. The EU promotion policy 3 offers possibilities for EU producers to promote their products in the Union and around the world. 1 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/1169/oj/eng. 3 Regulation (EU) No 1144/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on information provision and promotion measures concerning agricultural products implemented in the internal market and in third countries and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 3/2008.”
  EU framework for voluntary quality and sustainability terms in food marketing · Food labelling harmonisation at EU level
• 2025-10-29 “E-004261/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission Currently there is no approved sheep and goat pox (SGP) vaccine in the EU. Nonetheless, the Veterinary Medicinal Products Regulation 1 allows Member States’ competent authorities to use a vaccine not authorised within the Union. An EU SGP vaccine bank is in place and can ship vaccines free of charge to a requiring Member State (no request received to date). Control measures at EU level for SGP are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2016/429 2 and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 3 . These measures include the immediate killing of kept animals of listed species in an affected establishment and the demarcation of restricted zones around the outbreaks. These measures are mandatory, and vaccination, should Greece decide to vaccinate, can only be applied in addition to them, not as an alternative. In addition, if Greece decides to vaccinate, it must submit a vaccination plan compliant with Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/361 4 . Then, the Commission may adopt a riskbased and proportionate plan establishing the necessary risk-mitigating measures, consistent with the standards of the World Organisation for Animal Health 5 and the treatments foreseen under Regulation (EU) 2020/687. Furthermore, the Commission continuously monitors and evaluates the implementation of EU rules through audits, ensuring they remain risk-based, proportionate and fully compliant with the EU legal framework, while safeguarding both animal health and the internal market. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/6/oj. 2 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj. 3 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/687/oj. 4 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2023/361/oj. 5 https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-do/standards/codes-and-manuals/.”
  GMOs
• 2025-10-29 “E-004260/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission EU tools and initiatives support Member States to strengthen health systems, via knowledge sharing, technical assistance, funding, policy guidance 1 . This includes country-specific recommendations under the European Semester and country-specific analyses under the State of Health in the EU process 2 . Greece can also leverage EU funding, from the EU4Health programme, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), or the Cohesion Policy Funds. The Commission verifies fulfillment of milestones and targets of measures included in the Greek recovery and resilience plan (RRP) during the assessment of payment requests submitted for the RRF. In addition, the Commission has frequent exchanges with the Greek authorities aiming at the full and timely delivery of RRP projects. Yet the implementation of RRP measures falls under Member State responsibility. Similarly, measures implemented under the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund are delivered under shared management 3 . The principal responsibility of taking appropriate measures to protect the financial interests of the Union and to ensure that the use of funds under the RRF complies with Union and national law lies with the Member States 4 . Nonetheless, Commission services assessed ‘ex ante’ each national control system and carry out ‘ex post’ system audits that also check whether Member States verify compliance with EU and national law, including State aid and public procurement rules. Hence, the Commission obtains reasonable assurance. Similarly, for the Cohesion Policy funds, mechanisms are in place to closely monitor the implementation progress of the programmes, and alignment with EU Regulations and programme priorities. 1 Please also see reply to question E-001242/2025: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025001242-ASW_EN.html. 2 Under the State of Health in the EU: https://health.ec.europa.eu/state-health-eu_en. 3 Under shared management the principle, project selection and implementation fall under the responsibility of the national authorities which operate effective management and control systems ensuring sound financial management and compliance with EU rules. 4 As provided by Article 22 of the RRF Regulation.”
  Public and private sectors role in healthcare services
• 2025-10-25 “E-004209/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission’s proposal on plants produced by certain new genomic techniques (NGTs) 1 aims at maintaining a high level of protection of human, animal health and the environment, in accordance with the precautionary principle and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It would set two distinct regulatory pathways adapted to different risk profiles of NGT plants. NGT plants equivalent to naturally occurring or conventionally bred plants in terms of modifications introduced and, therefore, of potentials risks (i.e. category 1 NGT plants) would be subject to the same safety and environmental rules as conventional plants. This is underpinned by scientific opinions of the European Food Safety Authority 2 and by the opinion of many other scientific bodies 3 . In the context of the legislative negotiations, the European Parliament and the Council did not adopt amendments to introduce risk assessment for category 1 NGT plants. NGT plants with complex modifications that would not be equivalent to conventional plants (i.e. category 2 NGT plants) would remain subject to a GMO risk assessment including environmental considerations. 2. The Commission cannot directly harmonise risk assessment internationally, but contributes actively to various international fora on biosafety 4 . An increasing number of non-EU countries regulate certain NGT plants as conventionally bred plants. In this context, the NGT proposal would help reduce regulatory divergence and protect the international competitiveness of European products. 1 COM(2023) 411 final. 2 EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms, Scientific opinion addressing the safety assessment of plants developed using Zinc Finger Nuclease 3 and other Site-Directed Nucleases with similar function. EFSA Journal 2012;10(10):2943: https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2012.2943; EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms, 2012. Scientific opinion addressing the safety assessment of plants developed through cisgenesis and intragenesis. EFSA Journal 2012;10(2):2561: https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2012.2561; EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms, ‘Applicability of the EFSA Opinion on site-directed nucleases type 3 for the safety assessment of plants developed using SDNs type 1 and 2 and oligonucleotide-directed mutagenesis’, EFSA Journal 2020;18(11):6299: https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2020.6299; EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms, 2022. Updated scientific opinion on plants developed through cisgenesis and intragenesis. EFSA Journal 2022;20(10):7621, 33 pp: https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2022.7621; EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms, 2022. Statement on criteria for risk assessment of plants produced by targeted mutagenesis, cisgenesis and intragenesis. EFSA Journal 20(10):7618, 12 pp; https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2022.7618; EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms, 2024. Scientific opinion on the ANSES analysis of Annex I of the EC proposal COM (2023) 411 (EFSA-Q-2024-00178). EFSA Journal, 22(7), e8894: https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2024.8894; EFSA, 2025. Literature horizon scan for new scientific data on plants and their products obtained by new genomic techniques (January 2022 to May 2025). EFSA Journal, 23(8), e9619: https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2025.9619. 3 SWD(2023) 412 final, Section 1 and Annex 6. 4 Such as the Cartagena Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity or relevant working groups of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).”
  New Genomic Techniques
• 2025-09-08 “E-003476/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission opened infringement procedures against Greece since this Member State did not transpose on time Directive (EU) 2020/285 (introducing changes to the value added tax (VAT) special scheme for small and medium-sized enterprises) 1 and Directive (EU) 2022/542 (which introduced changes in the area of VAT rates) 2 . Letters of formal notice were sent on 31 January 2025 3 , followed by reasoned opinions sent on 17 July 2025 4 . The Commission received replies from Greece on 11 and 12 September 2025 which are now being carefully assessed. 2. Member States have a primary responsibility to monitor the application of the relevant legal provisions and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will continue monitoring the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. The Commission aims to swiftly follow up on systemic issues involving the application of EU law in EU countries. However, one-off instances are better dealt with at national level, as long as there are available remedies, including judicial ones. In these cases, it is up to the national courts to apply and enforce citizens' rights under EU law. 1 Council Directive (EU) 2020/285 of 18 February 2020 amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax as regards the special scheme for small enterprises. 2 Council Directive (EU) 2022/542 of 5 April 2022 amending Directives 2006/112/EC and 2020/285 as regards rates of value added tax. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_25_273. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_25_1628.”
  VAT harmonisation · EU competences on taxation
• 2025-08-27 “E-003306/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recognises the importance of maintaining high hygiene standards in public toilets to prevent the transmission of microbes and ensure a safe and healthy environment for citizens. There are currently no European Standards relating to hygiene in public toilets and the Commission does not plan to implement a ‘hygiene score’. The Commission notes however that similar efforts have been made in other sectors, such as railways and mobile cabins, where standards have been developed to ensure high hygiene standards. For example, the European standard EN 17863:2023 provides requirements for hygiene and cleanliness on railway vehicles, including toilets and hand wash facilities, while EN 16194:2023 sets out requirements for mobile non-sewer-connected toilet cabins, including minimum quality requirements and on-site service standards. While there is no general guidance on hygiene available, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) offers a variety of sources regarding hand-hygiene, mainly related to healthcare settings 1 . However, it is important to promote general hand-wash and hygiene rules for the prevention on communicable diseases and educational material for the public is available 2 . In addition, ECDC promotes World Hand Hygiene Day 3 . 1 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/directory-guidance-prevention-and-control/corerequirements-healthcare-settings-0. 2 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Handwashing-poster.pdf. 3 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/world-hand-hygiene-day-2024.”
  EU competences on health
• 2025-08-27 “E-003307/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission acknowledges the importance of accessibility and basic sanitary equipment on long-distance buses and agrees that the lack of such facilities may create inconvenience for passengers. However, the scope of Regulation (EU) No 181/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 concerning the rights of passengers in bus and coach transport and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 1 does not cover this issue. Indeed, the Regulation explicitly states in its Article 2(7) that it does not introduce new technical requirements for buses. However, certain standards for toilets on buses do exist. The technical requirements for buses require inter alia toilet compartments, if fitted on buses, to have smoke detectors and not obstruct the doors, but do not regulate the inclusion or not of such facilities on-board. The Commission would also note that there is similarly no mandatory requirement for toilets on long distance trains or other passenger trains in the Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSI) established under Directive 2016/797 2 . The TSI only require that if there is a toilet on board then certain health-related and accessibility requirements are met. 2. It is for the Member States to regulate this matter, and the Commission does not at present envisage measures to establish minimum European standards for toilets on long-distance buses. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/181/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/797/oj.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration
• 2025-08-18 “E-003250/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission proposal for a Regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse 1 (the proposal) relies on a thorough and publicly available impact assessment 2 , including on fundamental rights. The proposal strives to achieve a fair balance in the protection of all fundamental rights impacted, including the right to privacy and the rights of the child enshrined in Article 24 of the Charter. Communications companies are the main actors that are capable of detecting explicit videos or videos that are child sexual abuse material. Currently companies are encouraged to do this voluntarily – a practice that has existed for over a decade and proved essential for child protection. Many major investigations in recent have succeeded thanks to this approach. Data shows that detection by companies has led to the rescue of a significant number of victims and to the arrest of perpetrators 3 . The Commission proposal for a Regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse 4 seeks to make this approach mandatory. The proposal is clearly defined, the terms are closely monitored by data protection authorities and provide guarantees. A similar approach is already being widely used to detect malware and spam. The proposal includes provisions on detection orders, which are measures of last resort when prevention measures are insufficient. They target only high-risk services, or where applicable, specific users or groups. Such orders are issued by a judicial or independent administrative authority balancing all the rights at stake and after a thorough assessment of their necessity and proportionality. The proposal is technology neutral, while acknowledging encryption as an important tool to guarantee the security and confidentiality of the communications of users. When executing a detection order, providers are required to put in place the requisite safeguards to ensure the security and confidentiality of the communications of users. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52022PC0209. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022SC0209. 3 For sample cases, see the Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022SC0209, Annex 7, p. 267. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52022PC0209.”
  Privacy & digital economy · Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2025-08-07 “E-003207/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. EU State aid rules do not apply to subsidies granted by third countries. In accordance with Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, State aid rules apply only to aid granted by a Member State or through Member State resources. 2. The Commission has several legal means at its disposal allowing the investigation of foreign subsidies or to tackle potential anti-competitive behaviour involving undertakings established in third countries and affecting competition in the EU. EU antitrust rules prohibit agreements between market operators of any nationality that would restrict competition in the EU and the abuse of dominance by market players affecting the EU market. Regulation (EU) 2019/712 1 tackles practices distorting competition between Union air carriers and third-country air carriers and causing, or threatening to cause, injury to Union air carriers. Those instruments can be activated following a thorough investigation by the Commission, based on a substantiated complaint or otherwise compelling factual, verifiable and thorough evidence of unfair competition practice. Regarding foreign subsidies, the Commission powers are prescribed in Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 2 . The Commission has so far not received any such complaint regarding the issue at stake and is not in possession of compelling evidence that would warrant an investigation under the aforementioned legal instruments. 3. Should the Commission come into possession of any such evidence, by way of a complaint or otherwise, then it would evaluate whether to open an investigation and under which instrument, in accordance with the applicable procedures. 1 OJ L 123, 10.5.2019, p. 4, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/712/oj/eng. 2 OJ L 330, 23.12.2022, p. 1, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2560/oj/eng.”
  State Aid
• 2025-08-06 “E-003189/2025 Answer given by Mr Micallef on behalf of the European Commission The Commission to supports Europe's rich cultural heritage, including sites of religious interest, and Member States in developing cultural heritage policies and initiatives. Programmes such as Creative Europe support cross-border projects in cultural heritage, notably in the areas of safeguarding, digitisation, sustainability, and knowledge exchange. Funding is allocated on a competitive basis, and interested parties can explore opportunities by visiting the official Creative Europe website: Calls - Culture and Creativity 1 . Beyond Creative Europe, the Commission’s CultureEU funding guide 2 provides details on over 75 funding sources available. Furthermore, initiatives like the European Heritage Awards provide opportunities to promote and safeguard sites of outstanding cultural and spiritual value, such as Mount Athos. As part of EU rich cultural heritage, Mount Athos is eligible to be included in European cooperation projects in which organisations – such as cultural institutions, universities, NonGovernmental Organisations, or public authorities – act as applicants. Commission services encourage Mount Athos’s Holy Community or potential applicants to contact the local Creative Europe desk 3 to receive more information on funding opportunities offered by their programmes. 1 https://culture.ec.europa.eu/funding/calls. 2 https://culture.ec.europa.eu/funding/cultureu-funding-guide. 3 https://culture.ec.europa.eu/resources/creative-europe-desks.”
  EU and national cultural identities
• 2025-08-06 “E-003188/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. An unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, to international agreements and to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Charter, as well as abstaining from unilateral actions which run counter to EU interests, violate international law and the sovereign rights of Member States, remains a requirement to ensure such a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean 1 . The delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones should be addressed through dialogue and negotiations in good faith, in accordance with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 2 , having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. The EU, through its officials, statements and reports, has repeatedly emphasised these positions, including its commitment to the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector, which is a project of common interest financially supported by a EUR 657 million grant under the Connecting Europe Facility, along with an additional EUR 100 million grant from the Recovery and Resilience Facility. The EU retains the right to use, if need be, the instruments and options at its disposal to defend its interests and those of its Member States. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-politicaleconomic-and-trade-relations-0_en. 2 https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-08-06 “E-003185/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has recurrently underlined its strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. The EU remains vigilant to any analogous attempts to influence through covert funding. The EU Security Union Strategy 1 recognises ‘hybrid threats’ as including a mixture of coercive and subversive activity by state or non-state actors aimed at influencing public opinion and policy. This encompasses illicit streams of funding, political corruption and manipulation of diaspora networks to sway decision-making both inside and outside the EU. 1 COM(2020)605 final.”
  Foreign interference in Europe · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-08-06 “E-003187/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Following a final and binding criminal conviction in appeal by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), on 6 August 2025, the BiH Central Election Commission decided to revoke Milorad Dodik’s mandate as President of the Republika Srpska entity. This decision was subsequently confirmed by the Court and is thus final. Early elections for the position of President of Republika Srpska are therefore to take place under BiH Election Law. The EU calls on all relevant institutions and political parties to facilitate the orderly and swift conduct of the Republika Srpska entity Presidential elections. Compliance with decisions of the state-level judicial institutions is a cornerstone of the Dayton agreement. The EU recalls that the sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order and international personality of BiH need to be respected. Any actions undermining these principles are dangerous and unacceptable. The EU urges all political actors to renew the country’s focus on progressing on the EU path, taking resolute actions to implement the necessary reforms.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina
• 2025-08-02 “E-003170/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Recording post-fire biodiversity disturbance is primarily the responsibility of national authorities. The Commission supports the assessment such as the European Forest Fire Information System 1 and other Copernicus services 2 , which provides harmonised data on fire extent, severity, impacts and recovery 3 . These assessments complement Member States’ obligations under the Regulation on land use, land use change, and forestry 4 to monitor and report emissions from natural disturbances 5 , as well as for wider EU frameworks under the Nature Restoration Regulation (NRR) 6 , the Habitats Directive 7 and the 2030 Biodiversity Strategy 8 . The NRR requires Member States to prepare national restoration plans, including measures, timelines and financing for restoring degraded ecosystems, including those affected by disasters. Funding is available under the EU programme for the environment and climate action 9 , the Common Agricultural Policy 10 , Cohesion Funds 11 , Horizon Europe 12 and the EU Solidarity Fund 13 . Preventive and emergency capacities are reinforced through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism 14 and rescEU 15 . The Commission is committed to supporting Member States in the development of national restoration plans, which, according to NRR Article 15(t)(ii), have to include dedicated sections to consider the potential of restoration measures to prevent or mitigate the effects of natural disasters. The EU Forest Strategy 16 fosters forest resilience while the EU Adaptation Strategy 17 also encourages Member States to integrate nature-based solutions that restore 1 https://forest-fire.emergency.copernicus.eu/. 2 Specifically relevant are European Drought Observatory and the vegetation – related products of the Copernicus Land Monitoring Service. 3 Further modules for post-fire soil erosion and recovery are currently under development. 4 Regulation (EU) 2018/841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry in the 2030 climate and energy framework, and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 and Decision No 529/2013/EU, OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 1–25. 5 Including wildfires. 6 Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869, OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024. 7 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50. 8 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/biodiversity-strategy-2030_en. 9 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life_en. 10 https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agricultural-policy_en. 11 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/available-budget_en. 12 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en. 13 For natural disasters: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/solidarity-fund_en. 14 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en. 15 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/resceu_en. 16 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/forest-strategy_en. 17 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/adaptation-and-resilience-climate-change/eu-adaptation-strategy_en.”
  Nature protection and restoration in the EU · EU policy on infrastructure for preventing climate-related disasters (floods, droughts, extreme weather etc.)
• 2025-07-28 “E-003115/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission may launch investigations on suspected breaches of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union either upon receipt of a complaint or on its own initiative, for example based on information it received from the market. When deciding whether to launch an investigation, the Commission can set priorities to make more effective use of its limited resources and focus its efforts on deterring the most harmful practices. National competition authorities (NCAs) are very often well placed to investigate suspected infringements limited to one country or area. 2. The Commission cooperates with NCAs of EU Member States, including the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC), through the European Competition Network (ECN). The ECN ensures an efficient division of work between NCAs and the Commission, and an effective and consistent application of EU competition rules. Each NCA, member of the ECN, determines its areas of activity and its enforcement priorities independently and autonomously. NCAs have discretion to decide whether to open or close an investigation in a specific sector and the Commission does not interfere with such decision of NCAs. Having said that, the Commission is aware of recent actions by the HCC in the banking sector. In December 2023, the HCC fined Greek banks for anticompetitive practices on various payment and transaction services 1 and, in July 2024, the HCC launched a, still ongoing, sector inquiry on deposit interest rates 2 . 3. The Commission and NCAs, when enforcing EU competition rules, aim to safeguard the competitive process in any sector of the economy, including the provision of banking services. Competitive markets result in lower prices, better quality of services and more choice to the benefit of consumers. 1 https://www.epant.gr/en/decisions/item/2902-decision-838-2023.html. 2 https://www.epant.gr/en/information/sector-inquiries/bank-deposits.html.”
  EU policy on banks profits · Financial regulation
• 2025-07-28 “E-003114/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission When taking action, the EU is particularly vigilant in ensuring the respect of the allocation of competences, as enshrined in the Treaties and fully respects the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. The recent initiatives put forward to address EU defence readiness do not depart from this position. In particular, proposals in support of EU defence industry are based on Article 173 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1 . Articles 42 to 46 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 2 deal with the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). More specifically, Article 42(2) of the TEU foresees the progressive framing of a common EU defence policy. Any decision leading to a common defence shall be taken unanimously by the European Council. The solidarity between Member States is reflected in Article 42(7) of the TEU, which sets out the obligation for Member States to provide aid and assistance in case one of them is the victim of an armed aggression on its territory. In accordance with Article 29 of the TEU, Member States’ national prerogative in terms of arms exports to non-EU countries are exercised consistently with Council’s Common Position 2008/944 3 , last updated in April 2025. It is for Member States to ensure that national decisions in this regard conform to that common position. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2016/art_173/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/compos/2008/944/oj/eng.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-07-28 “E-003113/2025 Answer given by Commissioner Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s Communication on a Vision for Agriculture and Food 1 sets out a roadmap to guide the Union’s activities in the agrifood sector in the years ahead. It acknowledges that a diverse and balanced nutrition can impact positively people’s well-being and health. In this context, the Commission recognises the nutritional value of animal products as a source of high-quality protein, essential minerals, and certain vitamins. The European Food Safety Authority notes that food groups such as meat and meat products, fish and shellfish, milk and dairy have significant and specific dietary functions. At the same time, it also encourages sufficient consumption of whole grains, fruits and vegetables, nuts and seeds 2 . Since the objective is to promote healthy and balanced nutrition, the Commission neither advocates for veganism nor promotes a shift towards more strictly plant-based eating habits. It shall be noted that the Commission is actively fostering policies to progress towards a future-proof livestock production system through the Common Agricultural Policy and to support research and innovation through Horizon Europe 3 . 1 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/overview-vision-agriculture-food/vision-agriculture-and-food_en. 2 https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/7259. 3 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en.”
  Nutrition · Plant-based diet
• 2025-07-25 “E-003105/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission In 2023 the Commission adopted the Communication on a comprehensive approach to mental health 1 . It supports Member States and stakeholders in addressing mental health issues through 20 flagship initiatives and almost EUR 1.3 million in funding opportunities. The Commission monitors the implementation of the Communication through a tracking framework 2 . Some of these flagship initiatives include a project with the World Health Organisation 3 to provide Member States targeted support via policy dialogues and capacity building to improve their mental health systems, a multi-disciplinary training and exchange programme for health professionals 4 and an EU support package on stigma and discrimination. The focus of the Communication is on supporting vulnerable population groups, such as children, young people and older persons. The 2024 EU4Health Work Programme 5,6 includes a grant to Member States and a call for proposals to stakeholders to support a comprehensive, prevention-oriented approach to mental health of vulnerable groups. The 2025 EU4Health Work Programme 7 includes a call for proposals on lifelong prevention for a healthy life with a focus on cardiovascular diseases, which will also address mental health. Following the adoption of the Communication, the Commission launched a call for Member States and stakeholders to submit best and promising practices on mental health 8 . 29 initiatives were identified and uploaded to the EU Best Practice Portal on Public Health 9 . These proven and concrete practices are publicly available, and Member States may choose to transfer (elements of) them at national, regional or local level. The Commission consults with Member States via the Public Health Expert Group 10 on public health priorities. 1 https://health.ec.europa.eu/publications/comprehensive-approach-mental-health_en. 2 https://health.ec.europa.eu/latest-updates/updated-tracking-framework-implementation-commissioncommunication-comprehensive-approach-mental-2024-10-10_en. 3 https://www.who.int/europe/activities/partnering-with-the-european-union-(eu)-to-tackle-mental-healthchallenges#:~:text=WHO%20is%20partnering%20with%20the%20European%20Commission%20to,to%20take %20a%20comprehensive%20approach%20to%20mental%20health. 4 https://eu-promens.eu/eu-promens. 5 https://health.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4fb8f72b-eac7-484f-9bab03c945f59032_en?filename=c2024_7871_annex_en.pdf. 6 https://health.ec.europa.eu/funding/eu4health-programme-2021-2027-vision-healthier-european-union_en. 7 https://health.ec.europa.eu/publications/2025-eu4health-work-programme_en. 8 https://health.ec.europa.eu/events/best-and-promising-practices-mental-health-2024-03-11_en. 9 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/dyna/bp-portal/submission/search?call=Mental%20Health. 10 https://health.ec.europa.eu/non-communicable-diseases/expert-group-public-health_en.”
  EU policy on mental health
• 2025-07-21 “E-003024/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has no competency to assess or intervene in Member States’ own accountability processes aimed at determining responsibility for historical events.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-07-21 “E-003022/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has reacted accordingly to developments referred to in the Honourable Member’s question. In its conclusions of 14 October 2019 1 , the Council recalled the decision taken by some Member States to halt arms exports to Türkiye. Member States committed to strong national positions on the basis of the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 2 , including strict application of criterion 4 (regional stability) as a basis for denying a licence. The EU has stressed that Türkiye must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States. The EU has underlined its expectations from Türkiye to fully respect international law, to deescalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to promote good neighbourly relations in a sustainable way 3 . The Council has also taken good note of the recent improvements in relations between Türkiye and Greece in the expectation that they will be sustainable 4 . National assessment of the Common Position criteria on a case-by-case basis has in some instances resulted in a denial or suspension of exports to Türkiye, as shown in the public online database operated by the European External Action Service 5 which reflects annual EU reports on arms export. Member States continuously work in the Common Foreign and Security Policy framework to promote convergence in arms exports. The Council’s Working Party on Conventional Arms Export remains seized of arms exports to Türkiye. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13090-2019-INIT/en/pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008E0944. 3 This was stressed by the European Council conclusions of June 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/24/european-council-conclusions-23-24-june2022/, p.7. 4 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16707-2023-INIT/en/pdf. 5 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eeasqap/sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078-f616633118bb/sheet/74299ecd7a90-4b89-a509-92c9b96b86ba/state/analysis.”
  EU-Turkey relations · Trade relations with Turkey
• 2025-07-21 “P-003025/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In June 2025, the European Council 1 addressed the worrying situation in Libya, and its possible consequences in terms of European security, as well as migratory flows. It also reaffirmed the EU’s steadfast support for Libya and the United Nations (UN) Support Mission in Libya in advancing national reconciliation, institutional unity, and a transparent, inclusive dialogue anchored in Libyan ownership and consensus. The European Council recalled that the Türkiye-Libya Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states. In its 2024 Enlargement report 2 , the Commission noted that ‘Türkiye’s lack of cooperation continued to hamper EU’s efforts to implement the UN embargo on Libya effectively’. EU’s efforts to implement the UN embargo on Libya continued to be challenged by Türkiye’s obstructive attitude towards Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI 3 , openly questioning its purpose, legitimacy and impartiality. The November 2023 Joint Communication 4 indicates that Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations and respect the sovereignty of all Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including inter alia the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 5 . The EU remains committed to defend its interests and those of its Member States as well as to uphold regional stability. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/cjtb3oep/20250626-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/2024-communication-eu-enlargement-policy_en. 3 European Union Naval Force IRINI, https://www.operationirini.eu/. 4 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-politicaleconomic-and-trade-relations-0_en. 5 https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-07-21 “E-003027/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The European list of hazardous waste was replaced in 2000 by the Commission decision establishing a list of wastes 1 . This covers products which have become ‘waste’, including hazardous waste, as defined by EU law 2 . The Commission monitors the treatment of waste in the Member States and has taken legal action against Greece for its failure to treat waste prior to landfilling 3 . The Landfill Directive’s 4 requirements for groundwater protection shall be implemented by national authorities because they are better placed than the Commission to assess the conditions on site. A permit for the landfill may not be given unless the characteristics of the site or the corrective measures to be taken indicate that the landfill does not pose a serious environmental risk 5 . The location of the landfill must take into consideration distance to waterways, water bodies, the existence of groundwater, coastal water, and the geological and hydrogeological conditions in the area 6 . During the landfill’s operation and after-care, water control, leachate management, protection of soil, groundwater and surface water shall be ensured 7 . Member States shall also ensure that all groundwater bodies achieve a good chemical status which is not deteriorated 8 and set national threshold values for certain pollutants 9 . 1 Commission Decision of 3 May 2000 replacing Decision 94/3/EC establishing a list of wastes pursuant to Article 1(a) of Council Directive 75/442/EEC on waste and Council Decision 94/904/EC establishing a list of hazardous waste pursuant to Article 1(4) of Council Directive 91/689/EEC on hazardous waste, as amended, OJ L 226, 6.9.2000, pp. 3–24. 2 Article 3(1) of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3–30, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/851 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 109–140. 3 Infringement case INFR(2021)2166, https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/search-infringementdecisions/?langCode=EN&version=v1&typeOfSearch=byDecision&refId=INFR(2021)2166&page=1&size=10 &order=desc&sortColumns=decisionDate. 4 Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste, OJ L 182, 16.7.1999, p. 1–19, amended by Directive (EU) 2018/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 100–108. 5 Article 1, 7-11 and Annex I, Section 1.2 of the Landfill Directive. 6 Annex I, Section 1.1 of the Landfill Directive. 7 Article 12-13 and Annex I, Sections 2-3 of the Landfill Directive. 8 Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73. 9 As listed in Part B Annex II, including chloride and parameters indicative of saline or other intrusions, of Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration, OJ L 372, 27.12.2006, p. 19–31.”
  Industrial emissions directive (IED) · Water pollution
• 2025-07-21 “E-003023/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s educational performance is declining, with 30% of students not reaching a minimum proficiency in mathematics and around 25% in reading and science 12 . Also, the share of top performers is steadily declining. To reverse this worrying trend and empower the education and training sector to have a stronger impact on Europe’s competitiveness, the Commission has adopted the Action Plan on Basic Skills 3 and the science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) Education Strategic Plan 4 under the Union of Skills 5 . The Commission believes that mutual learning between Member States, in combination with EU support, is key to promoting excellence in STEM education. Member States are and will be invited to coordinate the development of their national STEM strategies through the current and future European Education Area strategic framework 2026-2030, currently under discussion in the Council. A European STEM Executive Panel will advise on strategic issues and provide recommendations to foster cooperation between business and education in STEM, building on a STEM Skills intelligence. Deepening cooperation with the Education Technology (EdTech) 6 sector is key to driving innovation. In 2026, the Digital Europe Programme will fund an EdTech accelerator 7 to incubate and scale innovative EU companies, building on the Digital Education Hub Accelerator 8 which already supported innovative entrepreneurship in education, including in early childhood education. The Union of Skills announced a 2030 Roadmap on the future of digital education and skills, which will seek to establish long-term partnerships with EUbased EdTech. Erasmus+ funding can support a wide variety of projects to enhance STEM education, including competitions 9 in schools and a European STEM Week in 2026. 1 https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/881521. 2 https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2023/12/pisa-2022-results-volumei_76772a36/53f23881-en.pdf. 3 https://education.ec.europa.eu/document/action-plan-on-basic-skills-legal-document. 4 https://education.ec.europa.eu/document/stem-education-strategic-plan-legal-document. 5 https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-and-activities/skills-and-qualifications/union-skills_en. 6 Education Technology (EdTech) industry combines education and technological advances, producing and distributing software, hardware, platforms, tools and services for education and training (i.e. teaching, learning, assessment) in formal and non-formal setting. 7 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/work-programme-2025-2027-digital-europe-programme-digital. 8 https://education.ec.europa.eu/focus-topics/digital-education/digital-education-hub/accelerator-programme 9 See project example at: https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/projects/search/details/2020-1-FR01-KA202-080157.”
  Focus of EU policy on education (shaping workers vs citizens)
• 2025-05-28 “P-002152/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 1. It is the Commission’s understanding that the legal framework for the modification concerning the paying agency OPEKEPE is in preparation. The Commission has not yet received the necessary documentation to assess the legality of any decision concerning the OPEPEKE’s responsibilities. 2. Member States shall accredit paying agencies which comply with minimum conditions for the accreditation to ensure that funds are managed properly 1 . The issuing, reviewing and withdrawing the accreditation of a paying agency are the responsibility of the Member State’s competent authority 2 . To date, the Commission has not received official notifications of the decisions regarding the paying agency or the role of the Independent Authority for Public Revenue (IAPR) in this context, as the legal framework for the modification is still in preparation. 3. In September 2024, upon request of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, the Greek competent authority has put the paying agency OPEKEPE’s accreditation on probation, and an action plan was designed to address the deficiencies identified. The Commission is working closely with the Greek authorities in this context to ensure full and timely implementation of this plan, also considering the possible impact of the modification of competences ongoing in Greece. 1 Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 187–261. 2 Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116.”
  Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1) · Agricultural funding
• 2025-05-23 “E-002091/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission Greece is an active user of Copernicus Emergency Management Services (CEMS) 1 , including its on-demand mapping services. For example, in 2024, the Greek national civil protection authority, which is the national CEMS’ focal point, activated the rapid mapping service 14 times. For the time being, the Commission has not yet received a request from the Greek national civil protection authorities for CEMS risk and recovery services to monitor land deformation or for drawing up evacuation plans for a potential future incident in Santorini. However, Greece is aware of this option and has used this service in the past to develop, amongst others, evacuation plans, for example for two United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization World Heritage sites (Delphi and Ancient Olympia), and to assess their exposure to several hazards, including earthquakes. Under its Cohesion Policy thematic and regional programmes for the 2021–2027 period, Greece earmarked approximately EUR 130 million for the prevention and management of non-climate-related risks, such as earthquakes. In accordance with the shared management procedures, the selection of specific projects is a national competence. 1 https://emergency.copernicus.eu/.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-05-22 “E-002081/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of public reports concerning foreign influence operations in various countries. The Commission has put in place a comprehensive set of preventive and investigative mechanisms to combat fraud and corruption, including stringent internal controls, regular audits, transparency rules, and cooperation with bodies such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The EU Security Union Strategy 1 recognises ‘hybrid threats’ as including a mixture of coercive and subversive activity by state or non‑state actors aimed at influencing public opinion and policy while remaining below the threshold of declared warfare. This encompasses illicit streams of funding, political corruption and manipulation of diaspora networks to sway decision‑making both inside and outside the EU. The ProtectEU Internal Security Strategy 2 establishes a pan-EU, country-neutral framework – mainstreaming security impact assessments into all Commission policy-making, enhancing cross-agency anti-money laundering and anti-fraud cooperation (the Authority for AntiMoney Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, OLAF, the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, and the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation) and underpinning a harmonised anti-corruption directive – to detect and counter any illicit foreign or domestic influence, including that alleged of Türkiye. The Commission remains vigilant to any analogous attempts to influence EU policy through covert funding or corruption channels, including via foreign broadcasters, cultural agencies or financial institutions operating in Member States. 1 COM(2020) 605 final. 2 COM(2025) 148 final.”
  EU-Turkey relations · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-05-16 “E-001984/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU acknowledges the importance of education as a tool to combat discrimination and intolerance. In this respect, the EU is aware of the issue of religious content in non-religious school textbooks, as well as the potential discrimination against religious minorities. Pakistan has taken steps to revise teaching material and to remove religious references in school curricula and teaching materials on non-religious subjects in line with Article 22 of the Constitution of Pakistan. However, the EU believes that Pakistan needs to continue these efforts in order to address root causes of religious discrimination. Freedom of religion or belief is one of the key issues the EU discusses with Pakistan. In this context, the EU also addresses the topic of religious content in non-religious curricula and school textbooks. The Special Envoy on freedom of religion or belief raised the issue during a visit in September 2024. Core conventions on human rights cover, amongst others, access to education and non-discrimination of religious minorities. These conventions need to be observed in order for Pakistan to obtain a reduction in duties for a wide range of products entering the EU market. For this reason, the topic of Islamic religious reference in teaching material on non-religious subjects was mentioned in the latest Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus monitoring report of November 2023 1 and is part of the ongoing monitoring process. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2023)363&lang=en, p.9.”
  EU policy on Islam
• 2025-05-06 “E-001824/2025 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing Regulation’s 1 main pillars (IUU catch certification and dialogues) serve to prevent IUU fish from entering the EU market, thus contributing to implement a level playing field for legitimate operators within the EU and outside. Also, the revised Control Regulation 2 enhances the control of the supply chain and traceability requirements of fishery and aquaculture products, including imports. The catch certificate ensures legality of imported fish. The revised IUU Regulation obliges EU importers and authorities, as of 10 January 2026, to use CATCH, an EU IT system digitising the paper-based system, to stop fraudulent use of catch certificates, ease controls and risk identification, and harmonise import controls, enhancing the level playing field for EU operators and defending our market from unfair competition. The EU also promotes its standards, including on fisheries control, in international fora such as the Regional Fisheries Management Organisations or in its relations with neighbouring fishing nations. 2. The EU has strict controls on imported food to ensure high consumer protection and food safety. In other areas, consumer awareness of the higher standards of EU production can give a competitive edge to EU aquaculture over products from third countries not complying with similar standards 3 . The level playing field regarding imported fisheries and aquaculture products is also part of the evaluation 4 of the CFP Regulation 5 . As regards imports of aquaculture products, the Commission can use trade defence instruments, among other things targeting subsidies, to protect the EU single market from trade distortions 6 . Anti-subsidy measures are already in place on imports of trout from Türkiye. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 1447/1999: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/1005/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202302842. 3 This is one of the key objectives of the ongoing communication campaign on EU aquaculture. 4 https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-opens-public-consultation-common-fisheriespolicy-regulation-2025-01-27_en. 5 Including the Common Market Organisation. 6 In line with the World Trade Organization’s rules on subsidies.”
  Environmental regulation of fisheries · Funding for fisheries and aquaculture
• 2025-05-05 “E-001810/2025 Answer given by Mr Micallef on behalf of the European Commission Sport plays a powerful role in promoting peace, respect, and understanding within societies. By teaching us to follow rules, respect opponents, and reject violence, it contributes meaningfully to human rights and peaceful coexistence. As the world’s foremost sporting event, the Olympic Games symbolise these values and have the unique ability to bring people together across borders and differences. The Commission believes that international sporting events, including the Olympic Games, must not be used for political propaganda by regimes engaged in wars of aggression in violation of international law. At the same time the Commission fully supports the autonomy of the sporting movement and the universal right of individual athletes, to participate in such events and takes note of the decision of the International Olympic Committee to allow athletes from Russia and Belarus to compete in the Paris 2024 Olympic Games.”
  EU-Belarus relations · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-05-05 “E-001811/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The fall of the Assad regime signals a moment of hope for the Syrian people. In this critical period, the EU supports an inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned transition, guided by the respect for international law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, pluralism and tolerance across the Syrian society. The EU was gravely alarmed by the widespread violence in Syria’s coastal region and in other areas around Damascus in spring 2025 and strongly condemned the horrific crimes against civilians 1 . In parallel, the EU introduced individual listings against those responsible for human rights violations. It continues to call for an immediate end to violence across Syria and remains attentive to the actions of the transitional authorities in ensuring the protection of Syrians from all ethnic and religious backgrounds without discrimination. In this context, the EU welcomes the transitional authorities’ decision to establish an investigative committee and the subsequent formation of the National Authority for Transitional Justice as well as the National Authority for Missing Persons in Syria. These are important steps towards the comprehensive justice and truth which the Syrian people deserve. The EU will follow closely their implementation. The EU continues to be a staunch supporter of accountability mechanisms working on Syria, including the impartial and independent mechanism, the Commission of Inquiry, and the new Independent Institution on Missing Persons. Everything must be done to prevent such crimes from happening again. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesperson-establishment-national-authority-transitionaljustice-and-national_en.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU-Syria relations
• 2025-05-02 “E-001799/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission In the European Climate Risk Assessment (2024) 1 there is information on sea level rise and its impacts. Also, in the first Assessment Report (2024) 2 of the Knowledge Hub on Sea Level Rise an overview of the impacts in Europe is provided. In addition, as addressed in the Climate Law 3 as well as the Guidelines on National Adaptation Strategies 4 , Members States are supposed to execute robust climate change and vulnerability analyses and use the outcome as a base for their national adaptation strategies and plans. Through the Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change 5 the Commission is helping regional and local authorities to become climate resilient. This encompasses providing tools for climate risk assessment as well developing adaptation measures in coastal areas. In its Communication ‘The road to the next Multiannual Financial Framework’ 6 the Commission highlighted in February 2025 the increasing impacts of climate change in Europe that require stepping up work on climate and water resilience and preparedness. The Commission plans to put forward a proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework in the third quarter of 2025. The Commission will also step up support to implement adaptation strategies and planning, notably through the upcoming EU climate adaptation plan, foreseen for 2026. 1 European Environment Agency, European Climate Risk Assessment (2024) - https://climateadapt.eea.europa.eu/en/eu-adaptation-policy/key-eu-actions/european-climate-risk-assessment. 2 Knowledge Hub on Sea Level Rise, ‘Sea level rise in Europe’(2024), https://sp.copernicus.org/articles/spslre1.pdf. 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 ‘Climate Law’, Article 5.4. 4 Commission Notice Guidelines on Member States’ adaptation strategies and plans 2023/C 264/01 https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EL/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023XC0727%2801%29. 5 https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/mission/the-mission. 6 (COM(2025)46).”
  Climate efforts · EU policy on infrastructure for preventing climate-related disasters (floods, droughts, extreme weather etc.)
• 2025-04-28 “E-001699/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes a comprehensive approach to protect the EU from financial crime. The anti-money laundering (AML/CFT) Directive 1 includes the obligation to identify third countries posing significant money laundering risks. The AML package adopted in 2024 2 further strengthen these efforts inter alia by establishing mechanisms to better identify and manage risks from third countries. The Commission engages in depth with candidate countries on topics related to organised crime, corruption and drug trafficking in the context of the negotiations on accession, which offers a direct and operational framework to engage with Türkiye. Risks stemming from Türkiye and in the non-government controlled areas of the Republic of Cyprus are part of these on-going discussions with Türkiye. As member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Commission is fully aware of Türkiye’s compliance levels on AML/CFT, including its efforts to address any concerns through tangible actions, and of the risks associated with the non-government controlled areas as highlighted in the evaluation reports concerning Cyprus. While FATF removed Türkiye from its "grey list" of countries in June 2024, the Commission agrees that close monitoring of the effectiveness of Türkiye’s AML/CFT framework is essential. In line with the EU methodology for identifying high risk third countries 3 , as regards any candidate country, the Commission may consider mitigating measures included in the accession negotiations that address the identified strategic deficiencies. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/849/oj/eng. 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/latest-update-anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorismlegislative-package-2024-04-24_en. 3 SWD(2020) 99: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f745b6e8-735b-4855-b050f52276356fe6_en?filename=200507-anti-money-laundering-terrorism-financing-action-planmethodology_en.pdf.”
  Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass) · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-04-28 “E-001701/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission During the period of the economic adjustment programmes (2010-2018), Greece implemented a wide range of fiscal and structural reforms aimed, among others, at improving the efficiency of public finances. Among these measures was the gradual elimination of reduced VAT rates for certain economically rich islands in the Cyclades, as part of a broader reform of simplifying the VAT structure, broadening the tax base, and eliminating various exemptions. It is noteworthy that the Ionian islands never benefited from reduced VAT rates, while the islands of Leros, Lesvos, Kos, Samos and Chios maintained reduced VAT rates. Following Greece’s successful completion of the financial assistance programmes, the country returned to normal economic governance under the European Semester framework. As such, decisions on tax policy fall entirely under the competence of the Greek authorities but need to comply with the rules set out in Council Directive (EU) 2022/542. The EU continues to provide targeted support to Greek islands through various instruments, including the Cohesion Policy Funds. As announced in the Communication on ‘A modernised Cohesion policy: The mid-term review’, to support islands in addressing their challenges, the Commission will also launch a consultation on the development of a Strategy for Islands. Member States are free to design their tax systems, including how to determine the tax base and tax rates as well as appropriate incentives and tax breaks for taxpayers, as long as they respect primary and secondary EU law. Such policies must be designed carefully taking into account effectiveness, fairness, their fiscal impact and with minimal compliance costs.”
  Cohesion and rural funding · Funding for OCTs and outermost regions
• 2025-04-25 “E-001681/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The protection of personal data in the EU is ensured by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 1 which applies to both public and private organisations in the EU. Genetic data fall within the special categories of personal data which can be processed only if one of the conditions in Article 9(2) GDPR is fulfilled. This provides an additional layer of protection considering the potential risks arising from the processing of this type of data. Following the GDPR risk-based approach, controllers and processors must put in place adequate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk (Articles 5(1)(f) and 32 GDPR). If the envisaged processing is likely to result in a high risk, the controller has to conduct a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA), and in some situations, to consult the competent Data Protection Authority (DPA). In line with Article 28 GDPR, the controller has to choose a processor that provides sufficient guarantees in terms of data protection. The binding contract or other legal act governing their relationship shall stipulate, among others, that the processor must ensure that its staff authorised to process the data have committed themselves to confidentiality. The GDPR does not impose the public disclosure of the contract, nor the funding. It follows that the Greek public authority, acting as controller, is responsible for ensuring that the data processing for the preventive screening meets the GDPR standards. The monitoring and enforcement of the application of the GDPR falls within the competence of the national DPAs and courts, without prejudice to the Commission’s competences as guardian of the Treaties. It is therefore for the Greek DPA to examine whether the ‘programmatic agreement’ complies with the GDPR. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (GDPR), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88.”
  Processing of health data · Public and private sectors role in healthcare services
• 2025-04-21 “E-001584/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), through the Strategic Plans Regulation 1 , includes a range of tools that allow farmers and Member States to develop production (including of aromatic and medicinal plants) ensuring the viability and competitiveness of farms. In the Greek CAP Strategic Plan (CSP) 2 , a Basic Income Support with a total amount of EUR 4 274 574 890.is paid to all eligible farmers. The unit amount, per eligible hectare in the agricultural area of arable crops, is set to EUR 215. An increased support for small/medium farms and young farmers with bigger income support needs with a total amount of EUR 913 297 896 is also programmed under the CSP. Farmers may participate on a voluntary basis in the eco-schemes relevant to medicinal and aromatic plants with different support rates (e.g. organic farming: EUR 1 295/hectare/year, use of resistant and adapted species and varieties: EUR 824/hectare/year). Furthermore, under the rural development interventions, investment support is available to modernize or improve production, aiming to improve economic efficiency, and competitiveness of agricultural holdings to quickly adapt to market needs and to increase their market orientation. In addition, support is programmed for investments in the processing/marketing and/or development of several agricultural products, including medicinal and aromatic plants, aiming to produce quality products, increasing their added value, as well as helping to enter new markets. Finally, the CSP provides support for interventions for producer organisations (EUR 31 million), quality schemes (EUR 41 million), training (EUR 108 million) and advisory services to farmers (EUR 63 million). 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 (OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1). 2 CAP strategic plan of Greece: https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/category/sskap-2023-2027/sskap-egkrisitropopoiiseis/.”
  Agricultural funding · Export of EU agri-food products
• 2025-04-21 “E-001586/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Since 2007, Türkiye has benefited from Instrument for pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) funds. These funds aim at supporting Türkiye’s alignment with the EU acquis, reforms for sustainable socio-economic development, competitiveness and growth, including environment, climate and transport. EUR 4.8 billion was provided under IPA I (2007-2013) and EUR 3.3 billion under IPA II (2014-2020). In view of backsliding on reforms and with the accession negotiations being effectively at a standstill since 2018, under the current financial framework, the EU has significantly reduced financial support compared to the previous period: EUR 1.5 billion is foreseen under IPA III (2021-2027). Since 2011, a significant part of the support to Türkiye related has been provided in support of refugees and host communities in Türkiye (EUR 12.5 billion).”
  EU enlargement · EU-Turkey relations · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-04-21 “E-001580/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission In the 2024 Report 1 , the Commission noted that Albania’s alignment with the EU acquis on nature protection is advanced but expressed concerns about legislative changes made by Albania in the same sector which risk compromising Albania’s ecological and biodiversity value including potential Natura 2000 sites, in conflict with EU standards. These entail the extension of the 2015 legislation on strategic investments and its potential biodiversity which may lead to tourism or industrial investments in protected areas, and amendments to the Law on Protected Areas to permit activities like water extraction for irrigation and construction of tourist resorts within those areas. The Commission attaches great importance to the rule of law, which is a fundamental part of Albania’s accession process and is monitored in the context of Cluster 1 – Fundamentals and the Annual Rule of Law Report, as well as to environmental protection, which is monitored under negotiation Cluster 4 - Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity. Through the enlargement process and the EU-Albania Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 2 , the Commission is and will continue to closely follow the consolidation of rule of law rights in Albania, including property rights, as well as environmental protection. In the SAA subcommittee meeting on transport, environment, energy and regional development which took place on 24 June 2025, the Commission enquired with the Albanian authorities about alignment with the nature protection acquis and the Llamani Beach case, on which the Commission remains in contact with the Albanian authorities. 1 Albania 2024 Enlargement Report, SWD(2024) 690 final, p. 17-18; 85-86, available at https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a8eec3f9-b2ec-4cb1-87489058854dbc68_en?filename=Albania%20Report%202024.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02009A0428%2802%29-20210901.”
  EU-Albania relations · EU enlargement
• 2025-04-21 “E-001582/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1.According to the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 1 , works for the transfer of water resources between river basins where that transfer aims at preventing possible shortages of water and where the amount of water transferred exceeds 100 million cubic metres/year must first be assessed for their impact on the environment. It is the responsibility of the competent authorities to ensure that this assessment is done. 2. An artificial lake can be designated as a Natura 2000 site under the Birds 2 or Habitats 3 Directives, if the criteria therein are fulfilled. The Commission has no data that would suggest the need for lake Kremasta to be included in the Natura 2000 network. The EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 4 provides that by 2030, 30% of the EU land and 30% of EU marine area should become legally protected and one third of this (10% of EU land and 10% of EU marine area) should become strictly protected. It is Member States’ national competence to designate additional protected areas to contribute to this voluntary target. However, it should be noted that the Natura 2000 site ‘Koilada Acheloou Kai Ori Valtou’ depends on the status of lake Kremasta. 3. According to information provided by the Greek authorities 5 , Lake Kremasta is in good ecological potential under the Water Framework Directive (WFD) 6 . Changes in the hydrological conditions, such as those that could be due to the transfer of water to the artificial lake of Marathon, cannot lead to a deterioration of ecological potential, unless the competent authorities can duly invoke the exemption included in Article 4(7) of the WFD and meet all the strict conditions listed therein. 1 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1–21, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014, OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1–18. 2 Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds, OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7–25. 3 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50. 4 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/biodiversity-strategy-2030_en. 5 https://cdr.eionet.europa.eu/gr/eu/wfd2022/documents/el04/envzjdu3g/EL04_2REV_SDLAP_signed.pdf. 6 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32–35.”
  EU policy on water management
• 2025-04-21 “P-001585/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission According to Article 20(1) of Directive (EU) 2016/798 1 , it is the Member State’s obligation to ensure that an independent investigation is carried out after any serious rail accident on the Union rail system. The European Union Agency for Railways can only assist in an investigation at the request of a national investigation body, which was the case for the Tempi accident. The Agency however cannot replace the national investigation body in its role. On 16 December 2024, the Commission has opened infringement proceedings against Greece for failure to align with the requirements of Directive (EU) 2016/798 (INFR(2023)2036 2 ). The infringement addresses several long-standing systemic shortcomings in the functioning of the Greek rail system, identified during an audit by the European Union Agency for Railways. Most of these shortcomings were recently also confirmed in the Tempi accident investigation report prepared by the Hellenic Air and Rail Safety Investigation Authority (HARSIA). The Greek authorities have already on 3 April 2024 prepared an Action Plan to address the identified shortcomings, which is now being implemented. The Commission monitors progress of this implementation on the basis of regular reports received from Greece. In case the progress is deemed unsatisfactorily, the Commission will take all the necessary measures. 1 Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on railway safety, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/798. 2 See associated press release https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_24_6006.”
  EU support of rail transport · EU policy on aviation safety
• 2025-02-22 “E-000817/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Respect for the rule of law and the fight against corruption are clear Commission priorities, reinforced in the 2024-2029 Political Guidelines. Through its annual Rule of Law Report 1 , the Commission carefully monitors developments in all Member States, including Greece, on matters pertaining to the anti-corruption framework amongst others. In the 2024 Rule of Law report on Greece 2 , the Commission recommended that Greece continue efforts to establish a robust track record of prosecutions and final judgments in corruption cases, including highlevel corruption. The prosecution services identified a number of challenges to investigate corruption and economic crime. The Commission will continue to monitor and assess developments in Greece during the 2025 rule of law reporting cycle. The Commission has also been working to strengthen the EU legislative and policy framework against corruption. The package 3 it adopted in May 2023 includes a legislative proposal to modernise the current EU rules on corruption and provide law enforcement and prosecutors with the tools to fight corruption in all EU countries. The Commission is hopeful that the European Parliament and the Council will soon come to an ambitious agreement on this proposal that would be instrumental in strengthening the fight against corruption in each Member State and across the EU. 1 2024 Rule of law report - Communication and country chapters https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2024-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en 2 2024 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Greece https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/6741f4b2-6a10-44ba-b40c97a5a38e6827_en?filename=21_1_58062_coun_chap_greece_en.pdf 3 Anti-corruption: Stronger rules to fight corruption https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2516”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
• 2025-02-22 “E-000818/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission One of the Commission's primary energy policy objective is to successfully implement the RepowerEU plan 1 , which entails phasing out Russian energy imports to the EU. The expiry of the gas transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine end of 2024 resulted in the reduction of Russian gas imports to the EU by approximately 15 billion cubic meters per year. To ensure security of supply, the Commission has prepared for months, together with Member States, in anticipation of the end of transit via Ukraine, focusing on securing alternative routes and supplies. Notably, the Commission identified and incentivised Member States to utilise four diversification routes 2 with sufficient capacity, via Germany, Italy, Poland, and Greece. By doing so, the Commission effectively facilitated the EU's transition towards a more diversified and resilient energy landscape, acting first and foremost in the interest of Member States with fewer supply alternatives. The Commission did not intervene in Ukraine’s sovereign decision not to renew its transit agreement with Russia, neither did it intervene in the redirection of volumes via the Turkstream. The end of transit has caused Russia to lose approximatively USD 6.5 billion 3 per year, when the loss of revenues from the transit is estimated at USD 450 million for Ukraine per year. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereuaffordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en 2 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e8a46964-f29b-44f8-9410-689f9e34463b_en 3 ‘Breaking the link: The cost of shutting down Europe’s last Russian gas pipeline’, 13 January 2025, Stockholm School of Economics.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Natural gas
• 2025-02-13 “E-000694/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Human rights and the rule of law in Azerbaijan remain a priority for the EU and are at the core of the EU-Azerbaijan bilateral relations. The EU has repeatedly voiced concerns regarding the unsettling rise of arrests of independent journalists, human rights defenders, and political activists 1 . The EU has called on the Azerbaijani authorities to ensure that their actions adhere to the relevant obligations under domestic and international law. In this context, the EU has consistently called for the release of all persons imprisoned for exercising their fundamental rights. These messages have been conveyed publicly and bilaterally at all levels, including at the level of the High Representative/Vice-President. EU engagement with Azerbaijan remains instrumental in order to promote peace, stability and prosperity in the South Caucasus through regional cooperation, including in the context of the normalisation process between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The HRVP has welcomed the recent finalisation of negotiations between the two countries on a bilateral peace treaty and has called on them to keep this momentum and ensure the smooth completion of this process 2 . 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/azerbaijan-statement-spokesperson-human-rights-situation_en; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2024-10-22-ITM-020_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2024-12-18-ITM-019-03_EN.html 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/t%C3%BCrkiye/armeniaazerbaijan-statement-high-representativevicepresident-regarding-finalisation-negotiations_en?s=230”
  EU-Azerbaijan relations · EU-Armenia relations
• 2025-02-04 “P-000491/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is closely following developments throughout Syria and supports an inclusive Syrianled and Syrian-owned transition process, guided by the respect for international law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, pluralism and tolerance among all components of society. The interim leadership will be judged on their actions. The EU listing of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and its leaders is a transposition of the restrictive measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), therefore any change in the listing status is a matter for the UNSC. The suspension of other, sectoral, EU sanctions on Syria will be rolled out in a staged and reversible manner, whilst regularly assessing whether further suspension remains appropriate based on close monitoring of the situation on the ground. The EU remains strongly engaged in the fight against Da’esh and its affiliates, including in the framework of the Global Coalition against Da’esh 1 . The EU is particularly concerned by the current situation in the northeast of Syria, and how this might impact on the stabilisation and the future of the country. The EU is addressing the identified risks through counter-terrorism cooperation with regional partners, through its multilateral engagement with the UN and as co-chair of the Global Counterterrorism Forum 2 , through security measures, support for repatriation, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes as well as through funding programmes to prevent and counter violent extremism, radicalisation and propaganda. The EU welcomes the founder of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) recent call to the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve. Finding a fair and lasting solution, respecting fundamental rights and the rule of law, would not only benefit all Turkish citizens but would also contribute to stability in the entire region. 1 https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/ 2 https://www.thegctf.org/”
  EU-Syria relations · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-02-02 “E-000440/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission attributes great importance to the preservation of cultural heritage in the EU. In accordance with Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Commission encourages and promotes cooperation among Member States with a view to conserving and safeguarding cultural heritage. The returns mechanisms under the Directive 2014/60/EU 1 are not applicable for cultural objects unlawfully removed before 1 January 1993, namely those removed during the 19 th century, as in the situation described by the Honourable Member. While this Directive has no retroactive effect, Member States may apply on a voluntary basis its Article 15(2) arrangements to requests for the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed prior to 1 January 1993. The Commission has no current plans to revise the Directive 2014/60/EU or to adopt specific tools to support goodwill movements, while it remains committed to supporting cultural heritage initiatives. 1 Directive 2014/60/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 (Recast), OJEU L159/1 of 28 May 2014.”
  EU and national cultural identities
• 2025-01-28 “E-000388/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The presence of the British troops in Cyprus is regulated by the 1960 Agreement 1 establishing the Republic of Cyprus concluded between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), Greece, Türkiye of the one part and the Republic of Cyprus of the other part, and therefore not a subject of discussions between the EU and the UK. The EU works closely with the UK on many issues and regularly exchanges with British officials, including on the operation of the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). Following the UK’s withdrawal, the EU has been protecting the interests of Cypriot citizens living and working in the SBAs. In this context, the Commission is in charge of the implementation of the Protocol No 3 on the Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Cyprus 2 . The aim of the Protocol is to ensure that EU law, in the areas stipulated in Protocol 3 to Cyprus’ Act of Accession to the EU, will continue to apply in the SBAs. The territory of the SBAs continues to be part of the customs territory of the EU. The EU is fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the United Nations (UN) framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded and the EU acquis. 1 https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/cy20gr20tr600816treaty20of20guarantee.pd f 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/acc_2003/act_1/pro_3/sign/eng”
  EU-UK relations · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-01-28 “E-000387/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Audiovisual Media Services Directive 1 obliges Member States to ensure that audiovisual media services do not incite to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of a group based on any of the grounds referred to in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2 . In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission monitors the correct implementation of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive by Member States and, when needed, may decide to take appropriate action. It is national authorities’ primary responsibility to assess the compliance of media programmes with the relevant legal requirements. The investigation and prosecution of individual cases of alleged hate speech remains a competence of national authorities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2018.303.01.0069.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2018:303:TOC 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-01-20 “E-000222/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission Cohesion policy supports disaster prevention and preparedness measures in the 2021-2027 period, including those addressing flood risk. Moreover, as indicated in the Common Provisions Regulation 1 , all EU-funded infrastructure that has an expected lifespan of at least 5 years must undergo a climate proofing assessment. This procedure, carried out at the project level, ensures that new infrastructure is adapted to the climate risks of the territory, including, in certain cases, to flood risk. The Commission is also aware of the need to address the increasingly frequent and intense climate-related disasters. Therefore, RESTORE (Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction) 2 provides additional assistance to Member States affected by disasters in 2024 and 2025, helping them to quickly mobilise cohesion policy funds for disaster reconstruction and resilience interventions. It should be noted that under shared management, it is the Member States responsibility to select and carry out the projects that are in line with the programme agreed with the Commission, and that all resources must be used before the end of 2029. Discussion between the Commission and the Member States on progress of investments takes place regularly in the context of the monitoring committees, which must take place at least once a year for every programme, and of the annual review meeting of all programmes once a year. In addition, under the Floods Directive 3 , all EU countries are required to assess all areas where significant floods could take place, map the flood extent, assets and humans at risk in these areas and take adequate and coordinated measures to reduce this flood risk. 1 Article 73(2) - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02021R1060-20240630 2 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/whats-new/newsroom/18-12-2024-commission-welcomes-adoption-ofrestore-proposal-helping-member-states-recover-from-climate-related-disasters_en 3 Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-01-20 “E-000219/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission To date, the Commission has not received any application from Greece for protection of the name ‘Baklava’, ‘Greek baklava’ or similar names as a geographical indication. In the Greek Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Strategic Plan 1 , actions for the promotion of the special characteristics of Greek agri-food products, the promotion of their identity and the effort to enter into international markets and establish products of Greek origin, could be supported in the context of the LEADER 2 initiative. Furthermore, support could also be provided through LEADER for education and training actions aiming to increase the added value of local agricultural products and food, as well as to improve the competitiveness of the agri-food value chain, when those actions will be in line with the local development strategy of the concerned local action group. 1 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/category/sskap-2023-2027/sskap-egkrisi-tropopoiiseis/ 2 https://eu-cap-network.ec.europa.eu/networking/leader_en”
  EU policy on country of origin food labelling
• 2025-01-20 “E-000224/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission While the responsibility for road maintenance and the decision-making regarding road closures lies with Member States, the Commission’s Contingency Plan for Transport 1 , adopted in 2022, sets out a toolbox that can guide Member States when responding to crises, including weather-related, affecting the transport sector. Among other actions, it highlights the importance of ensuring minimum connectivity and improving the resilience of the transport network to climate change, natural hazards, and other disruptions. 1 COM(2022) 211 final.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-01-20 “E-000220/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission Trade in agricultural products between the Union and Türkiye is governed by Decision No 1/98 of the EC-Turkey Association Council 1 . Decision 1/95 of the Association Council 2 reaffirms the common objective to move towards the free movement of agricultural products between themselves. Increasing tariffs on agricultural products imported from Türkiye would go against this objective. The Commission can use trade defence instruments to tackle unfairly dumped or subsidised imports of such products. The complaints office of the Directorate-General for Trade can provide advice 3 . Food safety is a priority for the Commission. Food products placed on the EU market, regardless of their origin, must comply with the Union food safety legislation. Member States carry out official controls at all stages of production, processing and distribution, including at import. Where food of non-animal origin from third countries poses a risk, the Commission takes measures through Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1793 4 which include checks and special conditions governing the entry into the Union of certain food and feed of non-animal origin from certain third countries. These measures are periodically reviewed taking into account new information from Member States related to risks and instances of noncompliance. In addition, the Commission regularly performs audits in Member States and in third countries, to ensure that the relevant products comply with EU rules. The reports of those audits are published, including the actions taken to address the reports’ recommendations 5 . The Commission follows up on these actions. The Commission is not aware of any specific issues with Turkish products in Member States. 1 OJ L86, 20.3.1998, p.1 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/223/oj/eng 2 OJ L35, 13.2.1996, p.1 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012PC0092 3 Email contact: trade-defence-complaints@ec.europa.eu 4 OJ L 277, 29.10.2019, p. 89 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/1793/oj 5 https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2025-01-20 “E-000223/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission EU-Türkiye trade relations are based on an Association Agreement from 1963 1 and a Customs Union agreement 2 , which entered into force on 31 December 1995. Türkiye is an important trade partner to the EU, as well as a candidate country for EU membership. The EU has a strategic interest in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye, as reiterated by the European Council in April 2024 3 . Türkiye is an important EU export market. In 2024, Türkiye was the EU’s fifth biggest export market of goods by value of exports. Furthermore, even for some of sectors where the EU imports a lot from Türkiye such as motor vehicles and machinery, the EU has an overall trade balance or slight surpluses in value of exports 4 . Therefore, the engagement with Türkiye will continue in line with the framework of the existing agreements, alongside the Commission’s broader efforts to diversify supply sources and mitigate dependencies. At the same time the EU’s approach to trade and economic security seeks to enhance resilience and reduce excessive dependencies in key sectors on third countries, as also highlighted in the Competitiveness Compass adopted by the Commission on 29 January 2025 5 . In follow-up to the Compass, the Commission presented on 26 February 2025 a Clean Industrial Deal 6 to strengthen the competitiveness and decarbonisation of EU industry. In parallel, the Commission presented a simplification package 7 to reduce burdens for businesses. In addition to these measures to improve the business environment in the EU, the Commission is intensifying its efforts to open foreign markets to EU companies, including through trade agreements and partnerships. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f8e2f9f4-75c8-4f62-ae3fb86ca5842eee.0008.02/DOC_2&format=PDF 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:21996D0213(01)) 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/04/18/european-council-conclusions-onukraine-and-turkiye/ 4 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_turkiye_en.pdf 5 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/10017eb1-4722-4333-add2-e0ed18105a34_en 6 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/clean-industrial-deal_en 7 https://commission.europa.eu/news/commission-proposes-cut-red-tape-and-simplify-business-environment2025-02-26_en”
  Trade relations with Turkey