Afroditi LATINOPOULOU

Policy topics Afroditi LATINOPOULOU is active on

What Afroditi LATINOPOULOU has said (80)

• 2026-03-18 “Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission 11.6.2026 Written question Gender inequality causes gender gaps in employment, pay and pensions, thereby reducing the overall productivity of the EU’s economy. Gender budgeting allows to concretely address gender inequalities, thereby leading to broad societal benefits for European citizens. It also allows for a more efficient use of resources, which is particularly important in times of crisis. The Financial Regulation [1] establishes that programmes and activities shall be implemented taking into account the principle of gender equality, in accordance with an appropriate gender mainstreaming methodology (Article 33). The Commission’s proposal for the Performance Regulation [2] establishes that, for that purpose, activities of the budget shall be classified according to their contribution to gender equality, and that the Commission will provide specific guidance to do so (Article 7), as also committed in the Gender Equality Strategy 2026-2030 [3] . This is fully in line with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, notably Article 8 [4] . Implementing gender budgeting bears no costs other than the use of administrative resources needed to track its progress. These costs are vastly offset by the result of having addressed gender inequality, thereby the benefits of gender equality. Implementing gender budgeting does not require a reallocation of resources from one sector to the other. It is about incorporating a gender perspective in the budgetary process, whereby gender equality strongly contributes to the EU’s overall strategic goals, including social cohesion and competitiveness, multiplying the return on investments in critical sectors. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0545. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52026DC0113. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2012/oj/eng.”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion · Size of EU budget · EU expenditure on social policy
• 2026-03-03 “P-000872/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU takes any violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its Member States with the utmost seriousness. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression, it has the possibility to invoke Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 1 , which would lead to other Member States to provide aid and assist it. This invocation of Article 42(7) TEU remains the sovereign prerogative of Member States. The Commission and High Representative/Vice-President stand ready to support and coordinate any request for assistance from a Member State. The European Council has confirmed its determination to ‘deliver at pace and at scale’ to ensure Europe is equipped to act autonomously, in a coordinated way, and with a 360 degree approach against all threats. The Security Action for Europe instrument spearheads the EU’s response, with its EUR 150 billion defence loan scheme available for Member State to invest in priority capability areas including air defence. The Preserving Peace Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, presented in October 2025 2 , is another clear signal that the EU is strengthening its capabilities to deter and defend against aggression. Nine capability coalitions, including one specifically for air and missile defence, have been stood up to close critical gaps through joint development and procurement. It also proposes a set of European Readiness Flagships including the European Air Shield 3 and the European Drone Defence Initiative 4 . The former project aims to develop an integrated, multi-layered air and missile defence shield, fully interoperable with NATO's Command and Control system. The latter focuses on creating multi-layered, technologically advanced counterdrone detection, tracking and neutralisation capacities across Member States. In February 2026, the Commission presented a dedicated Counter-Drone Action Plan 5 with a focus on enhanced preparedness, coordinated responses and industrial defence readiness. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2008/art_42/oj/eng. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/readiness-roadmap-2030_en. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_812. 4 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/commission-publishes-action-plan-drone-and-counter-dronesecurity-2026-02-11_en. 5 Idem.”
  EU-Iran relations · EU competences on defence
• 2026-02-26 “Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question As rightly stated by the Honourable Member, questions related to certification of aerodromes are under the responsibility and oversight of the Greek Competent Authority. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in turn oversees the National Competent Authority after which, if non-compliance with EU law is detected and not being resolved, the Commission is formally notified by EASA and could raise a formal infringement procedure. To date, the Commission has not been notified by EASA to this end. The Commission underlines the importance of ensuring the safety of operations of military aerodromes handling civil traffic in accordance with Article 2.5 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (EASA) [1] and Article 7.4 of Regulation (EU) 2024/2803 (Single European Sky) [2] , where applicable. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1139/oj/eng. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R2803&qid=1776332836254.”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• 2026-02-26 “Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 6.5.2026 Written question The Commission agrees that social partners like passengers or staff of transport companies may deliver valuable insights concerning possible safety risks for the operation of the transport system. In the Commission’s view however, the existing legal framework already provides for possibilities to adequately involve such actors. In the area of railways, Regulation (EU) 2018/762 [1] requires that the safety management system (SMS) of railway undertakings and infrastructure managers covers mechanisms for consultation of staff. Additionally, in line with Article 33 and Article 35(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/796 [2] , the EU Agency for Railways (ERA) has certain monitoring powers towards national safety authorities and Member States. When preparing these assessments, ERA takes into account data coming from various sources, including from social partners. Similarly, social partners may request the Commission that it triggers an assessment according to Article 35(5) of the above Regulation. In the area of civil aviation, the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Basic Regulation [3] is the legal framework for safety. More generally, all citizens are entitled to raise complaints with the Commission if they believe an EU country has infringed EASA Basic Regulation or any other EU law. The Commission is of the view that the existing legislation allows for citizens’ complaints to be taken into account when it comes to the assessment of safety concerns and thus it has no intention to propose any further legislation on the issue at this stage. [1] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/762 of 8 March 2018 establishing common safety methods on safety management system requirements pursuant to Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission Regulations (EU) No 1158/2010 and (EU) No 1169/2010, OJ L 129 25.5.2018, p. 26, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2018/762. [2] Regulation (EU) 2016/796 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Railways and repealing Regulation (EC) No 881/2004, OJ L 138, 26.5.2016, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/796. [3] Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91, OJ L 212 22.8.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1139.”
  EU support of rail transport · EU policy on aviation safety
• 2026-01-29 “E-000383/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has repeatedly underlined, most recently in its 2025 annual report on enlargement policy 1 , that Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations and respect the sovereignty of all Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Despite the positive atmosphere and the ongoing dialogue between Greece and Türkiye, the unresolved dispute over the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones continued to strain bilateral relations. As pointed out in the 2025 annual report, Türkiye continued to systematically issue general navigational warnings challenging Greek sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction 2 . The Council noted improvements in relations between Greece and Türkiye in its conclusions of 17 December 2024 and underlined its expectation that these improvements will be sustained 3 . The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. Unequivocal commitment to international agreements and the UN Charter, as well as abstaining from unilateral actions which violate international law and the sovereign rights of Member States, remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bb4ddd1-4f20-4ee0-92db926996ec8dd1_en?filename=t. 2 Please see footnote 1. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-01-24 “E-000275/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Cyprus has been a Member State since 2004 and, as such, has access to all the financial tools available for the Members of the EU. In addition, the Commission implements the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot community (EUR 761 million allocated since 2006), which seeks to facilitate Cyprus’ reunification, including by financing confidence-building measures between the two Cypriot communities and promoting EU standards and values as well as alignment with the acquis in the Turkish Cypriot community. Full respect of international law, including the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, is at the core of the EU’s approach. In their international relations, all states are obliged to refrain from the threat or use of force, to respect international humanitarian law and to resolve conflicts peacefully. The Commission remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the acquis and the relevant European Council Conclusions 1 . The EU is ready to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process, with all appropriate means at its disposal. The EU has repeatedly underlined, including in the last Enlargement report published in November 2025 2 , that it remains crucial that Türkiye commits and actively contributes to such a comprehensive settlement, including its external aspects, normalise its relations with the Republic of Cyprus and respect the sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all Member States. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf. 2 Türkiye 2025 Report, 2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy, 4.11.2025 SWD(2025) 756 final.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-01-24 “E-000277/2026 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. All countries need to respect the jurisdiction, sovereignty and sovereign rights of all Member States, in accordance with international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Also, according to UNCLOS and customary international law, coastal States have sovereignty over their territorial sea, including for the adoption of laws and regulations related to fishing, innocent passage, as well as to take the necessary steps to prevent non-innocent passage. The Commission supports Member States in the implementation of fisheries control rules and compliance with the Common Fisheries Policy. In particular, the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) coordinates Member States’ inspection activities through the Mediterranean Joint Deployment Plan. EFCA deploys a patrol vessel on a permanent basis in the Mediterranean. Its activities may be complemented with tools such as aircraft and satellite monitoring, and support may be provided to national authorities’ activities if requested. Furthermore, EFCA in cooperation with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the European Maritime Safety Agency, each within its mandate, supports the national authorities carrying out coast guard functions. The international cooperation on fisheries of the EU with neighbouring third countries is achieved through regional fisheries management organisations such as the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, including the establishment of common regional rules and the exchange of best practices for fisheries sustainability.”
  Funding for fisheries and aquaculture · Environmental regulation of fisheries
• 2026-01-24 “E-000276/2026 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission Addressing medicine shortages is a priority for the Commission. The Commission’s objective is to ensure that medicines are available to patients across the EU when needed. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) and its Medicines Shortages Steering Group, which includes representatives from Member States, monitor and address ongoing shortages escalated to the EU level by national authorities, including shortages of antivirals. For critical shortages unresolved at the Member State level, the Medicines Shortages Steering Group and the EMA coordinate actions to mitigate their effects as much as possible. Additionally, a Member State may request assistance from others in urgent situations under the Voluntary Solidarity Mechanism. In the past, the procedures under this mechanism have successfully led to redistributing stocks available in other EU countries. The provisions addressing prevention of shortages under the new Pharmaceutical Regulation 1 , on which co-legislators found a political agreement in December 2025, will provide a robust EU framework for managing critical shortages and improving access to medicines. Specifically, the new Regulation will strengthen early notification obligations for shortages by companies and require them to have shortage prevention plans for medicines sold under prescription. This new regulatory framework would be complemented by the Critical Medicines Act 2 , as proposed by the Commission in March 2025, which aims to address upstream supply chain vulnerabilities and offer additional tools to enhance supply security. 1 COM(2023) 193 final. 2 COM(2025) 102 final.”
  Government stockpiling of critical medicines · Joint EU procurement of medicines · Pharmaceuticals regulation in EU
• 2026-01-14 “E-000135/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has taken note of recent statements by the Russian authorities concerning the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. Russia has an established record of systematic violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief and has instrumentalised the Russian Orthodox Church to advance its geopolitical objectives. States must refrain from interfering in the internal organisation of religious institutions: a principle firmly protected under international human rights law. Churches are meant to promote peace, non-violence, mutual understanding and reconciliation. In this regard, the EU values the constructive role played by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, including its efforts to separate religion from nationalism, encourage interfaith dialogue and protect the environment. The EU remains firmly committed to upholding the right to freedom of religion or belief for all and it will continue to promote this right and denounce violations of it in the multilateral human rights fora and in its bilateral relations with third countries.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-01-14 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 18.3.2026 Written question The Pact on Migration and Asylum promotes a comprehensive approach to migration and is based on a balance between the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, as set out in Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 [1] . The EU Strategy on Asylum and Migration Management [2] places the prevention of illegal migration as one of the key objectives for the EU in the coming years. According to the European Annual Asylum and Migration Report [3] , illegal border crossings at the Union’s external borders decreased by 35% (223 812) in the period July 2024 — June 2025, compared to the period July 2023 — June 2024. Pursuant to Article 56(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351, alternative solidarity measures can be used in the fields of migration, reception, asylum, return and reintegration and border management, focusing on operational support, capacity building, services, staff support, facilities and technical equipment. Article 65(1) of that regulation further specifies that such measures have to be based on a specific request of the benefitting Member State. On 11 March 2025, the Commission adopted a legislative proposal in the form of a regulation establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union [4] . Negotiations between the co-legislators are ongoing. The proposal aims at setting the legal framework for Member States to return illegally staying third-country nationals to a ‘return hub’ in third country, based on an agreement or arrangement and in respect of international human rights standards and principles in accordance with international law, including the principle of non-refoulement. [1] Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401351. [2] COM(2026) 45 final. [3] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The European Annual Asylum and Migration Report (2025), COM(2025) 795 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f449c5d6-bf11-11f0-a612-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. [4] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC, COM(2025) 101 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:9565bdd7-ff1a-11ef-9503-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2026-01-13 “E-000113/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission On 9 January 2026 1 , on behalf of all Member States, the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) firmly condemned the use of violence, arbitrary detention and intimidation tactics by security forces, and expressed the solidarity with the Iranian people that voiced their legitimate aspirations for a better life, freedom and dignity. The HR/VP also called for the release of all those unjustly detained for exercising their human rights. The rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, as well as the right of access to information, are universal and binding obligations for Iran under international law. The Council adopted new restrictive measures against perpetrators of serious human rights violations in the context of the recent nationwide protests, including prominent figures such as the Minister of the Interior 2 , and reached a political agreement to list the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation under the Council Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism 3 . The EU stands in full solidarity with the Iranian people that voice their legitimate aspirations for a better life, freedom and dignity. The EU commitment to human rights extends to the UN fora. The EU urges Iran to allow free and unhindered access to the country for UN mandate holders and to cooperate fully with the independent, international Fact-Finding Mission and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran. At the Special Session of the Human Rights Council on 23 January 2026, the EU strongly supported the work of UN mechanisms and the extension of their mandate. The EU is a strong supporter of the UN accountability mechanisms. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/01/09/iran-statement-by-the-hr-on-behalf-of-theeu-on-the-situation-in-the-country/. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/01/29/iran-council-adopts-new-sanctions-overserious-human-rights-violations-and-iran-s-continued-support-to-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine/. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/compos/2001/931/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on human rights · EU-Iran relations
• 2025-11-27 “E-004715/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Honourable Member is very correct, that water resilience is key to tackle water scarcity and other water related challenges. As announced in the Water Resilience Strategy 1 , the Commission’s proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework 2 features support to water resilience through investments and reforms. But already now, the mid-term review of the Cohesion Policy 3 has created a unique package of incentives for water resilience projects, including in relation to water infrastructure. Also, the Common Agricultural Policy 4 provides a wide range of tools, including support for sustainable farming practices and investments which increase water resilience in agriculture and rural areas, as well as risk management tools 5 . Interreg programmes 6 and the b-solutions initiative 7 also supports transboundary cooperation on water quantity issues 8 . The Commission continuously promotes transboundary cooperation on water scarcity and drought in the context of its cooperation with Member States in the framework of the Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive 9 , particularly through a dedicated Working Group for Water Scarcity & Droughts 10 which facilitates the exchange of best practices and the development of common guidance. The Commission is also actively encouraging Member States and third countries to cooperate more closely on water quantity management issues in the context of the competent international river basin bodies, particularly through the adoption of coordinated Programmes of Measures for the various international river basin districts in line with Article 3 of the Water Framework Directive. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/environment/water-resilience-strategy_en. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/eu-budget-2028-2034_en. 3 COM(2025) 163, 1 April 2025 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/communication/mid-term-review2025/communication-mid-term-review-2025_en.pdf. 4 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy_en. 5 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/financing-cap/cap-funds_en. 6 https://interreg.eu/. 7 https://www.b-solutionsproject.com/ 8 For instance, by means of helping neighbouring countries in the Danube river basin calculate a water balance, https://interreg-danube.eu/projects/danube-water-balance. 9 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32–35. 10 The CIS Working group adopted, for instance, Technical Guidance no 24 of June 2024, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/river-basin-management-changing-climate_en.”
  EU policy on water management
• 2025-11-27 “E-004714/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. In 2021-2027, Cohesion Policy supports investments in drinking water supply and water resource conservation across Greece, with an EU contribution of EUR 515.5 million. As part of the ongoing Mid-Term Review, Attica and other Greek regions are expected to benefit from increased financial resources under the relevant programmes to strengthen secure access to water, sustainable and integrated water management, and water resilience. Moreover, Greece’s Recovery and Resilience Plan 1 prioritised the establishment of a water regulatory authority to improve the sustainability of water utility operations and investments. The plan also supports the development of water supply and water-saving infrastructure. The decisions on project prioritisation and implementation locations lie with the competent Greek authorities. If a disaster exceeds national response capacities, a country can request assistance through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 2 , enabling the Emergency Response Cooperation Centre to mobilise support from other EU Member States and Participating States, such as specialised equipment or response teams. Greece did not request its activation in this case. 2. Water scarcity is a manmade disaster and not a natural disaster. Member States and accession countries suffering from water scarcity are not eligible for assistance from the EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) 3 . The European Water Resilience Strategy 4 supports access to clean, affordable water through improved water resource management, increased water efficiency and wastewater reuse. Among these actions is the effective implementation of Water Framework Directive 5 , which obliges Member States to protect the ecological and chemical status of their water bodies. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resiliencefacility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en. 2 EU Civil Protection Mechanism: https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civilprotection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en. 3 Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3) as amended by Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 143) and by Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 March 2020 (OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002R2012. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/environment/water-resilience-strategy_en. 5 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p.1.”
  Climate efforts
• 2025-11-07 “E-004423/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Since the detention of the five Greek Cypriot citizens on 19 July 2025, the EU services have been actively engaging with multiple actors on the ground, including the United Nations and have raised the issue with the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The EU services have closely monitored the situation and remained attentive to the well-being of the EU citizens. The issue was raised in the context of the informal video conference of the Foreign Affairs Ministers in August 2025 and discussed with the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus directly at the level of the High Representative/Vice President. All five EU citizens have now returned to their homes.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-11-07 “E-004422/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), through its CAP Strategic Plans (CSPs) 1 provides for several tools to support farmers. The tools include direct payments to support income. To take preventive action and to build resilience, the Greek CSP 2 supports investments in farm modernisation and in the restoration of production potential, risk management tools, and sectoral interventions. In response to severe weather events, a new measure was introduced in the Rural Development Programmes to help farmers recover from damages. Greece has made use of this possibility (Measure 23) 3 . The Greek CSP allocates EUR 175 million per year to complementary redistributive income support for sustainability targeted at small and medium-sized farmers 4 . To strengthen farmers’ position in the value chain, the Greek CSP supports cooperation, innovation and training. The Greek CSP is based on the identified needs and responds to the specificities of Greek agriculture. At the request of Greece, funds may be reallocated or new interventions may be introduced subject to the Commission’s approval. The CAP allows a high degree of flexibility for use by Member States of different instruments to meet the needs of the diverse agriculture in the EU. Beyond the income support and rural development measures a specific scheme supports the agricultural sector in the Smaller Aegean Islands. 1 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/cap-my-country/cap-strategic-plans_en. 2 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/category/sskap-2023-2027/sskap-egkrisi-tropopoiiseis/. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3242/oj/eng. 4 EUR 181 626 236,70 were paid for claim year 2023, EUR 170 million (provisional amount) were paid for claim year 2024 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/9i-grapti-diadikasia-epitropis-parakolouthisis-ss-kap/.”
  Agricultural funding · Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1)
• 2025-11-07 “E-004424/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Strategics Plans (CSPs) 1 provide for interventions to address the specificities of the Member States concerned. The Greek CSP 2 was approved based on the identified needs and responds to the specifics of the Greek farmers. Proposals for the future CAP will allow Greece to design tailored measures to support certain sectors through reinforced instruments of coupled income support and incentives. The Commission has made clear that it is not compromising on its EU health and sanitary standards under trade negotiations. Such standards need to be fulfilled by all imported products, regardless of whether they enter the EU market under World Trade Organization (WTO) terms or under the terms of a bilateral agreement. In some cases, higher sustainability standards in third countries are applicable on imported products either through specific tariff conditionalities stipulated under trade agreements or via ad-hoc autonomous legislation. The Vision for Agriculture and Food makes a clear commitment to promoting fair competition, in line with international rules. The Commission will work towards raising global production standards in international standard-setting bodies in areas such as plant protection products and animal welfare, and it will intensify its economic diplomacy outreach to promote EU products. The Vision also stipulates that the Union will ensure domestically that ambitious EU standards do not lead to economic, environmental and social leakages, and that the European agri-food sector is not put at a competitive disadvantage without corresponding reciprocity. The work has started on delivering greater alignment in terms of production standards and strengthening EU import controls. 1 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/cap-my-country/cap-strategic-plans_en. 2 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/category/sskap-2023-2027/sskap-egkrisi-tropopoiiseis/.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur · Agriculture (green)
• 2025-11-03 “E-004298/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission Member States have the obligation to set up an Integrated Administration and Control system (IACS) as set out in Articles 65 and 66 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 1 and further detailed in Regulation (EU) 2022/1172 2 and Regulation (EU) 2022/1173 3 . The procedures on data sharing are established in Regulation (EU) 2022/1475 4 . Upon request of Member States, the Commission may provide technical support concerning digitalisation of control procedures and data sharing. Technical assistance to the Common Agricultural Policy Strategic Plan can be used as provided for in Articles 94 and 125 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 5 for that purpose. Greece is implementing an accreditation action plan set to be finalised by 12 March 2026 and an IACS action plan has to be finalised by the end of 2026. The Commission monitors on a regular basis the progress of the implementation of both action plans. In case of failure to comply with the proposed actions, including the quarterly reporting, the Commission may adopt implementing acts suspending the monthly or the interim payments as provided in Article 42(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116. However, this should not have an impact on the payments to farmers. The implementation of the action plans does not exclude the possibility of future audits aimed at ensuring that the control systems are functioning effectively and are aligned with the expected standards. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2116/oj. 2 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1172 of 4 May 2022 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the integrated administration and control system in the common agricultural policy and the application and calculation of administrative penalties for conditionality, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2022/1172/oj. 3 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1173 of 31 May 2022 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the integrated administration and control system in the common agricultural policy, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2022/1173/oj. 4 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1475 of 6 September 2022 laying down detailed rules for implementation of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the evaluation of the CAP Strategic Plans and the provision of information for monitoring and evaluation, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2022/1475/oj. 5 Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj.”
  Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1) · Agricultural funding
• 2025-11-03 “E-004301/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The security situation, especially in northern Nigeria, is of great concern. The country faces systemic insecurity affecting, among others, Christian individuals, communities and places of worship, even though violence in Nigeria often cuts across ethno-religious boundaries. The EU strongly condemns the cruel attacks and abductions that have recently taken place, and supports the Nigerian government’s efforts to have all hostages safely released. Over the last years, the EU and its Member States have funded many projects on prevention of conflict, peacebuilding and support to populations affected by violence. In Nigeria, the EU helps people in need and victims of violence regardless of their ethnic, religious or political affiliation. Following the Yelwata massacre which took place in June 2025, the EU Ambassador to Nigeria visited the victims a few days after the attack. The EU provided rapid support (EUR 1.75 million), addressing basic needs as well as providing for social protection and durable solutions for internally displaced persons. The EU remains steadfast in its commitment, with EUR 46.5 million for humanitarian assistance allocated to Nigeria in 2025 through partner organisations working on the ground. Through various peacebuilding and human rights projects, the EU also aims to foster trust between religious leaders, encouraging interfaith dialogue and community-led reconciliation. The EU Delegation in Nigeria has been partnering with the National Human Rights Commission and the National Peace Committee. EU-funded events organised by these institutions are aiming to discuss issues such as farmers/herders conflicts, and on a more general note, to establish a constant dialogue on drivers of violence.”
  EU policy on African region · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2025-11-03 “E-004299/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Energy security and the Mediterranean region are two important priorities for the Commission, as demonstrated by the recent adoption of the Pact for the Mediterranean 1 and by the upcoming revision of the EU energy security framework 2 . The Commission welcomes and supports the regional cooperation on interconnectivity projects in the Eastern Mediterranean via different frameworks, including Projects of Common Interest (PCI) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMI) projects provided by the TransEuropean Networks for Energy (TEN-E) Regulation 3 . The Alexandroupolis and Revithoussa liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals are already operational and can support the diversification of gas supply of South-East Europe. The terminals were co-funded through the European Structural and Investment Funds and the Connecting Europe Facility. The Commission also actively supports electricity interconnectivity in the region, as demonstrated by the inclusion of the Great Sea Interconnector in the new Energy Highways Initiative. The security of key energy infrastructure against hybrid or geopolitical threats is a high priority of the Commission and is covered by the Critical Entities Resilience Directive 4 . This is why since the mid-term review of the Cohesion Policy in September 2025 5 , critical energy infrastructure protection projects are eligible for Cohesion Policy financing. As the Commission’s proposal for the next multiannual financial framework translates the objective of ‘preparedness by design’ into its structure, it also addresses preparedness against emerging threats, such as hybrid attacks. Lastly, the upcoming European Grids Package will strengthen the resilience and security of cross-border energy infrastructure. 1 JOIN(2025) 26 final. 2 COM(2025) 870 final, Initiative 7. 3 Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure. 4 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC. 5 Regulation (EU) 2025/1914 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2025, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2025-09-24 “E-003701/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. In this regard, unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, to international agreements and to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, as well as abstaining from unilateral actions which run counter to EU interests, violate international law and the sovereign rights of Member States, remains an essential requirement. Delimitation of the continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) has to be addressed in accordance with international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and by peaceful settlement of disputes, including through the International Court of Justice. In the 2025 enlargement report on Türkiye 1 , the Commission highlighted that, despite the positive atmosphere and the ongoing dialogue between Türkiye and Greece, the unresolved dispute over the continental shelf and the EEZs continued to strain bilateral relations. The Commission also stressed that, while tensions in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean have been markedly reduced after the February 2023 earthquakes, Türkiye should avoid actions that could undermine regional stability. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bb4ddd1-4f20-4ee0-92db926996ec8dd1_en?filename=t%C3%BCrkiye-report-2025.pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-09-03 “E-003412/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The EU does not impose restrictions on methane emissions from beef cattle. Emissions from agriculture are included in the Effort Sharing Regulation 1 (ESR), together with emissions from domestic transport, buildings, small industries, and waste. Under the ESR all those emissions together should be reduced by 40% by 2030 (compared to 2005) and that EU-level target translates into differentiated targets per Member State. Member States have a single target covering all emissions in the sectors mentioned above and can design their climate change mitigation action accordingly and decide on the corresponding contribution of the sectors covered by the ESR. The EU does not restrict beef production. The decline in EU beef production is the result of multiple factors. Productivity gains and genetic improvements in the dairy sector lead to more milk production with fewer animals, reducing the availability of cattle for beef production. The EU beef sector is experiencing issues with profitability, which causes reduction in farm numbers and/or a switch to dairy production or other activities. The EU actively supports the beef sector. by coupled income support (targeted to sectors undergoing difficulties) in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy. In its proposals for post-2027 period, the Commission has proposed to further increase the maximum ceiling for coupled support to 20%, with a possibility for additional 5% increase if Member States consider it necessary. 1 Regulation (EU) 2018/842.”
  Climate efforts
• 2025-09-03 “E-003411/2025 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in Eastern Mediterranean. All countries need to respect the jurisdiction, sovereignty and sovereign rights of Member States, in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) the provisions of which reflect customary international law. In this regard, coastal States have sovereignty over their territorial sea, including for adopting laws and regulations related to innocent passage and taking necessary steps to prevent passage that is not innocent. The EU consistently promotes regional cooperation within Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, such as the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean, aiming to achieve a level playing field. While the primary responsibility for the safety and security conditions of the fish workers and for the control of fishing activities lays with the Member States in their waters and falls on their authorities, the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) assists operationally Member States and coordinates their fisheries inspection activities in the Mediterranean through a dedicated Joint Deployment Plan, to which the EFCA patrol vessels participates. Alleged illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing by Turkish vessels is monitored by Greece and the Commission. Under Regulation (EC) 1005/2008 1 , any unauthorised entry of third-country fishing vessel in a Member State's territorial sea constitutes IUU fishing. The Member State concerned is primarily responsible for monitoring waters, inspecting suspicious vessels, and applying proportionate sanctions. Türkiye’s ratification of the UNCLOS would improve cooperation with the EU in fisheries. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/1005/2011-03-09/eng.”
  Asylum & border control · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-09-01 “E-003350/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission acknowledges that EU islands are highly diverse and face challenges requiring tailor-made responses across several EU policies. Cohesion policy supports investments in both the South and North Aegean, with a substantially increased budget 1 compared to the previous programming period aiming to strengthen the regions and address significant needs. In line with the shared management principle, the selection and implementation of co-financed projects falls under the responsibility of the national authorities. 2. Under the Common Provisions Regulation 2 , programmes must establish the performance framework with measurable indicators against which progress is monitored. Achievements are made publicly available through the Cohesion Open Data Platform 3 , ensuring transparency and accessibility of results. Managing Authorities also carry out programme-specific evaluations, while the Commission regularly monitors implementation and cooperates with national authorities to ensure that resources are used soundly in line with EU regulations and programme priorities. 3. Cohesion Policy remains committed to supporting regions, ensuring that people can exercise their right to stay in the place they call home. The mid-term review of cohesion policy 4 offers Member States an opportunity to revise and better align policies and financing mechanisms with local realities, while ensuring consistency with both regional needs and EU’s political priorities. It also allows for an assessment of how programmes are supporting islands and coastal areas in addressing their challenges. 1 Specifically for 2021-2027, some EUR 677 million total public funding (versus EUR 424.1 million in 20142020) has been allocated under the two regional programmes, aimed at fostering, amongst others, entrepreneurship and competitiveness, enhance education, health and social infrastructure, as well as promote sustainable development. Cohesion Policy also supports the GR-eco islands initiative, promoting energy autonomy, green mobility, and sustainable tourism on 39 islands, including 27 from the South Aegean and 5 from the North Aegean. 2 Consolidated text: Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy. 3 https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/. 4 Regulation (EU) 2025/1914 – https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1914/oj.”
  Funding for OCTs and outermost regions · Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-09-01 “E-003347/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Managing EU external borders is a key priority, involving shared responsibility between Member States and the EU. The Commission supports this effort through policy, funding, and operational aid. Key measures include multiannual strategic policies, support by Frontex, large scale information technology (IT) systems for border management, and EU funding of EUR 7.92 billion for Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) for the 2021-2027 programming period 1 . Cooperation with third countries addresses illegal immigration, smuggling, and security risks. External borders management is also addressed in the Pact on Migration and Asylum 2 through the Screening Regulation and contingency planning. The Commission proposal for legislation to improve the effectiveness of returning third-country nationals with no right to stay in the EU is under negotiation. In its proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034 3 , the Commission proposed establishing National and Regional Partnership Plans to increase flexibility for tackling demographic challenges, enabling tailored, long-term responses. Cohesion policy is crucial, particularly in less developed regions affected by emigration or underemployment through investment in attractiveness, productivity, innovation, and reform backed by the European Semester. Efforts also aim to support vulnerable regions at risk of a ‘talent development trap’ 4 with the ‘Talent Booster Mechanism’ 5 . By 2026, an EU-wide strategy for islands and coastal communities is expected. Cohesion policy aids Greek regions, including Eastern Macedonia, Thrace, and Aegean islands, with EUR 639 million and EUR 679.3 million allocated for 2021–2027 to boost local economies, social infrastructure, and sustainable development, supplemented by sectoral program funding. 1 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/funding/borders-and-visa-funds/integrated-border-management-fund-bordermanagement-and-visa-instrument-2021-27_en. 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/eu-budget-2028-2034_en. 4 Regions in or at risk of falling a ‘talent development trap’ are defined in Commission’s communication ‘Harnessing talent in Europe’s regions’ COM(2023) 32 final of 17 January 2023. 5 Further information on the ‘Talent Booster Mechanism’ is available at: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/communities-and-networks/harnessing-talent-platform_en.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-08-14 “E-003243/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The general objective of the European Defence Fund (EDF) 1 is to foster the competitiveness, efficiency and innovation capacity of the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB). This contributes to strategic autonomy by supporting collaborative actions and cross-border cooperation, particularly involving small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps. The EDF also aims to strengthen the agility of defence supply and value chains, and better exploit industrial potential in innovation, research and development. It encourages the participation of SMEs and non-traditional defence actors, including technologies with dual-use potential, such as unmanned vehicles, for which collaborative research and development (R&D) actions are underway. The defence sector is demand driven, since Member States and associated countries remain the only buyers and end users of the defence technologies and products. Consequently, the EDF annual work programmes aligns with the priorities set by the EDF programme committee, reflecting the needs of the armed forces of Member States and associated countries. The programme committee has not identified firefighting as an area to be addressed. Nonetheless, several ongoing EDF R&D actions may have dual use potential, such as unmanned vehicles, and the resulting product could be used by Member States military to support in national calamities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2025-08-12 “E-003228/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The EU energy policy aims to ensure security of supply, affordability and sustainability. The energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean can contribute to Europe’s energy diversification and autonomy, provided their development is consistent with the Union’s climate and environmental commitments. Article 194.2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) establishes the right of Member States, to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. The Commission attaches the greatest importance to safeguarding the sovereign rights of all Member States, in full respect of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. As recalled in the Joint Communication on the State of Play of EUTürkiye Relations 1 , unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations and abstaining from unilateral actions, which run counter to EU interests, is an essential requirement for security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The EU supports regional cooperation frameworks such as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, and promotes and financially supports cross-border clean energy infrastructure projects. One example is the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI), a project that the Commission strongly supports and which was included in the Energy Highways initiative announced by the President of the European Commission at the State of the Union speech on 10 September 2025. It is also a Project of Common Interest (PCI) and a EUR 657 million grant under the Connecting Europe Facility has been allocated to it. The Cypriot Recovery and Resilience Plan also includes a loan of EUR 100 million for the project. 1 JOIN(2023) 50 final.”
  EU-Turkey relations · Climate efforts
• 2025-08-12 “E-003225/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU Security Union Strategy 1 recognises ‘hybrid threats’ as including a mixture of coercive and subversive activity by state or non-state actors aimed at influencing public opinion and policy while remaining below the threshold of declared warfare. This encompasses illicit streams of funding, political corruption and manipulation of diaspora networks to sway decision-making both inside and outside the EU. The EU remains vigilant to any analogous attempts to influence through covert funding or corruption channels, including via foreign broadcasters, cultural agencies or financial institutions operating in Member States. The EU has recurrently underlined its strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. The EU continues to expect Türkiye to unequivocally commit to good neighbourly relations. Cohesion Policy supports social inclusion and economic development in the Greek regions, including Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. Some EUR 639 million has been allocated to the regional programme for 2021-2027, aimed at fostering, amongst other things, entrepreneurship and competitiveness, enhancing education and social infrastructure, and promoting sustainable development. These investments are expected to strengthen the region and improve the quality of life for all. 1 COM(2020)605 final.”
  EU-Turkey relations · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-08-12 “E-003227/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU remains vigilant to any attempt to influence through covert funding or corruption channels, including via foreign broadcasters, cultural agencies or financial institutions operating in Member States. The EU's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Regulation (2019/452) 1 provides a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the EU on the grounds of security or public order and for a mechanism for cooperation between Member States, and between Member States and the Commission. The final decision in relation to any foreign direct investment remains the sole responsibility of the Member State where the foreign direct investment is planned or completed. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/452/oj/eng.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2025-08-12 “E-003226/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The EU faces an evolving cyber threat environment: among other strategies, the ProtectEU Strategy 1 highlights the need to further build resilience against hybrid threats including by reinforcing cybersecurity. The EU has a robust legal framework for critical sectors’ cybersecurity. In particular, the NIS2 Directive 2 sets risk management and incident reporting requirements for entities in 18 sectors. Member States, including Greece, can consider national circumstances when transposing the Directive, in particular by using the minimum harmonisation approach where appropriate. Other EU policies help tackle malicious cyber activity. For instance, the Cyber Resilience Act 3 bolsters cyber resilience of products with digital elements in the internal market while the EU Cyber Blueprint 4 strengthens cooperation between different actors in responding to cyber crises. Moreover, the Cybersecurity Act is being revised 5 with a view to streamline cybersecurity measures and strengthen cyber resilience. The Commission is not competent to control the activities of civil society organisations operating in Member States. To address the risk of foreign interference in democratic processes, Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising bans the provision of political advertising services to sponsors from third countries in the three months preceding an election or referendum. The Commission is also preparing a new European Democracy Shield which will provide a strategic approach to safeguard, strengthen and promote democracy. Building on existing EU frameworks and legislation, the initiative will reinforce efforts to counter foreign information manipulation and interference, and disinformation. 1 COM(2025) 148 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0148. 2 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive). https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj/eng. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act). https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj/eng. 4 Council Recommendation of 6 June 2025 on an EU blueprint for cyber crisis management. https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3445/oj/eng. 5 The EU Cybersecurity Act https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14578-TheEU-Cybersecurity-Act_en.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2025-08-07 “E-003212/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The development and implementation of school curricula is a competence of the EU Member States 1 . The role of the EU is to support Member States in their efforts to provide high-quality education and training systems and to facilitate the exchange of good practices on areas of common interest. For example, as part of the Working Group on Equality and Values in Education and Training, the Commission supports mutual learning among experts from the Ministries of the EU Member States and candidate countries, as well as representatives from stakeholder associations, social partners, and international organisation. In 2022, the Working Group focused on gender equality in and through education 23 , contributing to the objectives of the European Education Area 4 . The publications of the Working group, in the form of issue papers, are based on discussions from the group’s meetings and do not represent the official position of the Commission. While it is unclear to which specific guidelines the question refers to, it is worth noting that, rather than being prescript, guidelines in general aim to offer concrete, hands-on advice for policymakers and educators and they should be adapted to the specificities of each country and education system. 1 Art. 165 TFEU; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2008/art_165/oj/eng. 2 https://education.ec.europa.eu/news/gender-equality-WG-issue-paper. 3 https://school-education.ec.europa.eu/en/discover/publications/dimensions-gender-equality-and-througheducation#:~:text=This%20issue%20paper%20addresses%20gender%20gaps%20in%20education%2C,genderbased%20violence%2C%20with%20next%20possible%20steps%20for%20educators. 4 https://education.ec.europa.eu/about-eea/strategic-framework.”
  Role of education (social change vs. tradition) · Gender roles, equality and inclusion · EU and national cultural identities
• 2025-08-07 “E-003210/2025 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Mediterranean and continues to expect that all countries respect the jurisdiction, sovereignty and sovereign rights of all Member States, in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Additionally, according to UNCLOS and customary international law, coastal States have sovereignty over their territorial sea, including for the adoption of laws and regulations related to fishing, innocent passage as well as to take the necessary steps to prevent non-innocent passage. 2. The European Fisheries Control Agency deploys a patrol vessel on a permanent basis in the Mediterranean. Its activities may be complemented by aircraft and satellite monitoring and support activities to national authorities if requested. 3. The Greek European Maritime Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) programme provides key support for the resilience and competitiveness of the fisheries sector and coastal communities. It supports modernisation and innovation to boost market competitiveness, training related to sustainable and innovative practices and projects aimed at diversifying income. A significant portion of the funds is allocated to fisheries control and enforcement, including enhancing surveillance of fishing activity and traceability, as well as addressing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The Member States’ Managing Authorities may select for support operations under the scope, priorities and specific objectives of their national EMFAF programme and in line with applicable Union and national law. The Commission works with Greece to ensure its EMFAF programme meets sector-specific needs.”
  EU-Turkey relations · Asylum & border control
• 2025-08-07 “E-003211/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission 1 and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) signed a contribution agreement funded under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) 2 to support beneficiaries of international protection in Greece to go back from Germany to Greece. The implementation of the project started in February 2025 for the duration of 18 months. The beneficiaries of international protection will receive integration and transition support from the HELIOS+ integration project 3 , funded under the European Social Fund+ Greek programme, notably through integration courses, accommodation and employability. Solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility is a fundamental principle of the EU enshrined in Article 80 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. With the Pact on Migration and Asylum 4 , in particular the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation 5 , the EU has established a permanent, legally binding and flexible solidarity mechanism to ensure that no Member State is left alone when under pressure. While all Member States need to contribute to this mechanism, they will be able to choose between relocations, financial solidarity, or alternative measures. 1 Contribution Agreement signed in line with section 4.8 (Direct Award to support reception, asylum and return systems under pressure) of the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund Thematic Facility Work programme for 2023, 2024 and 2025, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/funding/asylum-migration-and-integrationfunds/asylum-migration-and-integration-fund-2021-2027_en. 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/1147 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, OJ L 251, 15.7.2021, pp. 1–47, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1147/oj/eng. 3 https://greece.iom.int/helios. 4 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en. 5 Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, OJ L, 2024/1351, 22.5.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1351/oj.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-08-07 “E-003209/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is encouraging Member Stater to develop a regular and sustained structured dialogue with civil society organisations. In its Rule of Law Reports for 2024 1 and 2025 2 , the Commission recommended the Greek authorities to develop a regular and sustained structured dialogue with civil society organisations and simplify the registration requirements for civil society organisations in view of maintaining an open framework for them to operate. The Commission is not competent to assess the actions of non-governmental organisations operating in the different Member States that act under the control of national authorities. 1 SWD(2024) 808 final. 2 SWD(2025) 908 final.”
  Asylum & border control · Regulation of NGOs in Europe
• 2025-07-13 “P-002851/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and continues to expect all countries to respect the sovereignty and the sovereign rights of all Member States, in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Abstaining from unilateral actions which run counter to EU interests, violate international law and the sovereign rights of Member States remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. As recalled by the European Council in June 2025 1 , the Türkiye-Libya Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with customary law based on the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states. The EU firmly believes that maritime delimitation disputes need to be settled by peaceful means, notably through good faith negotiations, and in full respect of international law, including UNCLOS. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/cjtb3oep/20250626-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2025-06-18 “E-002475/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not possess evidence on the correlation between data on irregular migration and asylum seekers and the availability of housing in EU cities. At the same time, available data show that migrants are increasingly affected by the ongoing housing crisis as they face obstacles in securing stable and affordable living conditions 1 . While housing is largely a competence of Member States, the Commission will put forward a European Affordable Housing Plan to support EU countries, regions and cities in increasing the supply of affordable and sustainable housing and improve access to housing for people in need. Regarding financing, various EU funds are available for Member States and local authorities to support affordable and social housing 2 . In addition, the Commission put forward a proposal 3 to enable Member States and regions to increase their investments in affordable housing under Cohesion policy. The Commission services also put forward a new financial instrument model for affordable housing 4 . The Commission works with the European Investment Bank, national promotional banks and international financial institutions on a panEuropean investment platform to attract more private and public investment for affordable and sustainable housing. Moreover, the Commission plans to amend its State aid rules related to services of general economic interest to give Member States a flexible tool to subsidise affordable housing projects without undue distortion in the private housing market or detrimental effect on social housing initiatives. 1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/European Commission (2023), Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2023: Settling In, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1d5020a6-en (4. Living conditions of immigrants). 2 To assist Member States, the Commission has published a toolkit that provides an overview of available EU funding opportunities in housing – ‘Social housing and beyond’ (https://european-social-fundplus.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-launches-toolkit-support-social-housing-member-states), including: the Recovery and Resilience Facility; the European Regional Development Fund; the European Social Fund Plus; the InvestEU; the Horizon Europe; the Technical Support Instrument; the Single Market Programme; the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund; the Social Climate Fund. In addition, the Cohesion Fund and the Just Transition Fund also support the investments in the energy efficiency of housing stock. Details are available in story ‘how cohesion policy supports housing’ at the Cohesion open data platform: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/whats-new/panorama/2025/03/03-12-2025-how-cohesion-policy-helpssolve-europe-s-housing-crisis_en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0163. 4 For combining Cohesion policy funding with resources from the European Investment Bank and other financial institutions) https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/communication/mid-term-review-2025/swd-affordablehousing-2025_en.pdf.”
  EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination · Asylum & border control
• 2025-06-18 “E-002472/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission Development of rural areas is one of the specific objectives of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It includes various tools which can help wine tourism. Under Rural Development interventions the CAP provides support to individual producers and organisations, and also through community-led activities like LEADER. Interventions could include investments, information actions, cooperation activities, knowledge exchange or training. Furthermore, Member States can support actions undertaken by certain organisations to promote wine tourism in production regions, and the Commission has recently proposed 1 that producer groups managing geographical indications, which are deeply embedded in their communities, can also benefit from this measure, creating opportunities for local employment and growth. In line with the Communication on the EU’s long-term vision for rural areas 2 and the Vision for Agriculture and Food 3 , the Rural Pact made available for local and regional authorities a community platform made of more than 3,000 members across Europe and a dedicated community group on rural tourism for exchanging good practices 4 . The Guide on EU Funding for Tourism 5 may help to identify all potential opportunities for wineries as well as other actors. For example, under the 2021-2027 Cohesion Policy, Greece has allocated EUR 564 million to support projects and actions in the sectors of culture and tourism as part of measures that strengthen the resilience and sustainability of the sectors and their role in socioeconomic and territorial development. The Creative Europe Programme also support Europe’s living heritage as wine tourism, notably through the European Heritage Label, enhancing their recognition and preservation. 1 The 2025 ‘Wine Package’: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0137. 2 Communication on the Long-term Vision for the EU’s rural areas: https://eurlex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:6c924246-da52-11eb-895a01aa75ed71a1.0003.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 3 Communication on A Vision for Agriculture and Food. Shaping together an attractive farming and agri-food sector for future generations: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0075. 4 https://ruralpact.rural-vision.europa.eu/groups/rural-tourism_en. 5 https://transport.ec.europa.eu/tourism/eu-funding-and-businesses/guide-eu-funding-tourism_en.”
  EU strategy for tourism development · EU and national cultural identities
• 2025-06-18 “E-002474/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Prespa Agreement between North Macedonia and Greece, which is binding under international law, is a cornerstone of regional stability and an example of reconciliation for the Western Balkans and beyond. As highlighted in the December 2024 Council conclusions 1 and in the Commission 2024 Enlargement Package 2 , it is crucial that all parties implement the agreement in good faith and achieve concrete outcomes. The enlargement process is and will remain a merit-based process and maintaining good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation is vital. The Commission continues to actively engage with North Macedonia to ensure that bilateral agreements remain unchallenged and are fully upheld. The Commission will continue to support North Macedonia in all efforts to build trust with countries in the region. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 2 SWD(2024) 693 final.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU enlargement
• 2025-06-18 “E-002473/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission remains committed to strengthening the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the EU and encouraging the harmonious development of its Member States and their regions through its cohesion policy. The European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) 1 provides an important contribution to the EU’s employment, social, education and skills policies, including structural reforms in these areas. The EU Home Affairs Funds for 2021–2027 2 are designed to ensure that EU financial support complements Member States’ responsibilities in managing migration and internal security. Funding is channelled through national programmes agreed with the Commission and subject to regular monitoring so that resources are used for clearly defined objectives 3 . The funds also support measures that benefit local communities facing migratory pressure by improving reception conditions, supporting integration, and enhancing law enforcement cooperation. The statistics available to the Commission indicate that irregular entries in the EU account for a small fraction of migration – for instance around 10% of total arrivals in 2023 4 . The number of third country nationals found to be illegally present in the EU in 2024 decreased by 27.4% compared to 2023 5 . Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 6 establishes common rules for the collection of EU statistics on migration, international protection, migration and as returns. In the context of the European Semester, the Commission is also monitoring the socio-economic situation of local communities. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 PE/42/2021/INIT, OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, pp. 21–59. 2 The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Border Management and Visa Instrument and the Internal Security Fund. 3 These include strengthening fair and efficient asylum systems, supporting the dignified return of irregular migrants, reinforcing border management and enhancing law enforcement cooperation. 4 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/statistics-migration-europe_en#migration-toand-from-the-eu. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=Enforcement_of_immigration_legislation_statistics. 6 Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers, OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, p. 23.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-06-03 “E-002221/2025 Answer given by Ms Minzatu on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission upholds fundamental rights as enshrined in the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In the EU, asylum-seekers are entitled to reception conditions (housing, financial support, etc.) under conditions specified by the Reception Conditions Directive 1 . 2. The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan 2 sets out concrete initiatives to reduce by 2030 the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 15 million. The Commission is working on the first EU Anti-Poverty Strategy, aiming to improve access to social protection and services, including for vulnerable groups. Furthermore, the Commission adopted the Strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030 3 to ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities in society and supports Member States in implementing the United Nation’s Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities 4 . 3. EU financial support to vulnerable groups is provided, for instance, through European cohesion policy funds and the Recovery and Resilience Facility. In particular, the Social Climate Fund 5 helps to alleviate the social and economic impacts arising from the Emissions Trading System 2 6 , providing dedicated funding to support the most affected vulnerable groups, notably households in energy or transport poverty. The Commission plans to adopt the European affordable housing plan 7 , to tackle the housing crisis, foster social cohesion as well as promote climate neutrality. 1 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast), OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 96–116, which will be replaced by Directive (EU) 2024/1346 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, OJ L, 2024/1346, 22.5.2024, as of 12 June 2026. 2 https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-and-activities/european-pillar-social-rights-buildingfairer-and-more-inclusive-european-union/european-pillar-social-rights-actionplan_en#:~:text=The%20European%20Pillar%20of%20Social%20Rights%20sets%20out,the%20Principles%20i nto%20concrete%20actions%20to%20benefit%20citizens. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0101. 4 https://social.desa.un.org/issues/disability/crpd/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities-crpd. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32023R0955. 6 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/ets2-buildings-road-transport-andadditional-sectors_en#about-the-ets2. 7 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14670-European-affordable-housingplan_en.”
  Minimum income harmonisation at EU level · EU policy on disability inclusion & accessibility · EU expenditure on social policy
• 2025-05-29 “E-002166/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission will conduct an analysis of the impact of housing speculation and its economic consequences and will propose follow-up actions where needed. The Commission will also assess systemic issues with short-term accommodation rentals and make proposals to tackle the inefficient use of the current housing stock. In addition, the Commission will put forward the European Affordable Housing Plan in the first quarter of 2026. The Commission notes that protection of primary residences, and regulation of electronic auctions as a way of acquisition of properties are a Member States’ competence. Housing is a space where long-term investments meet real economic need. Private investment plays an important role here and can, when well-regulated and responsibly managed, contribute to increasing the supply of housing, including by supporting developments that might not otherwise be viable. The inflow of non-European capital in the real estate sector may be covered by the free movement of capital principles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which as a matter of principle, prohibit any restrictions. However, Member States may adopt the measures necessary to safeguard legitimate public interests. The restrictions of capital flows from third countries may go beyond restrictions on capital flows within the EU. The Commission also observes that – given that housing is largely a competence of Member States – any avenue of work on housing will have to respect the principle of subsidiarity.”
  EU regulation of short-term rentals · EU policy on social & environmental impact of foreign investments · EU housing policy
• 2025-05-29 “E-002164/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU and the EU Delegation in Cairo are aware of and continue to monitor the recent developments in Egypt after the Ismailia Court of Appeals issued a ruling linked to the legal status of Saint Catherine’s Monastery in Sinai. In a meeting called by the Arab Republic of Egypt’s Foreign Ministry, the Egyptian authorities assured Member States’ Ambassadors and the EU Head of Delegation in Cairo that the Egyptian government remains fully committed to preserving the monastery’s religious, historical, and spiritual status, adding that the current status of the area around Saint Catherine’s Monastery is untouchable. It was reaffirmed that the monks' access to the site will not be affected by the court ruling. The EU welcomes the commitments of the governments of Greece and Egypt to work together towards safeguarding the rights of Saint Catherine’s Monastery and awaits any new developments with regard to its legal status. The EU will continue to follow the situation closely and await the result of the discussions between the Egyptian and Greek Authorities, insisting on the necessity to preserve the monastery’s religious, historical, and spiritual status, in accordance with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation World Heritage Convention 1 . 1 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization World Heritage convention website, Saint Catherine Monastery: https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/954/.”
  EU-Egypt relations · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2025-05-29 “E-002165/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Besides implementing all sanctions adopted by the United Nations, the EU also adopts autonomous sanctions to counter terrorism, defend human rights and democratic institutions, or prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons or weapons of mass destruction. Decisions on sanctions are taken unanimously by Member States in the European Council. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is listed under the EU’s Iran sanctions regime in relation to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, several dozen IRGC officials, and IRGC-related individuals and entities, are listed under further EU sanctions regimes 1 . Cooperation between the Azerbaijani Armed Forces and the IRGC depends on the bilateral relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. While the EU encourages partner countries to align with EU sanctions policy, the EU does not apply so-called secondary sanctions. The relationship between the EU and Azerbaijan remains based on the EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 2 . The EU is committed to developing this relationship, based on respect for fundamental principles, including the rule of law and human rights. The EU continues to pursue an open dialogue with Azerbaijan to address all issues, including related to the regional situation. 1 https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1999/614/oj/eng.”
  EU-Iran relations · EU-Azerbaijan relations
• 2025-05-20 “E-002028/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Demographic evidence indicates there is no single solution to address population ageing and decline. The Commission demography toolbox 1 considers a wide range of instruments, resources and policy frameworks to help Member States respond to demographic changes, from adaptation and support measures on the labour market, to pension and health systems, child-care and to long-term care provision, with a view to ensuring intergenerational fairness and territorial cohesion. The Commission sees that migration can play a complementary role to address labour shortages in specific sectors, in addition to measures to activate and upskill the existing EU workforce 2 . The determination of the conditions for the naturalisation of third country nationals and acquisition of citizenship is an exclusive competence of the Member States. Family policies and policies to boost birth rates remain primarily under the competence of Member States. The Commission has put forward a wide range of initiatives, tools and funding opportunities that help create favourable conditions enabling people to pursue their life and family aspirations in the place they call home 3 . These are supported mainly through the cohesion policy funds 4 . Under the European Social Fund Plus, Greece will establish a National Observatory of Demographic Policy to contribute to the implementation of the national action plan for demography. The design of tax-benefit systems is within the competence of Member States. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/communication-demographic-change-europe-toolbox-action_en; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023DC0577. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0090. 3 For example: The Work-Life Balance Directive aims to improve the balance between work and family lives for parents and carers. The EU Strategy on the rights of the child aims to combat child poverty, improve access to childcare, education and healthcare, and support families in vulnerable situations. The European Child Guarantee aims to ensure that all children at risk of poverty or social exclusion have access to essential services such as education, care, healthcare, nutrition and housing. The Council Recommendation on the revision of the Barcelona targets on early childhood education and care (ECEC) encourages Member States to increase availability, affordability, accessibility and quality of ECEC. 4 The EU cohesion policy, through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and the Just Transition Fund (JTF) provides support for start-ups, local small and mediumsized enterprises, investment in public services and transport, thereby contributing to socio-economic and territorial cohesion. The Talent Booster Mechanism directly addresses brain drain and talent retention, including in Eastern and Southern Europe. The Youth Guarantee aims to ensure that young people receive a job, education or training offer within four months of becoming unemployed.”
  EU competences on demographic policy · EU strategy on population growth · Support for families
• 2025-05-12 “E-001888/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Member States are unanimously agreeing on European security questions, in particular through European Council conclusions. This ensures that the security and defence interest of each Member States are respected in any decisions relating to European defence. Over the past years, the EU has agreed a number of defence industrial programmes and instruments, such as the European Defence Fund 1 , European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act 2 , the Act in support of ammunition production 3 , or most recently the Security Action for Europe instrument 4 . Furthermore, negotiations are currently ongoing on a future European Defence Industry Programme 5 . These programmes and instruments support Member States who are and will remain in the driving seat for their defence, in particular for identifying the capabilities required by the armed forces. The legislative procedures governing the adoption of such programmes or instruments are in line with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. All of these programmes and instruments are open to all Member States irrespective of the share of their gross domestic product that they spend on defence. Moreover, these programmes and instruments all include conditions to ensure that the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States are respected. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1525/oj/eng. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202501106. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024PC0150.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-05-12 “E-001885/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Euro cash has legal tender status in the euro area under EU Law. Its continued existence and availability is guaranteed by the Treaties, as long as there is demand for it. On 28 June 2023, the Commission put forward a legislative proposal on the legal tender of cash aiming at ensuring the widespread acceptance of and access to cash. This proposal seeks to ensure that euro cash remains widely accepted for payments and easily accessible for people, businesses and public entities across the euro area. It obliges Member States to monitor and report on the situation and take measures to address any problems identified in relation to cash acceptance and access. The proposal will ensure that everyone in the euro area is free to choose their preferred payment method and has access to basic cash services, thereby also ensuring the financial inclusion of vulnerable groups who tend to rely more on cash payments. The Communication on the European Preparedness Union Strategy 1 adopted by the Commission on 26 March 2025 sets out a comprehensive approach to preparedness calling for involvement of public authorities, society and individuals in building a culture of resilience to crises, whether they be natural or man-made disasters or conflicts. In these circumstances the role of cash and the cash infrastructure is key, thus it is essential to ensure that Member States are prepared appropriately to respond in different exceptional circumstances where the demand for cash could rapidly increase or cashless payments are significantly disrupted. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/preparedness_en.”
  Means of payment (cash vs digital) · Digital euro
• 2025-05-12 “E-001886/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s work to promote and defend the rule of law is underpinned by equal treatment between Member States, the full respect of EU law and European standards, and a process embedded in dialogue and mutual understanding. The Commission has a wide range of tools at its disposal to uphold the rule of law, with the same rules and principles applying to each Member State. These tools include the annual Rule of Law Report, the Article 7 procedure, the general regime of conditionality and infringement proceedings. The general regime of conditionality 1 is designed to protect against breaches of the principles of the rule of law that affect or seriously risk affecting the EU budget. The conditions for its application are established by the Conditionality Regulation adopted by the co-legislators and upheld by the Court of Justice. The European Parliament has recognised the effectiveness of the general regime of conditionality. The Commission makes its assessment in an objective, impartial and fair manner, in line with the Regulation. The Council is the institution that adopts the final decisions. The European Court of Auditors found that the measures taken by the Council in respect of one Member State so far were in line with the Regulation. Regarding infringement proceedings, Articles 258 and 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union allow the Commission to take action when a Member State fails to fulfil its obligations under EU law. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission monitors the application and enforcement of EU law by the Member States and may decide to take appropriate action against a Member State. The Court of Justice is the final arbiter in matters of infringement. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.”
  Rule of law in Hungary · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2025-05-12 “E-001887/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean and in maintaining a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. A stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean requires unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, to international agreements and to the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter as well as abstaining from unilateral actions that violate international law and the sovereign rights of Member States. Türkiye is a candidate country and a key EU partner. In the 2024 enlargement report 1 , the Commission emphasised that Türkiye must avoid actions that damage good neighbourly relations and respect the sovereignty of all Member States and their sovereign rights. This includes the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In its Council Conclusions of December 2024 2 , the EU noted the improvements in relations between Greece and Türkiye and expressed its expectations that these improvements will be sustained. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2024_en. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2025-04-30 “E-001725/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030 1 qualifies the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (‘United Kingdom’) as an essential European ally with which cooperation on security and defence should be enhanced in mutual interest. The EU-United Kingdom Security and Defence Partnership 2 outlines that the EU and the United Kingdom share the same challenging security environment and have vital interests in the peace, security and stability of Europe and beyond and provides a framework to facilitate regular highlevel dialogue and strategic consultations, joint initiatives, and possibilities for participation in specific EU defence initiatives. EU defence related programmes already provide for limited participation of third countries under strict eligibility conditions aimed at protecting the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States. This also applies to the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument 3 : the United Kingdom – like other third countries having concluded a Security and Defence Partnership with the EU – can participate in common procurements as buyer. Industrial participation (as supplier) is however conditional on the signature of a specific bilateral agreement between the EU and the third country in question, defining the rules and conditions of participation of the third-country entities, including additional safeguards to the EU and Member States’ security and defence interests. Regarding Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), decisions on the involvement of third countries are taken by the Council on a case-by-case basis acting by unanimity. Security and Defence Partnerships with third countries are fully in line with this policy. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readiness%2 02030.pdf. 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2025/EUUK%20Security%20and%20Defence%20Partnership.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  EU-US relations · EU competences on defence
• 2025-04-30 “E-001724/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission values Geographical Indications (GIs) as a tool preserving the rich and diverse culinary heritage of the Union and contributing to sustainable agriculture, landscape and biodiversity preservation, job creation and economic viability in production regions. More than 280 Greek GIs are already registered in the Union. The latest review of the Union GI rules 1 enhances the protection of GIs and the position of GI producers in the markets. Also, a toolkit to guide interested producers on how to apply is being prepared. 2. The Culture strand of the Creative Europe program 2 focuses on initiatives promoting artistic and cultural cooperation. This can include projects related to gastronomy and culinary practices, recognised as part of Europe’s intangible cultural heritage 3 . Projects aimed at preserving, promoting, or innovating within the gastronomic culture can be aligned with the goals of the Creative Europe program. The gastronomic heritage of the Greek islands could also potentially be showcased through a transnational European Heritage Label application, in collaboration with islands that share similar culinary traditions. Relevant Greek authorities may be contacted for guidance on initiating such a proposal. 3. The Commission supports the promotion of agricultural products 4 , including those not protected under a quality scheme such as GIs. Promotion measures aim to highlight the specific characteristics of EU agricultural and food products, including authenticity, diversity or traditions. Many Greek programmes are funded under this policy 5 . The programme for the smaller Aegean islands 6 supports the production of several PDO and PGI products, such as wines, cheeses, mastic and ‘Tomataki Santorinis’. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1143 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 2 https://culture.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/creative-europe-culture-strand. 3 https://multimediark.slowfood.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/1_Policy_Brief.pdf. 4 Regulation (EU) No 1144/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 5 For info on programmes and funding: https://enjoy-its-from-europe.campaign.europa.eu/en. 6 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/market-measures/outermost-regions-and-smallaegean-islands/smaller-aegean-islands_en.”
  EU framework for voluntary quality and sustainability terms in food marketing · EU policy on country of origin food labelling
• 2025-04-30 “E-001723/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The core mandate of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) is to support Member States in external border management and returns. The support of Frontex is invaluable to Member States’ ability to manage the EU’s external borders safely and effectively. Furthermore, the Commission continues to attach great importance to ensuring that the Agency has sufficient human and financial resources for the fulfilment of its tasks. Frontex has a broad mandate to comprehensively support the Member States in managing migration at their sections of EU external borders. Nonetheless, the Commission will assess this issue in detail in the process of preparing the review of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 1 . As question three falls under the responsibility of Frontex, the Commission has asked the Agency to provide an answer to the question raised by the Honourable Member. The Agency’s reply will be sent to the Honourable Member by the Commission as soon as possible. 1 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1–131.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-04-28 “E-001691/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ provided the first international legal definition of genocide and establishes a duty for states to prevent and punish this crime. All Member States are parties to the Genocide Convention. All Member States are also Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which includes genocide as one of the core crimes. The EU has the strengthening of human rights at its very core, including with regard to genocide and crimes against humanity. This is both an internal and external priority, remaining high on the agenda of the EU's foreign and security policy. The best point of departure is early action. The EU works together with the United Nations and partners around the globe to strengthen the global protection of human rights and address early warning signs that could point to genocidal behaviours. Member States are required to criminalise racist or xenophobic acts and public incitement to hatred, including online. The EU’s strategy on combating antisemitism 1 aims to put the EU in the global lead in this area. Through its 2020-2027 Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy 2 , the EU aims to combat intolerance, harassment, and violence based on ethnic origin, religion or belief. To date, the EU has allocated EUR 20 million to the Global Initiative Against Impunity, funding projects tackling impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. It includes specific support to the work of the EU Genocide Network. This network was established to facilitate cooperation between national authorities of Member States when investigating and prosecuting core international crimes. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combattingdiscrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/combating-antisemitism/eu-strategy-combating-antisemitism-andfostering-jewish-life-2021-2030/about-eu-strategy_en. 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-action-plan-human-rights-and-democracy-0_en.”
  Support for International Criminal Court · EU competences on human rights
• 2025-04-14 “E-001528/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU leadership has recurrently underlined that the EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye 1 . Türkiye is a candidate country, a key partner in several areas of joint interest and a longstanding partner in the Common Security and Defence Policy. Nonetheless, accession negotiations with the country remain at a standstill since 2018, as Türkiye has not reversed the negative trend of continued deterioration of democratic standards noted in the past years 2 . Respect of rule of law and progressive alignment with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy are integral parts of the EU-Türkiye relationship. The EU recognises the contribution of all non-EU Allies, including Türkiye, to the European and Transatlantic security. The EU is engaging with Türkiye on a phased, proportionate and reversible manner in line with the November 2023 recommendations of the Joint Communication on the state of play of the EU-Türkiye relations 3 and the conclusions of the European Council of April 2024 4 . The White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 5 recalls that EU actions will take into consideration the security and defence interests of all Member States, while reaffirming the key role that like-minded partners can play to strengthen European security and defence. The proposed Regulation on Security Action for Europe 6 is under discussion in the Council and the conditions for cooperation with partners will be settled in this Regulation, once adopted, following a two-step approach: first, joining joint procurement activities; second, negotiating an agreement with the EU to allow its defence industry to supply Member States. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/7c67aed6-e7c2-47de-b3f8b3edd26a3e26_en?filename=COM_2024_690_1_EN_ACT_part1_v11.pdf. 3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/202311/Joint%20Communication%20to%20the%20European%20Council%20%20State%20of%20play%20of%20EUTurkiye%20political%2C%20economic%20and%20trade%20relations.pdf. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf. 5 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/introducing-white-paper-european-defenceand-rearm-europe-plan-readiness-2030_en. 6 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6d6f889c-e58d-4caa-8f3b8b93154fe206_en?filename=SAFE%20Regulation.pdf.”
  EU competences on defence · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-04-14 “E-001529/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Member States have the right to regulate real estate markets. In doing so, however, they must respect the basic principles of the EU Treaties, first and foremost the fundamental freedoms. The right to acquire, use or dispose of real estate falls under the free movement of capital principle set out in Articles 63 et seq. of the TFEU, or, depending on the purpose, under freedom of establishment pursuant to Article 49 TFEU. As a rule, these freedoms prohibit any restrictions on the acquisition of real estate as well as direct or indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality, unless they are justified by legitimate reasons of public interest as recognized in the Treaties or in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Where a measure pursues such a legitimate objective, restrictions to property transactions can be justified only insofar as they are suitable for securing, in a consistent and systematic manner, the attainment of the objective which they pursue and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective 1 . The free movement of capital also extends to investments from third countries. However, special considerations apply to justifications for restrictions on the movement of capital to and from third countries. The CJEU stressed that the relations with third countries can be said to ‘take place in a different legal context’ from that which occurs within the EU, when EU legislation is not applicable to third countries. Consequently, under the Treaty additional justifications may be acceptable in the case of Member States’ restrictions as regards third countries. 2 To be noted that the freedom of establishment extends to nationals of Member States as well as legal entities established in the EU. 1 Case C-670/21, BA (Inheritance – Public housing policy in the European Union), EU:C:2023:763, p. 67 and the case-law cited. 2 CJEU, cases C-101/05, Skatteverket, p. 36; C-446/04, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, p. 171.”
  Anti-money laundering regulation · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2025-03-27 “E-001286/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU’s net greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 and the climate neutrality target by 2050, enshrined in the European Climate Law, require a swift decrease in emissions from all sectors. The Regulation on CO 2 emission standards for new passenger cars and vans 1 sets targets for the average emissions per manufacturer, which get stricter over time, up to a 100% emission reduction target for new vehicles registered in the EU from 2035 onwards. The Regulation creates long-term certainty so that investments can be channelled in clean technologies, new value chains in the EU, recharging infrastructure, and the reskilling of users. Over the past years, the efficiency and range of zero-emission vehicles has steadily improved – reaching an average of close to 350 km already in 2022 2 , and the availability of recharging and refuelling infrastructure has strongly increased. As the technology develops, further improvements of these aspects are expected in the coming years. 2. The Commission notes that the abovementioned Regulation does not impose the use of any specific technology. 3. The EU is not competent to determine the specific working conditions and equipment used by law enforcement authorities, including the type of patrol cars they use. It is for the relevant national authorities to do so. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/631/2024-01-01. 2 https://alternative-fuels-observatory.ec.europa.eu/policymakers-and-public-authorities/electric-vehicle-modelstatistics.”
  Road transport environmental policy · EV charging infrastructure
• 2025-03-18 “E-001129/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The deployment in Greece of European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) has been assessed by the EU Agency for Railways, on request of the Greek authorities. The assessment 1 revealed lack of a proper governance scheme to coordinate the implementation and use of the system, as well as shortcomings in relation to its deployment and maintenance. The Agency presented a set of recommendations to address these findings. The Commission has set clear deadlines for the deployment of ERTMS across the EU. The trans-European transport network (TEN-T) Regulation 2 requires Member States to roll out ERTMS by 2030, 2040 or 2050, depending on the specific part of the TEN-T network. The Commission closely monitors progress of the roll-out and offers additional support to Member States through the work of the ERTMS coordinator. The coordinator will publish by the end of 2025 his new work plan which will include the state of play of the roll-out. In the future, annual status reports will also be published. The Commission assesses the completeness and the compliance of national transposition measures with the Rail Safety Directive 3 , whereas the EU Agency for Railways regularly audits the work of the national safety authorities which play a pivotal role in ensuring safety of the rail system in a Member State. On request of the Commission, the Agency may also perform a complex assessment covering all actors in a given Member State. For all identified findings, Member State prepares an Action Plan. In case of significant deficiencies, the Commission may open an infringement case as in the case of Greece (INFR(2023)2036, letter of formal notice of 16 December 2024 4 ). 1 Report ERA/REP/2-2023 of the European Union Agency for Railways regarding the assessment of maturity of ERTMS deployment in Greece and recommendations on the way forward, 21 March 2024. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1153 and (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1679/oj. 3 Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on railway safety, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/798/oj. 4 Associated press release: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_24_6006.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration · EU support of rail transport
• 2025-03-17 “E-001127/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has repeatedly condemned 1 the Houthi threats and attacks against commercial ships, as unacceptable violations of international law threatening maritime security, peace and stability in the region. The EU underlined that they must stop, notably through the High Representative/Vice-President’s declaration on behalf of the EU and its Member States of 12 January 2024 2 , welcoming the 10 January 2024 United Nations Security Council resolution 2722 3 condemning the Houthi attacks. The EU has taken good note of the latest United States (US) designations of Houthi individuals and entities and is currently analysing their potential impact. The EU implements the United Nations Yemen sanctions through its Council Decision 2014/932 4 . This includes the Houthis (Ansar Allah), 12 Houthi commanders and influential figures, as well as a targeted arms embargo. Moreover, in 2024, the EU designated individuals and entities for their support to the Houthis under its sanctions regime regarding Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities in the Middle East and the Red Sea region 5 . The EU is committed to continue its engagement in the Red Sea through its defensive maritime operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES, ensuring the protection of maritime routes and international navigational rights. Operation ASPIDES mandate has been recently extended until 2026 6 . Operation ASPIDES also proceeds with some exchange of information with US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian and other maritime actors in the region, including Operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA. The EU also remains the key contributor to the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen, which aims to facilitate the unimpeded free-flow of commercial items. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ep-plenary-speech-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-houthiattacks-red-sea_en 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/01/12/yemen-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-welcoming-the-un-security-council-resolution-strongly-condemning-houthiattacks-on-red-sea-shipping/. See also the EU Spokesperson’s statements of 5 and 13 December 2023: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/yemen-statement-spokesperson-houthi-attacks-red-sea_en, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/yemen-statement-spokesperson-houthi-attacks-ships-red-sea_en 3 http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2722 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0932 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02023D1532-20241118 6 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/02/14/red-sea-council-prolongs-the-mandate-ofoperation-aspides/”
  EU-Iran relations · EU foreign policy approach · EU-US relations
• 2025-03-17 “E-001126/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The rule of law and human rights in Azerbaijan remain a priority for the EU and are at the core of the EU-Azerbaijan bilateral relations. The EU has repeatedly voiced concerns regarding the unsettling rise of arrests of independent journalists, human rights defenders, and political activists on politically motivated charges in Azerbaijan. The EU has called on the Azerbaijani authorities to ensure that their actions adhere to the relevant obligations under domestic and international law. In this context, the EU has consistently called for the release of all persons imprisoned for exercising their fundamental rights. These messages have been conveyed publicly and bilaterally at all levels, including at the level of the High Representative/VicePresident 1 also during her visit to Azerbaijan on 25 April 2025. The EU has closely followed the issue of Karabakh Armenian detainees held in Azerbaijan. It is of great importance that Azerbaijan ensures the right to a fair trial and adequate detention conditions, in line with its international commitments. The EU has also advocated addressing these issues as part of confidence-building measures between the parties. Any common foreign security policy decision relating to sanctions is for the Council to make by unanimity. EU engagement with Azerbaijan remains instrumental in order to promote peace, stability and prosperity in the South Caucasus through regional cooperation, including in the context of the normalisation process between Azerbaijan and Armenia. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/azerbaijan-statement-spokesperson-human-rights-situation_en; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2024-10-22-ITM-020_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2024-12-18-ITM-019-03_EN.html; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/council-europe/1506th-meeting-committee-ministers-11-september2024-eu-statement-exchange-views-european-committee_en?s=51”
  EU-Armenia relations · EU-Azerbaijan relations
• 2025-03-11 “P-001051/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission On 11 March 2025, the High Representative/Vice-President issued a statement on behalf of the EU 1 , which condemned in the strongest terms the horrific crimes committed against civilians, including summary killings, many of which allegedly perpetrated by armed groups supporting the security forces of the transitional authorities. The EU called for a swift, transparent and impartial investigation to be conducted to ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice. It welcomed the commitments made by the transitional authorities, in particular the establishment of an investigative committee. It further called on the transitional authorities to allow the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to investigate all violations. Everything must be done to prevent any such crimes from happening again. The EU continues to call for an end to violence across Syria and urges all parties to protect Syrians form all ethnic and religious background without discrimination. The EU consistently supports a peaceful and inclusive Syrian-led political transition, grounded on the respect for international law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, pluralism and tolerance among all components of society. The EU continues to be a staunch supporter of accountability mechanisms working on Syria, including the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the Commission of Inquiry, and the new Independent Institution on Missing Persons. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/pdf/”
  EU-Syria relations · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2025-03-03 “E-000894/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not have aggregate data concerning the costs incurred by the Member States in relation to third country nationals illegally staying in the EU. Estimating the costs of returns depends on a variety of elements. In the case of voluntary returns, the estimated cost should include at least the flight and other transportation costs, the in-cash and in-kind assistance provided to the returnee and, where relevant, a package for the reintegration in the country of origin. In the case of forced returns, the estimated cost should include at least the cost of pre-removal accommodation, the flight (often a charter flight), the involvement of escorts when necessary, and other special arrangements before, during and after return. According to an estimate of the European Parliamentary Research Service 1 , forced return costs EUR 3 414 per individual, compared with EUR 560 per voluntary return. The 2020 study of the Commission Joint Research Centre ‘Projecting the Net Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the EU’ 2 provides an analysis of the fiscal impact of migration in the EU in the past and the future. No other such studies are planned for the immediate future. 1 The Cost of Non- Europe in Asylum Policy, European Parliamentary Research Service, Authors: Wouter van Ballegooij and Cecilia Navarra, European Added Value Unit, PE 627.117 – October 2018. 2 https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC121937.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-02-27 “E-000876/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is committed to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) as an ambitious project of major geopolitical and economic relevance. To this end, the Commission plans to intensify contacts with all relevant stakeholders, including the co-signatories of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2023 as well as other interested countries, Member States, and financial institutions to discuss implementation of the different segments of the corridor. The EU is also looking at supporting IMEC through EU initiatives, such as TransMediterranean Energy and Clean Tech Cooperation Initiative, and via its transport and digital connectivity programmes under the Global Gateway strategy; as well as exploring possible contributions in the form of technical assistance for feasibility studies and soft connectivity elements; and trilateral cooperation efforts to leverage private and public investments for the relevant infrastructure. It is not foreseen that the transport-related components of the corridor would pass through the Red Sea. Rather, a railroad is envisaged to connect the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean through the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East. Should any other connectivity-elements of IMEC (such as cables) need to pass through the Red Sea, the security implications would be assessed thoroughly before deploying any concrete projects. Türkiye and Iran are not currently part of IMEC. As for any project of this kind, the Commission will assess and address scrupulously any potential risk to the EU’s economic, security or other interests, including strategic dependencies on any third country.”
  Trade relations with Turkey
• 2025-02-27 “E-000879/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 1. Protecting civilians, ending the violence and tackling the drivers of conflict in Eastern Congo requires a holistic response by the region as a whole. The EU is contributing by strengthening the Congolese security and law enforcement apparatus, supporting local and regional conflict mediation initiatives as well as activities aimed at tackling hate speech and extremism. The Allied Democratic Forces as a group and several of its senior leaders are subject to United Nations (UN) sanctions. One of its senior leaders is also subject to EU restrictive measures. 2. The EU has been actively supporting, publicly and diplomatically, the African-led Luanda and the Nairobi processes. It has recently intensified its outreach to key actors in the region, with calls and meetings involving the President of the European Council, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region. It will continue to do so. 3. The EU has been extremely active in the provision of humanitarian aid to the populations in need in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It has already made available EUR 60 million for the humanitarian response in country in 2025, in addition to financing humanitarian aid flights transporting cargo and humanitarian workers in the country and humanitarian advocacy efforts. The EU has supported and welcomed the decision by the UN Human Rights Council of 7 February 2025 to establish an independent fact-finding mission on the serious human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law committed in North Kivu and South Kivu, in the eastern DRC, to be followed by an independent commission of inquiry.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU-Congo (DRC) relations · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-02-20 “E-000778/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission underlines that the responsibility for rail safety lies with the Member States and relevant actors, as set out in Article 4 of Directive 2016/798 1 . Neither the Commission nor the European Union Agency for Railways (the Agency) can replace these actors in their roles. The Commission does assess the compliance of the national measures transposing the Rail Safety Directive 2 , whereas the Agency audits its implementation and application by the national safety authorities, which play a pivotal role in ensuring safety of the national rail systems. On request of the Commission, the Agency may perform complex assessments of the entire rail sector in Member States. To rectify non-compliance, Member States must implement an Action Plan. In case of deficiencies in the implementation of EU law, the Commission may take the necessary measures, as it was done for Greece by opening an infringement case (INFR(2023)2036 of 16 December 2024 3 ). The Commission considers that the legislative framework concerning rail safety is mature and contains strong control mechanisms. However, it should be improved by EU-wide safety occurrence reporting for early alerts and by measures enhancing the risk-based monitoring capabilities of the Agency. In the Commission’s view, the 2024 trans-European transport network (TEN-T) Regulation 4 introduced a solid framework to ensure the development of an efficient, digital and resilient rail network in the European Union. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016L0798. 2 Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on railway safety, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/798/oj. 3 Press release: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_24_6006. 4 Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1153 and (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1679/oj.”
  EU policy on aviation safety · EU support of rail transport
• 2025-02-20 “E-000777/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission supports Member States to ensure security of energy supply in the Union. According to article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Member States have the full right to determine the conditions for exploiting their energy resources, their choice between different energy sources and the general structure of their energy supply, while adopting measures in view of the commitment for the EU to become climate-neutral by 2050 1 . Regarding the exploitation of hydrocarbons, the EU legal framework is based on Directive 94/22/EC (Hydrocarbons Directive) 2 which lays down common rules for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons resources located on its territory. It applies to both onshore and offshore fields. The Directive underlines the sovereign rights of the Member States over hydrocarbon resources within their territories, e.g. determine the geographical areas and authorise entities to exercise those rights. The Commission can intervene only in cases where the Directive is not correctly implemented. 1 As laid out in the European Climate Law. 2 On conditions for granting and using authorisations for prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons. Directive 94/22/EC: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1994/22/oj/eng.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Natural gas
• 2025-02-12 “E-000660/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Dismantling criminal networks involved in migrant smuggling is a key priority for the Commission. Within its competences, the Commission supports Member States not only through direct coordination of relevant response policies on the ground, but also by leveraging the resources of EU agencies, such as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency through the deployment of Standing Corps, and the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) through the deployment of guest officers in support of secondary security checks and migrant smuggling investigations. The Commission highly encourages and supports the effective cooperation in a whole-of-aroute approach, between on the one side countries of origin and transit and on the other side destination countries in the EU, to ensure effective interventions to prevent and counter irregular migration. Such measures are pursued as part of the renewed EU action plan against migrant smuggling (2021-2025) 1 and the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats 2 policy cycle. Moreover, in November 2023, the Commission launched a Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling 3 along three key pillars - prevention, response and alternatives - and proposed to strengthen the EU legal framework 4 and the role of Europol 5 to ensure that the EU has the necessary legal and operational instruments to respond to this evolving crime. The Commission has also reached out to transport operators and partner countries and proposed a Regulation to take measures against transport operators 6 and provided a toolbox addressing the use of commercial means of transport to facilitate irregular migration to the EU 7 . 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions A renewed EU action plan against migrant smuggling (2021-2025), COM(2021) 591 final. 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/law-enforcement-cooperation/empact-fightingcrime-together_en. 3 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/60f6cc08-c7ee-46db-bee5689562d34436_en?filename=Call-to-action-global-alliance-to-counter-migrant-smuggling_en_1.pdf. 4 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum rules to prevent and counter the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the Union, and replacing Council Directive 2002/90/EC and Council Framework Decision 2002/946 JHA, COM(2023) 755 final. 5 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on enhancing police cooperation in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, and on enhancing Europol’s support to preventing and combating such crimes and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/794, COM(2023) 754 final. 6 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures against transport operators that facilitate or engage in trafficking in persons or smuggling of migrants in relation to illegal entry into the territory of the European Union, COM(2021) 753 final. 7 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/toolbox-addressing-use-commercial-means-transport-facilitate-irregularmigration-eu_en.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-02-11 “E-000613/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Since the adoption of the European Parliament resolution 1 on investor residence schemes 2 , the Commission has taken action to address the risks related to security, money-laundering, tax evasion and corruption. In its 2022 Recommendation 3 , the Commission called on Member States to take measures to prevent such risks and take specific actions regarding investor residence permit granted to nationals of Russia and Belarus. The new Anti-Money Laundering package 4 also introduces strict obligations on involved actors and requires Member States running these schemes to assess and monitor risks, and to put in place mitigating measures. In addition, the proposed recast of the Long-Term Residents Directive 5 includes rules to prevent third-country investors from abusively acquiring EU long-term resident status. With regards to the social impact of ‘golden visa’ schemes, the Commission notes that in respect of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, primary responsibility for housing is within the remit of Member States, and regional and local authorities. However, the Commission is already providing support to Member States through a variety of funding and programmes 6 . In addition, the Commission appointed the first-ever Commissioner responsible for housing and established a Task Force for Housing. The Commission will put forward a European Affordable Housing Plan to help national, regional and local authorities address structural drivers of the housing crisis. The Commission will foster investments in affordable housing through a pan-European investment platform 7 , by allowing Member States to double cohesion policy investments in this area and by reviewing State aid rules to enable housing support measures. 1 European Parliament resolution of 9 March 2022 with proposals to the Commission on citizenship and residence by investment schemes (2021/2026(INL)) proposed to phase out CBI (Citizenship by investment Schemes) by 2025, and proposed other measures to address the risks posed by RBI (Residence by investment schemes) which are commonly named as "golden visas (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-92022-0065_EN.pdf). 2 Commonly known as ‘golden visa’ schemes. 3 C(2022) 2028 final, Commission Recommendation on immediate steps in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in relation to investor citizenship and investor residence schemes. 4 In particular: Directive (EU) 2024/1640 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the mechanisms to be put in place by Member States for the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Directive(EU) 2019/1937, and amending and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849; Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. 5 COM(2022) 650 final. 6 Including the Recovery and Resilience Plans, the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund and Just Transition Fund, as well as the InvestEU programme’s Social Investments and skills window and sustainable infrastructure window and the European Social Fund+. 7 To be established in cooperation with the European Investment Bank and other financial institutions.”
  Anti-money laundering regulation · Legal migration
• 2025-02-06 “E-000560/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Commission outlined in REPowerEU the strategic necessity to accelerate the clean energy transition and diversify natural gas supplies, including through domestic gas resources 1 . The EastMed pipeline is one of the options to transport gas from Israeli and Cypriot fields to Greece. The Commission continuously monitors energy infrastructure developments in alignment with EU policy objectives and available policy instruments. The EastMed pipeline is included in the list of Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMIs), and therefore can benefit from streamlined permitting processes, improved regulatory treatment and funding from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) under certain conditions. The project has received funding under the CEF to carry out a feasibility study. The feasibility of the EastMed pipeline will depend on its commercial viability, including future demand dynamics in line with our climate ambitions, and its potential to contribute to the goals of the REPowerEU. The Commission monitors the implementation of the priority projects and works alongside Member States to address emerging challenges. For instance, the EU addresses challenges like cyber threats and physical security to energy infrastructure via the Critical Entities Resilience Directive 2 and the Network and Information Directive (NIS2 Directive) 3 , and is reviewing the Union’s energy security framework. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/key-documents-repowereu_en 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj/eng 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555”
  EU energy infrastructure integration · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Natural gas
• 2025-01-30 “E-000430/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission makes considerable efforts to foster transboundary cooperation on water management as required by Article 13 of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) 1 which sets a requirement for Member States, in the case of an international river basin district, to ensure coordination for the benefit of water bodies. Moreover, Article 12 of the WFD lays down that where a Member State identifies an issue which has an impact on the management of its water but cannot be resolved by that Member State, it may report the issue to the Commission and any other Member State concerned and may make recommendations for the resolution of it. There are no records in the Commission of such a formal notification. The agreement on the River Arda continues to be the subject of bilateral discussions. 2. Precision irrigation, the use of wastewater in agriculture 2 and less water consuming crops can increase irrigation efficiency. Through the Common Agricultural Policy 3 the Greek Strategic Plan 4 offers tools supporting the irrigation sector. Under rural development, investment support is available for improving irrigation facilities, as well as for agricultural holdings adopting water conservation techniques. Furthermore, farmers may participate on a voluntarily basis in eco-schemes relevant to agricultural water sustainability, including the use of climate resilient crops and digital applications for irrigation. Finally, the cross-border cooperation Interreg programme Greece-Bulgaria 2021- 2027 5 provides financial resources to facilitate cooperation and may also support actions related to protocols and cooperation plans. 1 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73. 2 According to EU Regulation 2020/74, farmers can irrigate with treated wastewater. This regulation facilitates the establishment of water reuse systems, utilising treated wastewater from local reclamation facilities, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/741/oj/eng 3 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy_en 4 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/category/sskap-2023-2027/sskap-egkrisi-tropopoiiseis/ 5 https://www.greece-bulgaria.eu/”
  EU policy on water management · Agricultural funding
• 2025-01-30 “E-000429/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission has been made aware of this, e.g. by the written question E-002085/2024. Projects should be planned and implemented covering all aspects of sustainability highlighted in the publication ‘EU principles for sustainable raw materials’ 1 . In combination with legal requirements, e.g. from the Water Framework Directive 2 , a safeguard framework ensures that such impacts on the environment, social cohesion and drinking water are minimised. 2. Recycling plays a crucial role to ensure secure and sustainable supply of antimony. Secondary antimony is mainly recovered from lead-acid batteries and to a lesser extent from polymers 3 . The Commission aims to increase such recycling efforts by setting the right legal framework in the critical raw materials, waste and product legislation but also by funding several projects to develop innovative antimony recovery processes 4 . The Extractive Waste Directive 5 encourages the recovery of extractive waste by means of recycling, reusing or reclaiming such waste in accordance with the existing environmental standards. 3. National bodies are primarily responsible to verify compliance of individual projects with the EU environmental legislation. For example, the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 6 requires to assess environmental impacts for projects, which might have such adverse impacts. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will continue monitoring the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. The Commission aims to swiftly follow up on systemic issues involving the application of EU law in EU countries. However, one-off instances of this are better dealt with at national level, as long as there are available remedies, including judicial ones. 1 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/6d541f66-0f81-11ec-9151-01aa75ed71a1/language-en 2 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32–35. 3 Raw Materials Information System (RMIS) - https://rmis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/rmp/Antimony 4 Project Close WEEE – CORDIS - https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/641747 Project PLAST2bCLEANED – CORDIS - https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/821087 Project NONTOX – CORDIS - https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/820895/results Project Stibiox- CORDIS - https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/824871 5 Directive 2006/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the management of waste from extractive industries and amending Directive 2004/35/EC - Statement by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 15–34. 6 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1–21, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014, OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1–18.”
  Sourcing of critical raw materials · EU policy on water management · Nature protection and restoration in the EU
• 2025-01-09 “E-000067/2025 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. Under the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean, the EU reporting mechanisms ensure structured communication between coastal and flag States, enabling action when vessels are suspected of engaging in Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. Also, in line with the relevant Council Regulation (EC) 1 , the Member State concerned has primary responsibility for control in its waters, including the adoption of enforcement measures and resource allocation. 2. The Commission supports Greece through the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and the European Fisheries Control Agency, which deploys the patrol vessel ‘Ocean Sentinel’, provides satellite imagery and aerial surveillance and coordinates inspection campaigns. The Commission intends to reinforce controls by improving synergies with the European Maritime Safety Agency and strengthening joint deployments in the Mediterranean. 3. Alleged IUU fishing by Turkish vessels is monitored by the Commission and the Member States concerned. In this context, unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, to international agreements and to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations’ Charter, as well as abstaining from unilateral actions which run counter to EU interests, violate international law and the sovereign rights of EU Member States, remains an essential requirement 2 . Türkiye’s ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would improve cooperation with the EU on fisheries and maritime policy 3 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/1224/oj/eng as recently modified by Regulation (EU) 2023/2842 of 22 November 2023. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-politicaleconomic-and-trade-relations-0_en 3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/8010c4db-6ef8-4c85-aa06814408921c89_en?filename=T%C3%BCrkiye%20Report%202024.pdf”
  Environmental regulation of fisheries · Funding for fisheries and aquaculture
• 2024-12-23 “E-003082/2024 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges the concerns raised in the referenced report. Addressing illicit drug trafficking is a shared priority. Accession negotiations with Türkiye remain at a standstill since June 2018, following the decisions of the European Council 1 . Consequently, the Commission has reduced financial support to Türkiye, with funding in the area of fundamental rights reoriented towards civil society organisations. At the same time, as a candidate country, the adherence of Türkiye to the EU acquis is systematically monitored and evaluated in the Commission’s annual Türkiye Report 2 . Türkiye’s alignment with EU standards, including the rule of law, anti-corruption and law enforcement cooperation on organised crime, including drug trafficking, is essential for accession. In the area of the rule of law, the latest annual Türkiye Report highlighted persistent serious concerns. In terms of combating organised crime, Türkiye was urged to strengthen its operational commitment to cooperation and enhance information exchange with EU law enforcement partners. The Commission also continues to address these issues through bilateral dialogues, including the specialised sub-committee Number 8 3 , that are integral to the EU-Türkiye relationship. Additionally, it remains committed to supporting Türkiye in strengthening its capacities through targeted pre-accession assistance and enhanced cooperation. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35863/st10555-en18.pdf 2 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2024_en 3 Sub-Committee on Customs, Taxation, Drug and Money Laundering (judiciary, fundamental rights and freedoms, home affairs, taxation, customs and financial control).”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2024-12-18 “E-003044/2024 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Council Recommendation on Smoke- and Aerosol-free Environments 1 recommends that Member States extend the coverage of smoke- and aerosol-free policies to indoor areas and key outdoor areas such as recreational spaces for children (public playgrounds), service establishments, public buildings and transport stops and stations. The Council Recommendation is a non-binding instrument and the competence of introducing smoking bans and bans against the use of emerging products in public places, rests with the Member States, at national level. The main objective of the Council Recommendation on Smoke- and Aerosol-Free Environments is to better protect people in the EU from exposure to second-hand smoke and aerosols, especially among children and more vulnerable people, in both indoor and certain outdoor spaces. It also aims to de-normalise and discourage the use of traditional tobacco products and emerging product and reduce nicotine addiction. Prevention, smoking cessation, and awareness-raising campaigns to support the reduction of nicotine addiction are included in the Recommendation as supporting measures to help strengthen smoke- and aerosol-free environments. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/news/commission-proposes-extend-coverage-smoke-free-environments-2024-0917_en#:~:text=The%20revision%20calls%20on%20EU%20countries%20to:%20extend%20the%20coverage”
  EU measures on lifestyle-related behaviours (smoking, drinking, eating, etc.) · Smoking regulation
• 2024-12-17 “E-003003/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The fall of Assad’s regime marks a historic moment for the Syrian people. The EU urges all actors to exercise maximum restraint and avoid any further violence, to ensure the protection of civilians and to uphold international law, including international humanitarian law. Türkiye has a legitimate right to fight against terrorism, in accordance with the rule of law, and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighbouring states. The EU is committed to a Syrian-led, Syrian-owned peaceful and inclusive political transition, for the benefits of all Syrians. The European Council conclusions of 19 December 2024 1 called for full respect for Syria’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within secure borders, in accordance with international law. The EU stands ready to support the new phase in Syria in coordination with regional partners and other actors. The High Representative/VicePresident is in close contact with her counterparts in the region and took the opportunity to underline the EU’s position in international meetings, most recently in Ankara on 24 January 2025, and will continue to do so. The EUR 1 billion allocated to refugee and migration management support in Türkiye in 2024 will be implemented under the instrument for pre-accession (IPA III) and Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI). Contracting and implementation will take place under the supervision of the EU Delegation in Ankara according to the rules and procedures prescribed by the EU’s Financial Regulation 2 and the respective instrument-specific regulations, including the provisions on monitoring, audit and evaluation. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU-Syria relations
• 2024-12-17 “E-003002/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU remains firmly committed to combatting terrorism and enforcing the EU restrictive measures framework. In Syria, where the terrorist threat remains, the EU is in contact with interim authorities and local actors, including civil society, to advocate an inclusive, peaceful, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political transition. These contacts, carefully calibrated, can include members of organisations against whom restrictive measures are adopted by the United Nations Security Council. To revise the justification of these measures is a question for the entire international community. The EU’s autonomous restrictive measures also include humanitarian exceptions to ensure the unimpeded provision of humanitarian aid to people in need. The EU is closely following and cautiously assessing developments in Syria, in close coordination with Member States and international partners. The EU is attentive to the statements and acts of the new transitional authorities. The EU expects concrete actions that will ensure that all Syrian citizens, from all components of society, are protected and fully included in the transition process. All actors in Syria should ensure the protection and uphold the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Syrians, whether believers or non-believers, based on their equal rights as citizens.”
  EU-Syria relations
• 2024-12-06 “E-002807/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission On 19 February 2024, the EU deployed its Naval Force Operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES in the Red Sea, with a mandate to protect ships under attack, to accompany vessels and to reinforce maritime situational awareness, in cooperation with international partners. Between 19 February 2024 and 19 January 2025, EUNAVFOR ASPIDES has contributed to uphold the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and beyond by protecting and monitoring more than 500 merchant vessels and their crews during their transits under missiles and drones threats. In addition, it has established in a record time a network of cooperation with the shipping industry. Over 2024, more than 25 meetings in Brussels and more than 8 trips to the region ensured that the activities of the operation were understood by EU partners and that the defensive posture would fit in the complex regional environment. The diplomatic outreach has facilitated the political regional buy-in, the necessary daily logistics and the informal clearance of ad hoc access to partners’ infrastructures in case of emergency. When the Houthis hit MV Sounion, risking a large oil spill, the European External Action Service reached out to all regional actors to allow the removal of the vessel and avoid a major environmental catastrophe. The Commission provides maritime surveillance and situational awareness services through the integrated maritime services hosted by the EU Maritime Safety Agency. These efforts support the ongoing monitoring of safety, security, and pollution prevention in the affected areas. Additionally, the Commission closely monitors economic impacts, such as increased rerouting costs and reduced traffic to Mediterranean ports and stays in close contact with relevant industry stakeholders.”
  EU relations with Gulf countries · EU-Iran relations
• 2024-12-02 “E-002721/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The fall of Assad’s regime is a historic moment for the extraordinarily resilient Syrian people, who have suffered in their pursuit of dignity, freedom, and justice. EU’s principled and firm approach proved to be right. Now an inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political solution, in the spirit of the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2254 1 , is more urgent than ever. In the Statement of 9 December 2024 2 , the EU ‘urge[d] all actors to avoid any further violence… and urge[d] the protection of members of all minorities, including of Christian and other non-majority confessions.’ On 14 December 2024, in Jordan, the High Representative/Vice-President participated in an international meeting on Syria where Arab countries and other partners agreed on principles of engagement with the new authorities. These included an inclusive political process with UN support, a government representative of all components of society, the build-up of institutions, the fight against Da’esh, accountability for crimes, and respect by all external actors of Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In line with these principles, the EU considers fundamental both the protection of members of all – including ethnic and religious – minorities and their effective inclusion in the political transition. The EU and its partners will continue to fight terrorism and remain committed to supporting the global coalition against Da’esh and other initiatives to counter violent extremism and radicalism. The EU continues to give help and particular attention to the issue of families of foreign terrorist held in camps in Northeast Syria. Türkiye's EU accession talks remain stalled due to democratic and legal setbacks, but the EU values Türkiye as a key partner and seeks progress through constructive cooperation. 1 https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2254.pdf 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/12/09/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-fall-of-the-assad-regime/”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU-Syria relations · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2024-11-20 “E-002602/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission closely monitors the implementation of the Greek Recovery and Resilience Plan, in close contact with the Greek authorities. Only certain specific parts of the Northen Cretan highway are covered by the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF): the construction of the segment from Neapolis to Agios Nikolaos, certain works from the segments from Chania to Heraklion and from Hersonissos to Neapoli. The Commission will assess progress in the context of corresponding payments requests 1 . Cohesion Policy, under the 2021-2027 programme ‘Transport’, co-finances the part of the highway from Chania to Hersonisos (Heraklion). The Commission closely monitors implementation and consults with the national authorities to support its progress. 2. Under the RRF Regulation 2 , if any of the milestones is not satisfactorily fulfilled, the payment of all or part of the financial contribution shall be suspended. If these milestones are not fulfilled within a period of six months from the suspension, the Commission shall reduce the amount of the financial contribution proportionately. If, due to objective circumstances, certain milestones and targets are no longer achievable, either partially or totally, a Member State can request to amend its Recovery and Resilience Plan. Likewise, there is a possibility, upon Member State request, to consider reallocation of funding in the ‘Transport’ programme in case of critical delays in its implementation. 3. The Commission is not in a position to estimate with precision the possible impact of developments related to the Northern Cretan highway on the economic development of Crete, nor on road safety. These questions are best addressed to the responsible authorities at national level. 1 The Greek Recovery and Resilience Plan is available at: https://commission.europa.eu/business-economyeuro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32021R0241”
  EU funding for transportation
• 2024-11-14 “E-002546/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The definition of personal data in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 1 (GDPR) is technologically neutral and broad to prevent creating a serious risk of circumvention of the protection of personal data 2 . Article 4(1) GDPR defines personal data as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’, including an online identifier that identifies the person directly or indirectly. Online identifiers, such as cookies and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, combined with other information may be used to create online profiles of natural persons and identify them 3 . Whether an IP address is personal data within the meaning of Article 4(1) GDPR depends on whether it can be linked to an identified or identifiable natural person. That is not necessarily always the case and depends on the specific circumstances of the case. In that respect, account must be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used to identify the person, looking at all objective factors, such as the cost, the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration available technology 4 . The Court of Justice of the EU found on several occasions that IP addresses constituted personal data because the user of the IP address could be identified by the controller at issue 5 . In the second report of the application of the GDPR 6 , the Commission did not conclude that the definition of personal data should be amended. Regardless of their nature as personal data, where IP addresses are stored or accessed from the user’s terminal equipment, Article 5(3) of Directive 2002/58/EC 7 applies. That provision protects the confidentiality of users’ terminal equipment. It requires consent for the storage of or access to information (both personal and non-personal) stored in the terminal equipment, unless it is carried out for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication or if it is strictly necessary for the provision of an information society service explicitly requested by the user 8 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88. 2 See for more recital 15 GDPR. 3 See for more recital 30 GDPR. 4 See for more recital 26 GDPR. 5 See for example C‑470/21 and C-604/22. 6 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Second Report on the application of the General Data Protection Regulation, COM/2024/357 final. 7 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37–47, see in particular recital 28. 8 See also EDPB, Guidelines 2/2023 on Technical Scope of Art. 5(3) of ePrivacy Directive.”
  GDPR
• 2024-11-14 “E-002545/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Demography Toolbox 1 provides a comprehensive mapping of tools and policy measures to support Member States on demographic change. It aims to reconcile family aspirations with paid work, promote gender equality, empower younger and older generations, and where necessary address labour shortages through legal migration. The effective integration of thirdcountry nationals legally residing in the EU is essential. The European Social Funds Plus is the main EU funding instrument that invests in people and thus helps to address the demographic challenges. It has a total budget of EUR 142 billion. (EU funding and national co-financing) during 2021-2027. It supports measures as access to employment, including for youth and women, access to services, such as long-term care and child care services, and education and skills. Well-managed legal migration can help reducing labour shortages. Migration in itself will not offset demographic decline. In line with the Pact on Migration and Asylum 2 , providing a strong European response to irregular migration and migrant smuggling is an essential part of the comprehensive approach to migration (the EU has launched the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling). The Pact is also establishing a set of new rules for managing migration and establishing a common asylum system at EU level. The new system will address the issue of irregular arrivals of non-EU nationals at the EU external borders. It will set up fast, efficient and streamlined procedures for asylum and return, as well as strong safeguards for the people concerned. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/communication-demographic-change-europe-toolbox-action_en 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en”
  EU competences on demographic policy · Support for families · EU strategy on population growth
• 2024-11-04 “E-002406/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU strongly supports the fundamental aspiration of the people of Iran for a future where their universal human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, protected and fulfilled. The EU has been following the case of student Ahou Daryaei from the beginning and will continue to monitor her situation very closely, also now when she returned to her family without any formal charges having been brought against her. The EU is using every opportunity, both publicly and in direct diplomatic contacts, to call on Iran to ensure respect for women and girls’ rights and to combat all forms of discrimination and violence in public and private life. The Commission promotes inclusion, diversity and unity in the EU. Issues regarding the wearing of religious clothing, such as the hijab, in the public sphere are a matter for Member States, subject to the judicial control by national courts and the European Court of Human Rights.”
  EU-Iran relations · Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2024-10-16 “E-002104/2024 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU-Turkey Statement 1 remains valid and is the main framework of cooperation with Türkiye on migration. Despite challenges, the Statement has produced tangible results leading to a significant decrease of loss of human lives and improving the situation of refugees and migrants in Türkiye. The number of irregular border crossings between Türkiye and the EU has remained consistently and significantly lower than before the EU-Turkey Statement. On 16 October 2023, the Commission presented the EU Action Plan for the Eastern Mediterranean 2 with targeted operational measures aiming at addressing migration management along this route, including Türkiye. The Commission is closely monitoring the situation, including the arrivals to the Greek islands, and is discussing with the Turkish authorities on a regular basis. Total EU assistance allocated to refugees and host communities in Türkiye since 2011 amounts to just under EUR 11 billion (up until and including 2024). This includes support for refugees to meet their basic needs 3 . Projects in the areas of education, health, basic needs and socio-economic support have helped millions of refugees and migrants to have more decent lives, while conditions are not conducive for returns. Funding has been increasingly allocated to migration management and to strengthen Türkiye’s capacity to manage migratory pressure along its borders. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4994 3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/eighth-annual-report-facility-refugees-turkey_en”
  Asylum & border control